

- 55 Yalman, *Gördüklerimiz*, iv, 119.  
 56 Esirci, *Menderes*, 94-7, where the full text of the speech is given, and *Cumhuriyet*, 2 Oct. 1947.  
 57 *Cumhuriyet*, 5 Dec. 1947.  
 58 Kili, *Kemalism*, 160-61.  
 59 Quoted by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın in 'Şeriat İsteriz', *Tanin*, 3 Oct. 1947.  
 60 Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 38. İnönü was referring to men like Kenan Öner, Sadık Aldoğan, and Ahmet Tahtakılıç.  
 61 Karpát, *Politics*, 211-15. Karpát cites Kenan Öner's letter published in *Yeni Sabah*, 17 Jan. 1948.  
 62 *Cumhuriyet*, 9 May 1948.  
 63 For Bayar's views see *Cumhuriyet*, 13 June 1948 and for Menderes's views, Esirci, *Menderes*, 151-6.  
 64 *Cumhuriyet*, 21 Jan. 1949 and Karpát, *Politics*, 220.  
 65 *Cumhuriyet*, 31 Jan. 1949 and E. J. Benice, 'Günaltay Kabinesi ve Kalkınma Planı', *Son Telgraf*, 1 Feb. 1949.  
 66 *Cumhuriyet*, 11 Feb. 1949.  
 67 In the Assembly, when his party was accused of being against Islam, Günaltay retorted, 'I am the Premier of a government which has opened the Faculty of Divinity (*İlahiyat Fakültesi*) to teach the high principles of Islam in this country.' *Cumhuriyet*, 9 June 1949, quoted in *Ayın Tarihi*, June 1949, 27-31.  
 68 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, İçişleri Bakanlığı, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Dernekler* (Ank., 1950), 341-64.  
 69 Kemal Sülker, *Sabahattin Ali Dosyası* (Istanbul, 1968), 81 and *passim*.  
 70 Karpát, *Politics*, 372-3. The professors expelled were Pertev Naili Boratav, Niyazi Berkes, Adnan Cemgil, and Behice Boran. Boratav and Berkes emigrated to France and Canada respectively.  
 71 Karpát, *ibid.*, 232-3.  
 72 Erim's statement on the occasion of the anniversary of the Declaration of 12 July. *Ulus*, 13 July 1949.  
 73 The Democrats exposed these secret negotiations in 1955. See Toker, *Tek Parti*, 348-50; Karpát, *Politics*, 239; Yalman, *Gördüklerimiz*, iv, 208.

## CHAPTER II

## THE MENDERES ERA 1950-1960

*In many respects, the Ninth Grand National Assembly will have in our history a unique place. It is for the first time in our history that, as a result of a full and free expression of the national will, this distinguished Assembly has come to a position where it can shape the nation's destiny.*

*We shall remember that historic day [14 May 1950] as the day of victory not only for our party but for Turkish democracy.*

Adnan Menderes, speech in the Grand National Assembly, 29 May 1950

*Inter-party Relations in 1950*

THE Democrats had succeeded in wresting political power at the polls from the well-entrenched ruling party, a rare accomplishment in the politics of developing countries. But the election results created an identity crisis for the two parties since both had to adapt to new roles for which there was no precedent in Turkish politics. Despite rumours of military intervention (described in chapter 6 below), the transfer of power was carried out smoothly. The overwhelmingly Democrat Assembly elected Celâl Bayar as President, and he, in turn, appointed Adnan Menderes as his Prime Minister. The new government was announced on 22 May.<sup>1</sup>

Adnan Menderes (1899-1961) was an affluent landowner from Aydın, a prosperous and developed province in western Anatolia. He entered politics in 1930, joining the recently formed opposition party, the Free Republican Party. When this party was dissolved a year later he joined the RPP and was elected representative for Aydın. Menderes remained in the party until his expulsion in 1945. He was a founder-member of the Democrat Party, and the destinies of the two became intimately linked.

Menderes had come to the notice of Celâl Bayar during the 'Free Party experiment'. The latter was struck by his dynamism and his acute awareness of Turkey's problems. Menderes, he

recalled, understood the psychology of the people, especially the Turkish peasant, and possessed the qualities necessary for leadership. When Bayar decided in 1945 to form an opposition party he invited Menderes to be one of the founders. Later, he decided that if his party came to power at the general election of 1950 Menderes would be his Prime Minister. Only Menderes, he felt, had the personality and outlook to provide the modern and progressive leadership the country so badly needed in order to catch up with the developed West.<sup>2</sup>

The initial mature behaviour of the parties and the professions of goodwill towards one another proved deceptive. In fact, their relations in the Assembly and articles in party periodicals revealed unresolved tensions. The first confrontation was not long in coming. On 29 May Menderes presented his programme and this was followed by a debate during which the programme was criticized and defended. On 2 June Menderes answered his critics' charges and the Republicans sought the right to reply, in accordance with the regulations governing the procedure of the Assembly. However, Refik Koraltan, its Chairman, denied the opposition this right, and the Republicans walked out of the House in protest. The government received a vote of confidence, though there were 192 abstentions.<sup>3</sup>

The scene in the Assembly on 2 June was a bad omen for future relations between the parties. The press noted that this incident had virtually been a repeat performance of a debate which had taken place four years earlier on 14 August 1946. On that occasion Recep Peker had read his programme and the Democrats had requested an adjournment before the debate so that they could study the programme and prepare their criticism. The Chairman had rejected the request and the DP opposition had staged a walk-out. Before leaving the Assembly, Menderes had protested: '...if discussions are opened in this manner it means that we are not being given the opportunity to participate.'<sup>4</sup> There were other occasions when Republican governments had contravened parliamentary practice; now the Democrats were emulating their example.

Relations between the parties became even worse when, on 6 June, the government purged the high command of the Turkish armed forces, replacing the Chief of the General Staff and other senior officers with men not associated with the RPP and therefore more politically reliable.<sup>5</sup> The Democrats were very sensitive about their standing with the military, convinced that the commanders would not be totally loyal to the government while İsmet İnönü led the opposition. They reacted sharply when pro-RPP newspapers

tried to exploit the purge for political ends. These newspapers (*Ulus* and *Hürriyet*), the Democrats claimed, were carrying out a campaign designed to inflame feelings in the armed forces against the government. When the opposition continued its offensive and demanded an explanation for the changes in the armed forces, Menderes denounced these tactics as a campaign to subvert the army and the nation, a campaign which the RPP had opened when the Democrats had not even been in power a month. 'All our efforts', he said, 'are directed to cementing democracy in our country. If the RPP wants to enter into a successful partnership, it must expel those craving for power [*iktidar hastaları*, literally power-sick] from the leadership. It is the "power-sick" who want to spoil the [political] atmosphere. They have attacked and taken the offensive, using a polemic designed to show the distortion of political stability in the country...'<sup>6</sup>

Menderes's *iktidar hastaları* was a reference to İnönü and his followers in the RPP and manifested the deep fear of İnönü which most Democrats harboured. It was this factor, the Pasha factor (*Paşa faktörü*), which bedevilled inter-party relations in the decade under discussion and long after. İnönü-phobia was based on the conviction that İsmet Pasha had not really accepted DP rule and was determined to undermine the Democrats at the first opportunity. The Democrats felt insecure so long as İnönü was active in politics. Not only did İnönü make them feel insecure, he also brought out a sense of inferiority in a way they could not explain. The real cause of their insecurity was that, although they had acquired political power at the polls, they felt uncertain about their hold over the state—especially the central and provincial bureaucracies—the armed forces, the judiciary, and even the universities and the press. All these institutions, especially the armed forces, the Democrats imagined, still retained some loyalty to İsmet Pasha and the RPP. Unable to depend on the state, the Democrats emphasized their dependence on the 'national will' (*milli irade*), which became a fetish with them and their successors.

It is difficult, in the light of the overwhelming majority they enjoyed, to understand the Democrats' preoccupation with the opposition during these ten years. In not one of the three assemblies—1950, 1954, and 1957—did the opposition come close to challenging and bringing about the fall of the DP government. In these three assemblies the RPP, the largest opposition party, had 69, 31 and 178 seats, respectively, as compared to 408, 503 and 424 seats held by the Democrat Party. What, then, did the Democrats fear?

In fact, the DP oligarchy, sometimes described as the Bayar-

Menderes group, was more concerned about its standing with its own party than with the opposition. Menderes was always more apprehensive of his own supporters, who had the power both to challenge him and overthrow him. The preoccupation with İnönü and the RPP, although it was real enough, was also diversionary and provided an element of unity in a party far from united. As we shall see in the next chapter, Menderes had to spend much time and energy maintaining a hold on his own party.

Another factor which requires serious consideration in the discussion of democracy in Turkey is the attitude of the majority party towards the idea of opposition in general and opposition parties in particular.<sup>7</sup> Historically, opposition of any sort had been equated with hostility, in the minds of both rulers and ruled. With the introduction of constitutional government, the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, and political parties in 1908, it soon became evident that traditional political attitudes would continue to persist—and in such a political climate the opposition fared badly. When multi-party politics were restored in 1945 there had been no substantial change in political attitudes. The Republicans, then in power, did not expect the opposition parties to provide serious and constant criticism. They expected them to be the junior partners in government, providing mild criticism which would act as a safety valve and an element of stability in political life. The continued existence of a legal and active opposition bewildered and demoralized the supporters of the RPP, just as it increased support for the Democrats. The extremists in the RPP were aware of this and considered closing down the DP, but in the end the views of the moderates were able to prevail.

