palgrave
macmillan

Turkey in the Cold War

Ideology and Culture

Edited by

Cangül Örnek and Çağdaş Üngör



Turkey in the Cold War

This page intentionally left blank

Turkey in the Cold War

Ideology and Culture

Edited by

Cangül Örnek
Assistant Professor, Maltepe University

and

Çağdaş Üngör
Lecturer, Marmara University

palgrave
macmillan

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978-1-137-32668-3

First published 2013 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

ISBN 978-1-349-45990-2 ISBN 978-1-137-32669-0(eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137326690

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.

Contents

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all of our authors, whose invaluable contributions made this project worthwhile. We also received various kinds of assistance and support from our family, friends, and colleagues. Special thanks go to Igor Rodríguez Calderón, Büşra Ersanlı, Günay Göksu Özdoğan, Ahmet Demirel, Ayşegül Sever, Mehmet Mert Sunar, Hivren Demir Atay, Selçuk Esenbel, Yüksel Taşkın, Suna Gülfer Ihlamur, Emre Erşen, and Murat Yeşiltaş.

Cangül Örnek and Çağdaş Üngör

List of Abbreviations

AID	United States Agency for International Development
DISK	The Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu)
DP	Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)
ECA	European Cooperation Agency
IECO	International Economic Cooperation Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IZFAS	İzmir Fair Services Culture and Art Affairs Trade Inc. (İzmir Fuarcılık Hizmetleri Kültür ve Sanat İşleri Tic. A.Ş.)
JP	Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)
METU	Middle Eastern Technical University (Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi)
MP	Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)
MTTB	National Turkish Union of Students (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMP	Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
NOP	National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi)
OWI	Office of War Information
PRA	Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı)
PRC	People's Republic of China
RPNP	Republican Peasants and Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi)
RPP	Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
TDK	Turkish Language Association (Türk Dil Kurumu)
TİİKP	Turkish Revolutionary Party of Workers and Peasants (Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi)
TİP	Labor Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi)
TKP	Communist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Komünist Partisi)
TKZS	Trudovo-Kooperativnote Zmedelsko Stopanstvo (Agricultural Labor Cooperative)

TüSTAV	Social History Research Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı)
UFI	Global Association of the Exhibition Industry
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIE	United States Information and Education
USIS	United States Information Service

Notes on Contributors

Neslişah Leman Başaran is currently a PhD student at Strasbourg University, Unit of Cultures and Societies in Europe (Laboratoire Cultures et Sociétés en Europe) and in Marmara University, Department of Political Science and International Relations. The title of her thesis is 'Business Circles in Istanbul in the 1920s and 1930s and Their Relation to Political Power'. Her areas of interest include the political, social, and economic history of Turkey in the twentieth century; the period of transition from empire to republic; ideologies and intellectuals of the early twentieth century in Turkey; the working-class and labor history of Turkey in the first half of the twentieth century; and the political and social life of Istanbul in the last period of the Ottoman Empire and in the early decades of the Republic.

Sezgi Durgun is a lecturer in political philosophy at the Political Science Department of Marmara University, Istanbul. With a background in philosophy, she channeled her research interests into political science. Her research interests have developed as she analyzed the notions of nationalism, ideology, and culture from the perspective of the philosophy of space. She has published several articles on nationalism, territory, and space. Her doctoral dissertation, which focuses on the concepts of 'homeland' and 'nationalism' within the Turkish nation-building process, was published by İletişim in May 2011 with the title *Memalik-i Şahaneden Vatana* (*From Ottoman Patrimonium to Turkish Republican Homeland*).

Richard Garlitz is an Assistant Professor of History at the University of Tennessee at Martin where he teaches courses on US foreign relations, Middle East history and world history. He received his PhD from Ohio University in 2008 where he studied for six years at the Contemporary History Institute. His dissertation, 'Academic Ambassadors in the Middle East: The University Contract Program in Turkey and Iran, 1950–1970', explores how six American universities provided assistance to all levels of education in Turkey and Iran and assesses the effect that those projects had on US–Turkish and US–Iranian relations. He has co-edited (with Lisa Jarvinen of LaSalle University) *Teaching America to the World: Education and Foreign Relations since 1870* (2012) for which he contributed a chapter titled, 'US University Advisors and Education Modernization in Iran, 1951–1967'.

Çimen Günay-Erkol is an Assistant Professor of Turkish Literature at Ozyegin University, Istanbul. Her expertise lies in testimonial fiction written in and after Turkey's military periods, as well as memoirs and discourses of masculinity in literature. She has published articles on contemporary Turkish literature in journals such as *Journal of European Studies*, *Symposium*, *Journal of Turkish Literature*, and she has recently developed a particular research focus on women writers of different generations and ethnic origins in Turkey. Currently she is leading a research project on women writers in Turkey, nationally funded by TÜBİTAK and supported by ESF as part of a joint research project in Europe, under the auspices of ISCH Action, 'Women Writers in History – Toward a New Understanding of European Literary Culture'.

Doğan Gürpınar teaches at Fatih University, Istanbul. He completed his PhD at Sabancı University. He is the author of *Ulusalcılık* (2011) and *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy* (forthcoming). He was a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University in 2010–11 and is currently working on the emergence of the historical visions of Turkish nationalism in the late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. His articles on Turkish historiographical visions and contemporary Turkish ideologies have appeared in journals such as *Middle Eastern Studies*, *British Journal of Middle East Studies* and the *International Journal of Turkish Studies*.

Dağhan Irak is an independent researcher and a sports writer. He holds a Master's in modern Turkish history from Boğaziçi University. His dissertation entitled 'The Transformation of Football Fandom in Turkey since the 1970s' is a comparison of British and Turkish football scenes in terms of hyper-commodification and social change. He co-authored *Türkiye ve Sosyal Medya* (*Turkey and Social Media*) with Onur Yazıcıoğlu, published by OkuyanUs in 2012. He currently works as a sports columnist for *Evrensel* newspaper. His principal research interests are sociopolitical aspects of sports, sports history, sports fandom, and the media.

Ceren Kenar obtained her MA in sociology from Boğaziçi University. Her thesis was on the politics of *khutbes* and the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs. She is currently a doctoral student at the American University of Beirut. Her research interests include the impact of late Arabic thought on Ottoman intellectuals and the late Ottoman visions on the 'reformation' of Islam.

Burçak Keskin-Kozat is Associate Director of the Sohaib and Sara Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies and the Mediterranean Studies Forum at Stanford University. She received her PhD in sociology from the

University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. Her research interests include issues of modernization, gender, nationalism, and religion in the context of the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.

Cangül Örnek is an assistant professor at Maltepe University, Department of International Relations and European Union. She holds a PhD in international relations from Marmara University. She has been a visiting scholar at the Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies, New York University, and at the Institute for Middle East Studies, George Washington University. She is currently carrying out a research project on the development of Turkish Studies in the US during the Cold War. Her research focuses on the history of ideas, the intellectual history of Turkey and Cold War ideology. She has written on the Americanization of social sciences in Turkey in the post-Second World War era. She received the Association of Turkish Social Sciences' Young Social Scientist Award in 2011.

Gözde Somel is currently a doctoral student in the Department of History at the Middle East Technical University. After concluding her Master's thesis, she spent a year in the Pushkin State Institute of Russian Language in Moscow in order to improve her language skills. Her main areas of research are the history of the Russian Empire, Russian political thought and literature, Ottoman–Russian relations in the nineteenth century and comparative analysis of the demise of the two empires.

Çağdaş Üngör is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Marmara University, Istanbul. She holds a PhD in East Asian History from the State University of New York in Binghamton. Her studies concentrate on Chinese foreign propaganda during the Maoist decades, Turkey's participation in the Korean War and China's influence on Turkish left-wing groups during the 1960s. She is the recipient of the Young Social Scientist Award of 2010, granted by the Association of Turkish Social Sciences.

Introduction
Turkey's Cold War: Global Influences, Local Manifestations

Cangül Örnek and Çağdaş Üngör

A young Turkish boy visiting the İzmir International Fair in the mid-1950s would have found it difficult to choose a favorite between the Soviet pavilion, which displayed a model Sputnik, and the American pavilion, which promised its visitors the sight of the 'magical' TV set. By the late 1960s, he might have faced a similar dilemma upon entering a bookstore in Ankara, where he contemplated buying a 'social realist' novel instead of going to a downtown theatre to see the latest Hollywood movie. In the meantime, his friends might have been gathering at the campus of the Middle East Technical University (METU) – a model Western institution, where the language of instruction is English – to demonstrate against 'American imperialism'. Such dilemmas, needless to say, represent only a tiny fraction of what we, as the editors of this volume, call 'Turkey's Cold War experience'. This volume, which aims to explore the local manifestations of the Cold War struggle in its ideological, social, and cultural dimensions, is inspired by these seemingly contradictory life experiences.

Although Turkey's position and policies during the Cold War have received considerable attention from scholars,[1] much of the available literature concentrates on high politics, that is, Turkey's Cold War diplomacy, military strategy, its bilateral relations, and so on.[2] The ideological and cultural dimensions of Turkey's Cold War experience are largely neglected in this literature, although they are essential to capture the full historical picture and thoroughly understand the interplay between the global and local contexts.[3] Another major flaw in the available literature on 'Turkey in the Cold War' is its excessive preoccupation with Turkey's position in the Western alliance and the developments that occurred on the Turkish–American axis. Although Turkey was not an open battleground, where both Cold War fronts enjoyed equal representation and influence, the sole emphasis on Turkish–American relations overlooks

Turkey's encounters with the Soviet-led 'Eastern bloc'.[4] The available literature on Turkey's Cold War experience, therefore, is biased, both in the thematic and geographical sense. This volume addresses these fundamental shortcomings and attempts to broaden the scope of research on 'Turkey during the Cold War' by drawing on the conceptual tools of the recently emerging 'cultural Cold War' literature.

Since the 1990s, there has been an intensified scholarly effort to examine the social, cultural, and ideological dimensions of the Cold War struggle. The growing literature on the 'cultural Cold War'[5] has opened up new avenues of Cold War historiography, which was previously confined to a narrow strategic perspective. Before the flourishing of this new agenda, the political, economic, and military contests between the capitalist and socialist poles were analyzed as strategic moves in a chess game – as if they could be isolated from their manifestations in the world of discourses, ideas, and ideologies. Exploring the battles for establishing hegemony in the world of ideas, this new literature has shed light on the previously neglected spheres of Cold War confrontations, ranging from artistic creativity to sports encounters. Likewise, movies, books, exhibitions, media, and daily life experiences have assumed new political significance in the Cold War context.

The 'cultural Cold War' has illuminated the cultural milieu of the Cold War and enriched our insight with regard to the struggle between the two clashing worldviews. This literature has not only expanded the range of research topics, but also prompted studies that extend the geographical focus of Cold War scholarship. While the field is still predominantly concerned with developments in the European–American axis or inter-bloc cultural rivalry,[6] this new outlook has also inspired a number of studies that deal with the impact of the Cold War struggle outside Europe and the US. Most recently, East and Southeast Asia,[7] Latin America,[8] and the Middle East[9] have received some attention from historians who examine the social and cultural dynamics of the Cold War era in different localities. Despite the geographical expansion of this new research agenda, however, many issues relating to the Cold War experiences of non-Western countries still remain unexplored or overlooked. In this sense, Turkey is a major case in point. Although this country has been at the center stage of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan – as well as other globally significant policies, which have shaped the larger Cold War environment – Turkey is completely neglected in this new body of literature. *Turkey in the Cold War: Ideology and Culture* aims to address this important gap by bringing the local ramifications of this ideological struggle to global scholarly attention.

The present volume, therefore, serves a twofold purpose. First of all, it locates Turkey on the map of 'cultural Cold War studies' by contributing to the expansion of the geographical horizons of this new scholarship. In this sense, this study will be a partial remedy for this literature's relative neglect of the non-Western world – which is particularly visible in the Middle East region. Second, this volume contributes to the field of Turkish studies by illuminating the previously overlooked dimensions of Turkey's Cold War experience. Shifting the focus to the social, cultural, and ideological dimensions of the Turkish Cold War experience complicates the picture presented in available studies, most of which concentrate on the official realm. Seen through the conventional lens, Turkey was a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member and a committed Western ally. On the economic spectrum, Turkey was a capitalist country, where anti-communism dominated the public discourse and IMF policies shaped important government decisions concerning agriculture and industry. Based on such parameters, therefore, Turkey seems to have been a model Cold War ally. When the focus is shifted to the social realm, however, one can see that Turkey had a highly contested Cold War culture. While it is clear that Hollywood cinema had its fans, the Cold War period witnessed various forms of resistance against American influence in the Turkish cultural sphere – a sentiment shared unequally and for different reasons by the Islamic, nationalist, and leftist circles.

As the above examples suggest, the Cold War struggle substantially altered the ideological positions pursued by the official circles and various social groups in Turkey during the second half of the twentieth century. Therefore, the local experiences associated with the Cold War era need to be properly addressed in order to grasp ideological, social, and cultural dynamics, some of which continue to influence modern-day Turkey. Having said this, one should note that *Turkey in the Cold War* is not a comprehensive volume, which presents a full-fledged analysis of Turkey's Cold War history. Nor does it aim to provide full coverage of all the social, cultural, and intellectual developments that occurred in Turkey during the Cold War years. Whereas this volume does not concentrate on the diplomatic realm, it leaves few of the conventional topics relating to Turkey's Cold War experience (including the Marshall Plan, Korean War, and Cyprus crisis) untouched. Examining the domestic repercussions of these events, this volume aims to provide an alternative reading of the 'Cold War effect' in Turkey and to draw scholarly attention to many of its underemphasized themes, such as literature, exhibitions or sports.

This volume's themes include propaganda and persuasion activities, the making of official and alternative discourses, the cultural/ideological

dimensions of Turkey's international exchanges, the Cold War's impact on Turkish intellectual circles and cultural life, as well as the local ramifications of Western aid and assistance. In particular, *Turkey in the Cold War* aims to provide answers to the following questions:

- What were the manifestations of the major Cold War ideological divisions (US–Soviet, as well as Sino–Soviet) in the Turkish context?
- What was the role of official institutions and pro-establishment intellectuals in disseminating pro-Western/anti-communist ideas?
- How did the Turkish officials, intellectuals, and dissidents respond to American influence in the social, economic, and cultural fields?

An overview of the main domestic and international events that have shaped Turkey's Cold War experience will reveal the relevance and significance of these questions to comprehend modern Turkey.

Turkey's Cold War: Significance and Legacy

When the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, it inherited a contradictory legacy from the Ottoman Empire that was marked by the modernization efforts of the Western model and deep suspicions about the real intentions of European powers. The memories of the Western occupation following the Empire's defeat in the First World War were still fresh. During the 1920s, the founders of the republic focused on domestic priorities and made efforts to improve the poor economic infrastructure in the war-ravaged countryside. Having launched a full-scale Westernization campaign at home, they adopted a status quo approach in foreign policy and dealt with the unresolved issues lingering from the demise of the Ottoman Empire. In the meantime, the oppressive policies of the new regime silenced all kinds of political opposition. By the early 1930s, the authoritarian political tendencies strengthening in Europe after the Great Depression had immediate ramifications for Turkey, resulting in the establishment of the Republican People's Party's (RPP) one-party rule.

Having received political and material support from its northern neighbor during the War of Independence (1919–22), the young Turkish Republic maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The primary area of collaboration was economic planning and industrialization. Yet the RPP leadership followed a hybrid economic track – that is, they made use of Soviet development policies but also benefited from German technical expertise and adopted

Italian labor law, which constituted the legal basis for oppressive labor policies. In the realm of foreign policy, although the Kemalist cadres avoided building a binding alliance with the Western powers, they restored relations with Britain and other countries that had occupied Turkey following the First World War. In domestic politics and the ideological sphere, the pro-Western and anti-communist essence of the new regime has been apparent right from the beginning.

Early signs of deterioration in Turkish–Soviet relations occurred during the Second World War years, when Turkey witnessed the rise of a pro-German, pan-Turkist group composed mostly of Turkish men of letters and émigré intellectuals from the Turkic parts of the Soviet Union. Tolerated by the government and supported by the mainstream media, this group expressed its admiration for Nazi Germany and hatred for the Soviet Union, especially during the military campaign of the German army into Soviet lands. Although Turkey officially preserved a neutral position between Nazi Germany and the Allies,[10] the ideological climate inside the country was heavily influenced by racist and anti-communist propaganda. When the war ended with the victory of the Allied powers, including the Soviet Union and the United States, the members of this group were prosecuted by the Turkish authorities. The case became known as 'Racism–Turanism' (*Irkçılık–Turancılık Davası*). In the end, minor criminal charges were brought against a number of people, including Zeki Velidi Togan, Alparslan Türkeş, Nihal Atsız, and Fethi Tevetoğlu. These people would later become active in the Turkish political scene during the Cold War years, as protagonists of Cold War anti-communism.

While the RPP government had maintained a complicated policy of neutrality during the Second World War, Turkey joined the Allies in 1945, if only as a token gesture. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Soviet demands concerning the Bosphorus Straits and Eastern Anatolian provinces pushed Turkey further away from its northern neighbor. Eager to join the Western bloc, Turkey used this issue as an opportunity to win the support of Britain and the US.[11] The void in Turkey's international affiliation was soon filled by the US government, which sent the SS *Missouri* warship to Istanbul in 1946 and extended Marshall Aid to Turkey in 1948. On the domestic scene, the RPP government fostered a new political climate in the country, which signaled the launch of the Cold War era. The early signs of this ideological shift were the debates surrounding the murder of Sabahattin Ali – a leftist writer – and the imprisonment of the famous communist poet, Nâzım Hikmet. Hikmet's escape to socialist Romania in 1950 was not just the start of his exilic

life in the socialist bloc but also of the sharpening of Cold War ideological battles in Turkey.

Although the RPP leadership was crucial in dictating Turkey's priorities in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, it was the Democrat Party (DP) which shaped the ideological and cultural parameters of Cold War Turkey. Adnan Menderes's Democrats, whose election victory signaled Turkey's transition into a multi-party democracy in 1950, turned the country into a capitalist and anti-communist stronghold in the following decade. The party promoted private enterprise, agricultural modernization in the countryside, and rapid urbanization. The DP government's promises to transform Turkey into a 'little America' with 'a millionaire in every neighborhood' had wide appeal. The cultural symbols of this large-scale change were the highways – which were built with American assistance and technical expertise – as opposed to railroads, which had become associated with one-party rule. In the rural areas, the mechanization of agriculture accelerated by tractors imported from the US as part of the Marshall Plan also caused remarkable social change.

Another turning point in Turkish history came during DP rule with Turkey's admission into NATO in 1952, subsequent to the country's participation in the Korean War under UN command. This decision solidified Turkey's geopolitical position and made the country an active partner in the organizational structure of the Cold War. During the early 1950s, the general atmosphere in Turkey was very much in favor of the US. In these years the early signs of American hegemony in Turkish popular culture became visible. A typical example was Celal İnce's song praising the Turkish–American friendship, which could be heard in football stadiums or in the *Voice of America*'s Turkish broadcasts.[12] In the meantime, Grace Kelly hairstyles and nylon stockings became quite fashionable among urban women. Likewise, American novels and *Bütün Dünya* – a local magazine that published large excerpts from *Reader's Digest* – became available to Turkish readers.

US influence in the cultural realm was hardly limited to popular culture. A more subtle process was the emergence of a new generation of young people with an Anglo-Saxon orientation, which would reshape Turkish political and social life in the coming decades.[13] For a long time, Robert College in Istanbul had been the leading American educational institution in Turkey. Beginning in the late 1950s through to the 1960s, the Turkish university system gradually adapted to the American model. Furthermore, a number of universities, including Middle Eastern Technical University in Ankara and Atatürk University in Erzurum, were

founded by American assistance. In parallel with a global trend, the US became the new destination for university education, as well as academic and professional training. In the following decades, thousands of young Turkish people benefited from the American governments' exchange programs and visited the US. This new generation gradually replaced the previous elites who received their degrees from French or German universities, spoke French or German, and enjoyed European culture.

Throughout the 1950s, the Turkish–American alliance had few domestic critics – and those few were mostly confined to leftist intellectual circles. Under these circumstances, the DP government easily labeled any criticism against US policies either as a 'Soviet plot' or a sign of betrayal of the Turkish–American friendship.[14] The government's intolerance for dissident views hit a new low after the DP's third election victory in 1957. While anti-communism continued to dominate the public discourse, the government-sanctioned censorship measures now targeted even moderate journalists and university professors. The government's heavy hand on the national press led some to tune-in to *Bizim Radyo*, a Turkish Communist Party organ whose clandestine radio broadcasts from the neighboring socialist countries proved to be one of the earliest cracks in official propaganda.[15]

The censorship measures, combined with the economic hardship of the late 1950s, rendered Menderes an unsympathetic political leader in the eyes of the educated elite. In this fragile atmosphere, the ideological alliance of the urban middle classes around the main opposition party (RPP) and the army resulted in the first military coup of the republic's history. While the leaders of the 27 May 1960 coup executed Adnan Menderes and the top leaders of the Democrat Party, they immediately assured the US government that Turkey would continue to cherish its international obligations, including its membership of the Central Treaty Organization and NATO. Turkey's official Cold War position was therefore hardly affected by this abrupt political change. The same incident, nevertheless, completely transformed the social atmosphere in Turkey and reshaped the country's Cold War culture – which would become an increasingly contested one during the 1960s.[16]

Following the promulgation of the 1961 constitution, which introduced many new civil and political liberties, Turkey witnessed the flourishing of civil associations and left-wing political organizations – among them the influential Labor Party of Turkey (TİP). This era also opened a new phase in the trade union movement. The Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DISK), founded by leftist trade unionists in 1967, fiercely

challenged Türk-İş, the pro-government labor confederation that had advocated American-style 'free unionism' since the early 1950s.

As Turkey underwent this process of intense social and political transformation, new conflicts emerged in the intellectual and cultural sphere. In the relatively liberal atmosphere of the 1960s, translations of the previously banned Marxist classics became popular. Likewise, the left-wing literary circles engaged in a discussion with the socialists of Western and Eastern Europe on the merits of 'socialist realism'. Meanwhile, rock 'n' roll music found many fans among the urban youth. While the nationalist and religiously conservative circles in Turkey remained largely untouched by these cultural influences, they nevertheless engaged in various publication activities to propagate their own vision of Turkey. The alliance between the nationalist and Islamic circles, which would ultimately result in the 'Turkish–Islamic synthesis' of later decades, was being molded in the 1960s around local Associations for Fighting Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*). While the nationalists legitimized their position by accusing Moscow of plots against Turkey, the Islamic groups embraced 'national and sacred values' against 'godless communism'.[17]

During the 1960s, Cold War cultural and ideological clashes were no longer confined to a narrow intellectual sphere. Foreign policy issues and international developments were discussed by wider sections of society and were made manifest in people's daily lives. Although the US continued to exert influence in the cultural sphere, it was in this period that Turkey also saw the rise of anti-American sentiment. This was partly related to international developments that had placed Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy under closer scrutiny. A major example was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the Kennedy administration used the Jupiter missiles located in Turkey as a bargaining chip to soothe its Soviet counterpart. As the missiles were removed from Turkish soil without consulting the local authorities, this incident raised questions on the very nature of the Turkish–American alliance.[18] Two years later, another major crisis was triggered by inter-communal violence in Cyprus, a Mediterranean island off the Turkish coast that was inhabited by Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In 1964, the US administration's involvement in the Cyprus question discouraged Turkey from acting on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. President Lyndon Johnson's letter to Ismet Inonu, which threatened repercussions lest Turkey resorted to unilateral military action, caused a major uproar in the country. In the following years, the 'Johnson Letter' would become an important reference point for those who embraced anti-American sentiments.

Another fundamental discussion during the 1960s, and partly the 1970s, concerned Turkey's economic development. During the Marshall Plan years, the Turkish economy had been plagued by high rates of inflation and external debt. In the post-1960 era, Turkish intellectuals, influenced by the development debates and initiatives in the international sphere, such as the Bandung Conference, started to seek an alternative 'third way'. While protectionist policies gained currency in Turkey, as in the rest of the capitalist world, some circles advocated a state-led planning model as the only way out of the country's economic problems. Nationalization, which became the hallmark of development debates all around the non-Western world, was promoted in Turkey as well, as a remedy for the country's 'underdevelopment'. In fact, development debates harbored two approaches based on two conflicting models: of socialist planning and of capitalist development. While the leftist and left Kemalist intellectuals advocated the former, Turkey's conservative technocrats – assisted by American experts from the late 1950s onwards – implemented the latter model in Turkey.

In domestic politics, Süleyman Demirel's Justice Party (JP) – the immediate successor of the Democrat Party – became the dominant actor with its election victories in 1965 and 1969. Unlike the Democrats of the 1950s, however, JP rule had to face severe domestic challenges. By 1968, the Demirel government was overwhelmed by the surging leftist movement, which demanded radical transformations in Turkey, such as deviation from the country's capitalist economy or its alliance with the Western bloc. Inspired by student protests in the European metropolises, these left-wing students embraced anti-imperialist ideology as well as Third World-centric sentiments. A major influence was the guerilla movement in Latin America against pro-American governments and CIA-led paramilitary groups. Other global Cold War antagonisms also had immediate repercussions in the Turkish context. The deterioration in Soviet–Chinese relations, for instance, was closely followed by the rise of Turkish leftists in the late 1960s. The Sino–Soviet ideological split eventually led to the emergence of pro-China groups in Turkey, which represents one of the earliest divisions within the Turkish left.

In the final years of the 1960s, Turkish public opinion was dominated by anti-American student demonstrations and a radicalized labor movement. At Middle East Technical University, students set the US ambassador's car on fire during his visit to the campus. A number of leftist youth groups resorted to arms, kidnapped the Israeli ambassador to Turkey, and clashed with the security forces. In 1971, a right-wing army clique's

dissatisfaction with civilian measures to curb these events resulted in a military coup against the JP government. The so-called 'March 12 Intervention' was accompanied by numerous arrests, especially of left-wing journalists, authors, student militants, and university professors. Shortly after the coup, Bülent Ecevit's RPP gained new ascendancy in domestic politics as the 'left-of-center' party.[19] In 1974, the coalition government led by the RPP issued a general amnesty, which released all political prisoners. In the same year, the Ecevit government launched a military operation in Cyprus and divided the island along its north–south axis. While the 'Cyprus intervention' enjoyed much popularity at home, it strained Turkey's relations with Western powers.

In the second half of the 1970s, the international repercussions of Turkey's continued military presence in North Cyprus, together with the impact of the global oil crisis, depleted the country's foreign exchange reserves. The financial crisis, which jeopardized the already fragile Turkish economy, was matched by the paralyzed state of the Turkish political scene. While the parliament proved unable to elect a president, the ideological struggle between the opposing camps took a violent turn. By the late 1970s, Turkish nationalists and Muslim conservatives had already solidified their alliance against the rising leftist movement. The organization of right-wing paramilitary groups, which would later gain the notorious label *Turkish Gladio*, had a substantial role in intensifying the so-called 'anarchy'.[20] Their activities paved the way for military intervention in 1980.

The violence culminated in the second half of the 1970s. On 1 May 1977, 36 workers were killed in Taksim Square, an incident commonly known as 'Bloody May Day'. Most of the workers lost their lives in the panic created by sniper shootings coming from the surrounding buildings. In December 1978, another massacre took place, this time of the Alevis living in Kahramanmaraş, a city located in southeast Anatolia. The Alevi population became the target of rightist paramilitaries because of their allegedly 'heretical' belief system and leftist political orientation. Over 100 Alevis were killed in Kahramanmaraş in a series of incidents that lasted for days. This was followed by the 'Çorum Massacre' of July 1980, resulting in 50 causalities among the city's Alevi population. Aside from these organized massacres, which were conducted by the *Turkish Gladio*, the newspapers of the time reported daily shootings in the streets, assassinations of university professors, intellectuals, and trade unionists. The attacks fueled student boycotts at high schools and universities, labor strikes, street protests that were met with further violence or measures such as strikebreaking, lockouts, and so on. During

the last summer before the military coup, the country had obviously descended into a severe political and economic turmoil.

Turkey thus entered the last decade of the Cold War with a completely dysfunctional democratic system. The bloodbath that had characterized the final years of the 1970s would be cited numerous times in the coming decades, chiefly to justify the military coup that overthrew the Demirel government on 12 September 1980. While the military leaders once again felt it necessary to swear allegiance to Turkey's international obligations (i.e. NATO), the political intentions of the coup leaders were hardly surprising to the US government.[21] The implicit American support for the military intervention became much clearer as the coup leaders reshaped Turkish political and social life in subsequent years. Although the coup initially targeted militants from both sides of the ideological spectrum, the official ideology of the post-1980 era – commonly known as the 'Turkish–Islamic synthesis' – proved to be in continuity with the anti-communist discourse promoted in Turkey since the early Cold War years. Following the promulgation of the 1982 constitution, which severely limited civil and political liberties, the 'Turkish–Islamic synthesis' came to dominate the educational curricula, as well as other aspects of social life in Turkey.

With the former political leaders remaining imprisoned, Turgut Özal's newly established Motherland Party (MP) seized the opportunity to lead Turkey into a neoliberal path in the early 1980s. Advocated at the time by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, this new economic mindset signified a shift from import substitution to export-oriented policies, as well as privatization of government industries. Funded by substantial IMF loans, MP's economic policies resulted in high levels of inflation and an ever-growing income disparity in Turkey. On the cultural spectrum, Turkey was gradually transformed into a consumption society – a process symbolized by the opening of the first McDonalds restaurant in Turkey in 1986. With few cultural critics and political outlets to divert attention and a severe restriction of student organization on campuses,[22] Turkish youth turned to mass culture, including TV shows, football, and pop music. This new popular culture was the equivalent of the 'American dream' in the Turkish context, since it articulated the opportunities provided by capitalism to move up in society.

The end of the Cold War therefore came to Turkey sooner than the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. When the Soviet Union started to disintegrate, there were few people left in the Turkish public sphere to lament for its demise. The right-wing circles, neoliberal intellectuals – composed mainly of professionals in the media and advertisement sector – as well

as the new bourgeoisie which benefited from neoliberal policies, all celebrated the victory of the capitalist bloc over the socialist.

Outline of the Volume

Turkey in the Cold War examines Turkey's Cold War experience around three major themes: (I) Propaganda and Discourse, (II) Culture and Sport, and (III) Foreign Aid and Assistance.

Part I lays down the parameters of the Cold War ideological climate in Turkey by focusing on the themes of propaganda, public opinion, and discourse. Based on an examination of official and popular media produced and consumed by different groups, these essays shed light on the making of official (i.e. anti-communist) and alternative discourses.

Kenar and Gürpınar focus on the interplay between the Turkish official ideology and Islamic sentiment in the late 1970s. The authors examine the content of the widely disseminated Friday sermons (*hutbes*) issued by the Presidency of Religious Affairs amidst the rise of ideological militancy in Turkey. While the essay refrains from reducing the Presidency to an official ideological instrument, it demonstrates various instances when the Islamic scholars' views overlapped with the Kemalist state agenda. Focusing on an unconventional yet important means of persuasion in Cold War Turkey, the essay scrutinizes Friday sermons and their fierce attack on left-wing ideologies in the years leading to the 1980 military coup.

Focusing on another discursive aspect of Cold War Turkey, Üngör examines how the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–69) was appropriated by opposing ideological camps. Üngör uses the Cultural Revolution as a case to demonstrate the inner divisions within Turkish public opinion. In the late 1960s, news on "Red China" presented an opportunity for mainstream intellectuals to reinforce their anti-communist positions, while left-wing groups embraced Mao's radical egalitarianism. As it placed the Sino–Soviet split on Turkey's agenda, the Cultural Revolution also had a divisive impact on the Turkish left – a case which demonstrates that Cold War developments had immediate ramifications for the Turkish context.

The third essay of the section concentrates on the İzmir International Fair, which has become a microcosm of American and Soviet propaganda activities in Turkey after the Second World War. Durgun focuses on several instances of superpower competition at the exhibition and examines the larger Cold War rivalries through the American and Soviet displays of technological progress, economic development, and

ideological superiority. The author elaborates on the İzmir Fair's transformation from an arena of American hegemony in the 1950s to a contested ideological space during the mid-1960s. As İzmir Fair was one of the few locations where the Turkish public experienced Cold War propaganda at work, Durgun is able to present several examples as to how its visitors responded to propaganda.

In the section's final essay, Somel and Başaran focus on the individual case of Nâzım Hikmet – a globally known Turkish poet – to examine his role in the propaganda and persuasion mechanisms of the early Cold War era. Based on new archival evidence, this essay examines Hikmet's trip to Bulgaria in 1951, which aimed to win the hearts and minds of the Turkish community there, many of whom had fled to Turkey. Assisted by communist officials, Hikmet visited many towns and villages where he communicated with Bulgarian Turks and offered solutions to facilitate Turks' integration into the communist system. The details of Hikmet's trip – which remain largely obscure in the available studies – shed light on the poet's underemphasized role as an 'engaged intellectual' during the 1950s and demonstrate how Turkish intellectuals became active agents in the Cold War ideological struggle.

Part II deals with the impact of the Cold War ideological climate on Turkish culture. Focusing on exemplary literary works, translation activities, and sports exchanges, this section sheds important light on the cultural scene in Turkey during the Cold War. The section is launched with Günay-Erkol's essay, which gives a panoramic view of Turkish prose and poetry from 1945 until the 1980s. The essay examines how Turkish writers from different political and cultural backgrounds dealt with the larger issues of ideology and identity during the Cold War years, all with an aim to display the dynamic relationship between the local and international contexts. The author places emphasis on the changes brought to the literary scene by the military interventions of 1960, 1971, and 1980 in Turkey, as well as globally significant events, such as the Korean War, the surge of 'socialist realist' literature, or the '68 student movement.

Another important contribution is made by Örnek, who deals with the spread and influence of American literary works in Turkey during the 1950s. The author examines the Turkish literary scene at a time when American novels became a cultural attraction, thanks partly to the efforts of US diplomats but mostly to the local publishers who promoted an American lifestyle in the years following the launch of the Marshall Plan. The essay discusses the intense translation effort pioneered by the Varlık publication house, public debates on the merits of

American literature vis-à-vis the French, as well as the mixed reception of American novels by different segments of the Turkish intelligentsia.

Irak's essay focuses on Turkish sports diplomacy in the early Cold War years, particularly on the 'friendly' football games. The DP government, Irak argues, successfully utilized sports diplomacy as a means to propagate the country's new commitment to the US-led Western alliance. The 'friendly' games played by various Turkish teams against their Western/pro-Western counterparts in the 1950s became manifestations of national pride as well as ideological comradeship. Turkish football audiences, however, were not always easy to win over. The most significant challenge in this sense was the case of Greece, another NATO member, which was at odds with Turkey over the Cyprus issue during the mid-1950s. While the political elites in Turkey pushed for more 'friendly' games with Greece, Turkish fans showed resentment – resulting in occasional eruptions of violence.

Part III deals with issues of foreign aid and assistance in the Turkish context. These essays acknowledge the role of the US government and Western bloc organizations in shaping Cold War Turkey, without employing a top-down approach that reduces the recipient party to a passive actor. Garlitz's essay, for instance, deals with the land-grant university scheme implemented at Atatürk University in Erzurum – albeit with limited success. Aimed at facilitating agricultural modernization in the rural areas, this project was initiated by the US government in coordination with the University of Nebraska. Soon after its launch in 1954, however, it was understood that the project would be difficult to implement – due to Turkish scholars and students' unfamiliarity with the American educational system, cultural misunderstandings, as well as ideological hostilities, all of which came to the fore by the mid-1960s.

Keskin-Kozat's contribution likewise displays the complexities of the negotiation process between Turkish and American officials during the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Turkey. The essay complicates the conventional donor–recipient relationship by elaborating on the divergence of opinion between the US State Department and the European Cooperation Agency (ECA), which acted as the Marshall Aid authority. Keskin-Kozat argues that the Turkish political actors were able to exploit these differences, as well as the larger geopolitical context, in order to maximize their interests during 1948–52.

Notes

1. See, for instance, M. Bilgin (2007) *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era* (London: Tauris Academic); S. Seydi

(2006) 'Making a Cold War in the Near East: Turkey and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1947', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 17, no. 1, pp. 113–41; S. Rizas (2009) 'Managing a Conflict between Allies: United States Policy towards Greece and Turkey in Relation to the Aegean Dispute, 1974–76', *Cold War History*, 9, no. 3, pp. 367–87; B.R. Kuniholm (1994) *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece* (Chichester: Princeton University Press); B. Kayaoğlu (2009) 'Cold War in the Aegean Strategic Imperatives, Democratic Rhetoric: The United States and Turkey, 1945–1952', *Cold War History*, 9, no. 3, August, 321–45; G.C. McGhee (1990) *The US–Turkish–NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets* (Basingstoke: Macmillan); E. Athanassopoulou (1999) *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests 1945–1952: The First Enlargement of NATO* (London: Frank Cass); A. Sever (1997) *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Orta Doğu 1945–1958* (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları).

2. Some other notable studies touch upon the Cold War period only in passing as they examine the Turkish foreign policy over a longer time span. William Hale's (2000) *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000* (London and New York: Frank Cass) is one such example. Similarly, Nasuh Uslu's (2003) *The Turkish–American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance* (New York: Nova Science) provides an overview of Turkish–American relations, with chapters on military alliance and case studies like the Cuban Missile Crisis and Cyprus. Likewise, Baskın Oran's (2001) *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar 1919–1980* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları), a two-volume overview of Turkish foreign policy, devotes considerable attention to Turkey's position vis-à-vis the Western and socialist blocs during the Cold War.
3. An exceptional study is *Turkish–American Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830–1989* (Cambridge: Scholars), edited by Nur Bilge Criss, Selçuk Esenbel, Tony Greenwood and Louis Mazzari (2011). This is the only available study that partly deals with the cultural aspects of the Turkish–American relationship. While the book offers some insight on the cultural aspects of the bilateral relations in the Cold War context, it lacks a clear-cut Cold War focus. As a trajectory of an alliance since the Ottoman–American encounter, the book is another important contribution to the literature on the history of Turkish–American relations that covers cultural as well as political interactions.
4. For an exception, See B. Gökay (2006) *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920–1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism* (New York: Routledge). A recent monograph by Jamil Hasanlı is another rare example which draws on new archival documents and discusses Turkey's Cold War history from the angle of Soviet–Turkish relations. Furthermore, Hasanlı connects the early Cold War years of this controversial neighborhood to a global level of analysis and argues that Soviet–Turkish relationship was of particular importance in terms of giving an impetus to the Cold War era. Although it has a non-conventional geographical concentration, Hasanlı still approaches his case through strategic lenses and puts emphasis on Stalin's leadership to explain the course of developments. See J. Hasanlı (2011) *Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945–1953* (Maryland: Lexington Books).
5. The phrase 'Cultural Cold War' derives from the title of Frances Stonor Saunders's path-breaking study. See F.S. Saunders (1999) *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: New Press).

6. Notable examples include Y. Richmond (2003) *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press); H. Krabbendam and G. Scott-Smith (2004) *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–60* (London: Frank Cass); p. Major (2004) *Across the Blocs: Exploring Comparative Cold War Cultural and Social History* (Portland: Frank Cass); M.J. Medhurst (2000) *Critical Reflections On the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*, Presidential Rhetoric Series, no. 2 (Texas A&M University Press); U.G. Poiger (2000) *Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press); C.G. Appy (ed.) (2000) *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945–1966* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press); J. Fousek (2000) *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press); D. Seed (1999) *American Science Fiction and the Cold War* (Edinburgh University Press); M. Carroll (2003) *Music and Ideology in Cold War Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press); T. Shaw (2007) *Hollywood's Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press); S. Lucas (1999) *Freedom's War*: *The US Crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945–56* (Manchester University Press).
7. See W. Wongsurawat (2009) *Dynamics of the Cold War in Asia: Ideology, Identity, and Culture* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan); Yangwen Z., Hong L., and M. Szonyi (2010) *The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (Leiden and Boston: Brill); T. Day and M.H. T. Liem (2010), *Cultures at War: The Cold War and Cultural Expression in Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications); C. Saeki (2007) *US Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan: Promoting Democracy 1948–1960* (Lewiston, Queenston, and Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press); C. Forslund (2002) *Anna Chennaut: Informal Diplomacy and Asian Relations* (Wilmington, DL: SR Books.)
8. See J. Franco (2002) *The Decline and Fall of the Lettered City: Latin America in the Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press); G.M. Joseph (2008) *In from the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War* (Durham: Duke University Press).
9. See, J.R. Vaughan (2005) *Unconquerable Minds: The Failure of American British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945–1957* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan); M. McAlister (2001) *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
10. For a detailed study on Turkey's war-time foreign policy, see S. Deringil (1989) *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality* (Cambridge University Press).
11. In those days, the US did not consider this issue alarming enough to take urgent action. See F. Ahmad (1977) *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), p. 337.
12. See M.Ö. Alkan (2003), 'Kore'de Birleşen, Kıbrıs'ta Ayrılan Yollar: Türkiye'de Amerikan İmajının Değişimi (1945–1980)', *Toplumsal Tarih*, 118, October, pp. 54–5.
13. The political leaders who governed the country during the turbulent Cold War years also belonged to this new generation. Süleyman Demirel, who was without doubt one of the key leaders in Turkish politics, started his professional career as an engineer in the development projects. Before

running for the JP leadership, he received engineering training in the US and became the representative of the Morrison construction company in Turkey. Bülent Ecevit, who rose to the RPP leadership in 1972 and served as prime minister during the critical days of the ideological clashes in Turkey, was a graduate of the American Robert College. Before pursuing a career as a politician, he was admitted into an exchange program to study journalism in the US. Turgut Özal was a technocrat known for his conservative views. In the early years of his career as a state employee he went to the US to participate in a training program in electrical engineering. After he returned from the US, he worked in close collaboration with American experts in large-scale development projects.

14. Starting from the post-Second World War years, the left-wing circles were severely condemned for such efforts. The suppression of criticisms reached a climax in the 1950s, when it became almost impossible to hear any negative statements on Turkish–American relations. For instance, after Mehmet Ali Aybar published his criticisms of American aid and the US warship *Missouri*'s Istanbul visit in the newspaper *Zincirli Hürriyet*, a nationalist crowd attacked the newspaper's printing facilities. Aybar was later sentenced to prison because of the views he had expressed in the newspaper. Barışseverler Cemiyeti (The Peace Association) faced a similar fate after it distributed leaflets protesting the Korean War. The Association got banned and its members, including its president Behice Boran, received prison sentences.
15. See G. Zileli (2000) *Yarılma (1954–1972)* (Istanbul: Ozan Yayıncılık), p. 62.
16. The coup was welcomed by the urban educated class in Turkey, including those in left-wing circles. Until 1980, 27 May was officially celebrated as the 'festival of liberty and constitution'. The coup also gave later generations of Turkish leftists the false hope that the army could be utilized in a revolutionary struggle. On the political scene, the DP legacy influenced the next generation of right-wing political parties (among them, the Justice Party and Motherland Party) which dominated domestic politics in the rest of the Cold War years.
17. Following a long period of silence under single-party rule, Islam had regained significance in Turkish political and cultural life by the early 1950s. While Kemalists initially accused the Soviet Union and local communists of conspiring to instigate the religious revival in Turkey, the Islamic circles eventually proved to be an ally in the country's struggle against communism.
18. See E.J. Zürcher (2004) *Turkey: A Modern History* (New York: I.B. Tauris), p. 274.
19. By the mid-1960s, following Bulent Ecevit's rise to the party leadership, the RPP ideology moved towards the left side of the political spectrum, although nationalism remained one of its key features.
20. Cadres recruited primarily from *ülkücü* paramilitaries linked to the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) played an important part in accelerating the violence. *Turkish Gladio* was not an exception. Such organizations were common in other countries that experienced fierce ideological struggles during the Cold War years. For an elaborate study with a chapter on Turkey, see D. Ganser (2005) *NATO's Secret Armies, Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe* (London and New York: Frank Cass).
21. The facts disclosed on the coup revealed that Turkish officers acted in close coordination with their American diplomatic and military counterparts. It is

also argued that a secret message sent to Washington DC just after the coup read, 'Our boys have done it.' See M.A. Birand (1985) *12 Eylül: Saat 04:00* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları), p. 1.

22. Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu (Higher Education Board), founded by the 1982 Constitution after the military coup, was primarily responsible for the suppression of student activism. The council dismissed more than 70 university professors for political reasons.

Select Bibliography

Ahmad, F. (1977) *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Alkan, M.Ö. (2003) 'Kore'de Birleşen, Kıbrıs'ta Ayrılan Yollar: Türkiye'de Amerikan İmajının Değişimi (1945–1980)', *Toplumsal Tarih*, 118, October, pp. 54–5.

Birand, M.A. (1985) *12 Eylül: Saat 04:00*. Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları.

Deringil, S. (1989) *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality*. Cambridge University Press.

Ganser, D. (2005) *NATO's Secret Armies, Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe*. London and New York: Frank Cass.

Saunders, F.S. (1999) *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*. New York: New Press.

Zileli, G. (2000) *Yarılma (1954–1972)*. Istanbul: Ozan Yayıncılık.

Zürcher, E.J. (2004) *Turkey: A Modern History*. New York: I.B. Tauris.

Part I
Propoganda and Discourse

1

Cold War in the Pulpit: The Presidency of Religious Affairs and Sermons during the Time of Anarchy and Communist Threat

Ceren Kenar and Doğan Gürpınar

This study investigates the use of religion during the Cold War by the Turkish state via the Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*), the state agency that is responsible for regulating and monitoring the conduct of religious services (in mosques and elsewhere), as well as for the imposition of 'proper Islam'. This essay examines sermons delivered during Friday prayers (*khutba* in Arabic, *hutbe* in Turkish) which were sanctioned by the Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA) and recited from pulpits throughout the country in addition to articles published in various PRA periodicals that the PRA distributed primarily to train and inform imams (clerics, prayer leaders) and circulated in cities, towns, and thousands of villages across the country. The essay specifically examines sermons[1] in the late 1970s on the eve of the 1980 coup when Islamic anti-communism was at its zenith. Before 1980, imams were *de jure* free to prepare their own sermons due to certain legal loopholes. However, the PRA provided imams with sermons, which were supposed to be used as models, even if these model sermons were not expected to be read verbatim. These model sermons were distributed via the PRA's periodicals, first and foremost *Diyanet Gazetesi* (*PRA Journal*) in the late 1970s during the cultural Second Cold War in Turkey.

This essay also discusses the repercussions of the invasion of Afghanistan as demonstrated in the journal of the PRA since this incursion propelled Cold Warriorism merged with Islamic vigilance. Rather than investigating Islamic and Islamist anti-communism, this essay examines the campaign launched by the PRA and its employment of Islamic motifs to garner obedience to the (secular) state. It also examines the intersection of the agendas of the Kemalist national security

establishment with an Islamic consciousness against the common foe as consummately embodied in the discourses of the PRA.

Introduction: The Changing Face of Cold War Culture and Anti-Communism in Turkey

In the first two decades of the Cold War, Kemalism, which had strictly excluded any public expression of Islam from legitimate politics, assumed the anti-communist Cold War line in Turkey (in contradistinction to the conservative and religious overtones of the culture of Cold war in the United States).[2] It was the 'civil religion' of Turkey.[3] Remarkably, the attributes of religion in the United States were assumed by Kemalism. Kemalism (as a secular and civic religion for many) was seen as constituting the pivot of the social and moral universe of the nation, particularly for the middle classes and bureaucratic-military establishment in Turkey. The war on communism was waged in Turkey under the aegis of Kemalism. The values espoused by Kemalism were juxtaposed against subversive communism.

This culture of the Cold War prevailed in Turkey until the mid-1960s. This conformist political culture perceived any political diversion (and tilt either to the right or the left) as inherently treacherous and hazardous to the moral order of the mainstream. This centrism perceived both right-wing Islamic politics and socialism as abhorrent and offensive to the values embodied by the Kemalist republic and its values. Although religion emerged as a bulwark against communism in the minds of arch-secularist Kemalists as early as the late 1940s – simultaneously with the rise of McCarthyism, which was concerned that republican radicalism may bring about unintended Communist infiltration – public references to religion were viewed with suspicion. Nevertheless, these attitudes changed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By the mid-1960s, a new (and antagonistic) political culture surged both at the right and left wing of the political spectrum. It was also the time when the Cold War consensus shattered, not unlike the transformation of the political culture of the United States in the 'long sixties' and the surge of the counter-culture.[4] The simultaneous emergence and surge of the left and the right, which were dissociated from their center-left and center-right bases, transformed the political climate.

Certainly, this was a new political climate, ushered in by the relatively progressive 1961 Constitution, in which the center could no longer hold (both on the right and on the left). In this polarized political climate, the left and the right emerged claiming to be antithetical and

in juxtaposition to each other rather than replicating and adapting the supposedly universal ideologies of Western Europe. In the second half of the 1960s, the staunchly Kemalist youth gradually tilted to the left and to a newly imagined 'progressive Kemalism', which gradually transformed into socialism. During this period, socialism became the dominant political allegiance among youth, especially on university campuses. It was so much so that voting for the center-right Justice Party (JP) and adhering to a rightist worldview was regarded as a disgrace tantamount to treason.[5] This nascent socialism was molded within the ideology of Kemalism, upholding its enlightened premises and its rancor toward religion.[6]

This shift created its nemesis on the right. In fact, arguably the Turkish right-wing dispositions (as they began to disassociate from the Turkish center-right) were created as a mirror image of the Turkish left. Although previously the Islamic-inspired nationalists could be marginalized by the center-right governments, as in the case of the closure of the controversial Turkish Nationalists Association in 1953,[7] this was no longer tenable. Concomitant with the rupture of the youth from the RPP and Kemalism tilting toward socialism and mocking the political centrism of their parents, the sons of the voters of the JP in the countryside also broke from the JP. As a member of this generation recalls, 'We perceived the [Justice] Party as Masonic, an imitator of the West and cosmopolitan.'[8] The center-right JP, which had successfully overwhelmed the center of the political spectrum with the enormous turnouts it enjoyed in the elections (53 percent in 1965, 47 percent in 1969), began to lose its grip and its monopoly on the right of the political spectrum.[9] The minor right-wing Republican Peasants and Nation Party (RPNP) was renamed the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) after the election of Alpaslan Türkeş as the chairman in 1965, and was transformed from a conservative agrarian-populist party to a radical nationalist party. Simultaneously, a new party with an Islamist orientation, the National Order Party (NOP), was founded in 1970 by those who no longer wanted to be affiliated with the centrist and pragmatic JP but sought an exclusively Islamic political orientation.[10] Furthermore, those who were perturbed by the internationalist commitments of Süleyman Demirel, the powerful chairman of the JP, quit the party to found a new Democrat Party (DP), slightly tilted to the right of the party. They invoked a populist discourse imbued with the conservative values of the constituency of the JP. Disturbed with the surge of right-wing tendencies within the party, the JP ousted well-known right-wing ideologues who used to be affiliated with the party. Well-known right-wing deputies of the JP,

such as Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, the author of many books and pamphlets inciting the sentiments of the conservatives, and Osman Turan, the eminent conservative historian, intellectual, and ideologue, were expelled from the party. The right wing of the party under the leadership of Sadettin Bilgiç, who lost the party congress to Demirel, was also driven out from the commanding heights of the party. Nevertheless, in the 1970s, the centrist DP was forced to endorse a right-wing political stance and establish a 'National Front' with the political parties to its right against the perceived leftist threat. The center-right consensus established against the left crumbled and its center of gravity shifted to the right.

The right as a political outlook unfettered by the centrist JP was clearly on the ascendancy. The mushrooming Organization for Combating Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*), with overt Islamic overtones,[11] was heavily active in anti-Communist vigilance in the 1960s, most likely encouraged by the Turkish para-state.[12] The National Turkish Union of Students (MTTB, Milli Türk Talebe Birliği) was taken over by conservative and right-wing students in 1967 with the election of İsmail Kahraman (future minister from the Islamist Welfare Party [Refah Partisi] in 1996–97).[13] The student union declared 'Zionists, Communists, and Masons' as its foremost foes. However, its main ideological thrust was its staunch and uncompromising anti-communism, which associated communism with every kind of vice, moral corruption, and cosmopolitanism. The Turkish rightist discourse was arguably crafted in the mirror image of the pervasive Communist threat, which was tantamount to immorality, social degeneration, materialism, and atheism.[14] The Turkish right exploited the prevailing clichés regarding the Turkish left and communism. A new publication industry boomed with the publication of anti-Communist books (many of which were translations from English and French) printed in the thousands. These works were distributed gratis by state publication houses in addition to a private supply of volumes written by alarmed anti-Communists, who devoted themselves to exposing the ominous, dark face of the socialists and the left.[15] Leftists were not to be reproached for their dismissal of capitalism and private property. It was their transgression of the social and moral order and codes of behavior that made them treacherous in the eyes of the rightists. According to this view, communism threatened not an economic regime but 'the territorial integrity of Turkey',[16] 'the last surviving Turkish state', 'the sacred treasury of this nation',[17] and national values and consciousness.[18]

This rhetoric did not remain abstract, but brought about the mobbing of the offices of the socialist Labor Party of Turkey (TİP) and other

leftist organizations (most notoriously, the assault on the Union of Teachers of Turkey in Kayseri in 1969 and the assault on the leftist protest against the 6th Fleet in 1969 known as 'Bloody Sunday')[19] in various towns. These attacks were most likely coordinated by the Turkish para-state organization. Whereas in the second half of the 1960s, this anti-Communist violence was perpetrated by overtly religious mobs, by the 1970s the Islamic character of the anti-Communist mobs and anti-Communist vigilance was trivialized and the Islamic motifs were incorporated into a nationalist right-wing sentiment.[20]

Given that anti-communism constituted the thrust of this new temperament, it lacked a clear ideological content and agenda.[21] This new rightist worldview was an amalgamation of religious, nationalist, centrist, and populist sensibilities based on the identity of the foe: the left, communism, and cosmopolitanism. In the 1970s, according to İlhan Darendelioğlu who headed the Association for Fighting Communism, 'Turkish nationalism finally fused with Islam and was imbued with a Turkish-Islamic consciousness at a time when the feebleness of patriotism devoid of any faith and religion was acknowledged.'[22] In this environment, Islam/religion emerged as a relatively prominent and hence legitimate component of this burgeoning political sentiment that was to be upheld as an antidote to socialism and communism. The Turkish (national security) establishment tilted to the right as socialism and leftist dispositions among youth swelled. Reshuffling its network of alliances, Islam began to be endorsed by the national security establishment.

In Italy, the 1970s were known as *anni di piombo* (years of lead), marked by the rise of socialism, ideological polarization, and the spread of violence. Turkey also experienced the escalation of the 'second Cold War' after the waning of the détente in the second half of the 1970s, which was marked by street violence, paramilitary activity, bloodshed and an assertive anti-communism and Cold War culture. Arguably, already by the end of the 1960s, this rising leftist activism paved the way for the molding of a new anti-Communist front and shared political outlook. It was at this juncture and in this anti-Communist moral panic that Kemalism, the organic ideology of the Turkish national security establishment, tilted to the center-right from the center-left and even compromised itself with a different political presence and political instrumentalization of Islam. It is not that the national security establishment wholeheartedly championed religion. On the contrary, while socialist activists and militants were severely persecuted, the leaders and followers of the Islamic fraternities (first and foremost Nurcus) were also tracked.[23] However, the new alignments (and the rise of a new reformist

Kemalism that sympathized with socialism) necessitated the forging of a new anti-Communist bloc in which Islam was pragmatically instrumentalized. This essay will investigate how Islam and Islamic discourse were incorporated and instrumentalized within the Cold War ideological mobilization based on the sermons produced by PRA and published in its journal to inform and educate the local imams as Islam became more visible within the anti-communist ideological front in the 1970s.

The Presidency of Religious Affairs and Friday Sermons

Observers on Turkish laicism generally agree on the *sui generis* character of Turkish laicism.[24] Since 1929, when the provision identifying Islam as the religion of the state was removed from the constitution, the Turkish state has not identified any state religion in its constitution.[25] Despite the provisions of the constitution, however, there is a particular understanding of Islam as the country's de facto religion.[26] The Turkish state developed an uneasy and complex relationship with Islam: rather than severing its ties with religion, it attempted to accommodate religion as a 'helping hand'[27] in order to perpetuate its legitimacy and attain national solidarity. Therefore, while there were serious efforts to diminish the public visibility of Islam by imposing secularization policies on the masses as an elite initiative, the overall project of the republic encompassed several strategies to domesticate Islam and to incorporate religion as well to monopolize the 'proper' interpretation of Islam. Hence, there are various indicators of how the (Turkish?) republic utilized Islam as a public religion instead of relegating it to matters of personal belief and restricting it to the private sphere.[28]

This instrumentalization of Islam was to be achieved through the formulation of an official Islam produced through the institution of the PRA. The PRA is an important institution in terms of manifesting the uneasy and complicated relations between the Turkish Republic and Islam. The PRA was established in 1924 as an administrative unit to conduct 'services regarding Islamic faith and practices, to enlighten society about religion, and to manage places of worship'.[29] The *raison d'être* of the PRA was to serve as a means through which the republic could propose an interpretation of Islam that was in accordance with the official ideology. The PRA claims to represent all Muslims in Turkey and professes to undertake the 'religious needs and services' of Turkish society.[30] The institution is empowered to administer the knowledge and practice of Islam, to inspect all mosques, to appoint imams, and to produce, disseminate, and promote Islamic knowledge.

Up until 1965, the institution lacked a comprehensive law regulating the function and scope of its jurisdiction. Between 1924 and 1965, due to a legal loophole, the PRA was not authorized to prepare, distribute, or oversee the sermons preached in mosques all around Turkey. At least in theory, the imams were free to determine the content of their sermons, and they were not guided by any rules or advisory sermons prepared by the central authority.[31] On 22 June 1965, a new act (no. 633) regarding the status of the PRA was passed. With this amendment the organizational structure and scope of jurisdiction of the PRA was enlarged extensively. Thus, with this act and this article, the PRA was assigned to prepare sermon samples for the first time in its history.[32] However, between 1965 and 1980, extemporaneous sermons were not prohibited, and the PRA had implicitly allowed imams to deliver self-prepared sermons. The total prohibition of extemporaneous sermons was introduced through a secret report circulated shortly after the 1980 coup. The uniformity of sermons could only have been attained through the drastic measures implemented after the 1980 coup.[33]

Sermons in the Time of 'Anarchy'

Although, the sermons of the PRA[34] were not overtly political and consciously refrained from outright and sharp political references so as not to diminish its claim to represent the universalistic and eternal Islamic faith, the political and social developments and *anarşi*/anarchy (the word used exhaustively to refer to the 'chaos' caused by the socialist youth movement) of the 1970s, which had pervaded 'factories, banks, and the streets which the police fail to protect',[35] were addressed. The leftist youth and the socialist movement were attacked by the employment of the Islamic political tradition and the articulation of the Islamic vocabulary that was presumed to be eternal and universal. Arguably, the Western origin and references of the word *anarşi* benefited the Islamic agenda. It could be argued that as a foreign cultural item extraneous to Islam and Muslims it was deliberately employed to point out its non-indigenous nature. Several articles elaborating the causes of the 'anarchy', as well as the recipes for eradicating anarchy, also appeared in the journal of the PRA. All of these articles, as will be discussed later on, encouraged the community to take action against the calamitous incidents pervading society and emphasized the grave and burdensome cost such chaos was inflicting on society. 'The Turkish nation has been afflicted by a great *fitna*, plotted by the external powers' was the dictum which epitomized the approach of the PRA towards the turbulence that

gripped the nation in the 1970s. *Fitna* (plural *fitan*) in Islamic political thought and historiography is often associated with and harkened back to the first civil war over the claims to the caliphate, the series of events following the murder of 'Uthman, including the controversial accession of 'Ali, the Battle of Siffin, the Khawarij and Shi'a schisms, and the rise of Mu'awiyya.[36] *Fitna* includes all that was regarded as objectionable in an act of rebellion against the government: 'sedition, civil strife, the disruption of political and religious order, and a grave menace to the social fabric of the community'.[37] *Fitna* was an affliction, a misfortune, and curse to be avoided at all costs to preserve the well-being of the ummah.

