

Introduction

IN JUNE 1955, Conrad Hilton delivered a speech marking the grand opening of the Hilton Hotel in Istanbul. His remarks situated the new building—its construction, location, and architectural form—within a broader narrative of Turkey’s political trajectory and its contemporary geopolitical importance. The mogul drew a line of continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey, and he praised their shared, “deep and very sound mistrust” of Russia, the “great northern neighbor,” just as company publications hyperbolically advertised the Istanbul Hilton as located “ten miles from the Iron Curtain.”¹ The hotel, as Hilton and company envisioned it, was to be a strategic deployment in a broader ideological conflict with the Soviet Union, a conflict that was nonetheless fought out in material terms.

Speaking to the Rotary Club of Los Angeles the following year, Hilton explained that he saw his franchises as an effort to match the “Communist sprawl” at its own game, albeit in a “friendly, industrial way.”² Proximity to the Iron Curtain motivated the chain’s outreach to Istanbul, Baghdad, and Berlin, while Cairo held “the key to Africa and the Middle East,” Japan to Asia, and India to the “great ‘neutral’ bloc.” West Berlin and Spain, meanwhile, were helping to “close the pincers over Europe.” Each hotel in his international chain, Hilton insisted, was to be a “first-hand laboratory” where local and foreign tourists “may inspect America and its ways at their leisure,” a site where the attitudes and psyches of locals deciding between conflicting visions of modernity could be directly

manipulated and where new worldviews could be cultivated by the architects and entrepreneurs drafted into the service of American capitalist modernity.³

The early phases of the Cold War presented seemingly boundless opportunities for American entrepreneurs, experts, and policy makers to construct laboratories of the type envisioned by Hilton. It was in the global periphery, particularly on the terrain of developmental thought and practice, that some of the most important battles of the Cold War were fought.⁴ A seminal weapon in the American intellectual arsenal was modernization theory, which prevailed in both academic and policy circles and upheld a singular, evolutionary path towards development. Scholars and experts modeled the trajectory towards modernization after the American vision of economic growth, and they presumed that it would entail such turning points as urbanization, the rise of mass media, and increasing rates of literacy. But while they assumed that development along the lines of this model was inevitable, they paradoxically believed that this model was also one that had to be induced. Between Truman's interpellation of "underdeveloped areas" in his 1949 speech announcing the Point Four program and Kennedy's declaration of the 1960s as the "Development Decade," foundations, private corporations, and foreign aid and technical assistance programs collaborated to showcase the boons of American modernization across the newly minted Third World.⁵ Their projects were to aid the containment of the Soviet Union and provide the formula for winning hearts and minds on the global periphery.

The Hilton enterprise envisioned Turkey on the front lines of the Cold War, evident in the country's belonging to NATO, fighting in the Korean War, and hosting of American military bases and nuclear missiles along its northern and southern coasts. The Turkish government, in turn, participated fully in giving itself a vital location in this military and geopolitical cartography, frequently citing Soviet demands for free access to the Bosphorus in its requests for American economic, technical, and military assistance. The United States readily obliged over the years, as Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan funds enabled agricultural mechanization and the extension of a highway network across Turkey.⁶ These programs also jump-started the country's tourism industry, providing, among other things, the funding for Hilton's hotel and its showcase of capitalist enterprise. These tangible transformations in Turkey's material and social landscape, along with the country's program of economic

and political liberalization between 1945 and 1960, captured the imagination of social scientists, such as Daniel Lerner and Dankwart Rustow, as they grappled with problems of modernization, inspiring a vision of Turkey as a model to be emulated, a case to be explained, and a laboratory in which to experiment.⁷

Hotels and Highways examines how Turkey served as both the template on which modernization theory was based and the object on which it was enacted. As an early participant in the American aid regime, Turkey was an important site that enabled the simultaneous construction and validation of postwar developmental thought and practice. It was a venue for fact-gathering, theory development, and experimentation but one that could also paradoxically serve as a ready-made model for the world, especially for its neighbors across the Middle East. The tensions and contradictions between these roles were manifested in the contentious and uncertain interactions between American and local actors and practices, even as they were glossed over by modernization theory's triumphant certainties. These encounters lay bare the political implications of developmental laboratories, which were material and tangible sites that also served rhetorical and social functions, sanctioning certain ideas and practices of modernization and expertise while disavowing others.

Recent intellectual histories have astutely underscored the central role that social scientific knowledge played in the ideological battles of the Cold War.⁸ Even sophisticated works that examine local instantiations of modernization theory, however, reduce it to an intangible discourse or "narrative strategy," depicting it as a lens that guides or frames developmental projects.⁹ In many of these accounts, academics convene at Social Science Research Council conferences in Dobbs Ferry, at the MIT Center for International Studies in Cambridge, or at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica. Their theories are then passed on to officials in Washington, shipped abroad, and tested and implemented on the ground. If defects are found in overseas projects, scholars and experts reassemble to appraise their theoretical model, smooth out its edges, and perfect the prototype. Ironically, such narratives can reproduce the core assumption of the modernization theorists themselves, reinstating the West as the center of knowledge production.