In power, the attitude of the Democrats to opposition was somewhat different from that of the Republicans. The Republicans, as the ruling party for over a generation, suffered from a sense of guilt in its dealing with the opposition. Even the legitimacy of Republican governments was in doubt since they had never come to power through free and honest elections; they had never received a mandate from the people. The Democrats, however, saw themselves as the new force in Turkish history which would take the 'revolution' to its final stage. They were confident that history was on their side and that their first task was to remove the RPP from power since that party under İnönü had become the principal obstacle to progress.

The Democrats believed that this obstacle had been removed by their victory at the polls, which they regarded as the culmination of the political revolution. Significantly, they described their electoral triumph as a 'white revolution'. But this was only the beginning,

for they intended to progress from the political revolution to a thorough-going social and economic transformation, for which they had the mandate of the 'national will'. Thus, they became impatient and frustrated with the RPP opposition, which, they claimed, had virtually lost its *raison d'être* and which ought now to permit the new government to get on with the task of moving the country forward. Instead, the opposition continued to harass the government by indulging in politics and nothing but politics. Its positive contribution after six months had been nil, and Menderes expressed his anxiety about an opposition that had not brought a single constructive question before the Assembly. He hoped the Republicans would soon get a grip on themselves.<sup>8</sup>

The Democrats' view of themselves and their attitude towards the opposition seemed to be confirmed by their continuing triumphs at the polls, at least during the first seven years. The municipal elections of 3 September 1950, the first test to be held since the general election, were a landslide victory for the Democrats. Of the 600 municipalities held by the Republicans, 560 passed under Democrat control.<sup>9</sup> In October the Democrats won the provincial elections (*Genel Meclis Seçimleri*) in 55 of the 67 provinces<sup>10</sup> and this pattern continued until the general election of 2 May 1954, when the Democrats increased their representation in the Assembly from 408 (1950) to 503 and their percentage of the vote from 53.59 to 58.42 per cent. The Republican representation was reduced from 69 to 31 and their percentage of the popular vote from 39.98 to 35.11 per cent.<sup>11</sup>

Each electoral success made it even more difficult for the Democrats to accept and tolerate criticism, and Nihat Erim complained in the columns of *Ulus* that 'ever since the Democrat Party came to power, its first government has not been able to make itself get used to criticism.'<sup>12</sup> The concepts that criticism should be tolerated and that it should be constructive would have to become rooted in Turkey's political culture before multi-party politics could succeed. Immediately after the municipal elections of 3 September 1950 Menderes made a remark which summed up the attitudes of his party: 'On 14 May the Turkish nation eliminated the People's Party from power; on 3 September it [the nation] eliminated it from opposition.'<sup>13</sup>

Some former Democrats, in their conversations with the author, had difficulty in explaining why their preoccupation with the opposition continued even though they had realized that there was no threat to their power. They agreed, in retrospect, that this had been their party's major error, for it had diverted them from more pressing problems. What the élite of the DP could not deal with

rationally was even more confusing for the party's rank and file. The rank and file had expected the victory of their party to reduce the RPP to total political impotence. To their surprise and bewilderment, the RPP—symbolized by İnönü—was still active and criticizing the new government with vigour.

This was the political climate in which Menderes began his rule. Throughout this decade inter-party strife, which became more bitter with time, remained a constant factor. Taken out of the context of relations between members within the parties, this factor is surprisingly incongruous since both parties had much in common and few areas of disagreement. Had Turkey been a developed country, where the function of the party system was to maintain the *status quo* or to bring about regulated change, the two parties might have functioned admirably. They differed about as much as the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States and had more in common than the Labour and Conservative parties in Britain. But they were not operating in a society in which the ruling class was united on the maintenance of the *status quo*; the Turkish ruling class was agreed on the need for change so long as the basic structure of society remained unaltered.

In spite of a broad area of agreement, the parties failed to agree on the nature and the pace at which the country ought to be transformed. The Republicans favoured a slower and steadier transformation in which bureaucratic-military groups within the power structure would not suffer unduly and would be given time and opportunity to be absorbed into the emerging capitalist society. The Democrats, on the other hand, had not considered the implications of their socio-economic programme. Their primary impulse was to develop the country as rapidly as possible, for they believed that once the country had gained sufficient momentum they would be able to eliminate errors and iron out the problems. Their only concern was to implement the programme for which they had a national mandate and which the opposition was hindering. By playing at politics it was distracting both the government and the nation from the urgent tasks ahead.

Much to the surprise and annoyance of the government, İnönü even criticized its decision to send a battalion of Turkish troops to Korea without consulting the opposition: 'The conformity of views between the Government and the opposition party over major national issues is a fundamental requirement in order to achieve unity in the country.'<sup>14</sup> The Democrats would have agreed but they objected to the way in which the Republicans exploited the issue. Some weeks later İnönü began to complain of the existence of instability and political insecurity in the country. The entire state

structure, from the army to the lower levels of the bureaucracy, felt threatened. Commenting on the measures the Democrat Party had introduced against the Left, İnönü said that 'The accusation of communism and the threat to expel a citizen from the country is a direct attack on the principle of the rule of law. It is enough to put an end to every kind of political activity.'<sup>15</sup> Two days later the Ministry of Finance announced that it was investigating the finances of the RPP in order to see how much money the party had appropriated from the state treasury during its twenty-seven years in office, and how much it owed to the state.<sup>16</sup> It soon became clear that the government intended to seek 'compensation' of about TL 50 million, a sum which was expected to cripple the party.<sup>17</sup>

Analysing inter-party relations, Nadir Nadi, the editor of *Cumhuriyet*, noted that although eight months had passed since the Democrats came to power the two parties had failed to establish normal relations. He held the Republicans responsible because they had not given the new government an opportunity to perform its task; they had begun to attack the government without waiting to see its performance. They should have waited until the 1951 budget had been introduced before launching their campaign. For their part, the Democrats were criticized for reacting immaturely towards the opposition,<sup>18</sup> and for carrying out measures designed only to please the people. It was one thing to serve the people, wrote Nadir Nadi, and another to please them. The Republicans, in their last years in power, had sacrificed principles in order to cultivate votes and had thereby lost the opportunity to serve the people. He advised the Democrats not to do the same<sup>19</sup>—a sound and prophetic warning which was repeated often but which went unheeded. The budget debates in February 1951 reminded Nadir Nadi of inter-party relations in the years after 1946: he pointed out that, even though the ruling party (*iktidar partisi*) had come 'to power with the genuine wish of the people and with a large majority', it did 'not have the psychological excuse from which the People's Party suffered in the late 1940s.'<sup>20</sup>

#### *Religious Reaction and Kemalism*

This period of bitter relations between the government and the opposition coincided with what is described as the 'religious reaction', marked by the vandalizing of Kemal Atatürk's busts and statues, insolent behaviour towards women in the small towns of Anatolia, and demands for the restoration of Islamic practice in Turkey and an end to militant secularism. At the Democrat Party provincial congress in Konya, for example, some delegates deman-

ded that the right to wear the fez and the veil, and to use the Arabic script, all three abolished by the Kemalist reforms of the 1920s, be restored.<sup>21</sup> These proposals were rejected by the party. But religious reaction had become issue number one for the RPP, much to the embarrassment of the DP leadership, though it hardly improved the RPP's image with the voter. The Republicans were able to renew their claim that they, members of the party of Atatürk, were the real guardians of his reforms. Menderes retorted that the real guardian of the reforms was the Turkish nation and the government began to take action against the Right.<sup>22</sup> The Ministry of the Interior issued a communiqué to all provincial governors ordering that measures be taken to protect Atatürk's statues, and investigations were opened against reactionary and clericalist publications such as *Büyük Doğu*, *Sebilürreşad* and *İslâmiyet*, which were charged with the exploitation of religion for political ends.<sup>23</sup>

The RPP's constant clamour about religious reaction and the Atatürk reforms seems to have been designed as a strategy to slow down change and to maintain the *status quo* for as long as possible. The DP leadership was embarrassed by the accusation of anti-Kemalism which was levelled against the party, but knew of no way to deal with it adequately since the accusation could never be satisfactorily defined. Many Democrats, especially men like Bayar, were able to make as good a claim to Kemalism as any Republican. In fact, they claimed that their aim was to make Kemalism a living ideology, as it had been before Atatürk died in 1938. On the fourteenth anniversary of Atatürk's death Menderes wrote that the task confronting Turkish society was not merely to preserve Atatürk's achievements (as the Republicans desired) in their original form and character, but to develop those achievements in accordance with the aims and motives which had governed them at the outset. Under the Democrats, the Turkish nation was experiencing the joys of such progress and Atatürk could rest eternally with a blessed soul.<sup>24</sup>

According to a DP interpretation of Kemalism—also shared by many Republicans—Atatürk had carried out his programme of reforms in order that Turkey should become Westernized within the capitalist system based on free enterprise. These were the 'aims and motives' of the reforms which Menderes referred to. This policy had been practised until the early 1930s, when it was found that both internal conditions and the world situation did not permit the continuation of this experiment. It was only then, perhaps encouraged by the Soviet example and aid, that the Kemalist régime decided to introduce active state intervention and

planning into the economy. But even then, the aim was to create an economy which was viable and a class of private entrepreneurs capable of taking over. When this class was sufficiently developed, the state enterprises would be transferred to it and a free market economy established. This was the transformation the Democrats sought to carry out and they saw it as being perfectly in keeping with the original aims of Kemalism.