These articles are frequently colored with authoritative texts, such as relevant hadiths and verses of the Qur'an preaching the virtues of obedience.[38] However, even here the selective – if not manipulative – usage of hadith is noteworthy. For instance, the hadith, 'He, who separates himself from the sultan, by even so much as a hand span, dies the death of jahiliyya',[39] was frequently used in both articles and sermons regarding 'anarchy'. This hadith was used to show that obedience to the state is a must in the Sunni tradition and any divergence from this path would be punished in the most brutal way. Although there are different versions (and interpretations) of the same hadith, it is noteworthy that this version of the hadith was preferred among all others. In other interpretations of this hadith, obedience to the sultan is not asked for, but to the prophet, the Islamic faith, or the community.[40]

Anarchy is usually depicted as hell on earth in different genres of Islamic writing, and the PRA's approach to the issue is no exception. In a sermon entitled, 'The Reasons for Anarchy and Remedies to Eradicate It', anarchy is described as a state of society in which 'the life, property, and honor of humankind are not secure, but under permanent danger and no difference between the just and the unjust is observed. Those who have money, power and backing dominate and rule unjustly. The concepts of justice and righteousness are forgotten.'[41] The state of rebellion is seen as both the cause and the effect; it is not only a retribution coming from Allah as a punishment for the sinners' deed, but also a sinful exploit in itself that deserves retribution. The *umma*, which corresponds to the nation in the paradigm of nation-state, here emerges as a worldly and otherworldly community simultaneously, hardly dissociable from each other. Whereas any divergence from the path of God was seen as treacherous, given that the subservience of the *umma* could be maintained via the mediation of political authorities, any protest against political authorities was also deemed equally treacherous.

Hence, obedience and subservience to political authority become ends in themselves, even though they were theoretically seen at the beginning as means for the maintenance of divine order. Therefore, resistance to political authority became a worldly heresy deriving from divine modes of legitimacy. Accordingly, obedience is considered and esteemed as the ultimate virtue. This is reflected in one of the sermons entitled, 'Avoid the *Fitna*':

> Our prophet prescribes us to obey the legitimate state forces who are prescribed the responsibility of governing society. He foresees that some Muslims will rebel against the state forces, and in those times he orders Muslims to keep their patience and silence, avoid strife and fighting, and prevent the spread of *fitna* … In times of *fitna*, every Muslim is obliged to side with the legitimate state forces and help the security forces. Every Muslim who dies in the service of the state forces achieves the status of martyrdom … Muslims are shrewd people. We have to be on the alert and ready for the orders coming from our state's legitimate forces … The Afghani people are now suffering from their mistake in not perceiving the coming danger. We urge our nation to be awake lest we share the same fate.[42]

The notion of obedience is where the nationalist and Islamic outlooks concur and, in fact, replicate each other. Hence, the republican imagery was inspired by Islamic codes to a certain point, in fact an Islamic *Weltanschauung* was integrated into and assimilated by the republican imagery via certain Islamic teachings such as the call for obedience to authority (of the republican state), which represents not only the nation and its interests but also the (Islamic) community. Hence, the PRA produces a version of Islam in which these two supposedly contrasting political cultures meet, overlap, and coexist without overt dissonance.[43]

Not only obedience, but also a unified and homogenous social fabric are desired by both of these discourses. As maintained in the sermon, 'a society composed of members who do not think alike or who share different beliefs shall not attain peace or comfort'.[44] According to this vision, a heterogeneous society inevitably leads to anarchy and is characterized by great mischief and disasters. Therefore, an Islamic and nationalist unity is considered the most important means to eliminate *fitna*. This Islamic and national unity is not only perceived as a political or social issue, but is also a moral duty and an obligation of the believer. Therefore, those who fail to obey must be suffering from severe moral shortcomings. 'Anarchists' (read leftists) lack two virtues and qualities

that are bestowed upon every individual: piety and humanity. 'For them incidents like theft, rape, and murder are normal, habitual behaviors.'[45]

What are the causes of and the ways to eliminate *fitna* according to the PRA? The anarchy haunting Turkish society is an international plot to poison young Muslim minds against the true faith and undermine the unity of the nation: 'The seed of *fitna* was planted by the external powers.'[46] The emergence of 'anarchy' was propelled by malign actors contriving a broader plan to destroy Islam. However, the lack of Islamic education had provided a fertile ground for the spread of civil strife among society and allowed 'anarchist' (read socialist) inclinations to grow. The articles and sermons exhaustively emphasize the 'moral' roots of 'anarchy', arguing that anarchy (that is, the socialist movement) did not stem from economic inequality, but from the absence of piety and morality among youth. It has been pointed out that 'anarchists were the sons of the rich', a popular theme that has been exploited comprehensively by the Turkish right to discredit socialism, associating it with Westernization, which leads people to abandon their moral values.[47]

Had Islamic awareness been maintained and proper moral education been provided, society would be immune to such conspiracies. Therefore, 'in order to eliminate anarchy, we should implant belief in the hearts of children and youth … If Islamic upbringing is neglected and our children are educated in an unhealthy manner to make them Jewish, Christian, Zoroastrian, Free-Masonic, Atheistic, and materialistic, children might be affected by this and lean towards that direction.'[48] As expected, this kind of explanation had always been popular among Islamist circles. For example, Said Nursi, a prominent Islamist scholar and activist known for his distaste for the republican regime, had noted in 1950 that

> Communism, Free-Masonry, Atheism and irreligion result in Anarchism. Against these terrible forces of destruction, only the Islamic unity surrounding the truths of the Qur'an can endure. It is the only way to emancipate this land from the occupation of foreigners, to prevent this nation from falling into anarchy, and to save mankind from these dangers.[49]

Having pinpointed the congruence between the two supposedly conflicting dispositions, Kemalism and Islamism, one should keep in mind that this congruence or alliance is an uneasy relationship, marked by conflicts and clashes. Kemalism is molded within a certain historical juncture and is articulated with different connotations in different circumstances. Turkish politics is marked by temporary and uneasy

political alliances, rather than by a fixed chasm between the center and the periphery. Since its advent, Kemalism has appeared in different forms. It has been rearticulated and restructured by very different political discourses and thus has never been able to be monopolized by a single ideology in Turkish politics. Whereas the discourse articulated by the PRA is compatible with the nation-statist premises of Kemalism, it clashes with the leftist exegesis of Kemalism, which was endorsed by leftists at the time. Hamdi Mert, the vice president of the PRA, argued in the journal that 'our country is in the grip of a serious and historical crisis. Especially, the excessive liberties provided by the 1961 Constitution could not be digested by society. These excessive liberties resulted in the anarchy rampant in the universities, factories, and the streets.'[50] By blaming the 1961 Constitution for the anarchy, Mert also equates left-Kemalism[51] with socialism and anarchy. This is also the theme of the article quoted above in which (so-called) 'progressives' of the 1970s were presented as offshoots/mutations of the Kemalism of the 1930s.

The nation-statism was reproduced within the Islamic vocabulary and discourse while anarchy and socialist dissent were discredited within this political framework. In the sermons, religion was clearly seen as an individual morality. Sermons primarily imposed religious obligations upon individuals. However, this morality was to be contextualized within a social and political order. What is more, morality was to be upheld by the legitimate political authority, which is itself the embodiment of morality. Obedience to community/society is depicted as a moral and religious obligation. Furthermore, community/society was equated with the nation, and lastly the state emerges as the guardian and bearer of the national idea. As articulated in one sermon, the state is defined as 'the institution that represents the nation and maintains order'.[52] The suggested sermons of the PRA perfectly demonstrate this mechanism of multi-level synchronization and the linking of individual morality and integrity to national mores and obedience to the state.

Vigilance and Activism in 'Private' Sermons

A brief overview of sermons produced by the clergy may be useful to observe the resemblances and differences between the sermons suggested by the PRA and the sermons improvised by the imams. The sermons written and delivered by the local imams were considerably different in content and style from the sermons recommended by the PRA. These sermons were emotionally more charged and ideologically blatant in contrast to the traditionalism and quietism of the sermons

of the PRA. In these sermons, the facets of a 'Cultural Cold War' are more manifest, and virulent vilification of socialists is more vocal. For example, in Osman Şekerci's compendium of his sermons, following his sermons on 'the benefits of trees' and the 'importance of trees in Islam', we encounter a sermon on 'land ownership'. Quoting a relevant hadith, Şekerci maintains that 'the meaning of this hadith is apparent. There is no single hint that [Islam] opposes private property. Had it been the case, the prophet who was endowed with the mission of implementing the commands of the Qur'an would have undertaken it.'[53] After providing much evidence in support, Şekerci concludes his sermon by remarking that 'private property is legitimate in Islam. It is inalienable.'[54] He reiterates his views and concerns in his sermon on 'labor, property, and industrial relations'. In this sermon, he reprimanded Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, arguing that 'the theory of "property is theft" leads people to live a parasitical life'.[55]

However, it is important to bear in mind that Şekerci's and his colleagues' vindication of private property is not an unabashed advocacy of full-blown capitalism. On the contrary, they all persistently advise their audience to distribute their wealth to the needy and the poor (a theme that also pervaded PRA sermons).[56] Nevertheless, they see self-standing and self-supporting individuals as the thrust of the Islamic community. They imagine the Islamic community as a community of equals of a 'middling sort'.

Ömer Öztop, an imam who preached from the pulpit of the prestigious Süleymaniye Mosque, also maintained that the 'merchant [*tüccar*] is the pillar of society. Those societies with righteous merchants enjoy vigorous social texture. Those societies whose merchants bear commercial ethics live in justice and serenity.' For Öztop, a merchant has to be honest, reliable, and trustworthy.[57] His subsequent sermons on modesty, arrogance, jealousy, venom, and slander also reveal his vision of a social order based on moral uprightness and integrity. Evidently, for him and his colleagues, social justice is a function of individual morality and the magnanimity of individuals rather than a social problem to be dealt with at a macro level compatible with the supposed economic visions of the Qur'an.[58]

Öztop seems to be alarmed by those who are disturbing this moral order and social peace. In his sermon entitled, 'Who Are You?', Öztop admonishes his audience by telling them that

> you cannot defame God, the prophet, the Qur'an, or the clergy. You cannot live without prayer and ablution. You cannot let Communists,

> Zionists, and Masons speak out. You cannot participate in dancing nor let your wife and daughter dance. You cannot raise your children in a way that will lead them to renounce their religion and ancestors. You cannot do any of these things.[59]

Apparently for Öztop, leftist agitation and left political activism are natural corollaries of moral degeneration and the intrusion of Western values. For him, socialism is not a political ideology that envisions a certain social order but a moral phenomenon which is detrimental to social and moral order. He asks whether or not 'liberation [*kurtuluş*] comes with swarming the streets'. For him, liberation will be achieved by learning from books, which are 'our weapons against those swarming the streets'. Öztop juxtaposes 'books', referring to the wisdom of common sense, with the vulgar and irresponsible (socialist leaning) youth. In his sermon on 'jihad and martyrdom', Öztop cautions his audience to 'beware of those who harass, have an eye on the property and chastity of your coreligionists and seek an opportunity to create turmoil in the country'. This is because 'it is a duty of every Muslim to fight against anything against Islam and anything detrimental to Muslims'.[60] Öztop denounces the quietism of the PRA. He charges each and every Muslim with combating 'anarchists' and 'seducers of the society'.

Islam imagines a harmonious society where relations between the members of the 'community of equals' (a certain *Gottgemeinschaft*, a community of believers) are cordial and amicable. This vision complies with the populism of the Turkish center-right ideology in this regard. For Öztop, 'the white and the black, the rich and the poor, the chief and the clerk, the free and the slave, the worker and the boss, all should gather in the cloak of Islam. This is because Islam is the guide to humanity.'[61] Socialism, which is regarded more as nihilism and hostility to all the values professed and adhered to by society, is perceived as a threat to the moral order of society. The denouncement of private property also seems to be a blasphemy, not because Islam supports exploitation of labor but because it envisions a homestead for every believer, a utopia of self-standing citizens (which was believed to exist in medieval Islam before the arrival of capitalism and the intrusion of Westernization) with more or less equal earnings, with no poor or rich. However, the primary problem with socialism is that it is seen as tantamount to sedition and blasphemy.

One commentator, Kamil Yeşil, writing in the Islamist newspaper *Milli Gazete* in 2009, recalled the religious upbringing of his youth 'in the 1970s via compilations of sermons at a time when one hardly found

religious publications and periodicals in Anatolia'.[62] He lists his main sources of learning as the first book he read in this regard, the compilation of Tahsin Yaprak, who gathered the sermons he had delivered from the pulpit of Hacı Bayram Mosque in Ankara, and the compendiums of Ali Rıza Demircan, Ömer Öztop (his influential 'Addresses from the Pulpit of Süleymaniye'), and Mehmet Emre. 'These all dealt with issues of capitalism, socialism, and imitation of the West.' It was not only the texts of sermons he read that shaped his religious upbringing and learning. He maintains that

> oral religious training was as influential as written culture. The preachers addressed similar issues. Fethullah Gülen, Timurtaş Uçar, Abdullah Büyük were the most prominent preachers of the time. These hodjas and many others … before the 1980s used to prepare their Friday sermons on their own … and they used to speak out freely.

Regretting that the military coup in 1980 destroyed this vibrant culture, he goes on:

> September 12 must have brought new regulations in this area, as it did in all other areas, so that after the coup the hodjas started to deliver the same sermons everywhere. It is after this year that we began encountering sermons advising people to comply with the traffic rules in villages that had only village roads or no roads at all, and weird sermons talking about protecting the trees and not cutting them down in villages where the main livelihood was forestry.

Certainly, the glorious years of preachers had come to an end with the strict monitoring and standardization of sermons by the PRA. The ethos of sermons imbued with the culture of the Cold War in which the world was divided between atheistic leftists and righteous rightists (which included nationalists and proponents of the center-right, as well as Islamists and religious conservatives) was supplanted by the traditionalist and quietist sermons imposed by the state. These sermons and the new culture of sermons were indoctrinating listeners with nation-statist values and were calling for staunch loyalty to the state, not in the name of an anti-Communist front of believers, but in the name of loyalty to the state, which represented the ultimate good after the successful clampdown on and marginalization of the leftist militants and socialist movement in Turkey with the military coup in 1980. It is no coincidence that Yeşil resents that the style and aesthetics of the

sermons were transformed drastically, and for him that does not imply an improvement but a decay in the sermons' emotional shrewdness and rhetorical power.

The Invasion of Afghanistan: An Exception

In contrast to the insularism of the Cold Warriorism entrenched in the sermons, the reactions to the Communist takeover in Afghanistan in 1978 followed by the Soviet invasion the next year instigated a Cold Warriorism on a global scale. The developments in Afghanistan seem to be the only major Cold War entanglement that mobilized Islamic sentiments and Islamic Cold Warriorism as visible in the periodicals and, to a much lesser degree, in the sermons of the PRA, freed from the traditional Islamic worldview.[63] It seems to be the only international affair that was covered closely by the journal of the PRA. The journal covered and reported the developments in Afghanistan extensively, a major departure from the general editorial policy of the journal. For these reasons, it is worth briefly discussing the perceptions of the invasion and the war in Afghanistan as presented in the PRA periodicals and sermons.

The PRA journals paid attention to developments in Afghanistan even before the invasion. The resistance of 'Muslim forces' against the 'Marxists in power' (sic) was enthusiastically supported by the journal. It informed its readers vehemently that 'Marxists execute Muslim clerics by incarcerating them in metal boxes',[64] and reported on other means of purging Muslim clerics. Conveying how Communists camouflaged themselves and deceived people when they took power, the journal buoyantly maintained that 'the people now realized the extent of the catastrophe they faced',[65] and they began resisting.

The journal gladly finds a clear-cut dichotomy in which the opposing sides are not only resolute, but also morally unambiguous. 'The Marxists in power supported materially, militarily, and morally by the Soviet advisors' on one side, and the 'people, tribes, clergy, and Islamic guerillas protecting their country, people, and values' on the other side constitute two moral poles, the 'evil' against the 'just'. Nevertheless, whereas in all the previous issues, the journal heralded the coming of the defeat of the 'Marxists' and victory of the 'Muslims', the unsettling Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 exasperated the journal. The journal reported this blow on its front cover, reporting that 'Soviets began exterminating Muslims' and that 'Muslim fighters maintained that they will not stop fighting until an Islamic state has been

established.'[66] The sermon published in this issue was entitled 'Jihad in Islam', which may have been galvanized by the Soviet invasion.[67] Another sermon published in the issue dealt with the 'tragedy of the Afghan people'.

Another article reminded readers that although Afghanistan was the first Muslim country invaded by the Soviets, it was not the first time that the Soviets had invaded foreign countries.[68] We are reminded that Soviet armies previously had overrun Poland, Finland, and Czechoslovakia and that Soviet expansionism and militarism were a global threat inherent in Soviet political culture.[69] Nevertheless, such a global-scale and comprehensive treatment of the Communist threat was an exception. The journal defines Soviet expansionism as 'imperialism'. Nevertheless, reminding readers of the dictum 'drive to the southern seas' of czarist Russia as the historical background of Soviet expansionism, the journal associates Soviet policies with czarist expansionism (as experienced by retreating Ottomans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).[70] Anti-Communism seems to be emphasized less than the traditional and historical fear and hostility harbored against the historical enemy, Russia, in the eyes of committed Muslim anti-Communists. Arguably, the anti-Communist fervor was incorporated into anti-Russian sentiment. Soviet imperialism was interpreted as the continuation of Russian expansionism.

> It is a pity that some among the new generations who do not know about the War of 93 [the Turco–Russian War of 1877–78] and are unaware of the oppression Turks and Muslims are suffering in the Soviet Union prefer the Communist International anthem to the Turkish National anthem.'[71]

The journal does not develop a persistent and consistent emphasis on 'Soviet atheism', a theme commonplace among Muslim circles. However, arguably provoked by the Soviet invasion, the issue that lamented the invasion reported that the Qur'an was sold for extravagantly high prices on the black market in the Soviet Union, 'due to the atheistic policies of Soviets'.[72] The journal also reported that Mohammed Ali (Cassius Clay) called for a boycott of the Moscow 1980 Olympics 'in the name of Islam and God'.[73] The dormant anti-communism in its global context seems to have surged in the wake of the Soviet invasion, a theme hardly visible previously.

The vigilance against Soviet expansionism continued. The invasion and popular insurgency were also covered in the next issue on the front

page. The journal not only pointed to the sell-out of the Communists in Afghanistan and the treachery of Babrak Karmal, 'who had given away his country to the Soviets', but also of the 'Turkish Babraks',[74] rhetorically asking if these 'Babraks' would be embarrassed by the gallantry of the freedom fighters. Another piece condemned those 'who are inviting Soviet imperialism naively or knowingly' in Turkey in light of the latest developments in Afghanistan.[75]

However, it would be a mistake to view this fervent support for the resistance in Afghanistan as a Cold War concern. It would be more appropriate to see it as an outburst animated by an Islamic sensitivity. In the journal's regular page on international developments, readers were informed of the sufferings and struggles of Muslims worldwide, including Eritrean Muslims (fittingly, suffering at the hands of Mengistu, the Marxist-Leninist dictator of Ethiopia who had toppled the emperor Haile Selassie),[76] Philippine Muslims, and others. Reporting on the Muslim Moro guerillas fighting against Ferdinand Marcos's Philippines was a constant theme in the journal,[77] regardless of the fact that Marcos was an unwavering ally/client of the United States in the global Cold War. Those Muslim guerillas who were killed were dubbed 'martyrs' in these reports. However, although they were imbued with emotionally charged vocabulary, these informative pieces remained side issues that were never seen as major causes to pursue in contrast to domestic ills and threats. This was not the case with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, where the invasion became the main issue to stir up the editorial. It is possible to speculate as to the reasons why Afghanistan drew enormous attention. Maybe this interest stemmed from the merger and amalgamation of several related (and indistinguishable) themes, including traditional anti-Russian fervor, anti-Communism, and Muslim sentiment. Cold War politics seems not to be a primary concern and agenda item. Instead, perhaps anti-Communist sentiment was successfully incorporated into the traditionalist Muslim vision and used to reinforce it. Anti-Communist rhetoric was extensively employed to galvanize the readers even more. It is clear that the journal does not perceive the world as a war between the two opposing economic systems exemplified by the Soviet Union and the capitalist West. Rather, it perceives the world as the stage for an eternal struggle between righteous Islam and its enemies, both domestic and international. The rhetoric of anti-Communism may be handy on certain occasions, but it was not a prominent agenda item. This could lead us to assume that the national security establishment was not involved in guiding the PRA in this aspect, even though the covering of 'anarchy' (read leftist

activism and militancy) was another story in which the national security establishment seems to have had an effect in shaping the policy of the PRA without upsetting the boundaries of the ideological 'autonomy' of the PRA.

Conclusion

The sermons suggested by the PRA reflect the elective affinity and compromise between the visions of the secular establishment and Islam and its traditional worldview, and also reveal the affinities and confluence of these two mindsets.[78] Two major characteristics in the sermons worth emphasizing are (1) the idea of an organic community and (2) the idea of an imposing communal morality. These commonalities show that rather than being a manipulation of Islam, there is an elective affinity between the Islamic vision of social and political order and Cold War nation-statism and the secular establishment. However, this concord was not static. It was at its zenith in the 1970s when the Cold War was experienced most intensively. It gradually waned in the 1980s after the military junta had eradicated leftist groups unrest and Islam began to be seen as the major threat to the national security establishment, prompting new alliances and confrontations.

Rather than seeking to demonstrate, as might be expected, the conscious instrumentalization of the PRA as an outpost of the Cold War state, this essay highlighted the autonomy of the PRA from the concerns and agenda of the secular state establishment. The essay did not present the PRA as a heavily charged 'ideological apparatus' of the Kemalist state and the Cold War national security establishment, shaped by imminent political agendas the state sought. On the contrary, examining the sermons sanctioned by the PRA and the publications of the PRA, we can observe that the PRA pursued its own agenda, priorities, and concerns, which did not clash with the main premises of the staunchly secular Kemalist state and its agenda, but overlapped with them in many aspects. It is also striking to observe that regardless of political developments and priorities the PRA stubbornly continued to suggest sermons on the same themes, which emphasized the regulation of a moral community and assumed the existence of a pre-modern community of believers in which individual merits were a primary concern. The Cold War was imagined through the filter of this Islamic worldview and its vision of society, morality, politics and order, which comply with the premises and priorities of nation-statism. A blatant Cold Warriorism may be observed at certain junctures when

it complies with and reinforces Islamic concerns, such as in the case of the abhorrent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Likewise, the 'anarchists', who are seen as 'seducers of moral values and society', are discredited and repudiated outright. It is also likely that the increasing spotlight on 'anarchists' and 'anarchy' beginning in 1980 was imposed by the military as a public relations effort and a manipulation of public opinion shortly before the upcoming coup in September 1980. Yet, exceptions notwithstanding, Cold War rhetoric was not a mobilizing element by itself. It was only utilized when it conformed to the moralistic scheme reflected in these sermons, in which 'our side' embodies ultimate morality and purity as opposed to the moral corruption of communism and the Communist aggression, which was merely another clash with Islam.

Notes

1. The prayer (*salat*) is the second of the Five Pillars of Islam, which include the profession of faith (*shahada*), almsgiving (*zakat*, *sadaqa*), the fast of Ramadan (*siyam*, *sawm*), and pilgrimage (*hajj*). These practices are obligatory for all believers once they have reached puberty. Islamic practice is well known for its diversity in terms of belief and practice, yet the Five Pillars of Islam remain the core and common marker, the five essential practices all incumbent on Muslims to accept and follow. On Friday, the noon prayer is a congregational prayer and should be performed, preferably at the mosque and led by a prayer leader, namely the imam. The imam's function is to guide the community in the prayer, to keep the actions uniform, and to recite the sermon (*khutba*). Attendance at the Friday prayer has traditionally been declared obligatory for all Muslims, with the exception of women, slaves, the sick, travelers, those tending to the sick and under subjugation. The sermon is an essential part of the Friday prayer; listening to the sermon is obligatory in order for one's Friday prayer to be considered valid. Friday sermons have both a religious and political significance within the Islamic tradition. Throughout Islamic history, sermons have served as a channel of political and religious communication. See A. Rippin (1993) *Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices* (London: Routledge), pp. 130–1; J. Esposito (1998) *Islam: The Straight Path* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 89–90; A.J. Wensinck (1965), 'Khutba', in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, II (Leiden: Brill), p. 841; B.M. Borthwick (1967) 'The Islamic Sermon as a Channel of Political Communication', *Middle East Journal*, 21, no. 3, p. 300. The word *khutba* in Arabic refers to liturgical oratory and in its broadest meaning the word refers to any sort of public address. J. Renard (1996) *Seven Doors to Islam: Spirituality and the Religious Life of Muslims* (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 40.
2. See S.J. Whitfield (1996) *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).
3. For 'civil religion', see R. Bellah (1967) *Daedalus*, 'Religion in America', 96, no. 1, pp. 1–21.

4. For a narrative of the cultural transformation in the 'long' 1960s (which according to the author began in 1958) and its contrast with the 'conservative 1950s', see A. Marwick (1998) *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c. 1958–c. 1974* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press).
5. For the Turkish left's indictment of the governing party of national treason and selling-out, see D. Gürpınar (2011) *Ulusalcılık* (*Nationalism*) (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınları), pp. 246–52; Ö.M. Ulus (2011) *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris).
6. This linkage was obsessively observed and abhorred by right-wing conservatives. For example, Ahmet Kabaklı, who emerged as one of the doyens of Turkish conservatism and nationalism, remarked that 'to be frank, [the Bolshevik riff-raff] was heartened by the leftist RPP leaders, who did not care about order, freedom and the Turkish state. They back Communists and encourage anarchy and burglary as a means of attaining power.' A. Kabaklı (1969) 'Suçluyu Takdim Ediyorum' ('I Present You the Guilty'), *Tercüman*, 22 February; quoted in İ. Darendelioğlu (1977) *Pazarlar Kanlı İdi* (*Sundays Were Bloody*) (Istanbul: Orkun Yayınları), p. 183.
7. T. Demirel (2011) *Demokrat Parti İktidarı ve 27 Mayıs Darbesi* (*The Democrat Party Rule and the May 27 Coup*) (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları), p. 139.
8. S. Kocabaş (2004) *Bir Kuşağın Dramı, 1960–1980* (*The Tragedy of a Generation, 1960–1980*) (Istanbul: Vatan Yayınları), p. 106.
9. For the JP, see T. Demirel (2004) *Adalet Partisi: İdeoloji ve Politika* (*The Justice Party: Its Ideology and Politics*) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları).
10. A.E. Turan (2004) *Türkiye'de Seçmen Davranışı* (*Voter Behavior in Turkey*) (Istanbul: Bilgi Universitesi Yayınları), pp. 77–8; J. Landau (1974) *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden: Brill); M.A. Birand and S. Yalçın (2006) *The Özal* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık), pp. 51–2.
11. See İ. Darendelioğlu (1968) *Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Hareketleri* (*Nationalist Movements in Turkey*) (Istanbul: Toker Yayınları), pp. 222–4, 286–9, 353–60. Although an association named as such was opened first in Zonguldak in 1950 and in Istanbul in 1956, both of these initiatives did not survive and were closed down. The association was relaunched in Izmir in 1963, and in a short time it swelled, opening numerous offices in different cities.
12. For the Cold War Turkish stay-behind organization established within the Turkish Chiefs of Staff, see D. Ganser (2005) *NATO's Secret Armies* (London: Routledge), pp. 224–44; E. Kılıç (2009), *Özel Harp Dairesi* (*The Special Military Unit*) (Istanbul: Turkuvaz).
13. Ç. Okutan (2004) *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (MTTB),1916–1980* (*The National Turkish Student League, 1916–1980*) (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları), p. 133.
14. Kocabaş, *Bir Kuşağın Dramı*, pp. 108–9.
15. For some prominent examples of this genre, see İ. Darendelioğlu (1978) *Türkiye'de Komünist Hareketleri* (*Communist Movements in Turkey*) (Istanbul: Bedir Yayınevi); F. Tevetoğlu (1962) *Faşist Yok, Komünist Var* (Ankara: Türkiye Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği Yayınları); idem (1967) *Türkiye'de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler* (*Socialist and Communist Movements in Turkey*) (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası); O.Z. Efeoğlu (1973) *Kızıl Ahtapotun Kolları: Türkiye'de*

Rusya ve Kızıl Çin'in Faaliyetleri (*Arms of the Red Octopus: The Activities of Russia and Red China*) (Ankara: TOBB Matbaası).

16. O.S. Orhon (1969) 'Asıl Suçlular' ('The Real Guilty'), *Son Havadis*, 20 February. Quoted in Darendelioğlu, *Pazarlar Kanlı İdi*, p. 180.
17. Darendelioğlu, *Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Hareketleri*, pp. 157, 339.
18. Interestingly, although the Turkish right was not enamored of Atatürk and his radical modernization project against the socialist movement and the socialist movement's praise of Atatürk as an anti-imperialist leader, the right-wing observers did not refrain from endorsing Atatürk and 'our Turkish republic founded by the eternal leader' comprehensively. The imposing reference to Atatürk was used to discredit leftists and show them as opposing the republic and its Kemalist thrust as a corollary of their portrayal of the Turkish left as inimical to the moral, social, and political order and national sensitivities.
19. For a compilation of the newspaper clippings regarding Bloody Sunday, as well as an account and defense of paramilitary vigilance, see Darendelioğlu, *Pazarlar Kanlı İdi*, pp. 125–239.
20. For a general assessment of the emerging Turkish right in the 1960s, see Mustafa Eren (2010) *Kanlı Pazar* (*Bloody Sunday*) (Istanbul: Kalkedon).
21. For a study of the dispositions of the anti-Communism emerging in the late 1960s, see Y. Taşkın (2000) 'Anti-Komünizm ve Türk Milliyetçiliği: Endişe ve Pragmatizm' ('Anti-Communism and Turkish Nationalism: Anxieties and Pragmaticism'), in T. Bora (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik* (*Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Nationalism*) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları), pp. 618–34.
22. Darendelioğlu, *Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Hareketleri*, p. 8.
23. For the persecution of Nurcus, see Bekir Berk (1971) *Nurculuk Davası* (*The Nurculuk Case*) (Istanbul: Hikmet Gazetecilik). Also see Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, p. 267. Also, for virulent polemics on the 'Nurcu threat' in the Kemalist press in the 1960s as well as the anti-Nurcu campaigns of the military, see U. Azak (2010) *Islam and Secularism in Turkey* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris), pp. 115–38.
24. For a discussion on the character of Turkish secularism, see E. Özyürek (2006) *Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press); N. Göle and L. Ammann (2006) *Islam in Public* (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press); A. Davison (1998) *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey* (New Haven: Yale University Press) ; Y. Navaro-Yashin (2002) *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey* (Princeton University Press); E. Özdalga (1998) *Modern Türkiye'de Örtünme Sorunu, Resmi Laiklik ve Popüler İslam* (*The Issue of Veiling in Turkey, Official Secularism and Popular Islam*) (Istanbul: Sarmal Yayınları).
25. In fact, in 1937 the constitution was amended to incorporate the principle of laicism. It has been noted that Turkey and Senegal are the only Muslim countries that incorporate the principle of laicism or secularism in their constitutions. See N. Öktem (2002) 'Religion in Turkey', *Brigham Young University Law Review*, 2, no. 2, p. 372.
26. See J. Fox (2008) *A World Survey of Religion and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. 247.
27. İhsan Yılmaz (2005) 'State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey', *The Muslim World*, 95, no. 3 (July), p. 388.

28. C. Kenar (2011) 'Bargaining between Islam and Kemalism: An Investigation of Official Islam through Friday Sermons' (Master's thesis, Boğaziçi University), p. 92.
29. İ. Gözaydın (2008) 'Diyanet and Politics', *The Muslim World*, 98, no. 2/3, pp. 218–20.
30. M. Aydın (2008) 'Diyanet's Global Vision', *The Muslim World*, 98, no. 2/3, pp. 164–5.
31. Kenar, 'Bargaining between Islam and Kemalism', p. 90.
32. Kenar, 'Bargaining between Islam and Kemalism', p. 95.
33. Kenar, 'Bargaining between Islam and Kemalism', p. 192. This report was prepared by Mehmet Özgüneş (Minister of State), Cevdet Menteş (Minister of Justice), İlter Türkmen (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Selahaddin Çetiner (Minister of Internal Affairs), Hasan Sağlam (Minister of National Education), Münir Güney (Minister of Rural Affairs and Cooperation), Vecdi Özgül (Minister of Youth and Sports), and Tayyar Altıkulaç (President of the Presidency of Religious Affairs). See İ. Kara (2008) 'Cami, Ordu, Siyaset: 27 Mayıs İhtilaline Dair bir Hutbe' ('Mosque, Military and Politics: A Sermon on the May 27 Revolution'), *Toplumsal Tarih*, 173, p. 46.
34. The sermons used throughout this article are obtained via scanning the PRA periodicals. Also see for two compilations of sermons by PRA, many of which had been printed repeatedly in the PRA periodicals, see *Hutbeler* (*Sermons*) (1973) (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları); *Hutbeler* (1981) (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları).
35. H. Mert (1980), 'Tek Çıkar Yol Bütünleşmek' ('The Only Way is to Unite'), *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 1, 232, p. 1.
36. G.R. Hawting (1978) 'The Significance of the Slogan "lā hukma illā lillāh" and the References to the "Hudūd" in the Traditions about the Fitna and the Murder of 'Uthmān', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 41, no. 3, pp. 453–63.
37. The initial meaning of the word was test or trial, hence it refers to a temptation devised to challenge a believer's faith. In the Qur'an, it was used to describe the testing fire of the Day of Judgment. It also had a social – if not political – meaning since the word appeared frequently in the sense of public disturbance, which put the community of believers to the test. As such, the Qur'an stated, 'fitna is more grievous than killing', and the Prophet was ordered to fight those who sowed mischief 'until there is no more fitna and God's faith prevails'. See A. Ayalon (1987) 'From Fitna to Thawra', *Studia Islamica*, 66, pp. 149–52.
38. The doctrine of civil obedience is cardinal in Islamic political thought, especially after the historical process that led Sunni Islam to establish itself as the 'state religion'. Historically, Sunni Islam evolved to become the religion of the ruling elite and of the state to keep its hegemony over the state's legal and cultural system. Therefore, Sunnism developed in close alliance with and through adjustment to the requirements of the central state. The ulama, which was often incorporated into the state apparatus, generally preached that the caliph, or in reality anyone in effective possession of political power, had to be obeyed using the pretext that an unjust ruler was still better for the community than civil strife. As aptly conveyed by Nazih Ayubi: 'opposition to the state is therefore almost tantamount to abandoning the faith; it is

not only to be condemned by the society but is also to be prevented by the state'. N. Ayubi (1992) 'State Islam and Communal Plurality', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 524, November, pp. 79–91. See also P. Crone and M. Hinds (1986) *God's Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam* (Cambridge University Press).

39. 'Her kim sultana itaatten bir arşın dışarı çikarsa o cahiliye ölümü ile ölür.' See K. Güran (1980) 'Fitneden Sakınınız', *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 234, p. 10.
40. In the compilation of Yahiya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi, a prominent hadith scholar, this hadith urges obedience to God: 'Ibn 'Umar said, "I heard the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, say, 'Anyone who removes his hand from obedience will meet Allah on the Day of Rising with no proof. Anyone who dies without having given the oath of allegiance will die the death of the Jahiliyya.'"' Another variant of this hadith goes, 'Whoever dies split off from the community will die the death of Jahiliyya.' See Yahiya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (1975) *Gardens of the Righteous: Riyadh as-Salihin of Imam Nawawi* (London: Rowman and Littlefield), p. 125.
41. 'Anarşinin Sebepleri ve Yok Edilme Çareleri' ('Anarchy and Ways to Destroy It') (1980) *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 1 February, 230, p. 10.
42. 'Fitneden Sakınınız' ('Keep Away from Sedition') (1980) *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 1 March, 232, p. 10.
43. Kenar, 'Bargaining between Islam and Kemalism', pp. 5–6.
44. 'Anarşinin Sebepleri ve Yok Edilme Çareleri', p. 10.
45. 'Anarşinin Sebepleri ve Yok Edilme Çareleri'.
46. 'Anarşinin Sebepleri ve Yok Edilme Çareleri'.
47. N. İşbilir (1980) 'Anarşi' ('Anarchy') *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 15 February, 231, p. 5.
48. 'Anarşinin Sebepleri ve Yok Edilme Çareleri', p. 10.
49. B.S. Nursi (2004) *Emirdağ Lahikâsı* (*The Emirdağ Annex*) (Istanbul: Söz Basım Yayın). p. 24.
50. H. Mert (1980) 'Anarşi Can Almaya Devam Ediyor' ('Anarchy Continues to Take Lives'), *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 1 February, 230, p. 8.
51. Here left-Kemalism refers to the interpretation of Kemalism as a staunchly secular disposition that strictly limits any public display of Islam and confines it to the private realm rather than a strictly leftist interpretation of Kemalism that blends it with socialism.
52. 'Vergi Vermek Çok Önemli Bir Vatandaşlık Görevidir' ('Paying Taxes Is a Very Important Civic Duty') in *Hutbeler* (1981) (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları), p. 468.
53. O. Şekerci (n.d.) *Hutbeler* (Istanbul: Şamil Yayınevi), 'Toprak Mülkiyeti' ('Property of Land'), p. 293.
54. Şekerci, 'Toprak Mülkiyeti', p. 295.
55. Şekerci, 'Çalışmak, Mülkiyet, İşçi İşveren İlişkileri' ('Industrial Relations, Labor and Property'), p. 297.
56. Also see, Y. Üstün (1972) 'İslam Açısından Beşeri Münasebetler' ('Social Relations according to Islam'), *Diyanet Dergisi*, September–October, 11, no. 5, p. 315.
57. Ö. Öztop (n.d.) *Süleymaniye'den Hitap* (*Addresses from Süleymaniye*) (Istanbul: Bahar Yayınları), II, 'Ticaret Ahlakı' ('Commercial Ethics'), p. 85.
58. For the concepts of moral economy in contemporary Islamic thought, see T. Kuran (1989) 'On the Notion of Economic Justice in Contemporary

Islamic Thought', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 21, no. 2, pp. 171–91; T. Kuran (1986) 'The Economic System in Contemporary Islamic Thought: Interpretation and Assessment', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 18, no. 2, pp. 135–64; Hamid Enayat (1982) *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press).

59. Öztop, I, 'Sen Kimsin?' ('Who are You?'), p. 160.
60. Öztop, I, p. 155.
61. Öztop, I, 'İşte İnsan Hakları' ('The Human Rights'), p. 165.
62. K. Yeşil (2009) 'Vaaz ve Hutbelerin Değişen Dili' ('The Changing Language of Preaching and Sermons'), *Milli Gazete*, 12 February.
63. Also see B. Bozgeyik (1981) *Orak-Çekiç'in Kıskacından Kurtulabilenlerin Hikayesi: Afganistan'dan Türkiye'ye* (*Those Who Had Saved Themselves from the Claws of Sickle and Hammer: From Afghanistan to Turkey*) (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları); M. Osmanoğlu (1990) *Afganistan Cihadının 10 Yılı* (*The Ten Years of the Afghanistan Jihad*) (Istanbul: Rehber); A. Muhaciri (1988) *Bir Mücahidin Cihad Günlüğü* (Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları).
64. 'Afganistan'da Müslüman Kuvvetler Taraki Rejimine Karşi Yeni Bir Hücuma Hazırlanıyor' ('The Muslim Forces About to Strike a New Attack against Taraqi') (1979) *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 1 September, 220, p. 58.
65. H. Akyıldız (1979) 'Dünden Bugüne Afganistan İç Savaşı ve Müslümanların Mücadelesi' ('The Afghanistan Civil War in Retrospective and the Struggle of Muslims'), 1 November, 24, p. 120.
66. 'Afganistan İşgal Edildi' ('Afghanistan had Been Occupied') (1980) *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 15 January, 229, p. 1.
67. 'İslam'da Cihad' ('Jihad in Islam') (1980) *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 15 January, 229, p. 5.
68. A. Tülek (1980) 'Sovyet Pençesindeki ilk Müslüman Ülke Afganistan' ('Afghanistan, The First Muslim Country in the Claws of the Soviets'), *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 15 January, 229, p. 11.
69. According to Mahmud Osmanoğlu, the author of a comprehensive book on the Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion, 'the Afghan jihad is one of the most important Islamic, global and social events of the century. The jihad is Islamic because it is a war between Islam and communism, between the righteous and ungodly … and it is universalist because it is waged between a subjugated nation and a superpower and is a quest for independence against an invading force.' M. Osmanoğlu (1990) *Afganistan Cihadının 10 Yılı* (*The Ten Years of the Afghanistan Jihad*) (Istanbul: Rehber), p. 7.
70. H. Mert (1980) 'Afganistan'ın İşgali ve Sovyet Emperyalizmi' ('The Invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet Imperialism'), *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 1 February, 230, p. 1.
71. 'Afganistan'ın İşgali ve Sovyet Emperyalizmi', p. 2.
72. 'Sovyetler Birliği'nin Din Aleyhtarlığı Yüzünden Bir Kur'an-ı Kerim Karaborsada 100 Bin Liraya Satılıyor' ('Qur'an Worth Hundred Thousand Pounds in Blackmarket Due to the Anticlerical Policies of the Soviet Union') (1980) *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 15 January, 229, p. 10.
73. 'Allah ve İslam Adına Moskova Olimpiyatlarını Boykot Ediniz' ('Boycott Moscow Olympics in the Name of God and Islam') (1980) *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 1 March, 232.
74. 'Hindu-Kuş Sovyet-Kuş Olacak mı?' ('Will Hindukush Be Soviet?') (1980) *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 1 February, 230, p. 9.

75. Mert, 'Afganistan'ın İşgali ve Sovyet Emperyalizmi', p. 2.
76. 'Eritre'li Müslümanların Bağımsızlık Mücadelesi Devam Ediyor' ('The Independence Struggle of Eritrean Muslims Continues') (1978) *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 1 April, 186, p. 7.
77. 'Filipin Müslümanları 4 Yıldır Süren İç Savaşta 30 Bin Şehit Verdiler' ('The Death Toll in Muslim Struggles in the Four-year Long Civil War Reaches Thirty Thousand') (1977) *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 1 December, 178, p. 7; 'Filipin Müslümanları Mücadelelerine Devam Ediyorlar' ('The Struggle of Filipino Muslims Continues') (1978) *Diyanet Gazetesi*, 1 April, 186, p. 7.
78. For discussion of the interweaving of Kemalism and Islam, see C. Houston (2001) *Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation State* (New York and Oxford: Berg); S. Çagaptay (2006) *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey* (London and New York: Routledge); Davison, *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey*; N. Lindisfarne (2002) *Elhamdürillah Laikiz* (*Thank God, We Are Secular*) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları); S. Kaplan (2006) *The Pedagogical State* (Stanford University Press).

Select Bibliography

Periodicals

Diyanet Gazetesi, 1978–80.

Books and Articles

Berk, B. (1971) *Nurculuk Davası*. Istanbul: Hikmet Gazetecilik.
Borthwick, B.M. (1967) 'The Islamic Sermon as a Channel of Political Communication', *Middle East Journal*, 21, no. 3, pp. 299–313.
Bozgeyik, B. (1981) *Orak-Çekiç'in Kıskacından Kurtulabilenlerin Hikayesi: Afganistan'dan Türkiye'ye*. Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları.
Darendelioğlu, İ. (1968) *Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Hareketleri*. Istanbul: Toker Yayınları.
——(1977) *Pazarlar Kanlı İdi*. Istanbul: Orkun Yayınları.
——(1978) *Türkiye'de Komünist Hareketleri*. Istanbul: Bedir Yayınevi.
Demirel, T. (2004) *Adalet Partisi: İdeoloji ve Politika*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
Diyanet, İ.B. (1981) *Hutbeler*. Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları.
Fox, J. (2008) *A World Survey of Religion and the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ganser, D. (2005) *NATO's Secret Armies*. London: Routledge.
Kenar, C. (2011) 'Bargaining between Islam and Kemalism: An Investigation of Official Islam through Friday Sermons'. Master's thesis, Boğaziçi University.
Kılıç, E. (2009) *Özel Harp Dairesi*. Istanbul: Turkuvaz.
Kocabaş, S. (2004) *Bir Kuşağın Dramı, 1960–1980*. Istanbul: Vatan Yayınları.
Landau, J. (1974) *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*. Leiden: Brill.
Nursi, B.S. (2004) *Emirdağ Lahikâsı*. Istanbul: Söz Basım Yayın.
Okutan, Ç. (2004) *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (MTTB), 1916–1980*. Istanbul: Bilgi Universitesi Yayınları.
Osmanoğlu, M. (1990) *Afganistan Cihadının 10 Yılı*. Istanbul: Rehber.
Öztop, Ö. (n.d.) *Süleymaniye'den Hitap*. Istanbul: Bahar Yayınları.

Şekerci, O. (n.d.) *Hutbeler.* Istanbul: Şamil Yayınevi.
Taşkın, Y. (2000) 'Anti-Komünizm ve Türk Milliyetçiliği: Endişe ve Pragmatizm', in T. Bora (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*. Istanbul. İletişim Yayınları, pp. 618–34.
Tevetoğlu, F. (1962) *Faşist Yok, Komünist Var.* Ankara: Türkiye Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği Yayınları.
——(1967) *Türkiye'de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler.* Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası.
Yeşil, K. (2009) 'Vaaz ve Hutbelerin Değişen Dili', *Milli Gazete*, 12 February.

2

China and Turkish Public Opinion during the Cold War: The Case of Cultural Revolution (1966–69)

Çağdaş Üngör

Introduction

The global history of the Cold War can hardly be analyzed without reference to the People's Republic of China (PRC). More commonly known as 'Red China' at the time, this country is often cited as one of the major players in this ideological confrontation, alongside that of the United States and the Soviet Union. While the PRC regime acted as part of the socialist bloc during the 1950s, it asserted itself as an autonomous actor subsequent to the Sino–Soviet ideological split of the early 1960s. China's uncompromising stance and self-assumed revolutionary leadership role was most visible during the Cultural Revolution (1966–69), when the Maoist discourse fiercely challenged the 'revisionist' leadership of the Soviet Union as much as it opposed American imperialism. Although China has been a formidable power for the two superpowers to contend with, its reception and influence in Turkey during the Cold War era has rarely been scrutinized. While not justifying the neglected state of the field, there are a number of reasons as to why international-relations scholars and political historians have so far paid little attention to China's influence in Turkey during the Cold War.

The People's Republic certainly figured less in the Turkish consciousness during the 1960s – as compared to the United States (a major ally and a source of ideological inspiration) and the Soviet Union (a proximate communist neighbor with the historical baggage of bilateral hostilities). Likewise, the average Turkish citizen had little reason to be concerned about 'Red China' – a country located at the other end of the Asian continent and which therefore posed no immediate threat to Turkey. Yet, as I will try to elaborate in this study, China 'did matter' in the Turkish public opinion[1] as it became an important reference point

in the political discussions held on both sides of the ideological spectrum. In terms of explaining China's particular role in the Turkish context (i.e. how and why it mattered), the tumultuous phase of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–69) is a good case in point.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was launched in China by May 1966 upon Chairman Mao Zedong's famous call on the youth to 'smash the party headquarters'. An unprecedented event which drew worldwide attention to China at the time, the Cultural Revolution soon made headlines in Turkey. As the initial and the most violent phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966–69) preceded the establishment of Sino–Turkish official ties,[2] the PRC regime was not able to exert direct influence on Turkish public opinion. Although China is known to have used alternative channels to penetrate Turkey, these government-sponsored attempts failed to reach broad segments of Turkish society in the late 1960s.[3] In this sense, it is important to note that Turkish perceptions of the Cultural Revolution were largely shaped through unofficial channels (most notably by the media) and crafted – more than anything else – by journalists, editors, students, and those in various other intellectual circles in Turkey.

When the first news of the Cultural Revolution reached local audiences, Turkey had been undergoing a phase of democratization for some time, which – among other things – enabled the formation of a burgeoning leftist movement. The radical intelligentsia – with its emphasis on anti-American sentiment and the Third World spirit – had already carved up an alternative space within mainstream public opinion. Therefore, Turkish public opinion in the mid-1960s was much more diversified compared to the 1950s, when the anti-communist discourse went mostly unchallenged. Within this context, it was inevitable that a significant global event such as the Chinese Cultural Revolution would be interpreted via the opposing lenses provided by Cold War divisions. In this sense, the Cultural Revolution initially became instrumental for both sides of the ideological spectrum to reinforce their previously held notions on communism. Yet, as it publicized the ideological division between China and the Soviet Union, this episode also shook the very foundations of the bipolar Cold War atmosphere in Turkey and elsewhere. By bringing the Sino–Soviet split to the Turkish agenda, therefore, the Cultural Revolution also caused a shift in ideological positions – at least among those who adhered to left-wing ideologies.

This essay aims to examine these diverging perceptions based on the reports and news items that appeared in the mainstream (i.e. anti-communist) media and the leftist publications, translated books,

memoirs of prominent intellectuals, and so on. But before we turn to analyze how 'Red China' was appropriated within the larger ideological divisions in Cold War Turkey, it is necessary to say a few words on the larger political context and the limitations of knowledge about China during the 1960s.

Knowing 'Red China': The Limits of Turkish Public Opinion

At the height of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–69), Turkey had little direct access to the People's Republic. This state of affairs was partly due to Turkey's lack of linguistic and academic expertise on modern China at the time.[4] On a broader level, though, the low information flow was due to the Cold War atmosphere, which had placed Turkey and China at opposite poles of the ideological spectrum. As a consequence, the bulk of available knowledge on 'Red China' was of a derivative nature. Most news items that appeared in the Turkish mainstream media were translations from the Japanese, Hong Kong, or American news agencies. With few exceptions, all the non-fiction books, novels, and other types of publications on China were also translations.[5] At the height of the Cultural Revolution, China's self-imposed isolation from the rest of the world certainly posed extra challenges in terms of information flow. The disruptions in the Chinese government bureaucracy and daily life, not to mention the rise of xenophobia, have indeed undermined communication with China on a global scale.

Despite the low information flow, however, the Turkish public was not indifferent towards the PRC during the Cold War years. In the early 1950s, the Korean War fostered interest in China from the Turkish public. When Turkish troops under UN command fought against Chinese soldiers in northern Korea, the Turkish media made a serious effort to paint a vivid portrayal of the Chinese 'enemy'.[6] As Turkey had decidedly become a part of the Western alliance (and a NATO member) after the war, negative public opinion concerning the opposite ideological bloc (including 'Red China') remained intact. Throughout the 1950s, mainstream Turkish media mostly followed in the footsteps of the US-led 'Red scare' discourse. By the time the Cultural Revolution made the headlines, though, there had been a dramatic change in both the local and global context.

The constitution introduced after the 1960 *coup d'état* – ironic as it may seem – enabled the formation of a more liberal political atmosphere in Turkey. The establishment of the Labor Party of Turkey (TİP), radicalization of the student organizations, and trade union activism overlapped

with the wave of 'counter-culture' movements springing up in Western metropolises.[7] By the mid-1960s, an increasing number of young men and women were gathering around left-wing student organizations to discuss Turkey's political destiny. Although they differed in their analysis of Turkey's current situation (semi-feudal/semi-dependent or fully capitalist?) and future strategies (national-democratic revolution, socialism through parliamentary struggle or guerilla movement?), they all sought an alternative path that would shift the country away from its pro-Western orientation. Not surprisingly, many were also interested in the People's Republic and its prominent leader, Mao Zedong.

Throughout the 1960s, while left-wing groups demanded revolutionary changes in Turkey, conventional intellectuals stood their anti-communist ground – now intensified with fears about the rise of the political left in Turkey. Within this larger ideological debate, the case of the Cultural Revolution became instrumental for both sides to elaborate on their respective ideological positions. From its launch onwards, Turkish public opinion was divided on the exact nature of this event. Divided as such opinion may have been, it was certainly not cut into equal measures. Any examination of Cold War Turkey – a US ally and a NATO member – should consider the relative strength of the anti-communist press (with its conservative and/or nationalist overtones) vis-à-vis the leftist media. Yet, given the rising popularity of socialist ideals, it is likely that left-wing intellectuals exerted more influence on Turkish public opinion than suggested by the sheer circulation figures of leftist publications.

Now, let us closely examine the diverging perceptions of the Cultural Revolution as they were crafted by Turkish opinion leaders in 1966–69.

Diverging Perceptions on China and the Cultural Revolution

Similar to their counterparts elsewhere in the world, Turkish intellectuals – left and right – became interested in the Cultural Revolution because it was both unprecedented and unpredictable. National print media, which usually published few reports on China, caught up with recent developments as early as 1966. Regardless of their particular political sympathies, all major newspapers covered the Cultural Revolution – often on a daily basis. China also became a hot topic in university lectures, with a number of Turkish academics introducing their students to modern Chinese history.[8] In a similar fashion, a

growing number of books dealing with Chinese politics and economics appeared in Turkish bookstores by the second half of the 1960s. This intense publication effort was visible on both sides of the ideological spectrum. In the anti-communist camp, notable examples include the Turkish translation of Roy Mac Gregor-Hastie's *The Red Barbarians: The Life and Times of Mao Zedong*, and En-tseng Hsü's *The Invisible Conflict*, which warned local readers of the dangers of Chinese communist propaganda and organization skills.[9] Likewise, the translation of Lai Ying and Edward Behr's *The Thirty-sixth Way: A Personal Account of Imprisonment and Escape from Red China* and Robert Loh's *Escape from Red China* portrayed a rather bleak picture of Maoist China. Another example is Lin Ting's novel *Pyjama Stories*, whose Turkish translation was advertised in the newspapers as 'the novel which explains the real story behind voluntary price reductions in the communist countries'.[10]

Although hostile works written by critics of China probably reached a wider audience, leftist groups in Turkey were keen on disseminating their own perception of 'Red China'. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, left-wing press houses in major Turkish cities (most notably in Ankara and Istanbul) published several translations of Mao Zedong's works, among them the famous *Little Red Book*.[11] Left-wing journals such as *Yön* and *Aydınlık* became instrumental in familiarizing Turkish readers with Chinese-style socialism and Mao Zedong's thought. Other favorable accounts of China also found their way into the left-wing readers market in Turkey. Among the translated works whose originals had already achieved global circulation, one could find Lin Biao's *Long Live the Victory of the People's War*, as well as works written by prominent China-watchers like Edgar Snow and Han Suyin.[12] Such works clearly left a long-lasting impression of China on the minds of several Turkish leftists.

Now let us turn to examine the discursive strategies employed by Turkish intellectuals in news items and opinion pieces that appeared in the mainstream and left-wing media.

Conventional Views: 'Red China' in Disarray

China's visibility in the mainstream Turkish media clearly increased after the launch of the Cultural Revolution – if only to reinforce the country's negative perception.[13] Although the newspapers varied in their emphasis, they were by and large utterly critical of communist China and its leader Mao Zedong. Several news items and opinion pieces highlighted the PRC regime's problems, and elaborated on the country's tyrannical

rule and its potential threat to other countries. Likewise, the language used in depicting Mao Zedong was highly critical, if not openly hostile. Turkey's anti-communist authors disliked him for his attempts to eradicate China's religious, traditional, and historical heritage.[14] He was called 'a lunatic who yearned for war'.[15] Some mentioned his status in China as a 'prophet' possibly in order to invoke hatred among the religiously conservative Turkish readers. Even relatively moderate writers criticized Mao's mistaken choice to call in the masses in order to solve China's political problems – which could have been easily solved by the party cadres.[16]

Mainstream intellectuals did not doubt that the Cultural Revolution was an ongoing civil war, a factional power struggle, if not an ideological purge initiated personally by Mao Zedong.[17] Some stated, or at least hoped, that anti-Mao feelings were widespread in China and the Cultural Revolution would prove to be a mass movement against the Chairman himself.[18] More superficial accounts stated that the whole movement was a result of the inner quarrels and jealousy between China's first ladies.[19] There was a widespread conviction in Turkey (also shared by the leader of the social democratic opposition) that Mao Zedong was manipulating the youth to reshape Chinese politics.[20] Accordingly, many news items focused on the sheer violence of this ideological struggle, the criticism campaigns, or mass meetings.[21] The name 'Red Guards' (*Kızıl Muhafızlar*) became closely associated with the factional struggle and the most violent incidents in China.[22] The very idea that the government organs were in disarray and the masses were taking the lead in China was a discomforting story for the mainstream readers in Turkey. Such news items, therefore, clearly played into the hands of the Turkish middle classes and their well-known preoccupation with political order.

Among all the unpleasant news, those concerning the Sino–Soviet ideological dispute were particularly important. Seemingly, Turkish media paid more attention to the consequences of this debate than to its theoretical intricacies. According to some, the main issue behind the controversy was territory.[23] Others used the Sino–Soviet split as an opportunity to alarm the Turkish public about an imminent global war.[24] Some exploited the pro-Soviet arguments in order to highlight the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Among the right-wing authors who took a special interest in China was Nüzhet Baba of *Yeni Istanbul*, whose pieces appeared in his self-explanatory column 'Arkadan Vuranlar' ('Backstabbers').[25] Although he was a staunch anti-communist, Baba gladly cited China's critics in the Eastern bloc and explained how Mao's

mistaken path ran against the 'universalist character' of socialism.[26] Likewise, Mehmet Barlas warned that Mao Zedong's domestic policies contradicted the very nature of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.[27]

Another major concern about China in those years was the country's recent advances in nuclear weapon technology.[28] While many referred to China's hydrogen bomb to provoke fear, others used the opportunity to mark the irrationality of Chinese communist leadership:

> Everybody knows that China's population is rising steadily. But the agricultural yield is not on the rise. Everybody knows that they eat dog and cat meat in China to avoid hunger. Everybody knows that they bury the dead without coffins in order to save wood … But China is not giving up its experiments to build an atomic bomb, which cost billions. This is downright murderous insanity.[29]

Such vulgar and inaccurate examples were common among the hard-line authors, who went to great lengths to prove their case. Other types of gross exaggeration and distortion also applied. One of the titles published in *Yeni Istanbul*'s 'Dünyanın Gözü Çin'de' ('The World Is Watching China') article series, for instance, read 'Red China: A Nation That Feeds on Opium Smuggling'.[30] Unlike what was implied in its title, the article examined the background of the Sino–British Opium Wars, which broke out in the mid-nineteenth century simply because the Qing Dynasty attempted to ban opium smuggling.