Rather than emanating from the West and migrating to their venues of application, social scientific theories are themselves produced in particular but often uncertain encounters between actors engaged in trans-

national intellectual and policy networks. Put differently, theories do not hover above and independent from their destinations but rather are manufactured in material spaces where they can be worked out, refined, and given more definite form. Products of knowledge do not emerge out of secluded, disembodied scholarly practice; they are more akin to artifacts, whose fabrication requires the active construction of political alliances and material networks that they can inhabit and traverse. In these settings, the otherwise “abundant, complex, and heterogeneous” elements of the world are translated into “simpler objects that [researchers] can manipulate at leisure.”¹⁰ Researchers grow in size and strength relative to their objects of study, which are scaled down and simplified. But through the very acts of manipulation, simplification, and material fabrication, knowledge practices generate new realities and subjectivities on the ground, foreclosing some political possibilities while opening up novel sites of struggle.

The manufacturing of modernization theory rested on the construction and manipulation of architectural and infrastructural spaces. Experts built laboratories where they could scale down problems of geopolitics and development to a manageable size and where they could test and cultivate modern subjectivities. They identified the capacity for empathy, mobility, and hospitality as the primary indices of development, and they constructed microcosms where these attitudes could be measured but also incubated. In Turkey, the corresponding sites of theory construction included survey research, highways, and tourism landmarks such as the Istanbul Hilton Hotel, each of which is the subject of a chapter of this book. The survey interview was not only a method to measure modernization but also a site for its enactment; roads were not simply means to integrate the national economy but venues where subjects could develop “modern” relationships to machinery, time, and mobility; and hotels would not simply consolidate the tourism industry but refine the desired traits of impersonal and anonymous hospitality. Although these microcosms were intended to help the United States prevail in a Cold War fought over alternative models of development and expertise, they were offset by the resilience of recipient subjects as well as anxieties and hesitations on the part of practitioners. The confident modernity that Hilton and others hoped to project across the Third World concealed a persistent uncertainty, a nagging doubt, sometimes more explicit, sometimes less, that the project of shrinking the world to the manageable scale necessary for it to be successfully manipulated was a hopeless task.

The Turkish Model of Modernization

Hilton publications imagined Istanbul within striking distance of the Iron Curtain and spoke with authority about the politics, history, and aspirations of Turkey, noting that it “formerly was the focal point of all the Middle East” and was now becoming “definitely a European country, . . . making great strides in developing its economy and social structure close to Western thinking.”¹¹ The postwar consolidation of American hegemony rested on the active construction of a geography of development, and especially of an “underdeveloped world,” as regions and countries were assigned specific roles and levels of achievement in the global political economy. In this mapping, Turkey was given—and Turkish officials and policy makers actively sought out—an important role. As a country consciously opting for a pro-Western orientation, as evidenced through its membership in the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the precursor to the World Bank), and regional defense agreements, such as the Baghdad Pact, Turkey presented a special opportunity for its Western allies and an ostensible prototype for its Middle Eastern neighbors alike.¹²

This was an opportunity that both Turkish and American policy makers sought to seize. In 1948, Turkey was included in the Marshall Plan, despite the fact that the country had entered World War II at the last possible moment, after having earlier signed a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany and having refused British entreaties to join the Allies. European Recovery Program funds brought agricultural machinery and extended a highway network across the country; these projects were included within the Marshall Plan’s program of Americanizing the organization of production and consumption patterns across Western Europe.¹³ The Plan, as many historians have argued, was not simply an extension of American aid to devastated European countries but also a deliberate program of forestalling and defusing calls for a more assertive redistribution of wealth that might include social guarantees for national health care, full employment, universal education, and subsidized housing.¹⁴ American policy makers discouraged projects that might be seen as moving too far from market-oriented development, while they promoted an economic reconstruction program that produced “not the high standard of living in itself, but rather the technologies, procedures, and information about how to achieve ‘a little bit more well-being.’”¹⁵

In Turkey, the Marshall Plan–funded highway network largely superseded a proposed land reform bill of 1945, intended to eliminate landlessness among the peasantry by redistributing the properties of absentee landlords to the tenants and sharecroppers who worked on them.¹⁶ Rather than implement land reform, as had been done in Japan, postwar American assistance allocated agricultural machinery and built highways, which ultimately benefited large landowners. The transfer of highway equipment and expertise also prefigured Truman’s 1949 Point Four Program and its goal to “help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.”¹⁷ Programs like the highway initiative helped crystallize the postwar role of development in the relationship between the United States and the global periphery. Technical knowhow would henceforth manage the “difference between extraordinary levels of affluence for some and modest levels of living for the majority of the world, rather than [offering] the effective means of addressing those differences.”¹⁸ In the words of Paul Hoffman, who oversaw the Marshall Plan between his term as the president of the Studebaker Company and the first administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, European recovery had provided a training ground for American policy makers, who “developed the essential instruments of a successful policy in the arena of world politics.”¹⁹