The Democrats asked for political peace, implying an opposition which shared the same fundamental principles, so as to implement this programme. But the RPP, complained Menderes, refused to make political peace and insisted on attacking the government. The opposition's initial accusation had been that the Democrats were not keeping their election promises, but statistics had given a lie to this accusation and the Republicans had been forced to drop it.<sup>25</sup>

The Republicans did not end their campaign of vilification, however. Instead they began to propagate the myth that there was 'no political tranquility and security in the country, that a partisan administration was in power which was doing great damage to the administrative structure of the country. Citizens were not receiving equal treatment and were being dealt with according to their alleged political convictions. The administration was so partisan that everyone in public service was under the control of a kind of political commissar. Not even the judiciary was left untouched and measures were being taken which would render the independence of the judges null and void. The mentality of the administration made it impossible [for the opposition] to work within the context of the National Assembly.'<sup>26</sup>

During their first year of office the initiative was entirely in the hands of the Democrat Party. It met the opposition's warnings of religious reaction and the threat to reform by passing an act, popularly known as the Atatürk Law, on 25 July 1951. The new law was designed both to protect Atatürk's statues and his reforms and at the same time to prevent the 'defamation of the DP government'.<sup>27</sup> Economic conditions also favoured the government. Nature in 1950 and 1951 had been kind and the country enjoyed a bumper harvest, both in grain and cotton, which assured the Democrats of the rural vote in the by-elections of 16 September 1951. The urban working class vote, still very small and therefore of no great political consequence, had been virtually secured by the passage of the 'paid weekly holiday law' in August. Later in the month the government sent to various ministries for examination the draft of a bill which would give unionized labour the right to strike. This bill became the carrot dangled before the working class

but it was never passed by the Democrats during their ten years in office.

#### *The Democrats become Autocratic*

At this stage the Republican campaign carried no conviction for the voter, with the result that the Democrats won 18 of the 20 seats contested in 15 out of 17 provinces.<sup>28</sup> Success at the polls was followed by a 'foreign policy triumph'. In October 1951 the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreed in principle to accept Turkey's entry into NATO. In the climate of euphoria, the Republicans decided to maintain a low profile, but that was a temporary tactic and they resumed their campaign of castigation.

The RPP policy of constant criticism did not square with the DP interpretation of democracy and the Democrats concluded that the Republicans were not willing to play the game according to the rules. Deputy Premier Samet Ağaoğlu is said to have stated that 'Democracy is the régime of numbers. In this régime the wishes of the masses are carried out. We, as the responsible ones in power, are obliged to take into consideration the wishes of the mass of the people and not the shouts and criticisms of a handful of intellectuals.'<sup>29</sup> This view was consistent with, and complemented, the idea of the national will and was equally vague. It made the actions of a majority government democratic and legitimate, provided those actions were assumed to serve the people. The people had the ultimate power to judge the action and rectify an error at the next elections. Thus at the conclusion of the debate during which the Bill enabling the government to confiscate much of the property of the RPP was passed, Menderes said: 'If the nation declares that we have made a mistake, we will pay the price like men at the elections in three months' time.'<sup>30</sup>

It is on the basis of this cliché of the national will, repeated *ad nauseam* during the ten years, that many people have sought the principal philosophical differences between Democrats and Republicans. The Democrats were described as the populist, rural party and the Republicans as élitist, urban and supported by the intelligentsia.

The view that the majority party received its mandate from the people whom it served led the Democrats to conclude that they had the right to monopolize and to use for their own purposes all the institutions of the state. This was the mentality of a monoparty régime and was out of place in a multi-party system in which most state institutions ought to be neutral in relation to political parties.

The Democrats disregarded this principle and considered all institutions to be at the service of the party in power. When the Republicans accused the government of monopolizing the state radio—instead of providing equal time to the opposition—Menderes replied that this practice was completely democratic because the controlling authority of the radio, which was an organ of the state, was the government. The radio was not common property and it would not be shared with the opposition parties. 'For the last time, they [the opposition] must realize this. We are making all possible efforts to eliminate party politics from the radio and make it an objective instrument voicing the opinions of the state.'<sup>31</sup>

As a result of this attitude the Democrats slowly began to lose the confidence and support of those elements affected by this policy, who may be broadly categorized as the intelligentsia. They retained the support of the broad mass of the Turkish people—hardly affected by their policy towards the radio, the press, the judiciary, or the universities. The intelligentsia had supported the Democrats during their years in opposition precisely because the RPP had become too rigid and monopolistic in its control of state institutions. They had hoped that the Democrats would restore to the system the dynamism and flexibility it had originally had. They found, however, that the Democrats were guilty of the same sin as their predecessors, with the added disqualification of being able to find precarious legitimacy for their acts in the national will.

This explains why İnönü and his party were beginning to regain some support and popularity by mid-1952.<sup>32</sup> The role played by İnönü in these first two years was designed to make him appear the guardian of the state and its values, with only intermittent concern for the voter. The Democrats attributed to İnönü's personality and leadership the RPP's refusal to compromise with them, and they calculated that, if they could undermine his image and position in the party, the opposition would crumble. They were correct in viewing İnönü as the symbol of the opposition. Their task, however, was not an easy one.

The Democrats believed—as did many Republicans—that while İnönü remained leader, the RPP could not acquire the new personality that was necessary for multi-party politics. İnönü was too deeply implicated with the past, and the party could not be liberated from the one-party mentality until he and his faction had been purged.<sup>33</sup>

Over the country as a whole, İnönü's image in opposition still cast a great shadow. Since Atatürk's death İnönü had all but replaced him in the public mind. During the war years, when he

used the title *Millî Şef* (National Leader), he was almost guilty of establishing the cult of personality. He travelled round the impoverished country in the luxurious 'White Train' and in the city in a car surrounded by a motorcycle squad, a practice Celâl Bayar discarded. Furthermore, İnönü permitted statues of himself to be erected in public places, his picture to be printed on postage stamps and paper money, and his name to be given to streets, squares, and schools. The Democrats passed a law forbidding the erection of statues of the living as well as the use of their names for streets, squares and schools! Soon afterwards the İnönü banknotes were removed from circulation.<sup>34</sup>

For the Democrats, the relationship between their party and the RPP could be summed up in one word: İnönü. Speaking at a party rally in Istanbul, Mükerrrem Sarol, a prominent Democrat and Menderes's confidant, told his audience: 'We have nothing to give or take from the Republican People's Party; the problem is the İnönü problem. If there were no İnönü, there would be nothing between us we could not resolve. ...'<sup>35</sup> This view was inevitable in a political system as ideologically limited as the Turkish, in which political parties became personality parties rather than parties based on doctrines and ideology. The DP became a personality party (*kişi partisi*) by 1954, and the RPP did not stop being İnönü's party until 1972, when it dropped İnönü. It now seems to have become Ecevit's party.

In the last quarter of 1952 two factors contributed to make inter-party relations even more bitter. First, the Republicans chose to exploit differences in the DP caused by the challenge to the Bayar-Menderes leadership. This infuriated Menderes. Secondly, the government's policy of inducing rapid growth produced serious social and economic problems. In the long run the second factor was more serious because the effects of the unbalanced and unco-ordinated economic policies were only beginning to be felt and became more acutely serious with the passage of time. This involved very basic questions such as rising prices, shortages of basic commodities, and inflation, issues which the man in the street understood and with which the opposition could reach large numbers.

İnönü, sensing a serious division in the DP and hoping to force an early election, embarked on a campaign tour of Turkey in September 1952.<sup>36</sup> This tour prompted Menderes to ask: 'What is the purpose of their rallies? Are they forming a new party or preparing a national uprising? Is it patriotism to keep the nerves of the people on edge as though we were on the eve of elections ...?'<sup>37</sup> The tension kept on rising. On 7 October Republicans were

attacked by DP supporters and RPP buildings were stoned. Next day the governor of Balıkesir refused İnönü permission to hold a meeting in the town on the grounds that public order would be threatened. İnönü responded by cancelling the remainder of the tour, claiming that the government had made it impossible for the opposition to exercise its political rights.<sup>38</sup>

The attempt on the life of Ahmed Emin Yalman, one of Turkey's foremost journalists, on 22 November 1952 shocked the intelligentsia and brought the problem of the religious reactionaries to the forefront. The young schoolboy responsible was said to be a member of the Islamic Democrat Party, and Yalman was chosen as the target because he was a 'Jew and a mason'.<sup>39</sup> For the moment the two parties were forced to adopt moderate policies towards each other. Even the RPP's attempt to introduce a question in the Assembly on the Balıkesir affair ended without incident. In spite of the exchange of harsh words on 29 November, the parties were headed for a period of honeymoon. The beginning of the honeymoon was marked by the Prime Minister's appeal to the 'conscience, common sense and patriotism' of the Republicans and the proposal to collaborate against 'religious reactionaries, communists and other lunatics who are the enemies of freedom'.<sup>40</sup>

The DP-RPP truce lasted into July 1953, one of the longest periods of amicable relations between the two parties. Beneath the calm, however, the government continued its investigation of the RPP's wealth. In Manisa, Menderes stated that the RPP was 'a political organization worth 250 million Turkish liras. Not even the capital of our national bank is so large. Is this a party, a bank or an American style trust or cartel...? Where did they acquire all this...?'<sup>41</sup>

However, the government's decision on 8 July to close down the Nation Party brought the truce to an end. The pronouncements at the Nation Party's Fourth Congress were considered a threat to the Atatürk reforms and the party was accused of exploiting Islam for political ends. As though to confirm the government's accusation, a group of forty members led by Hikmet Bayur walked out of the congress when their proposal that the party remain faithful to the Atatürk reforms was rejected.<sup>42</sup>

Instead of supporting the government, the RPP issued a communiqué denying the rumour that there was any agreement between the party and the government on this issue. This came as a surprise since the 'RPP, as the heirs of Atatürk, might have supported government action against a party seeking to undo the Revolution. Instead it decided to condemn the action as the infringement of domestic liberty, and to use it as a weapon against

the government. ...<sup>43</sup> Thereafter relations between the two parties began to deteriorate rapidly.