In terms of convincing readers, nothing seemed better than providing testimonies from fellow Turkish citizens or Uyghur Muslims. *Hürriyet* once used the eyewitness account of a returned Turkish student, who had stayed in China for over a year, albeit without any language skills.[31] Other Turkish nationals who recently came from China also testified to the miserable life conditions and the extent of political repression in China – especially towards the Muslims.[32] Among the discursive strategies available to the mainstream media, exposing the anti-Islamic character of the Cultural Revolution was perhaps the most convenient. In this sense, emphasizing the suffering of the Uyghur minority in China's Xinjiang autonomous region (labeled 'Chinese Turkistan' or 'Eastern Turkistan' in the Turkish media) made sense. The emphasis on the victimized status of the Uyghur Muslims aimed to strike a chord with a predominantly Muslim audience.[33] Turkish admirers of the Cultural Revolution, on the other hand, were not in the least moved by such calls for religious solidarity. In this sense, the Cold War divide in Turkish public opinion was explained best in the words of three Uyghur men

who sought refuge in Turkey in May 1968: 'There are some senseless people in Turkey who send telegraphs to Mao and swear allegiance', they said. 'At a time when the Turks in East Turkistan are suffering, it is the Vietnam War that is declared a national matter.'[34]

The Left Wing's Embrace of the Cultural Revolution

As the above quotation suggests, the leftists' perception of the Cultural Revolution was in direct contrast with depictions of the event in the Turkish anti-communist media. Against their ideological opponents who reduced the Cultural Revolution to a domestic power struggle or a civil war, the left-wing intellectuals in Turkey presented the event as a brand new exercise in radical egalitarianism. In the words of a left-wing opinion leader, Doğan Avcıoğlu, 'Cultural revolution is neither a civil war, nor simply a purge movement; it is rather a historical stage towards the construction of an egalitarian society.'[35] Mao's call on the youth to criticize government organs was applauded by the members of the Turkish left, who understood it as an attempt to eradicate the 'revisionist' tendencies among Chinese officials. Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, a former member of the Communist Party of Turkey and a well-known intellectual, believed that China launched the Cultural Revolution in order to abolish 'the corruption inside the [Communist] party, the [socialist] government and among the "high people" [men of party-government-culture]'.[36] Likewise, the prominent columnist Çetin Altan warned against the Turkish media's tendency to 'jump to simplistic conclusions regarding China'. While he refrained from a straightforward defense of Mao, he pointed out the complexities of the Cultural Revolution, which, according to him, were going to 'force thinkers to rephrase their terminology in the long years to come'.[37]

If the mainstream media's depictions of the Cultural Revolution had little impact on leftist circles, it was because the latter refused to consume the news items published in what they considered to be 'bourgeois media'.[38] In its stead, the left-wing groups resorted to alternative sources of information – most of which provided them with rather sympathetic accounts of China. There were, for instance, works written by French intellectuals, many of whom were fascinated by the Cultural Revolution themselves.[39] Other sources included the left-wing periodicals published in Turkey, such as *Yön* and *Aydınlık*. Likewise, Mao Zedong's own works were becoming largely available in Turkish.[40] A favorable image of China also disseminated through informal channels. One could be easily impressed, for instance, by the slogans painted on

the walls of college campuses.[41] The youth were particularly impressed by Mao Zedong's emphasis on anti-imperialist movements in the Third World and his verbal challenges against the US government.[42]

While the Chinese Cultural Revolution provided both ideological camps with the opportunity to reinforce their earlier visions of communism, it particularly encouraged the Turkish leftists to learn more about the Chinese case. It was during the Cultural Revolution years that the Turkish left became familiar with the Sino–Soviet split. Unlike the mainstream media, whose treatment of the dispute was ambiguous at best, the left-wing intellectuals closely examined the arguments put forward by the Chinese and Soviet communist parties. Young leftists in Turkey wanted to make sense of this dispute – if only to choose the right side of the debate when the occasion arose. In this sense, books on the nature of the Sino–Soviet split – albeit not always written or edited by leftist authors – appealed to the Turkish student activists.[43] During the 1966–69 period (i.e. before the Sino–Soviet split caused any major divisions within the Turkish left) Mao Zedong had almost universal appeal among the Turkish leftists.[44] While the bulk of the left-wing intellectuals did not consider themselves 'Maoists', the majority were seemingly more appreciative of China.[45] According to Ergun Aydınoğlu, there were a number of reasons why the Chinese position was more attractive to the Turkish left:

> in a country like Turkey, where conditions almost pushed the leftists into radicalism, China's seemingly radical theses had a strong appeal. Defending some of the 'revisionist' Soviet theses, on the other hand, was not that easy for the leftist ranks, which competed against one another in terms of radicalism. Thus, Soviet theses such as 'peaceful co-existence' or 'peaceful transition to socialism' were ignored by the Turkish Communist Party cadres … But for the former Turkish Communist Party members, though, one could say that sympathy towards the Chinese Communist Party was much stronger. Especially for the younger cadres, ideals such as radicalism, revolutionary clarity, and an uncompromising attitude towards imperialism were being represented more by the Chinese or Cuban communists.[46]

But Mao's advocacy of radicalism on the world stage was not the only reason for China's positive reception among Turkish leftists. Marxist intellectuals also made use of the Chinese case in their attempts to develop a viable strategy to bring about socialist revolution in Turkey. As Suavi Aydın put it, Chinese socialism was one of the theoretical sources

behind the 'national democratic revolution' thesis,[47] which became the dominant paradigm in the Turkish left by 1968. According to its proponents, Turkey was a semi-feudal, semi-dependent country and therefore it needed to go through a 'national democratic revolution' before it could move on to the socialist stage. The idea of a national revolution that would eradicate the feudal and imperialistic ties in a country was reminiscent of Mao Zedong's 'new democracy'.[48] China's past experiences with Western imperialism and the rural structure of its economy led many to think of it as a relevant model for Turkey.[49] One of the founding fathers of the 'national democratic revolution' thesis, Mihri Belli, wrote extensively on the Chinese-type socialism in *Aydınlık*.[50] Belli's writings introduced the thought of Mao Zedong to young student activists, some of whom fully embraced the Chinese model in following years.

With the emergence of the first Maoist faction in 1969, the impact of the Cultural Revolution in the Turkish context became more clear-cut. Gathered around the journal *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, the members of the Turkish Revolutionary Party of Workers and Peasants (Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi, or TİİKP) followed the Chinese Communist Party's teachings throughout the 1970s.[51] While the group failed to establish a hegemonic position within the Turkish left, its promotion of Chinese-type socialism led to an escalation of the Sino–Soviet dispute within Turkey. Turkish Maoists' emphasis on mass propaganda activities drew criticism from various circles, including other Mao sympathizers who favored guerilla struggle.[52] On a broader level, the emergence of pro-China factions in Turkey demonstrated that the larger Cold War divisions had their immediate repercussions in the local context. The Cultural Revolution, therefore, did not only enable the opposing ideological camps to maintain and reinforce their previous notions of communism, but also led to changes in perspective, at least among those who advocated socialist transformation in Turkey.

Conclusion

During the Cultural Revolution years, Turkey's access to 'Red China' was limited at best. The information gap was partly due to Turkey's lack of linguistic and academic expertise in East Asian studies, but also to China's self-imposed isolation during the 1960s. It was amidst these constraints that the Cultural Revolution became an important topic of discussion for the politically informed elites in Turkey. Thanks to the intense translation effort and extensive media coverage, Turkish

intellectuals developed a relatively deeper understanding of 'Red China'. For those interested in the People's Republic, however, it was clear that the bipolar Cold War atmosphere did not leave much room to maneuver. As the politically informed elites in both camps had to rely on the small amount of information flowing out of China at the time, it was their earlier convictions on communism that provided them with the rhetoric to fill in the blanks. Not surprisingly, right-wing and left-wing intellectuals had fundamental disagreements on the nature of Chinese communism, as well as on the objectives and prospects of the Cultural Revolution.

At the height of the Cultural Revolution, politically informed elites in Turkey fostered two opposing images of Maoist China. The mainstream media, whose main preoccupation was order and stability, took issue with the violence, chaos, and political uncertainties associated with the Cultural Revolution. Accompanied by images of fearsome Red Guards, disruptive mass meetings and demonstrations, these news items cautioned Turkish readers on the inherent dangers of the communist system. Right-wing intellectuals fiercely attacked Mao's anti-religious and anti-traditional stance. According to these conservative intellectuals, China's turning against its own historical heritage and Confucian value-system was a great mistake. In their efforts to bring the Cultural Revolution home, anti-communist authors also made explicit references to the suffering of the Uyghur minority (Muslim and Turkish) at the hands of Chinese communists.

Those who hoped to guide Turkey towards a socialist revolution, by contrast, were greatly inspired by the Cultural Revolution. As they hoped to achieve a similar transformation in Turkey, the left-wing intellectuals praised the radicalism associated with the Red Guard movement. While the Sino–Soviet split was treated as a foreign policy matter in the mainstream media, it was taken much more seriously among leftist circles – especially by those who thought the Chinese example could be replicated in the Turkish context. In this sense, the Cultural Revolution, which propagated China's struggle against Soviet 'revisionism', had a long-term impact on the Turkish left. As early as 1969, Turkey saw the formation of a pro-China faction, which thereafter became instrumental in disseminating the thought of Mao Zedong and intensifying the Sino–Soviet dispute in the Turkish context.

Therefore, while the Cultural Revolution helped both ideological fronts in Turkey to reinforce their previously held Cold War positions, it also led to changes in perspective – at least among those who took the Sino–Soviet split seriously. While the Cultural Revolution fell short

of transforming the Turkish cultural and artistic scene – as it did, for instance, in France[53] – it nevertheless broadened the scope of ideological debate. By the early 1970s, 'Cultural Revolution' had already become part of the Turkish lexicon – albeit with different connotations, depending on who used the phrase.[54]

Notes

1. I use the term 'public opinion' to refer to a set of common attitudes on a particular subject in a given location. This definition takes public opinion as something crafted essentially by the politically informed elites through the use of mass media.
2. Turkey recognized the PRC regime in 1971. For an examination of the local political context and domestic controversy on the recognition, see A. Atlı (2010), '12 Mart Muhtırası ve Türkiye'nin Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'ni Tanıması' ('March 12th Military Intervention and Turkey's Recognition of the People's Republic of China'), presented at Çin-Türkiye İlişkileri Çalıştayı (Sino–Turkish Relations Workshop), Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 7–8 May.
3. Although China did not have an embassy in Turkey, a small number of Chinese publications circulated in Turkey. Another important exception here is the Turkish-language broadcasts launched by the PRC regime's official broadcaster Radio Peking in 1957. Based on the number of listener letters, these broadcasts seem to have reached a rather tiny audience in Turkey. It was, nevertheless, an attempt to directly influence the Turkish public opinion.
4. Turkey lacked specialized research institutions devoted to modern China studies. Ankara University's Sinology Department, which was established in the 1930s, concentrated on the recovery of Chinese language sources on ancient Turkish history – rather than studying China for its own sake.
5. One such exception was Yılmaz Çetiner's *Mao'ya Tapanlar* (*Mao Worshippers*), which was a detailed account based on the author's interviews and personal observations in China. Although the title of the book may suggest otherwise, this journalistic work was not a piece of typical anti-communist propaganda. Throughout the book, the author attempts to situate Chinese socialism in its historical context and challenges some of the common perceptions in Turkey about Red China (such as its maltreatment of Muslims, and so on). See Y. Çetiner (1969) *Mao'ya Tapanlar* (*Mao Worshippers*) (Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar).
6. Ç. Üngör (2006) 'Perceptions of China in the Turkish Korean War Narratives', *Turkish Studies*, 7, no. 3, pp. 405–20.
7. M. Klimke and J. Scharloth (2008) eds., *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism 1956–1977* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
8. Haluk Ülman of Ankara University's Faculty of Political Sciences was one such academic. His lectures on early twentieth century China with a special focus on the activities of the Soviet adviser Borodin is clearly remembered by one of his students. See A. Çubukçu (2002) 'Türkiye'de Maoculuğun

doğuşu üzerine bazı gözlemler' ('A Few Observations on the Birth of Maoism in Turkey'), *Praksis*, 6, p. 54. Another example is Yılmaz Altuğ of Istanbul University, who published his lecture notes on China under the title 'China Question' in 1967. See Y. Altuğ (1967) *Çin Sorunu: 'Günün Siyasi ve İktisadi Meseleleri' Ders Notları* (*China Problem: Political and Economic Problems of the Day*) (İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi).

9. R.M. Gregor-Hastie (1969) *Bir Kızıl 'Barbar'* (*The Red Barbarians: The Life and Times of Mao Zedong*) (Istanbul: Gün Yayınları).
10. See, 'Pijama Hikayesi' (advertisement), *Akşam*, 1, 2, and 4 February, 1967. A similar example is Bette Lord's *Sekizinci ay: 17 yaşındaki Çinli kız Sansan'ın Kızıl Çin'den firarının Heyecanlı Hikayesi* (*Eighth Moon: The True Story of a Young Girl's Life in Communist China, by Sansan as told to Bette Lord*) (Istanbul: Gün Matbaası, 1966).
11. These works were translated from English or French. See Mao Tsetung (1966) *Çin inkılabının teorik meseleleri* (*Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*) (Istanbul: Sosyal Yayınları); idem (1970) *Sağ ve Sol Sapma* (*Left and Right Deviation*) (Ankara: Ekim Yayınları); idem (1969) *Başkan Mao Tsetung'un Sözleri* (*Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong*) (Ankara: Ekim Yayınları); idem (1967) *Gerilla Harbi* (*On Guerilla Warfare*), (Istanbul: Payel Yayınları); idem (1969) *Halk Savaşında Temel Taktikler* (*Basic Tactics*) (Ankara: Ser Yayınları); idem (1967) *Yeni Demokrasi* (*On New Democracy*) (Istanbul: Sosyal Yayınları); Mao Çe-tung (1966) *Teori ve Pratik* (*Theory and Practice*) (Ankara: Sol Yayınları); idem (1971) *Askeri Yazılar* (*Selected Military Writings of Mao Zedong*) (Ankara: Sol Yayınları); idem (1967) *Emperyalizmle Mücadele* (*Struggle against Imperialism*) (Ankara: Sol Yayınları); idem (1967) *İhtilalin Özü* (*Little Red Book*) (Istanbul: Gün Yayınları); idem (1970) *Halkın Demokratik Diktatörlüğü Üzerine* (*On the People's Democratic Dictatorship*) (Ankara: Aydınlık Yayınları); idem (1966) *Kültür, Sanat, Edebiyat* (*Culture, Art, Literature*) (Istanbul: Ataç Kitabevi); idem (1970) *Çin Devrimi* (*Chinese Revolution*) (Ankara: ODTÜ SEK Yayınları); idem (1970) *Milli Burjuvazi ve Eşref Sorunu Üstüne* (*On the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry*) (Ankara: Ekim Yayınları); idem (1970) *Seçme Eserler* (*Selected Works*) (Ankara: Ser Yayınları).
12. E. Snow (1967) *Mao Çe-tung: Bir devrimcinin otobiyografisi* (*Mao Zedong: Autobiography of a Revolutionary*), trans. M. Ardos (Ankara: Sol Yayınları); Han Suyin (1972) *Sabah Tufanı: Mao Zedung ve Çin devrimi 1893–1854* (*The Morning Deluge: Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Revolution, 1893–1954*) (Istanbul: Hür Yayın ve Ticaret A.Ş.); Lin Biao (1970) *Yaşasın Halk Savaşının Zaferi* (*Long Live the Victory of the People's War*) (Ankara: Bilim ve Sosyalizm Yayınları).
13. I do not suggest that the Turkish mainstream media was a monolithic bloc. One needs to differentiate between left-wing newspapers such as *Akşam* and *Cumhuriyet*, whose columnists offered more in-depth articles on China than their counterparts in the right-wing *Tercüman* or *Yeni Istanbul*. In terms of the headlines and news items concerning the Chinese Cultural Revolution, however, there was no noticeable difference among these newspapers.
14. N.N. Tepedenlioğlu, 'Kızıl Çin'i Mao'nun dişleri arasında aramayınız … Mao Çin'in karnındadır' ('Don't seek Red China in Mao's teeth … Mao is in China's belly'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 4 February 1967, p. 6. Also see N. Baba, 'Mao dini kaldırmak istiyor' ('Mao wants to abolish religion'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 29 October, 1966, p. 5.

15. See 'Mao harp isteyen bir deli idi' ('Mao was a lunatic who yearned for war'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 3 November 1966, p. 3.
16. H. Topuz, 'Kültür İhtilali Neler Getirdi?' ('What did the Cultural Revolution bring?'), *Cumhuriyet*, 2 March 1967, p. 2.
17. 'K. Çin'de idareciler birbirine girdi: Mao'nun tahtı etrafında kanlı mücadeleler oluyor' ('Administrators in Red China turned against each other: Bloody struggles ensue around Mao's throne'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 14 July 1966, sec. 6; 'Komünist Çin dahili harbin eşiğinde ('Communist China is on the verge of civil war') (cover page), *Hürriyet*, 6 January 1967; 'Kızıl Çin'de iç savaş baş gösterdi' ('Civil war breaks out in Red China'), *Akşam*, 10 January, 1967 (cover page); K. Sağlamer, 'Kızıl Çin'de neler oluyor?' ('What is happening in Red China?'), *Cumhuriyet*, 10 January 1967.
18. 'Kızıl Çin'de Maoculara tepki arttı' ('Reactions against Maoists grow in Red China'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 30 January 1967, p. 3; 'Mao'nun muhalifleri şehirde kızıl muhafız avına çıktı' ('Mao's opponents are hunting down red guards in the city'), *Cumhuriyet*, 9 January 1967; 'Mao'nun muhalifleri özel bir ordu kurdu' ('Mao's opponents established a private army'), *Cumhuriyet*, 17 January 1967; 'Mao'ya karşı bir isyan bastırıldı' ('A rebellion against Mao was put down'), *Milliyet*, 18 April 1968.
19. 'Çindeki kaynaşmada kadın parmağı var' ('Women's involvement in China's chaos'), *Akşam*, 17 January 1967, p. 5; 'Kızıl Çin'de liderlerin karıları kapışıyorlar' ('Leaders' wives cross swords in Red China'), *Hürriyet*, 6 January 1966.
20. This conviction was so popular that the General Secretary of the Republican People's Party, Bülent Ecevit, used it against his political opponent, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in a domestic controversy. He blamed Demirel for using Mao's methods to instigate chaos in Turkey. See 'Ecevit: Demirel Maonun Usullerine Özeniyor' ('Ecevit: Demirel tries to imitate Mao's methods'), *Milliyet*, 3 August 1968.
21. 'Kızıl Çin'de olaylar devam ediyor' ('Incidents continue in Red China'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 5 October 1966, p. 3; 'Kızıl Çin'de taraflar birbirinin kulak, dil, burun ve parmaklarını kesiyorlar' ('Opposing sides in Red China cut each other's ears, tongue, nose and fingers'), *Akşam*, 9 January 1967 (cover page); 'Pekin radyosu ilk defa kanlı olaylardan bahsetti' ('Radio Peking mentions bloody incidents for the first time'), *Akşam*, 16 January 1967, p. 3; 'Maocular arasında çatışmada 11 kişi öldü' ('Eleven people die during intra-Maoist clashes'), *Milliyet*, 7 May 1967.
22. 'Kızıl muhafızlar ile askerler çarpıştı: 200 kişi öldü' ('Red Guards clash with soldiers: 200 people die'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 6 November 1966 (cover page); 'Kızıl muhafızlar Makaoya saldırmaya hazır bekliyor' ('Red Guards are ready to attack Macao'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 13 December 1966, p. 3; 'Kızıl Çin'de neler oluyor? Asya'nın baş belaları Kızıl Muhafızlar' ('What is happening in Red China? Red Guards, the troublemakers of Asia'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 24 October 1966, p. 5; 'Kızıl Çin'de işçiler, Kızıl Muhafızlarla çarpışmaya başladı' ('Workers in Red China start to clash with the Red Guards'), *Tercüman*, 10 January 1967 (cover page); 'Kızıl muhafızlar birbiriyle çarpışıyor' ('Red Guards fight against each other'), *Akşam*, 12 January 1967; 'Kızıl muhafızlar Konfüçyüs'ün doğum yerini yağma ettiler' ('Red Guards plunder the birth place of Confucius'), *Cumhuriyet*, 18 January 1967 (cover page).

23. 'Rusya ile Çin'i karşı karşıya getiren esas konu: toprak' ('Territory: The main issue which brought Russia and China up against each other'), *Ulus*, 25 October 1966, p. 5.
24. '1967 savaş yılı mı olacak? K. Çin-Rusya savaşabilirler' ('Is 1967 going to be a year of war? Red China and Russia may fight'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 30 December 1966, p. 3; 'Sovyet Rusya ile Kızıl Çin arasındaki gerginlik arttı' ('Rising tension between Soviet Russia and Red China'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 3 November 1966, p. 3; 'K. Çin, Rusya'ya '700 milyonluk ordumuza kan borcunu öde' dedi' ('Red China to Russia: Pay your blood debt to our army of 700 million'), *Tercüman*, 1 February 1967, p. 3; 'Rusya, Çin'e görülmemiş şiddette bir nota verdi' (Russia delivered a bitter note of unprecedented scale to China), *Tercüman*, 11 February 1967, p. 3; 'Brejnev Mao'yu suçladı: K. Çin'deki olaylar çok tehlikeli bir sahfada' ('Brezhnev accused Mao: Incidents in Red China at a very dangerous stage'), *Akşam*, 15 January 1967, p. 5.
25. See, for instance, N. Baba, 'İki Büyük Emperyalist: Rusya ve Çin' ('Two major imperialists: Russia and China'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 23 October 1966, p. 5; idem, 'Çin birden komünizme kaymıştı' ('China slipped towards communism all of a sudden'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 27 October 1966, p. 5.
26. N. Baba, 'Mao ileri gelenleri azlediyor' ('Mao dismisses prominent people'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 1 November 1966, p. 5.
27. M. Barlas, 'Çin'den gelen haberler …' ('News from China …'), *Cumhuriyet*, 9 January 1967, p. 3.
28. 'Pekin: Silahı ilk kullanan biz olmayacağız' ('Beijing: We will not be the first ones to resort to arms'), *Cumhuriyet*, 19 June 1967, p. 3; 'Çin ilk kıtalararası füzesini bu yıl atabilir' ('China may launch its first inter-continental missile this year'), *Cumhuriyet*, 6 May 1967, p. 3; F. Akkor, 'Çin mucizesi' ('China miracle'), 8 July 1967, p. 2.
29. B. Felek, 'Neler oluyor, neler?' ('Everything that happens'), *Cumhuriyet*, 16 January 1967, p. 3.
30. Nizamettin Nazif Tepedenlioğlu, 'Afyon kaçakçılığı ile geçinen millet: K. Çin' ('Red China: A nation which feeds on opium smuggling'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 5 February 1967.
31. This student was a highly dubious personality, whose stay in China was seemingly mandatory. He was previously expelled from Soviet Russia after being accused by the local authorities of indecent conduct at the educational institution where he was enrolled as a student. See 'Kızıl Çin'de bir sene kalan Türk öğrencisi yurda döndü' ('The Turkish student who has stayed one year in Red China came back to the homeland'), *Hürriyet*, 6 January 1967.
32. 'Kızıl Çin'den kaçan 13 Türk yurda sığındı' ('Thirteen Turks who fled Red China took shelter in the homeland'), *Yeni Istanbul*, 30 March 1967.
33. 'Çin Türkistanında kanlı savaşlar şiddetlendi' ('Bloody wars turned violent in Chinese Turkistan'), *Ulus*, 30 January 1967, sec. 8; 'Kıta Çin'inde Müslümanlar zor durumda' ('Muslims in mainland China are in dire straits'), *Ulus*, 23 January 1967, p. 4; 'Çin Doğu Türkistanı Mao'ya karşı direniyor' ('China's Eastern Turkistan resists Mao'), *Cumhuriyet*, 29 January 1967, p. 3; 'Moskova'ya göre Çin, idaresindeki Türkleri imhaya çalışıyor' ('According to Moscow, China is trying to eradicate the Turks under its rule'), *Cumhuriyet*, 26 January 1967.

34. 'Kızıl Çin'den gelen Doğu Türkistanlılar çektiklerini anlattı' ('Eastern Turkistanis who fled Red China talk about their suffering'), *Milliyet*, 29 May 1968.
35. D. Avcıoğlu, 'Çin'de olup bitenler' ('Things that happen in China'), *Yön*, 3 February 1967, 6, no. 201, p. 9.
36. H. Kıvılcımlı, 'Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti: Kızıl Bekçiler' ('People's Republic of China: Red Guards'), *Sosyalist*, 7 February, 1967.
37. Ç. Altan, 'Çin' ('China'), *Akşam*, 11 January 1967, p. 3.
38. Although Turkish media spectrum included left-wing newspapers, such as *Cumhuriyet* or *Akşam*, these newspapers did not refrain from employing anti-communist rhetoric when necessary (see n. 13 above). The negative tone underlying all the news items on the Chinese Cultural Revolution might have led left-wing groups in Turkey to reach such generalizations.
39. Examples include J. Baby (1967) *Çin–Rus Çatışmasının İçyüzü* (*La grande controverse Sinosovietique 1956–66*) (Istanbul: Gün Yayınları); C. Bettelheim and J. Charriere (1966), *Çin'de Sosyalizmin Kurtuluşu* (*La Construction du socialisme en Chine*) (Istanbul: İzlem Yayınları); J. and T. Marsouin (1967), *Komünist Çin'den Geliyoruz* (*Nous avons enseigné en Chine populaire*) (Istanbul: Sıralar Matbaası).
40. See n. 11 above for examples of Mao Zedong's works translated into Turkish. It is also noteworthy that those fluent in foreign languages obtained books by the help of friends or acquaintances abroad. Şahin Alpay, for instance, read Mao's *Selected Works* – which was not yet available in Turkish – in its English version. See N. Mater (2009) *Sokak Güzeldir: 68'de Ne oldu?* (*Street Is Beautiful: What Happened in 68?*) (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları), p. 173.
41. Çubukçu, 'Türkiye'de Maoculuğun', p. 55.
42. Gün Zileli emphasizes the positive reception of Chinese slogans such as 'American imperialism and nuclear threat are paper tigers' and 'Imperialism and its running dogs'. See G. Zileli (2000) *Yarılma: 1954–1972* (*The Cleavage: 1954–1972*) (İstanbul: Ozan Yayıncılık), p. 262.
43. In 1967 alone, three books were published on the nature of the Sino–Soviet split. See C. Baban (1967), *Çin–Rus Anlaşmazlığı* (*Sino–Russian Dispute*) (Ankara: Altınok Matbaası); Baby, *Çin–Rus Çatışmasının İçyüzü*, and S. Ege (1967) (ed.), *Pekin–Moskova Çatışması* (*Beijing–Moscow Conflict*) (Ankara: Bilim ve Sosyalizm Yayınları).
44. Zileli, *Yarılma*, p. 184.
45. Çubukçu, 'Türkiye'de Maoculuğun', p. 56.
46. E. Aydınoğlu (2008) *Türkiye Solu (1960–1980)* (*Turkish Left – 1960–1980*) (Istanbul: Versus Yayınları), p. 277.
47. Advocated first and foremost by Doğan Avcıoğlu and Mihri Belli, 'national democratic revolution' (*milli demokratik devrim* or MDD) became a popular term embraced by leftist circles during the late 1960s. Its proponents criticized the Labor Party of Turkey, which portrayed Turkey as a fully capitalist country ready to enter the next stage of economic development, that is socialism. MDD liners, by contrast, argued that Turkey was still a semi-feudal, semi-dependent country, which needed to go through a 'national-democratic' revolution that would enable Turkey to achieve full independence before it could move on to the socialist stage. In terms of strategy, MDD liners advocated building a united front of 'national forces'

vis-à-vis imperialist powers and their local collaborators. Eventually, MDD liners sought partners in the military and/or Kemalist circles.

48. S. Aydın (1998) 'Milli Demokratik Devrim'den 'Ulusal sol'a Türk solunda özgücü eğilim ('Indigenous Tendencies within the Turkish Left from "National Democratic Revolution" to "National Left"'), *Toplum ve Bilim*, 78, Güz, p. 66.
49. According to Oral Calışlar, the Maoist strategy of 'encircling the cities from the countryside' was particularly inspiring for the young radicals. Mater, *Sokak Güzeldir: 68'de Ne oldu?*, p. 260.
50. Mihri Belli was once accused of being a 'Maoist', which implied that he was unable to analyze Turkey's situation and produce solutions for its unique problems. He replied to his critics as follows: 'In China, a social revolution, which determined the destiny of 750 million people, took place. This revolution was realized through the adaptation of a practical guide called "scientific socialism" to China's specific conditions – by introducing a series of original solutions, without imitating the past. We, as the proletarian revolutionaries, are obliged to examine those. And the ones that know the problems of the Chinese revolution best are certainly those who have undertook that revolution. For this reason, we read, analyze and make use of Mao's work. But this is not "Maoism". Nor is it an unscientific attitude like seeking the solutions of the problems we face in Turkey by employing the ready-made prescriptions that come from China.' See Mihri Belli (1970), 'Proleter Devrimci Hareketimizin Çizgisi Açıktır: Milli Demokratik Devrim ve İçyüzü Broşürüne Cevap' ('The Line of Our Proletarian Revolutionary Movement Is Clear: A Response to the Pamphlet "National Democratic Revolution and Its Inside Story"'), in idem, *Yazılar: 1965–1970* (*Writings: 1965–1970*) (Ankara: Sol Yayınları), p. 362.
51. The TİİKP (Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık) group initially composed of Doğu Perinçek, Gün Zileli, Ömer Özerturgut, Erdoğan Güçbilmez, Şahin Alpay, Atıl Ant, and Cengiz Çandar. For a brief outline of the party's history, see D. Perinçek (1988), 'Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi (TİİKP)' (Turkish Revolutionary Party of Workers and Peasants'), in M. Belge (ed.) *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi* (*Encyclopedia of Socialism and Social Struggles*) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları), pp. 2186–7.
52. While the sympathizers of the 'national-democratic revolution' thesis advocated a united front strategy, which aimed to bring together 'progressive' elements in society, those who advocated guerilla warfare believed that revolutionary change could be achieved through armed struggle in the countryside. As early as 1971, TİİKP also faced inner divisions. As Oral Çalışlar, a former member of the party explains, 'During the March 12th period, two groups split from the TİİKP. The first group was headed by Garbis Altınoğlu, which later took the name Halkın Birliği (People's Union), the other was Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist Leninist or TKP/ML (Communist Party of Turkey, Marxist-Leninist) headed by İbrahim Kaypakkaya. Both movements placed more emphasis on the peasantry as compared to TİİKP and both regarded the party leadership as pacifist and rightist.' See O. Çalışlar (1988), 'Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi-Köylü Partisi' ('Turkish Revolutionary Party of Peasants and Workers'), in Belge (ed.), *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, pp. 2194–5.

53. For a detailed analysis of China's impact on the French intellectual scene during the 1960s and 1970s, see R. Wolin (2010) *The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution and the Legacy of the 1960s* (Princeton University Press).
54. Osman Turan's *Türkiye'de Komünizmin Kaynakları ve Kültür İhtilali* (*Sources of Communism in Turkey and the Cultural Revolution*) is a good case in point. Being a typical example of anti-communist literature, the book refers to China on many occasions – always with negative connotations. While the first edition of the book (1964) did not include the phrase 'cultural revolution' in its title, the author felt the need to use this phrase in its later editions. In the meantime, 'Cultural Revolution' has become a common term in Turkey.

Bibliography

Periodicals

Akşam (1966–69)
Cumhuriyet (1966–69)
Hürriyet (1966–69)
Milliyet (1966–69)
Tercüman (1966–69)
Ulus (1966–69)
Yeni Istanbul (1966–69)

Books and Articles

Altuğ, Y. (1967) *Çin Sorunu: 'Günün Siyasi ve İktisadi Meseleleri' Ders Notları*. İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi.
Atlı, A. (2010) '12 Mart Muhtırası ve Türkiye'nin Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'ni Tanıması', presented at Çin–Türkiye İlişkileri Çalıştayı (Sino–Turkish Relations Workshop), Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 7–8 May.
Aydın, S. (1998) 'Milli Demokratik Devrim'den 'Ulusal sol'a Türk solunda özgücü eğilim', *Toplum ve Bilim* 78, Güz.
Aydınoğlu, E. (2008) *Türkiye Solu (1960–1980)*. Istanbul: Versus Yayınları.
Baban, C. (1967) *Çin–Rus Anlaşmazlığı*. Ankara: Altınok Matbaası.
Baby, J. (1967) *Çin–Rus Çatışmasının İçyüzü*, ed. Orhan Eti. Istanbul: Gün Yayınları.
Belli, M. (1970) *Yazılar: 1965–1970*. Ankara: Sol Yayınları.
Bettelheim, C., and J. Charriere (1966) *Çin'de Sosyalizmin Kurtuluşu*. Istanbul: İzlem Yayınları.
Brieux, J.J. (1966) *Çin devrimi ve sonrası*, trans. Melih Borahan. Ankara: Toplum Yayınları.
Çalışlar, O. (1988) 'Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi-Köylü Partisi', in M. Belge (ed.), *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 2194–5.
Çetiner, Y. (1969) *Mao'ya Tapanlar*. Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınları.
Çubukçu, A. (2002) 'Türkiye'de Maoculuğun doğuşu üzerine bazı gözlemler', *Praksis*, no. 6, pp. 53–62.
Daubier, J. (1977) *Çin Kültür Devrimi Tarihi 1965–1969*, trans. Büşra Zarifoğlu. Istanbul: Koral Yayınları.

Ege, S. (ed.) (1967) *Pekin–Moskova Çatışması*. Ankara: Bilim ve Sosyalizm Yayınları.
Erer, T. (1972) *Çin'de Neler Gördüm?*, n.p. Ceylan Yayınları.
Fairbank, J.K. (1969) *Çağdaş Çin'in Temelleri 1840–1950*. Ankara: Doğan Yayınevi.
Fitzgerald, C.P. (1966) *Çin ihtilali*. Istanbul: Kitapçılık Limited Ortaklığı Yayınları.
Han, S. (1972) *Sabah Tufanı: Mao Zedung ve Çin devrimi, 1893–1854*. Istanbul: Hür Yayın ve Ticaret A.Ş.
Hsu, U.T. (1968) *Gizli Mücadele: Komünistler Çin'i nasıl ele geçirdi?*, trans. Cevdet San. Ankara: Doğuş Yayınları.
Jelohovstev, A. (1969) *Bir Sovyet Yazarının Gözüyle Çin Kültür İhtilali*, trans. Nihal Önal. Istanbul: Varlık Yayınları.
Klimke, M., and J. Scharloth (eds) (2008) *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism 1956–1977*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lai Y., and E. Behr (1971) *Mao'nun zindanları: Kızıl Cehennemde Bir Kadın*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.
Lin, T. (1966) *Pijama Hikayesi*. Ankara: Yarın Yayınları.
Lin, B. (1970) *Yaşasın Halk Savaşının Zaferi*. Ankara: Bilim ve Sosyalizm Yayınları.
Loh, R., and H. Evans (1976) *Kızıl Çin'den Neden Kaçtım*. Ankara: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Yayınları.
Lord, B. (1966) *Sekizinci ay (17 yaşındaki Çinli kız Sansan'ın Kızıl Çin'den firarının Heyecanlı Hikayesi)*. Istanbul: Gün Matbaası.
Mac Gregor-Hastie, R. (1969) *Bir Kızıl 'Barbar'*. Istanbul: Gün Yayınları.
Mao Çe-tung (1966) *Kültür, Sanat, Edebiyat*. Istanbul: Ataç Kitabevi.
——(1966) *Teori ve Pratik*. Ankara: Sol Yayınları.
——(1967) *Çin Kurtuluş Savaşı*, trans. Ahmet Angın. Istanbul: Habora Yayınları.
——(1967) *Emperyalizmle Mücadele*. Ankara: Sol Yayınları.
——(1967) *İhtilalin Özü*. Istanbul: Gün Yayınları.
——(1970) *Çin Devrimi*. Ankara: ODTÜ SEK Yayınları.
——(1970) *Halkın Demokratik Diktatörlüğü Üzerine*. Ankara: Aydınlık Yayınları.
——(1970) *Milli Burjuvazi ve Eşref Sorunu Üstüne*. Ankara: Ekim Yayınları.
——(1970) *Seçme Eserler*. Ankara: Ser Yayınları.
——(1971) *Askeri Yazılar*. Ankara: Sol Yayınları.
Mao Tsetung (1966) *Çin inkılabının teorik meseleleri*, trans. K. Sahir Sel. Istanbul: Sosyal Yayınları.
——(1967) *Gerilla Harbi*. Istanbul: Payel Yayınları.
——(1967) *Yeni Demokrasi*. Istanbul: Sosyal Yayınları.
——(1969) *Başkan Mao Tsetung'un Sözleri*. Ankara: Ekim Yayınları.
——(1969) *Halk Savaşında Temel Taktikler*. Ankara: Ser Yayınları.
——(1970) *Başkan Mao Tsetung'un sözleri*, trans. Y. Yalçın. Ankara: Ekim Yayınları.
——(1970) *Sağ ve Sol Sapma*. Ankara: Ekim Yayınları.
Marsouin, J., and T. Marsouin (1967) *Komünist Çin'den Geliyoruz*, trans. E. Esenkova and R. Tumen. Istanbul: Sıralar Matbaası.
Mater, N. (2009) *Sokak Güzeldir: 68'de Ne oldu?* Istanbul: Metis Yayınları.
Perinçek, D. (1988) 'Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi (TİİKP)', in M. Belge (ed.), *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 2186–7.

Schram, S. (1970) *Çin'de Sürekli Devrim*. Istanbul: Yol Yayınları.
Snow, E. (1967) *Mao Çe-tung: Bir devrimcinin otobiografisi*, trans. M. Ardos. Ankara: Sol Yayınları.
Tao Ç., J. Charriere, and H. Marchisio (1968) *Çin'de Halk Komünleri*, trans. A. Necmi. Istanbul: Payel Yayınları.
Turan, O. (1977) *Türkiye'de Komünizmin Kaynakları ve Kültür İhtilali*. Istanbul: Nakış Yayınları.
Wolin, R. (2010) *The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution and the Legacy of the 1960s*. Princeton University Press.
Zileli, G. (2000) *Yarılma: 1954–1972*. İstanbul: Ozan Yayıncılık.

3

Cultural Cold War at the İzmir International Fair: 1950s–60s

Sezgi Durgun

The world fairs are political as well as cultural spaces for confrontation, propaganda, and persuasion.[1] During the Cold War, the international fairs proved to be significant arenas of propaganda, which reflected an 'ideological geopolitics'[2] that demarcated the 'free' West from the communist Eastern bloc. Therefore, the fairs during the Cold War period were used by the superpowers to upstage each other by showing their latest innovations in space science, industrial design, as well as agricultural technologies. Hence, one of the important aspects of Cold War fairs lies in the fact that they shrank the bipolar constellation of world politics into a spectacle, where 'consumer goods work better than the explosives'.[3] This essay focuses on the Cold War themes of the İzmir International Fair, which was an important location for ideological confrontation and propaganda. Through the examination of local newspapers, I will present a depiction of how the two superpowers utilized the İzmir International Fair during the 1950s and 1960s.

The İzmir International Fair is worth discussing in many respects. It was founded by the Turkish State in 1927 with the cooperation of the Governor's Office, Municipality, and the İzmir Chamber of Commerce. It took almost ten years to transform it into an international Fair[4] that could effectively serve multiple purposes, such as showcasing technology, accelerating international trade, and spreading cultural propaganda. Moreover, according to some journalists, the İzmir Fair served other purposes, such as espionage, which implies that secret agents were allegedly sent to the Fair mostly by the members of the Warsaw Pact, while some other countries (such as Korea, India, Libya, Japan, and China) sent their agents to İzmir for 'internships'.[5]

It is also worth noting that besides being one of the confrontation arenas of the superpowers, the İzmir Fair was one of the early

propaganda tools used by the young Turkish Republic to promote the Western modernization to its own citizens. In the national context İzmir Fair was described as a 'public school' (*Halk Okulu*)[6] that was associated with the Turkish Republic's attitude of 'teaching how to be Western and modern'. By looking into the historical transformation of the fair arena, it seems historically significant to observe how 'Smyrna', being the Ottoman cosmopolitan hub populated by Armenian and Greek merchants for many years, became 'İzmir', the modern face of the republic.

In the early years of the republic, İzmir was associated with the modern life style, trade, and national commercial development. Thus, İzmir was chosen as a venue for the First National Economy Congress that was held on 17 February 1923, eight months before the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. The first economy congress in İzmir had a vital importance for the articulation of a national economic policy[7] that would serve the development of the national market. It was decided that rapid economic measures were to be taken, such as establishing an industrial bank that would provide credit to the Turkish industrialists, and adopting the law for the encouragement of the national market and industry.[8] Simultaneously with this congress, an exhibition that displayed local and national products regarding agriculture and handicrafts was held. The İzmir Chamber of Commerce was in charge of the arrangements of this exhibition, which paved the way for further exhibitions in 1927 and 1928.[9]

The exhibition of 1927 was organized when Kazım Pasha, who had been one of the famous commanders of the National Struggle, was appointed as the Governor of İzmir. Kazım Pasha was interested in economic progress and the growth of the local market. With the participation of Governor Kazım Dirik, the president, and the members of İzmir Chamber of Commerce, municipality authorities, press, tradesmen, and businessmen, it was decided that a commission would be established in order to organize regular local exhibitions, called the '9th of September Exhibition'.[10] The primary goal here was to encourage the national market and to open the doors for international exchange and trade. Among the participants of these exhibitions there were countries – such as the Soviet Union, England, France, and Italy – who exhibited local goods such as hats, woven goods, perfumery, leather, furniture, tiles, and agricultural tools. The textile workbenches of Russians, cars of Germans, agricultural tools of Hungarians, and automobiles, were all pieces of great interest. So, exhibitions in 1923, 1927, and 1928 can be seen as the preliminary versions of today's İzmir International Fair.[11] Eventually,

with its membership in the Global Association of the Exhibition Industry (UFI) in 1948,[12] İzmir Fair turned into an international arena where one could observe the basic dynamics of world politics that cast their shadow on international commerce.

Although İzmir Fair has received some scholarly attention, the Cold War propaganda and persuasion mechanisms and the cultural/technological rivalry at the Fair seem to have been neglected. The literature regarding the Fair[13] remains content either with the larger historical discussion of Turkey's Euro-American modernization or the examination of the Fair's role in the national market.[14] This essay, therefore, attempts to address this gap by offering a picture of the ideological/cultural competition between the American and Soviet pavilions in the Fair in the period 1950–70. The analysis here will be based on the examination of the local media (*Yeni Asır* and *Ege Express*) and city archives at İzmir Fair Services Culture and Art Affairs Trade Inc. (IZFAS).

Before providing any analysis of the atmosphere at the İzmir Fair, it must be noted that the Americans and the Soviets were not competing under equal conditions at the Fair. Although Turkey had close relations with the Soviet Union during the 1930s, the Turkish state distanced itself from the Eastern bloc, remained an 'uncommitted country' in later years, and kept the relationship on a pragmatic level. With the beginning of the Cold War, the Turkish state clearly sided with the Western bloc; in this context Marshall Aid and NATO membership paved the way for Americanization and anti-communism, which were appropriated by the Turkish state.

The 'Eastern Bloc' at the Fair

Until the 1950s, the Soviet Union was seemingly ahead of the United States in terms of propaganda and persuasion activities at the international fairs.[15] Obviously, in the exhibits of the Soviet Union and the other communist countries international trade fairs not only offered opportunities for commerce but also provided straightforward access to the public for promoting ideologies in different countries.[16]

The history of Turkish–Soviet relations goes back to the Turkish War of Liberation. The Soviet Union was the first great power that recognized the government of Ankara. Later, during the preliminary process of the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Turkish–Soviet exchange also remained relatively intense.[17] From the end of the 1920s until the Second World War, a young Turkish Republic was in active cooperation with the Soviet Union.[18] During the one-party rule of the Republican

People's Party (RPP), it was apparent that the Turkish state was mainly interested in making use of Soviet development policies. However, as I have already mentioned, from the Turkish state's view, Turkish–Soviet friendship had no ideological depth, and it was rather a technical cooperation.

The Soviet Union was present at the first two İzmir Fairs (1927 and 1928), which were opened under the title the '9th September Exhibition'. As a matter of fact, in 1927, nine foreign countries and more than 70 foreign participant companies were represented, with a total of 80,774 visitors.[19] The number of Soviet companies was 16, whereas there were only 5 American companies.[20] Soviet presence at the Fair gradually increased during the 1930s. The Fairs in 1933 and 1934 were especially vital for the reinforcement of Turkish–Soviet exchange. For instance, in 1934, an area of 700 sq m (400 sq m indoor – 300 sq m outdoor) was designed for the Soviet Pavilion, which was to be reserved also for the coming years.[21] In this area, Soviets displayed agricultural machinery, radio/cinema equipment, medical instruments, motors/industrial machinery, clothing, and ceramic products. It caught the attention of Turkish visitors mostly when two large-scale portraits of the founders of the Turkish Republic (M. Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü) were displayed; these portraits were made of specially colored lamps and neon lighting, which was one of the innovative Soviet products of the time.[22]

During the formative period of the İzmir Fair, the Soviet Union not only remained a loyal participant but also contributed to the construction of the fair arena. In 1936, Nikolai Bulganin,[23] the Mayor of Moscow at the time, sent Soviet architects to İzmir to restore the Fair venue (360,000 sq m), which included the central city quarters destroyed by the 'Great Fire' (1922).[24] After reconstruction, this venue was named *Kültürpark*, a name inspired by the Culture Park in Moscow.[25] From the Turkish perspective, this was a necessary move, which would also serve to redefine İzmir's *agora*.[26]

For the internationalization of the Fair in 1936, the Turkish state did its best to cooperate with the participant countries (primarily with the Soviet Union) and to reduce the amount of bureaucracy involved in the preparations. To facilitate the process, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs abolished the visa requirements and fees for visitors from the participant countries who were represented by a total of 48 companies at the Fair (the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Greece).[27] Besides, the Turkish Ministry of Interior obliged all regional companies and chambers of commerce to construct their own pavilions to display Turkish products and engage

in business with foreign companies at the Fair. Consequently, 45 local companies participated.[28]

In 1936, *Kültürpark*'s inauguration ceremony was attended by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and a group of ministers on 1 September 1936.[29] The prime minister's visit gave an impetus for the planning of the next fair in 1937. Throughout the year 1937, there was an intense preoccupation with the preparations by which the Municipality started to build modern gardens, decorative fountains, restaurants, and recreation areas around the pavilions.[30] In September 1937, the Minister of Economic Affairs, Celal Bayar, inaugurated the fair in which 104 foreign and 424 local companies participated.[31] In these formative years, the state institutions were also actively represented, as in 1937 when the Ministry of Health opened a Health Museum and the Turkish Aeronautical Association (Türk Hava Kurumu) constructed the famous Parachute Tower,[32] which became one of the symbols of the Fair.[33]

The Heyday of American Influence

After the Second World War, since Turkey sided with the Western bloc, the Soviet–Turkish friendship swiftly ceased. In the new political context, Turkey was positioned as a base of the US Cold War strategy.

During the post-war period the US government took action in general and employed new strategies regarding economic aids and cultural propaganda. In this context, the Truman Doctrine (1947) and the Marshall Plan (1948)[34] were announced and NATO (1949) was founded as the military alliance that served to contain communism. As a matter of fact, American domination rapidly increased after Turkey became a NATO member in 1952. Moreover, during the 1950s and 1960s, the NATO information service introduced a chain of propaganda campaigns via travelling exhibitions that toured NATO countries.[35] Between January–March 1953 the NATO exhibition started to tour Turkey and it came to İzmir, where the NATO's Air Component Command Headquarters was located.[36]

In terms of propaganda, the American discourse in general had set its goals in the following way:

> Other exhibiting nations do need, and expect, to sell merchandise; the U.S.A. wants and needs to establish its influence in politically uneasy countries, to promote capitalism as a system superior to communism. The first goal then, is eminently political despite its commercial garb.[37]

Eventually the post-war period marked the Americanization period in Turkey. Meanwhile during this period Turkish domestic politics was also transforming with the introduction of the 'multi-party system' and rule of the Democrat Party, which followed a relatively liberal, trade-driven development policy with an emphasis on private entrepreneurship. In this context, Turkish economic policy was shaped through the Marshall Aid program.[38]

In 1950, even before Turkey's NATO membership, numerous American investments and Marshall Aid were advertised in the Marshall Pavilion. On 23 August 1950, the Marshall Pavilion was opened by Russell Dorr,[39] who gave a speech on agricultural machinery and industrial aid.[40] In his speech, Dorr underlined the message that 'İzmir will be the hub for new Eastern markets as well as for American goods; the quality of life will increase by the cooperation between the liberal and independent countries who serve world peace.' The local newspaper *Yeni Asır* reported Dorr's speech along with the speeches of the Turkish Minister of Economic Affairs, the Mayor, and the Governor of İzmir. As the newspaper *Yeni Asır* reported, the opening ceremony of the Marshall Pavilion ended with the release of many colorful kite-balloons as symbols of freedom and peace. The spectators and journalists were reminded by the pavilion managers that 'these balloons are real balloons', so that the public should not draw any analogies between 'balloons' and 'vain promises'. Hence, Turkish local media reported Dorr's visit and Marshall Aid as 'the touch of the peace fairy' to Turkish–American friendship.[41]

Already in the mid-1950s, the imagery and discourse of the American Pavilion was incorporated by the official advertisements of the İzmir Fair itself. The similarity between the symbolism of the posters of the İzmir Fair and of the Marshall Plan proves that the promotion of Marshall Aid was seen as an important, planned feature of the İzmir Fair. In both posters the cooperation of nations was depicted as the flags of the European nations forming the blades of a windmill while the American flag forms the tail. The poster text is the following: *Whatever the weather, we only reach welfare together.*[42] In the same spirit of cooperation, the official guide of the Fair described the Marshall Plan as a process 'that paves the way for world peace and welfare, which would make the nations stronger'. Meanwhile, it was also remarkable that the American President, Eisenhower, sent an official letter to İzmir Fair (1956), in which he emphasized the role of the Marshall Plan, while underlining 'the significance of İzmir Fair that contributes to the free exchange of ideas for the improvement of humanity'. Moreover, this

letter also highlighted the benefits of Marshall Aid as 'a peaceful model that makes it possible to produce cheaper goods with less labor so that the majority would benefit from it'.[43] It was obvious that the Marshall Plan was not only promoting a certain way of liberalism and industrial development, it was also touching on the lifestyle of the people. The publicists of the Marshall Pavilion invited visitors to the Fair 'to taste the experience' of the First World's consumption culture. At that time, it was typical of the American exhibitions to 'domesticate the Cold War' by using household items or a 'typical American home and kitchen' as propaganda vehicles.[44] So, cosmetics (lipstick and shaving foam), kitchenware, and home decoration were displayed as elements of the American lifestyle. Besides displaying American domestic culture, there was also an attempt to familiarize the Turkish public with American food culture. It is worth noting in this context that many visitors had the first taste of Coke and hot dogs at the İzmir Fair in the 1950s.[45] Particularly, the Coca-Cola Pavilion was promoted in the Fair's amusement park as the 'magic drink' that was about to bring Turks under its spell. In the food section there were many types of canned food that were donated to the Turkish Ministry of Education, which later distributed this food to poor students and families in need.[46] How American propaganda was incorporated into popular culture was also illustrated during the Fair of 1954, where the records of a Turkish song by Celal İnce were distributed free of charge. The album cover listed the 'words of freedom' by the founding fathers of Turkey and the US, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) and George Washington (1732–99). This song (in the popular tango style) portrays how American hegemony in Turkish popular culture became visible:[47]

> America, America / As long as the world stands
> Turkish people are with you in the war of freedom.
> This is a song of friendship, reflection of siblinghood,
> We became blood-brothers in Korea;
> The light of this friendship does not go out.

During the 1950s the Americanization of popular culture could be seen in fashionable pop music, jazz orchestras, and variety shows at the Fair. The entertainment arenas, casinos, restaurants, and night clubs (*Mogambo*, *Göl Casino*, and *Cubana*), artificial lakes, and fountains of the Fair all became new gathering points for the urban upper-class.[48] Western-style popular culture dominated even the production of 'political meaning' and 'branding'. For instance, a newly designed park for

free public use, which was located around the most stylish part of the Fair – that is, around the artificial lake (*Göl*) and next to the elegant Lake Casino-Club (*Göl Gazinosu*) – was named by the Fair authorities the 'Democratic Recreation Area' (*Demokratik Gezinti Yeri*).[49]

The Space Race: 'Sputnik versus Apollo'

As the post-war period brought a boom in innovations and technology, it also brought new ways of competing, one of which was the space race, which enjoyed remarkable publicity at the Fair. Obviously, the innovations in space science were used by America and the Soviet Union to undermine each other. As it follows from the headlines of the newspapers, local media was almost encouraging the race between the US and the USSR. The news was presenting the space race almost as science fiction movie ads and as the ultimate game of the superpowers, where each party was trying to attract public attention with the most surprising discovery.

In 1958, the İzmir Fair hosted the first big showcase regarding space science: a model of (the 30 m) *Sputnik 1*, the first artificial satellite launched on 4 October 1957, was proudly exhibited by the Soviets in their pavilion (4250 sq m). The section reserved for *Sputnik* in the Soviet Pavilion was the main center of attraction for the visitors. The representatives of the Soviet Pavilion were overwhelmed by the curiosity of the crowd and journalists. Pleased by the high public interest, Soviet representatives advertised the idea 'that they could have launched Sputnik from İzmir too – only if there was a rocket here', and that 'they could send men to the moon as soon as they invent the technology for the return!'[50] In the same year, in response to the Soviet *Sputnik*, the American Pavilion (4500 sq m) tried to attract the public's attention with the debut of another technological innovation: television. At the American Pavilion, a TV station was set up to broadcast throughout the fair arena. TV was found to be 'magical' by the general public who watched it for the first time.[51] When a live interview with the Turkish Minister of Economy was broadcasted, it was pronounced 'magical' by the minister himself, who had appeared on TV for the first time in his life.[52]

İzmir Fair supplements of both the local and national newspapers reported the space race with a special focus. In 1960, the president of Turkey, Cemal Gürsel, visited both the Soviet Pavilion and the American Pavilion to receive information about the latest innovations in space science. How the US and Soviet pavilions received President Gürsel was

compared by the local media in the following way: 'At the American pavilion Mr Gürsel was offered *Coca-Cola* from the paper cup of a vending machine', which is interpreted as American style: 'automatic and easy', whereas in the Soviet Pavilion, President Gürsel was given a special gift, the model of the Sputnik (that was also called the *baby moon*) while he was offered a glass of Russian Vodka.[53]

To talk about 'the man in space', visitors to the İzmir Fair had to wait until 1961, when the Soviets managed to launch the rocket called *Vostok 1* to the moon. Yuri Gagarin, the cosmonaut of *Vostok 1* who traveled to the moon, was one of the most popular figures at the Fair of 1961. The gigantic picture of Gagarin at the entrance of the Soviet Pavilion was reported in the local news as the 'the new propaganda tool of the Soviets'.[54]

In terms of the space race, the US's genuine reply to *Sputnik* came with *Apollo 11*. *Apollo 11* was the spaceflight which landed the first people; it accomplished a national goal proposed in 1961 by late US President John F. Kennedy. According to NASA's historical records, Kennedy felt great pressure to have the United States 'catch up to and overtake' the Soviet Union in the 'space race'. Four years after the Sputnik surprise of 1957, the cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin had become the first human in space on April 12, 1961. It was very embarrassing for the US.[55] When Neil Armstrong stepped off the Lunar Module's ladder onto the Moon's surface and returned back safely to the Earth, this effectively ended the space race.[56] This 'moon walk', in the form of a short documentary, was proudly shown to visitors[57] with the model of *Apollo 11* at the American Pavilion at the İzmir Fair in 1969.

During the space race, 'space imagery' was dominating the advertisement and entertainment discourse at the Fair. For instance in the 1970s, Zeki Müren (1931–96), a prominent Turkish singer, who performed his regular shows in *Manolya* Garden, was announced in the posters as 'the man who came from Space'. Müren appeared onstage with one of his unique costumes embellished with a glossy metallic accessory that was inspired from the 'space-effect' and 'extraterrestrial' characteristics, that is with extremely high-heeled shoes, mini skirt and feminine make up, which blurred the distinction between gender roles.

Under the Pressure of 'Anti-Communism'

As mentioned at the beginning of this essay, the Soviets and the Americans did not compete with each other under equal conditions. In the heyday of İzmir Fair's American influence during the early 1950s,

the pressure of anti-communism was clearly felt at the Fair. As can be seen in the state discourse and local media, the public was warned against 'the danger of communist propaganda' at the Eastern bloc pavilions.[58]

During the 1950s up until the end of 1960s, the pavilions of Czechoslovakia and Hungary were inspected numerous times by the İzmir police on suspicion of communist propaganda. It became almost an ordinary security measure to send the suspected material to Fair Security and threaten those pavilions with the charge of the 'misuse of trade arena by promoting communism'.[59] Apparently, in contrast to the hospitality shown to the American Pavilion, the Soviet bloc was treated as a 'dangerous' friend of Turkey. It was claimed by the local media that Soviets were using the international atmosphere of friendship for the propagation of collectivism.[60]

Anti-communism at the Fair reached its climax in 1951, when the Czechoslovakian Pavilion was charged with communist propaganda and closed down on 24 August 1951. The directors of the pavilion got arrested by the police and were tried at the High Criminal Court of İzmir. The court confiscated 10 posters and signboards that were allegedly associated with communist propaganda. Specifically, the poster that describes the Soviet view of 'world peace' was interpreted as a communist propaganda tool. The title of the poster was as follows: 'Peace is not to be ushered in by prayers but by uniting the struggle of the peace-loving nations and communities.'[61]

It is remarkable that the theme of the 'peace fairy', which was a regular discursive element in the Marshall Pavilion, was taken as illegal propaganda when set in the Czechoslovakian Pavilion. At the court, the directors of the pavilion defended themselves by claiming that 'they had used the posters in the previous İzmir Fairs and they were using the same material all around the World Fairs in Brussels, London and Paris'.[62] Despite apologies and explanations, the representatives of the Czechoslovakian Pavilion were blamed in the local media for 'agitating the public and abusing the international space by communist propaganda'.[63] Rüştü Şardağ, a Turkish politician, editor, and columnist in *Yeni Asır* interpreted this case in an idiosyncratic manner. In his column he wrote an imaginary dialogue with the pavilion as if the pavilion was a person victimized by Soviet propaganda: 'I asked whether there was really nothing else to exhibit but the Muscovite agitative slogans. "Where are your national goods and products?" The Czech Pavilion answered: "This brutal regime swept away our national and human values, so we are mutilated."'[64]

Following the Czechoslovakian case, the prosecutor instituted a legal proceeding against the Hungarian Pavilion on suspicion of 'communist propaganda'.[65] The Turkish security forces regularly checked the pavilions of the Soviet bloc countries and the İzmir police were constantly vigilant towards all types of communist propaganda. Numerous times, documents such as prospectuses, flyers, brochures, even records of folk songs, were deemed illegal communist propaganda. On 23 August 1961, the Turkish security forces confiscated the prospectus of the machines at the Soviet Pavilion under suspicion of the propaganda of 'collectivism'. After İzmir police inspected the pavilions, the prospectus documents, and many folk song recordings were expropriated and sent to Ankara for further investigation.[66] In 1966, the Soviet Pavilion was again examined by Turkish Security Forces under suspicion of the propaganda of collectivism. A 44-page booklet from the pavilion was sent to Ankara to be examined by the censorship committee.[67] Also on 17 September 1969, the İzmir police confiscated records of the voice of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, and accused the Soviet Pavilion of promoting 'communism'.[68]

Anti-Western and Anti-American Protests

For Turkey, the 1960s marked the period when the capitalist model and alliance with the Western bloc were seriously questioned for the first time. As this sort of skepticism arose, the Fair arena transformed from being a simple stage for confrontation into a place where multiple actions and attitudes interacted. Hence in this multifaceted atmosphere, anti-communism (retained and expressed as an active pressure on the pavilions of the Soviet/Eastern bloc) and newly emerging anti-Americanism were resonating with the rising sentiments of Turkish nationalism.