Turkey’s role in the creation of this postwar world order went beyond its role as an early laboratory of development. It proved to be a staunch ally of the Western bloc over the years, joining the British embargo of nationalized Iranian oil in 1952; voting against Algerian demands in the United Nations in 1954; supporting Britain, France, and Israel during the Suez Crisis in 1956; nearly declaring war on Syria in 1957; and allowing the United States to use its bases during the intervention in Lebanon in 1958.²⁰ Outside of the Middle East, Turkey’s alignment with the Western bloc included its defense of European and American interests at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955; its participation, at the behest of the United States, was grudging at best, not least because North American observers repeatedly referred to it as a “meeting of the colored races,” a status from which Turkish statesmen believed they were exempt.²¹ For Western policy makers, Turkey could be deployed as a disciplinary force at the margins of the metropole. For academics and ex-

perts, it could also be evoked as a model to be emulated across the same margins.

Turkey's status as a prototypical case in the postwar social scientific imaginary was in part a legacy of the Ottoman and Kemalist reforms that characterized its landscape. During the Tanzimat period (1839–76), the struggling empire undertook centralization, bureaucratization, and the establishment of new schools, while the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876–1909) saw an attempt to embark on a modernization project that was explicitly modeled after Germany. After the establishment of the Republic in 1923, subsequent Turkish state-building projects mirrored these earlier attempts, now identifying modernization with Enlightenment-style secularism and the imposition of political and social reform in a top-down fashion. The bureaucratic elite, led by Kemal Atatürk, the self-appointed father of all Turks, implemented changes in the script, scales, calendar, and education system, breaking with Islamic code in favor of the Swiss-inspired Civil Code of 1926. Over the subsequent decades, the principle of secularism would be enforced by the state, proliferated by “Kemalist” devotees, and protected under the aegis of the army in its self-designated role as the sentinel of *laïcité*.

The configuration of Turkey as a model for modernization theory drew on these legacies. But it crystallized in 1950 with the implementation of the country's first multiparty elections, leading to a decade of government by the Democrat Party (DP) under Adnan Menderes between 1950 and 1960. Atatürk's Republican People's Party, now led by İsmet İnönü, waited its turn in opposition. The DP, backed by small merchants, urban petty bourgeoisie, and commercial farmers, had a populist appeal from its conception in 1946, exemplified in its support for the expansion of religious liberties, private enterprise, and foreign investment.²² During his government, Menderes was in basic agreement with the recommendations of American advisors, who denounced railway-led industrialization projects and encouraged agricultural mechanization and the extension of a highway network.²³

Seemingly a success story of simultaneous economic and political liberalization, Turkey thus surfaced at once as a “model ally” and the archetype of modernization theory for Cold Warriors in the United States. Still, its labeling as a model for its Middle Eastern neighbors was hardly an innocent discovery. It was just as much an effort to discredit the ways

in which these neighbors had already embarked on their own political and economic trajectories, drawing on a plethora of alternative modernizing ideologies that were available across the region, such as pan-Arabism, political Islam, and socialism, among others.²⁴ American scholars, policy makers, and pundits rediscovered Turkey as a putative regional template in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 2011; in doing so, they effaced the history and political effects of previous American theories and projects. The Turkish model was equally attractive for those who prescribed “moderation” for Islamist parties and those who sought the continuation of neoliberal policies in post-Mubarak Egypt.²⁵ The enthusiasts of the template were silent about Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s escalating persecution of leftist, primarily Kurdish activists, journalists, and students during the same period and about the highly unequal effects of his neoliberalization program, which resulted in high rates of unemployment and workplace deaths.²⁶ The government’s heavy-handed response to the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the 2016 military coup attempt have once again led political scientists to use the country as a test case for their theories of “competitive authoritarianism,” but neither these reversals nor these erasures are new to the discipline’s record of engagement with Turkey.²⁷

When Cold War modernization theorists and policy makers praised Turkey’s seeming pliability as an ally, they treated its postwar transition to multiparty politics as consistent with earlier reform projects. In doing so, they knowingly concealed its undemocratic manifestations.²⁸ Among the forgotten facts of Turkey’s political history was its ambivalent status during the interwar period and many of its elites’ sympathies for Nazi Germany.²⁹ Also unmentioned were the ferocious nationalism of the “reformist” state, which deemed indispensable the creation of a unified and homogeneous Turkish, Muslim, yet laic bourgeoisie. The measures taken in this direction were the expulsion of Greek communities and the massacre of Armenians and Alevi Kurds in the early twentieth century as well as the establishment of Varlık Vergisi, a capital tax targeting non-Muslims between November 1942 and March 1944, and the government-sanctioned anti-Greek pogroms of 1955.³⁰ Social scientists’ subsequent condoning of the 1960 military coup, which led to the overthrow and hanging of Menderes and three cabinet members, was also consistent with the contradictions and amnesias of Cold War modernization.³¹ The persistent erasure of such episodes from narratives of the “suc-

cessful” Turkish model is a testament to the simultaneously material and ideological work undertaken by modernization theory.