### *The Election of 1954*

With a general election less than a year away, relations were bound to deteriorate. Political truce would have been disastrous for the opposition, whose very existence depended on controversy. The approaching election explains the RPP position on the closure of the Nation Party. The Nation Party votes could go to a sympathetic RPP—and that was precisely the accusation Hikmet Bayur made against the Republicans.

In preparation for the general election in 1954, the Democrats began to tighten their grip on the political situation in the country. On 16 July the Assembly Group of the party held an extraordinary meeting and decided unanimously to ask the government to prepare Bills designed to protect the established judicial, social, and political order. These Bills were to be submitted to the Assembly before the recess and the Assembly would remain in session until they had been debated and passed.<sup>44</sup> The amendments of the Universities Law, which forbade university professors from participating in politics, and the Law to Protect the Freedom of Conscience and Assembly were passed on 23 July and the Assembly went into recess.<sup>45</sup> A few days later Kasım Gülek, the Republican Party's Secretary-General, denounced these laws as anti-democratic measures designed to win the elections by devious means.<sup>46</sup>

By the end of October Menderes had virtually declared war on the opposition. He claimed that the Republican campaign was 'as disgusting as the broadcasts of Moscow' and gave a warning that his party had examined the situation carefully and in a spirit of patriotism and had decided that such an opposition was destructive and subversive. The relations between the opposition and the party in power, he said, were not those of criticism, discussion—or even struggle—but only of enmity. The situation could not be permitted to continue in this manner and the DP had decided to pay back in the same coin.<sup>47</sup>

The meaning of Menderes's warning soon became clear. The question of the RPP property came before the National Assembly on 9 December. After bitter debate, the Assembly voted to confiscate all Republican Party property which was not indispensable for the continuation of party activities. Apart from the material loss, which was substantial, this decision was a great blow to the prestige of the RPP. After the vote, İnönü made a speech in

the Assembly denouncing the decision in the strongest terms, and the RPP Group walked out.<sup>48</sup>

The Republican Party was in total disarray. This was apparent from its electoral campaign, in which it was able to raise neither issues nor enthusiasm. The Republicans emphasized their claim that the DP was heading towards a dictatorship; the confiscation of RPP property proved this, and the possibility of a fair election was therefore ruled out. In January 1954 İnönü proposed that a Constitutional Court be established to act as a check on the Democrats' unconstitutional activities. Nadir Nadi pointed out that this contradicted İnönü's earlier ideas and his policy during his years in power. Besides, this demand could not be met in the short time before the election in May.<sup>49</sup>

In February, soon after the Republican Nation Party (RNP) was founded as the successor to the dissolved Nation Party, İnönü established a loose electoral alliance with this party. When he was accused of wooing the conservative, religious vote by this action, he explained that the co-operation was designed to give the opposition strong representation in the Assembly, and the agreement did not concern the party's principles or programme.<sup>50</sup> In April İnönü adopted a radical posture, criticizing the government's economic policies, especially the Law on Foreign Capital Investment and the Oil Law, both of which were denounced as exploitation and reminiscent of the capitulations.<sup>51</sup> All these shifts and turns had no beneficial effect on the electorate and proved disastrous at the polls, especially with the Democrats steering a sure and steady course.

For the Democrat Party, victory at the polls presented no serious problem. The party's record during the first four years seemed to speak for itself. The good harvests, foreign credits, and the government's investment in public works gave an air of prosperity to the country and contradicted the opposition's propaganda.<sup>52</sup> Nor could citizens with vivid memories of Republican autocracy take seriously the RPP's propaganda concerning the lack of freedom and security. The average citizen felt freer in 1954 than he had done five years earlier.

The Democrats, however, were not taking any chances with the opposition's propaganda. On 8 March 1954 the government amended the Press Law and prescribed punishment for journalists whose writings were deemed harmful to the political and financial prestige of the state or invaded the private lives of citizens.<sup>53</sup> Furthermore the party in power was in a position to reward its supporters materially.<sup>54</sup> The programme of public works and factory construction had also been undertaken with an eye to the



electorate. That is why the opposition had described the numerous foundations for cement and sugar plants as 'election factories'.<sup>55</sup> On 2 May the Turkish people went to the polls and showed their overwhelming appreciation of the ruling party;<sup>56</sup> just as, three years later, they would make known their reservations.

### *The New Menderes*

It was natural that the magnitude of this electoral victory should influence the prevailing political climate. The Democrats' populist image was reinforced and any doubts about the élitist character of the opposition were removed. Before the election Menderes had sometimes spoken of the years 1950-4 as a transitional period which would come to an end with the 1954 election. After that, a new era of stability would open in which the opposition would come to terms with the national will and begin to play the role of friendly critic and junior partner to the majority party. If, on the other hand, the opposition chose to continue its old truculent policy, the party in power would have a formidable majority in the Assembly and the support of the national will in the country to carry any policy.

The metamorphosis in Menderes and the DP after the elections was also widely noted. Ahmed Emin Yalman, who saw Menderes immediately after the victory, was told quite frankly:

The elections have clearly revealed how much the citizens like the road I have taken. So far I have attached value to consultations with you journalists. Metaphorically speaking I used to seek your advice on whether to use aspirin or optalidon as a cure for nerves. Now the people's lively confidence makes it obvious that there is no further need for such consultations. I am going to have the final word and use aspirin or optalidon as I please.<sup>57</sup>

The impression of one-man government was inevitable after an electoral victory to which Menderes had contributed so much. He now thought he could disregard the press and the universities—two bastions of the intelligentsia—and rule on his own. He alienated both, and the consequences in the party were great. Liberal academics in the party such as Fethi Çelikbaş, Feridun Ergin, and Turan Güneş became disillusioned with the DP under Menderes only after 1954. Other academics who had been sympathetic to the DP struggle for democratic politics (for example, Turhan Feyzioğlu, who was not a member of the party and whose father was a Republican) also became lukewarm towards the Democrats.

Feyzioğlu joined others to air his discontent by writing in the Ankara weekly *Forum*.<sup>58</sup>

The marriage of grass-roots politicians and the intelligentsia could not last indefinitely. Liberalism became fashionable in the academic circles of Ankara and Istanbul in the late forties and fifties, just as socialism would become fashionable in the early sixties. Those who went as students to Britain and America returned home infatuated with Anglo-Saxon liberal ideals, which they planted in the universities. The fraudulent elections of 1946 had convinced the Turkish intelligentsia that parliamentary democracy could be achieved only with a DP victory and therefore the Democrats received the whole-hearted support of the intelligentsia.<sup>59</sup>

Many of the academics who supported the Democrats were interested primarily in political liberalism, of which economic liberalism was seen as a logical extension. In western Europe the process had matured in reverse; political liberalism had been the outcome of economic liberalism. While in opposition the Democrats had been sincere about liberalism, both political and economic. In power, however, their principal concern was the economy. In this respect they shared the aspirations of the Republicans: both wanted to achieve material progress that would transform Turkey into a 'Little America'.<sup>60</sup>

Factions in both parties reached the conclusion that political liberalism would act as a brake on economic expansion. In opposition the Democrats had been very hostile to this view, held by the Republican extremists. In power, Menderes found that the RPP extremists had not been so wrong after all and that political liberalism did distract the government from the task of economic expansion. By 1954 the Turkish liberals had learned their lesson: liberalizing a régime was not the same as transforming it into a liberal régime.

Menderes soon discovered that the political problems he had faced during his first term had been aggravated by the election results. The opposition was now weaker than before; the RPP's representation in the Assembly had dropped from 69 to 31. The party was demoralized and hardly in a position to exercise the functions of opposition. The Democrat Party's strength had increased to 504 seats, but internally this weakened rather than strengthened the party. Opposition to the Menderes-Bayar group began to crystallize and Menderes became more determined to establish his supremacy over the party.

Menderes told the Assembly on 24 May that the programme he was presenting was not new; it was already well known to the

party and one which had been explained and defended throughout the country during the election campaign.<sup>61</sup> The cabinet he had presented on 17 May, however, was very different in character from the earlier ones. This was the first uncompromisingly 'Menderes cabinet' because the election had been won not by the party but by Menderes. Confident of his power, he decided to carry out a major reconstruction of the cabinet and the party. He felt free to bring in trusted friends like Mükerrrem Sarol who were not popular with the party. In his new cabinet Menderes introduced seven new ministers and shuffled four.<sup>62</sup> The Assembly Group's reaction to this cabinet was such that it nearly led to the fall of Menderes in December 1955.

The threat came from within his own party; but again he concentrated his verbal fire on the opposition. In his programme he warned the opposition that

... we will not permit the continuation of the preceding period with all its serious mistakes, its irrational, corrosive and dishonourable quarrels, its false political struggle based on lies and slander as though nothing had happened on 2 May. [Applause and shouts of 'bravo' from the left.] The results of the last elections are of great significance and their extremely important and continuing consequences will be felt on the destiny of the country. The recent elections most definitely separate the preceding transitional period from the one which is now beginning.