The mid-1960s were the most hectic years at the İzmir Fair in terms of public protests. In particular, the Cyprus issue in 1963–64 and Arab–Israeli conflict in 1967–69 led to rising anti-American sentiment, which cast its shadow heavily on the arena of the İzmir International Fair. Due to the US position on the Cyprus issue, in 1964 there were remarkable protests targeted at the American Pavilion. A flyer that was distributed by the protestors at the Fair's main entrance gate in 1964 called for boycotting the American Pavilion: 'Citizen! You can't be friends with a country that tries to prove you wrong on the Cyprus issue. Yes, you are right. Don't visit the American Pavilion!'[69]

The protest groups were referring to US President Lyndon Johnson and his famous letter to İsmet İnönü of 5 June 1964, where Johnson

stated that the 'US is against a possible invasion of Cyprus' and 'will not help Turkey if an invasion of Cyprus leads to conflict with the Soviet Union'.[70] In order to protest the American position, students used the following slogans in demonstrations: 'Johnson, False Friend!' 'Yankee Go Home!' 'NATO Fiasco!', and 'Where is the Declaration of Human Rights?'[71]

The protest started to heat up and turned into riots on the night of 29 August 1964, and consequently things got out of control when the protesters started to damage many countries' pavilions and burn the flags of the United States, Greece, Bulgaria, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, the United Arab Republic, France, and the United Kingdom. During the protests some of the national pavilions – particularly the Institution of Agricultural Equipment (*Zirai Donatım Kurumu*), which had been integrated with the Marshall Pavilion – got their fair share of anti-American sentiment. The protests were not only limited to the destruction of the pavilions at the Fair arena. Western-style entertainment clubs also became a target of the protests. Furthermore, famous nightclubs such as *Mogambo*, *Cubana* and *Göl Casino*, where dance shows and jazz music were staged for upper-class customers, were attacked.[72] One can possibly argue that in these reactive protests there was a mixture of political attitudes and conservative-nationalist sentiments blending through resentment of the Western life style. Moreover, the protests were not only limited to the fair arena, they spread all around İzmir and targeted the American, Greek, and Italian consulates and the Anglican Church. Due to these events, the American Consulate in İzmir canceled the celebration activities for the 'American Day' which was to be held on 7 September 1964. As a result of these protests the security measures were tightened throughout the city and consequently 63 people stood trial at the Criminal Court of İzmir.[73]

Despite all the chaos of the atmosphere (anti-communism, anti-American protests, an increase in Turkish nationalism), the 1960s can be seen as a period when commercial links were tightened with the Soviet/ Eastern bloc. Given the rise of anti-American sentiments, it is highly probable that the Soviet authorities wished to revive Turkish–Soviet relations via trade and exchange. For instance, in 1969, the director of the Soviet Pavilion, M. Saharov, declared[74] that 'we are happy that Turkish–Russian trade is increasing', while he referred to the statistics of bilateral trade, which gradually rose from 17 million rubles (1964) up to 55 million rubles (1968) in four years. However, as mentioned in the previous section on anti-communism, 28 days after Saharov's press statement, the İzmir police confiscated the records of the voice

of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in the Soviet Pavilion and accused the Soviet authorities of promoting communism.[75]

Meanwhile, the pavilions of the Eastern bloc promoted the advantages of Turkish–East European exchange: geographical proximity, cheap and fast trade via the Black Sea, and common historical heritage. The pavilions of Romania and Bulgaria in particular were highlighting that they were the 'Balkan neighbors' of Turkey.[76] In the same context, Hungary, which built a close relationship with the İzmir Chamber of Commerce and signed acts of cooperation for specific deals, was also underlining its historical friendship with Turkey.[77] As a result of these deals the Turkish trade volume with the Eastern bloc countries rapidly increased during the 1960s; for instance, Bulgarian–Turkish trade tripled from $2,544,000 in 1955 to $6,026,000 in 1964, and the future target was announced as $13,500,000 by the annual protocol signed in 1966.[78]

In this context, the Bulgarian Pavilion was proudly exhibiting its industrial machinery and also products that were used for cargo and transportation inside factory plants, such as motors and electrocars,[79] which had a solid market in Turkey. The electrocar in particular was exhibited in the Bulgarian Pavilion and highlighted as one of the favorite vehicles used in the Turkish mining and metal fabricating sectors of 54 Turkish cities.[80]

Among the other pavilions of the Eastern bloc, the Czechoslovakian Pavilion stood out for its display of medical instruments (surgical equipment, X-ray dental radiography, and optical instruments), motorcycles (Skoda, Slavia, CV, and JAVVA), radio sets, recorders, cameras, Sinephon motion picture projectors, and musical instruments. In 1967, the Czechoslovakian Pavilion proudly announced that '35,000 *CV* and *JAVVA* motorcycles were used in the Turkish market'. The pavilion also emphasized that 'more than 2000 Czechoslovakian engines and machines are used in the Turkish textile industry'; moreover, the 'Turkish auto-steel factory in Istanbul produces 10,000 motorcycles patented by Czechoslovakia'.[81] In the same year, in order to highlight its cooperative role in the development of the Turkish economy, the Czechoslovakian Pavilion displayed models of prototypical Turkish factories at the Fair. These were the factories that were founded by Czechoslovakian companies in the city of Uşak (the first sugar factory, 1926), in the capital city Ankara (a beer factory, 1935), and also in the city of Çanakkale (Çanakkale ceramic factory, 1957).[82]

As a whole it can be argued that from the mid-1960s onwards, the climate of the Fair was becoming more multi-dimensional when compared

to the 1950s, when there was a clear American hegemony. The 1960s was also the period when Turkey witnessed the rising power of civil movements and left-wing political organizations in general. As can be understood from protests at the Fair in 1964, the reactions of people to Americanization were becoming more noticeable in the public sphere.

Concluding Remarks

During the 1950s to 1960s, İzmir Fair was a stage for ideological rivalry between the US and the USSR. From the US perspective, it was an important place to promote the Marshall Plan, to advertise the American way of life, and create a NATO hub for the Middle East and Mediterranean. Hence, in 1950–60, the Fair's atmosphere was highly Americanized. The American Pavilion focused on the publicity of the Marshall Plan investments in Turkey (i.e., imports of agricultural machinery) as well as promoting new consumerist values (TV sets, canned food, cosmetics, jazz music records, kitchen appliances, and Coca-Cola) together with anti-communism, which was welcomed by the Turkish state. The same place was viewed by the Soviets as modeling Moscow Culture Park, where they could exhibit their latest technological innovations and display the 'spirit of the Soviets' in an international atmosphere.

From the perspective of the Turkish state and Fair authorities, this Cold War rivalry was seen as advantageous both for international trade and development policies. In spite of its anti-communist policy at the Fair, the Turkish state accelerated trade relations with the Soviets at the end of the 1960s. Therefore, it can be argued that the economic pragmatism, changing interests, and national and international politics were the main factors that governed the multilayered interactions at the Fair. In sum, İzmir Fair perfectly illustrates that culture and technology were used as Cold War weapons by the superpowers. It also provides us with a significant example of how the Fair arena is politicized by the public (such as the Anti-American protests), which proves that the relation between the senders and receivers of propaganda is not necessarily one-dimensional.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Sabiha Tezcan from İZFAŞ for invaluable professional help, providing unpublished reports and

documents. I also would like to extend special thanks to Dr Charles Sabatos (Yeditepe University) and Dr Ksenia Gorbenko (University of Pennsylvania) who read and commented on the essay with great interest and academic attention.

Notes

1. One famous historical example of this confrontation was the face-off between the German and Soviet Pavilions during the interwar period at Paris Expo *International Exposition: Art and Technology in Modern Life* (1937), where each was trying to overshadow the other by the style and size of Pavilions. This was a powerful example of 'cultural propaganda', which loaded the power struggles that predated the imminent catastrophes of the Second World War. For further analysis, see: J. Willett (1996) *Art and Politics in the Weimar Period* (New York: Da Capo Press), pp. 213–22; see also S. Durgun (2006) 'The Architectural Death Cult Faces the World', *Lapsus*, 1, no. 1, pp. 117–29. For the analogy between interwar cultural propaganda and Cold War Exhibitions, see J. Masey and C.L. Morgan (2008) *Cold War Confrontations* (Baden: Lars Müller).
2. J. Agnew (1998) *Geopolitics: Revisioning World Politics* (London: Routledge), pp. 86–124.
3. G. Castillo (2005) 'Domesticating the Cold War: Household Consumption as Propaganda in Marshall Plan Germany', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40, no. 2, p. 261.
4. According to archival records (İZFAŞ), the first international participation took place in 1936. İzmir International Fair became a member of the UFI, the Global Association of the Exhibition Industry, in 1948.
5. M. Qasımlı (2012) *SSCB-Türkiye: İlişkilerin Normalleştirilmesinden Yeni Soğuk Savaş'a Kadar* (Istanbul: Kaknüs).
6. The term 'public school' (*Halk Okulu*) was coined by the Mayor of İzmir, Behçet Uz (1893–1986) in his speech at the closing ceremony of the İzmir Fair (1933). See Y. Aksoy (2001) *Love for 70 Years: İzmir Fair* (İzmir: Metropolitan Municipality of İzmir), p. 5.
7. The Second Economy Congress, with prominent references to the first, was held in 1981 after the 1980 Turkish *coup d'état*, also in İzmir.
8. A.G. Ökçün (1981) *Economic Congress of Turkey* (AÜSBF Publications), 471 (Ankara: Ataturk University Faculty of Social Sciences).
9. E. Polat (2008) 'Uluslararası İzmir Fuarının Kuruluşu ve İlk Sergiler' ('The Foundation of the International İzmir Fair and the First Exhibitions'), MA thesis, Dokuz Eylül University (İzmir: Institute of the Social Sciences), pp. 29–73.
10. Polat, 'Uluslararası İzmir Fuarının Kuruluşu ve İlk Sergiler', pp. 58–73.
11. İzfaş Archive, 'Brief History Online', available at http://izfas.com.tr (accessed 5 September 2011).
12. İzfaş Archive, 'Brief History Online' (accessed 5 September 2011).
13. M.Ö. Gürel (2011) 'Architectural Mimicry, Spaces of Modernity: The Island Casino – İzmir, Turkey', *Journal of Architecture*, 16, no. 2, pp. 165–90; E. Er

and F. Korkut (2003) 'U.S. Involvement in the Development of Design in the Periphery: The Case History of Industrial Design Education in Turkey, 1950s–1970s', *Design Issues*, 19, no. 2, pp. 17–34; E. Ergut and B. İmamoğlu (2009) *Cumhuriyet'in Mekânları Zamanları, İnsanları* (Ankara: Dipnot).

14. Polat, 'Uluslararası İzmir Fuarının Kuruluşu ve İlk Sergiler'.
15. Er and Korkut, 'U.S. Involvement', p. 21.
16. Er and Korkut, 'U.S. Involvement', p. 21.
17. H.F. Gürsel (1968) *Tarih Boyunca Türk–Rus İlişkileri* (Istanbul: Ak).
18. The Soviet–Turkish Treaty of Friendship was signed on 16 March 1921. For further information, see S. Bilge (1992) *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye–Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920–1964* (Ankara: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları).
19. Polat, 'Uluslararası İzmir Fuarının Kuruluşu ve İlk Sergiler', p. 42. As a matter of fact, the United States participated in both the 1927 and 1928 Fairs, but its participation did not leave any major trace; it was hardly mentioned in the local media.
20. Polat, 'Uluslararası İzmir Fuarının Kuruluşu ve İlk Sergiler', p. 44.
21. Polat, 'Uluslararası İzmir Fuarının Kuruluşu ve İlk Sergiler', p. 108.
22. Polat, 'Uluslararası İzmir Fuarının Kuruluşu ve İlk Sergiler', p. 109.
23. In 1931 Nikolai Bulganin (1885–1975) was the mayor of Moscow. During the Second World War Bulganin served under Joseph Stalin in the war cabinet. See R.D. Markwick (2004) 'N.A. Bulganin', *USA's Encyclopedia of Russian History*, Digital – Macmillan Reference.
24. This fire destroyed the arena that once was the cosmopolitan marketplace dominated by non-Muslim Ottoman subjects and foreigners – 'Levantines' or 'Franks' – of European origin. For a discussion of how the 'Great Fire' (1922) got erased from public memory, see B. Kolluoğlu Kırlı (2005) 'Forgetting the İzmir Fire', *History Workshop Journal*, 60, pp. 25–44.
25. Y.P. Zander (2010) 'Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminin Önemli Bir Tanığı Olarak İzmir Fuarı', in E.A. Ergut and B. İmamoğlu (eds), *Cumhuriyet'in Mekânları Zamanları, İnsanları* (Ankara: Dipnot), p. 144.
26. By the *agora* I refer to the arena that was destroyed by the 'Great Fire' (1922). See n. 24.
27. Y. Aksoy (1983) '1936 İzmir Enternasyonal Fuarı'nn Açılışı' ('The Opening of İzmir International Fair 1936'), *Yeni Asır*, 4 August 1983.
28. Polat, 'Uluslararası İzmir Fuarının Kuruluşu ve İlk Sergiler', pp. 139–45. See also, Archival Records of IZFAS, www.izfas.com.tr (accessed 5 July 2011).
29. E. Bilget (1936) 'Dergimize Panayır Hakkında İzmir Urayından Gelen Değerli Mektup' ('The Valuable Letter to Our Journal from the Mayor about the Exhibition'), *Belediyeler Dergisi*, 13, no. 18, p. 45.
30. Polat, 'Uluslararası İzmir Fuarının Kuruluşu ve İlk Sergiler', pp. 165–70.
31. İzfaş Archive Online, available at www.izfas.com.tr (accessed 4 June 2011), and see also www.mekan360.com (accessed 8 August 2012).
32. These two buildings were famous examples of the neo-classical style, which was in line with the general design of the pavilions that demonstrated modernist symbolism and geometric characteristics. Zander, 'Erken Cumhuriyet', p. 146.
33. O. Rahmi (1937) 'Paraşüt Kulesi', *Yedigün Mecmuası*, 233, no. 29, p. 6.
34. The first substantial aid from the Marshall Plan went to Greece and Turkey in 1948, countries that were seen as the front line of the battle against communist

expansion, and which were already receiving aid under the Truman Doctrine. D.M. Bostdorff (2008) *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine* (Texas: Tamu Press), p. 51; B. Birinci (2007) 'The Marshall Plan in Turkey: A Critical Evaluation of United States Interests in the Plan and Effects of the Plan on the Republic', MA thesis, the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul; A. Sever (1997) *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Orta Doğu 1945–1958* (Istanbul: Boyut).

35. L. Risso (2011) 'Propaganda on Wheels: NATO Travelling Exhibitions in the 1950s and 1960s', *Cold War History*, 11, no. 1, p. 14. These exhibitions also toured Ankara and Istanbul and were seen by approximately half a million people in Turkey.
36. Obviously the establishment of NATO headquarters (LANDSOUTHEAST) in İzmir (1952) increased the city's significance as NATO's 'vital eastern anchor' for the East Mediterranean and Middle East Region.
37. J.F Mitarachi (1957) 'Design as a Political Force', *Industrial Design*, 4, no. 38. Also see A.J. Pulos (1988) *The American Design Adventure: 1940–1975* (Cambridge: MIT Press), pp. 236–41, cited in Er and Korkut, 'U.S. Involvement', p. 21.
38. B. Kayaoğlu (2009) 'Strategic Imperatives, Democratic Rhetoric: The United States and Turkey 1945–52', *Cold War History*, 9, no. 3, pp. 321–45.
39. Russell Higginson Dorr was a retired international banker and government official involved with postwar Europe and the Far East. During the 1950s he served in Turkey to administer the Marshall Plan.
40. Dorr announced that 1400 agricultural implements were distributed in Turkey in 1950. Likewise, American engineers developed projects for İzmir and the whole Aegean region – for instance, the irrigation schemes for the valley of Büyük Menderes River as well as the coal mine operations in towns such as Soma, Değirmisaz, and Tunçbilek. *Yeni Asır*, 24 August 1950.
41. *Yeni Asır*, 21 August 1950.
42. The poster can be viewed at http://library.marshallfoundation.org/posters (accessed 12 December 2012).
43. Archive: *Ege Express*, 21 August 1956.
44. Castillo, 'Domesticating the Cold War', p. 262.
45. This information is based on short interviews with local people in İzmir, who kindly told me about their memories about the İzmir Fair (July 2011).
46. Archive: *Ege Express*, 15 September 1957.
47. For the English version of the lyrics I refer to Gürel, 'Architectural Mimicry', p. 171. For a detailed discussion of the significance of this song in Turkish culture and history, see also M.Ö. Alkan (2003) 'Kore'de Birleşen, Kıbrıs'ta Ayrılan Yollar: Türkiye'de Amerikan İmajının Değişimi (1945–1980)', *Toplumsal Tarih*, 118, p. 54–5. For discussion of the significance of the lyrics in the İzmir Fair context, see E. Feyzioğlu (2006) *Büyük Bir Halk Okulu* (İzmir: İzfaş Kültür), p. 91. As the lyrics of the song imply, the Korean War (1950–53) was viewed as an opportunity to furnish the West with a sign that proved Turkey's good faith, because Turkey was one of the more significant participants in the UN alliance.
48. See Gürel, 'Architectural Mimicry', p. 171.
49. *Yeni Asır*, 21 August 1958.

50. *Yeni Asır*, 21 August 1958.
51. *Yeni Asır*, 22 August 1958.
52. *Yeni Asır*, 20 August 1958.
53. *Yeni Asır*, 21 August 1960.
54. *Yeni Asır*, 9 August 1961.
55. NASA History Office, available at http://history.nasa.gov/moondec.html (accessed 9 September 2012).
56. R. Stenger (25 May 2001) 'Man on the Moon: Kennedy speech ignited the dream', CNN, archived from the original on 6 June 2010.
57. *Yeni Asır*, 20 August 1969.
58. *Yeni Asır*, 24–5 August 1951; 17 September 1969.
59. *Yeni Asır*, 5 August 1951; 24 August 1951; 24 August 1961; 5 September 1969.
60. *Yeni Asır*, 13 August 1966.
61. *Yeni Asır*, 25 August 1951.
62. *Yeni Asır*, 26 August 1951.
63. *Yeni Asır*, 25 August 1951; 20 September 1951.
64. R. Şardağ (1951) 'Bir Pavyonun Feryadı', *Yeni Asır*, 25 August 1951.
65. *Yeni Asır*, 25 August 1951.
66. *Yeni Asır*, 24 August 1961.
67. *Yeni Asır*, 14 August 1966.
68. *Yeni Asır*, 17 September 1969.
69. *Yeni Asır*, 31 August 1964.
70. *Yeni Asır*, 30 August 1964.
71. *Yeni Asır*, 30 August 1964.
72. *Yeni Asır*, 31 August 1964.
73. *Yeni Asır*, 1 September 1964.
74. *Yeni Asır*, 19 August 1969.
75. *Yeni Asır*, 17 September 1969.
76. *Yeni Asır*, 5 September 1964; 12 September 1966; 1 September 1974.
77. *Yeni Asır*, 12 September 1966.
78. *Yeni Asır*, 12 September 1966.
79. *Electrocar* or *elektrocart* is an electric vehicle, typically a small cart with an electrical driving gear and storage battery. In the United Kingdom, similar small electric vehicles were known as electric drays.
80. *Yeni Asır*, 9 September 1966.
81. 'Fuardaki Çekoslovak Pavyonu' ('Czechoslovakian Pavilion at the Fair'), *Yeni Asır*, 26 August 1967.
82. *Milliyet*, 24 August 1961. In the Fair of 1962, Çanakkale ceramic factory opened its own pavilion and attracted great public attention in an area of 294 sq m, with a variety of ceramic products.

Select Bibliography

Archival Sources

İzfaş Achives
İzmir Municipality Archives

Periodicals

Yeni Asır
Ege Express
Milliyet
Yedigün Mecmuası

Electronic Sources

Yeni Şafak Online Archive: www.yenisafak.com.tr.
Milliyet Online Archive: www.milliyet.com.tr.
NASA History Office: http://history.nasa.gov/moondec.html.
İZFAŞ Archive: www.izfas.com.tr.

Books and Articles

Agnew, J. (1998) *Geopolitics: Revisioning World Politics*. London: Routledge.
Aksoy, Y. (2001) *Love for 70 Years: İzmir Fair*. İzmir: Metropolitan Municipality.
Alkan, M.Ö. (2003) 'Kore'de Birleşen, Kıbrıs'ta Ayrılan Yollar: Türkiye'de Amerikan İmajının Değişimi (1945–1980)', *Toplumsal Tarih*, 118, pp. 54–5.
Bilge, S. (1992) *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye–Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920–1964*. Ankara: İş Bankası Kültür.
Bilget, E. (1936) 'Dergimize Panayır Hakkında İzmir Urayından Gelen Değerli Mektup' ('The Valuable Letter to Our Journal from the Mayor about the Exhibiton'), *Belediyeler Dergisi*, 13, no. 18, pp. 45–6.
Bulkeley, R. (1991) *The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Castillo, G. (2005) 'Domesticating the Cold War: Household Consumption as Propaganda in Marshall Plan Germany', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40, no. 2, pp. 261–88.
Durgun, S. (2006) 'The Architectural Death Cult Faces the World', *Lapsus*, 1, no. 1, pp. 117–29.
Er, E., and F. Korkut (2003) 'US Involvement in the Development of Design in the Periphery: The Case History of Industrial Design Education in Turkey, 1950s–1970s', *Design Issues*, 19, no. 2, pp. 17–34.
Ergut, E., and B. İmamoğlu (2009) *Cumhuriyet'in Mekânları Zamanları, İnsanları*. Ankara: Dipnot.
Feyzioğlu, E. (2006) *Büyük Bir Halk Okulu*. İzmir: İzfaş Kültür.
Gürel, M. (2011) 'Architectural Mimicry, Spaces of Modernity: The Island Casino – İzmir, Turkey', *Journal of Architecture*, 16, no. 2, pp. 165–90.
Kayaoğlu, B. (2009) 'Strategic Imperatives, Democratic Rhetoric: The United States and Turkey 1945–52', *Cold War History*, 9, no. 3, pp. 321–45.
Kolluoğlu-Kirli, B. (2005) 'Forgetting the İzmir Fire', *History Workshop Journal*, 60, pp. 25–44.
Masey J., and C.L. Morgan (2008) *Cold War Confrontations*. Baden: Lars Müller.
Mitarachi, J.F. (1957) 'Design as a Political Force', *Industrial Design*, 4, no. 2, pp. 37–9.
Polat, E. (2008) 'Uluslararası İzmir Fuarının Kuruluşu ve İlk Sergiler'. MA thesis, Dokuz Eylül University.

Qasımlı, M. (2012) *SSCB-Türkiye: İlişkilerin Normalleştirilmesinden Yeni Soğuk Savaş'a Kadar*. Istanbul: Kaknüs.
Risso, L. (2011) 'Propaganda on Wheels: NATO Travelling Exhibitions in the 1950s and 1960s', *Cold War History*, 11, no. 1, pp. 9–25.
Rydell, R.W. (1993) *World of Fairs*. University of Chicago Press.
Sever, A. (1997) *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Orta Doğu 1945–1958*. Istanbul: Boyut.
Willett, J. (1996) *Art and Politics in the Weimar Period*. New York: Da Capo Press.

4

Engagement of a Communist Intellectual in the Cold War Ideological Struggle: Nâzım Hikmet's 1951 Bulgaria Visit

Gözde Somel and Neslişah Leman Başaran

The globally known Turkish poet Nâzım Hikmet fled from Turkey to the Soviet Union in June 1951 due to political reasons. He spent the last 13 years of his life in the Soviet Union, from where he was able to travel all around the world. During this period he visited socialist Bulgaria twice, where a considerable Turkish minority was living, first in 1951 and again in 1957. His first visit, which will be analyzed here in detail, was in September 1951 – the same year he left Turkey. This visit had a specific mission: to convince the Turkish minority in Bulgaria not to migrate to Turkey and to encourage them to take part in collective farming – the mode of agricultural production that the Bulgarian communist government sought to establish in the rural areas. For this purpose, Nâzım – accompanied by a group of local officials, intellectuals, and journalists – visited many villages and towns in Bulgaria, which were populated by Turkish peasants.

The details of this visit are largely obscure in the available scholarship on the poet's life and works.[1] These studies rarely include this official visit to Bulgaria or merely mention it in passing among his other journeys, and even when more detailed attention is paid it is mostly depicted as a disappointment for the poet. These works prefer to deal with the life of Nâzım Hikmet in Moscow and to stress his 'conflict' with Stalin and the implementation of Soviet policy. In other words, the emphasis is on his critiques of socialist practices in the Soviet Union rather than his engagement with it, highlighting his critical approaches towards the policies and practices of the socialist camp and minimizing the importance of examples such as the visit to Bulgaria where he worked openly in the service of a socialist government.

In the works and memoirs described above, one can discern two narratives concerning the poet's attitude towards the administrations of socialist countries, beginning with the supposed disappointment of the poet's second stay in the Soviet Union. According to the first narrative, by 1951, the initial years of the Revolution, which the poet witnessed as a university student in Moscow (between 1922–24), were gone; Soviet society had turned static as a result of authoritarian practice, supported ideologically by the 'cult of personality'.[2] Nâzım Hikmet realized the undemocratic aspects of the Soviet system, especially when he found out that a number of his Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) acquaintances who had fled to the USSR were sent to the *gulag*s.[3] Nâzım Hikmet raised his critical voice as he witnessed the cruelties of the regime.[4] However, he could not go further since he was obliged to stay in the Soviet Union as a political exile.[5] Some even claim that he was disappointed when he realized the superiority of Western countries, especially in terms of the living standards of the working class.[6] The second common narrative takes for granted the naivety of the poet's approach towards socialist regimes.[7] According to this view, he was unable to recognize the failure of these regimes and his prestige was abused by the authorities in the service of socialist propaganda.[8]

Rather than questioning the basis of such claims, this essay argues that in 1951, when Nâzım Hikmet left Turkey for the Soviet Union, he was a truly engaged intellectual who never abstained from using his prestige as a poet for the cause of socialism. In the end of 1951, after spending some months in socialist countries, he was still convinced that socialism in its 'real' form in the Soviet Union and East European countries was better than the capitalist system applied in countries such as Turkey. And despite the accusations that he was a 'traitor' or a 'henchman of the Soviets', he undertook the task of convincing Bulgarian Turks, on behalf of the Bulgarian communist government, not to go to Turkey. Nâzım Hikmet's early Cold War position as an engaged intellectual defending the Soviets without major criticism is mostly neglected by researchers on his life and works.

To better understand the political engagement of Nâzım Hikmet as a poet, we have to look closer at what it meant to be an intellectual during the Cold War. Right after the Second World War, the literary and intellectual world in general was divided along ideological lines as left and right, with the socialist system on one side and the world of the free market on the other. While most engaged intellectuals advocated a socialist system, the so-called 'counter-engagement' trend, which targeted the USSR and defended the 'American system',[9] was

equally strong. However, engaged intellectuals of the left wing did not constitute a homogenous group, especially after 1947, when Zhdanov formulated the doctrine of 'socialist realism'.[10] Thereafter socialist intellectuals were categorized as those who were critical or skeptical about 'real socialism' in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and those who continued to support the socialist system in these countries.[11] Just as in the case of Nâzım Hikmet, most of the analysis on the Cold War and on the period's intellectuals tends to focus on critiques of socialism, either by way of socialist intellectuals' critiques of the USSR or by focusing on the period in the lives of 'engaged intellectuals' when they were critical of it.

The Migration of the Turkish Minority from Bulgaria to Turkey

The Turkish minority in Bulgaria is the heritage of the Ottoman dominion over the country which lasted almost five centuries, until the independence of Bulgaria in 1908. Just before independence from the Ottoman Empire, the minorities in the country, amongst whom the Turks constituted the overwhelming majority, amounted to one-fourth (almost 26 percent) of the total population. After independence, the number of Turks in Bulgaria decreased to 19 percent of the population, and following the Balkan Wars, the two World Wars and the mass immigration of 1950–51, in 1957 this percentage was further reduced to just 8 percent.[12]

In Bulgaria, Turks were mostly settled in villages or towns like Dobrudja, Silistre, Shumen, Varna, Dobrich, and Balchik, namely in rural areas in the north of the country, close to the Black Sea and Romanian border. For the most part, Turks were prosperous farmers or farm owners.[13] Another characteristic of the Turkish minority living in Bulgaria was the fact that they were still attached to the social traditions inherited from the Ottoman period. Whereas a nationalist and modernist reformation process was taking place in the new republic of Turkey, the Turkish minority of Bulgaria was still an overwhelmingly religious community that kept its traditional lifestyle and was reluctant to change it.[14] It seems that there was an unofficial agreement between the Turkish minority and the Bulgarian government before the war: Turks would preserve their traditional lifestyle centered around the Hodjas (religious leaders), meaning that they would be accorded a sort of autonomy, and in return they would not interfere with politics in Bulgaria and would remain 'loyal' to the government.[15]

These characteristics of the Turkish community were probably the reason why Turkish farmers were the most resisting element when after 1947 the newly founded communist Bulgarian government sought to introduce collective farms to rural areas, a program called the Agricultural Labor Cooperative (Trudovo-Kooperativnote Zmedelsko Stopanstvo, or TKZS). As rich farmers, Turks who traditionally did not have any confidence in Bulgarian authorities naturally stood against collectivization, which meant the nationalization of existing farms. The traditional-religious lifestyle of Turks, centered around the Hodjas, also played an important role in the resistance against the implementations undertaken by the communist government, who was eager to abolish the autonomy of this minority.[16] Consequently the resistance of the Turkish farmers with a number of their Bulgarian counterparts was so strong that 'collectivization was suspended or completely halted' by Bulgarian authorities.[17] That could be the reason why the Bulgarian government in the summer of 1950 suddenly decided to allow the immigration of 250,000 Turks to Turkey. They probably believed that the wealthy Turkish farmers would prefer to leave the country and settle down in Turkey rather than voluntarily give their arable lands or herds to the collective farms. It was also in 1950 that Bulgarian authorities started to gain concrete results in the collectivization of rural areas: 'By 1950, 51 percent of the farms and 47.5 percent of the arable land had been collectivized.'[18]

Accordingly, in August 1950, the Bulgarian government delivered to Turkish authorities a note asserting that Turkey should accept 250,000 of the Turks currently living in Bulgaria, those willing to immigrate to Turkey. This demand was backed by the argument that for the previous two years Turkey had been trying to disseminate discontent among the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and to mislead public opinion in Turkey about the situation in the country. The Turkish government responded by delivering a counter-note refusing the demands of the Bulgarian authorities. But the Turks in Bulgaria had already started to immigrate towards Turkey in large numbers. The authorities in Bulgaria were giving the Turks passports and visas enabling them to leave the country, but in return the Turkish authorities were not willing to give them visas enabling their entry to Turkey. Turks who had left their homes and domains in Bulgaria accumulated in the border between the two countries. Under these circumstances, in the first days of October 1950, Turkey closed its border with Bulgaria and Turkish families were abandoned at the Bulgarian–Turkish border. The border between the two countries was left closed until the beginning of December of that year, by which time the Turkish authorities had reopened the frontier. Finally

Turkey and Bulgaria reached an agreement on some points regarding the migration, which lasted until November of 1951, at which point Bulgarian authorities declared that they halted the immigration.

As a result, during the years 1950 and 1951, a huge wave of immigration from Bulgaria to Turkey took place: in August of 1951 alone, Turkey claimed that the number of people who had migrated from Bulgaria was 146,000.[19] In two years, a total of 154,393 Turks had passed the border in order to immigrate into Turkey (52,185 in 1950 and 102,208 in 1951). The biggest waves of immigration took place between December 1950 and April 1951, when Turkey reopened the border with Bulgaria (21,143 in December 1950; 21,352 in January 1951; 20,237 in February 1951; 9553 in March 1951; and 16,250 in April 1951). At the end of 1951, the number of immigrants returned to the mean averages of the 1940s. When in November 1951 Bulgaria prohibited any further migration, the number of immigrants had already been reduced to 1000.[20]

The causes and consequences of the migration of 1950–51 may be better understood by taking into consideration the circumstances of the Cold War passing through its hot-blooded days with the outbreak of the Korean War. In fact, the confrontation between Turkey and Bulgaria on the issue of immigration was the result of increasing tension between the two countries after the Second World War. The tension first started immediately after the war due to the Red Army brigades being deployed to Bulgaria until 1947. It is estimated that in the fall of 1946 approximately 90,000 Russian soldiers were deployed to Bulgaria. On the other hand, Turkey started to take an active position in the Cold War initiated between the USA and the Soviet Union. Turkish authorities expressed their willingness to take part in NATO after its foundation in 1948 and they succeeded in entering the organization in 1952. The membership of Turkey in NATO was considered by the Bulgarian government to be a threat to its security. Bulgarian authorities expressed many times their discomfort regarding Turkey's willingness to take part in NATO and finally, when Turkey's membership was officially accepted in February 1952, the government of Bulgaria sent a note to the Turkish authorities protesting the country's NATO membership and claiming that the Thrace in Turkey had been used as a base for the education of spies in order to send them to Bulgaria.[21] Thus, at the beginning of the Cold War, the border between the two countries became the frontier on which the tensions of the war solidified.

Consequently the press in Turkey saw the issue of migration as an opportunity for anti-communist propaganda, targeting the communist government in Bulgaria directly, but also the USSR. It was claimed by

some newspapers that the real responsibility for this conflict lay with the Soviet Union and that it had been deliberately created by Russia in order to weaken Turkey.[22] The second argument by the press in Turkey was that Turks in Bulgaria were subject to incredible torture and cruelty by the communists.[23] For example, an article claims that the Bulgarians were trying to 'Russify' the Turks by organizing a campaign of 'literacy'. 'It has been decided to "make the Turks red" by teaching them how to read and write and by giving them red books.'[24] The third anti-communist argument was that the expulsion of Turks also aimed at placing communist propagandists in Turkey. A columnist warned that among the emigrants there were dangerous persons, meaning communist propagandists and organizers.[25] Turkey's decision to close its frontier with Bulgaria was also justified by the claim that Bulgarians were trying to send agents and Gypsies to Turkey.[26] In fact some emigrants from Bulgaria had been arrested on the charge of spreading communist propaganda some months after settling in the villages.[27]

Mission: Convincing Bulgarian Turks of the Socialist System

The visit of Nâzım Hikmet to Bulgaria in September 1951[28] took place when the massive migration of the Turks had considerably decreased. The Bulgarian authorities who had encouraged the migration in the summer of 1950 had changed their policy by the fall of 1951 and decided to stop the massive flow of Turks to Turkey. Approximately 150,000 Turks had already left the country when the Bulgarian government decided to halt the migration. This change of strategy may have several explanations. First, Bulgarian authorities were probably convinced that many Turkish farmers who caused troubles for the collectivization of the agriculture had left the country, and second, it may have been realized that with the flow of Turks, the needed workforce for collective farms was also lost. Therefore they decided to keep the remaining Turks in the country and sought to convince them to take part in the collective farms.

Therefore, Nâzım Hikmet, the famous and beloved Turkish poet, had been invited to Bulgaria to convince Turks to stay in the country and further to convince them to get registered in collective farms. It was believed that after the emigration of mostly wealthy Turkish families, the remaining population was composed of landless peasants and small farmers that could be persuaded through ideological propaganda since their economic interests were not supposed to be in conflict with government policies.

The choice of Nâzım Hikmet for this mission was not arbitrary. The poet had close ties with the Turkish community in Bulgaria. His popularity among the Turks in Bulgaria had become widespread, especially during the international campaign for the freedom of the poet.[29] On 15 January 1950, a committee was established with Turkish political exiles taking the lead in introducing the case of Nâzım Hikmet to Bulgarian society and putting pressure on the Turkish government. A booklet was prepared, including a special report about the life and works of Nâzım Hikmet with an appendix of his selected works.[30] This report, widely distributed by the committee, played a major role in molding public opinion. Besides the cities and intellectual circles, the solidarity campaign spread over the rural areas and especially in the towns and villages populated by Turks, in which many public meetings and demonstrations were held.[31] Hundreds of telegrams were sent to the Turkish government from Bulgarian towns demanding an end to the poet's imprisonment.[32] Many of his works were published during this campaign in Bulgarian. His name was given to a number of schools and public places. The Union of Writers of Bulgaria declared 15 May as the memorial day of Nâzım Hikmet's struggle for freedom.[33]

As the Bulgarian authorities had already decided to conduct a propaganda campaign among Turks in order to integrate them into the socialist system, using the prestige of Nâzım Hikmet seemed very appropriate. He was expected to tell the Turkish population about the unfavorable conditions that awaited them in Turkey and the advantages of staying in Bulgaria, as well as to convince them to accept the new economic arrangements by addressing them in their own language. Bulgaria never officially admitted that Nâzım had been invited to Bulgaria in 1951 specifically for this mission. However, Nâzım Hikmet himself reveals this information in his report submitted to the Bulgarian authorities after his visit, that he was officially invited by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria and the General Secretary of the Party, Vilko Chervenkov, for this specific mission.[34]

From Nâzım Hikmet's point of view, this first official visit after he fled from Turkey was a good opportunity to make observations about the transformations in a socialist country other than the Soviet Union. After 1951, he mainly concentrated on works related to the world peace movement as a member of the World Peace Council founded by left-wing intellectuals in 1949. Yet he was eager to learn about the achievements of socialist regimes and about the manifestations of those achievements in the daily life of people. For this reason he made dozens of visits to different parts of the socialist camp. Visiting both urban and

rural areas, factories, universities, schools, and many other institutions, he established face-to-face contact with people, and he closely observed economic production and daily life in socialist countries.[35] Those visits also enabled him to become acquainted with intellectuals, writers, and artists. As in his later visits to different socialist countries, the poet participated in many large and small meetings with people of art and literature in Bulgaria. However, the most striking aspect of the visit for the poet was to be invited to help solve a specific problem of the regime related to the Turkish minority. He would later express this motivation in his official report with the following words: 'I will be glad if I can help the Communist Party of Bulgaria. Comrades can always consider me on their side. For me, it will be a great pleasure to work within the Turkish population of Bulgaria.'[36] Actually the poet had already expressed his will to work for the interests of socialism in the letter he had written from Romania in the days following his flight from Turkey.[37]

During the visit, which lasted 12 days, the poet's efforts had two main objectives. First, he strove to understand the reality of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, the reasons for their wish to leave the country, and their demands of the Bulgarian government, all through face-to-face contact with the Bulgarian Turks. To this end he also requested the related statistical data from the party authorities in local areas concerning the social conditions of the people who had already left for Turkey or were intending to emigrate. Second, together with this he tried to convince the Turkish people he met in the towns and villages to stay in the country and to get registered in the collective farms.[38]

Before long, Nâzım set forth with a group of around 20 people composed of party officials and technical staff, responsible for recording and broadcasting the visits. Besides, he was accompanied by an official agent from the Soviet Union, as would be the case in almost all of his future visits abroad.[39] According to the information given in official reports, the total number of the people who were addressed during the 20 public meetings and 12 gatherings with the Turkish peasants amounted to around 130,000.[40] In every locality, he met with party officials and sometimes had meetings with the active members of the communist party about the situation there. An interesting detail about the itinerary of the trip is that it included mostly the towns and villages of inner regions in the north and south of the country such as Deliorman (Ludogorie), Haskova, and Kardzhali. However, the regions in the North Black Sea coast like Balchik, Dobrich, and Varna, where mostly wealthier Turks were living, do not appear in the list of villages visited.

In all those meetings organized in the towns and villages he visited, Nâzım made passionate speeches. In his report, he points to his puzzlement at seeing how widespread the anti-communist propaganda was among religious men, landlords, and radio stations broadcasting from Turkey in the villages.[41] In his own propaganda speeches he was aiming to influence mainly poor peasantry instead of rich landowners, a significant number of whom had already left the country. According to his view, while the interests of rich landowners were damaged by the collectivization process, the reason why the poor peasantry was reluctant to support the new policies was the heavy ideological propaganda and the inability of the Bulgarian authorities to communicate with this poor segment of the Turkish population. The migration was like an epidemic spreading over the population, although the possible consequences of moving to Turkey were unknown among most of the people.[42] He emphasized the capitalist character of Turkey and tried to convince Turks not to leave Bulgaria, by listing the differences between socialism and capitalism. He called people to be alerted against the 'imperialist provocations' in which Turkey could take part since it was firmly allied with the US. He explained the class differences, exploitation, and difficulties for a worker to make a living in Turkey. He mentioned the deficiencies of health and educational services in the country. He also referred to the repression towards socialists by reporting the fact that some Bulgarian emigrants were in prisons in Turkey at that time.[43] He proposed to Turks that they stay in Bulgaria and work together for the building of socialism, which he claimed promised incomparably more than capitalist Turkey could offer them and their children.[44]

Nâzım Hikmet made a great effort to convince the villagers to enroll in the collective farms. Each meeting was concluded by his call to join the collective farm of that particular area and this call was followed by a small ceremony of registration in which the names of the villagers who applied to join the farm were listed. He himself contributed to the establishment of two collective farms during meetings in the villages of Guslar and Çiftlik.[45] According to the reports and narratives, Nâzım Hikmet was met by large crowds nearly in all of his destinations. He listened to the grievances of the local population and tried to find solutions. He would later point out in his report that disregard for the cultural identity of the Turks by the authorities was one of the reasons behind the migration and reluctance to join the collective farms:

> I realized that the Bulgarian comrades working within the Turkish population are confused about the customs and religion of the Turks.

> A genuine class approach, stopping the migration and educative practices, will serve to establish the TKZS in a short time. For instance, I saw in Pravda a TKZS in a village of the Dulovo region where Turkish peasants were engaging in swine breeding. As you know, in the religion of Mohammed, even to touch the pig is a great sin.[46]

The poet proposed some concrete measures for overcoming the problems of the Turks in Bulgaria which he believed had a strong cultural aspect and had their roots in the prewar period.[47] He drew attention to the deficiencies of daily life for the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and the difficulties they encountered from being a minority. According to him, the radio broadcasting and publishing activities for the Turkish population were badly organized and insufficient. The radio programs were badly scheduled and their contents were not interesting. The language used both in radio programs and in the printed publications was incomprehensible for an ordinary country person. The Turkish party activists also had difficulties in communicating with the Turkish population. The necessary material and the educational cadre in the schools were inadequate. He concluded that the radio programs in Turkish should be rendered understandable and more interesting in content. The folk music and reflections of the daily life of people should gain some prevalence in the programs. The printed publications should be improved. He suggested publishing a humor magazine entitled *Nasrettin Hoca Communist*[48] addressing the villagers.[49] He also stressed the importance of the participation of the Turkish population, the overwhelming part of which was composed of uneducated villagers and townsmen in politics. He strongly advised the enrollment of more Turkish people, especially among the ranks of poor peasantry, in the Communist Party.[50]

We see that all the conclusions and suggestions expressed by the poet were about how to integrate the Turkish minority into the socialist system in Bulgaria. As an artist and as a communist he was convinced that the system emerging in Bulgaria was categorically better than the system in Turkey. On the other hand, he realized that the conditions in Bulgaria were also not favorable for the Turkish minority. But what he believed and tried to convince the Bulgarian Turks of was that these conditions would change with the advance of the socialist system. He was asked by the authorities of the Communist Party of Bulgaria to convince the Turks not to migrate, but he did not limit his mission to that. He also proposed to Bulgarian authorities some measures in order to integrate the Turks into the system. As seen above, he considered the cultural integration of the Turkish minority within Bulgarian society to

be essential. First, poor Turkish peasantry should be relieved from the influence of religious functionaries and anti-communist propaganda. That's why he stressed the importance of education, radio programs, journals, and newspapers. Besides, according to Nâzım Hikmet, all these efforts should take into account the cultural identity, language, and traditional elements such as the religion of the Turks. That's why he strongly opposed practices like forcing men and women to work together – Turks objected for religious reasons – or to employ them in swine breeding. Political participation was another important aspect that Nâzım Hikmet strongly stressed. He believed that the Turkish minority would develop strong ties with the regime if they were given the opportunity to express their identity through the political corps, such as the local councils and national parliament. Indeed, the level of knowledge of the Bulgarian language among the Turkish minority may have been considered an obstacle. Certainly, the old people and those who were living in villages where there were no schools did not know Bulgarian. However, in his report Nâzım Hikmet did not mention the language issue as an obstacle for integration, probably believing that the ongoing efforts of the Bulgarian government to spread public education would solve this problem.

We do not have enough sources that enable us to weigh the success of the trip. Some memoirs that refer to Nâzım Hikmet's visit to Bulgaria in 1951 describe it as a great encounter of the poet with the local Turks[51] and some others prefer to define it as a failure or at least a disappointment for the poet. However, there is little empirical analysis of these memoirs. Zekeriya Sertel, a prominent Turkish intellectual and a close friend of the poet, for instance, touches on the discontent of the Bulgarian authorities about the results of Nâzım's visit and justifies this resentment by the fact that the poet did not pay a visit to Bulgaria again for six years.[52] Saime Göksu and Edward Timms, on the other hand, attribute the long interval between the two visits to Bulgaria (1951 and 1957) to the suspicions of the party about the value of the visit of 1951.[53] Sabri Tata, a member of the Turkish minority who was a teenager at the time of Nâzım's visit, expresses his impressions of the visit in his book, sarcastically titled *The Adventures of Turkish Communists in Bulgaria*. As an anti-communist and anti-Bulgarian, he asserts that party bureaucrats who had shown great respect to the poet during his entire visit in 1951 left him alone in 1957.[54]

Fahri Erdinç, a man of letters who had migrated from Turkey to Bulgaria in 1949 after his short imprisonment for his supposed involvement in the Communist Party of Turkey, and who was already an

acquaintance of the poet, also refers to the visit in his book on Nâzım Hikmet.[55] He quotes the ideas of Ali Rafiev, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria. Rafiev was in charge of the affairs of the Turkish minority and as a Turkish political refugee he was in contact with Fahri Erdinç, who had been considered by Bulgarian authorities to be someone to be kept under close surveillance.[56] Rafiev, who was also responsible for Nâzım Hikmet's 1951 visit, affirms that the efforts of the poet were not sufficient to solve the problem. However, he also asserts that Bulgaria did not have high expectations for this visit.[57] Memet Fuat, the stepson of the poet, who became a prominent writer, asserts a contrary view, stating that Bulgaria was seeking an immediate change in the attitude of the Turks after they listened to Nâzım, which would not have required extra effort on the part of the government.[58] In fact, it is true that Nâzım Hikmet's visit created a certain impact on the Turkish minority and, as reflected in his report, the poet was hopeful for the future when he left Bulgaria.

On the other hand, Nâzım Hikmet was condemned by the Turkish authorities for his efforts to persuade the Turkish population in Bulgaria. In their eyes, he committed the crime of being in the 'other camp' in the Cold War, of defending communism. He was already found guilty of escaping from Turkey to the USSR, and now he was defending their case against Turkey. This was enough for some newspapers in the country to treat the poet as a 'traitor'. He was described as a 'henchman of the Soviets', as a person used by the Bulgarian government for its own aims against the Turks.[59] A columnist got so angry about him that he called him a 'rabid dog', and also gypsy – a race the columnist believed to be inferior to his own – and even claimed that Nâzım Hikmet was beaten by a Turkish young man during his visits.[60]

Therefore, in the Turkish press the visit of Nâzım Hikmet to the Turkish villages in Bulgaria in order to stop the migration was described as a 'failure' for the poet, and it was claimed that the poet was not welcomed by the Turkish population – that only a few Turkish communists and gypsies attended the speeches he had given, or that the people were gathered by force to attend the meetings.[61] In a news report, the visit made by Nâzım Hikmet to a village of Turks was described in the following way:

> In Koşukavak, one of our race said 'Whatever you tell us, we will go to Turkey and die under the Turkish flag' and Nâzım Hikmet answered by screaming at him 'ignoble, fascist, capitalist' and then this villager was arrested by a Bulgarian national guardsman.[62]

Conclusion

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 1990s witnessed the image of Nâzım Hikmet being transformed from 'the henchman of the Soviets' to 'the romantic national poet of the homeland'. This was marked by Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) and an outstanding anti-communist in Turkey, when he read a poem of Nâzım at his 'Invitation' to his party congress in 1994.[63] Later, in 2002, the centenary of the poet's birth was officially celebrated under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture. In this readmission of the poet by the authorities in Turkey, his patriotism as well as his romanticism has been strongly highlighted. And accordingly, his identity as an engaged intellectual during the Cold War ideological struggle, especially his cooperation with the authorities of the Soviet Union and socialist Bulgaria, was overlooked more than ever.

We believe that this visit of the poet to Bulgaria in 1951 has not garnered much interest both in academic writing and in the recently published memoirs, not just because of the lack of sources or because it was not important, but because it did not fit well with this newly created image of the poet. The era after the Second World War, or the era of 'Cultural Cold War', was also the era of worldwide-known 'engaged intellectuals', whose political identity was as admired as their artistic production. This identity was not limited to political statements, but they contributed practically, participating in the activities of such organizations as the World Peace Council, by visits to socialist countries, by adhering to the communist parties of their country, or by cooperating with the governments of socialist countries, as seen in the case of Nâzım Hikmet. However, the tendency today is to remember these 'engaged intellectuals' free from their political identity or to draw an image of them as 'inveigled', politically 'frustrated' by the ideological currents of the Cold War period. Nâzım Hikmet's visit to Bulgaria as an 'engaged intellectual', and the mission he undertook, is vital to challenging this image.[64]

Notes

1. M. Fuat (2001) *Nâzım Hikmet, Yaşamı, Ruhsal Yapısı, Davaları, Tartışmaları, Dünya Görüşü, Şiirinin Gelişmeleri* (*Nâzım Hikmet, His life, Mental Structure, Causes, Debates, Worldview, and Developments in his poetry*) (Istanbul: Adam Yayınları); Z. Sertel (1996) *Nâzım Hikmet'in son yılları* (*Last Years of Nâzım Hikmet*) (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları); S. Göksu and E. Timms (1999) *Romantic Communist*: *The Life and Work of Nâzım Hikmet* (New York: St Martin's

Press); T. Ataöv (1976) *Nâzım Hikmet'in Hasreti* (*Nostalgia of Nâzım Hikmet*) (Istanbul: May Yayınları); E. Babayev (2002) *Nâzım Hikmet: Yaşamı ve Yapıtları* (*Nâzım Hikmet: His Life and Works*) (Istanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi); V.T. Hikmet (1989) *Nâzım'la Söyleşi* (*Conversation with Nâzım Hikmet*), trans. A. Behramoğlu (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi); idem (2008) *Bahtiyar ol Nâzım: Anı* (*Be Happy Nâzım: Memoir*) (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları); A. Sverçevskaya (2002) *Kardeşim Nâzım: Çağdaşlarının Anıları* (*Brother Nâzım: Memories of His Contemporaries*), trans. M. Özgül (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi).

2. The 'cult of personality' refers to the cult that arose around the personality of Stalin as an idealized and heroic image representing the glorious past and future of the country.
3. The *gulag*s were Soviet labor camps especially for political prisoners.
4. E. Turgut (2002) *Nâzım Hikmet* (Levallois-Perret: Editions Turquoise), p. 257.
5. H. Akgül (2002) *Nâzım Hikmet, siyasi biyografi* (*Nâzım Hikmet, Political Biography*) (Istanbul: Chiviyazıları), p. 283.
6. Fuat, *Nâzım Hikmet*, p. 609.
7. Sertel, *Nâzım Hikmet'in*.
8. S. Tata (1993) *Türk Komünistlerin Bulgaristan Maceraları* (*Adventures of Turkish Communists in Bulgaria*) (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları), p. 9.
9. An example of this is the review publication *Le Figaro Littéraire* from the French world of literature. Claire Blandin summarizes the attitude of this review during the Cold War as '*contre-engagement*' (counter-engagement). *Le Figaro Littéraire* in the second half of the 1940s published many articles and reports on 'how oppressive is life in the USSR', 'how primitive the Russians' acts are in the countries of Eastern Europe', and so on. Additionally the review presents itself as the protector of the writers 'threatened' in the USSR. Thus the review is deeply engaged in an anti-communist campaign. On the question of taking a side in the conflict, Blandin reveals also that *Le Figaro Littéraire*, besides its attitude against the USSR, was in favor of the 'American system'. See C. Blandin (2007) 'Les interventions des intellectuels de droite dans Le Figaro littéraire: L'invention du contre-engagement' ('The Interventions of Right-wing Intellectuals in *Le Figaro littéraire*: The Invention of Counter-engagement'), *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, 96, Oct.–Dec., pp. 179–94.
10. Socialist realism was a controversial literary theory developed in the Soviet Union in 1932. It became influential especially after the congress of the Soviet Writers Union in 1934, where Andrei Zhdanov, the Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR, pointed out its importance. Inheriting the tradition of nineteenth-century Russian realism, it aims to reflect real life in art works, objectively, as it is. However, different from previous realist waves, socialist realism aims at strengthening the belief in socialist ideals.
11. O. Frolin (2007) 'Un débat intellectuel en Période de Guerre Froide' ('An Intellectual Debate during the Cold War'), *Nouvelles Fondations*, 5, April, p. 159. Writers like Vittorini in Italy and Edgar Morin in France criticized this formulation of socialist realism as an attempt by politicians to intervene in culture.
12. G.W. Hoffman (1964) 'Transformation of Rural Settlement in Bulgaria', *Geographical Review*, 54, 1 Jan., pp. 45–64 (46). H.L. Kostanick (1955) 'Turkish Resettlement of Refugees from Bulgaria, 1950–1953', *Middle East Journal*, 9, no. 1, pp. 41–52 (42).

13. Kostanick, 'Turkish Resettlement of Refugees', p. 42.
14. N. Ragaru (2010) 'Voyages en identités. Les espaces-temps de l'appartenance des Turcs de Bulgarie installés en Turquie', *Critique Internationale*, 47 (April–June), pp. 37–60 (42).
15. M.P. (1951) 'The Expulsion of the Turkish Minority from Bulgaria', *The World Today*, 7, no. 1, pp. 30–6 (31).
16. M.P., 'The Expulsion of the Turkish Minority', p. 33.
17. Kostanick, 'Turkish Resettlement', p. 43.
18. Hoffman (1964) 'Transformation of Rural Settlement', p. 62.
19. *Milliyet*, 26 August 1951.
20. 'Up until 1940, some 10,000 to 12,000 people migrated to Turkey under this agreement annually, except during the period from 1930 to 1935, when the total fell to less than 1,000 per year. During the Second World War, the movement again declined. When the Communists came into power in Bulgaria in 1944, emigration was officially discouraged and fell to a mere trickle.' Kostanick, 'Turkish Resettlement of Refugees', pp. 42–5. 'Between 1928 and 1939 nearly 100,000 Turks left Bulgaria for Turkey.' M.P., 'The Expulsion of the Turkish Minority', p. 32.
21. İ. Soysal (1997) *Soğuk Savaş Dönemi ve Türkiye Olaylar Kronolojisi (1945–1975)* (*Cold War Period and the Chronology of the Developments in Turkey*) (Istanbul: İsis), pp. 142–3.
22. *Milliyet*, 15 August 1950 and 20 September 1950. For example, in an article that based its arguments on American sources of information, it was claimed that the original plan of the Russians was to exterminate all the Muslims in the USSR and in its 'satellites' in Europe, and that the forced migration of 250,000 Turks from Bulgaria was a part of this plan. See *Milliyet*, 23 September 1950. Another extreme example of this 'Russian conspiracy' argument is a report in the newspaper entitled 'Bulgarians are falling into disfavor in the Kremlin'. When we read the content of the report we understand that the reason why they are falling into disfavor is that they could not fulfill the task given to them by Moscow: to guarantee that 250,000 Turks are sent to Turkey on the 33rd anniversary of the Russian Revolution (*Milliyet*, 15 November 1950). A similar argument has been put forward in more academic work. An article dealing with the expulsion of Turks from Bulgaria described the expulsion as part of a larger plan to get rid of non-national elements: 'The Soviets would appear to be engaged in a gigantic clean-up of the "unreliable" national elements along Black Sea coast.' M.P., 'The Expulsion of the Turkish Minority', p. 34.
23. These articles were mostly interviews made with those who came to Turkey. In these interviews it was claimed that in Bulgaria, Turks were forced to work in mines and those who attempted to escape were tortured. *Milliyet*, 18 January 1951. There were also claims such as that it was prohibited for the Bulgarians to buy the goods of Turks and that it was forbidden to speak Turkish. *Milliyet*, 25 August 1950. In one article it was written that each Turkish family in Bulgaria was forced to pay $700 for the construction of a statute of Stalin. See *Milliyet*, 2 February 1951.
24. *Milliyet*, 23 November 1950.
25. *Milliyet*, 14 August 1950, article by İsmail Hami Danişmend.
26. *Milliyet*, 17 November 1950.

27. *Milliyet*, 19 December 1950. A person named Kazım who came from Bulgaria to Kırklareli was arrested on the charge of communist propaganda.
28. The documents used in this essay about Nâzım Hikmet and his visit to Bulgaria in 1951 are found in the archive of TüSTAV, as duplicates of the following documents: RGASPI f. 495, op. 266, d. 47, doc. no: 154–8 (original in Russian). The owner of this archive in Turkey, the Social History Research Foundation of Turkey (TüSTAV), was founded in 1992 by the directors of the United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP), which itself was founded in 1988 as the union of two longstanding leftist parties in Turkey: the Labor Party of Turkey (TİP) and the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP). TBKP no longer exists but TüSTAV continues its activities as an important archival source on the history of the Turkish communist and workers' movements. Immediately after its foundation, TüSTAV acquired the documents relevant to the Communist Party of Turkey from the Comintern archives inside the Russian State Archive for Social and Political History (RGASPI). However, the overall sources that refer to this visit are extremely limited.
29. A widespread campaign for the release of the poet started in the first place in Turkey, in February 1950, stimulated by the poet's commencement of a hunger strike. At that time, Nâzım Hikmet had already been in prison for 12 years and his health was worsening. Supporters of the poet started to put pressure on the government for amnesty legislation. In November 1950, the campaign gained an international character with the decision taken in the congress of the World Peace Council in Warsaw to establish a committee to start an international campaign for the release of Nâzım Hikmet. The committee consisted of world-famous writers and artists such as Pablo Picasso, Paul Robeson, and Jean Paul Sartre. This was followed by a petition campaign and public demonstrations in many European countries, especially in France and in the countries of Eastern Europe. It is believed that these campaigns played a decisive role in the liberation of the poet and his recognition in the world. K. Coşkun (2007) *Barışın Şairi Nâzım Hikmet* (Istanbul: Nâzım Hikmet Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı Yayınları), pp. 94–6.
30. F. Erdinç (ed.) (1977) *Nâzım Hikmet ve Bulgaristan* (*Nâzım Hikmet and Bulgaria*) (Ankara: Evrensel Dostluk Yayınevi), p. 62.
31. Erdinç (ed.), *Nâzım Hikmet ve Bulgaristan*, p. 62.
32. Erdinç (ed.), *Nâzım Hikmet ve Bulgaristan*, p. 62.
33. Göksu and Timms, *Romantic Communist*, p. 269.
34. TüSTAV; material at Dr N. Hikmet at 10 lista. p. 1.
35. S. Develioğlu (2004) *Nâzım'ın 'Macar Toprağı'* (*The 'Hungarian Soil' of Nâzım Hikmet*) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları), pp. 170–1.
36. TüSTAV; material at Dr N. Hikmet at 10 lista. p. 10.
37. 'I have fled abroad in order to organize the relations of the party, to solve the problems that are important for it and to work actively in the International Peace Committee. I want to go to Moscow to solve these problems. If I can solve these problems here, I will stay in Bucharest. I will work through the instructions of the brother parties and the World Peace Committee.' TüSTAV, F495. op. 266 D47, g II, Nâzım Hikmet, Lichnoe pismo Nazima Hikmeta (personal letter of Nâzım Hikmet).
38. TüSTAV, Nâzım Hikmet, Informatsia a paezdke v Balgariu c Nazimom Hikmetom (information about the trip to Bulgaria with Nâzım Hikmet), p. 2.