Modernization Theory in Action

Following the recent applications of science and technology studies to the social sciences, we can trace the demanding work that is entailed in the crafting of knowledge claims and their material effects.³² Social scientific theories and attendant methodologies not only measure, encode, or describe but also engender the phenomena they seek to explain, such as the economy, objectivity, probability, public opinion, madness, or the “modern fact.”³³ Modernizers brought with them a positivist orientation towards the construction of knowledge: they assumed that the world existed out there, independent of themselves, as a collection of facts to be apprehended and investigated.³⁴ Knowing this world rendered it controllable—an urgency which ran counter to their insistence on objectivity but a sign that they remained “within the basic trope of modernity.”³⁵ They described the changes they observed as modernization, and by labeling it as such, they contributed to the transformation of their objects of inquiry.

In acting upon and bringing order to the material and social landscape, the modernizers collected and calculated information that otherwise existed separately. The construction of developmental thought was predicated on the mobilization of an array of material equipment, such as Voice of America–funded questionnaires, Ford Foundation–funded maps, and meticulously kept reports about Marshall Plan allocations—“technologies of distance” that tallied, arranged, and organized that which they claimed to merely represent.³⁶ Such documents facilitated attempts to gather information about the locals and to render that data mobile, stable, and combinable in the name of universal knowledge.³⁷ They delineated particular places, practices, and individuals as modern while labeling others as backward and provincial. Survey respondents who were too timid to articulate their opinions were coded as traditional subjects. Delays in reports to Marshall Plan headquarters marked the local experts as indolent at the same time that their zest for large-scale developmental projects was seen as a testament to their impatience; such outlooks proved too slow and too hasty, alternately, for the temporal and behavioral comportments associated with modernization. Just as experts’ maps assigned regions of the country to designated grades within a develop-

mental scheme, local interlocutors were ascribed a location in a developmental hierarchy premised on the achievement of modern subjectivity.

The set of claims rallied by modernization theorists not only pertained to the developmental trajectory of Turkey but also generated a series of assumptions about modern psyches and postures. The different laboratory experiments were intended to occasion the enactment of modern subjectivities, on either side of the Atlantic, including those who conducted social scientific surveys and those who responded to them, those who were responsible for the allocation of road-building machinery and those who were to learn the maintenance of the machines, and those who designed the hotels and those who were to inhabit them within conventions of hospitality. Recipients of roads, hotels, and surveys were to cultivate mobility in physical and imaginary terms: if they could not literally undertake travel, they should be able to psychically accommodate the vision of self-chosen, voluntary movement. The modern self was expected to travel, imagine, and imagine travel. Modern subjects were also to know how to travel *well*, to wait in line for public transportation, and to lodge in aesthetically appealing, hygienic, and comfortable facilities. Ease of travel would occasion the emergence of new conceptions of time measurement and encourage territorial unification, an important concern to local politicians grappling with the assimilation of Kurdish populations. But given the unequal distribution of machines and roads and their use in managing the movement of unruly subjects, their ostensibly universalizing modernity in fact operated through class differentiations and ethnic hierarchies.

If the American model of development was to appear universally attainable, experts had to create the conditions for its replication across the world. Modernization theory was packaged as abstract and singular, as though it could be unmoored from the local networks, material arrangements, and political histories that enabled its production and dissemination. This erasure of the materiality of knowledge production should be thought of as an “accomplishment”; in John Law’s terms, it was one that secured the coherence of concepts such as modernization into given items.³⁸ But we can try to dislodge the certitude of that accomplishment by unraveling the image of a “Great Divide between the universal knowledge of the Westerners and the local knowledge of everyone else,” by weaving back together the strands that have heretofore separated.³⁹

Local Passage Points

The diverse array of travelers embroiled in the weaving of modernization theory included survey researchers, diplomats, businessmen, engineers, and architects—all itinerants within transnational circuits of intellectual and imperial production. Although these figures seemingly agreed on the premises of their theories and projects, they furtively contested their specificities. Their travels testify to the porosity of the boundaries between the foreign and the domestic, a recurring revelation found in transnational histories of US–Middle East relations.⁴⁰ Recent histories of international development have also looked “beyond the metropolitan centers of the West” in order to show how projects on the ground “shape the ideas from which they emerged.”⁴¹ David Engerman, Nathan Citino, Nicole Sackley, and others have recovered the ways in which local practices and regional ideologies have been constitutive of development.⁴² I engage with this work to show that the making of modernization theory was by no means a unidirectional process, precisely because of a material necessity to enroll and translate the interests of Turkish scholars and policy makers.⁴³ Intermediary figures positioned themselves as “obligatory passage points” through which flows of information and knowledge traversed the Atlantic.⁴⁴ The characters whose itineraries are traced in the following chapters were such passage points; they include social scientists Dankwart Rustow, Kemal Karpat, Nermin Abadan, and Frederick Frey as well as technical experts such as Vecdi Diker, Harold Hilt, Gordon Bunshaft, and Sedad Hakkı Eldem. They all had to be rallied in order for modernization theory to gain traction.