This is how we understand the meaning of 2 May.<sup>63</sup>

### *Measures against the Opposition*

Menderes's task of consolidating his position in the party and the country would have been made easier had the economic troubles caused by four years of haphazard policies not begun to surface. Rising prices, spiralling inflation, shortage of goods and black-marketeering forced the government to announce in July that it would curtail commercial credit to importers in order to prevent the speculative hoarding of goods and that it would take other measures to combat inflation and profiteering.<sup>64</sup> The government introduced other devices such as foreign exchange controls and amended its very liberal foreign trade regulations. But all these were insufficient to check the economic crisis that was building up. To make matters worse, Turkish agriculture, which had seemed tremendously dynamic until 1953, began to show signs of stagnation. Production had increased because of an increase in the acreage cultivated and good weather, not because of greater yields per acre. In 1954 the harvest was below average and by the end of the year Turkey was forced to import American wheat.<sup>65</sup> In

October, airlines operating in Turkey raised the price of tickets by 25 per cent if they were bought in Turkish liras.<sup>66</sup>

The opposition now had an issue which affected the lives of ordinary people. Menderes, however, refused to acknowledge the existence of a serious economic situation, let alone a crisis. He saw the problems as minor, capable of being resolved by adequate legislation. He blamed the opposition for constantly harping on these issues and painting a picture which was bleaker than the reality. In fact, the opposition's criticism had turned into something like a self-fulfilling prophecy and made the task of the government more difficult.<sup>67</sup> The failure of the economy became one more reason why Menderes felt he had to silence the opposition.

The Press Law had already been tightened on 8 March 1954, before the general election in the following May. On 30 June the Assembly amended the Electoral Law so that a candidate rejected by one party could not stand for another in a coming election, thereby checking the tendency to defect. It became obligatory for government officials to resign six months before an election if they wished to contest it. Opposition parties were forbidden to put up mixed lists, a measure that nullified the possibility of electoral co-operation between them. Finally, the state radio would no longer be used by the opposition parties although the party in power would continue to use it.<sup>68</sup> On 5 July the Assembly passed a new law which empowered the government to suspend, and, after a period of suspension, to retire employees of the state, including professors and most judges who had either twenty-five years of service or were over sixty. This ended the bureaucracy's independence of the executive.<sup>69</sup>

The effect of these measures was to increase Menderes's unpopularity amongst the intelligentsia, a trend which continued until his fall on 27 May 1960. At the same time, however, his repressive legislation had made his position impregnable to legal attack. 'Today', concluded İnönü in a parliamentary debate, 'there is no force in the Assembly Group, in public opinion, nor in the press which can stop the Prime Minister from the road he has taken and push him towards moderation.'<sup>70</sup>

In the summer of 1955 the Cyprus question had come to dominate Turkish politics and the government exploited the issue to cover up its own deficiencies. The RPP all but gave up its function of opposition; on 26 August, three days prior to the opening of the London Conference on Cyprus, the Republicans declared that they were putting aside unilaterally the debate on internal politics as a sign of solidarity with the government.<sup>71</sup>

The İstanbul riots of 6/7 September exposed the pent-up

tensions in Turkish cities. It was rumoured that these riots were organized by the government to demonstrate to the London Conference how strongly the Turkish people opposed *enosis*, the unity of Cyprus with Greece. But this organized demonstration of high school and university students spontaneously degenerated into a riot—the rebellion of the Istanbul ‘*lumpenproletariat*, the bootblacks, porters, apartment janitors and mendicants—ex-villagers barely subsisting amidst the relative luxury and wealth of the city.’<sup>72</sup> This mob pillaged both Greek and Turkish stores in a fit of ‘merciless hostility to wealth’. This was the first mass reaction against the DP’s ‘never-seen-before development’.<sup>73</sup>

The government was visibly shaken by the turn of events and immediately declared martial law in Turkey’s three main cities, Ankara, Istanbul, and İzmir. Martial law enabled the government to tighten its political control and check dissent. But dissension within the Democrat Party rose sharply as the result of the riots and the Minister of the Interior, Namık Gedik, resigned on 10 September 1955. In the next two months, Menderes’s position had been so totally eroded that he was prepared to resign, so demoralized was he by the barrage of criticism from within the Assembly Group. But he was persuaded to go before the Group and to offer the formula of seeking a vote of confidence for himself while his cabinet resigned. The Group accepted this compromise and Menderes survived.<sup>74</sup>

Menderes emerged temporarily chastened from this experience. But the long-term effect of the compromise proved to be disastrous for Menderes, the party, and the nation. He came to see himself as indispensable; the entire cabinet could be sacrificed, but not Menderes. In accepting this compromise the Assembly Group had violated the principle of cabinet responsibility, so necessary for democratic government. The dissidents in the party lost all hope of being able to democratize the party from within and decided to go into open opposition. On 20 December 1955 they officially announced the formation of the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*).<sup>75</sup>

The reconstituted cabinet and its programme were both indicative of the new and chastened Menderes.<sup>76</sup> It included ministers who had the approval of the Assembly Group; men close to Menderes, for example Sarol, had been dropped—Sarol was even sent before the Disciplinary Committee accused of activities which created discord and destroyed unity in the party.<sup>77</sup> The programme was so full of compromise, meeting almost all the demands of both the DP dissidents and the opposition, that İnönü asked rhetorically: ‘Is it their programme or our list of demands?’<sup>78</sup> İnönü also

noted that ‘Adnan [Menderes] is playing for time. He will not implement any of it.’<sup>79</sup> Within a short time İnönü’s assessment was proved correct and 1956 went down as the year of Turkey’s retreat from democracy, when the ruling party destroyed democratic institutions.<sup>80</sup>

There is an intimate relationship between the deteriorating economic situation and politics. As prices rose and shortages increased, the public became more responsive to the criticisms of the opposition; Menderes responded by taking measures to isolate the public from politics. After the repressive measures, political activity outside the framework of the Assembly virtually became impossible. The law against public meetings made it difficult for a population whose literacy level was low to learn the views and criticism of the opposition. Those who were literate were left face to face with a muzzled press. Only discussion in the Assembly remained free, and later the government put pressure on the press to stop publishing reports of Assembly debates.<sup>81</sup>

The runaway inflation forced the government to resort to the National Defence Law, first introduced on 18 January 1940 when the country had had to face the hardships of wartime neutrality. The Law of 6 June 1956 gave the government broad powers of intervention in controlling prices and the economy. The passage of this law suggests that Menderes was not dogmatically committed to *laissez-faire* practices, as is often suggested. His economic position, while committed to capitalism, was ‘pragmatic’ and nearer that of the RPP than the liberal Democrats who had formed the Freedom Party. Freed from their influence and pressure, Menderes was quite willing to turn to controls.

With the emergence of the Freedom Party as an important force, the political situation became fluid. Menderes was able to re-establish his hold over the Democrat Party without serious difficulty. But the character of the party changed significantly with the liberal wing in opposition. The DP became Menderes’s party and there was no longer anyone with national stature, except possibly Sıtkı Yırcalı, capable of challenging his leadership. Ideologically, the party remained committed to free enterprise; but now, like its leader, it was closer to the Republicans than to the Freedom Party.

In 1956 the opposition, in spite of the burden of legislative repression, became more confident and aggressive. Initially, the Republicans declined in influence and prestige and by December the Freedom Party had become the chief opposition party, with 32 members in the Assembly.<sup>82</sup> But the Freedom Party lacked the national

organization necessary to transform it into an effective opposition party and its strength was therefore ephemeral.

### *The Election of 1957*

The sense of political uncertainty which existed throughout 1956 could be resolved only by a general election. The Democrats, aware that they were losing ground and popularity in the country, postponed by-elections on 11 July and local elections on 1 September.<sup>83</sup> Despite these signs of the DP's reluctance to go to the country, by the end of the year rumours of an early election were strong.

On 5 January 1957 Menderes again denied such a possibility.<sup>84</sup> The first sign that he intended to hold a general election in 1957 was the government's announcement in May that the buying price of grain had been raised.<sup>85</sup> This was bad economics because it stimulated purchasing power in the countryside and increased inflation. But it was good electoral politics since it virtually guaranteed the rural vote. The increasing chauvinism over Cyprus—especially while the Soviet Union supported Makarios, and the growth of the Left in neighbouring Syria also strengthened the hand of the Democrats. By seeking a consensus on foreign policy they forced the opposition parties to accept a more passive electoral campaign.<sup>86</sup>

Only on 4 September did the Democrats announce that the general election would be held on 27 October, but an unofficial campaign had been in full swing throughout the summer. The opposition parties had been holding consultations to consider the question of co-operation and unity. This time they seemed to be making progress and were able to issue a joint proclamation of principles on 4 September. The Democrats, seeing this as a possible threat to their electoral chances, decided to present a Bill that would prevent opposition unity.<sup>87</sup> In the Assembly, Minister of State Emin Kalafat denounced 'the joint proclamation of the three opposition parties, who wanted to form a hostile front against the legitimate government in the guise of co-operation, as a document of subversion.'<sup>88</sup> However, the Democrats need not have worried, for in the end the opposition parties were unable to find a formula for co-operation, the RNP and the FP blaming İnönü and the RPP for the deadlock.<sup>89</sup>

In this election the Democrat Party still held the advantage. In spite of inflation the government pleased rural voters, who constituted the majority of the electorate, by paying a higher price for produce and establishing a moratorium on farm debts. The

government distributed funds for schools and mosques and used the state radio for party propaganda; speaking in Kayseri, Menderes claimed that under his rule 15,000 mosques had been built in seven years.<sup>90</sup> The tension over Cyprus and the confrontation with Syria and the Soviet Union also helped. But in spite of all these positive advantages it was doubtful whether the Democrats would be able to win a majority as they had done in the past.