39. The report of the Soviet agent is one of the few valuable documents that contribute to our knowledge about the visit of the poet to Bulgaria in 1951. TüSTAV, Nâzım Hikmet, Informatsia a paezdke v Balgariu c Nazimom Hikmetom.
40. TüSTAV; material at Dr N. Hikmet at 10 lista. p. 1.
41. TüSTAV; material at Dr N. Hikmet at 10 lista. p. 1. Nâzım Hikmet, Informatsia a paezdke v Balgariu c Nazimom Hikmetom.
42. TüSTAV; material at Dr N. Hikmet at 10 lista. p. 1.
43. TüSTAV; material at Dr N. Hikmet at 10 lista. p. 1.
44. TüSTAV; material at Dr N. Hikmet at 10 lista. p. 1.
45. When the poet arrived at Çiftlik village, the villagers told him that they changed the name of their village to 'Nâzım Hikmet'. Blaga Dimitrova, 'Bulgaristan Gezisi Notları' ('Travel Notes in Bulgaria'), in Erdinç (ed.), *Nâzım Hikmet ve Bulgaristan*, p. 146.
46. TüSTAV; material at Dr N. Hikmet at 10 lista. p. 1.
47. On 9 September 1944, a popular insurrection had taken place after which 'the people's republic' was declared in Bulgaria.
48. Nasrettin Hoca is a Seljukian satirical mystic figure, sometimes believed to have lived during the Middle Ages (around the thirteenth century) and considered a populist philosopher and wise man, remembered for his funny stories and anecdotes.
49. TüSTAV; material at Dr N. Hikmet at 10 lista. p. 1.
50. TüSTAV; material at Dr N. Hikmet at 10 lista. p. 1.
51. Erdinç (ed.), *Nâzım Hikmet ve Bulgaristan.*
52. Sertel, *Nâzım Hikmet'in*, p. 48.
53. Göksu and Timms, *Romantic Communist*, p. 323.
54. Tata, *Türk Komünistlerin Bulgaristan Maceraları*, p. 20.
55. F. Erdinç (2006) *Kalkın Gidelim Nâzım'a* (Istanbul: Yordam Kitap).
56. TüSTAV, Nâzım Hikmet, Informatsia a paezdke v Balgariu c Nâzımom Hikmetom.
57. Erdinç (ed.), *Nâzım Hikmet ve Bulgaristan*, p. 48.
58. Fuat, *Nâzım Hikmet*, p. 587.
59. 'Red Poet works in Bulgaria to hinder the departure of the immigrants. According to our sources, Nâzım Hikmet who has been sent by the Bulgarian government to the regions where a considerable population of the Turkish minority resides works hard in a despicable way to succeed in his mission.' *Milliyet*, 29 October 1951.
60. The column of Orhan Özkırım. *Milliyet*, 1 November 1951.
61. It was written that the people had been gathered by the force of 'red scourges'. See 'Kızıl kırbaçlarla toplanan Türkler' ('Turks who gathered by the force of "red scourges"'), *Milliyet*, 1 November 1951.
62. *Milliyet*, 10 October 1951.
63. *Milliyet*, 10 October 1994. He was followed by the leader of the 1980 *coup d'état* Kenan Evren. Evren made a statement that he loved the poems of Nâzım Hikmet. See 'Evren de Nazımcı oldu' ('Evren became a fan of Nâzım, too'), *Milliyet*, 3 December 1994.
64. Special thanks to Erden Akbulut and Sibel Sular from the Social History Research Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, or TüSTAV) for providing the documents which made this essay possible, to Paul Williams for his careful reading, and to Cangül Örnek for her encouragement.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

TüSTAV, F495. op. 266 D47, g II, Nazım Hikmet, Lichnoe pismo Nazima Hikmeta.
TüSTAV; material at Dr N. Hikmet at 10 lista.
TüSTAV, Nazım Hikmet, Informatsia a paezdke v Balgariu c Nâzimom Hikmetom.

Periodicals

Milliyet, 1950–51.

Books and Articles

Akbulut, E. (2002) *Bizim Radyoda Nazım Hikmet*. Istanbul: TüSTAV.
——(2002) *Komintern Belgelerinde Nazım Hikmet*. Istanbul: TüSTAV.
——(2008) *Anılar, Bilal Şen*. Istanbul: TüSTAV.
Akgül, H. (2002) *Nazım Hikmet, Siyasi Biyografi*. Istanbul: Chiviyazilari.
Alper, O.R. (2002) *Mülteci Komünist*. Istanbul: Timaş.
Ataöv, T. (1976) *Nazım Hikmet'in Hasreti*. Istanbul: May Yayınları.
Babayev, E. (2002) *Nazım Hikmet: Yaşamı ve Yapıtları*. Istanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi.
Benderli, G. (2003) *Su Başında Durmuşuz*. Istanbul: Belge Yayınları.
Blandin, C. (2007) 'Les interventions des intellectuels de droite dans Le Figaro littéraire: L'invention du contre-engagement', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, 96, Oct.–Dec., pp. 179–94.
Coşkun, K. (2007) *Barışın Şairi Nazım*. Istanbul: Nâzım Hikmet Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı.
Develioğlu, S. (2004) *Nazım'ın 'Macar Toprağı'*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
Dimitrova, B. (1977) 'Bulgaristan Gezisi Notları', in Fahri Erdinç (ed.), *Nazım Hikmet ve Bulgaristan*. Ankara: Evrensel Dostluk Yayınevi, p. 146.
Erdinç, F. (2006) *Kalkın Gidelim Nâzım'a*. Istanbul: Yordam Kitap.
Erdinç, F. (ed.) (1977) *Nazım Hikmet ve Bulgaristan*. Ankara: Evrensel Dostluk Yayınevi.
Frolin, O. (2007) 'Un débat intellectuel en période de Guerre Froide', *Nouvelles Fondations*, 5, April, pp. 156–60.
Fuat, M. (2001) *Nazım Hikmet, Yaşamı, Ruhsal Yapısı, Davaları, Tartışmaları, Dünya Görüşü, Şiirinin Gelişmeleri*. Istanbul: Adam Yayınları.
Göksu, S., and E. Timms (1999) *Romantic Communist*: *The Life and Work of Nazım Hikmet*. New York: St Martin's Press.
Hikmet, V.T. (1989) *Nazım'la Söyleşi*, trans. A. Behramoğlu. Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
——(2008) *Bahtiyar ol Nazım: Anı*. Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.
Hoffman, G.W. (1964) 'Transformation of Rural Settlement in Bulgaria', *Geographical Review*, 54, no. 1, pp. 45–64.
Kostanick, Huey Louis (1955) 'Turkish Resettlement of Refugees from Bulgaria, 1950–1953', *Middle East Journal*, 9, no. 1, pp. 41–52.
M.P. (1951) 'The Expulsion of the Turkish Minority from Bulgaria', *The World Today*, 7, no. 1, pp. 30–6.
Petek, F. (2009) *Bir Hayat Üç Can*. Istanbul: TüSTAV.

Ragaru, N. (2010) 'Voyages en identités. Les espaces-temps de l'appartenance des Turcs de Bulgarie installés en Turquie', *Critique Internationale*, 47 (April–June), pp. 37–60.
Sertel, Y. (2008) *Nazım Hikmet ile Serteller.* Istanbul: Everest Yayınları.
Sertel, Z. (1996) *Nazım Hikmet'in son yılları.* Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları.
Soysal, İ. (1997) *Soğuk Savaş Dönemi ve Türkiye Olaylar Kronolojisi (1945–1975).* Istanbul: Isis.
Sverçevskaya, A. (2002) *Kardeşim Nazım: Çağdaşlarının Anıları*, trans. M. Özgül. Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
Tata, S. (1993) *Türk Komünistlerin Bulgaristan Maceraları.* Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları.
Turgut, E. (2002) *Nazım Hikmet.* Levallois-Perret: Editions Turquoise.

Part II
Culture and Sport

5

Issues of Ideology and Identity in Turkish Literature during the Cold War

Çimen Günay-Erkol

In the Cold War era, the period from the end of the Second World War to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Turkey was dominated by efforts of democratization and liberalization, economic growth and instability, intellectual and political quarrels, three successful (1960, 1971, and 1980) and two abortive military coups (1962 and 1963), and armed aggression in the streets which reached a peak toward the end of 1970s. The ruins left by military dictatorships are still relatively unexplored, and the neoliberal structure and hegemonic discourses introduced by them still influence contemporary life. The Cold War has left an imprint not only in literature but also in daily language, and its legacy is very much alive. The Turkish dictionary prepared and made online by the state-supported Turkish Language Association (TDK), for example, gives *Moskof gâvuru* (infidel of Moscow) as a synonym for the word *Rus* (Russian), linking an ethnic identity to a political system (the ideal of a Moscow-centered international dictatorship) and religious otherness at the same time.

Although the spectrum of Cold War writing in Turkey is impressively broad, the polarized atmosphere created by left-wing and anti-communist activities, and the concerted social and political defiance of young generations influenced by the events of 1968, have left a valuable imprint on the world of letters. In the limited space of this essay, I aim to focus on the main characteristics of the Cold War literature in Turkey and comment on the literary movements and personages by focusing on relevant biographical profiles. Following the chronology of the three successful military interventions Turkey experienced, which socially and politically transformed the country, such a panoramic look will reveal the ideological positions available to writers during the Cold War era. I aim to demonstrate how racist, socialist, Islamist, or nationalist

discourses were produced by writers in Turkey as a response to the ideological tensions elevated to a new level of intensity in the Cold War.

Turkey's ambivalent position as a secular Muslim state, and the sharp dichotomies it experienced between the Soviets and the West, and also between the Muslim Orient and Western modernity, nurtured many of the intellectual conflicts of twentieth-century Turkey. Cold War literature not only responded to political problems and emerging divisions but also vitalized an inward turn to self that communicates the traumatic instances of the political conflicts. Concern for world affairs was a common motive for writers of different genres. Therefore, not only essayists but also novelists, poets, and playwrights attempted to recapture the realities of the day from different ideological perspectives. In works that are thematically and stylistically diverse, writers examined several questions of psychological, social, and political origin.

Post-Second World War and Turkey's Democratization

In the early 1930s, when socialist realism was announced as the official style of Soviet culture in the First Congress of Soviet Writers, which gathered invited writers from around the world, its impact on literature in Turkey was quick and immense.[1] A new type of realism with an augmented interest in exploitation of the masses, social injustice, and the contamination of politics attracted some established writers who started to criticize, more baldly than ever, Turkey's worn-out traditions, political orthodoxies, and feudal habits. The grand narratives of nationalism/Kemalism became targets and a heated discussion on the prospects of literature emerged, with pro-Soviet writers in one camp, who assume a politically active role for literature, and pro-Western writers in the other, who insisted on artistic autonomy. There were of course neutral names, who did not favor one side over the other, further complicating the literary establishment. Considering the operations of the state-funded Translation Bureau (1940–46) and the Ministry of Education's support for the publication of Western classics, it is possible to say that post-war Turkey was an arena of competition for trendsetters in literature, including the state itself.[2]

One of the most influential literary figures in post-Second World War Turkey was Nâzım Hikmet (Ran) (1901–63),[3] an outspoken poet and intellectual who is regarded as the founding father of modern verse. Hikmet was on the forefront of the oppositional left, and his political dedication caused him several years in prison and exile. Nâzım Hikmet used poetry to fight injustice on a global scale: the invasion of Ethiopia

was a concern in his poems ('Taranta Babu'ya Mektuplar', 1935), as well as the Spanish Civil War ('Karanlıkta Kar Yağıyor', 1937), the Korean War ('23 Sentlik Askere Dair'), and the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima ('Kız Çocuğu', 1956). In his early poems, Nâzım Hikmet promoted a patriotic, heroic identity that stood up for the nationalistic fight in Turkey against the allied invasion. These early poems gave way to poems with socialist ideals, based on the everyday struggles of the working class. Nâzım Hikmet's allegiance to the project of the Communist Party of Turkey and his criticisms of the official ideology gradually marginalized him, finally making him a primary target of state censorship. He was forbidden to publish after 1938. However, the attempt to alienate him, paradoxically, increased his popularity.

Nâzım Hikmet's masterwork *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları* (*Human Landscapes from My Country*, the multi-volume epic saga written between 1941–51 and published in 1966–67) portrays the lives of different strata in Turkey. His post-1945 works include a sharpened critique of traditions and militarism, and also a more pacifist and cynical tone. After he fled Turkey and was ultimately labeled a betrayer of the Turkish nation, Nâzım Hikmet obtained a Polish passport and lived in Sofia, Warsaw, and finally in Moscow. Poems written during his years of exile portray a sense of nostalgia, a yearning to return to his roots.[4]

The generation of 1940, consisting mostly of poets under the influence of Nâzım Hikmet, attempted to unite a radical political vision of justice with the folklore of Turkey to produce an imagined Turkish identity. Members of this movement, such as Hasan İzzettin Dinamo, A. Kadir, Enver Gökçe, Arif Damar, Ahmed Arif, and others, united their explorations of war and militarism, class struggles, and the economic exploitation of workers with poetic imagination and produced memorable verse. Can Yücel, who published his first book in 1950, provided an extended discourse on anarchism and eroticism in the Marxist vein. These names inspired further generations with their vision of justice and political opposition.

In parallel to the rise of socialist realism, another vein of realism that sought to mimetically represent all levels of society and the diversity of social issues with rather less explicit political messages was also under development. Short-story writers such as Reşat Enis Aygen, Bekir Sıtkı Kunt, Kenan Hulusi Koray, and Mehmet Seyda, as well as the two well-known pens of Cevat Şakir Kabaağaçlı and Sait Faik, produced remarkable stories of everyday life, focusing on the struggles of ordinary people and detailing their drama.[5] Writers such as Memduh Şevket Esendal, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, and Samet Ağaoğlu elaborated the human

drama with a romantic realism without any explicit political references and produced memorable short stories that reflected the conditions of post-war Turkey.

Nâzım Hikmet's anti-Soviet contemporaries were likewise attached to the problem of divisions among people. Peyami Safa (1899–1961),[6] the prominent novelist and journalist of anti-Soviet conservatism during the Cold War and Nâzım Hikmet's most famous opponent in polemics, urged a synthesis of East and West, and a reconsideration of Islam in the intellectual sphere.[7] Although Safa was an anti-Soviet in the dualistic world of Cold War politics, he was an anti-Westernist in the cultural realm. In Safa's conservative perspective, the West was to Turkey as a woman to a man. Safa referred to the Westernization of Turkey as a feminizing process reducing national power, which is completely marked as masculine.[8] Safa's magnum opus, *Matmazel Noraliya'nın Koltuğu* (*The Armchair of Madmoiselle Noralia*, 1949), explores a young man's growth to maturity as his girlfriend transforms in his eyes from an initial object of his 'animalistic' sexual desire into an intellectual and spiritual companion.

Some anti-Soviet writers of the time were also interested in national values as defining themes, such as Nihal Atsız (1905–75),[9] a leading Pan-Turkist ideologue and the most prolific writer of works with an ultra-nationalistic character. Atsız, who attempted to move beyond the historical Ottoman Empire, was a widely read author in his time. Similar to Nâzım Hikmet and Peyami Safa, Atsız and Sabahattin Ali were involved in a political polemic, which gave rise to street fights and demonstrations between supporters of the two writers, as Sabahattin Ali had brought a lawsuit against Atsız for his accusations of treason. This conflict was the initial sign of the ideological polarization introduced by the Cold War between the leftists and the Turkists.

Atsız's literary effort aimed to create a significant distant past in terms of heroism in his novels so that the current lack of power would be compensated for. His two popular books *Bozkurtların Ölümü* (*Death of the Greywolves*, 1946) and *Bozkurtlar Diriliyor* (*Greywolves Resurrection*, 1949) build an epic saga positioned in Central Asia before the advent of Islam into Turkish culture. This focus on Central Asia, which was by this time a Soviet territory, kept up the anti-communist agenda of the Turkists. Both novels abound in heroic acts of fighting and skirmishing, and also the self-sacrifice of men for the greater good of their fellows or in line with the orders of a higher authority. Heroic/sacrificial masculinity is suggested as a racial trait in these novels, that is, Turkish men are almost always better heroes in many ways than the Chinese. But the

novels, in a self-contradictory way, offer grey wolves as role models to all men for resistance to foreign rule. In several articles that increased his popularity, Atsız marked the social changes in Turkish culture as signs of moral degeneration of the original elements of that culture and emphasized the responsibility of communism for the degeneration of the Turkish lifestyle.

There was a softened Turkism in Kemalism as well. Some contemporaries of Atsız who were influential authors (albeit with different stories of anti-communism), such as Falih Rıfkı Atay, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, and others, were against racism and they did not deviate from Kemalism, the official ideology, while Atsız was a fervent critic of any ideology except Turkism. Atsız saw political Islam as the enemy of Turkism because of the internationalist character of the Islamist project.[10] The softened Turkism legitimized cultural traits emphasized by Atsız, such as loyalty to authority or the cult of leadership, but it withdrew the emphasis Atsız had placed on race.

The problem of synthesis in Turkish culture is also a feature of the major works of Kemal Tahir and Orhan Kemal, two young authors whom Nâzım Hikmet inspired while in prison. Just like Nâzım Hikmet, the two Kemals were arrested several times on political bases and spent a considerable amount of time in jail. In 1938, when Kemal Tahir was doing his military service, he was sentenced to 15 years for making communist propaganda. During his prison sentence, he wrote some of his best novels, but after his release he could only make a living by publishing adaptations of foreign crime novels (the Mayk Hammer series), which gained enormous popularity. After publishing poems and short stories, he finally came out with novels that deal with the lives of people of rural origin, and the alienation that they suffered once they migrated to cities.

Stemming from socialist realism, the two Kemals' writing opened new horizons via the village theme. Kemal Tahir (1910–73), in his trilogy on Anatolian life – *Yediçınar Yaylası* (*Yediçınar Plateau*, 1958), *Köyün Kamburu* (*Hunchback of the Village*, 1959), and *Büyük Mal* (*Big Commodity*, 1970) – illustrated corruption, both economic and sexual, in village life. Tahir focused on generations of a family based in rural Çorum, where villagers defy the corrupt landlord–exploited peasant pattern established by earlier novels on Anatolian village life. Tahir depicted villagers as decadent and grievously corrupt, challenging the essentialist and hygienic tone of Turkish nationalist writing about Anatolia. Men in his novel are slaves to their sexual instincts, and women are eager to use men's sexual dependence on them. Violence, filth, and rape appear as natural components of life, and expose the degeneration and misery of the

masses in Anatolia. Kemal Tahir defines men as by nature possessive and oppressive, and with a pathological sexual desire.

Orhan Kemal (Mehmet Raşit Öğütçü, 1914–70), similarly to Kemal Tahir, started to write in prison after he met Nâzım Hikmet as a fellow prisoner. He was found guilty in 1939 of a breach of the Turkish penal code for reading the books of Maxim Gorki and Nâzım Hikmet and producing communist propaganda, which resulted in his being sentenced to five years imprisonment. Kemal educated himself in prison under the guidance of Nâzım Hikmet and published his first novel, *Baba Evi* (*My Father's House*), in 1949, in which he presented a similar masculinity-based criticism of Turkish modernization. *Baba Evi* and its sequel *Avare Yıllar* (*Idle Years*) both explore the rites of passage of a boy who fails to be like his father.[11] Kemal handles the transformation metaphorically, using the instability generated by the troubles of a young boy as a euphemism for the instability generated by the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire into self-governed nation-states. The novel asks if new generations can challenge the pre-established definitions of identity forced on them by earlier generations.

Writers that helped forge a leftist literary tradition and a spirit of opposition to hegemonic politics in Turkey at the expense of frequent imprisonment also include names such as Aziz Nesin, Sabahattin Ali, Rıfat Ilgaz, Vedat Türkali, and Yaşar Kemal, all of whom left their peculiar traces in Turkish literature. The Ottoman Empire of the past was a source of inspiration for those writers as well. They critically explored the ethnocentric, religious methods of 'othering', which push particular identities rather than others to the borders of society.

The most prominent name in political Islam in Turkish literature at the beginning of the Cold War was the well-known poet and polemicist Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904–83),[12] who started publishing the widely read political journal *Büyük Doğu* (*The Great East*) in 1943, and who, toward the 1950s, became one of the most influential names of the anti-communist front. Similar to Safa, Kısakürek was an anti-Soviet author; however, he was also critical of the Westernization inherent in Turkey's modernization. Kısakürek carried out an Islamist critique of Western civilization in his works: the decadent, materialist, immoral West is a common theme in his writings. He was equally hostile to communism and individualism and, in a nationalistic rhetoric, he likened Turkey to a woman whose chastity is in danger due to attacks by both. Kısakürek argued that Muslims had become 'pariahs in their own countries' ('öz yurdunda parya'; 'Sakarya Türküsü', 1949).[13] Kısakürek's mysticism secured him a distinguished place among other nationalist authors with

Islamic sensibilities, but it did not save him from prison. The ruling power tolerated Islamic sensitivities in as much as they helped form a united anti-communist front, but did not hesitate to strike them when the limits were exceeded.

The literature of the period 1950–60 was dominated by the village theme but some other dramatic aspects of Turkish sociopolitical history, such as the deployment of Turkish troops to Korea under the UN framework and the resulting casualties of the first armed clash of the Cold War era, also inspired writers. It was Nâzım Hikmet who responded first to the drama with poems (such as '23 Sentlik Askere Dair') and a play called 'Fatma, Ali ve diğerleri'. The criticism did not, however, evolve into a serious discussion in literature of the impact of war on the masses and the specific trauma it inflicted on men who became soldiers.[14]

The novel that is considered the apogee of the village-novel genre, which became dominant in the 1950s, is *İnce Memed* (*Memed, My Hawk*, 1955). Yaşar Kemal's world-famous novel is an epic saga of the heroic fight of a noble bandit against rural landowners. The novel centers on Memed, a boy oppressed by the tyrannical landlord Abdi Aga since childhood. Memed becomes a man, joins a group of outlaws, turns into a Turkish Robin Hood, and takes his revenge in the end. Although Memed is heroic in one sense, he is also fallible and human, and this makes the novel very appealing. His acts of heroism are balanced with a sense of vulnerability, and his utopian revolutionism is very carefully explored. Similar to Kemal Tahir, Yaşar Kemal does not idealize the peasants. They seem to support Memed's fight, but when alarmed about their personal interests, the peasants quite easily retreat to their original positions and surrender to the hegemony of Abdi Ağa.

Here the lack of a consistent image of characters echoes the ambivalent situation of Turkey: Is Turkey of Europe or not? Is it a modern or a feudalist state? Is it a democracy or a dictatorship? The lack of a consistent image for characters also echoes the multidimensional character of the identity problem. Yaşar Kemal molds binary identity questions into complex problems and reminds us that, for a single person or a nation, 'being' and 'belonging' are complicated projects that should not be simplified.

İnce Memed is one of the best examples of the power problem common in the Turkish Cold War literature. Several other writers have also dealt with merciless rural life, and the struggles of peasants under inhumane landowners, natural disasters, and poverty. Some of the best socialist realists in this period include Talip Apaydın, Kemal Bilbaşar, Fakir Baykurt, and Dursun Akçam. Ordinary examples of the village

novel push peasants forward as positive heroes, who fight to destroy the corrupt system and defend the interests of the people.[15] Only a few of those novels catch a dramatic balance and escape being solely an exhibition of positive heroes.

In addition to the further development of socialist/Islamist veins in literature, the 1950s also saw the emergence of an 'apolitical' literary movement in poetry called İkinci Yeni (Second New). Poets associated with this movement, such as Edip Cansever, İlhan Berk, Cemal Süreya, Turgut Uyar, and Ece Ayhan, invalidated the socialist realist poetry of the 1940s and also the earlier Garip poets, who practiced avant-gardism with simple language focusing on ordinary people.[16] The political content of socialist realist poems is replaced with a multilayered, abstract, and dark imaginary, and an experimentalist and existentialist exploration of self in İkinci Yeni. In this abstract poetry, the attention turned to the malleable and fragmented psyche. The loss and regeneration of self was a central question which reflected the heightened concern for vulnerability. Some other poets such as Asaf Halet Çelebi, Cahit Sıtkı Tarancı, Behçet Necatigil, Fazıl Hüsnü Dağlarca, and others, which were not included in İkinci Yeni, also aimed for pure, 'uncontaminated' art and refrained from political content in their works.

As Nazi atrocities were unmasked towards the end of the war, a decline in support or sympathy for Turkish nationalistic radicalism occurred. Turkist-Turanists channeled their efforts into a nationalism that was not hostile to Islam and formed an anti-Soviet front together with Islamists. They united under Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri (Associations for Fighting Communism), which was established in Zonguldak in 1950 and in İstanbul in 1956.[17] The 1960s saw both an anti-communist movement organized in associations and an opening to the left in politics under the protection of the new constitution. A liberal atmosphere was created with the arrival of the new constitution following the intervention of the military in 1960, but political control of reactionary authors became severe before long, as oppositional politics kept being perceived as a threat to the integrity of the state in Turkey.

The 1960 Coup: Furthering Democracy with Non-Democratic Means

The political atmosphere in the country reached a dramatic climax when the military intervened in politics, arguing that the government had lost its democratic legitimacy in 1960. Support from urban elites for the Menderes government gradually declined due to corruption

charges, sanctions employed against the press, and its direct involvement in the universities. Many people perceived the intervention as an update of the Kemalist modernization project.[18]

As a new constitution was introduced following the military coup, with a wide range of civil liberties and social rights, an atmosphere of liberation arrived. Taking advantage of the liberal attitudes towards organized political activity in the new constitution, many different political groups such as Islamist, Turkist, and socialist accumulated around political clubs. The quasi-liberated political environment provided a similar liberty in literature.[19] In the 1960s, the ban on Nâzım Hikmet's works was removed, and the foundational texts of Marxism started to get published in Turkish.[20]

The socialist realist vein of Turkish poetry continued its development with the arrival of new names such as Hasan Hüseyin, Şükran Kurdakul, Ataol Behramoğlu, and Gülten Akın. Some of these writers initiated links with the Soviet Writers Union. Behramoğlu, for example, who majored in Russian literature at Ankara University, was an invited guest of the union in 1972 and spent two years in Moscow working on Russian literature at Moscow State University. Kemal Tahir and Orhan Kemal, two students of Nâzım Hikmet from prison, kept publishing novels and short stories and inspired younger generations of writers with socialist tendencies.

A patriotic reactionary discourse emerged in poetry as an answer to the Marxist poetry vein and provided access to a nationalistic romanticism via the works of writers such as Niyazi Yıldırım Gençosmanoğlu, Bahattin Karakoç, Yavuz Bülent Bakiler, Ali Akbaş, and Dilaver Cebeci. Nationalism at different levels of intensity was a popular topic in the left as well. The search for a certain trend in socialism, which could be referred to as 'a localized socialism', gained prominence.[21] Back in the early 1960s, some prominent names in Turkish literature had already responded to such a quest. In his 1963 book *Kurtlar Sofrası* (*Dining Table of the Wolves*) (written in the seven-year period from 1954 to 1961), Attila İlhan (1925–2005), poet, polemicist, and novelist, argues for the necessity of adapting socialism to the specific needs of Turkey and the need to establish a popular social base for the movement. The novel centers on Mahmud, a journalist who considers himself to be the child of an unfinished (Kemalist) revolution, and discusses the rise of new classes in Turkey in parallel to Mahmud's struggle between his personal romance and his sense of duty to society. Mahmud's growth into adult masculinity is a restoration of the unfinished Kemalist revolution by socialism.

Many Turkish socialists inherited the anti-Western critiques of the earlier Kemalist era. They referred to nationalism to obtain the trust and support of the masses. Yaşar Kemal defined nationalism rather positively in an article, stating that 'real nationalists are the socialists'.[22] An alternative to the attempt to link the image of the socialist man to that of the Kemalist reformer was the attempt to trace socialism in the distant Turkish past. Kemal Tahir, in his most famous novel, *Devlet Ana* (*Mother State*, 1967), focuses on thirteenth-century Anatolia and portrays a proto-socialist state and social structure. Following the growth of the Ottoman Empire from the thirteenth century onwards, Tahir mixes individual stories of growth into stories of manhood and revenge. He makes use of the folk tales of Dede Korkut, Anatolian legends, verses from the Koran and the Bible, Persian literature, and Central Asian poetry. In this novel, Tahir's greatest challenge was the Republican rejection of the Ottoman past, but he also annoyed those who were not eager to make Ottoman history a foundational part of Turkish socialism.[23]

The transition from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic and the transformation it forced upon identities is also a major concern in conservative novelist Tarık Buğra's *Küçük Ağa* (*Little Aga*, 1963) and its sequel *Küçük Ağa Ankara'da* (*Little Aga in Ankara*, 1967). In these novels Buğra focuses on Mehmet Reşit, an Islamic clergyman sent from İstanbul to the little Anatolian town Akşehir, who supports the Ottoman Sultan against the nationalists and experiences a drastic change of mind in the course of time. These two novels are fictive documents of the Turkish War of Independence outside the realm of official history, and they touch upon the moral and political ups and downs of Turkish nationalism. The novels also include an affirmation of the nationalistic activism infused with Islam, and therefore pave the way for a Turk–Islam synthesis, a project of unification of the Turkish-Islamic national identity, which served as the foundation for the anti-communist movement and became the major premise beneath Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri (Associations for the Struggle against Communism).

The gripping quest for 'Turkish socialism' invited several other questions. In the works of Islamist poets such as Cahit Zarifoğlu and Sezai Karakoç, who gathered around the journal *Diriliş* (*Resurrection*) in the 1960s, the search for roots was a central feature. This brought an exploration of ancestry and a personal search for childhood. Cahit Zarifoğlu's (1940–87) *İşaret Çocukları* (*Children of Signs*, 1967) contains painful returns to the past and an exploration of death and metaphysics. In Sezai Karakoç's (b.1933) poetry, contemplation on theology and the icons of Islamic mysticism become visible in parallel to the dramatic

exploration of the national past. The eminent suitability of such topics to discuss self and identity in a historicized manner opened new horizons in the discussion of Turkish modernity.

İsmet Özel, whose first book *Evet İsyan* (*Yes Revolt*, 1969) reflects socialist tones, is one of the prominent names that contributed to romantic revolutionism in Turkish letters. He later took a different path and chose Islamic mysticism, but his lyrical search for roots in culture continued. Özel's defense of Islam marked a transformation in Islamist thinking. He criticized the unthinking acceptance of the notion of a civilized West and argued that trying to prove that civilization under Islam is more civilized than the West starts with a detrimental observation. He furthered the question of civilization in his *Üç Mesele* (*Three Problems*, 1978) and argued in an article titled 'Her Türlü Medeniyete Karşı' ('Against Every Type of Civilization') that civilization led the way to classed societies based on exploitation and tortured souls.[24]

In the works of writers with an Islamist worldview, the discussion of identity trouble probes colonial subordination, tracing the changes in the cultural climate of Turkey in parallel to its history of Westernization, with specific emphasis on the struggle between stereotypes of the past and the present. Although Turkey was never colonized, in the literal sense, the belated Westernization it experienced qualifies as a case of cultural colonization, because dramatic changes occurred in cultural patterns during the process. In a striking contrast to poetry, novels written by Islamist writers put a stronger emphasis on the cultural colonization of Turkey. The 1967 novel *Minyeli Abdullah* (*Abdullah of Minye*) of Hekimoğlu İsmail, for example, is a propaganda book fueled with anti-communism and anti-Westernization. Hekimoğlu follows the line drawn by Peyami Safa and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, and choses to side with the Western bloc against communism, while he criticizes the Westernization of Turkey in domestic politics. In *Minyeli Abdullah*, Hekimoğlu criticizes socialism and modernism as Western imports and negotiates an Islamic lifestyle using a religious figure based in the Egyptian town of Minye. The novel presents socialists as people filled with hatred of society and the nation, and explores issues of political action against such figures, pushing Islam forward as the remedy.

A young generation of short-story writers labeled as 'the Generation of 1950', who later also proved themselves as successful novelists, constituted the counter-current in the literature of 1960s Turkey, as they lacked the political emphasis of the domineering socialist-realist literature. These writers were mostly of city origin, and they focused on the alienation of intellectuals and their growing mistrust of people in

their works. Vüsat O. Bener, Demir Özlü, Ferit Edgü, Orhan Duru, Yusuf Atılgan, Bilge Karasu, and Tahsin Yücel, who all began to write in the ten-year period between 1950 and 1960, focused on an identity problem distanced from class struggle. With urban identities at the center, these writers touched upon societal pressure, and the existentialist skepticism and inner struggles of intellectuals.

As political discussion evolved into armed clashes in the streets in the deeply radicalizing atmosphere under the influence of the global anti-authority movements of 1968, the figure of the intellectual in Turkey had to make way for that of the guerilla fighter. Armed resistance elevated student protests to a new level, and anti-Americanism reached its peak.[25] This extremely politicized atmosphere gradually turned into an oppressive one, with much friction between the different political groups that clashed in the streets. When the military intervened in politics in Turkey for the second time, their measures were more brutal and the casualties were heavier. Turkey became a site of torment under the military regime from 1971 to 1973.

The 1971 Coup: Further 'Democratization' Under the Hammer

A few weeks after an interim government was formed in the leadership of Nihat Erim, Erim declared on a radio broadcast that the precautions taken by the government 'will land on their [the radicals'] heads like a hammer' ('devlet balyoz gibi inecek').[26] The 12 March 1971 coup punished 1968 radicalism ferociously and traumatized a mass of individuals of different generations and social status (overwhelmingly the leftists). The US supported the coup via counter-guerilla forces (Turkish *gladio*) that were under the command of the Turkish Special Forces as part of its counterinsurgency politics.[27] Declassified transcripts of US Foreign Policy in 1969–76 give details of the intelligence activities that prepared the way for the coup.[28]

Stuck in an untenable atmosphere of violence and chaos, the mainstream public perceived the coup as a timely act in an attempt to preserve the quasi-democratic status quo of the country and welcomed the armed forces' taking power into their hands. Before the coup, there were massive casualties in street fights almost every single day, and numerous politically motivated murders, the victims of which went mostly unidentified. The interim government declared a state of emergency in 11 cities, and therefore ended the chaos in the streets. However, as radical activists found themselves victims of a military state that pursued

a brutal campaign and made arbitrary arrests, the anti-leftist motives behind the intervention became clearer.

Socialist realism remained a productive vein in literature and nurtured journalistic perspectives (with political interference) on the realities of the country. A rich body of fictional writing concentrating on the memories of the military period emerged in the 1970s. The locations of novels and plays of the early 1970s are mostly prisons or police cells, while poems focus on the struggles of the civil war-like conditions of the streets. The military's taking power in their hands initiated a concerted self-questioning in writers of the period who, in one way or another, were involved in politics. In the first half of the 1970s, writers who physically became victims of the military wrote narratives with testimonial overtones and reenacted their bitter experiences as political detainees. Built on still-fresh memories of the events of the military intervention, most such works were also rich in quotidian details of urban life in 1970s Turkey.

Çetin Altan, a member of the left wing of the Labor Party of Turkey (TİP), published *Büyük Gözaltı* (*Extreme Surveillance*, 1972), a chronicle of a grievous imprisonment in a custody cell which is linked to a troubled life under pressure in a persecutory culture. A desperate man under custody speaks directly to the reader in this novel. The custody cell is used strikingly as a metaphor to delineate the accounts of growing up in a traditional society. Nurtured by Altan's memories of imprisonment in the heyday of military rule, the novel depicts the spectacular story of a man fighting oppressive measures not only under custody and against his guardians, but also through his entire life against the restrictions of society.

Such a cultural criticism of panoptical power is also carried out by Erdal Öz in *Yaralısın* (*You Are Wounded*, 1974), which is a retrospective self-judgment of a leftist revolutionary intellectual with documentary accounts of torture. When he is sent to prison after a clandestine interrogation, the protagonist discovers that violence and hunger for power are also central to the lives of those who were already pushed into a subaltern position by the repressive measures of the state apparatus in prison. With the prison dimension, the power problem in the novel is divorced from the military–civil dichotomy and settles into a broader discussion. *Yaralısın* not only confronts torturers with their victims, but also turns a critical eye on how people organize themselves into power hierarchies, even in conditions when they all are victims of oppression.

In addition to the testimonial literary perspective that centers on resistance against hegemonic structures and official history, an alternative perspective in literature was also present, which actively encouraged

aesthetic resistance and paying attention to the individual. Oğuz Atay's *Tutunamayanlar* (*The Disconnected*, 1970), for example, presents the search for identity as the central problem in Turkish culture and carries out a criticism of Turkish modernization with ironic intent.[29] Although it does not let the militaristic bureaucracy go without criticism while doing this, the major premise of the book is to reveal the conflicts of an urban, petty-bourgeois intellectual, in what may be considered an extension of the existentialist exploration of self initiated by the Generation of 1950.

Several other post-dictatorial novels published immediately after the return to democracy in 1973, such as Vedat Türkali's *Bir Gün Tek Başına* (*One Day Alone*, 1974), Melih Cevdet Anday's *İsa'nın Güncesi* (*The Diary of Jesus*, 1974), also revolve around the issue of power. These novels explore individuals who try to judge their feelings and the validity of their ideological line. A certain trend of focusing on rural struggles also continued in literature of the 1970s, but the focus now shifted more towards the internal migration to big cities, and the problem of cultural compatibility rather than the hierarchical dynamics of village life.

Yaşar Kemal remained a mouthpiece for subjugated masses under the overwhelming tensions of rural landowners in the 1970s as well. In his *Yusufçuk Yusuf* (*Yusufçuk Yusuf*, 1975), he explores the tension between established and contemporary landowners, making the transformation from *ağa* to *bey* a major metaphor for the transformation of Turkey into a culture of premature capitalism from that of feudalism. New writers shifted from pre-established forms of writing about village life and developed new strategies and more complex models of representation. The clash between the traditional and the modern in rural life inspired several other writers in the 1970s. Ferit Edgü's *Kimse* (*No One*, 1976) and its sequel *O/Hakkari'de Bir Mevsim* (*He/A Season in Hakkari*, 1977) revolve around a teacher exiled to Hakkari, in southeastern Turkey, and explore the intellectual alienation of a young man from his surroundings. Passages of sharply observed realistic descriptions record and protest the oppressiveness of a life in isolation, while acknowledging the predicament of individuals, who became fragile victims of power.

In the late 1970s, some major books of Turkist ideology were reissued to support the task of challenging the leftist versions of solidarity and martyrdom in the post-coup novels. The most important of these were *Bozkurtların Ölümü* (*Death of the Greywolves*) and *Bozkurtlar Diriliyor* (*Greywolves Resurrection*), two popular novels by the famous Turkist Nihal Atsız.

The years 1975–77 can be described as a period of gestation, in the sense that after the armed forces left the political sphere in 1973, all

political camps were trying to consolidate their positions. Works published in this epoch ushered in a wave of women writers who explored power struggles with an enhanced critical lens. Women writers such as Adalet Ağaoğlu, Sevgi Soysal, Pınar Kür, Leyla Erbil, and others, illustrated men's collusion with power, even from the position of a victim. Women writers critically questioned the differences between men and women in capitalist culture, and criticized the power that comes with financial wealth. Writers such as Ayla Kutlu, Nursel Duruel, Erendiz Atasü, and others, also contributed to this feminist surge in literature, making the struggles of women in everyday life visible.

In a series of novels published by women in the late 1970s, such as Sevgi Soysal's *Şafak* (*The Dawn*, 1974) or Pınar Kür's *Yarın Yarın* (*Tomorrow Tomorrow*, 1976), female characters are obsessive sites of masculine evaluation and judgment, and the novels achieve success in meshing gender issues with the political upheavals of the period. Readers are immersed into stories of women cloistered in the clutches of patriarchy. Two major questions in these works are, first, whether people can renounce their social class and change sides, and second, whether men can give up their gender privileges and unite with women in their fight for liberation. Those are challenging questions to ask, considering that the revolutionary leftist movement in Turkey was overwhelmingly male and lacking an established proletarian class.

The increasing popularity of the leftist testimonial novels on military coups triggered an attempt by the right wing to tell their particular stories. A new set of novels emerged, which attempted to undermine the emancipation claimed by the leftist worldview by addressing the superiority of conservative national and cultural values. As anti-communism moved into the private domains of personal relations and family matters, writers employed a moral tone in their narratives. Emine Işınsu (Okçu)'s *Sancı* (*Pain*, 1975) – which tells the life story of Ertuğrul Dursun Önkuzu, 'a martyr' of the anti-communist Greywolves, focusing on the skirmishes that erupted between armed groups of the left and the right – and Sevinç Çokum's *Zor* (*Hard*, 1977) – which, similarly to Emine Işınsu's *Sancı*, focuses on the life of a boy of village origin – claimed the martyr status for the members of 'idealists' (Greywolves) who sacrificed their lives in order to protect the nation against 'destructive' Western ideological imports. Both novels stigmatize leftist revolutionaries and challenge their previously established victim role by illustrating them in a false consciousness.

Another literary protest that emerged in the 1970s as a reaction to the dominance of the socialist-realist themes in literature was the Islamic one, which developed around writers such as Hekimoğlu İsmail, Ahmet

Günbay Yıldız, Mustafa Miyasoğlu, and Halit Ertuğrul, who in didactic narratives, attempted to secure prestige for an alternative modernism.[30] In contrast to village novels with idealist teachers who fight religious conservatism as the explicit focus, these novels denied the progressive role of secularism and called for a total rejection of Western values. In their vision, the leftist worldview was equal to heresy. Therefore, the novels of these writers elevated the anti-communist cause to the level of a moral and religious issue.

The 1980 Coup and the End of the Cold War

Turkish literature of the 1970s saw a strong contribution from writers who explore individual struggles with fragmented identities. Not only the 12 March novels, but also others published in the ten-year period between 1970 and 1980, play a conspicuous role in the exploration of identity, its ideological attachments and state of flux.[31] Street fights decreased following the intervention of the military in 1971, and the ideological clash found its way to literary domains; however, unrest arose once again by the end of the 1970s. When another intervention took place on 12 September 1980, all mass opposition was silenced overnight. Turkey found itself in the midst of an oppressive regime, the destructiveness of which dwarfed that of 12 March.

Those who survived the 12 March 1971 coup as activists dissociated themselves after the 12 September 1980 coup. The military's US-supported intervention ended the Cold War atmosphere in Turkey, as the socialist camp could not survive the deadly hit. This last intervention was so destructive that a liberal atmosphere, which allowed the questioning of the regime, could flourish only years after the intervention, and by the time such an atmosphere formed there was not a collective body of writers with similar political agendas but rather diverse individuals dealing with the memories of 12 September in their writings.

Although with different agendas, literature kept illustrating the complex and often contradictory ways people engage with power. Since the last military coup impaired ordinary people's engagement with an activist opposition irreversibly, it distanced writers from dealing with political issues in their works. A collective literary interest, which attempted to challenge the official history and mainstream politics, never formed as powerfully. As urban life gradually replaced the dominant motifs of rural life, a critical exploration of existence and identity became the most popular trend in literature. Some genres like the village novel became extinct. Anatolian peasants were no more a collective attraction

in the 1980s, as the realist trend in literature shifted its focus to the working classes in cities. But the literary interest in the subaltern continued and writers focused on the squatter districts of cities, people of different ethnic backgrounds and sexual orientations, and so forth.

Post-1980s in Turkey witnessed the rise of postmodernist literature, which privileged fragmented discourse, discontinuity, fantasy, and multiplicity. Texts that violated linear narrative logic and favor narrational elements over plot became visible. Mainstream literary interest accumulated on the individual, intra-psychic matters, and new techniques of writing. Writers that made their debut in the 1980s, such as Latife Tekin and Turkey's Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk, obtained a considerable readership with their complex stories of self, which refered to Turkey's problematic modernization only allegorically. However, the attempt to insert historical and political criticism into literature also continued. Writers such as Vedat Türkali, Oya Baydar, and Mehmet Eroğlu inserted their socialist writing in narratives that focused on social change and provided a sweeping reexamination of political paradigms. Although successive military interventions forced a softening in the protest tone that fiction in Turkey once adopted, some narratives kept a particular engagement with sociopolitical events and conflicts. They asked questions, and criticized if not protested.

Poets of İkinci Yeni, who emerged in the 1950s and were active until the 1970s, inspired introverted and individualistic poetry in the post-1980s as well. Urban life made up the settings of post-1980 poetry, in which linguistic experimentation became more effective, and replaced political references. The works of Haydar Ergülen, Lale Müldür, and Küçük İskender exemplify the post-1980s style that refrained from ideological messages but related to historical and political issues within the problem of self. Poets of the 1980s acted rather independently when compared to earlier generations. It is therefore hard to draw borders of a particular literary movement.

Writers such as Mehmet Göktaş, Vahap Akbaş, Mehmet Uyar, Raif Cilasun, and Nurullah Genç took Islamic lifestyle as the subaltern existence and published novels in an attempt to develop Islamic-Turkish subjectivity, criticizing the Turkish project of modernization and practices of modernity and democracy. For some others, such as Mustafa Necati Sepetçioğlu, Turkists were the new subalterns; he furthered the vein of Turkism in contemporary literature. Sepetçioğlu's novels attempted to turn attention back to the Turks' entrance to Anatolia and their building the Turkish Empire. Although he gathered a certain readership, Sepetçioğlu never achieved the popularity of Nihal Atsız.

In the initial phases of the Cold War, the domain of literature was more an arena for political fighting. A realistic and didactic style was eminent, and it was quite natural for writers to act as teachers, although their styles varied from pure didacticism to a nuanced discussion of politics. Towards the end of the post-Cold War period, however, it is hard to find writers as teachers or ideologues. The exercise of writing in this period blended with structural experiments, the deconstruction of classical views and epic narratives, entrance into the world of the absurd, and so forth, and it became more a creative enterprise than a political one.

Writers of course continue to hold political beliefs, and these beliefs influence their views of Turkey, the world, and literature. Ideological skirmishes continue in newspaper columns and on TV shows in post-Cold War Turkey, but literature is more 'narcissistic', self-contained, and inward-looking. However, identity problems prevail as popular topics. Several writers from different political camps continue to write on identity. In post-Cold War literature is a nuanced discussion of the identity problem, enriched with memories of the two world wars, the prolonged Cold War polarity, military interventions, and street fights which ended many lives, and unidentified murder victims. Representations of identity in post-Cold War literature are fluid, diverse, and fraught with ambiguity but largely anxious. What literature of the 1980s inherited from Cold War literature in Turkey is an unquestionably impaired identity, which writers show an unlikely willingness to discuss.

Notes

1. There was a Turkish delegate in the Writers' Congress of 1932, headed by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu. His wife, Leman Karaosmanoglu, says, 'On the order of Ataturk, Yakup Kadri and Falih Rıfkı went to Moscow for the International Writers Congress in 1932.' See İ. Savaşır (1987) 'Halit Ziya, Yakup Kadri ve Diğerleri', *Defter*, Aralık-Ocak, pp. 133–9.
2. Ş.T. Gürçağlar (2008) *The Politics and Poetics of Translation in Turkey 1923–1960* (New York: Rodopi).
3. Nâzım Hikmet studied sociology and economics at the University of Moscow (1921–28) and joined the Communist Party of Turkey in the 1920s. He went through many trials and was imprisoned on political grounds for long years during 1928–33 and 1938–50. He was awarded the International Peace Prize in absentia in 1950 together with Paul Robeson and Pablo Neruda. After he gained his release from jail by public amnesty, he left Turkey in 1951 and lived in the USSR for the last 12 years of his life.
4. See, for example, 'Letters From a Man In Solitary' (1962) and 'Things I Didn't Know I Loved'. N. Hikmet (2002) *Human Landscapes from My Country: An Epic Novel in Verse*, trans. Randy Blasing and Mutlu Konuk (New York: Persea Books), pp. 120–1.

5. Süha Oğuzertem comments that Sait Faik 'pioneered and represented the strong paradigm of a rising literary and cultural romanticism in Turkey', and saw his work as a significant turning point in twentieth-century Turkish fiction. See S. Oğuzertem (2004) 'Introduction: Sait Faik's Utopian Poetics and the Lyrical Turn in Turkish Fiction', in idem (ed.), *Sleeping in the Forest: Stories and Poems of Sait Faik* (New York: Syracuse University Press), pp. xv–xxx.
6. Peyami Safa is the popular writer of some remarkable psychological tales, and a powerful polemicist of his era. He has earned a prominent place in literary circles following his novels that favor spiritualism and defend the East against the West. Safa is an ardent critic of the moral weaknesses of 'Westernized' Turkish social life.
7. Nazım İrem refers to Peyami Safa as a conservative Kemalist. See, N. İrem (2004) 'Undercurrents of European Modernity and the Foundations of Modern Turkish Conservatism: Bergsonism in Retrospect', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40, no. 4, pp. 79–112.
8. S. Elif Aksoy (2008) 'Muslim–Christian Dialogue in Peyami Safa's *The Armchair of Mademoiselle Noraliya*', *Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, 20, pp. 87–104.
9. Nihal Atsız is a prominent Turanist writer who has more than 30 books to his name. He majored in the history of literature and has published several academic essays in addition to his fictional books. He established and presided over the Nationalist Clubs (Türkçüler Derneği). See J. Landau (2003) 'Ultra-Nationalist Republic in the Turkish Republic: A Note on the Novels of Hüseyin Nihal Atsız', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 39, no. 2, pp. 204–10.
10. Islam was a heated topic of discussion in the Turkist movement. Hugh Poulton notes that it has always formed a complication in Turkist party politics. H. Poulton (1997) *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent* (London: Hurst and Company), p. 156.
11. Ç.G. Erkol (2012) 'Imperial Trauma and Liminal Masculinity in Orhan Kemal's *My Father's House* and *Idle Years*', *Journal of European Studies*, 42, no. 3, pp. 245–60.
12. Necip Fazıl's education was frequently interrupted. He studied philosophy in Paris and had a bohemian life in his early twenties. In his later years he became a prominent name in the anti-communist front in Cold War Turkey.
13. G. Çetinsaya (2004) 'İslamcılıktaki Milliyetçilik' ('Nationalism in Islamist Thought'), in Y. Aktay (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 6 (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları), pp. 437–47.
14. *Yaraya Tuz Basmak* (*Salting the Scar*), a spectacular novel centered on the war in Korea written by Attila İlhan, arrived many years later in 1978.
15. C. Rathbun (1972) *The Village in the Turkish Novel and Short Story: 1920 to 1955* (The Hague: Mouton & Co.).
16. See O. Koçak (2003) 'Our Master, Our Novice: On the Catastrophic Births of Modern Turkish Poetry', *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102, no. 2/3, pp. 567–98.
17. İ. Darendelioğlu (1977) *Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Hareketleri* (İstanbul: Toker), pp. 317–21.
18. W. Wiker (1963) *The Turkish Revolution 1960–1961* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution), and C. Dodd (1979) *Democracy and Development in Turkey* (Beverley: Eothen Press).

19. M. Belge (1987) 'The Left', in Irvin C. Schick and Erturul Ahmet Tonak (eds), *Turkey in Transition* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 147–76.
20. I. Lipovsky (1992) *The Socialist Movement in Turkey* (London and New York: Brill).
21. For a more nuanced discussion of the term, see Arif Dirlik (1998) 'The Third World in 1968', in idem, *The World Transformed* (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 295–320.
22. Y. Kemal (1967) 'Sosyalizm ve Milliyetçilik', *Ant*, 1, p. 11.
23. R. Bali (2006) *Turkish Students' Movements and the Turkish Left in the 1950s–1960s* (Istanbul: Isis Press).
24. İ. Özel (1978) *Üç Mesele* (İstanbul: Düşünce Yayınları).
25. P.J. Magnarella (1982) 'Civil Violence in Turkey: Its Infrastructural, Social and Cultural Foundations', in idem, *Sex Roles, Family and Community in Turkey*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), pp. 383–401; and N.B. Criss (2002) 'A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case', *The Journal of American History*, 89, no. 2, pp. 472–84.
26. Radio broadcast on 23 April 1971. N. Erim (2007) *12 Mart Anıları* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları), p. 218.
27. D. Ganser (2005) 'Terrorism in Western Europe: An Approach to NATO's Secret Stay-Behind Armies', *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, 6, no. 1, pp. 69–95.
28. 'Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1969–1976' (2007), Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 30 (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office).
29. S. Ertuğrul (2003) 'Belated Modernity and Modernity as Belatedness in *Tutunamayanlar*', *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102, no. 2/3, pp. 629–45.
30. K. Çayır (2007) *Islamic Literature in Contemporary Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
31. S. Irzık (2003) 'Allegorical Lives: The Public and the Private in the Modern Turkish Novel', *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102, no. 2/3, pp. 551–66.

Select Bibliography

Aksoy, S.E. (2008) 'Muslim–Christian Dialogue in Peyami Safa's *The Armchair of Mademoiselle Noraliya*', *Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, 20, pp. 87–104.

Bali, R.N. (2006) *Turkish Student's Movements and the Turkish Left in the 1950s–1960s*. İstanbul: Isis Press.

Belge, M. (1987) 'The Left', in I.C. Schick and E.A. Tonak (eds), *Turkey in Transition*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 147–76.

Çayır, K. (2007) *Islamic Literature in Contemporary Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Çetinsaya, G. (2004) 'İslamcılıktaki Milliyetçilik', in Y. Aktay (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 6. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 437–47.

Criss, N.B. (2002) 'A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case', *The Journal of American History*, 89, pp. 472–84.

Dirlik, A. (1998) 'The Third World in 1968', in idem, *The World Transformed*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 295–320.

Dodd, C. (1979) *Democracy and Development in Turkey*. London: Eothen Press.

Erim, N. (2007) *12 Mart Anıları*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.

Erkol, Ç.G. (2012) 'Imperial Trauma and Liminal Masculinity in Orhan Kemal's *My Father's House* and *Idle Years*', *Journal of European Studies*, 42, no. 3, pp. 245–60.

Ertuğrul, S. (2003) 'Belated Modernity and Modernity as Belatedness in *Tutunamayanlar*', *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102, no. 2/3, pp. 629–45.

Ganser, D. (2005) 'Terrorism in Western Europe: An Approach to NATO's Secret Stay-Behind Armies', *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, 6, no. 1, pp. 69–95.

'Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1969–1976' (2007) Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 30. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office.

Hikmet, Nâzım (Ran) (2002) *Human Landscapes from My Country: An Epic Novel in Verse*, trans. Randy Blasing and Mutlu Konuk. New York: Persea Books, pp. 120–1.

İrem, N. (2004) 'Undercurrents of European Modernity and the Foundations of Modern Turkish Conservatism: Bergsonism in Retrospect', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40, pp. 79–112.

Irzık, S. (2003) 'Allegorical Lives: The Public and the Private in the Modern Turkish Novel', *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102, no. 2/3, pp. 551–66.

Koçak, O. (2003) 'Our Master, Our Novice: On the Catastrophic Births of Modern Turkish Poetry', *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102, no. 2/3, pp. 567–98.

Landau, J. (2003) 'Ultra-Nationalist Republic in the Turkish Republic: A Note on the Novels of Huseyin Nihal Atsız', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 39, no. 2, pp. 204–10.

Lipovsky, I. (1992) *The Socialist Movement in Turkey*. London and New York: Brill.

Magnarella, P.J. (1982) 'Civil Violence in Turkey: Its Infrastructural, Social and Cultural Foundations', in idem, *Sex Roles, Family and Community in Turkey.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 383–401.

Oğuzertem, S. (2004) 'Introduction: Sait Faik's Utopian Poetics and the Lyrical Turn in Turkish Fiction', in idem (ed.), *Sleeping in the Forest: Stories and Poems of Sait Faik*. New York: Syracuse University Press, pp. xv–xxx.

Poulton, H. (1997) *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent*. London: Hurst and Company.

Rathbun, C. (1972) *The Village in the Turkish Novel and Short Story: 1920 to 1955*. The Hague: Mouton & Co.

Savaşır, İ. (1987) 'Halit Ziya, Yakup Kadri ve Diğerleri', *Defter*, Aralık-Ocak, pp. 133–9.

Wiker, W. (1963) *The Turkish Revolution 1960–1961*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.

6

'The Populist Effect': Promotion and Reception of American Literature in Turkey in the 1950s

Cangül Örnek

Despite the claim for ideological aloofness shared by most writers, the world of letters has seen outrageous political campaigns throughout history. During the 1950s as the ideological struggle between two worldviews sharpened and anti-communist hysteria contaminated minds in the West, books and writers became the victims of a Cold War fury. In Turkey, the start of this era was signaled by several unprecedented events, including the expulsion of four prominent academics, writing for the leftist *Yurt ve Dünya* and *Adımlar* magazines, from Ankara University, and an attack by a crowd of nationalist students on the offices and printing presses of a leftist journal, *Tan gazetesi*. In the United States, the McCarthyist campaign not only interrogated writers but also banned books or encouraged attacks against politically heretical books by invoking hatred against dissident thoughts. These assaults against books and writers in both countries created a suffocating climate that lingered throughout the rest of the Cold War.

The Cold War effect in the literary world was not solely oppression. The Janus face of Cold War biblioclasm[1] included the rediscovery of books as valuable instruments of cultural policy. In this manner, the US government soon appreciated the practical value of books for introducing American values to the world, teaching non-Western people how to acquire modern techniques, and molding uncritical minds. Acknowledging the potential of books in the ideological contest, the US Department of State inaugurated a book translation program in some countries, including Turkey. The translation program in Turkey was designed in 1950 and started to operate as a full-fledged program in 1951.[2] Within this program, the State Department, based on the suggestions of embassies, was deciding which fiction and non-fiction books

should be published in local languages. Once the decision was made, the State Department provided material and procedural assistance, such as solving copyright problems.

The book translation program was not the only book-related activity of the US in Turkey. Since the early 1950s, there were American libraries in Ankara, Istanbul, and İzmir that were providing in-library reading facilities, loan privileges, and holding special events such as book exhibitions or conducting English courses.[3] American librarians were also assisting university libraries or libraries of government institutions.[4] The US government and private institutions provided grants to send Turkish librarians to the US for librarian training or to invite American librarians to Turkey.[5] The Ford Foundation provided funds to the foundation of a librarianship chair at Ankara University[6] and the Rockefeller Foundation backed the establishment and development of new American literature programs at Istanbul and Ankara universities.[7]

Partly due to these planned efforts, American literature translations burgeoned in Turkey after the Second World War. Yet, despite the wide spectrum of American activities regarding books, the contributions of the Turkish publishers to this boom should also be emphasized as they published most of the prominent samples of American literature, as well as cheap pulp-fiction books. The rising demand for American cultural products such as movies also had a vital function, as it prepared the market for American books. Furthermore, the increasing domination of the US, not only in political, economic, and military terms but also as a new center of aesthetic and intellectual creativity for the West, had certain implications for Turkish intellectual life, which was constantly interacting with the artistic and intellectual circles of Europe.