The otherwise obscure role of such intermediary figures can be illustrated with the example of Mahmut Makal, who was a rural schoolteacher educated in the Kemalist Village Institutes. The Institutes were founded in 1940 with the aim to modernize the peasantry and to propagate Kemalism across rural areas.⁴⁵ Makal’s account of his experiences across Anatolia, ranging from social norms and food shortages to timekeeping practices he observed, captured the imagination of American and European social scientists, who nonetheless counseled caution to his Western audiences. They drew on Makal’s writings to distill the elements of earlier, especially Kemalist projects of modernization, and they expurgated parts that were not to their liking. In his preface to the annotated English edi-

tion, historian Lewis Thomas suggested that Makal's "rationalist and liberal assumptions will make it all too easy for European readers to fall with him into the fallacy that we must set to work to shed light in this darkness, to fill the vacuum of ignorance with the blessings of modern knowledge."⁴⁶ Thomas's wary position was in line with the editorial interjections offered by anthropologist Paul Stirling. Where Makal proclaimed that "a woman's voice is taboo" in villages, Stirling interposed in a footnote that "as often, the author exaggerates." In response to Makal's observation that "there is no aspect of village life so confused as that of marriage," Stirling reprimanded: "The confusion exists largely in the author's mind, and results from applying a Western ideal of marriage, itself altered by his own deeper attitudes."⁴⁷

Portions of Makal's text that detracted from the vision of the Turkish model of modernization were excised, written away as the aspirations of an individual who benefited from "modern education" and reacted to his own village as a "citizen of twentieth-century Western civilization."⁴⁸ Makal thus confirmed the self-fashioning of western scholars as sympathetic observers, more willing to "understand" their objects of inquiry. The assignment of biased, convoluted thinking to this particular mediator enabled the modernizers' own claim to objectivity. Makal figured prominently in debates about new directions not only in the Turkish social sciences but also in the work of American scholars of Turkey and modernization, such as Walter Weiker, Frank Tachau, Richard Robinson, and Herbert Hyman.⁴⁹ Sociologist Daniel Lerner used the popularity of Makal's book as both fodder and material proof for his own categories of tradition and modernization: "That there now exists in Turkey a market of over 50,000 people able to buy the book . . . is a datum which suggests that economic participation via cash, and psychocultural participation via literacy, have grown together in significant measure."⁵⁰ The fact that his later text—*The Fable of Development*, which chastised the shortcomings of the Turkish government's developmental projects—remains untranslated is indicative of the simultaneous enrollment and erasure of obligatory passage points.⁵¹

Local interlocutors—docile collaborators, silent skeptics, and unruly resisters alike—were active, if fickle, participants in the crafting of modernization theory. Their involvement and resistance were necessarily curtailed by an imbalanced political context marked by US aid and geopolitical ascendance. But as we will see in chapters 1 and 2, members of the

political science faculty at Ankara University were not the subservient recipients of recent developments in American social science: they adapted its categories and methodologies, and they remade their premises. The engineers and architects who are the subjects of chapters 3 through 5 were the target of modernizing schemes in methods of record keeping, roadbuilding, and time management. Yet vernacular practices of expertise and competing visions of development persisted, leading to moments of “disconnect and mistranslation” that were constitutive of modernization across its sites of articulation and instantiation.⁵² Finally, the recipients of academic and infrastructural projects, such as survey respondents, university students, and rural populations, remained recalcitrant, attesting to the re-signification and redeployment of modernization’s temporalities and associated spatial practices. Theories of modernization and attendant developmental projects were not only selectively appropriated and indigenized but produced in the very details of encounters and ultimately used in unforeseen and at times contradictory ways.

Derailments and Hesitations

Modernizing schemes could be offset by unintended consequences, such as material misuse and self-reflexive practitioners. Such roadblocks exemplify the contingencies that were entailed in the construction and implementation of social scientific theories, which proceed through the work of multiple actors and material mediators, themselves capable of doing more (and less) than their users anticipate. Developmental techniques and visions produce signs, subjects, and material objects that are capable of reworking the inevitabilities their creators imagined.