By the summer of 1957 economic hardship had become a reality though it affected the towns more than the countryside, and the poorer provinces of central and eastern Anatolia more than the prosperous west. Had the elections been held according to schedule, in May 1958, the story might have been different both in relation to further economic deterioration and opposition unity.

The opposition parties emphasized economic hardship and the lack of freedom, but they offered no appealing alternative. The RPP was the only opposition party with a national following. But during its seven lean years in opposition it had failed to eradicate its authoritarian image and win public confidence. It had succeeded only in regaining the support of the intelligentsia. Of the other two parties, the RNP was too parochial and the Freedom Party too vague and ill organized.

Nevertheless, the election of 27 October 1957 was a major setback for the Democrats. They still won an overwhelming majority in the Assembly: 424 seats as compared to 178 (Republican) and four each for the RNP and the FP. Perhaps more significant than the seats was the relatively low turnout of voters. Only 77·15 per cent of the eligible voters voted, as compared to 88·75 per cent in 1954 and 89·06 in 1950. The Democrats received 47·90 per cent of the vote—whereas in 1950 and 1954 they had won more than 50 per cent—and thus lost the right to claim the mandate of the national will. The Republican vote had risen from 36 to 41 per cent, an increase which gave the party greater confidence.<sup>91</sup>

### *Instability Continues*

Menderes had held an early election in order to restore political stability and calm but the results produced only greater instability and tension. There had been some violence on election day and the Republicans began to question the legality of the election and the honesty of the results.<sup>92</sup> On Republic Day (29 October) there was an anti-government demonstration in Gaziantep and troops were called in to disperse it. Menderes was in a state of panic. He sent

his Defence Minister Şemi Ergin to investigate, telling him 'There is a rebellion (*ihtilâl*) in Gaziantep. The people have attacked the Government.'<sup>93</sup> On his return to Ankara, Ergin found soldiers and tanks at strategic points in the capital. This, Menderes told him, was because the Assembly would meet that day and perhaps the People's Party would seize the Assembly or there might be a rebellion. 'As a matter of fact', noted Ergin, 'once this anxiety gets into those who rule the country, it does not augur well for the future.'<sup>94</sup> Menderes's anxiety was not without some basis, for prior to the elections there had been rumours of military conspiracy and intervention.<sup>95</sup>

Menderes was unable to announce his new cabinet until 25 November, almost a month after the election.<sup>96</sup> During this period there was hardly any governmental activity, though the Assembly Group of the DP was busy discussing the policy of the new government. On 14 November the Group asked the government to take action against officials who had supported the opposition, and proposed more stringent press laws which would forbid 'harmful articles and pictures' as well as legal measures against the opposition.<sup>97</sup> On 19 November it voted unanimously to request the Assembly to investigate the opposition's activities before and after the election to see if they had been subversive.<sup>98</sup> By December there was even talk of amending the rules and regulations of the Assembly in such a way as to make opposition within it virtually impossible and to prevent reports of its proceedings from reaching the public. The amendments were passed on 27 December: sovereignty, which the constitution invested unconditionally in the people, passed into the hands of the government.<sup>99</sup>

These amendments marked the end of the freedom of speech, even in the Grand National Assembly. There were bitter discussions, but when the opposition members saw that their arguments had no effect on the government benches they decided to stage a walk-out in protest (25 December). Not even all Democrats were happy with these measures and many stayed away from the discussions; on the day of the vote only 381 out of 424 were present.

In this climate of political repression and increasing economic hardship came the first hint of military conspiracy against the government. On 17 January 1958 the press reported the arrest of nine officers in Istanbul on the charge of fermenting rebellion in the army. In spite of a long investigation, including torture, the authorities were unable to uncover anything; of the nine, all were released except the informer, who was sentenced to gaol. But the government had received a scare and became even more nervous

and truculent. The Minister of Defence Şemi Ergin was forced to resign and was replaced by Ethem Menderes, who was very close to the Prime Minister though in no way related to him. Adnan Menderes did not give this incident very much importance because he was convinced that the armed forces as a whole remained untainted by conspiracy and he was misled by the support for the régime from the senior officers.<sup>100</sup>

#### *The DP and the State*

By the beginning of 1958 the government had become totally isolated from virtually all the institutions of the state. First, it had been the press and the judiciary, followed by the civil bureaucracy in the 1957 election, and finally the army and the universities. The Ministry of Education had had trouble with some professors in 1957 and after the amendment of the Assembly regulations the conflict became more acute. Hüseyin Naili Kubalı, Professor of Constitutional Law at Istanbul University, denounced the measures of 27 December as unconstitutional and declared that journalists were not bound by law to obey them.<sup>101</sup> Tevfik İleri denounced the professor's riposte against the measures as interference in everyday politics and a violation of the Universities Law.<sup>102</sup> The following day it was announced that the Senate of Istanbul University would consider the Kubalı case and on 1 February Professor Kubalı was suspended.<sup>103</sup> This marked the beginning of a serious confrontation between the government and the universities, bringing together the two ingredients which played an important role in the overthrow of the Democrats: the army and the intellectuals.

Despite the government's measures, the economic situation did not improve in 1958 as Menderes had expected. Not only did the restrictive legislation fail to provide relief to the consumer, it had the effect of alienating important supporters of the government like the cotton farmers and the businessmen. The cotton farmers protested against the decision to freeze prices; the İzmir Chamber of Commerce criticized the measures to fix prices and regulate distribution and proposed that they be lifted, since competition was the only way to curb inflation and overcome shortages.<sup>104</sup> Unable to cope with the economy, Menderes decided, under foreign pressure, to introduce a stabilization programme on 4 August 1958. This involved a *de facto* devaluation of the Turkish lira from 2.80 to 9.025 to the US dollar. With this concession came the announcement of a \$359-million credit from Turkey's allies which bolstered the government's financial position and was

described by the opposition as a 'life belt' thrown to Menderes by the Western powers.<sup>105</sup>

The revolution in Iraq on 14 July 1958 added a new dimension to Turkish politics. It made a deep impression on the DP leaders, who now came to see military intervention backed by popular support as a potential threat to their power. It created in their minds a veritable revolution phobia. The opposition was seen in a new light, as being inevitably designed to subvert the government. Less than a month after the Iraqi revolution, the Assembly Group of the Democrat Party issued a communiqué accusing the RPP of attacking the Assembly, the ruling power (the government), and the Turkish nation. The communiqué ended with these words: '... it is evident that a democratic administration cannot work with such an opposition productively or in a state of security.'<sup>106</sup> The Assembly Group which issued this communiqué also decided to look into the RPP's activities when the Assembly reopened on 25 August, and, if it was deemed necessary, to take appropriate measures. This was the first hint of investigating the Republican Party.<sup>107</sup>

Menderes's Balıkesir speech of 6 September 1958 is considered by the Republicans as the beginning of a campaign of active repression against İnönü and his party.<sup>108</sup> It was also the first occasion on which Menderes used the word 'revolution' in the context of Turkish politics.<sup>109</sup> The direction that Menderes was intending to take became clear when he spoke at the party's İzmir Congress. He said that 'just as precautions are being taken against commercial profiteers under the National Defence Law it is becoming necessary to take precautions against profiteers in politics.' He then singled out the Republicans for criticism, and warned them that if they again threatened the bureaucracy, as they had been doing, it would mean curtailing democracy (*Demokrasiye Paydos*).<sup>110</sup> Finally, on 12 October Menderes appealed for the creation of a 'Fatherland Front' (*Vatan Cephesi*) against the 'front of malice and hostility' being created by the Republicans.<sup>111</sup> Menderes, attracted by General de Gaulle's example, was himself in search of a new type of populist régime.

In spite of the threats of repression, the RPP was gaining confidence and assuming the offensive. The Freedom Party, which had briefly challenged the RPP's claim to be the principal opposition party, dissolved itself and the majority at its Extraordinary Congress voted to merge with the Republicans.<sup>112</sup> The Republicans needed to make no great efforts to increase their popularity; the government's continuing economic setbacks took care of that. At the same time the RPP was changing its image and

acquiring a new identity. The Fourteenth Congress (12-15 January 1959) marked the beginning of a new orientation in the party, towards a greater concern for economic welfare and social justice and away from abstractions, which had been its primary concern throughout the 1950s.<sup>113</sup> Soon after the campaign to establish the Fatherland Front and isolate the opposition 'Everyone, irrespective of party affiliation was urged to stand against the policy of subversion and destruction which endangers national security, leads our fellow-countrymen to fratricide and speaks ill of the efforts made for the good of the nation.'<sup>114</sup> The government used the carrot and the stick in its campaign, promising to reward those who supported the Front and punishing those who did not. Villages were promised roads, credits, and mosques; and a village which had voted Republican had its electricity cut.<sup>115</sup> This 'populist' campaign was a failure because it could not arouse any genuine enthusiasm.