As a result of the combined effects of these factors, American literature, which was almost unknown among Turkish readers a decade previously, became one of the national literatures widely translated into Turkish in the 1950s. Setting out from this point, this essay is aimed at disclosing the intellectual implications of the 'American literature boom' and its reception in Turkey in the second half of the 1940s and throughout the 1950s. It is argued that this wave of translation augmented populist tendencies in the cultural-intellectual sphere. By 'populist tendencies' I mean a growing inclination to adopt a rhetoric that praises rural/provincial values and embraces an anti-elitist position in cultural and political debates. These tendencies actually sprouted in postwar Turkey due to several other reasons, including the agricultural development agenda, domestic political developments, and Cold War anti-communism. In the 'long 1950s'[8] the US urged Turkey, a receiver of

Marshall Plan funds, to take the path of agricultural development and undertake the role of supplying agricultural products for the European markets.[9] In the domestic sphere, the Democrat Party government came to power in 1950 with a base of mass rural support and adopted a populist discourse addressed mainly to the peasantry. The Democrat Party's discourse accommodated anti-intellectual motifs, including anti-communist hatred and intolerance towards dissident views, which would turn into physical oppression.[10]

During the early Cold War, the general public in Turkey was exposed almost one-sidedly to the ideological influence of the US. The canals were almost plugged against leakage of opinion from the Socialist bloc and the government silenced the voices of intellectuals who adhered to Soviet socialism. However, this does not mean that American influence permeated smoothly into the cultural and literary sphere without any serious challenges or obstacles. There were weak socialist tendencies that were sustained, particularly among intellectuals, despite the oppressive measures of the governments. Aside from that, the Francophone tradition of Turkish intellectual life appeared to be obstructing a full-fledged American hegemony. Furthermore, the reception of American literature was not always flattering. Among American writers there was no one whose literary impact on Turkish writers could be compared with that of Flaubert or Stendhal. Accordingly, this essay also accounts for the literary climate prevailing in Turkey to demonstrate that American literature translations did not encounter a cultural vacuum.

This essay investigates the debates around the promotion, reception, and impact of American literature among literary circles in Turkey. The book translation program of the Department of State is first discussed, followed by an exploration of the contributions of *Varlık*, a prominent publishing house and a literary magazine, to the program. I argue that the program remained far behind its goal of creating a profound literary impact. Nevertheless, interest from Turkish publishers allowed American literature to become the most translated national literature of the 1950s.

Book Translation Program in Turkey: The Cold War over Literary Taste

In the case of US cultural policy, the promotion of books and literature was designed in relation to intelligence and information activities. This approach was the legacy of the Office of War Information (OWI), the predecessor of US institutions in cultural diplomacy, which

combined culture and information.[11] The OWI recruited American writers together with intelligence personnel. After the war, the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, also known as the Smith–Mundt Act, served as the charter for overseas information and educational exchange activities.[12] United States Information and Education (USIE) started to operate as part of the foreign posts of the US government. In 1953, the United States Information Agency (USIA) became the independent body responsible for formulating and coordinating cultural policy. The United States Information Service (USIS) was the name given to overseas branches of the USIA.[13]

Carried out by the USIA, American cultural diplomacy outside of the West was organized around a more policy-oriented approach compared to the British or French practice. The latter two owed their cultural hegemony partly to their investment in 'pure cultural activity',[14] and to their ability to create an aura around their cultural activities that obscured the hegemonic aims lying behind them. The British and French cultural centers, in terms of their dedication to ostensible 'culture for the sake of culture', are good examples of this approach. However, rather than disseminating 'pure culture' similar to its European counterparts, the US aimed at steering public opinion in order to gain support for American policies among critical sectors of society. As Americans pursued direct policy goals,[15] this often overshadowed the intellectual essence and aesthetic concerns of the projects carried out, which became the case for American cultural activities.

Another aspect of international cultural intervention after the Second World War concerns the fact that US Cold War cultural policy had to come up against French efforts to promote a French cultural influence. Thus, the different ideological atmosphere that pervaded US and French intellectual life during the long 1950s introduced a tacit friction in the Western sphere of the Cold War. In the US, that period became the scene of a series of attacks against dissident thoughts in different areas of intellectual life, including literature. Blacklists, censorship, and interrogations were some of the notorious methods employed against books and writers during the heyday of the anti-communist fury. It is striking that even book burning, which became a taboo subject[16] after it was identified with German fascism, was among the methods used in the US by officials or ordinary people. The assaults transcended domestic boundaries and American overseas libraries were asked to purge all materials detrimental to US objectives. Obeying the directives, government agencies abroad also took part in this campaign by systematically removing politically heretical books

from overseas libraries or unsystematically (without having a pre-set program) burning some.[17]

One of the outcomes of this onslaught against critical thought in the US was that, in public opinion, intellectuals became suspect of being potential traitors to the state and disloyal to the values of society. This negative image of the intellectual widened the gap between the world of the intellectual and that of the people. Furthermore, among intellectuals, McCarthyism was generally interpreted as an extreme right-wing reaction of middle-class groups, even as a mass movement of the people.[18] As anti-intellectual hatred gradually penetrated public opinion, intellectuals argued that art should be protected from the vulgarism of 'the common man'. In some artistic circles, these kinds of arguments accompanied a growing appreciation of elites for their taste and support for art. This climate led other intellectuals to largely remove social content from their works and advocate a concept of 'pure art' or 'art for art's sake'.[19]

What was unique about American intellectual life was that eschewing political involvement, particularly at the level of working-class politics, became the *Zeitgeist* of the 1950s. However, at the same time in Europe the battle between two ideological camps was still going on. France, which had been at the heart of European thought, continued to harbor intellectuals of radical positions and dissident ideas. Although intellectuals who were once associated with the Communist Party started to drift apart from Marxist class analysis after the war, many of them continued to be politically dissident or radical.[20] The French avant-garde and many artists and writers still disdained bourgeois values while the American avant-garde started to lean on the material support of the art-lover elite.[21] This difference between French and American artistic/intellectual worlds partly explains why American cultural hegemony in the Cold War entailed not only fighting Soviet cultural influence but also superseding the critical and radical positions put forth by French intellectuals. Christine Sylvester in her article on art in the Cold War cites the prominent American art critic Clement Greenberg who argued that US art was superior to Parisian art and of vital importance to Western culture.[22] Sylvester reminds us that the Cold War entailed a cultural war that was initially waged against Parisian artistic hegemony and subsequently had an impact in other allied countries regarding the supremacy of US values.[23] In his inspiring book on New York's and Paris's struggle to be the center of modern art, Serge Guilbaut illuminates one of the dimensions of this Cold War contest.[24] Missionaries of the American aesthetic perspective were keen to establish it as *the*

international perspective for the Western hemisphere of the Cold War.[25] In this process, the center of art was transferred from the old continent of radicalism to the new headquarters of the Cold War, from Paris to New York.

Conceiving the cultural battles also as intra-bloc struggles and perceiving Europe as a ground of ideological confrontations, it is not a coincidence that the US Senate enacted the Smith–Mundt Act after a visit of a group of senators to Europe. Smith–Mundt became the landmark in 'cultural Cold War' history. The act declared the US government's intention to embark on a worldwide campaign in the cultural sphere. Under the Smith–Mundt Act, the US started to pour money into cultural activities, which were deemed useful for creating a positive image of Americans, and to generate support for American values in the Cold War. In this context, American literature was also promoted as a part of cultural policy since it would give a first-hand account of American life to literate people living in different geographies.

During the Cold War, book-related activities were planned as part of US cultural policy and oriented by Washington to local conditions or American priorities in particular countries. In the Turkish case, one of the primary concerns was to supersede French influence, a concern directly connected to the broader agenda of the US in the cultural Cold War. The US Consulate's evaluation of the inauguration of a translation program explicitly demonstrates concerns for developing a Turkish audience for American literature that were brought forward to justify launching a translation program and spending government funds on books:

> In Istanbul bookstores it is possible to buy, in Turkish, books dealing with every aspect of French life and culture. It is also possible, of course, to buy translations of French trash. Translations of American literature, on the other hand, are for the most part of the type most likely to reinforce the impressions already formed by the Turkish public on a surfeit of Class-B movies. In many cases they appear to be shoddy translations or summary translations. Often they are translated from French versions and are thus two steps away from the original. *Gone With the Wind*[26] is an example of this.
>
> The Cultural Affairs Assistant saw nothing in the way of translations of American medical or technical books or of textbooks of any description. The reason for this is to be found chiefly in the fact that the generation now established at the top in most fields in Turkey is French- or German-educated. Thus it will be some time before the

> American-educated generation will make itself felt and before we can hope to rival the deep-seated French cultural tradition. Our work lies chiefly with the strata below the top.
>
> However, this phenomenon illustrates all the more clearly the need for adequate translations of American literature. The younger generation is coming under the influence of Anglo-Saxon culture. English is the most popular language to learn in the schools. But the generation now in power needs to have its American literature translated. While we are vitally concerned with long-range effects, we nevertheless live in an atmosphere of urgency. A better understanding of America by present-day shapers of Turkish policy is greatly to be desired.[27]

First and foremost, the justification given above for the urgent necessity of a translation program demonstrates that American literature translations were regarded as a means to increase American influence. The document also shows that French literature was seen as an obstacle for building American hegemony in this area. The emphasis on overcoming French literary influence in Turkey could also be interpreted as evidence for an intra-bloc cultural struggle. In other words, this example demonstrates how the American enterprise of building cultural hegemony entailed the American perspective and cultural/intellectual products to gain currency in the Western arena of the Cold War, in this example in Turkey.

However, despite envy of French cultural hegemony,[28] the details of the State Department Book Translation program in Turkey demonstrate that competing with French literature did not provide motivation to seek out intellectual sophistication and literary value in the books chosen for the program. In the correspondence between American diplomatic missions in Turkey and Washington, *intellectual taste* was hardly brought up as an issue. The main criteria for choosing a title was its utility in presenting the US and American way of life and arousing sympathy and support for its policies and interventions.[29] In fact, although US officials were certainly not happy with the lack of influence of American literature among Turkish readers, the main emphasis of the translation program was not to reverse the situation. Rather, the program was designed in line with the general principles of *cultural policy*, as defined above, dedicated to the task of integrating cultural activities with intelligence/information activities.

A glance at the books chosen for the program shows that priority was given to content that offered information about different aspects of American life and the history of the United States as well as

anti-communist material. Another privileged category consisted of books concerning agricultural modernization, health, education, and science, and/or topics in accordance with the US perspective on modernization strategies for non-Western societies.[30]

The translation program was also shaped in relation to different policies designed for particular geographies. In the case of Turkey, this resulted in a program that opted for practical value over literary quality. Although the US directed its overall cultural struggle towards the goal of attaining the admiration of intellectuals, especially in Europe, in Turkey the translation program was geared towards audiences connected to modernization programs and technical assistance rather than addressing intellectuals.[31] With the introduction of the Marshall Plan, Turkish capitalist modernization, especially in agriculture, became one of the primary concerns of American foreign policy. Diplomatic activities in different spheres, ranging from the political to the cultural, were thus formulated around this main agenda in Turkey.[32]

Nevertheless, intellectual/non-practical literatures were translated as part of the book translation program. The embassy proposed the translation of books by prominent American authors even when the writers were known for their critical stances.[33] Regarding critical titles, the conventional attitude was to give precedence to a work's contribution to presenting the achievements of American literature over the negative depictions of American life in these books. As Edward R. Murrow, former director of the USIA, said, 'You must tell the bad with the good. We cannot be effective in telling the American story abroad if we tell it only in superlatives.'[34] This general principle was vulnerable to changes to the intensity of anti-communist fury in domestic politics or in US foreign policy.[35]

The Embassy collaborated with the Turkish Ministry of Education and local publishers for publishing and distributing American books. The Ministry was a vital channel for the distribution of American books to schools.[36] The cooperation of the Ministry meant that titles on different aspects of American life or booklets on technical issues would reach schools even in remote villages in Anatolia. Furthermore, the US diplomatic mission was also enthusiastic to work with local publishers who specialized in different genres or reader groups and had diverse distribution channels. The translation program supported local publishers in different ways, including through the purchase of guarantees for a certain number of title publications or providing paper (a scarce item during the postwar years). A document on negotiations between the Embassy and local publishers demonstrates

that the US Embassy was in close contact with a number of publishers, such as Nebioğlu, Inkilap, Doğan Kardeşler and Varlık.[37] The Embassy asked each publisher to make suggestions on 'how USIE could best cooperate to achieve a wider sale, or more titles, [of] both literature (fiction), politics and wider distribution and sale [of a] wider selection of titles'. Interestingly, Doğan Kardeşler and Varlık were not so willing to cooperate:

> No definite conclusions were reached on the **last point**, but was thoroughly explored with each publisher. Some slight hesitation on this last **point** was expressed by two of the publishers (DOGAN KARDESLER and VARLIK) to give blanket statements of assistance in order to protect them from being an outlet for U.S. propaganda.[38]

The worries disclose that the publishers were aware of the propaganda function of the translation assistance they would receive. However, although Varlık was reluctant to assist the Embassy, it nevertheless played a key role in the promotion of American literature in Turkey, not only through its translations but also through the publication of its self-titled magazine, *Varlık*. As the translation program did not appear solid in its literary content and thus fell short of creating a profound impact in regard to changing literary taste in favor of the Americans, mainly because propagating American values and policies overshadowed literary concerns, the role of Varlık as a protagonist of American literature became more important. In the following section of this essay I turn to Varlık, explaining its leading role in disseminating American literature.

Varlık's Promotion of American Literature in the 1950s: Reception and Impact

The Contribution of American Literature to the Rising Populism of the Decade

After the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the Kemalist cadres launched a translation endeavor that would include the translation of Greek classics and the canons of European literature into Turkish. The real architect of the initiative was the Minister of Education, Hasan Ali Yücel. The goal was to establish a Western foundation for new secular Turkish thought by ensuring that Western classics would be accessible in Turkish to new generations. Over time, the translation program

grew to include classic titles from French, German, Russian, and other Western and Eastern literatures, particularly after the formation of a translation bureau in 1940.[39]

American literature 'made an extremely poor showing in this program'. Until 1950, 509 world classics had been translated into Turkish and only 4 of them were American titles. Books by William James, Abraham Lincoln, and O. Henry were on the list of 'American classics', while only John Steinbeck's *Of Mice and Men* was translated in the category of modern American literature.[40] Above all, American literature or philosophy was not regarded as a source of Western civilization, which was identified with the knowledge and philosophy that had thrived in continental Europe rather than the Americas. During subsequent years private initiatives and American endeavors helped to foster American literature in Turkey.[41] Although some notable titles were translated into Turkish in the previous decades, up until the Cold War years it was the cheap detective stories that dominated the Turkish book market in the name of American literary production.

However, beginning in the postwar years and throughout the 1950s elegant examples of American literature were translated into Turkish. Yaşar Nabi Nayır was the pioneer of publishers who contributed to these new translation efforts. As a Kemalist intellectual and a well-known literary figure, Yaşar Nabi had been active in the publishing sector and literary life with his publishing house[42] and magazine, both named Varlık.[43] A glance at the publishing catalogues belonging of those years shows that Varlık published many titles from American fiction. *Varlık* magazine, which was a long-lasting and very influential literary magazine, allocated meaningful column inches to articles introducing American writers or literature, and issued several examples of the American short story. Behind the magazine's wide coverage of American literature, marketing concerns for the books published by the Varlık publishing house played an important role. Still, the publishing house's devotion to American literature demands explanation. *Varlık* highlighted American literature to such an unprecedented extent that readers could hardly find insights into other national literatures in the pages of the magazine. By contrast, they could find plenty of analyses of American literature, biographies of American writers, and examples of American short stories. Bewildered by this concentration on American literature, some readers began to question the motives behind Yaşar Nabi's publishing policy.[44]

Other big publishers of the era such as Remzi and Nebioğlu accompanied Varlık in publishing American fiction. Turkish readers were already

familiar with pioneers of American literature such as Edgar Allen Poe, Eugene O'Neill, and Walt Whitman, whose works had been translated previously. Among the American canonical writers whose works were translated in the 1940s and 1950s, Erskine Caldwell, Pearl Buck, John Steinbeck, and Ernest Hemingway took the lead, since almost all of their prominent titles appeared in Turkish. The latter three were Nobel Prize winners in literature, although Steinbeck won the prize as late as 1962. All four were 'bestsellers'. These names became quite popular in Turkey but they were not the only American writers available in Turkish. Thanks to Varlık, Turkish readers became acquainted with short stories from prominent American writers such as Truman Capote, William Saroyan, James T. Farrell, Ray Bradbury, and O. Henry. Kathleen Winsor's romance novel, *Forever Amber*, was also a bestseller in Turkey.[45] A brief overview of the authors whose works were chosen for translation reveals that the publisher took into account both the reputation and the popularity of the writers in considering them for Turkish translation.

On the other hand, neither popularity nor the literary value of the books alone convincingly explains why American literature was discovered so suddenly and intensively in Turkey, to an extent that other national literatures remained so far behind. Especially during the 1950s, the dominance of American literature became a phenomenon beyond doubt, as manifested by the publication figures given in the next section. In fact, the rationale behind the interest in a literary genre or a national literature is not easy to identify as there can be contingent causes or mere aesthetic and literary reasons for changes in taste. However, some literary phenomena, such as the postwar American literature translation boom in Turkey, demand analysis of the surrounding social and ideological circumstances. In this regard, one important feature of the long 1950s in Turkey was that American hegemony began to extend into different aspects of cultural and intellectual life. The inflation of American books in the Turkish book market could not be explained solely by, or independent from, the culminating American cultural influence beginning in the postwar years.

Another feature of the era was the central place that developments in rural/provincial areas gained in intellectual debates as well as in the economic and political life of Turkey. In this regard, it is important to note that American titles translated into Turkish were predominantly novels from the naturalist genre of the 1930s, which were based on the experiences of rural transformation observed in the daily lives of rural communities. Most novels and short stories were devoted to the depiction of

social problems in the American countryside. The thematic concerns of those literary works overlapped with the concurrent agricultural development agenda of Turkey incited by the Marshall Plan, and the strong populist inclinations in the political and cultural spheres articulated with the rise of the peasantry as a real power in the multiparty system.

The rural populism of the Democrat Party years had its roots also in the legacy of the Kemalist *köycülük* (peasantry) movement of the 1930s,[46] although the latter did not advocate the transfer of political power to peasantry but rather the enlightenment of the rural population of Turkey. The *köycülük* movement offered a kind of 'enlightening mission', from literate people and intellectuals to the village, as a remedy to deep social problems witnessed in rural areas. During the early Republican era, intellectuals were frequently accused of being alienated from the genuine culture enduring among the rural communities of Anatolia or of failing to carry out their responsibilities towards the Turkish peasant who 'fell into the clutches of illiteracy'. In this sense, the ideology of the *köycülük* movement harbored implicit and explicit anti-intellectual elements.[47]

This helps to make sense of Yaşar Nabi's distaste for intellectualism, which he deemed a waste of time, and his preference for a literature that according to him was more down to earth and touched the real agenda of the country. Yaşar Nabi, an intellectual loyal to the Kemalist *köycülük* movement, admired a literature that reminded intellectuals of their responsibility in the modernization process.[48] Thus, the discussions on rural issues and the rising populism in the broader context and Varlık's peculiar endeavor all enabled Caldwell's *Tobacco Road* to become a bestseller in Turkey and to gain its place on the bookshelves next to Mahmut Makal's *Bizim Köy* (*Our Village*), which hit the headlines shortly after its publication by Varlık.

In the 1950s there was a shift in the priorities of government policies from enlightening peasants to technically improving agricultural production. In this period, both the agricultural development agenda and Marshall Plan assistance in particular placed rural issues once again at the center of public debate. In this sense, the boom in American literature translations was compatible with the cultural politics of Turkey that were imbued with rural populism during those years. This consistency between the discourse in Turkey and themes narrated in American novels might also have created an incentive for Turkish publishers' interest in translating American books.

In addition, considering the naturalist novel's preoccupation with depicting life and change in American rural and provincial locales, it

is possible to say that translations from American literature may have contributed to the strengthening of populist tendencies, which had already been influencing Turkish thought.

Varlık published an interesting article by Muhtar Körükçü on the possible effects of American literature, entitled 'Hikâyeciliğimizde Amerikan Sistemi' ('The American System in Our Short Stories'). In that piece, Körükçü asserted that young Turkish writers were influenced by the American short story,[49] particularly its involvement in the ordinary and simple events of daily life. Körükçü went on to argue that Sait Faik, whose name was identified with the new short story of Turkish literature, from the early period of his writing career, was engaged with the American short story. Körükçü defended his argument by pointing out Faik's involvement with the daily life concerns of ordinary people.[50] Indeed, Faik is known for his esteem for pre-industrial handiwork, as he found purity and a resistance to alienation in 'small production'.[51] These themes depict the fashion in Turkish literature, which had its heyday in the 1940s and 1950s, one marked by an inclination towards pre-industrial values and praise for populism over intellectualism. Although the American naturalist genre was generally dealing with the daily life issues of ordinary people and lamenting vanishing pre-industrial values, it might be an exaggeration to assume such a direct impact as Körükçü did. However, as the American short story became generally accepted as presenting very commendable examples of the genre, it had a literary impact on Turkish short-story writing.

The Rise of American Books at the Expense of the French

While the general Cold War atmosphere and Turkish–American alliance created a suitable ground for fostering American fiction, Soviet literature suffered in the very same circumstances. Books of prominent Russian writers continued to appear in Turkish, but the modern Soviet literature was almost totally ignored by the publishers. *Varlık*'s straightforward response to a reader question on the issue demonstrates that this lack of attention was in fact deliberate: 'We cannot publish any works of modern Russian literature – even those writings which, as you said, are not related to ideology; you should excuse us in this respect; some people cannot even tolerate translations of classic Russian writers.'[52] The explanation elucidates how even authors and publishing houses had succumbed to the suppressive rules of Cold War anti-communism during this period. However, it was not only Soviet literature that was exposed to unfavorable conditions in the Cold War literary climate of Turkey. Figures for translated fiction show that American literature won its

popularity at the expense of French literature. According to the figures given by Gürçağlar, in the period 1938–50, 511 books were translated from American and British writers, whereas translations from French literature consisted of 508 titles. During the period 1951–60, translations from English and American literature rose to 930, while the figure was only 365 for French literature.[53] Although the figures do not differentiate between American and British books, the available information on translated world literatures from other sources like *Varlık* suggests that American titles constituted the main portion of the translations from English-language literatures.

Thus, figures indicate that American literature's popularity soared in Turkey in the 1950s and that Turkish publishers replaced French literature mostly with American. Yaşar Nabi overtly declared that Varlık's incentive for leaning towards American literature was caused by his dislike for French literary currents, which urged him to promote an alternative.[54] In his response to the criticisms directed against his publishing policy, Yaşar Nabi explained why he opted to publish American books in lieu of the French, which according to him sank into senseless intellectualism:

> It is a valid and appropriate observation that we do not cover French literature to the extent of its significance in the world. However, we should say that we do so deliberately. For a very long period, Turkish art and thought had proceeded solely under French intellectual and artistic guidance. More than half of translations were made from French in our country. As a result, our literary market was dominated by an artistic approach, which was completely alien to the Turkish perception and worldview, and unable to reach our wide social strata due to its excessive intellectualism. In order to change this situation, there was a need to put an embargo on French literary products … The main titles of old French literature had been translated into our language. Today's French literature, on the other hand, presents a scene of total anarchy. It is not easy to notice and choose the works of real value in the confusion created by fights around ideologies and schools of thought … Regarding American literature … Among world literatures, American literature has the least particularistic character and thus is the least influential in imposing on us a certain worldview or artistic approach.[55]

While attacking 'senseless intellectualism', Yaşar Nabi was also denouncing surrealist and existentialist currents, which had implications

throughout Europe but leaked into Turkish intellectual life through the views and works of French intellectuals and artists. Their unconventional ideas on the form and content of the aesthetic creation were far too radical for Yaşar Nabi, who was advocating the merging of classic and new literature.[56] Furthermore, it was known that the surrealists had close links with political revolution and, for a time, with the French Communist Party. They were welcomed by the Soviet Union,[57] which alone was reason for Yaşar Nabi, as a fierce anti-communist,[58] to detest their stance. In particular, French intellectual life, which harbored aesthetically disruptive and politically radical positions and accommodated names like Sartre, who was sympathetic to the socialist bloc, or communist Aragon, was incompatible with the Cold War intellectual atmosphere in Turkey. Although there were still some left-wing literary circles in Turkey and they had ties with leftist literary figures in Europe,[59] the atmosphere in Turkey during the 1950s was hardly favorable for leftist literary production, as demonstrated by the imprisonment of communist poet Nâzım Hikmet, who had spent 12 years in prison until his release in 1950.

Nabi's criticism about French intellectualism was directly related to his view on the role of literature and literary people. Until the mid-1950s Yaşar Nabi, because of his adherence to the *köycülük* movement, advocated social awareness in literature, that is, literature had to undertake its share of responsibility for furthering the modernization efforts of the young Republic. The mission tailored for the writer left no room for 'literary games' or for the 'art for art's sake' perspective. Moreover, the 'man of letters' was not supposed to be critical of the socio-economic policies of the regime but to endorse the policies implemented. According to this view, not only writers but also the intellectual class in general should provide enlightened leadership to the backward Anatolian people. As Karpat put it, 'A strong social solidarity between all individuals is taken for granted and any attempt to weaken it is decried.'[60] The intellectual class was deemed a part of this organic society, and had crucial duties. That vantage point might have led Yaşar Nabi to publish Mahmut Makal's *Bizim Köy*, which is known as the keystone of the village novel genre of the 1950s.[61] In the second half of the 1950s, however, when social criticism of the village novel gradually evolved along the lines of socialist views and social responsibility in literature associated with socialist realism, Yaşar Nabi and his friends started an attack what they called 'controlled literature' (*güdümlü edebiyat*).[62] While writing extensively against his critics Yaşar Nabi did not miss the opportunity to quote an American, *Yale*

Review's editor-in-chief M. John Palmer, to prove the 'archaic' position of socialist realists. Yaşar Nabi narrated his conversation with Palmer on the issue as follows:

> He incidentally asked me to name the main artistic issue that drew the most attention from Turkish men of letters today. I told him that it was the issue of deciding whether it is necessary to deal with social issues; whether men of letters need to fight a case for their literary work. He bounced in his seat like a child: 'What are you talking about? Is that possible?' He was struck dumb: 'In America, it's been a long while since we put this issue on the shelf. 'Frankly, I couldn't have imagined that this would still be an issue in this country', he said. I told him that I was in full agreement.[63]

Despite *Varlık*'s anti-French and pro-American stance, some intellectuals who wrote for the magazine seemed more sympathetic to debates that erupted in France or in other parts of Europe regarding the new currents of intellectual life.[64] For instance, a frequent contributor, Orhan Hançerlioğlu, in his article on artistic currents of the century, applauded Dadaism, perhaps one of the most nonconformist and radical movements in art: 'For me, Dadaism is one of the most successful movements of our century and was helpful in laying the ground for today's art.'[65] As a prominent literary figure of his time, Hançerlioğlu's view is important since it is a small but significant sign of a more general discord between the protagonists of American literary influence and the intellectuals who continued to follow the intellectualist fashions of Europe.

This would be articulated more explicitly in the literary currents of the following years. As in the case of Hançerlioğlu, some intellectual circles in Turkey continued to follow the intellectualist fashions of Europe, and particularly France. The bifurcation in the intellectual sphere became even more apparent when a group of young writers, including Vüsat O. Bener, Demir Özlü, Ferid Edgü, Yusuf Atılgan, and Bilge Karasu, who were under the influence of French existentialist literature,[66] appeared with their first works and triggered a new literary current known as the 'literature of depression'.[67]

Learning about the 'Other America' through the American Novel

Although there was hardly any serious criticism around the literary value of American fiction, some comments hint at the critical disillusion surrounding the quality of most canonical works.[68] Orhan Hançerlioğlu, in

his flattering article on John Steinbeck's *Cannery Row*, gave a tacit account of the negative reception of American literature among intellectuals:

> Have you read Cannery Row? … If you haven't, you can not say that you know about American literature. Yet, looking at the disdain shown by westerners, one could question whether there is an American literature or not. Is there a distinctive American literature freed from the dominant impact of the West and the East? John Steinbeck confronts this issue with a very short book, Cannery Row. He eradicates the disappointment created by Herman Melville, Mark Twain, Sherwood Anderson, Sinclair Lewis, and Pearl Buck whose work was presented to us as masterpieces. Aside from William Faulkner whom, as far as I have read, I could not enjoy, or John Dos Passos whom for some reason I could not get acquainted with, I think Steinbeck is the most genuine proof for the existence of an American literature. You may rightfully disdain Burning Bright, The Pearl, Sweet Thursday, To A God Unknown, and even Of Mice and Men but you cannot disdain Cannery Row.[69]

Furthermore, this disenchantment was not really about the quality of literary works. As mentioned above, a majority of the novels translated into Turkish were examples of 1930s literature, written by writers who were part of the naturalist genre of American literature. The distinctive feature of this generation was the disillusion they felt against the system in an age of war and economic depression.[70] Those American novels, when translated into Turkish, bewildered readers because the reality they recounted was strikingly different from what was popularly known or imagined in Turkey. The gloomy depiction of American life with its poverty, deprivation, and misery conflicted with the impressions most Turks had in their minds. For those who continued to admire the US, the pessimistic aura of recent American fiction became a source of disappointment. Some, it seems, instead of questioning the available depictions of the US as a land of abundance, prosperity, and wealth, inclined to deem American writers unnecessarily pessimistic,[71] depicting the glass half-empty rather than half-full.

On the other hand, Turkish intellectuals, during a time when the US enjoyed almost complete immunity from negative assessment, came across bitter criticisms about this country for the first time through American fiction. This was unexpected for most of them. They had not expected that American literature would itself damage the American image. It is not possible to fully grasp the impact of that fiction on the

postwar and subsequent generation of Turkish readers, yet it could be assumed that the 'bashing' of the American image in that literature modestly contributed to the anti-American mood of the 1960s. At least literate people became more aware that 'real America' was not necessarily the heaven on earth that had been depicted in the past.

Conclusion

Literature can be a rich source for comprehending the ideological clashes as well as political and social conditions of an era. Such an endeavor can be undertaken as content analysis or contextual exploration. This essay mainly chose the latter approach by scrutinizing the boom in Turkish translations of American literature during the late 1940s and 1950s as a complex phenomenon that can be explained in relation to factors shaping the ideological climate of the time. The *international* factor, in this regard, was the 'cultural Cold War'. The ideological rivalry of the Cold War and the struggle to build hegemony in cultural and intellectual spheres led the US government to acknowledge the importance of books and book-related activities as an indispensable component of cultural policy.

The US Department of State's book translation program in Turkey was examined in the framework of the 'cultural Cold War'. Although the translation program started with vigorous objectives, its influence in promoting American literature remained limited. One reason for that, as elaborated in this study, could be the weak literary concern of the translation program ran by the US government. Instead, it was the translation endeavor of local Turkish publishers that became influential in boosting American literature. Aside from the personal initiatives of some publishers, this literary phenomenon could be explained by taking into account the local ideological atmosphere that became receptive to American cultural impact. In this regard, the essay examined the promotion of American literature not just as an imposition from outside but in the context of the mood of the era in Turkey. This mood was configured on one side by Turkey's position in the Cold War and on the other by sociopolitical developments in the domestic sphere. In other words, it could not be reduced to *domestic* factors but should be perceived as an interaction of influences, both *international and domestic*. The emphasis on the willingness of local actors and readiness of local ideological conditions for promoting American literature is important in order to comprehend how cultural hegemony could be effectively built during the Cold War.

However, the articulation of different tastes for American literature among the Turkish readership demonstrates once again that it is not possible to foresee the exact impact and reception of literary works. As the books of selected American writers, such as Steinbeck, took their place in the personal libraries of leftist activists in the coming decades, some Turkish intellectuals and writers who could not find intellectual satisfaction in American literature continued to prefer Camus to Steinbeck and reserved their shelf space primarily for French existentialist novels.

Notes

1. According to *Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language*, 'biblioclasm' means destruction of books, especially the Bible. In the literature on the history of books and printing the concept is adopted to refer to acts involving book and library destruction.
2. From the Istanbul Consulate to Department of State, 'Dept's Book Translation Program', 21 February 1950, Department of State Decimal Files, 1950–54, RG59, Cultural Affairs Near East, Box 2492, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). There were regular exchanges between the US diplomatic posts in Turkey and the Department of State about the translation program during 1951.
3. Part of this semi-annual report is devoted to explain the extent of the library program in Turkey. From the Ankara Embassy to Department of State, 'IIA: Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for period June 1 to November 30, 1952', 20 February 1953, pp. 14–20, Box 2492, NARA.
4. From the Ankara Embassy to Department of State, 'IIA: Some ways in which the American Library in Ankara has assisted and is assisting library development in Turkey', 24 April 1953, Department of State Decimal Files, 1950–54, RG59, Cultural Affairs Near East, Box 2493, NARA.
5. For an example of exchange of personnel between the Turkish National Library (Milli Kütüphane) and the Library of Congress see from the Ankara Embassy to Department of State, 'Semi-Annual Report on the International Educational Exchange Program', 1 February 1955, p. 4, Department of State Decimal Files, 1955–59, RG59, Cultural Affairs Near East, Box 2213, NARA.
6. O. Ersoy (1969) 'Ankara Üniversitesi DTCF Kütüphanecilik Bölümü'nün Onbeş Yılı' ('Fifteen Years of the Librarianship Chair at Ankara University'), *Türk Kütüphaneciler Derneği Bülteni*, 18, no. 4, p. 228.
7. See K.W. Rose (2008) 'The Rockefeller Foundation's Fellowship Program in Turkey, 1925–1983', the Rockefeller Archive Center, available at www.rockarch.org/publications/resrep (accessed 1 March 2012). Initially, American literature education was inaugurated as programs under the English Language and Literature chairs. A chair at that time was the equivalent of a department in the US. Neclâ Aytür, the head of the Department of American Culture and Literature at Ankara University and a senior scholar in the field, while explaining the initial efforts to include American literature in the curriculum

of Turkish universities, also points out the role of the US government: 'In 1953–1954, Mr Sidney Burks gave the first American Literature lectures in the English Literature and Language Chair at Ankara University. He was a young American whose major field was English literature; he worked for USIS. He may have been the cultural attaché or the director of courses. He and his wife stayed in Ankara for two years. The first Fulbright scholars began to be posted in Turkey in the mid-fifties, during the Cold War and Marshall Aid years. A Fulbright scholar was appointed to teach American literature in the English Department at Ankara University in 1954. Robert Hamilton Ball was the author of a book entitled *Elizabethan Drama*. He and his wife stayed in Ankara for two years. It was Prof. Ball who initiated the foundation of an American literature chair.' A. Kırtunç (1996) 'Interview with Neclâ Aytür', *Journal of American Studies of Turkey*, 3, pp. 59–68. For a detailed account of the flourishing of American literature programs in Turkey, see also E. Pakin (2008) 'American Studies in Turkey During the "Cultural" Cold War', *Turkish Studies*, 9, no. 3, pp. 507–24.

8. The long 1950s, in the Turkish case, refers to the period from the mid-1940s to the end of the 1950s, which was marked by intense anti-communist oppression as well as friendship with the US.
9. R. Margulies and E. Yıldızoğlu (1998) 'Tarımsal Değişim: 1923–70', in I.C. Schick and E.A. Tonak (eds), *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye* (*Turkey in Transition*) (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları), pp. 296–7.
10. Cem Eroğul (1990) *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (*History and Ideology of the Democrat Party*) (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları), pp. 191–3, 208–10.
11. M.N. Maack (2001) 'Books and Libraries as Instruments of Cultural Diplomacy in Francophone Africa during the Cold War', in H.G.B. Anghelescu and M. Poulain (eds), *Books, Libraries, Reading and Publishing in the Cold War* (Washington DC: Library of Congress), p. 65.
12. K.H. Nakamura and M.C. Weed (2009) 'U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and Current Issues, Congressional Research Service Report For Congress', 18 December, p. 4, available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs (accessed 18 September 2012).
13. Hans N. Tuch explains that USIA's task was twofold: 'The objective was to convey information … [D]uring the 1950s, USIA's policy and programs were conducted along two different tracks. One was the anti-Communist – the Cold War – track … On an entirely different track of USIA programming were the cultural and information activities that had had their genesis in the military occupation of Germany, Austria, and Japan. Following the Smith–Mundt Act, USIA introduced other library, publications, exhibits, and speakers programs.' H.N. Tuch (1990), *Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St Martin's Press), pp. 21–2.
14. Maack indicates this difference comparing British overseas libraries with the American. 'Books and Libraries', p. 65. The rest of the article relates how French policy, which Maack defines as 'humanistic endeavor', diverged from American book-related activities. See ibid., pp. 75–80.
15. In the Turkish case, an interesting example to that approach comes from the US library in Ankara. The following quotation is from a report prepared by the American librarian in charge of Ankara library on the readers of

anti-communist books: 'A total of 25 books on Russia and communism have been read by 72 Turkish readers whom I could trace. In analyzing these readers I found that an engineer and a university student had each read books; a teacher of English and a lawyer had each read 3 books. A few others had read 2 books, that most had read only 1 book in the groups. Allowing for duplications there were about 60 different readers in all.' From the Ankara Embassy to Department of State, 'Report on the Use of the Anti-Communist Books by Turks in the Ankara Library', 3 December 1951, Box 2492, NARA.

16. The campaigns of book disposals were restrained by concerns about the postwar prestige of the US. But as Fishburn emphasizes, the argument was about 'the method of their disposal'. Matthew Fishburn (2008) *Burning Books* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 161.
17. 'A 13 May communiqué to the overseas libraries specifically ordered the removal of books by people who had refused to testify before McCarthy's subcommittee. Two days later, in response to reports that some removed books had been burned, a directive cautioned that "books withdrawn … will not (repeat: NOT) be destroyed, but stored pending further instructions".' L.S. Robbins, 'The Overseas Libraries Controversy and the Freedom to Read: U.S. Librarians and Publishers Confront Joseph McCarthy', in Anghelescu and Poulain (eds), *Books, Libraries, Reading*, p. 30.
18. One of the few sociological analyses of McCarthyism that came out just after its heyday interprets the phenomenon with the assumption of a widening gap between intellectuals and anxious middle classes. See D. Bell (1955) *The New American Right* (New York: Criterion Books).
19. This retreat from people was also fostered by criticisms against 'mass culture', which was an extension of a postwar philosophical suspicion regarding the historical role of the masses after the rise of fascism in Europe with a popular base. This distrust towards masses pushed intellectuals to reconsider their belief in projects of radical change. Schaub interprets this reassessment of the relationship of radical thought to mass culture as conservative and argues that it stemmed from associating mass culture with totalitarianism. T.H. Schaub (1991) *American Fiction in the Cold War* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press), pp. 15–17.
20. Judt begins his book on French intellectuals between 1944 and 1956 (throughout which he seeks a response to the question why French intellectuals engaged themselves on the side of the left) with the following: 'For a period of about twelve years following the liberation of France in 1944, a generation of French intellectuals, writers, and artists was swept into the vortex of communism. By this I do not mean that they became Communists; most did not.' T. Judt (1992) *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 1.
21. Clement Greenberg in his path-breaking article, 'Avant-garde and Kitsch', originally published by *Partisan Review* in 1939, tried to overtly legitimize the dependence on elites by using kitsch as a target: 'No culture can develop without a social basis, without a source of stable income. And in the case of the avant-garde this was provided by an elite among the ruling class of that society from which it assumed itself to be cut off, but to which it has always remained attached by an umbilical cord of gold.' C. Greenberg (1985)

'Avant-Garde and Kitsch', in Francis Frascina (ed.), *Pollock and After: The Critical Debate* (London: Paul Chapman), p. 51.

22. C. Sylvester (1996) 'Picturing the Cold War: An Art Graft/Eye Graft', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 21, no. 4, p. 406.
23. Sylvester, 'Picturing the Cold War', p. 407.
24. Gilbaut, citing different magazines and critiques, elucidates how the American public received avant-garde (and how it gradually corresponded to the dominant ideology of the time), reconciled it with postwar liberalism and how it became a key element of American foreign policy. See S. Gilbaut (1983) *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art* (University of Chicago Press), pp. 184–94. On the promotion of 'abstract expressionism' as a part of the Cold War struggle in the cultural sphere, see M. Kozloff (1973) 'American Painting during the Cold War', *Artforum*, 11, no. 9, pp. 43–54.
25. Gilbaut, *How New York Stole*, pp. 165–77.
26. Emphasis in the original.
27. From the Istanbul Consulate to Department of State, 'Dept's Book Translation Program', 21 February 1950, Box 2492, NARA.
28. For instance, French literature, particularly because of the influence of Flaubert, Gide, and Baudelaire, has been a rich source for many literary currents in Turkey. It is possible to trace the impact of Balzac, Stendhal, Flaubert, and Zola among the first authors of the Turkish novel.
29. The Department of State explains the criteria used for the allocation of resources as follows: 'Book Translation funds may be obligated for assistance to publishers in the translation and publication of books (including condensations supplied by the Department) which contribute to a greater understanding and appreciation of American life, and thought, and democracy as a philosophy and way of life, and anti-Communist material.' From Department of State to the Ankara Embassy, 'A-150', 21 November 1951, Box 2492, NARA.
30. A short list of published books gives an idea about the range of the program: *Poultry Raising*, *Wheat Smuts Control*, *Russia's New Empire*, *Meet Some Americans*, *Forced Labor in Russia*, *Atomic Energy*, *175 Years of Freedom*, *Outline History of the US*. See, From the Ankara Embassy to Secretary of State, 'URTEL 445, March 8', 11 June 1951, Box 2492, NARA.
31. For a detailed account on this point, see C. Örnek (2012) 'From Analysis to Policy: Turkish Studies in the 1950s and the Diplomacy of Ideas', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 48, no. 6, pp. 941–56.
32. Örnek, 'From Analysis to Policy'.
33. Such as Sinclair Lewis's *Babbitt* and *Arrowsmith*, Dos Passos's *U.S.A. Trilogy* (the second book), and John Steinbeck's *Of Mice and Men*. From Istanbul to Department of State, 'Dept's Book Translation Program', 21 February 1950, Box 2492, NARA. But correspondence demonstrates that such a tolerant attitude was not always shared by the Department of State. *Arrowsmith* was included in the program. From Department of State to the Ankara Embassy, 'A-209', 12 January 1952, Box 2492, NARA. But compared to other books of Lewis, *Arrowsmith* is relatively less harsh in its social criticism. It was about medical practices, a subject which was deemed important for the modernization of non-Western societies. No further comments were found on the

U.S.A. Trilogy, but Steinbeck's book was not supported, for unknown reasons. See, from Department of State to the Ankara Embassy, 'A-388', 18 June 1952, Box 2493, NARA. In addition, John Hersey's *A Bell for Adano* was not found favorable and John Van Druten's *I Remember Mama* was not found suitable. See from Department of State to the Ankara Embassy, 'A-312', 4 June 1953, Box 2493, NARA.

34. Cited in Jody Sussman, 'Agencies: Thinking Positive at USIA', *Time*, 94, no. 40, 5 December 1969. See J. Sussman (1973) 'United States Information Service Libraries', p. 1, available at www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream (accessed 1 March 2012).
35. The changes in policies regarding USIS library collections could be generalized to other book-related activities. Sussman also gives an account of debates over USIS libraries. McCarthy incited a wave of hysteria by charging that the USIS contained material written by communists and other subversives. Hysteria ran so high that works by Eleanor Roosevelt and Upton Sinclair were taken off the shelves. One librarian even removed the works of Thomas Paine. Eleven 'questionable' books were burned. In May 1952 the State Department's Advisory Committee on Books Abroad recommended that authorship should not be a criterion. However, this policy was reversed in February 1953. The State Department issued an order forbidding the use of material by 'controversial persons, Communists, fellow-travelers, etc.' Sussman, 'United States Information', p. 3.
36. The case of *An Outline of American Education* is a good example. The Minister of Education Tevfik İleri said that he wanted to see this book in the hands of all teachers. Then the Ministry sent a truck and received 35,000 copies from the Americans. See from Ankara to Department of State, 'Distribution of "An Outline of American Education"', 20 September 1950, Box 2492, NARA.
37. For instance, publication of the following books was supported under the translation program: Max W Thornburg's *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*, Walter Bedell Smith's *My Three Years in Moscow* by *Nebioğlu*, and Van Doren's *What Is American Literature* by Varlık.
38. Emphasis in the original. From the Ankara Embassy to Department of State, 'Book Translation Program', 16 October 1950, Box 2492, NARA.
39. Gürçağlar draws attention to the role of translation efforts in building an intellectual framework for Turkish humanism and thus serving the nation-building process. Ş.T. Gürçağlar (2008) *The Politics and Poetics of Translation in Turkey, 1923–1960* (New York: Rodopi), pp. 64–73.
40. From the Ankara Embassy to Department of State, 'Department's Book Translation Program', 9 February 1950, Box 2492, NARA.
41. There was also a considerable missionary effort in publishing American books. The American Board of Foreign Missions in Istanbul under J.K. Birge was publishing books in Turkish. *Bütün Dünya* magazine was also an important source of American literature and culture as it was appearing almost as a Turkish-language version of *Reader's Digest*.
42. One interesting fact about Varlık publishing house was that, despite the crisis in the publishing business caused by high paper prices, it managed to hold a good share in the Turkish market owing to its 'one lira series',

a strategy of publishing cheap 'pocket books' that was adopted from the US book market.

43. *Yeditepe* was also an influential literary magazine and publishing house that was publishing American literature.
44. A reader was complaining about the weight *Varlık* had given to American literature: 'You translated so many titles from American writers such as Caldwell and Steinbeck that we have gotten weary of them. Their works – except for a few – are not that satisfactory anyway. In short, isn't it possible that we can find the prominent works of great authors such as E.M. Remarch, S. Pellico, Gogol, Tolstoi, Dostoyevski, Cervantes, T. Mann among your publications?' While responding to this complaint, Varlık used the excuse of a lack of translators for other languages and argued that the readers were asking for the works of Caldwell and Steinbeck. 'Okuyucularımızla Başbaşa' ('Head to Head with Readers'), *Varlık*, 427, 1 February 1956, p. 20.
45. According to the numbers supplied by the American public affairs officer, the first edition sold 7000 copies, the second edition 6000, and the third edition 5000. From the Ankara Embassy to Department of State, 'Book Translation Program', 10 October 1951, Box 2492, NARA.
46. *Köycülük* became influential in the early republic. Karaömerlioğlu defines the main characteristics of the ideology with 'its anti-urbanist and anti-industrialist bias, the exaltation of villages and peasants, its attitude toward Westernization, and finally its perception of education as the motor of rural transformation'. A. Karaömerlioğlu (1998) 'The People's Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34, no. 4, p. 74.
47. That approach was strongly displayed by Yakup Kadri's path-breaking novel, *Yaban* (*The Stranger*). The protagonist of the novel, Ahmet Celal, is a handicapped ex-soldier and intellectual who goes to live in a barren village in Anatolia. Throughout the novel, isolated by the villagers, he expresses his regret for the dark reality of village life. Disappointed by his observations, Celal finds intellectuals primarily responsible for neglecting the backward conditions of the Anatolian people. See Y.K. Karaosmanoğlu (2003) *Yaban* (*The Stranger*) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları).
48. Yaşar Nabi, in his foreword to *Bizim Köy*, condemns what he deems apathy among the intellectuals. Mahmut Makal (1950) *Bizim Köy* (*Our Village*) (Istanbul: Varlık), p. 4.
49. He mentions the writing style of Haldun Taner, Kenan Harun, Ferhan Oğuzkan, Tahsin Yücel, Seyfettin Turhan, Orhan Barlas, and Orhan Hançerlioğlu. M. Körükçü, 'Hikâyeciliğimizde Amerikan Sistemi' ('The American System in Our Short Story'), *Varlık*, 370, 1 June 1952, p. 18.
50. Körükçü, 'Hikâyeciliğimizde Amerikan Sistemi', p. 18. Ahmet Oktay, a literary critic, in his analysis on Sait Faik's short stories, and Orhan Kemal's and Yusuf Atılgan's novels, emphasizes their interest in the 'common man'. A. Oktay (1993) *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Edebiyatı 1923–1950* (*Literature in the Republican Period 1923–1950*) (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı), pp. 123–5.
51. Oktay, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Edebiyatı*, p. 122.
52. 'Okuyucularımızla Başbaşa' ('Head to Head with Readers'), *Varlık*, 425, 1 December 1955, p. 29.

53. Gürçağlar, *The Politics and Poetics*, p. 168.
54. In the twentieth anniversary of the magazine's publication, Yaşar Nabi openly declares that '*Varlık*, as it promised in the first issue, struggled to rescue our art from blindly imitating the French. It has succeeded.' Yaşar Nabi, 'Yirminci Yıldönümümüz' ('Our Twentieth Anniversary'), *Varlık*, 396, 1 July 1953, p. 2.
55. 'Okuyucularımızla Başbaşa' ('Head to Head with Readers'), *Varlık*, 397, 15 August 1953, p. 23.
56. Although he favored innovations in poetry, he also liked the legacy of Ahmet Haşim's symbolic poetry.
57. Honour and Fleming comment referring to Lunacharsky, Lenin's commissar for education and the arts: 'Surrealists have rightly understood that the task of all revolutionary intellectuals in a capitalist régime is to denounce bourgeois values. This effort deserves to be encouraged.' However, as they indicate, it did not take long for those Surrealists who had joined the party to leave it. H. Honour and J. Fleming (1982) *A World History of Art* (London: Macmillan), p. 590.
58. Yaşar Nabi was frequently expressing anti-communist views in his articles in *Varlık*, especially throughout the debate that erupted in the mid-1950s with leftist literary figures, such as Fethi Naci, Vedat Günyol, and Samim Kocagöz. The latter group advocated a literary perspective sensitive to social problems. Furthermore, from another article we learn that Radio Moscow once labeled Yaşar Nabi a 'fascist' because he explained 'the real truth' about Yugoslavia. 'Perde Arkası' ('Behind the Curtain'), *Varlık*, 374, 1 September 1951, p. 2.
59. The international campaign held for Nâzım's release was a case of cooperation between leftist literary and intellectual circles in Turkey and throughout Europe.
60. K. Karpat (1960) 'Social Themes in Contemporary Turkish Literature: Part I', *Middle East Journal*, 14, no. 1, p. 31.
61. Paul Dumont in his article on the village novel gives a detailed account of its predecessors and explains the social conditions for its emergence and themes. See P. Dumont (1973) 'Littérature et sous-développement: les "romans paysans" en Turquie', *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 28, no. 3, pp. 745–64.
62. As stated before, starting from the mid-1950s, a debate erupted between two literary magazines, *Varlık* and *Yeni Ufuklar*, on the social responsibility of literature. In this debate Yaşar Nabi accused his opponents for suggesting socialist views. For an example of that debate, see Y. Nabi, 'İllallah' ('Fed Up'), *Varlık*, 420, 1 July 1955, p. 29.
63. Y. Nabi, 'Bu Ayın Getirdiği' ('This Month's Agenda'), *Varlık*, 430, 1 May 1956, p. 3.
64. In fact, although American literature overshadowed French literature due to the publishing policies of prominent publishers such as Varlık, during the same period, Paris preserved its glamorous attractiveness for Turkish plastic arts. A major source of French influence was the prominent Turkish painters of the era who were either living in France or had continuous ties with that country.
65. O. Hançerlioğlu, 'Yüzyılımızın Sanat Cereyanları' ('Art Movements of Our Century'), *Varlık*, 371, 15 June 1952, pp. 10–11.

66. Mustafa Kurt, in his analysis of the Turkish existentialist writers of the 1950s, shows Camus, Sartre, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger as their literary and intellectual sources. M. Kurt (2007) '1950 Sonrası Türk Edebiyatında Varoluşçu Felsefeden Etkilenen Yazarların Romanlarında Yapı, Tema ve Anlatma' ('Structure, Theme and Narration in the Novels of the Authors Who Were Influenced by Existentialism in the Post-1950 era in Turkish Literature'), PhD thesis, Gazi Üniversitesi SBE.
67. 'Literature of Depression' defines a literary wave which emerged mainly in the second half of the 1950s and expressed the existentialist problems and pessimism of urban intellectuals.
68. As stated above, some readers were complaining about the weight Varlık had given to American literature and found the works of Caldwell and Steinbeck not so satisfactory. 'Okuyucularımızla Başbaşa' ('Head to Head with Readers'), *Varlık*, 427, 1 February 1956, p. 20.
69. O. Hançerlioğlu, 'Çarpan Kitaplar' ('Striking Books'), *Varlık*, 472, 15 February 1958, p. 3.
70. Earnest, in his book on the 'alienated generation', wrote the following about the long decade that started at the end of the First World War and went through the Great Depression: 'In that decade poetry, the novel, drama and literary criticism clearly embodied a group of related themes: the revolt against puritanism; disillusion with the values of Main Street and Zenith; a cynicism about professed American ideals, especially those of Protestantism and democracy; and on the positive side a search for new literary forms and models, especially those of Continental Europe as opposed to traditional English models.' E. Earnest (1970) *The Single Vision: The Alienation of American Intellectuals* (New York University Press), p. xi.
71. M. Körükçü, 'İnci' ('The Pearl'), *Varlık*, 349, 1 August 1949, p. 13.

Select Bibliography

Archival Sources

The Department of State Decimal Files, 1950–54, RG59, Cultural Affairs Near East, the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland.

Periodicals

Varlık, 1945–60.
Yeni Ufuklar, 1952–60.

Electronic Sources

Nakamura, K.H., and M.C. Weed (2009) 'U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and Current Issues, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress', 18 December, available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40989.pdf .
Rose, K.W. (2008) 'The Rockefeller Foundation's Fellowship Program in Turkey, 1925–1983.' The Rockefeller Archive Center, available at: www.rockarch.org/publications/resrep/pdf/roseturkey.pdf.

Sussman, J. (1973) 'United States Information Service Libraries', available at: www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream.

Books and Articles

Bell, D. (1955) *The New American Right*. New York: Criterion Books.
Dumont, P. (1973) 'Littérature et sous-développement: les "romans paysans" en Turquie' *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 28, no. 3, pp. 745–64.
Earnest, E. (1970) *The Single Vision: The Alienation of American Intellectuals*. New York University Press.
Eroğul, C. (1990) *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları.
Ersoy, O. (1969) 'Ankara Üniversitesi DTCF Kütüphanecilik Bölümü'nün Onbeş Yılı', *Türk Kütüphaneciler Derneği Bülteni*, 18, no. 4, pp. 228–31.
Fishburn, M. (2008) *Burning Books*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Gilbaut, S. (1983) *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art*. University of Chicago Press.
Greenberg, C. (1985) 'Avant-Garde and Kitsch', in Francis Frascina (ed.), *Pollock and After: The Critical Debate*. London: Paul Chapman, pp. 48–59.
Gürçağlar, Ş.T. (2008) *The Politics and Poetics of Translation in Turkey, 1923–1960*. New York: Rodopi.
Honour, H., and J. Fleming (1982) *A World History of Art*. London: Macmillan.
Judt, T. (1992) *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Karaömerlioğlu, A. (1998) 'The People's Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34, no. 4, pp. 67–91.
Karaosmanoğlu, Y.K. (2003) *Yaban*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
Karpat, K. (1960) 'Social Themes in Contemporary Turkish Literature: Part I', *Middle East Journal*, 14, no. 1, pp. 29–44.
Kırtunç, A. (1996) 'Interview with Neclâ Aytür', *Journal of American Studies of Turkey*, 3, pp. 59–68.
Kozloff, M. (1973) 'American Painting during the Cold War', *Artforum*, 11, no. 9, pp. 43–54.
Kurt, M. (2007) '1950 Sonrası Türk Edebiyatında Varoluşçu Felsefeden Etkilenen Yazarların Romanlarında Yapı, Tema ve Anlatma'. PhD thesis, Gazi University SBE.
Maack, M.N. (2001) 'Books and Libraries as Instruments of Cultural Diplomacy in Francophone Africa during the Cold War', in H.G.B. Anghelescu and M. Poulain (eds), *Books, Libraries, Reading and Publishing in the Cold War*. Washington DC: Library of Congress, pp. 58–86.
Makal, M. (1950) *Bizim Köy*. Istanbul: Varlık.
Margulies, R., and E. Yıldızoğlu (1998) 'Tarımsal Değişim: 1923–70', in I.C. Schick and E.A. Tonak (eds), *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye* (*Turkey in Transition*) (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları), pp. 285–307.
Oktay, A. (1993) *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Edebiyatı 1923–1950*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı.
Örnek, C. (2012) 'From Analysis to Policy: Turkish Studies in the 1950s and the Diplomacy of Ideas', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 48, no. 6, pp. 941–56.
Pakin, E. (2008) 'American Studies in Turkey during the "Cultural" Cold War', *Turkish Studies*, 9, no. 3, pp. 507–24.

Robbins, L.S. (2001) 'The Overseas Libraries Controversy and the Freedom to Read: U.S. Librarians and Publishers Confront Joseph McCarthy', in H.G.B. Anghelescu and M. Poulain (eds), *Books, Libraries, Reading, and Publishing in the Cold War.* Washington DC: Library of Congress, pp. 27–39.

Schaub, T.H. (1991) *American Fiction in the Cold War*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Schick, I.C., and E.A. Tonak (eds) *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*. Istanbul: Belge Yayınları.

Sylvester, C. (1996) 'Picturing the Cold War: An Art Graft/Eye Graft', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 21, no. 4, pp. 393–418.

7

From Battlefields to Football Fields: Turkish Sports Diplomacy in the Post-Second World War Period

Dağhan Irak

Introduction

The 1945–60 period constitutes a unique era of sports history in which sports encounters were imbued with a diplomatic mission to establish cultural relations between both allies and conflicting countries. After 1945, sports were employed as a 'soft power', and, as Beck accurately observes, perceived as a projection of national values, strengths, and weaknesses.[1] The bold initiative of the British diplomat (who was himself a medal-winning athlete) Philip Noel-Baker to invite the Soviet football team Dinamo Moscow to Britain to 'break down their [Soviet] isolation' is considered to have been the starting point for postwar sports diplomacy.[2] The success of this tour also set the tone for diplomatic encounters through sports competitions during the Cold War era.

The 'people's diplomacy' most of the time regulated the social tension that was generated by the Cold War. Sport competitions sustained the non-violent nature of the conflict, such as in the most famous example of 'ping-pong diplomacy', which helped ease Sino–Japanese and Sino–American relations during the World Table Tennis Championships of 1971 in Japan. Sports were presented as a symbol of discordant co-existence, a context in which the two blocs could challenge one another without lethal consequences. This perception of the world also helped both blocs to avoid political extremes that might have caused another global war.

Sports Diplomacy in Turkey

The Cold War indeed shaped the 'rules' of sports diplomacy that took place mainly between the East and the West. However, the sporting

'battle' had several different meanings for the peripheral actors of the Cold War, such as Turkey. For these actors, being involved in the sports diplomacy of the era meant more than crucial encouragement for their engagement in global politics. Sports came to function like a 'membership ID card' to the bloc with which they were engaged. Sports diplomacy gave them the opportunity to manifest their national prestige and the importance of their existence in world politics. For Turkey, for example, this happened through having sports contact with other countries in the same bloc, rather than being engaged in contests with countries from the opposite bloc.

The early republican period in Turkish history, in the sports domain, represents an imported and unfinished project. Because Turkey came very close to adopting the totalitarian policies of Germany and Italy, most of the plans involving sports had to be changed after Turkey shifted its alliance at the end of the war.[3] However, this period also created a heritage according to which the diplomatic significance of popular sports was understood. This significance was instantly employed in the aftermath of the war, with a mutual interest from both Turkey and its prospective allies.

It is possible to claim that Turkey might have been willing to use sports, especially football, in the international area, as it overlapped with the republic's primary objective from its very beginning. Modern Turkey's nationalism, which dates back to the 1910s (before the republic, to the days of the Second Constitution) was based on a *double-jeu* of admiring and challenging the West.[4] With the development of Sun Language Theory and the Turkish History Thesis in the 1930s, official Turkish ideology tried to construct a national pride depending on the claim that Western culture derived from an ancient, transcendent culture that essentially had been Turkish.[5] Hence, Turks were not just far from being inferior to the West, they were superior to them. Whereas the invented pseudo-scientific theories claiming Turkish people's superiority had obvious flaws, any considerable success in the sports domain would appear to present popular and visible evidence for that claim.