The Marshall Plan–funded highway network is illustrative of the manifold interpretive strategies that were corralled in developmental projects. Roads were engraved in accounts of modernization, which equipped transportation and attendant correlates, such as urbanization and communication, with explanatory prowess. Rather than functioning as a mere conduit for modernization theory, however, the highway network is best understood as a site where it was crafted and imbued with multiple meanings. Postwar highways were identified and tasked with political-economic integration, and they also built on residues of colonial and nation-building missions.⁵³ Ottoman, European, and Kemalist legacies of reform were piled on top of one another, and a new modernization

was stacked on in the Cold War; republican depictions of civilizing railroads bled into their replacements by liberalizing highways, at the same time as roads continued to facilitate the ongoing interior colonial project in Kurdish-populated areas of the country. Debates about state-led development, public works, and private enterprise were also scaled down to the level of roadbuilding machinery, while American experts contested German understandings of civil engineering and bureaucracy they found to be too managerial and dismissive of manual labor.⁵⁴

These negotiations were derailed even as they succeeded, as beneficiaries of roads would use them to leave their villages in inappropriate vehicles, such as tractors requisitioned for weekend trips into the city, much to the chagrin of social scientists and policy makers. Rural populations also began to use their newfound mobility to migrate to cities in unprecedented numbers, joining the ranks of the urban working classes. This was especially worrying given that efforts to discourage working-class consciousness and discredit alternative visions of development, such as land reform, had failed to deliver.⁵⁵ The unforeseen usage of roads can be viewed as a testament to the “self-defeating” components of infrastructural projects, the “inherent instability or volatility of the material.”⁵⁶ Roads were marked by translation strategies on the part of their recipients as well as that of competing governmental agencies; in the process, their normative and positive content was contested and worked over by experts and laypeople alike.

Although critics such as Arturo Escobar have done significant work to chronicle the forms of knowledge, institutions, and technological factors that constitute developmental discourse, they overlook the ways in which that discourse may well spawn subjectivities that escape a “top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic” approach that otherwise aims to “exclude people.”⁵⁷ The disempowerment and depoliticization of local populations are taken at face value in such analyses, whereby national governments and international agencies collaborate and succeed in their allocation of developmental resources as technical, politically neutral, and benevolent solutions to those in need. Most accounts portray developmental experts as conceited, self-assured, and successful at concealing the interventionist nature of their work. Even studies that foreground the unintended consequences of developmental plans present them as “instrumental” in the exertion and intensification of this depoliticizing effect.⁵⁸ I call attention instead to the fragilities and anxieties that mark expert thinking and practice throughout this book.

The actors involved in the construction and implementation of modernization theory may at first appear to resemble James Scott's conceited high modernists, who were "uncritical, unskeptical, and thus unscientifically optimistic about the possibilities for the comprehensive planning of human settlement and production."⁵⁹ These agents were indeed invested in "covering up" the true meaning of their work, not unlike those involved in the USAID developmental schemes in Egypt, as Timothy Mitchell recounts.⁶⁰ While Mitchell insists that a degree of "self-deception" was central to the constitution of development as a discourse of rational planning, his narrative assigns more certitude and coherence to social scientific thinking and attendant expert practices than the record shows existed.⁶¹ I suggest that instead we follow Tania Li in examining how attempts to render politically contentious issues technical are best seen as a "project, not a secure accomplishment."⁶²

The modernization theorists were expected to present themselves as empathetic yet disinterested researchers, but they were often mortified at their own lack of knowledge about their objects of study. The technical experts were to utilize modern techniques in engineering, record keeping, and punctuality but were deeply troubled by incompatibilities in design and building techniques. Although Conrad Hilton believed that the Cold War could be staged and won in the lobby of his international hotel, his employees, contractors, and congressional allies did not always agree with him, and they did not share his confidence in the battle he was fighting. Their performances were precarious and apprehensive, resulting in the untethering of modern selves and belying the claim that "the modernizers not only brought the solution, they were the solution; for the standards by which progress was to be measured mirrored their understanding of themselves."⁶³ The experts' self-understanding was not exclusively motivated by self-deception or insidious depoliticization but incorporated what Ann Stoler has called "epistemic uncertainty," revealing provisional "truth-claims" at best, in lieu of durable "regimes of truth."⁶⁴

The vagaries of expertise are inscribed in its often neglected affective components as well as its political and technical dimensions. The heterogeneity of interests on the part of US officials and their Turkish counterparts suggests a vision of expertise that exceeds the monolithic, disembodied, and calculating portraits we are accustomed to encountering in the literature. Failures, mistranslations, and uncertainties are intrinsic to expert knowledge and practice, yet their concealment need not secure the consolidation of expert authority. Rather, expertise is not only

crafted through material and local sites of encounters but also beset by risk and uncertainty as well as anxieties and hesitations on the part of its practitioners. Misunderstandings and gaps in knowledge do not stem exclusively from the hubris of the planners but are the very condition for expert knowledge and practice.