Menderes's survival in the air crash at Gatwick on 17 February 1959 introduced a new element into the political situation: the Menderes personality cult and religion, the one complementing the other. Menderes's escape was indeed a piece of good fortune in a tragic crash which took the lives of fourteen members of the delegation. In Turkey the escape was presented as a miracle and Menderes was portrayed as one chosen by God.<sup>116</sup> Religion had been exploited by both parties throughout the multi-party period, but now the exploitation became explicit and uncontrolled. The RPP was accused of atheism and of being anti-Islam while the DP projected an image of religiosity. The Democrats, unable to offer material rewards as they had done in the past, found it useful to offer spiritual ones. The opposition now had another issue to use against the ruling party, but one which did not find a response in the majority of the voters though it did stir the Kemalist sentiment in the armed forces.

### *The Democrats Lose the Initiative*

The political initiative had passed to the Republicans. In spite of his victory in 1957 Menderes was uncertain about his strength in the country and the party. Dissension in the local organizations of his party had continued even after the expulsion and resignation of the leaders in 1955. In a number of provinces, where congresses should have been held at regular intervals, the party had postponed them year after year, knowing that each congress would expose new divisions. Menderes had tried to place his men in local

organizations but this took time and planning and he was too preoccupied with problems at the centre, especially the economy.

The Democrat Party was in no position to hold elections in 1959 but on 25 March that is precisely what the Republicans proposed that it should do.<sup>117</sup> In April the Republicans launched a country-wide propaganda offensive, the climax of which was İnönü's tour of the Aegean region on 30 April. The tour had been well publicized and İnönü was met in Uşak by an enthusiastic crowd. The Aegean region was a Democrat stronghold. İnönü's arrival provoked a counter-demonstration and the police used tear-gas to clear the crowd. As İnönü's party was leaving Uşak for İzmir it was attacked by a large unruly mob and İnönü was struck on the head with a stone. This aroused bitter indignation throughout the country and was exploited to great effect by the Republicans.<sup>118</sup>

These incidents stretched the relations between the DP and the opposition parties to breaking point. The Republicans, unable to have the matter discussed in the Assembly, let alone investigated, resorted once more to a walk-out.<sup>119</sup>

Turkish politics were caught in a blind alley and the economy was in the doldrums. The stabilization programme of August 1958 had failed to halt inflation and 1959 was the year of rising prices. By the middle of June there was talk of an early election in order to resolve the political stalemate but the decision would depend on the prognostications of the experts on the performance of the economy.

These rumours of an election were sufficient to trigger off another tour of Anatolia by the Republicans designed 'to take the truth to the people in every corner of the country'.<sup>120</sup> But the economic situation did not permit an early general election and the government could not even risk holding by-elections in the prevailing atmosphere.<sup>121</sup> The opposition was therefore robbed of the right to hold public meetings—since these were now permitted only during an election campaign—and the political frustration increased. The policy of the government became more repressive but the RPP refused to be intimidated. Republican members of the Assembly continued to tour the country, an activity which was denounced as subversive by some Democrats who even demanded the closure of the RPP.<sup>122</sup> There were rumours that the decision on closure had already been taken.<sup>123</sup>

The year 1959 had been disastrous for democracy in Turkey. For the press, which was considered the conscience and guardian of a democratic régime, it was a year of trial and tribulation during which more newspapers were closed down and journalists imprisoned than in any other year.<sup>124</sup> Political activity had become

almost totally negative and non-productive, with the result that the average citizen was disillusioned and demoralized. Only the intelligentsia which supported İnönü and the RPP retained its enthusiasm for politics.

The Republicans claimed that the Democrats had taken them by surprise by holding an early election in 1957. They would not permit that to happen again and were therefore conducting an unofficial campaign, calculating that there would be a general election in 1960. The government could do little to check the opposition's activities, except to threaten more repressive measures. But this created the danger of escalation, bringing with it the threat of political turmoil and military intervention. However, by February 1960 there were rumours of further restrictive measures such as the requirement of official permission to hold press conferences and reduction of the period for election propaganda from 45 to 17 days.<sup>125</sup> However, the possibility of an early election was ruled out after the 1960 budget was voted on 1 March and next day the Assembly went into recess until 4 April.<sup>126</sup> Republican calculations based on an early election had been upset and a few days later the party made a declaration that 'it was now impossible for the two parties to overcome their differences'.<sup>127</sup>

### *The Road to Military Intervention*

The resignation of Vehbi Koç, the head of a vast commercial and industrial empire, from the RPP was symbolic of the turn the political situation was about to take. In his letter of resignation Koç wrote: 'I decided to resign from the RPP [which he had supported since its foundation] once it was clear that the inter-party conflict would be renewed with greater violence. I decided that when that happened I would not be in either party and would devote myself to work and activity that I am convinced will be of benefit to the country'.<sup>128</sup> He had sensed that the political situation would become worse and wanted no part in it.

The Republican declaration that 'it was now impossible for the two parties to overcome their differences' was a correct evaluation. In spite of the similarities in the programmes and ideologies of the two parties there was no agreement on the implementation of the programme. Electoral politics dominated the thinking of both parties. The Republicans, convinced that they would win the next election, pressed the government to hold it as soon as possible. But they issued a warning that unless the next election was fair, and held in an atmosphere of freedom, there could be a revolution.

Some newspapers were even comparing the situation in Syngman Rhee's South Korea with that in Turkey.

On 2 April 1960 Minister of Justice Esat Budakoğlu resigned and next day Celâl Yardımcı was appointed in his place. Yardımcı was very close to Menderes and Bayar and he is said to have been given this portfolio because Menderes could rely on him to carry out a programme of reform.<sup>129</sup> It is possible that Menderes wanted to fill such a key position as the Ministry of Justice with a person who would not question a policy of greater restraints against the opposition. Yardımcı's appointment coincided with the Kayseri incident, in which the train taking İnönü to Kayseri was stopped by the authorities and İnönü was asked to return to Ankara. He refused and was permitted to go after a delay of three hours, but this matter aroused great indignation.<sup>130</sup> The government was again embarrassed but reacted aggressively by accusing the RPP of conspiratorial activities, for which it claimed to have documentary evidence.<sup>131</sup> Next day the DP Assembly Group accused the opposition of instigating a military revolt and subversion, and requested that an Assembly Committee of Investigation be set up to establish the facts about the activities of the opposition.<sup>132</sup>

In spite of the accusation of the Assembly Group, *Cumhuriyet* was able to report that 'Adnan Menderes does not favour new tough measures at the moment; he defends the view that the country needs a period of tranquillity, not a period of darkness.'<sup>133</sup> Nevertheless, after a brief but acrimonious debate, an Assembly Committee of Investigation was set up on 18 April to investigate the Democrat charges that the opposition had transgressed legal limits. The Committee, made up entirely of Democrats and therefore hardly impartial, was given extraordinary powers which superseded those of the Assembly and the Courts, thereby violating the constitution itself. Using its powers, the Committee recommended the suspension of all political activity for three months and of all reporting of Assembly debates on the matter being investigated until the Committee had completed its work. On 27 April a Bill was passed empowering the Committee to censor the press, to suppress newspapers, to issue subpoenas, and to impose sentences of up to three years' imprisonment on anyone who resisted or hampered its work.<sup>134</sup>

The creation of the Committee immediately sparked off a demonstration in Ankara, on 19 April, which was dispersed by the police. On 26 April law professors denounced the authority granted to the Committee as unconstitutional. Next day the Assembly passed a law which increased the powers of the Committee, and it was during the discussion of this matter that

İnönü was suspended for twelve sessions for having 'used words inciting the people to revolt and to resist the laws, and openly attacked the Turkish nation and army and the integrity of the Grand National Assembly'.<sup>135</sup> The Republicans responded by staging demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara, using their youth organizations.<sup>136</sup> The government declared martial law in both cities, and next day, when the demonstrations continued, the universities were closed down. The press, forbidden to report the domestic situation, wrote about the fall of Syngman Rhee in South Korea and the restoration of democratic freedoms there. The implications were clear and the Turkish intelligentsia took encouragement from this, especially when it was learned that the American government had not supported the Rhee dictatorship. Writing after the event, Celâl Bayar noted that 'the flowing out of the university into the street on its own did not signify anything... It could be only a signal shot. If at the back there were crowds of people ready to come into the street, if there were trained militia forces, then it would mean there was a danger of revolution.'<sup>137</sup>

There was none of this in the wake of the student demonstrations. The people remained surprisingly passive and Menderes was confident that peace would soon be restored, and that those instigating the demonstrations would 'come to their senses by crashing their poor heads against the unshakeable rocks of law and order.'<sup>138</sup> By 3 May the situation had stabilized and the martial law authorities reduced the curfew hours and permitted public places like coffee houses, bars, cinemas, and night clubs to stay open after the curfew.<sup>139</sup>

It was more difficult to normalize the political situation and to establish a working relationship with the opposition. The question was: could the government do so before the army intervened? The threat of military intervention had become a reality by early May. İnönü had told foreign journalists that 'an oppressive régime can never be sure of the army' and Foreign Minister Zorlu had replied that the 'Turkish officer is fully aware that the army should not interfere in politics'.<sup>140</sup>

We now know that military plans to overthrow Menderes were in an advanced stage by May; Republicans and Democrats had some inkling of this and the Investigating Committee was scrutinizing the army. But Menderes decided to turn to the public in order to shore up his position. He addressed well-organized mass meetings in İzmir (15 May), Bergama (17 May), Manisa (17 May), and Turgutlu (18 May). He returned to Ankara on the evening of 18 May to celebrate the annual Youth Day on 19 May,



and to receive Prime Minister Nehru, in Turkey from 20 to 24 May.