Sports, especially football, offered the strongest ways to claim equivalence with and challenge the West since the emergence of modern Turkey with the Second Constitution in 1908. The opponent on the pitch was the 'enemy' as well as the partner. The General Harrington Cup, played just before the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 between Fenerbahçe and occupational armies' teams is a striking example of these fixtures. By the end of the Second World War, this changed slightly. The matches with foreign teams eventually were considered to

be 'friendly' games. Along with admiration and challenge, being allies was now a part of the game. Indeed, this psychological shift in the perception of these games was vastly dependent on the political domain.

The friendly games had additional importance as these encounters remained the sole fixtures (except for the Olympic Games) where Turkish sports teams could meet their international counterparts. For example, in football Turkey failed to qualify for the World Cup until 1954, and the European club competitions did not start until 1955. Therefore, between 1945 and 1960, the period in which sports contacts are analyzed here, friendly tournaments represented Turkey's only sports ties with the world. Also, in domestic Turkish sports, where professionalization was not introduced until 1959, these contacts also represented valuable income in the form of gate receipts and sometimes state aid.

We also should note that the Turkish sports literature widely ignores the political value of this period in sports history, except for Gökaçtı's *Bizim İçin Oyna* (*Play for Us*), which remains the only political history piece in the football domain.[6] Therefore, it is necessary to rely on the period's newspapers (especially *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, and *Vatan*, which gave extensive sports coverage in the era) for the sports facts and analyze them in the context of the international politics of the period.

Sports Diplomacy in the Late Single-Party Period (1945–50)

Turkey's first sports-related guest after the Second World War provided reliable proof of the increased importance of friendly games. The British naval cruiser HMS *Ajax*, which had participated in the D-Day landings, docked in Istanbul on 15 September 1945, bringing Abd al-Ilah, the regent of King Faisal II of Iraq, as a guest. The regent had been awarded the Legion of Merit by the United States in June and he later acted as a key figure in Iraq's diplomatic relations with the Western alliance. While Abd al-Ilah made diplomatic contacts in Turkey, the *Ajax* crew participated in sports events. The crew's football team played with Fenerbahçe and the Turkish Army's football team,[7] while some marines participated in swimming races against the crew of the Turkish Navy cruiser *Yavuz*. The games were followed by a feast at Istanbul's luxury Lido pool, decorated with British flags.[8] Meanwhile, the *Ajax* was opened for public visit.[9]

The *Ajax*'s visit, which took place just after the victory of the Allied Powers and even before the official end of the Second World War, presented a whole new way of international diplomacy. The victorious British soldiers appeared in public, playing games and attending cocktails. Sports proved to be an effective way to promote the Western

alliance. Just two weeks after this first visit, a track and field team from the United States visited Turkey and participated in international athletics events.[10] Their visit was followed by that of another track and field squad from Greece.[11]

Greece, standing just between the two newly constructed global camps, quickly became a new source of attraction for Turkish sports. Turkish officials selected Greece as Turkey's first opponent in international football soon after the end of the Second World War, in October 1945, and Greek football clubs started to visit Turkey. The first team to visit Turkey for friendly games was AEK (the Athletic Union of Constantinople). AEK had been founded by Greeks who had fled Istanbul after the Turkish War of Independence. The team had its origins in the Pera Club, one of the oldest clubs in the Ottoman capital.[12] Likewise, members of the Apollon Club, founded in İzmir, visited the club's native city in March 1948.[13] Apollon's visit also shows that these visits from Greece to Turkey continued even during the Greek Civil War (1946–49). However, the main increase in Turkish–Greek sports contacts was realized in the 1950s, when both countries were affiliated openly with the Western bloc through their NATO membership.

Another striking example of diplomatic sports contacts in which Turkey was involved in the postwar period was with Egypt. The Kingdom of Egypt had been a strategic base for Great Britain during the war. In May 1946, Turkey sent a large sports team to Egypt, presided by Zeki Rıza Sporel, former captain of the Turkish national football team. This trip, which included track and field athletes, was unprecedented in Turkish sports history.[14] Just two weeks after this trip, Egypt's biggest football club, Al-Ahly, was invited to Istanbul for the occasion of Fenerbahçe's 40th anniversary.[15] However, as the state of the relationship between Egypt and Britain gradually changed after British troops in Egypt were reduced in the late 1940s, this kind of athletic meeting was never repeated again between Egypt and Turkey. Moreover, in October 1951, just months before the Nasser Revolution, Turkey decided to freeze cultural and athletic contacts with Egypt, due to some anti-Turkish articles that had been published in the Egyptian press.[16]

Despite the obvious diplomatic nature of some athletic contacts during 1945–50, it would not be accurate to say that the Republican People Party's (RPP) governments of the multiparty period employed all of the international sports contacts for diplomatic reasons. For instance, many Austrian teams visited Turkey, despite the ideological differences between the two countries.[17] While some contacts, like the *Ajax* visit, were fully diplomatic, during the RPP governments' reign, the athletic

value of the events was still the priority. International football and track and field events also were encouraged because Turkey would participate in the 1948 Olympics in these branches. However, the Turkish General Directorate of Physical Education banned the visits of foreign football teams in February 1949, until the end of the local football league matches.[18] This certainly was a sports-related decision.[19] When the Democrat Party (DP) took power, however, such decisions were seldom taken. Compared to the diplomatic value of the international games, the local competitions seemed disposable.

Sports Diplomacy during Early Democrat Party Rule (1950–55)

The Democrat Party greatly accelerated pro-Western foreign policy, the initial signals of which had been visible during the postwar RPP governments. The weakening relationship between the Soviet Union and Turkey in the late 1940s resulted in a complete break in the 1950s and Turkey became completely engaged with the Western bloc. Turkey enthusiastically tried to prove its commitment to this new alliance through its attempts to become a NATO member and its involvement in the Korean War. In other matters, such as Third World issues or the case of Palestine, Turkey chose to stay close to the Western bloc.

In this period, sports diplomacy, especially football diplomacy, started to be used more frequently and strongly than ever before. Whereas many sports contacts had been organized according to the foreign policy objectives of the RPP period, the DP arranged almost all international sports meetings to conform to the new stance Turkey had taken.

Sports relations with Greece constituted a significant part of this sports policy. Turkey's western neighbor had just come out of a Civil War between the Western-supported government and the Soviet-backed Democratic Army, which had had a significant role in the survival of the country during the Nazi occupation in the Second World War. As the right-wing pro-Western government emerged victorious from this three-years-long civil war, Greece gradually became a loyal ally of the Western bloc. This meant that Turkey, which had made efforts to improve its relationship with its former enemy in the 1930s, now had to iron out their remaining differences. However, while the Truman Doctrine had forced the two countries side by side, by the end of the 1950s the Cyprus issue swept this alliance off the table.

The geographical proximity of the two countries and the fact that both countries were at the same level in most sports branches helped in

the use of sports diplomacy, especially involving football, as a powerful tool in normalizing the public side of international relations. Starting from 1950, the frequency of sport events increased. Before analyzing these meetings thoroughly, we should first note an incident that happened in May 1949, just a year before the DP took power, in order to emphasize the negative public feeling vis-à-vis the positive political approach about the sports contacts with Greece.

On 15 May 1949, the Turkish national football team played a friendly Mediterranean Cup game with Greece in Athens. According to reports of Turkey's official Anatolian Agency, Greek newspapers were decorated with Turkish and Greek flags and there was a very friendly atmosphere.[20] Also, a cocktail party was arranged for the two teams at the Egyptian Embassy in Athens, as the referee was Egyptian, and there was also an Egyptian team in the tournament.[21] The next day, a number of Turkish newspapers complained about the Greek team's foul play and the Egyptian referee's incompetent officiating,[22] even though the Turkish team had won the game 2–1. However, no other incidents were reported.

Yet, on 23 May, almost a week after the game, the Turkish press started publishing articles about the bad treatment the national team had received in Greece. The same day, the Pan-Turkist and Islamist National Turkish Students' Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği) staged a demonstration carrying banners that read, 'We don't want sports contacts with Greeks'[23] in Istanbul as well as in protests in Ankara and İzmir. The Turkish national team players also attended the meeting, and the team captain Gündüz Kılıç delivered a speech:

> I wanted to understand the reason for the Greeks' obvious hostility. When I asked one of their officials, he said: 'You're the strongest team in the tournament. The Egyptians sent us aid recently. Also the communists, whose numbers are increasing in Greece, may have staged a conspiracy against you.' I personally believe that the Red communists created this hostility. However, it is certain that the Greeks developed hatred for us because of their consecutive defeats against us.[24]

This speech, even though it carried a highly political tone, did not accuse all Greeks, but only the 'Red communists'. The press and politicians in both countries refrained from provoking a conflict. Greek government officials also attempted to calm the tension. A counter-meeting organized by some Greek students in Athens was banned and the Second Vice Minister, also the son of former President Eleftherios Venizelos,

Sophocles Venizelos, delivered a statement: 'It would be a disaster if the friendship my father had restored between Turkey and Greece collapsed twenty years later because of an unimportant sports event.'[25]

Both countries' officials continued this attitude until the protests died down. On 26 May, the Greek Vice Minister Tsaldaris met with Turkish Ambassador Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın and other Turkish diplomats at a reception in Athens.[26] The Turkish officials responded positively to these reconciliation attempts. Meanwhile, to prevent further tension, the trip to Athens by the Vefa Football Club[27] and the Greek wrestlers' trip to Turkey were canceled by the governments of the two countries.[28] The protests finally faded out after Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak's response to a parliamentary question in the National Assembly: 'The reaction was strong in Turkey as a very high level of hospitality was expected from such a close friend, and the Greek–Turkish friendship is essential.'[29]

This incident, which happened a year before the major change of power in Turkish politics, reveals many important points about Turkish–Greek relations. First of all, it can be said that despite the strong attempts at reconciliation by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Eleftherios Venizelos in the 1920s and the ongoing friendly political relations, relations between the two countries remained fragile at the public level. Also, this incident marked the rise of the Pan-Turkist and Islamist National Turkish Students' Union, an organization that would be very active in anti-communist right-wing politics during the Cold War and the Cyprus issue by the mid-1950s. Equally, even if the negative reactions were silenced by the strong initiative of both governments, this incident was an early portent of the atmosphere that would dominate the second half of the decade during the climax of the Cyprus question. Indeed, in the sports domain, this incident proved the effectiveness and importance of state initiatives in keeping Turkish–Greek sports relations alive. The 1949 Turkey–Greece game in Athens was an early example of the rise and fall of Turkish–Greek relations during DP rule.

The Democrat Party government reinstated athletic contacts between the two countries in July 1951, two years after the incident in Athens. Greek football and track and field teams visited Istanbul during the Islamic Ramadan holiday and a large group of Fenerbahçe and national team athletes made a trip to the Greek capital to participate in an international competition. One of the best-known sports pundits of the era, Adil Giray, interpreted the reinstatement of the contacts as follows:

> Incidents like the one in Athens can happen in any other part of world. However, in those places, mature officials resolve the disputes

> in sports terms. We did the opposite during the Athens incident. Unfortunately, the Greeks followed the same path … The football and athletics encounters between the Greek boys and ours sold out the city stadium three days in a row. The attention paid by the public despite the incredibly hot weather shows that everyone agrees on the continuation of the Turkish–Hellenic sports contact. It is the officials' responsibility to ensure this. In two weeks, a dozen Turkish athletes will go to Athens. We are sure that our youth will be greeted with lively and sincere interest over there.[30]

After this first contact, the sports meetings between the two countries continued at full speed. In 15 July 1951, the Ethnikos Alexandroupolis track and field team traveled to Turkey to compete against Beyoğluspor, the Greek minority team of Istanbul.[31] In August, Turkish national referee Sulhi Garan was invited to Athens to officiate a game.[32] In September, the Galatasaray football team organized a trip to Thessaloniki, while AEK visited Istanbul to play against Turkish teams.[33] In October, the Galatasaray athletics team visited Athens.[34]

The contacts continued at the same frequency in 1952. In March, Turkey and Greece played a football match in Athens.[35] The same month Apollon visited Istanbul to play Beşiktaş, Beyoğluspor, and Fenerbahçe.[36] In October, Panathinaikos came to Turkey.[37] Even smaller teams made trips to Greece. In March 1952, the regional division's Aydınspor visited Chios Island and Athens.[38] Beykozspor went to Thessaloniki in June.[39] In 1953, Edirne Karagücü, the army team of Edirne (the city located near the Turkish–Greek border), virtually unknown elsewhere, played the football team from Komotini.[40] In September 1953, another regional division team, Sökespor, visited Samos Island, while AEK revisited Istanbul.[41]

One very interesting thing about these trips of smaller teams is that the regional teams Aydınspor and Sökespor were from Aydın, the home region of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Also, Edirne's sole MP in the era was Rüknettin Nasuhioğlu, who was initially the Minister of Interior, and then the Minister of Justice of the DP governments. Some teams that normally could not have afforded a trip to Greece traveled there during that period.

The large number of athletic contacts with Greece in the first half of the 1950s completely overlapped with the political conjuncture. During the mutual visits of sports teams, Adnan Menderes also visited Athens with messages of further cooperation.[42] Meanwhile, in 1952, the Pan-Turkist and Islamist National Turkish Students' Union requested

permission from the Governorship of Istanbul to be allowed to stage a counter-demonstration against Greek youth, who had just organized a protest about Cyprus.[43] The request was denied and the governor asked the organization to give up protesting 'because there is an improved friendship between Turkey–Greece'.[44] It was also just before the signing in 1953 of the NATO-backed Balkan Pact among Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia.

The athletic contacts with Greece continued until the Cyprus issue entered the Turkish agenda. The Turkish–Greek track and field festival in June 1954[45] and the trip to Athens by Galatasaray athletes one month later[46] were the last contacts of Turkish sportsmen with their neighbors. At this time, protests about Cyprus remained suspended.[47] In 1955 the Cyprus issue became impossible to avoid and international talks began to discuss the future of the island subsequent to British withdrawal. The Turkish government let nationalist groups such as the Pan-Turkist and Islamist National Turkish Students' Union and the Cyprus is Turkish Association (Kıbrıs Türktür Derneği) promote widespread patriotic awareness, which resulted in the 6–7 September 1955 pogrom in Istanbul and İzmir, forcing many non-Muslim Turkish citizens to leave the country. After this incident, the sports contacts with Greece were suspended for more than two decades, until relations were relatively normalized. However, even after diplomatic relations were restored, there has never been another period of extensive sports diplomacy between the two countries. Therefore, the early 1950s mark an exceptional period in both the common history of sports and bilateral diplomacy.

The Cyprus issue affected Turkey's sports diplomacy in another way. The intense and nationalistic atmosphere of 1955 also created an interest in Cypriot Turkish football. In June 1955, Cypriot Turkish team Çetinkaya's coach Naci Özkaya visited Turkey to ask for help on some issues, such as the lack of sports facilities.[48] Çetinkaya also invited the Istanbul University football team to Cyprus via the Pan-Turkist and Islamist National Turkish Students' Union, which had taken on a prominent position in Turkish political life.[49] Also Basri Dirimlili, former Fenerbahçe and national team player, went to Cyprus to coach a football team in the mid-1960s.[50]

Another important example of sports diplomacy after the Second World War is the sports relations between Turkey and Israel. Diplomatic relations between these two countries had begun during the final days of the RPP government in 1949, when the foreign policy shift had become visible in Turkey. On 28 March 1949, Turkey officially recognized the Israeli state despite protests from the Arab nations. This was a

bold statement as Turkey was designated to be one of the West's major actors in the Middle East, via important projects like the Baghdad Pact. Seven months later, still during the RPP government, Fenerbahçe was invited officially to Israel to play against local teams.[51] Fenerbahçe made this trip in mid-March. The team was greeted by officials from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the airport, and the governor, Petach Tikva, made a speech in honor of the Turkish team, wishing relations between the two countries to grow stronger.[52] Following this trip, after the DP takeover, the Hapoel football team visited Istanbul in June 1950,[53] and the national football team went to Tel Aviv in November. This was followed by the visit of Maccabi Tel Aviv to Turkey in April 1951.[54]

Sports diplomacy with Israel also affected sports contacts with Lebanon. We should note that sports relations with Lebanon were established after the Israeli–Lebanese armistice in March 1949. Before this date, there had been no sports contact with Lebanon.[55] In May 1950, the Istanbul team of selected athletes and Istanbulspor football team visited Lebanon,[56] followed by the visit of Lebanese football champions Racing in June.[57]

During these athletic meetings, the Turkish press started questioning the choice of opponents. After the visits of the teams Hapoel and Racing, columnist Adil Giray published an article criticizing the excessive number of games and the weakness of the opponents.[58] However, as Giray suggested professionalization as the cure for the increasing number of friendly games in order to create other sources of revenue, it can be claimed that the diplomatic objective behind those games was largely overlooked at the time and it was thought that the games with Israeli and Lebanese teams had been organized by the clubs to raise money. It is true that the clubs arranged games with foreign teams in order to raise funds for their teams. During that period, professionalization existed in Turkey only in its incipient form (players were promised small bonuses or well-paying jobs as transfer fees), and the league games were not sufficient for the clubs to raise enough funds to succeed at football. Therefore, the clubs invited touring teams from Argentina or Brazil to achieve higher gate receipts. However, games with low-profile Israeli or Lebanese teams certainly cannot be considered in the same category. While South American, Swedish, English, or Austrian teams received attention from the football enthusiasts, these countries had no such reputations. When we assess these games within their historical context, it is clear that the real motivation behind these encounters was diplomatic/political.

Sports diplomacy with the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia also mushroomed in the 1950s. Tito's Yugoslavia applied an interpretation of socialism different from Stalinism, hence it was expelled from Stalin's Cominform in June 1948. After this, the country remained relatively open to influence from the Western bloc, and therefore attracted NATO's attention. During this time, when Turkey and Greece took the initiative to affiliate Yugoslavia with NATO through projects like the Balkan Pact, sports contacts with this country started. In December 1950, the Sarajevo football team visited Istanbul and played friendlies.[59] In May 1951, the team Hajduk traveled to Istanbul.[60] The team Beogradski also came to Istanbul in September 1952,[61] just three days before Anthony Eden, Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, met Josip Broz Tito to discuss the Balkan Pact between Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia. The Pact was agreed in February 1953. The same year, a Belgrade selection visited Istanbul[62] while the football team Vefa went to Yugoslavia in June.[63] The visits continued in 1955 with the travel of the Radnicki football team and the Yugoslavian youth basketball national team to Istanbul.[64]

Sports relations between Turkey and Yugoslavia took a different turn after 1955, when Turkey's ties with Greece were broken off completely. As European football as well as Turkish football was undergoing institutionalization in the same period, the number of friendly games decreased and they were replaced by European-wide official club competitions like the European Champion Clubs' Cup. However, Turkish–Yugoslavian sports relations continued as many players and coaches from Yugoslavia started to work in Turkey.[65] This contact was sustained until the fall of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

In the early 1980s, the Turkish government went so far as to declare Yugoslavian Muslim players to be of Turkish descent,[66] thus sidestepping the ban on foreign players.[67] Therefore, in the early 1980s, all of the foreigners in Turkish football were Yugoslavian. This can be attributed to two factors. First, Yugoslavia had historical ties with Turkey through the Ottoman Empire and had a large Muslim population. Second, Yugoslavia's independent foreign policy did not bother Turkey's alliance with the West. Compared to Bulgaria and Romania, which practically were satellite states of Stalinism, Yugoslavia was a logical choice.

The core of Turkey's political alignment after the Second World War was the United States of America. While American influence immensely shaped Turkish policies, it is hard to find examples of sports diplomacy between the United States and Turkey. The reason for that is mostly because different sports branches were popular in these two countries, and also because of the geographical distance. Even so, there are a couple

of instances when sports-based diplomacy or propaganda can be seen in Turkish–American relations. For example, in September 1945, right after visit of Ajax, a group of American track and field athletes visited Istanbul after having competed in Egypt.[68] Also, the basketball team of the SS *Missouri* cargo ship, which visited Istanbul in May 1947, played against Turkish teams. After the SS *Missouri*, some other American military ships visited Turkey. On one of these occasions, on 2 February 1949, a team of American navy officials and one Air Force official competed in an American football game in Istanbul's İnönü Stadium. This was an interesting experience as it was the first ever gridiron football game played in Turkey, and the only one for decades. The honorary kick-off for the game was arranged by the governor of Istanbul, Dr Lütfü Kırdar. High-ranking American military officials watched the game.[69]

Among these examples, the most extensive and interesting contact was surely the trip of the Beşiktaş football team to New York in May 1950. The visit created great excitement in Istanbul prior to its departure: the team members visited the governor, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and also created a cocktail in honor of the occasion.[70] In New York, the Turkish Ambassador and the Military Attaché followed the Beşiktaş games[71] and, on its return to Turkey, the team was received at the presidential palace in Ankara to meet President Celal Bayar.[72] The trip was featured in the *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune*. The team's chairman, Hakkı Yeten, also gave an interview to the Voice of America radio station. As sports columnist of the era Şazi Tezcan said, 'the trip was successful in terms of Turkey's propaganda in the United States'.[73] The close attention of the Turkish state officials before, during, and after this one-month visit shows that this trip was perceived to be more than an athletic contact by Turkey.

Conclusion

In order to summarize the characteristics of postwar Turkish sports diplomacy, we should first emphasize that between 1945 and 1955, the policy regarding international sports contacts showed consistency despite the change of power in Turkish politics. As discussed above, whereas the Democrat Party visibly accelerated the rate of international sports contacts that had pro-Western overtones, the initial step had been taken during the last days of the RPP government. Therefore, we can claim that the pro-Western foreign policy trend did not start with the handover of power from the RPP to the DP, but before that. Another important point about sports diplomacy between 1945 and 1955 is that it was one of the two factors that defined the international contact of Turkish sports

clubs. The only other factor that was effective in the choice of foreign opponents was the extent of rivals' popularity as the clubs needed to raise money to run their daily affairs. Most clubs invited the best teams they could afford; however, they also inevitably played with teams from countries with which Turkey tried to bond diplomatically. Whereas some of these teams were indeed below Turkish sports standards, the international experience gained by encounters with bigger teams actually helped the Turkish national football team as Turkey took part in the 1948 Olympic Games and the 1954 FIFA World Cup. The Turkish national football team waited 48 years to see another World Cup, and has not been able to qualify for the Olympics again since 1960; therefore, these were important achievements for Turkish football.

As a last remark, it should be noted that the decline of sports diplomacy after 1955 depended on the international sports conjuncture as well as the national one. It is true that Turkey became more isolated because of the series of *coups d'états* and the Cyprus issue after the 1960s; however, international sports encounters also changed in nature during these years. After the foundation of European sports governing bodies such as UEFA, regular and official European fixtures were arranged, so most teams no longer had the time or felt the need to organize friendly tours. Also, with the introduction of full professionalization in Turkey and in many other European countries, the training schedules of the clubs became more crowded and the number of games were reduced and regulated. The 1945–55 period marked a transition between the World War period and the institutionalization of European sports. The void of international sports encounters was filled by friendlies and international diplomacy benefited from them. Hence, this ten-year period represents a unique picture in terms of sports diplomacy, both in Turkey and in the global sports scene.

Notes

1. P. Beck (2005), 'Britain and the Cold War's "Cultural Olympics": Responding to the Political Drive of Soviet Sport 1945–58', *Contemporary British History*, 19, no. 2, p. 170.
2. P. Beck (2003), 'Confronting George Orwell: Philip Noel-Baker on International Sport, Particularly the Olympic Movement, as Peacemaker', *The European Sports History Review*, 5, pp. 199–201.
3. Nazi Germany's International Olympic Committee member and future sports minister Carl Diem, also known as the mastermind of the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, was invited to Turkey in September 1933 to prepare a plan to reshape Turkey's sport- and youth-related activities. Diem proposed a

youth organization closely modeled on the *Jügend* of the Nazi regime; however, this scheme never came to fruition. For a very fruitful work on early republican Turkish sports history, see Y. Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar* (*Robust and Brave Sons*) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004).
4. E.J. Zürcher (2004) *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd edn (New York: I.B. Tauris), p. 191.
5. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, pp. 189–90.
6. M.A. Gökaçtı (2008) *Bizim için Oyna* (*Play for Us*) *(*Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları).
7. *Cumhuriyet*, 17 September 1945.
8. *Cumhuriyet*, 18 September 1945.
9. *Cumhuriyet*, 19 September 1945.
10. *Cumhuriyet*, 28 September 1945.
11. *Cumhuriyet*, 30 September 1945.
12. 'The speech of Patriarch Varthalomaios', AEK FC official website, available at www.aekfc.gr/index.asp?a_id=3031.
13. *Akşam*, 27 March 1948.
14. *Akşam*, 4 May 1946.
15. *Akşam*, 18 May 1946.
16. *Akşam*, 25 October 1951.
17. *Akşam*, 20–31 January 1949, 18–21 March 1949.
18. *Akşam*, 27 February 1949.
19. As the games with foreign teams earned more gate receipts for Turkish teams than those with regular league games, most clubs gave priority to these games and sometimes opted out of domestic competitions. This sometimes jeopardized the local league's organization, so the national sports body had to take such a decision.
20. *Akşam*, 15 May 1949.
21. *Akşam*, 15 May 1949.
22. *Akşam*, 16 May 1949.
23. *Akşam*, 24 May 1949.
24. *Akşam*, 24 May 1949.
25. *Akşam*, 26 May 1949.
26. *Akşam*, 27 May 1949.
27. *Akşam*, 24 May 1949.
28. *Akşam*, 29 May 1949.
29. *Akşam*, 31 May 1949.
30. *Akşam*, 15 July 1951.
31. *Akşam*, 16 July 1951.
32. *Akşam*, 11 August 1951.
33. *Akşam*, 15–17 September 1951.
34. *Akşam*, 24 October 1951.
35. *Akşam*, 3 March 1952.
36. *Akşam*, 22–26 March 1952.
37. *Akşam*, 25 October 1952.
38. *Akşam*, 3 March 1952.
39. *Akşam*, 6 June 1952.
40. *Akşam*, 31 May 1953.
41. *Akşam*, 14–27 September 1953.

42. *Akşam*, 4 May 1952.
43. *Akşam*, 13 May 1952.
44. *Akşam*, 14 May 1952.
45. *Akşam*, 10 June 1954.
46. *Akşam*, 21 July 1954.
47. *Akşam*, 3 September 1954.
48. *Milliyet*, 14 June 1955.
49. *Milliyet*, 22 June 1955.
50. *Milliyet*, 6 September 1963.
51. *Akşam*, 16 January 1950.
52. *Akşam*, 15 March 1950.
53. *Akşam*, 2 June 1950.
54. *Akşam*, 11 April 1951.
55. D. Irak, 'The Transformation of Football since the 1970s' (Master's thesis, Boğaziçi University), pp. 57–8.
56. *Akşam*, 20 May 1950.
57. *Akşam*, 19 June 1950.
58. *Akşam*, 25 June 1950.
59. *Akşam*, 27 December 1950.
60. *Akşam*, 9 May 1951.
61. *Akşam*, 15–22 September 1952.
62. *Akşam*, 8 June 1953.
63. *Akşam*, 20 June 1953.
64. *Akşam*, 8 December 1955.
65. Between the beginning of the professional football league in 1959 and the fall of Yugoslavia in 1991, Yugoslavian coaches won ten championship titles in Turkey, the most number of titles for international coaches in Turkey (www.turkfutbolu.net/turkiyekupalari/samteknik.htm).
66. Law no. 2527 on Facilitating Foreigners of Turkish Ancestry to Perform Their Occupations and Crafts Freely in Turkey and Their Employment in Public and Private Establishments or Businesses, accepted in 1981, allows the Cabinet of Ministers to give foreigners of 'Turkish ancestry' the same working privileges as Turkish citizens.
67. The ban was forced due to the lack of foreign currency in Turkey after the global oil crisis.
68. *Akşam*, 4 May 1946.
69. *Akşam*, 3 February 1949.
70. *Akşam*, 13 May 1950.
71. *Akşam*, 24 May 1950.
72. *Akşam*, 24 June 1950.
73. *Akşam,* 18 June 1950.

Bibliography

Periodicals

Akşam, 3 February 1949–3 September 1954.
Cumhuriyet, 17–19 September 1945.
Milliyet, 14–22 June 1955.

Books and Articles

Akın, Y. (2004) *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar.* Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Beck, P.J. (2003) 'Confronting George Orwell: Philip Noel-Baker on International Sport, Particularly the Olympic Movement, as Peacemaker', *The European Sports History Review*, 5, pp. 199–216.

——(2005) 'Britain and the Cold War's "Cultural Olympics": Responding to the Political Drive of Soviet Sport 1945–58', *Contemporary British History*, 19, no. 2, pp. 169–85.

Gökaçtı, M.A. (2008) *Bizim için Oyna*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Irak, D. (2010) 'The Transformation of Football since the 1970s'. Master's thesis, Boğaziçi University.

Zürcher, E.J. (2004) *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd edn. New York: I.B. Tauris.

Part III
Foreign Aid and Assistance

8

Land-Grant Education in Turkey: Atatürk University and American Technical Assistance, 1954–68

Richard Garlitz

During his 1954 visit to the United States, Turkish president Celal Bayar asked for American assistance in building an agricultural university in eastern Anatolia that would function like an American land-grant college.[1] These institutions emphasize instruction and research in agriculture, engineering, and other fields related to rural and industrial development. Moreover, land-grant universities stress that higher education should meet the pragmatic needs of the people. They therefore engage in extension work, that is, the dissemination of information about scientific farming, nutrition, and public health to families far removed from the centers of higher learning.[2] Bayar understood the significant role that land-grant universities had played in American rural development since the late nineteenth century and wanted to bring the concept to Turkey. By 1954 the United States government was already involved in Turkish development through the Marshall Plan for European Recovery. It had also recently initiated a technical assistance program, popularly known as the Point Four program, which recruited experts, often from land-grant universities, to assist with rural improvement projects in developing nations.[3]

In response to Bayar's request, the United States government contracted the University of Nebraska to help develop Atatürk University in Erzurum, which opened in 1958, as a land-grant style university.[4] This essay draws on the University of Nebraska records of the project to explore the challenge of transplanting an educational philosophy that had proven effective in one nation into another with a very different academic tradition. It also examines the relationship between technical assistance and evolving US–Turkish relations during the early Cold War. The Nebraska advisors functioned as unofficial academic ambassadors for the United States to an important Cold War ally. Their mission was

part of a larger basket of public diplomacy programs designed to win hearts and minds to American modernization strategies.

In some respects, the University of Nebraska–Atatürk University collaboration represents a successful attempt at using American technical expertise to support higher education in another country. Whereas no Turkish institutions of higher learning existed in the eastern two-thirds of Turkey, by far the poorest part of the country, prior to 1954, Atatürk University developed into a thriving university that enrolled 1800 students by 1968. Graduates served in important positions at the university, in the Ministry of Agriculture, as rural agricultural extension agents, and in private business and industry.[5] But, the Nebraska advisors were only partially able to transplant land-grant higher education into Turkey. To some extent, this was because many Turkish professors did not fully understand the approach, while others opposed implementing the philosophy at Atatürk University. But the Nebraska advisors also misunderstood, or at least failed to appreciate, important aspects of Turkish academic protocol, and these misunderstandings created rifts with their Turkish colleagues. One of the most significant and enduring sources of tension was the thorny question of how much sway the American advisors should have over shaping the university's policies. Senior Turkish faculty members often showed ambivalence, even hostility, toward American influence, but the Nebraska advisors believed that instilling the land-grant philosophy would require breaking down many accepted practices in Turkish higher education.

The project also had to accommodate substantial changes in US–Turkish relations. American prestige in Turkey was at an all-time high in the mid-1950s when University of Nebraska advisors first went to Erzurum. The United States was the strongest Western power, supported Turkish membership in NATO, and carried no legacy of imperial scheming in Turkey. The 1960s, however, strained the US–Turkish relationship. As their nation grew in confidence and the Soviet threat subsided, Turks began to question the wisdom of tying their country so closely to a foreign power. This proved especially true after the United States and Turkey clashed over Cyprus policy in 1964 and as the United States sank deeper into the Vietnam War. More Turks began to see the United States as the latest imperial power seeking to control Turkey and foreign aid, including assistance to higher education, as the latest tool of domination. Again, the University of Nebraska documents suggest that the advisors did not really understand the changing cultural dynamic of the Cold War in Turkey. Locked in an American mindset about the conflict, key Nebraska advisors did not fully understand the local dynamics that

led to rising anti-American sentiment in Turkey. Rather, they tended to associate anti-Americanism with Soviet influence.

Agriculture, the Marshall Plan, and Turkish Development

Agricultural development became an important cornerstone of the emerging US–Turkish relationship beginning with the Marshall Plan in 1948. American planners believed that Turkey could best contribute to European reconstruction by supplying much-needed agricultural produce and minerals. Marshall Plan aid to Turkey therefore concentrated on agriculture, especially mechanization and bringing more land under cultivation.[6] The program produced impressive initial results; Turkey went from being an importer of wheat to one of the world's top producers between 1948 and 1953.[7] The introduction of 40,000 tractors helped expand the total acreage of wheat production by 400 percent by 1950.[8]

But these gains turned out to be ephemeral because mechanization alone could not meet Turkey's agricultural challenges. Large machinery proved impractical for the nearly 90 percent of Turkish farm families who cultivated fewer than 25 acres and even for some larger farmers whose land was fragmented into relatively small plots.[9] A shortage of trained mechanics and the need to import fuel and spare parts further increased the cost of mechanization. In addition, Turkish agriculture realized relatively few long-term gains in efficiency owing to a disappointing 1954 harvest truncated by poor weather and because it lacked a coordinated plan for agricultural development, a sufficient extension service, and hybrid plant and livestock varieties specialized to local conditions.[10] These were the kinds of problems that land-grant universities had long been researching in the United States.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish republic, understood that education had to accompany mechanization in developing the eastern provinces. In 1937 he challenged the Grand National Assembly to build an institution of higher learning that would serve the intellectual as well as practical needs of Turkey's eastern population.[11] But his Republican People's Party (RPP) emphasized industrial development in Turkey's large western cities during the interwar years, and the Second World War disrupted the nation's development agenda.[12] Turkey did organize a nascent agricultural extension service in 1943, but in eastern Anatolia it had only reached the Black Sea provinces by 1950.[13] The government developed a series of Village Institutes that provided rural boys and girls with a practical five-year course designed to make

them village teachers and guides to modern agriculture and hygiene.[14] The Marshall Plan sent advisors in agricultural education and home economics and assisted the Turkish government in expanding the nation's extension service.[15] Bayar's Democrat Party, which cultivated peasant support, once again made rural development an important part of the national agenda when it won control of the government in the 1950 elections.

Negotiating Two Very Different Approaches to Higher Education, 1955–64

Turkish and American officials agreed that Atatürk University should not be like Turkey's existing universities, which were steeped in the classical European traditions of higher learning. Turkish universities emphasized students memorizing lectures; there were few opportunities for practical applications of knowledge – even in disciplines such as agriculture and medicine.[16] Fields important to development such as agricultural extension and home economics did not exist in Turkish universities.[17] Atatürk University, on the other hand, was to provide a curriculum in both the traditional humanities disciplines and practical applications of the latest research in agriculture and related fields. Students would learn both in the classroom and by working alongside scientists on experiment farms. They would develop technical, administrative, and research skills that were important to increasing agricultural production and raising standards of living in rural areas. After much debate, the Turkish government selected Erzurum for the location of the new university based on the availability of cheap land for research and demonstration farms.[18] The site pleased the Nebraska advisors who played up the city's historic military significance and proximity to the Soviet border. Marvel Baker, the first head of the Nebraska team in Turkey, boasted that building an American-style university in Erzurum 'indicated they [the Turks] did not fear Russia', and affirmed their commitment to the West.[19]

Atatürk University faced significant challenges in its early years that limited the extent to which it could adopt the land-grant approach. The most immediate problem was the relationship between the university and the Turkish government. While most Turkish universities enjoyed a wide degree of autonomy, the government placed Atatürk University directly under the Ministry of Education.[20] Ostensibly, this was to allow the university to break with Turkish academic tradition, but in reality the arrangement gave effective control to representatives of Turkey's

traditional higher education elite. The Ministry appointed rectors from among leading Turkish academics, and a committee of senior Turkish professors external to the university supervised tenure and promotion. These generally conservative professors valued seniority and the ability to work within the system over pedagogical and research innovation.

A lack of Turkish familiarity with the land-grant concept and uncertainty about how it could be applied to Turkey represented another hurdle. Early on, the University of Nebraska arranged a series of short seminars to acquaint Turkish professors with the American land-grant system, but the results were questionable.[21] The idea that a university could be grounded in the mechanical and agricultural sciences, that professors and students could teach and learn by getting their hands dirty in the soil, and that extension work could be central to a university's mission, were all foreign to most Turkish academics. The social prestige of a university professor led many to balk at the idea of doing applied research on actual farms.[22]

Disagreements over teaching qualifications complicated the project as well. Turkish law prescribed a period of supervised practice and the successful completion of professional examinations before an academic holding a PhD could teach or conduct research independently. The Nebraska advisors lobbied hard against this protocol, which they thought protected the status quo at the expense of innovation.[23] They argued that young Turkish scientists trained in the United States had a better grasp of land-grant education and were often better prepared to carry out modern research in scientific agriculture than were their senior Turkish colleagues.[24] Some Nebraska advisors pointed to deficiencies in applied research within Turkish graduate-level education; others thought the full professors put too much emphasis on seniority and too little on pedagogical advancements.[25] Senior Turkish faculty, of course, rejected these arguments. After all, they had earned their positions by carefully working through Turkey's existing academic structure. In part, the disagreement over teaching qualifications stemmed from differences in Turkish and American academic customs, but it also reflected a growing challenge of young Turkish academics to the entrenched hierarchy of Turkish higher education during the 1960s.[26]

The appointment of university leadership positions also hindered stability. The normal assignment for a rector at Atatürk University was five years, but eleven different individuals held the job during the first decade. None served a full assignment, and only two stayed two full academic years. The list includes former government ministers and prominent professors from Turkey's most distinguished universities, but

only a couple achieved much distinction in Erzurum.[27] Naturally, some resented being taken away from successful careers at established institutions in more attractive cities; a few lacked interest in the project and spent as much time away from Erzurum as possible.[28]

The first rector, Ahmet Özel, did not receive his assignment until eight months before the university was to open.[29] An electrical engineer who had distinguished himself as rector of Istanbul Technical University, Özel was elected to the Grand National Assembly in 1954 and served as Minister of Education while the Nebraska team was working out the initial plans for Atatürk University. He was not, however, familiar with either agricultural colleges or American higher education.[30] Özel served for only six months, six weeks of which he spent elsewhere in Europe, before vacating the position just months before the university opened in the fall of 1958.[31] Faculty turnover and political turmoil in Turkey wrecked the leadership of Sabahattin Özbek, one of Atatürk University's most dedicated early rectors, who served during the 1960–61 academic year. As dean of agriculture at Ankara University during the 1950s, Özbek had worked effectively with the Nebraska staff in starting the agricultural extension program there. He had also received one year of advanced horticulture training at the University of Nebraska.[32] Unfortunately, faculty resignations left him overburdened; at one point he held the posts of rector, dean of agriculture, and dean of arts and letters simultaneously. Moreover, the military junta that took control of the Turkish government from May 1960 until October 1961 disrupted the university's progress. The Ministry of Education allowed Atatürk University to languish under the uncertain leadership of two interim rectors during the crisis.[33]

As a result, while Atatürk University grew during the years of the Nebraska contract, it did not really take on the spirit of an American land-grant institution. In 1961 the advisors reported, 'An understanding of the characteristics, functions, organization and operation of land-grant universities in the United States proved to be of slow growth.'[34] Two years later officials from the United States Agency for International Development (AID) found that Atatürk University 'continued to operate more along the lines of the classical type university'.[35] Upon completing the project in 1968, Nebraska and AID officials concluded that it was 'questionable' how much Atatürk University leaders 'understood the changes in education and service to the community' that were necessary to create such an institution.[36] That was the real heart of the matter. While Turkish professors wanted Atatürk University to enhance Turkish development, the educational system in which they operated

was bound by traditions that made it difficult for land-grant education to flourish.

Finally, building a completely new university using a multinational faculty presented considerable logistical challenges. The building program lagged behind schedule. Classes were held in a converted secondary school inside the city during 1958–59. Even in 1963 classroom space and student housing remained inadequate, and laboratories were almost non-existent.[37] None of the American advisors spoke Turkish well enough to talk freely with their Turkish colleagues. While some Turkish professors possessed a limited understanding of English, the language barrier made it difficult for Turks and Americans to engage in the kind of informal give-and-take discussions that help to establish close working relationships. Leo Fenske, a Nebraska agricultural economist who served for nearly eight years on the field team in Turkey, estimated that he could teach only about half a course each semester using an interpreter. Students naturally found the whole process tedious and cumbersome.[38]

Professor Eyub Hızalan, a soil scientist from Ankara University, brought a degree of stability to Atatürk University when he became rector at the beginning of 1962. The eighth rector in the five-year history of the institution, Hızalan became the first to take up full-time residence in Erzurum and to devote 'a major part of his time and efforts to the university'. The new rector 'stated very explicitly' his desire to 'establish an American system of education'. He even argued that the failure to do so 'would not only reflect on the stated intentions of the Turks but also would reflect adversely on American prestige'.[39] The arrival of more junior faculty members educated in the United States also helped expand the research program and reinforce American innovations in the curriculum. 'Perhaps the most encouraging feature of Atatürk University presently', noted a team of Nebraska representatives in the summer of 1962, 'is the splendid group of young assistants and *doçents* [associate professors] on the staff'. They did their work 'with sincerity and enthusiasm' and 'are imbued with the land-grant college philosophy'.[40] Finally, the university opened a new faculty apartment building in the summer of 1962. For the first time, Atatürk University could offer comfortable housing to prospective professors and their families who would have to leave the modern cosmopolitan centers of Turkish higher education in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir for the more remote and desolate confines of a frontier town.[41] Hızalan's leadership seemed to bring a new spirit of cooperation and progress.

The optimism, however, ground to a halt during the summer of 1964 as simmering disagreements between Nebraska advisors and their Turkish

colleagues erupted. The first came in the form of a letter that Harold Allen, an advisor in agricultural extension, had written in May expressing concern that Atatürk University was not using some of the equipment purchased under the Nebraska contract. Allen wrote that AID was 'not interested in penalizing the Government of Turkey or any institution with which it cooperates', but it had to know that 'the assistance given is warranted, wanted, and properly utilized'. Allen's phrasing struck a nerve with Hızalan who shot back that the American government lacked the power to penalize Turkey or its universities. Allen subsequently revised the letter to delete the offending paragraph, but the exchange revealed a growing discontent among Turkish faculty members at what they thought was an unacceptable American attempt to control the university.[42]

Hızalan apparently began reevaluating his commitment to the land-grant concept at about this time. The rector might have acted on the support of Hakkı Kısakürek, dean of agriculture, who favored a more traditional Turkish university orientation. Hızalan might also have become discouraged by the university's progress. He told the Americans that instead of bringing Turkish professors around to American education, the Turks seemed to be converting the Nebraska advisors to traditional Turkish practices.[43] Whatever the reason, Hızalan's reappraisal clashed with the Nebraska advisors who were still committed to developing an American-style university.

The episode also highlighted the question of how much influence the American advisors should have over shaping the university. Hızalan wanted the Nebraska advisors to assume a greater role in teaching and department-level supervision but to stay out of major decisions that would shape the university. The Nebraskans rejected his approach. They were willing to provide some teaching and administrative support while the university developed its own faculty: 'We will continue to be errand boys of sorts as long as we are in Turkey', noted Harold Allen.[44] But they saw their primary purpose as shaping the university along land-grant college lines. That meant involving themselves in major philosophical decisions, but to do so would be to encroach on the turf of senior Turkish administrators. 'The Rector and the Deans are supersensitive to everything which appears to challenge them in any matter', complained one Nebraska report, 'They want the prestige of their offices.'[45]

The Cyprus Crisis and Changing US–Turkish Relations

The university crisis came at a trying time in US–Turkish relations. While the United States had enjoyed a generally lofty stature in Turkish

public opinion during the 1950s, American policy toward Cyprus caused many Turks to reconsider their view of the United States during the following decade. The Turkish government contemplated sending a military force to the newly independent island during the summer of 1964 in order to ensure the rights of the Cypriot Turkish minority. But President Lyndon Johnson, wanting to avoid an open rift between two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey), sent Turkish prime minister İsmet İnönü a frankly worded letter in June warning him that the United States would not support a Turkish military campaign on the island and forbidding Turks to use American equipment if they went ahead. Turkish public opinion reacted negatively to the letter; many saw it as high-handed and unbecoming an ally.[46]

It is hard to imagine that the Cyprus crisis and the breakdown of Turkish–American cooperation at Atatürk University were unrelated. At the heart of each matter was the question of how much influence Americans should have in Turkey. Turks resented unwanted American attempts to control Turkish foreign policy in the former and higher education in the latter. Many interpreted the American position on Cyprus as proof that the United States used its largess to keep developing countries such as Turkey subservient to American interests. Historian and former State Department Turkey analyst George Harris writes that Turkish university students 'of all persuasions took to the streets to protest the American role in blocking Turkish aspirations'.[47] The Cyprus crisis marked the beginning of a cooling in the friendship that many Turks had felt toward the United States. Anti-Americanism picked up steam on Turkish campuses throughout the second half of the 1960s and some activists even resorted to violence to disrupt Turkish cooperation with the United States.[48] Student demonstrations against the United States and Americans working in Turkey remained pronounced until the 1971 Turkish military coup suppressed student activism.

The events of the summer of 1964 caused the Ankara office of AID and the University of Nebraska to consider terminating the project.[49] The situation stabilized under the leadership of interim rector Muharrem Köksal, who guided the university through the opening of its seventh academic year that autumn. AID and the Nebraska advisors praised him for bringing together a 'badly divided Turkish staff' and restoring harmony to the relationship between the Turkish professors and the American advisors.[50] The interim rector used his address at the opening of the 1964–65 academic year to stress the importance of Turks and Americans working together to build a better university.[51] By late October 'the most serious crisis in the recent history' of the university appeared to have passed.[52]

Revised Expectations: 1965–68

Atatürk University entered into a second period of constructive growth in 1965 and 1966 under the leadership of Osman Okyar, a renowned economist and a respected scholar of Turkish higher education. Okyar had previously held professorships at Istanbul and Ankara universities as well as at the new Hacettepe Science Center, which by the 1960s had become Turkey's most advanced medical school. Okyar impressed the Nebraskans, who described him as 'a progressive, open-minded person' who was interested in the land-grant approach and establishing institutional autonomy for Atatürk University.[53] During the summer of 1965, the rector collaborated with Don Hanway, then head of the Nebraska field team, on the most systematic plan for institutional development since the university opened its doors seven years earlier. More buildings were completed by the end of 1967, including the library, which Duane Lowenstein, the last head of the Nebraska team in Erzurum, called 'the most beautiful building' on the campus.[54] From the Nebraskans' point of view, Atatürk University finally had a rector who was able and committed to building a land-grant style university in Turkey.[55]

Despite his lofty stature, Okyar could not heal the divisions within the Turkish faculty. Indeed, his decisive leadership ultimately intensified them. These divisions created a major crisis at the university beginning in the autumn of 1966, one from which the project never fully recovered before terminating two summers later.[56] In October 1966, Hanway expressed concern as traditionalist professors united against Okyar's leadership. 'We observed Okyar's functional authority decline', he wrote with disappointed resignation, 'as the Faculty factions found ways to organize and thwart his efforts'.[57]

The Nebraska advisors found themselves in a precarious position. On the one hand, they still had confidence that Atatürk University might ultimately emerge as a strong institution capable of bringing modern agriculture to eastern Turkey, and they knew that at least some of the Turks wanted the project to continue. On the other hand, however, a cloud of uncertainty surrounded the project as the Nebraska contract was scheduled to end in the summer of 1967. While the University of Nebraska, AID, and Okyar all agreed that a one-year extension would allow for a more orderly termination in 1968, the Americans stressed that such a policy would only be desirable if Turks and Americans could recapture a spirit of cooperation. The Ministry of Education recalled Okyar at the end of 1966 and replaced him with an acting rector who enjoyed support from neither the Turkish faculty nor the ministry,

'challenged from beneath and apparently lacking solid support from above', as Hanway put it.[58] The Nebraska advisors feared that the project was reaching the point of diminishing returns.

Though the Nebraskans came to realize that they could not transfer land-grant education principles seamlessly to Turkey, they remained resolute in establishing high academic standards and improving student performance. One problem they faced was the incompatibility of a practical agricultural university with the social prestige of a Turkish university degree. Turkish students expected a university degree to open doors in the professions or government bureaucracy. Few students in Atatürk University's early classes wanted to pursue careers in agriculture, and they especially did not want to do research or extension work that involved manual labor.[59] Indeed, although Atatürk University was to be an institution that helped improve the lives of rural Turks, most of the students came from the larger cities where the secondary schools were concentrated.[60] Some had never seen a farm before enrolling in the university.

The university had difficulty attracting Turkey's best-qualified students in its early days. AID officials noted with disdain that the students who filled the university's early classes 'were literally picked off the streets'.[61] To improve student competency, the Nebraska advisors called for new regulations concerning academic standards and the evaluation of student progress. Most Turkish universities required no written work outside of an extended examination period each spring. The Nebraskans argued that students should demonstrate applied knowledge in laboratories, through written reports, and on the instructional farms. Moreover, students who failed an exam could not proceed with coursework until (and unless) they passed it the following spring. This procedure created a class of largely idle students who, facing an uncertain future, became easily disaffected. A group of students retaliated against the Nebraskans' reforms by instigating a three-week strike at the beginning of the 1961–62 academic year. Individual professors who tried to initiate more frequent examinations faced similar boycotts, walkouts, and other forms of abusive behavior from the students.[62]

While the Nebraska advisors never won over all of the students, they did help improve the overall quality of the curriculum. Atatürk University introduced more applied research, assignments, and in-term exams into the curriculum, and the quality of student commitment improved. 'Most of our students were sincere and hardworking', concluded Leo Fenske after eight years on the job. If the first students really were 'picked up off the streets', that clearly was no longer the case

four years later when one thousand students applied for 200 openings in the 1962 incoming class. Applications doubled the following year, though the university still accepted fewer than 300 incoming students. Most importantly, the university attracted more students from Turkey's eastern provinces where education opportunities had historically been limited. More than 300 graduates came from Erzurum province during the first decade. Graduates entered responsible positions in the state extension service, the Ziraat Bankası (Farm Credit Bank), the Ministry of Agriculture's irrigation service, sugar refineries, and other agencies. Some went on to academic careers at Atatürk University or Turkey's other institutions of higher learning. A few even became extension agents or farmers. 'It gives me great satisfaction', concluded Fenske, 'to note the progress of my former students'.[63]

Anti-Americanism on Turkish Campuses and Cooling US–Turkish Relations

Mounting Turkish disaffection with the United States and its foreign aid further reinforced the notion that the University of Nebraska collaboration with Atatürk University was approaching the end of its useful life by 1967. A small but vocal faction within the faculty and some of the students launched a campaign aimed at ridding the university and Turkey of American influence. An ongoing dispute over control of a joint Turkish government–AID trust fund for the university served as the catalyst. AID and the Nebraska advisors argued that the money had to be spent on Nebraska contract-related activities, but some professors and students saw the fund as another way that Americans tried to control Turkey. On 27 December 1967 the Nebraska advisors learned that a group of students was disseminating anti-American literature and organizing a campus-wide protest. Concerned that rioting might follow, chief advisor Duane Lowenstein discussed the matter with Professor Ali Ertugrul, dean of the university's new medical school. Local authorities sent additional police to patrol the campus. The university remained quiet, but student dissatisfaction with the American presence at the university continued.[64]

Lowenstein was convinced that these factions harbored pro-Soviet sympathies and called them the 'Russian element.' According to Lowenstein, dissident students showed more interest in engaging shadowy campus politics than in earning a degree. He complained that 'professional students' agitated for policies that, in his view, were not in 'keeping [with] the betterment of Turkey'.[65] Lowenstein's reaction probably reflected more an American Cold War tendency to associate all

leftist and anti-American activity with Soviet influence than it reflected actual student politics on Turkish campuses. Anti-American sentiment among Turkish university students did grow during the second half of the 1960s, but Soviet influence remained weak. Student unrest at Atatürk University did not approach that of Middle East Technical University in Ankara, where dissident students attacked Peace Corps volunteers and set Ambassador Robert Komer's car on fire while he lunched with university officials in January 1969.[66] The sea-change in popular attitudes towards Americans nevertheless undercut the Nebraska advisors' work in Erzurum.

Some of the cooling in US–Turkish relations resulted from Turkey's growing confidence on the world stage. Relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union improved during the decade, and Turks across the political spectrum called for a foreign policy more independent of the United States.[67] The Cyprus imbroglio added legitimacy to the view that Turkey would never be truly independent as long as it maintained a close but unequal association with the United States. Mehmet Ali Aybar, leader of the Labor Party of Turkey (TİP), opened his party's 1965 election campaign by lambasting America's 'imperialist policy' on Cyprus and urged Turks to 'struggle until no American is left in Turkey' the following year.[68] In addition, Turkish scholarship emphasized CIA intrigue in elections and internal security forces throughout the developing world and worried that Turkey might succumb to some form of covert American machination.[69] More Turks came to see NATO, American military aid, and even Peace Corps volunteers as none-too-subtle forms of imperialism.[70] One academic observer noted that 'the American presence had become too obvious in Turkey'.[71]

Doğan Avcıoğlu, editor of *Yön*, an influential publication for leftist intellectuals, particularly attacked American involvement in Turkish education. Like Aybar, Avcıoğlu argued that American foreign aid abridged Turkey's sovereignty in a number of ways. He abhorred projects that provided an American education to thousands of Turkish young people and wrote that Turks, not Americans had to be the ones to reform and expand their schools and universities.[72] A 1963–64 American survey suggests that many Turkish students agreed with him. Fewer than half of those surveyed believed that foreign aid 'has improved the standard of living of the Turkish people as a whole', and only two percent favored Turkey receiving American assistance for either education or technical development.[73] Finally, as with other student movements around the world, American involvement in Vietnam made the United States a popular target of student protest.[74]

It is ironic that the trajectory of US–Turkish relations fostered resentment against American education advisors who went to Turkey to help rectify conditions in higher education that inspired student protests in the first place. Joseph Szyliowicz, an expert on Middle East development, noted that many student demonstrations had 'roots that were non-ideological', but rather grew out of demands for better educational opportunities.[75] The annual number of Turkish high school graduates tripled between 1945 and 1960. To accommodate rising expectations, the government expanded universities but did so at a rate that far outpaced financial resources and economic development. The results were crowded campuses, a shortage of professors, outdated courses, little financial support for students, and insufficient professional opportunities for graduates.[76] Moreover, Turkish civil society became more liberalized during the 1960s, which gave students increased opportunities to voice their displeasure.[77] The Nebraska advisors worked hard to alleviate problems of Turkish higher education. They developed courses that were more applicable to Turkey's needs, assisted in developing a proper library, and helped establish research and extension services that would enhance employment opportunities for graduates. Furthermore, AID provided financial support for the building of adequate classrooms, laboratories, and living quarters. Yet, in the hyper-politicized atmosphere of the late 1960s, it was easy for student criticism of Turkish universities to morph into diatribes against the great power that Turkish students argued had too much influence in the country. 'The universities had become so politicized', Szyliowicz concludes, 'that placards demanding an end to American imperialism began to appear.'[78]

Don Hanway, who headed the Nebraska team in Erzurum between the summers of 1965 and 1967, judged the rise of anti-Americanism at Atatürk University to be an unfair representation of his colleagues' work. He complained about Turks who shifted the blame for problems at Atatürk University onto the Americans as a way of avoiding accountability. Duane Lowenstein, who replaced Hanway, acknowledged that Turkish students and professors sometimes failed to recognize good qualities in the American advisors. But he also sensed that Hanway's 'way of working with the Turks was not acceptable – a traditional US way of telling and not listening enough'.[79]

Lowenstein appreciated the fine and sometimes shifting line that American advisors had to walk in Turkey. They were not just technical experts but also academic ambassadors who were trying to sell an American approach to development. They could not simply dictate to their Turkish colleagues. Atatürk University would never be the institution

that the Nebraska advisors would have built in the United States, but it could be a productive university if they maintained a healthy and cooperative relationship with their Turkish counterparts. Being effective academic ambassadors also required the Americans to realize that they became the public face of the United States to the Turks with whom they worked. They would be judged on their own merits but also on developments in US–Turkish relations that were beyond their control.

Conclusion

The University of Nebraska advisors took a mixed view of their accomplishments when the project ended in the summer of 1968.[80] On the one hand, they had helped build an entirely new and much-needed university in Erzurum. Jason Webster, the project's long-time coordinator on the Nebraska campus, noted in 1967 that the university had begun 'attacking some of the economic problems of eastern Turkey'.[81] The Nebraska advisors had been less successful, however, in promoting other areas of land-grant education. The extension service at Atatürk University was still on shaky ground when the Nebraska advisors left, and they had not yet provided a firm base for home economics, which was still a new science in Turkey.[82]

It is interesting to note that subsequent to the University of Nebraska advisors leaving Turkey, Atatürk University began to function much more like contemporary land-grant universities in the United States. No longer primarily agricultural colleges, most American land-grants are now comprehensive research universities with recognized specializations in a broad range of fields. From its humble origins of just over a hundred students attending classes in a rented secondary school building, Atatürk University has likewise become a thriving research institution of more than 40,000 students and 17 faculties with research institutes and graduate programs in many fields of study.[83]

The collaboration between Atatürk University and the University of Nebraska illustrates the limits of American technical assistance in the developing world. Practices that worked well in a society with an established history of pragmatic education did not necessarily translate into a country of very different traditions. Technical assistance was never a purely technical matter, and host nations were hardly passive recipients of American knowledge. Rather, education assistance was a cooperative venture, and Turks ultimately decided how to incorporate American concepts. The project also demonstrates that changes within the international Cold War environment significantly affected technical

assistance. Turks rejected American assistance if it appeared to make Turkey a pawn in American foreign policy. The evolving Cold War landscape accelerated the sentiment during the 1960s.

Notes

1. W. Adams and J.A. Garraty (1960) *Is the World Our Campus?* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press), p. 20.
2. On the history of land-grant education and its impact on development in the United States, see H.S. Brunner (1962) *Land Grant Colleges and Universities, 1862–1962* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office); and W.D. Rasmussen (1989) *Taking the University to the People: Seventy-Five Years of Cooperative Extension* (Ames: Iowa State University Press).
3. The term 'Point Four' refers to the fourth foreign policy point of President Harry Truman's 1949 inaugural address in which he declared, 'I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life.' Dennis Merrill (ed.) (1995) *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency, Volume 27, The Point Four Program: Reaching Out to Help the Less Developed Countries* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America), pp. 1–5.
4. Point Four officials selected the University of Nebraska in part because of its distinguished record in agricultural teaching and research and in part because soil and climate conditions in Nebraska resembled those in eastern Turkey. The initial contract lasted from March 1955 until March 1958. It was extended in 1958 and again in 1965. M. Baker Press Release prepared for the Annual Edition of the *Omaha Daily Journal – Stockman*, December 1955, box 17, Turkish Program Coordinator Records (TPCR), Archives and Special Collections, University of Nebraska – Lincoln Libraries, Lincoln (hereafter Nebraska); University of Nebraska (1968) *Nebraska in Turkey: Turkish University Program Final Report, 1955–1968* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska), p. vii.
5. L. Fenske (1983) *Eight Years in Turkey* (Bemidji, MN: Richards), pp. 50–2.
6. G. Harris (1972) *Troubled Alliance: Turkish–American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute and Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution), pp. 31–2.
7. W.H. Nichols (1955) 'Investment in Agriculture in Underdeveloped Countries', *The American Economic Review*, pp. 45, 59–60.
8. 'Monthly Food and Agriculture Report, ECA Special Mission to Turkey', May 1950, box 4, entry 1399, Records of American Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948–61 (USFAA), National Archives II (NAII), College Park, MD; Fuad Köprülü, Turkish Foreign Minister, to Russell H. Dorr, Chief of ECA Special Mission to Turkey, 16 June 1951, folder Architectural Project, box 22, entry 1399, USFAA, NAII.
9. Nichols, 'Investment in Agriculture', pp. 64, 71.
10. D.J. Simpson (1965) 'Development as a Process: The Menderes Phase in Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, 19, pp. 149–50.
11. O. Okyar (1968) 'Universities in Turkey', *Minerva*, 6, p. 216.
12. M.D. Rivkin (1965) *Area Development for National Growth: The Turkish Precedent* (New York: Praeger), pp. 80–2.