Encounters of the Archival Kind

The assemblage of the epistemic and political order that comprised modernization theory was predicated on an array of artifacts, instruments, traveling experts, and local knowledge practices. Encounters within this semiotic universe often took textual and documentary form, the primary expression of which I was able to observe in a variety of archival settings. The organization and circulation of documents as well as their authorship (and ownership) were crucial to contesting visions of authority, expertise, and modernization.⁶⁵ Much like the other material mediators of concern to this project, archival documents were also laden with a multiplicity of meanings rather than serving as the venue for a singular interpretative exercise. Their contingency was discernible in their storage in different locations, their varying aesthetics and audience, and their materiality, which exceeded the signs inscribed on them and the meanings they were supposed to communicate.

The compilation of files in different archival sites revealed that which was deemed worthy of preservation. Their categorization reflected and facilitated the registers of truth through which experts approached their domains of study. Official memoranda and reports were crafted with multiple audiences in mind, as though they were already situated to become the property of all, or at least of the researcher with the correct kind of permit and identification. Yet some collections, such as the records at the Turkish General Directorate of Highways, were presented to me with personal anecdotes about the hindrances interfering with archival efforts: the available documents were partial, salvaged from a trip to the Pulp and Paper Industry Foundation to be recycled along with others. This particular story about gaps in record keeping readily mapped onto the dictates of the modernizers—missing paperwork was a seeming placeholder for truncated development that was manifest in material as well as conceptual terms.

A crucial research site holding the private papers of Dankwart Rus-

tow, a modernization theorist central to this narrative, was not a designated venue of storage at all. It was in this setting, perhaps fittingly, that the affective, tentative dimensions of expertise became clear to me. Dusty folders were marked, arranged, and catalogued with a logic of their own, neither alphabetically nor chronologically; yet they were effortless to navigate once I became familiar with the dozens of drawers and boxes lying around. Those who opened up their homes, offices, and, at times, rather sterile institutional archives were equally hospitable; at the Middle East Technical University, however, “spoiled” documents were denied to me, causing me to abandon a direction of inquiry. No matter how orderly their display, archival documents were also liable to surprise. They could be misplaced, lost, or recycled, evading openness to access and legibility.

Archival materials thus mirrored the frailties of the projects they chronicled. As material sites of enactment, they deflected and distorted, rather than commanded, the display of coherent subjectivities. Self-reflexivity surfaced, if episodically, in the correspondences among the experts—an interminable yet productive breach between epistemic and political anxieties or the consternation involved in building a paradigm, a hotel, a road, or an empire. Unintended consequences of the archival record included filled-out questionnaires that had been excised from a particular published account. These surveys imbued the respondents with embodied voices and strategies of resistance, one of the few instances in which the institutional record was not able to efface the recipients of developmental projects. Often, archives exercised hegemony in their positions as selective repositories, troubled and troubling; yet they remained pregnant with the possibility of dialogical encounter with the material.⁶⁶ Excavating the parochialism of modernization through its archival inscription allows us to reconceive of its histories and futures, both of which are opened up through mutual glances and the relentless remaking of selves, theories, and artifacts over the course of their travels.

Outline of the Book

The remainder of the book shows the ways in which developmental thought and practice were not imposed in a unidirectional or homogenous fashion in Turkey. As the country became a so-called model for the Middle East and a laboratory of development, the interactions of American theorists and practitioners with their Turkish colleagues shaped their

ideas and projects about modernization. Although they encouraged the enactment of certain tenets of modernity (empathy, mobility, hospitality) in specific sites (survey research, highways, hotels), the negotiations and disagreements between social scientists, government practitioners, and private sector capitalists were constitutive features of development.

One figure whose life trajectory contained within it many of the contradictions of modernization theory was political scientist and Middle East specialist Dankwart Rustow. Chapter 1 traces the emergence of modernization theory and its Turkish archetype in the postwar period, drawing on my research in Rustow's published work and private papers. His engagements with various institutions, such as the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the political science faculty at Ankara University reveal his status as a seminal but hesitant participant in the laboratization of Turkey in academic and policy circles. His travels between these institutions underscore the anxieties of those who benefited from the circuits of funding that joined academic centers, governmental agencies, and private foundations. The reservations of his Turkish and American colleagues came to inform Rustow's increasingly critical attitude towards modernization theory, thus attesting to his precarious position as a self-conscious contributor to its construction in Turkey. Thus, modernization theory was not simply an academic endeavor and policy prescription designed in the United States and then applied to the Third World but also an intellectual and political project that was, from its inception, in contentious dialogue with its object of development.