13. 'Technical Agricultural Organization in Turkey', 1952, box 4, entry 1399, USFAA, NAII.
14. B. Lewis (1969) *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd edn (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 478.
15. Hugh Richwine to Luther Brannon, 23 February 1951, box 4, entry 1399, USFAA, NAII; Hugh Richwine to Ismail Şener, 18 September 1950, box 4, entry 1399, USFAA, NAII.
16. Ö.C. Sarc (1966) 'Higher Education in Turkey', in idem, *Education as a Factor in Accelerated Economic Development* (Istanbul: Economic and Social Studies Conference Board), pp. 101–18; J. Szyliowicz (1973) *Education and Modernization in the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), pp. 338–40, 365–75.
17. A.M. Kazamias (1966) *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (University of Chicago Press), pp. 165–77, 274–5.
18. W.V. Lambert et al., 'Report of the University of Nebraska Delegation to Turkey on the Establishment of Atatürk University', 1 November 1954, pp. 3–4.
19. M. Baker interviewed by George Round, 1 October 1973, box 10, George Round Oral History Collection (GROHC), Nebraska.
20. Okyar, 'Universities in Turkey', p. 216. An English translation of the law that placed Atatürk University under the Ministry of Education (University Law 6990) appears in 'Quarterly Report of University of Nebraska – International Cooperation Administration Omnibus Contract Turkish Program', 30 September 1957, pp. 61–3.
21. 'Meeting of the University of Nebraska Turkish Committee', 9 September 1957, box 17, TPCR, Nebraska.
22. D.G. Hanway report, *Nebraska in Turkey: Semiannual Report of University of Nebraska–International Cooperation Administration Turkish University Program* (hereafter *NSR*), 31 December 1965, p. 9.
23. 'Meeting of the University of Nebraska Turkish Committee', 7 September 1957, box 17, TPCR, Nebraska.
24. 'Atatürk University Development Committee Meeting', 15 October 1957, box 17, TPCR, Nebraska; Baker, Report, *NSR*, 30 September 1961, p. 55; Report on the Review of Project no. 277-AI-11-AF, Advanced Agricultural Training Nebraska University (hereafter RRAAT/NU), 2 May 1963 and 19 July 1965, box 1, TPCR, Nebraska; and D. Hanway, *End of Tour Report*, *NSR,* 30 June 1967, pp. 50–2.
25. D. Hanway to V. Totter, 25 March 1966, box 17, TPCR, Nebraska.
26. A. Öncü (1993) 'Academics: The West in the Discourse of University Reform', in M. Heper, A. Öncü, and H. Kramer (eds), *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities* (New York: I.B. Tauris), pp. 164–5.
27. University of Nebraska, *Nebraska in Turkey*, pp. 1–6; Fenske, *Eight Years in Turkey*, p. 51.
28. RRAAT/NU, 2 May 1963 and 19 July 1965, TPCR, Nebraska.
29. A.C. Breckenridge report, 'Progress Report of University of Nebraska–ICA Contract Program with Turkey' (hereafter 'Progress Report'), 30 September 1957, p. 6; Otto Hoiberg report, 'Progress Report', 30 September 1957, p. 9.
30. On Özel's professional background, see Summary, *NSR*, 31 March 1958, pp. 2, 11; and M. Baker report, *NSR*, 31 March 1961, p. 16; on Özel's

performance as Minister of Education, see the transcript of 'Meeting of University of Nebraska Turkish Committee', 12 December 1957, box 17, TPCR, Nebraska.
31. O. Hoiberg report, see *NSR*, 30 September 1958, p. 10.
32. T.H. Gooding final report, in 'Progress Report', 30 September 1957, p. 51; H. Gould, 'University of Nebraska–ICA Contract Review and Summary', *NSR*, 31 March 1959, p. 3; and Otto Hoiberg, excerpts from report, *NSR*, 31 March 1959, p. 16.
33. M. Baker report, *NSR*, 31 March 1961, p. 17, and Marvel Baker report, *NSR*, 30 September 1961, p. 37.
34. M. Baker report, *NSR*, 30 September 1961, p. 53.
35. RRAAT/NU, 31 October 1963, box 1, TPCR, Nebraska.
36. 'Technical Assistance Project History and Analysis Report: Advanced Agricultural Training', 18 October 1968, box 21, entry 183 Turkey Subjects 1962–72, Records of the United States Agency for International Development (AID), NAII.
37. RRAAT/NU, 2 May 1963, TPCR, Nebraska.
38. Fenske, *Eight Years in Turkey*, p. 12.
39. RRAAT/NU, 31 October 1963, TPCR, Nebraska.
40. J. Webster, F. Eldridge, and E.F. Frolik, 'Inspection Report on University of Nebraska Program in Turkey', 20 June–13 July, 1962, in *NSR*, 30 September 1962, p. 12.
41. Fenske, *Eight Years in Turkey*, p. 42.
42. 'Special Report: Advanced Agricultural Training, 277-11-110-211, University of Nebraska', (hereafter 'Special Report') 30 October 1964, p. 5, TPCR, Nebraska.
43. RRAAT/NU, 31 October 1963, TPCR, Nebraska.
44. Harold Allen to Jason Webster, 2 February 1963, folder 13, box 49, TPCR, Nebraska.
45. RRAAT/NU, 23 October 1964, box 1, TPCR, Nebraska.
46. On the 1964 crisis in Cyprus and its impact on US–Turkish relations, see I. Giritli (1969) 'Turkey since the 1965 Elections', *The Middle East Journal*, 23, pp. 355–6; W. Hale (2002) *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000* (London: Frank Cass), pp. 148–50; Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 114–16; N. Uslu (2003) *The Turkish–American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance* (New York: Nova Science), pp. 163–75; and F.A. Váli (1971) *Bridge across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). Uslu includes the text of President Johnson's letter of 5 June 1964 as an appendix, pp. 320–2.
47. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 129.
48. G. Harris (1975) 'Turkey and the United States', in K. Karpat (ed.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1974* (Leiden: Brill), p. 56.
49. RRAAT/NU, 23 October 1964, TPCR, Nebraska.
50. 'Special Report', 30 October 1964, p. 9, TPCR, Nebraska.
51. M. Köksal, 'Opening Speech for the Academic Year, 1964–1965', box 1, TPCR, Nebraska.
52. 'Special Report', 30 October 1964, TPCR, Nebraska.
53. RRAAT/NU, 19 July 1965, TPCR, Nebraska.

54. D. Lowenstein report prepared for Wayne Collings, 24 August 1967, *NSR*, 31 December 1967, p. 15; see also Fenske, *Eight Years in Turkey*, p. 43.
55. Don Hanway report, *NSR*, 31 December 1965, p. 4.
56. 'Technical Assistance Project History and Analysis Report: Advanced Agricultural Training', 18 October 1968, box 21, entry 183, AID, NAII.
57. Don Hanway to A.C. Breckenridge, 20 May 1967, folder 5, box 50, TPCR, Nebraska.
58. Elvin Frolik and Jason Webster, 'Report of Inspection Trip, October–November 1966', box 14, TPCR, Nebraska; Hanway to Breckenridge, 20 May 1967, TPCR, Nebraska.
59. Fenske, *Eight Years in Turkey*, p. 49.
60. One Nebraska advisor estimated that roughly 40 percent of Atatürk University students came from west of Ankara during the first decade; see Don Hanway, *End of Tour Report*, *NSR*, 30 June 1967, p. 57.
61. RRAAT/NU, 31 October 1963, TPCR, Nebraska.
62. Webster et al., 'Inspection Report', p. 11; see also M. Baker report, *NSR*, 30 September 1962, p. 14.
63. Fenske, *Eight Years in Turkey*, pp. 49–51; RRAAT/NU, 31 October 1963, TPCR, Nebraska.
64. Duane Lowenstein to Marvin Cernik, AID/Ankara, 29 December 1967, folder 1, box 52, TPCR, Nebraska.
65. Lowestein to Jason Webster, 24 June 1967 and 25 July 1967, folder 2, box 52, TPCR, Nebraska; Lowenstein to Clyde (no last name), 25 June 1967, folder 2, box 52, TPCR, Nebraska.
66. G. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 139–40; Uslu, *The Turkish–American*, pp. 33–4; and 'Consultant's Visit to Faculty of Architecture, METU', 10 February 1969, box 2, entry 235, AID, NAII. Turkish students particularly disliked Komer's association with the unpopular rural pacification program in South Vietnam.
67. R. Lawson (1967) 'New Regime in Turkey', *Current History*, 52, pp. 107–8.
68. First quotation: K.H. Karpat (1967) 'Socialism and the Labor Party of Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, 21, p. 168; second quotation: Aybar quoted in Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 136.
69. N. Üstün (1967) *Türkiye'deki America* (*America in Turkey*) (Istanbul: Yaylacık), pp. 49–54.
70. M. Özbalkan (1970) *Gizli Belgelerle Barış Gönüllüleri* (*Secret Documents of the Peace Corps*) (Istanbul: Ant).
71. Giritli, 'Turkey since the 1965 Election', 356.
72. D. Avcıoğlu (1998) *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın* (*Turkey's Situation: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*), vol. 2 (Istanbul: Tekin), pp. 556–62. See also J. Landau (1974) *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden: Brill), pp. 80–2.
73. 'Complete Tabular Presentation of Turkish Students Survey Marginals and Open Ends Only', 10 January 1966, box 100, entry 1015, Country Project Files, 1951–64, Turkey, Records of the United States Information Agency (USIA), NAII. See questions 23–5.
74. F. Ahmad (1993) *The Making of Modern Turkey* (New York and London: Routledge), pp. 142–5; Landau, *Radical Politics*, p. 33.
75. J. Szyliowicz (1989) 'Turkey', in P.G. Altbach (ed.), *Student Political Activism: An International Reference Handbook* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press), p. 203.

76. J. Szyliowicz (1972) 'A Political Analysis of Student Activism: The Turkish Case', in Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr (eds), *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics*, vol. 3.3 (Beverly Hills: Sage), pp. 43–7.
77. K.H. Karpat (1972) 'Political Developments in Turkey, 1950–1970', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 8, p. 35; L.L. Roos, Jr, N.P. Roos, and G.R. Fields (1968) 'Students and Politics in Turkey', *Daedalus*, 97, pp. 189–93.
78. Szyliowicz, 'Turkey', p. 203.
79. Duane Lowenstein to Jason Webster, 24 June 1967, TPCR, Nebraska.
80. University of Nebraska, *Nebraska in Turkey*, pp. 2–4, 15–16.
81. Jason Webster, Coordinator's Comments, *NSR*, 31 December 1967, p. xv.
82. Baker, Interview, GROHC, Nebraska.
83. Atatürk University, 'History of Atatürk University', available at www.atauni.edu.tr/eng_ver (accessed 28 April 2008).

Select Bibliography

Adams, W., and J.A. Garraty (1960) *Is The World Our Campus?* East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

Avcıoğlu, D. (1998) *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, vol. 2. Istanbul: Tekin.

Fenske, L. (1983) *Eight Years in Turkey*. Bemidji, MN: Richards.

Garlitz, R. (2008) 'Academic Ambassadors in the Middle East: The University Contract Program in Turkey and Iran, 1950–1970'. PhD thesis, Ohio University.

Giritli, I. (1969) 'Turkey since the 1965 Election', *Middle East Journal*, 23, Summer, pp. 351–63.

Harris, G. (1972) *Troubled Alliance: Turkish–American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute and Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution.

——(1975) 'Turkey and the United States', in Kemal Karpat (ed.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1974*. Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, pp. 51–72.

Karpat, K.H. (1967) 'Socialism and the Labor Party of Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, Spring, 21, pp. 157–72.

Kazamias, A.M. (1966) *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey*. University of Chicago Press.

Landau, J. (1974) *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*. Lieden: Brill.

Lawson, R. (1967) 'New Regime in Turkey', *Current History*, 52, January, pp. 105–10.

Öncü, A. (1993) 'Academics: The West in the Discourse of University Reform', in M. Heper, A. Öncü, and H. Kamer (eds), *Turkey and The West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*. New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 145–70.

Özbalkan M. (1970) *Gizli Belgelerle Barış Gönüllüleri*. Istanbul: Ant.

Roos, L.L., N.P. Roos, and G.R. Fields (1968) 'Students and Politics in Turkey', *Daedalus*, 97, pp. 184–203.

Sarc, Ö.C. (1966) 'Higher Education in Turkey', in idem, *Education as a Factor in Accelerated Economic Development*. Istanbul: Economic and Social Studies Conference Board, pp. 101–18.

Simpson, D.J. (1965) 'Development as a Process: The Menderes Phase in Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, 19, Spring, pp. 141–52.

Szyliowicz, J. (1972) 'A Political Analysis of Student Activism: The Turkish Case', in Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr (eds), *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics*, vol. 3.3. Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 5–75.

——(1973) *Education and Modernization in the Middle East*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

——(1989) 'Turkey', in P.G. Altbach (ed.) *Student Political Activism: An International Reference Handbook*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, pp. 197–205.

Uslu, N. (2003) *The Turkish–American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*. New York: Nova Science.

Üstün, N. (1967) *Türkiye'deki America*. Istanbul: Yaylacık.

9

Negotiating an Institutional Framework for Turkey's Marshall Plan: The Conditions and Limits of Power Inequalities

Burçak Keskin-Kozat

One contribution of the 'cultural turn' in Cold War scholarship has been to rethink the limits and conditions of agency attributed to societies, nation-states, and social groups. Scholars writing from this perspective have challenged the static story of the Cold War between two power blocs defined by rigid binaries such as strong/weak, big/small, dominant/subordinated. Arguing for a context-dependent analysis of power asymmetries, they have unraveled many randomly told stories of the Cold War in the peripheries as well as in the center.[1]

The cultural turn in the Turkish case has proved relatively difficult, particularly because of the limited access to Turkish official archives and also the Turkish state's strict control over information about bilateral relations.[2] This essay aims to overcome such epistemological obstacles and present a more critical analysis of Turkish–US relations by focusing on the case of the Marshall Plan (1948–52). Acknowledging the power discrepancies underlying the donor–recipient relationship, I propose to explore the limits of control and the possibilities of resistance on the part of American and Turkish officials involved in the development and administration of the Marshall Plan projects.

Most analyses of Turkey's Marshall Plan portray American officials as a homogeneous group of individuals who undertook US aid projects either to benevolently assist Turkish modernization or to further US expansionism in the Middle East. Most scholars assume that Americans dictated the terms of the modernization projects as a result of the US preponderance of power or insofar as Turkish patronage politics allowed.[3] In contesting this prevalent assumption, I specifically explore how the historical dynamics of US overseas expansionism intersected with the geopolitical priorities of the US administration to generate deep

conflicts among US officials during the early Cold War. As such divergences of opinion interacted with contemporaneous Turkish diplomatic strategies, power asymmetries were bent and twisted, creating limited realms of resistance and control on the part of Turkish officials.[4]

In advancing these arguments, I first illustrate that although officials of the US State Department and the Marshall Plan authority (ECA) viewed Turkey's modernization as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, they diverged on the ways in which Turkey should be modernized. I then turn to the short history and organizational features of the Turkish State Ministry responsible for the implementation of the Marshall Plan projects, and specifically discuss the ways in which divergent perspectives of modernization held by US officials played into the hand of the Turkish governments.

The Marshall Plan (1948–52): A Brief Historical Overview

The Marshall Plan was one of the US foreign assistance programs launched after the Second World War. It provided $13 billion worth of US assistance over the course of four years to sixteen Western European nations so that they could achieve financial stability, contain domestic communist activities, and move away from the Soviet Union's political influence.[5] The assistance projects were administered by the European Cooperation Agency (ECA), which acted as a liaison between the US and European administrations in undertaking various modernization projects in the recipient nations.

For the ECA, Turkey differed from other Marshall Plan recipients because of its 'semi-Oriental' features. In fact, ECA staff occasionally refused to implement certain projects in Turkey, asserting that the country lacked the necessary infrastructure that would ensure the success of these projects with other European recipients.[6] Most US policy-makers also believed that it would require more than the Marshall Plan to achieve sustainable economic growth in Turkey. However, the financial costs of assisting Turkish economic modernization were considered less than the political gains of containing communist regimes in the Near East. The Soviet Union made territorial demands over the Turkish Straits and northeast Anatolia in 1946, and Moscow Radio jammed the Turkish airwaves to broadcast the official Soviet line.[7] Isolating Turkey from European reconstruction would have therefore been detrimental to both the US and Turkey's oil-rich neighbors. In the end, the US administration granted Turkey $349.02 million from the Marshall Plan. These funds were used to finance the construction of roads, agricultural

mechanization, and various training projects on economic productivity and industrial management.[8]

The Marshall Plan projects were interpreted on the receiving end through historical as well as contemporaneous power struggles. Some European elites perceived US assistance as a crucial chance to emulate modern production and management techniques, while others questioned the appropriateness of American methods to the unique conditions of their society. Still others denounced the assistance as a form of imperialism. Recipient governments typically utilized such differences both to manipulate the terms of American assistance and to bring about a transformation without challenging the fundamental values of their society.[9] The degree to which the European government could outmaneuver the ECA directives nonetheless depended on their relative strength vis-à-vis the US administration. Holding greater political leverage, the 'big recipients' (namely, Britain, France, and Italy) were able to divert American assistance to particular issues of which the ECA did not fully approve.[10] Interestingly, there are few works that examine the Marshall Plan from the perspective of the 'small recipients'; among them, even fewer reflexively problematize the limits of the ECA's influence on the process of economic modernization in the recipient societies. Starting off from this 'glaring lacuna in the bibliography of works on the Marshall Plan',[11] I examine in this essay how the divergences among US officials played into the hands of Turkish governments in manipulating the ECA's modernization efforts in Turkey. Before engaging this question, however, one needs to dwell on how and why US officials diverged on the proper way to modernize the Turkish economy. This requires a brief discussion of the historical trajectory and features of US activities abroad.

US Overseas Expansionism and a Brief Genealogy of Institutional Divergences

During the nineteenth century, US policy-makers chose to take a quite auxiliary role in the territories that came under US influence and extensively supported North American missionaries and investors to promote 'the American dream' on their behalf.[12] This collaboration intensified particularly during the mid-nineteenth century when US policy-makers appointed certain North American businessmen to key administrative positions at the recently acquired overseas bases and also endorsed an 'Open Door Policy' in China and 'Dollar Diplomacy' in Latin America.[13]

The twentieth century brought a significant transformation in this collaboration, primarily through the increasing preference of host

governments for employing North American economic experts who were not formally affiliated with the US state. Unlike the financial advisers imposed upon by North American investors or appointed by the US State Department, these politically 'detached' and 'disinterested' experts were expected to help host governments obtain greater US funding while effectively thwarting local, anti-imperialist opposition both against the host governments' policies and against the US impositions.[14] The pervasive effect of the Great Depression on US business was equally significant in the professionalization of US overseas expansionism. While the US administration directly intervened to regulate and coordinate the hard-struck American economic enterprises at home and abroad, it chose to put the potential recipient governments in contact with independent technical experts and approved the international loan requests on the basis of the reports these experts prepared.

Such indirect involvement in Third World modernization became central to US foreign assistance programs during the Cold War, particularly to the Marshall Plan. Even though its activities directly concerned US foreign affairs, the ECA was established outside the institutional structure of the State Department, the ultimate agency that handled the country's international relations. The Chief ECA Administrator was recommended but not required to consult the Secretary of State about particular Marshall Plan issues, and any disagreements between the ECA and the State Department were to be handled and resolved by the US President.[15] Moreover, the ECA's offices were located outside the State Department in Washington, DC as well as outside the US embassies in recipient countries. Last but not least, the ECA had financial autonomy in that its organizational budget came from the Marshall Plan counterpart funds provided by recipient governments.

In addition to the broader trend of professionalization, the ECA's autonomous standing stemmed from the experience of the US with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) that provided humanitarian assistance to Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. When the UNRRA did not render its promised objectives, the US State Department, having coordinated US participation in the program, came under severe public criticism. In fact, during congressional discussion of the Marshall Plan, many congressional members openly objected to the State Department's direct involvement in the Marshall Plan and argued instead for the establishment of an autonomous agency with a 'business mentality'.[16]

Although the ECA had legal autonomy, it ultimately followed the line of policy deemed appropriate by the US State Department. Its conceding

stance partly stemmed from the fact that most of its operational posts were occupied by individuals who were previously employed in either diplomatic or public service, and were thereby more receptive to the Marshall Plan's strategic objectives.[17] Another influential factor was the congressional source of funding for the ECA's reconstruction efforts. Congressional deliberations on the Marshall Plan focused mostly on the possible political consequences of the Marshall Plan for the United States as well as for recipient governments. While proponents of the Marshall Plan presented it as an essential effort to prevent the spread of communism and Soviet influence in Europe, its opponents vilified it as an attempt to take over Great Britain's colonial responsibilities in the Middle East with particular respect to the region's oil fields.[18]

Both the US State Department and ECA staff argued for the exigency of containing the imminent political influence of the Soviet Union in Europe and the Near East. Yet, they diverged on the relative importance of this political objective in the actual administration of particular modernization projects. Such tensions largely stemmed from the dynamics of US overseas expansionism discussed above, which on the one hand designated the US State Department as the primary authority in the country's foreign affairs and on the other hand promoted a politically detached institutionalization of US modernization activities abroad. The ensuing tensions were quite palpable in the case of Turkey's Marshall Plan: whereas the ECA Mission argued to evaluate Turkish modernization proposals on the basis of their technical merit and economic exigency, US State Department officials frequently intervened against the ECA's decisions in order to secure the Turkish government's further support for US foreign policy objectives in the region.

Political versus Technical: Tensions between the US State Department and the ECA

> The [US] administration w[ill] assist [Turkey] in preserving its independence and maintaining its present role [… as a] bulwark against Soviet expansion in the region.
>
> – US State Department, 1949 Policy on Turkey[19]

> The ECA has not come to Turkey, as generally alleged, for strategic reasons but because this country is in a position to play an integral part in the European recovery.
>
> – Russell H. Dorr, ECA Mission Chief in Turkey[20]

ECA personnel in Turkey argued that modernization could be accomplished through the full cooperation of Turkish and American staff as well as a sound evaluation of the possible benefits and costs of modernization projects. In the words of Russell H. Dorr, chief of the ECA Mission in Turkey, 'the [Turkish government] should indicate its point of view directly [to the ECA] so that the points in question could be fully discussed in light of the economic value of each case'. The 'economic value' of a project could, for him, be determined through a thorough evaluation of its infrastructural requirements, social necessity, and suitability to Turkish conditions. If Turkish governments, Dorr continued, decided on ECA projects on other grounds, they would turn the modernization efforts into an endless 'banker's transaction' or a 'trade' that would jeopardize his staff's 'duty and belief [... that they are to] be of real assistance to Turkey'.[21]

Under Dorr's leadership, the ECA Mission approached Turkey's modernization as a technical process that should be as much as possible kept separate from everyday political calculations. Even though some Turkish bureaucrats also shared this position, neither they nor ECA personnel had much power to hold their ground amidst Turkey's ongoing transition from one-party rule to multiparty politics. Political pressures on them particularly intensified on the eve of the 1950 Turkish national elections. In the midst of electoral campaigns, Hüseyin Kunter, an official from Turkey's International Economic Cooperation Organization (IECO), confided to Dorr that the competition between the incumbent government and the opposition was 'holding back certain economical and justifiable projects'. Dorr responded that one could not 'completely ignore' political considerations but instead should try to overcome political impediments by 'slow[ing] down certain projects and ... accelerat[ing] others'.[22]

Despite his acquiescence on such constraints, Dorr was quite resistant to privileging political priorities over technical ones. In fact, a week before his meeting with Kunter, Dorr bluntly refused the Turkish State Minister Cemil Said Barlas's request to 'give the Turkish public some glad tidings' by increasing the allocated ECA funding. Stressing that 'enough money was allocated to the existent projects', Dorr argued that 'it was [the Turkish government's] fault' if it still needed more funds for its modernization endeavors. In the same meeting, Dorr also reacted strongly to the Turkish minister's insinuation that the government might transfer the funds allocated for coal-mine projects to agricultural industries in order to increase its popularity among Turkish farmers before the upcoming elections. Rejecting the minister's suggestion, Dorr

asserted that such unilateral decisions would greatly undermine the overall progress of US modernization efforts in Turkey and demanded that the Turkish government be 'serious' about its expectations and demands.[23]

Nevertheless, ECA staff most of the time had to yield to the Turkish government's politically inclined requests about various modernization projects.[24] Their vulnerability vis-à-vis Turkish officialdom stemmed partly from the inadequate support they received from the US State Department. For instance, when Dorr complained to the US Ambassador in Ankara that the Turkish government disregarded the importance of anti-inflationary policies in achieving sustainable modernization, he was told not to be 'too strict with a country which [was] after all still Near Eastern in outlook and capabilities'. Dorr was further exasperated by 'the common gossip' in Ankara that he had 'a very strict attitude with the Turkish government while the Ambassador [was] endeavoring to secure them all that they ask[ed] for'.[25]

The US Ambassador's approach to Turkish governments largely reflected the US State Department's vision of global politics and Turkey's role in them. Toward the end of the Second World War, the Department was preoccupied with the escalating rapprochement between the Soviet Union and communist parties in the Near East and Eastern Europe. After the war, ongoing civil strife in Greece between the center-right and their left-wing contenders was accompanied by the separatist activities of the Tudeh party in Iran. US foreign policy-makers interpreted these developments as the beginnings of an ideological bloc formed under Soviet leadership and suspected that it would expand across the world through armed conflict. In subsequent US foreign policy formulations, Turkey held importance because of its geopolitical position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Reflecting on Soviet demands over the Turkish Straits, Loy W. Henderson, the Director of the Near Eastern Affairs Desk, wrote in 1946 that

> Turkey constitutes the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. A Russian dominated Turkey would open the floodgates for a Soviet advance in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula. … It would also dangerously, perhaps fatally, expose Greece and Iran [… to the influence of] Soviet Russia and its agents. … Such a development would … considerably weaken … the comprehensive security situation of the United States.[26]

As US State department staff intended to secure Turkish support for US foreign policy interests in the region, they accepted most Turkish modernization requests without conducting a thorough technical assessment of their substance and consequences. For instance, on the eve of the 1948 Marshall Plan allocations, Turkish officials were greatly dissatisfied with the designation of Turkey as a 'cash country' that could directly purchase materials from the United States but would not be eligible for the low-interest credits provided under US assistance. Claiming that Turkey had high defense expenditures and insufficient gold reserves, Turkish officials urged their American colleagues to reconsider the terms of Turkey's participation in the Marshall Plan. Mainstream Turkish journalists, too, voiced discontent on the issue, emphasizing that Turkey's expected share in the allocations was too small in comparison to that of other Marshall Plan recipients, which, they claimed, did not face as much direct threat from the Soviet Union.

Reporting on the issue, Edwin C. Wilson, the US Ambassador in Turkey, recommended that the State Department arrange some 'token credits' for the country. He emphasized the significance of assisting Turkish modernization for the continuation of broader US interests in the region, stating that

> Not only [the Turkish government] but [also …] the opposition, … even the man in the street, … cannot overcome the feeling or apprehension that Turkey has been somehow overlooked or 'left out' in connection with American thinking on recovery plans for Europe. The conception that … Turkey can make a contribution to [the Marshall Plan] by paying cash for needed equipment simply leaves Turks incredulous. … The whole question has become of such extreme *political* importance here that … it will be necessary for the [US], because of [its] *overall relations with Turkey*, to arrange to grant a small amount of credits, fully reimbursable, to assist Turkey in acquiring some of the equipment needed.[27]

Upon further deliberations, the US State Department recommended that the US Congress change Turkey's status in the Marshall Plan and extend the country a $10 million 'token credit'. In the following years, even though the country's economic situation remained largely the same in comparison to other recipients, the Marshall Plan credits and grants to Turkey increased considerably.[28] ECA staff vehemently objected to the State Department's politically motivated decisions, arguing that they turned the Marshall Plan into 'a sort of a *political* loan or bribe' in the

eyes of the Turkish government.[29] Nevertheless, their discontent did not find much support from the US administration whose approach to the Marshall Plan was shaped by Turkish reactions as much as by the US State Department's expectations about the Cold War.

Conflicting Perspectives: The Case of the Turkish State Ministry

When Dorr first met with the Turkish Prime Minister Hasan Saka in November 1948, he requested that the Turkish government establish a State Ministry that would formulate modernization projects for ECA funding and also establish coordination among the relevant Turkish ministries and Turkey's ECA delegations in Paris and in Washington DC.[30] The Turkish prime minister showed great interest in Dorr's proposal, but the Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadık Sadak shortly informed Dorr that the Turkish government would be 'unable, because of [the] scarcity of appropriate personnel, to establish a ministry to handle [Marshall Plan] matters'. Instead, the government could, the Minister stated, appoint 'a director … who would report directly to the Foreign Ministry and who would have a staff under him composed of individuals … who were familiar with the various projects for which ECA financing was desired by Turkey'. After a lengthy discussion, Dorr was able to convince the Turkish Foreign Minister to have the Turkish government reconsider his proposal. Eventually on 16 January 1949, the Mehmet Şemsettin Günaltay government established a State Ministry and appointed Nurullah Esat Sümer as the State Minister to coordinate all foreign, including US, assistance programs in Turkey.[31]

The State Ministry was akin to a 'ministry without portfolio' in that the incumbent did not head a ministry with full-time staff but instead assisted the prime minister in supervising the work of public institutions established as part of the Turkish Prime Ministry. In the specific case of the Marshall Plan, the State Minister worked closely with the IECO personnel. IECO was founded 31 May 1949 under the Turkish Prime Ministry, but it was chaired by a Secretary General who was, throughout the Marshall Plan, a Turkish Foreign Ministry official.[32] According to an IECO employee, the organization's personnel were predominantly recruited from the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the international affairs bureau of the Turkish Ministry of Commerce and Trade.[33]

IECO meetings were usually held with a small group of officials at the Turkish Foreign Ministry after regular working hours and, more importantly, without the participation of the State Minister.[34] Moreover,

IECO staff decided on Marshall Plan projects in minimum consultation with other relevant Turkish ministries. Recalling his service as the Public Works Minister, Fahri Belen asserted that the IECO largely disregarded his ministry's recommendations about certain Marshall Plan projects and in fact commissioned them to the companies of which Belen himself disapproved.[35] Considering such institutional affiliations and practices of IECO staff, the organization can be seen as an informal extension of the Turkish foreign ministry, a form of institutionalization that served the Turkish government's intention rather than Dorr's initial proposal.

The ECA's request to establish a separate State Ministry with a full-time staff primarily aimed to place US modernization efforts on a technical, collaborative basis. This intention became more apparent on the eve of the Turkish national elections on 14 May 1950, when the ECA Mission informally discovered the government's plan to abolish the State Ministry and transfer all ECA work to the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Dorr immediately met with Nihat Erim, the Deputy Prime Minister, and asserted that the Foreign Minister might not have sufficient time to handle the Marshall Plan projects for he would need to travel abroad for his primary ministerial functions. Beneath Dorr's assertions was a desire to keep the Marshall Plan on a technical level. When he did not get any affirmative reassurance from Erim, Dorr reported to his superiors in Paris that the Turkish Foreign Ministry would turn the Marshall Plan into 'a political negotiation' and thereby inhibit its primary goals of 'economic recovery and development'.[36]

When the elections brought the opposition Democrat Party (DP) to power on 14 May 1950, Dorr succeeded in convincing the new government to appoint a State Minister responsible for ECA Affairs.[37] However, the good relations between the ECA and DP did not last too long. On 9 March 1951, less than a year after the appointment of Fevzi Lütfü Karaosmanoğlu as State Minister, the DP Prime Minister Adnan Menderes replaced him with Refik Şevket İnce, who, Dorr claimed, 'would not be allowed to carry out the coordination functions'. The shuffling in the Turkish cabinet meant, for the ECA Mission, that they would have to deal directly with IECO staff who approached the Marshall Plan on a 'trading basis'.[38] In fact, on 21 March 1951, ECA Mission staff were called upon to meet with the Turkish Foreign Minister instead of the State Minister.[39] The State Ministry was liquidated a week after this request, and the IECO was officially linked to the Foreign Ministry three months after the liquidation.[40]

The short-lived history of the State Ministry illustrates the two major contentions of this essay. First of all, the ECA Mission's reactions to

these institutional developments delineate its technical approach to modernization. The Turkish Foreign Ministry's control over the Marshall Plan would, ECA staff argued, endorse 'giving as little as possible in return for as much [funding] as possible'.[41] After the IECO was linked to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Dorr complained to the US Ambassador in Turkey that channeling ECA work through the IECO 'drastically reduce[d] the usefulness of trained *technical* personnel and prevented them from *working* easily and informally *with each other* in the development of programs, organizations, and methods for executing such programs'.[42]

ECA staff continuously pointed in their memoranda to the Turkish governments' blatant disregard for the technical requirements of ECA modernization projects. They were particularly concerned with IECO officials' constant requests for obtaining more US funding to balance the Turkish foreign trade deficit. ECA staff found such requests technically inept, because they believed that the Turkish budget deficit would disappear when all modernization projects were finalized.[43] After participating in a series of highly confrontational meetings with Turkish officials about the budget deficit, Dorr reported to Milton Katz, the ECA Special Representative in Europe, that the Turkish government aims to

> get completely out from under the *safeguards* which have hitherto governed the expenditure of ECA funds. The Prime Minister himself … is extremely impatient with the idea that ECA should concern itself in any way with the *financial policies of the government*. Government officials at secondary levels have repeatedly expressed to members of this Mission their *impatience* at being required to give *some accounting* of *what* the funds are to be used for or *why* they are needed. … My appraisal of the present situation is that the Turkish government is now making an all-out effort to have *economic* aid placed on a *political-military* basis.[44]

Second and equally importantly, the liquidation of the Turkish State Ministry clearly illustrates the conflicts between the ECA Mission and the US State Department as well as the latter's informal authority over US modernization efforts in Turkey. One of the most evident tensions between the ECA Mission and the US Embassy surfaced when the Republican People's Party (RPP) government wanted to liquidate the Turkish State Ministry on the eve of the 1950 elections. A week before the ECA Mission was notified about this plan, the Turkish Foreign Minister 'brought up' the notion in his meeting with US Ambassador

George Wadsworth, in a way 'flying … a trial balloon'. Although the ambassador did not encourage the Turkish minister, he did not oppose the idea 'in very strong terms' either.[45]

Dorr was disturbed that the ambassador's leniency strengthened the Turkish government's confidence to take unilateral decisions about the administration of the Marshall Plan and to thereby eschew the necessary technical collaboration with the ECA Mission. When he asked Milton Katz to personally confront the Turkish delegates in Paris and the US ambassador in Turkey about the issue, Phillip W. Bonsal, one of Katz's aides and a US career-diplomat, suggested to him not to intervene directly and to instead consult with the US State Department in dealing with the problem.[46] The eventual acceptance of this suggestion illustrated that, in the last instance, top-level ECA staff yielded to the US State Department's directives about the administration of the Marshall Plan projects. It also highlighted the fact that the ECA Mission in Turkey lacked support from both the central ECA administration and other US government agencies in dealing with the Turkish government's politically inclined perspective on modernization.

Tensions between the ECA Mission and the US Embassy in Turkey accelerated especially during the second half of the Marshall Plan. In 1951, Dorr reported to the ECA Special Representative in Europe that US Ambassador George C. McGhee sided with the Turkish government in increasing the amount of Turkey's Marshall Plan allocation to balance the Turkish budget deficit. In fact, the ambassador had promised the Turkish prime minister, in the absence of Dorr, an increase in US aid to Turkey. When Dorr later rejected such a possibility, the Turkish prime minister treated him in an extremely bitter manner, fueled by confidence from the ambassador's promises about financial assistance.[47]

Yet, mere disagreement between the ECA Mission and the US Embassy did not trouble Dorr as much as the fact that the Turkish elites knew about it. Knowledge of such disagreement, he argued, encouraged Turkish officials to believe that they could

> play off the greater influence of the Diplomatic Mission … to get out from under a method of operation in which [the Turkish government was] called upon to prove the economic usefulness of the aid rendered and [was] asked to undertake changes in internal policies as the price of such aid.

The Turkish government, Dorr argued, viewed US desire for Turkey's military alliance as 'so strong that they [could] afford to defy the

Economic Cooperation Administration, and [could] count upon the influence of other [US] government agencies to get them what they [wanted]'.[48]

Dorr requested from Milton Katz to have the US Secretary of State call the Turkish Ambassador in Washington DC, 'making [ECA's perspective] clear to him' and 'transmitting [a memorandum] of that conversation to the Ambassador' in Ankara. 'So long as the present variance of views exist[ed] and [was] known to Turks', he further contended, 'there [would] be little purpose in maintaining a[n ECA] mission [in Turkey] since its influence [would] be negligible.'[49] Nonetheless, Dorr's pleas fell on deaf ears. As Katz chose to follow Bonsal's rather than Dorr's suggestion, only two weeks after Dorr's memorandum seeking Katz's assistance, the Turkish government liquidated the Turkish State Ministry and transferred all Marshall Plan affairs to the Foreign Ministry.

After the Turkish Foreign Ministry gained formal control over Marshall Plan affairs, Dorr hesitantly sought Ambassador George McGhee's support in placing Turkey's modernization projects on a technical footing. He specifically requested that McGhee explain to the Turkish Foreign Minister how IECO staff were so overburdened with other foreign economic engagements that they could not pay 'prompt and adequate attention' to ECA projects. Yet, he was quite cynical on the question of the ambassador extending wholehearted support to the ECA Mission on this issue at the expense of jeopardizing the Turkish government's support for US foreign policy interests. His cynicism became apparent when Dorr told the ambassador that the existing nature of the ECA Mission's interactions with Turkish officials 'promote[d] a feeling of *frustration* among *Americans* who ha[d] come to Turkey with a *sincere desire to assist in the economic recovery of the country*'.[50] Questioning the sincerity of American personnel, such as the ambassador, who were content with the current configuration of the Marshall Plan administration, Dorr adamantly took issue with the Ambassador's political approach to Turkish modernization as well as with his inadequate support to the ECA Mission's technical vision.

Yet, toward the end of the Marshall Plan, Dorr and his staff came acquiescently to acknowledge the fact that among US foreign policy circles, their requests carried less weight than the US embassy's views. Hence, after reporting his disagreements with the US ambassador in detail, Dorr suggested to Milton Katz that 'if [the ECA did] not intend to maintain [its] policy [in Turkey]', he needed 'immediate instructions to that effect so that [the Mission could] get along with [its] job on the new basis'.[51]

Epilogue

This essay started off from one of the central assumptions of the cultural turn that societies, social groups, and organizations are not monolithic entities locked once and for all in fixed binary power discrepancies. Focusing on a landmark foreign assistance program, I sought to illustrate that different agencies of a donor society may operate with slightly divergent views and thereby only enable limited opportunities for the recipient groups to attempt to correct underlying inequalities. Specifically, as the ECA Mission and the US State Department approached Turkey's modernization through slightly different lenses, they simultaneously fostered a situational alliance between the Turkish governments and the US State Department. As a handful of select Turkish diplomats were designated to propose, discuss, and implement the Marshall Plan projects on behalf of the Turkish governments, the ECA Mission found itself in a game of endless diplomatic negotiations that favored political considerations over technocratic judgments. In the end, the general convergence of opinion among the US State Department and Turkish governments subordinated the ECA's technical approach to the overarching political visions of containment and defensive modernization. In this respect, geopolitical considerations provided the relatively less powerful Turkish governments ample opportunity to revise the Marshall Plan projects in line with their political agenda.

Many diplomatic historians of the Cold War have shown that US officials as well as North American entrepreneurs were divided on whether and how the United States should sponsor European economic modernization through foreign assistance.[52] In explaining such divergences, David J. Alvarez asserts that foreign policy is a partially 'cooperative' and 'often uncoordinated' process of interactions among officials 'that represent diverse perspectives and interests' based on 'personal and organizational biases, fears, and goals'.[53] Approaching Turkish and American diplomacy through this lens may help instigate the much-warranted cultural turn in analyses of Cold War Turkey and thereby demarcate the intricate negotiations of power inequalities as well as the limited possibilities of resistance and control on part of less powerful actors.

Notes

1. T. Smith (2000) 'New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, 24, no. 4, pp. 567–91; B. Wheelan

(2000) *Ireland and the Marshall Plan, 1947–57* (Dublin: Four Courts Press); K.B. Burk (2000) 'Marshall Plan: Filling in Some of the Blanks', *Contemporary European History*, 10, pp. 267–94.

2. I discussed the epistemological influence of such factors in detail in B. Keskin-Kozat (2011) 'Re-interpreting Turkey's Marshall Plan: Of Machines, Experts and Technical Knowledge', in N.B. Criss et al. (eds), *Turkish–American Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830–1989* (Cambridge: Scholars Press), pp. 187–212.
3. O. Sander (1979) *Türk–Amerikan Ilişkileri: 1947–64* (*Turkish–American Relations: 1947–64*) (Ankara: Sevinç); N. Uzunoğlu (2003) *American Aid to Turkey: 1947–1963* (Istanbul: Acar); B. Oran (2001) *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (1919–1980)* (*Turkish Foreign Policy: Facts, Documents, Perspectives from the War of Independence to Today (1919–1980)*) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları); M.E. Değer (2004) *Emperyalizmin Tuzaklarındaki Ülke: Oltadaki Balık Türkiye* (*A Country in Imperialist Plots: Turkey in the Hook*) (Istanbul: Otopsi).
4. In this essay, I do not dwell on the ways in which Turkish political elites approached Turkish economic modernization during the Marshall Plan. I argued elsewhere that this issue needs to be evaluated in relation to the history of Westernization efforts from the late Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic as well as in relation to the Soviet Union's territorial demands from Turkey during the early Cold War period. B. Keskin-Kozat (2006) 'Negotiating Modernization through U.S. Foreign Assistance: Turkey's Marshall Plan (1948–1952) Re-interpreted' (PhD thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), pp. 111–17, 129–43.
5. The 16 Marshall Plan recipients were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Turkey. Although the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia were also invited to participate in Marshall Plan discussions, they declined the invitation, arguing that their involvement would jeopardize their national sovereignty. All of these countries, except Finland, later banded together to establish the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance that supervised economic development in communist/socialist countries (1956–91).
6. In response to an inquiry about a new productivity project, Henry Wiens, the ECA Mission's Program Review Officer, wrote as follows: 'A training program such as proposed for August in Austria would be of little or no value to Turkey, since immediate problems here are of a more elementary nature than those facing most Western European countries. … [B]asic production techniques are more needed than those refinements usually visualized in the concept of productivity.' RG 469, Entry 1042, Airgram TOREP A-30 from MSA Ankara to SRE Paris, 31 July 1952. Also see RG 469, Entry 1042, letter by Donald C. Stone, the Director of MSA Administration, 4 January 1952; RG 334, Entry 250, Folder 091.112/C (1952).
7. Keskin-Kozat, 'Negotiating Modernization', p. 4.
8. Keskin-Kozat, 'Negotiating Modernization', pp. 102–12.
9. R. Kuisel (1993) *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
10. I.M. Wall (1991) *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945–54* (New York: Cambridge University Press); C. Esposito (1994) *America's Feeble*

Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948–1950 (Westport, CT: Greenwood).

11. Burk, 'Marshall Plan', p. 271.
12. E. Rosenberg (1982) *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York: Hill and Wany).
13. M. Cuti and B. Kendall (1954) *Prelude to Point Four: American Technical Missions Overseas, 1838–1938* (University of Madison Press); W. Lafeber (1986) 'The "Lion in the Path": The U.S. Emergence as a World Power', *Political Science Quarterly*, 101, pp. 710–18; N. Gilman (2003) *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 69; G. Steinmetz (2005) 'Return to Empire: The New U.S. Imperialism in Comparative Historical Perspective', *Sociological Theory*, 23, pp. 341–50.
14. E. Rosenberg and N.L. Rosenberg (1987) 'From Colonialism to Professionalism: The Public–Private Dynamic in United States Foreign Financial Advising, 1898–1929', *The Journal of American History*, 74, pp. 59–82.
15. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1948), *The Hearings before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Economic Recovery* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), pp. 9–24.
16. Response to a letter by Carl M. Saunders, editor of *Jackson Citizen Patriot*, 2 January 1948, *Arthur H. Vanderberg Papers*, Roll 5.
17. W. Averell Harriman, the ECA Special Representative to Europe (1948–50), had been the US Ambassador to Moscow, whereas his successor, Milton Katz, had served as the deputy chief in the US Office of Strategic Services that provided foreign intelligence during the Second World War. Similarly, Donald C. Stone, the Director of Administration (1948–51), had previously served as Assistant Director of the US Budget Bureau, and his assistant, Wayne C. Taylor, was the US Undersecretary of Commerce during the war. For more information, see www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist; www.marshallfoundation.org.
18. See for instance, Mr Sikes, Representative from Florida, *U.S. Congressional Record*, 24 July 1947, p. 10089; Mr Mason, Representative from Illinois, *U.S. Congressional Record*, 12 January 1948, p. 113; Mr Taft, Senator from Ohio, *U.S. Congressional Record*, 4 March 1948, p. 2641; Mr Rich, Representative from Pennsylvania, *U.S. Congressional Record*, 18 December 1947, p. 11627; V. Marcantonio (1956) *I Vote My Conscience: Debates, Speeches and Writings* (New York: n.p.), pp. 250–7. Also see W.F. Sanford (1980) 'American Business Community and the European Recovery Program, 1947–1952' (PhD thesis, University of Texas, Austin), pp. 50–5; J.B. Bonds (2002) *Bipartisan Strategy: Selling the Marshall Plan* (London: Praeger).
19. Cited in G. McGhee (1990) *The U.S.–Turkish–NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine Contained the Soviets in the Middle East* (New York: St Martin's Press), p. 61.
20. 'Turks are Fearful of ECA's Motives', *New York Times*, 4 January 1949, p. 70.
21. RG 469, Entry 1399, Memorandum on the Meeting at the Prime Ministry between the Deputy Prime Minister His Excellency Samet Ağaoğlu and Chief of Mission the Honorable Russell H. Dorr, 17 June 1950, pp. 2–4. Also see Memorandum on the Meeting at the Ministry of Economy and Commerce between Minister Vedat Dicleli and Chief of Mission the Honorable Russell Dorr, 18 January 1950, pp. 11–13.

22. RG 469, Entry 1399, Memorandum on the Meeting at the Ministry of State between Minister of State C.S. Barlas and Chief of Mission the Honorable Russell Dorr, 22 March 1950, p. 5.
23. RG 469, Entry 1399, Memorandum on the Meeting between Minister of State C.S. Barlas and Chief of Mission the Honorable Russell H. Dorr, 14 March 1950, pp. 8–10.
24. B. Keskin-Kozat (2006), 'Negotiating Modernization through U.S. Foreign Assistance: Turkey's Marshall Plan (1948–1952) Re-interpreted', (PhD thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), pp. 201–3, 236–8.
25. RG 469, Entry 927, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Milton Katz, Special Representative to Europe, 12 March 1951, p. 8.
26. RG 59, 867.00/10–2146, Memorandum from Loy W. Henderson (NEA) to Acheson, Secretary of State, 21 October 1946, pp. 2–4. On the significance of Turkish–Soviet relations for US foreign policy during the Cold War, see M. Leffler (1985) 'Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO, 1945–1952', *The Journal of American History*, 71, pp. 807–25; B.R. Kuniholm (1980) *The United States, The Northern Tier and the Origins of the Cold War: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece* (Princeton University Press).
27. Letter from Edwin C. Wilson to John D. Jernegan, 10 February 1948, quoted verbatim in RG 59, 867.00/2-2648, Memorandum from Mr Trop to Mr Henderson, 26 February 1948, emphasis mine. Also see RG 59, 867.00/-1148, Memorandum on the meeting between Hikmet Baydur, the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, DC, and Marshall, the US Secretary of State, 11 May 1948; Turkish Republican Archives – Foreign Ministry Archive, 'Marshall Planında Türkiyenin Durumu' ('Turkey's Position in the Marshall Plan'), 16 January 1948.
28. G. Harris (1972) *Troubled Alliance: Turkish–American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research), pp. 31–2.
29. RG 469, Entry 927, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Milton Katz, Special Representative in Europe, 12 March 1951, p. 7, emphasis mine.
30. RG 469, Entry 1399, Chronological Index of Memorandums Prepared by Chief of Mission and Members of Mission, p. 1.
31. RG 469, Entry 236, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Paul G. Hoffman, ECA Administrator – Washington, DC, 14 January 1949, pp. 1–4.
32. *Turkish Grand National Assembly Proceedings*, 8th Session, vol. 19, pp. 1139–40; Law Number 5412, Law about the Establishment of International Economic Cooperation Organization, *Resmi Gazete*, 6 June 1949, Issue 7225, pp. 16257–8. The two IECO Secretary General during the Marshall Plan were Haydar Görk (1949–51, 1951–55) and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (1951–52), both of whom were young Turkish Foreign Ministry officials at the time.
33. S. Günver (1985) *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü: Z Zorro Gibi* (*The Story of Fatin Rustu Zorlu: Z as in Zorro*) (Istanbul: Bilgi). It is not exactly clear how many people were in fact employed at the IECO, because the organization's records are located in the Turkish Foreign Ministry archive, which is still closed to researchers. Yet, a juxtaposition in the ECA memoranda about the meetings with the Turkish State Ministry personnel and the available memoirs of Turkish Foreign Ministry officials reveals that the IECO was in fact run by

individuals who were employed either in the Turkish Foreign Ministry or in the international affairs bureaus of the Turkish Ministry of Commerce and Trade.

34. Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü*, p. 37; S. Günver (1990) *Garip Ada'nın Garip Eşeği* (*The Odd Donkey of the Odd Island*) (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları), p. 27; O. Gökmen (1996) *Bir zamanlar Hariciye: Eski Bir Diplomatın Anıları* (*Once Upon a Time at the Foreign Ministry: Memoirs From an Ex-Diplomat*) (Istanbul: Kaptan Ofset), pp. 229–32; Y. Gör (1996) *Seyahatname* (*Travelogue*) (Istanbul: Cağdaş), pp. 19–52; M. Esenbel (2000) *Türkiye'nin Batı ile İttifaka Yönelişi* (*Turkey's Drive Toward an Alliance with the West*) (Istanbul: Isis), p. 62.
35. F. Belen (1960) *Demokrasiden Diktatörlüğe* (*From Democracy to Dictatorship*) (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaasi), pp. 13–14.
36. RG 469, Entry 927, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Averell Harriman, Special Representative in Europe, 24 April 1950, pp. 2–3.
37. RG 469, Entry 1399, Memorandum on the Meeting at the Prime Ministry between the Deputy Prime Minister His Excellency Samet Ağaoğlu and the Chief of Mission the Honorable Russell Dorr, 17 June 1950. The DP government was established on 22 May 1950 and its first State Minister responsible for ECA Affairs was appointed on 11 July 1950. During these two months, interactions with the ECA were directly undertaken by the IECO.
38. RG 1399, Entry 927, Letter From Russell H. Dorr, Chief of the Mission, to Milton Katz, Special Representative, Office of Special Representative in France, 12 March 1951, p. 6.
39. RG 469, Entry 1399, Chronological Index of Memorandums Prepared by Chief of Mission, Members of the Mission etc., p. 3.
40. Turkish Republican Archives, 30.18.1.2.126.53.2, 5412 sayılı Kanun'la kurulan Milletlerarası İktisadi İşbirliği Teşkilatı'nın Dışişleri Bakanlığı'na bağlanması (IECO which was established by Law No. 5412 to be linked to the Turkish Foreign Ministry), 20 June 1951.
41. RG 469, Entry 1400, Memorandum from Russell H. Dorr, Chief of Mission, to the Honorable George McGhee, Ambassador of the United States, 17 January 1952, p. 3, emphasis mine.
42. Ibid., p. 3, emphasis mine. Also see RG 469, Entry 1399, Memorandum from Henry W. Wiens, Acting Chief of Mission to the Honorable George McGhee, Ambassador of the United States, 24 January 1952.
43. RG 469, Entry 1399, Memorandum between Russell H. Dorr, Chief of the Mission, and Minister of State C.S. Barlas, 19 November 1949, pp. 3–4.
44. RG 469, Entry 927, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Milton Katz, Special Representative in Europe, 12 March 1951, pp. 7–9, emphasis mine. Also see RG 469, Entry 1399, Letter from Henry Wiens, the Acting Chief, to John B. Lindeman, Director of Program Division, ECA-OSR, 2 May 1951.
45. RG 469, Entry 927, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Milton Katz, Special Representative in Europe, 12 May 1950, p. 3.
46. RG 469, Entry 927, Memorandum from Philip W. Bonsal to Milton Katz, Special Representative in Europe, 3 May 1950, p. 1.
47. RG 469, Entry 927, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Milton Katz, Special Representative in Europe, 12 March 1951, p. 3.
48. RG 469, Entry 927, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Milton Katz, p. 9.
49. Ibid., p. 9.

50. RG 469, Entry 1400, Memorandum from Russell H. Dorr, Chief of the Mission, to the Honorable George McGhee, Ambassador of the United States, 17 January 1952, p. 6, emphasis mine.
51. RG 469, Entry 927, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Milton Katz, Special Representative in Europe, 12 March 1951, p. 9.
52. H. Arkes (1972) *Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest* (Princeton University Press), p. 12; J. McGlade (1995) 'The Illusion of Consensus: American Business, Cold War Aid, and the Industrial Recovery of Western Europe, 1948–1958' (PhD thesis, George Washington University), pp. 150–4.
53. D.J. Alvarez (1980) *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1943–1946* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies), p. 14.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

Turkish State Archives (Ankara, Turkey)

Record Group 30.18.12 – Turkish Cabinet Decisions.

United States National Archives (Greenbelt, MD, US)

RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1945–49.
Decimal File 867, Microfilm Rolls 1–15.
RG 334, Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey.
Entry 250, Adjunct General Secretary, Central Files Unit, Decimal File, 1947–53.
RG469, Records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948–56.
On the Mission to Turkey:
Entry 1399, Office of the Chief of Mission Subject Files (Central Files), 1948–56.
Entry 1400, Office of the Chief of Mission Classified Subject Files (Classified Central Files), 1948–56.
The Office of Special Representative to Europe:
Entry 236, Director of Administration, Administrative Services Director.
Entry 927, Central Secretariat, Country Files, 1948–52, Turkey.
Entry 1042, Office of Economic Affairs Labor Division, General Subject Files 1950–53.

Bentley Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Personal Papers of Senator Arthur H. Vanderberg.

US Newspapers

Christian Science Monitor.
Los Angeles Times.
New York Times.
Washington Post.

Legislative Sources:

US Congressional Record, 1947–53.
Turkish Grand National Assembly Proceedings, 1947–53.

Books and Articles

Alvarez, D.J. (1980) *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1943–6*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.
Arkes, H. (1972) *Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest*. Princeton University Press.
Belen, F. (1960) *Demokrasiden Diktatörlüğe*. Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaası.
Bonds, J.B. (2002) *Bipartisan Strategy: Selling the Marshall Plan*. London: Praeger.
Burk, K.B. (2000) 'Marshall Plan: Filling in Some of the Blanks', *Contemporary European History*, 10, pp. 267–94.
Cuti, M., and B. Kendall (1954) *Prelude to Point Four: American Technical Missions Overseas, 1838–1938*. University of Madison Press.
Değer, M.E. (2004) *Emperyalizmin Tuzaklarındaki Ülke: Oltadaki Balık Türkiye*. Istanbul: Otopsi.
Esenbel, M. (2000) *Türkiye'nin Bati ile Ittifaka Yonelisi*. Istanbul: Isis.
Esposito, C. (1994) *America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948–1950*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Gilman, N. (2003) *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Gökmen, O. (1996) *Bir zamanlar Hariciye: Eski Bir Diplomatın Anıları*. Istanbul: Kaptan Ofset.
Gör, Y. (1996) *Seyahatname*. Istanbul: Cağdaş.
Günver, S. (1985) *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü: Z Zorro Gibi*. Istanbul: Bilgi.
——(1990) *Garip Ada'nın Garip Eşeği*. Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları.
Harris, G.S. (1972) *Troubled Alliance: Turkish–American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, available at: www.marshallfoundation.org; www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist.
Keskin-Kozat, B. (2006) 'Negotiating Modernization through US Foreign Assistance: Turkey's Marshall Plan (1948–1952) Re-interpreted'. PhD thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
——(2011) 'Re-interpreting Turkey's Marshall Plan: Of Machines, Experts and Technical Knowledge', in N.B. Criss, S. Esenbel, T. Greenwood and L. Mazzari (eds), *Turkish–American Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830–1989*. Cambridge: Scholars Press, pp. 187–212.
Kuisel, R. (1993) *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kuniholm, B.R. (1980) *The United States, The Northern Tier and the Origins of the Cold War: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece*. Princeton University Press.
Lafeber, W. (1986) 'The "Lion in the Path": The U.S. Emergence as a World Power', *Political Science Quarterly*, 101, pp. 705–18.
Leffler, M. (1985) 'Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO, 1945–1952', *The Journal of American History*, 71, pp. 807–25.

McGhee, G. (1990) *The U.S.–Turkish–NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine Contained the Soviets in the Middle East.* New York: St Martin's Press.

McGlade, J. (1995) 'The Illusion of Consensus: American Business, Cold War Aid, and the Industrial Recovery of Western Europe, 1948–1958'. PhD thesis, George Washington University.

Marcantonio, V. (1956) *I Vote My Conscience: Debates, Speeches and Writings*. New York: n.p.

Oran, B. (ed.) (2001) *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (1919–1980)*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Rosenberg, E. (1982) *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945*. New York: Hill and Wang.

Rosenberg, E., and N.L. Rosenberg (1987) 'From Colonialism to Professionalism: The Public–Private Dynamic in United States Foreign Financial Advising, 1898–1929', *The Journal of American History*, 74, pp. 59–82.

Sander, O. (1979) *Türk–Amerikan Ilişkileri: 1947–64*. Ankara: Sevinç.

Sanford, W.F. (1980) 'American Business Community and the European Recovery Program, 1947–1952'. PhD thesis, University of Texas, Austin.

Smith, T. (2000) 'New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, 24, no. 4, pp. 567–91.

Steinmetz, G. (2005) 'Return to Empire: The New U.S. Imperialism in Comparative Historical Perspective', *Sociological Theory*, 23, pp. 339–67.

US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1948) *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Eightieth Congress, Second Session on Economic Recovery (Part 1)*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

Uzunoğlu, N. (2003) *American Aid to Turkey: 1947–1963*. Istanbul: Acar.

Wall, I.M. (1991) *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945–54*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wheelan, B. (2000) *Ireland and the Marshall Plan, 1947–57*. Dublin: Four Courts Press.

Index