Chapter 2 focuses on the role of survey research as a fragile experiment that was nonetheless central to the enactment of modernization theory. I primarily explore the private papers and writings of sociologist Daniel Lerner as well as other studies his work inspired throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Many of these surveys attempted to gauge levels of modernization across Turkey during this period and were funded by organizations as diverse as the Mutual Security Agency, the Turkish State Planning Organization, the Ford Foundation, and the Voice of America, among others. I argue that these studies, which were conducted to measure and record the attitudes of peasants, students, and administrators, were also efforts to *create* modern subjects: the survey setting was in fact designed to produce the forms of subjectivity and interpersonal relations articulated and idealized by modernization theory. But the dissemination

of survey methodology and attendant theories of modernization were derailed by skeptical respondents and disorderly interviewer behavior. Surveys, it seems, often outstripped the intentions of their coders, sponsors, and creators.

Modernization theory was not an internally consistent formulation. Rustow's historically informed analysis of political development and Lerner's behavioral research into what he called the communications revolution were at odds with each other. If Rustow exemplifies modernization theorists' doubts and discomforts, Lerner's survey research aimed to conceal those uncertainties. Lerner believed that surveys could help enact empathy, which he defined as "psychic mobility" and which he explicitly linked to the capacity for physical mobility. This capacity is the subject of chapters 3 and 4, with a focus on a particular medium for its cultivation: the construction of a highway network across the country.

Chapter 3 examines the flow of aid money and expertise between the United States and Turkey by looking at the American-funded and -planned Turkish highway network in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Like surveys, engineers' offices and training programs became microcosms for testing and implementing theories of private versus public sector developmentalism. I show how the arrival of American aid, experts, and machinery was expected to instigate modernization in administrative and mechanical terms by acquainting the new highway organization and its civil engineers with rational methods of record keeping, time management, and machine maintenance. From that perspective, a highway engineering program in Ankara was intended to become a center for training engineers and bureaucrats across the Middle East. Yet this project was short-lived, and interactions between American and Turkish organizations were marked by contestation. The location of highways, the employment of contractors, and the labeling of road-building equipment were material sites where the agencies competed over the management of the Turkish economy and staked out their claims to authority and visibility.

Chapter 4 describes the modernizing, civilizing, and democratizing tasks assigned to the highways that were constructed during this period as well as the unexpected consequences and unforeseen usages of those highways. I draw on parliamentary debates, newspaper articles, and engineering journals to show how the highway program displaced plans for land reform as the primary vision of development. Social scientists, experts, and officials on both sides of the Atlantic construed the provision

of roads to the Turkish countryside as a “civilizational necessity,” one that would enhance economic development, education, and access to an open society. The proponents of the program believed that roads would grant access to otherwise remote corners of the nation, especially areas populated by Kurdish minorities, and that highways would shrink distances between different parts of the country, thus allowing its subjects to participate in a shared national space and economy. Although the beneficiaries were expected to imagine themselves as part of a unified nation consisting of modern subjects, the impact of roads, maps, and buses often exceeded the intentions and expectations of their providers. Modernist visions of the highway system providing a path to a prosperous and open future were thus frustrated by material roadblocks and the misuse of vehicles and equipment, opening the very category of the modern up to contestation, appropriation, and redefinition.

Modernizers hoped that, in addition to their colonial and civilizational functions, roads would imbue the peasantry with a penchant for leisure activities, such as taking vacations. Chapter 5 builds on this theme with a focus on the efforts to develop a tourism industry in Turkey in the immediate aftermath of World War II and a focus especially on the design and construction of the Istanbul Hilton Hotel. The hotel was financed by the Turkish Pension Fund and by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which was responsible for administering the Marshall Plan. The actors involved in the creation of the hotel alternately framed it as a bulwark against the threatening march of Communism, a turning point in the consolidation of the tourism industry, and the signifier of a hospitable mindset, an attitude considered to be a necessary corollary to modernization. I begin with an overview of the different meanings attributed to the hotel, set against the backdrop of the purported alignment of interests between the Hilton Corporation, the Turkish government, and the ECA, all of whom sought support for tourism promotion instead of direct foreign aid from Congress. Rather than serving as a medium for the top-down imposition of an Americanized modernity, however, the hotel was contentious from the outset in terms of its style, funding, and site as well as of the various meanings it was expected to communicate: local architects and politicians protested the hotel’s role in the proliferation of the corporate International Style, the incursion of foreign capital, and the expropriation of a public park overlooking the Bosphorus. Their criticisms also took place in the context of ongoing en-

twinelements between urban redevelopment and dispossession, further revealing the local, material, and political components of modernization.

Anthropologists, sociologists, and historians have begun coming to terms with the convoluted imbrication of their research projects with empire and grand schemes of development.⁶⁷ Political scientists, however, for the most part continue to insist on the inevitability of their involvement with developmental, humanitarian, or counterinsurgency projects despite longstanding evidence of their own uncertainties and apprehensions about such work.⁶⁸ *Hotels and Highways* uncovers the material history and political effects of a particular moment of social scientific knowledge production in a context marked by unequal power relations. By tracing the crafting and application of modernization theory as central components of both American Cold War policy and domestic politics in Turkey, I cast light on what historians of science have labeled the entanglements of “problems of knowledge” with “problems of the political order.”⁶⁹