The demonstration of the War College cadets on 21 May struck a heavy blow to the prestige of the government. Student demonstrations could be dismissed as the activities of irresponsible youths but a demonstration by future officers of the armed forces was something else. The government introduced new martial law measures and Ankara was placed in a state of siege. The cadets' demonstration also alarmed the conspirators, who feared an investigation which might uncover their activities and this prompted them to act with greater urgency. It was then that they decided to overthrow the government on 25 May, before Menderes left for Greece. But on 24 May the visit to Greece was postponed and the next day Menderes opened a new tour with a speech in Eskişehir. He declared that the Investigating Committee had completed its work and was preparing its report. According to Tekin Erer, Menderes was going to announce elections for September in the same speech, but Hasan Polatkan persuaded him to keep this announcement for Konya.<sup>141</sup> If this was the beginning of normalization it came too late, for in the early hours of 27 May a group of officers of the Turkish armed forces carried out the coup and overthrew the Menderes régime.

Menderes, during his ten years in power, had failed to create a new balance within the ruling forces in Turkey. He had even failed to give his party a stable identity. The introduction of the multi-party system had destroyed the equilibrium of the political system which had been created to meet the needs of consensus politics under a single, populist party. This system was slowly eroded by the development of new groups within the ruling class, notably the business and commercial groups during the war, and it made way for competitive party politics in 1945. But none of these groups was strong enough to dominate the new politics, and the Democrat Party—even though it paid sincere lip service to liberalism—was a coalition united principally to destroy the single-party régime of the RPP.

Menderes came to power firmly convinced that free competition without any restraints from the government would produce rapid economic growth. Within a few years he found that this policy benefited small groups rather than the country at large, and he was forced to introduce measures restraining economic freedom, with the result that he alienated his own supporters. Menderes, the champion of a *laissez-faire* economy, was forced to reintroduce the National Defence Law, one of the most interventionist laws of the First Republic. Later, in 1958, he reverted to *laissez-faire* principles

under the advice of American financiers. This zigzag policy left him without real support from any group except the landowners, his policy towards them having remained constant. By 1955 many businessmen had begun to support the opposition, with the result that in 1960 not even the businessmen were sorry to see him go.

Even in the days of opposition, when there was a great deal more unity, we saw dissension within the party which led to the formation of the Nation Party. But the imbalance in the political system affected not only the political parties but also the entire structure of the state. Initially the Democrats had concluded that the state would continue to serve the RPP and they had therefore attacked it as the ally of the Republicans. But within a few years they learned that the state apparatus was not naturally sympathetic to the Republicans and that it could be induced to remain neutral in the inter-party struggle and to serve the victorious party. What most state officials wanted was a guarantee that they would be left out of the political struggle and that there would be no reprisals against them if the Democrats came to power. The Democrats guaranteed this with the slogan 'we will not question the past' (*devr-i sabık yaratmayacağız*). Secondly, the officials sought an autonomous status in political life—only then could the state provide a semblance of unity for a fractionalized ruling class in which the groups competed against one another—but Menderes did not fulfil that need either.

The salaried class which ran the state apparatus also suffered most acutely from Menderes's inflationary economic policy. This was especially true of members of the armed forces, with minimal opportunity to supplement their salaries as do other state officials and police (with bribes), and academics (by private commissions, consultancy work, journalism, and writing). Most of the salaried class suffered not only economically but also by loss of social status. Once again, Menderes's policies were too haphazard to absorb these elements into the new system he was trying to create. The result was his isolation from certain institutions of the state which ought to have served his government. The Democrats were aware of this shortcoming and tried to take measures against it throughout the ten years. The culmination of these measures was the Investigating Committee whose purpose was, *inter alia*, to investigate the civil bureaucracy, the judiciary, the armed forces, the police, and the universities. A government which did not control these institutions was doomed to failure and İnönü gave this warning on 27 April, exactly a month before the overthrow of the régime.<sup>142</sup>

## NOTES

1 Initially the cabinet consisted of: Adnan Menderes (Prime Minister); Halil Özyörük (Justice); Refik Şevket İnce (National Defence); Rüknettin Nasuhioğlu (Interior); Professor Fuad Köprülü (External Affairs); Halil Ayan (Finance); Avni Başman (National Education); General Fahri Belen (Public Works); Zühtü Velibeye (Economy and Trade); Dr Nihat Reşat Belger (Health and Social Assistance); Nuri Özsan (Customs and Monopolies); Nihat İyriboz (Agriculture); Tevfik İleri (Communications); Hasan Polatkan (Labour); Professor Muhlis Ete (Management). See the Turkish press, 23 May 1950 and Kâzım Öztürk, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri ve Programları* (1968), 345-6, who lists the cabinet and all the subsequent changes. Samet Ağaoğlu and Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu were brought in as Ministers of State in June and July 1950, respectively.

2 Conversation with Celâl Bayar. See also Celâl Bayar, *Başvekilim Adnan Menderes* (n.d. [1970]), 103 ff.

3 The Turkish press, 30 May and 1, 2, and 3 June 1950. That most of those who abstained were Democrats revealed the weakness of discipline and consensus within the party.

4 *Ayın Tarihi*, Aug. 1946, 5-12 and 18-36; *Cumhuriyet*, 4 June 1950 and Karpat, *Politics*, 171-2.

5 *Cumhuriyet*, 7 and 8 June 1950. This event and its implications are discussed in ch. 6 below.

6 *Cumhuriyet* and *Zafer*, 14 June 1950 and Tekin Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi* (n.d. [1963?]), 36.

7 For a historical discussion of this topic, but with contemporary politics in mind, see Şerif Mardin, 'Opposition and Control in Turkey', *Government and Opposition* i/3 (May 1966), 375-88. See also Lewis, *Emergence*, 221 f., 265 f., 279-81, and 306 ff.

8 See Menderes's Aydın speech in *Zafer*, 15 Nov. 1950.

9 *Ayın Tarihi*, Sept. 1950, 2-5 and *passim* for the coverage of the elections; Fahri Giritlioğlu, *Halk Partisi*, i, 288-9.

10 *Zafer* and *Cumhuriyet*, 16 and 17 Oct. 1950.

11 See below, pp. 107-12.

12 *Ulus*, 1 Aug. 1950.

13 *Cumhuriyet*, 5 Sept. 1950, quoted in Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 70.

14 İsmet İnönü, *Muhalefet'de İsmet İnönü*, ed. Sabahat Erdemir, i, (1956), 18. The reason for the Democrats' anger was that foreign policy was considered to be a national concern, above party, and therefore not to be criticized in public. For more details of this incident see below, 390.

15 *Ibid.*, 19-20 (İnönü's election broadcast of 28 Aug. 1950).

16 *Cumhuriyet*, 31 Aug. 1950.

17 *Cumhuriyet*, 1 and 7 Sept. 1950 and Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, iii (1968), 130 ff. This third volume of a long and interesting biography of İsmet İnönü covers the years 1950 to 1964.

18 Nadir Nadi, 'Partiler Arası', *Cumhuriyet*, 24 Jan. 1951.

19 Nadi, 'Tek Yol', *Cumhuriyet*, 28 Jan. 1951.

20 Nadi, 'DP'ye Düşen Vazife', *Cumhuriyet*, 25 Feb. 1951.

21 *Vatan*, 12 Mar. 1951.

22 *Cumhuriyet*, 18 Mar. 1951.

23 *Zafer*, 29 and 30 Mar. 1951. On the question of Islam and politics see ch. 13.

24 *Yeni İstanbul*, 10 Nov. 1952.

25 *Zafer*, 19 May 1952. For 'refutation by statistics' see Demokrat Parti, *Yeni İktidarın Çalışmaları; 22-5-1950-1-8-1951: DP hizmetinde bulunduğu Türk milletine hesap veriyor* (Ankara, 1951) and *Yeni İktidarın Çalışmaları; 22-5-1950-22-5-1952* (İstanbul, 1952). The Democrats were fond of producing such book-length publications and after a while they came to believe their own propaganda.

26 Report in *Zafer*, 3 June 1952 of a speech by Menderes at Manisa, in which he quoted from, but did not identify, a speech by İnönü.

27 *Milliyet* 26 July 1951 and Erer, *On Yıl*, 68-9.

28 Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 75; Erer, *On Yıl*, 85-6. These by-elections were a serious setback for the Republicans because they had put up some of their leading personalities, including Necmettin Sadak and Lütfi Kırdar, both of whom were defeated. Soon afterwards Kırdar defected and became a Democrat Representative and Minister.

29 Yalman, *Gördüklerim*, iv, 238-9.

30 *Cumhuriyet*, 15 Dec. 1953.

31 Menderes's Antalya and Konya speeches, 13 Apr. and 22 May, respectively, reported over Ankara Radio on 14 Apr. and 23 May 1952 and monitored by the BBC. See the BBC's *Summary of World Broadcasts*, iv, no. 252, 18-19 (hereafter summarized as e.g. *SWB*, iv/252/18-19) and iv/263/31-2. For a full treatment of the radio question from the Republican point of view see Muammer Aksoy, *Partizan Radyo* (1960).

32 Yalman, *Gördüklerim*, iv, 270. Yalman quotes a contemporary dispatch he wrote from Samsun describing the trend towards İnönü.

33 See Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu's statement of 4 Sept. 1950 in *Ayın Tarihi*, Sept. 1950, 13-14. This view was confirmed in the author's conversations with former Democrats, former Republicans, and present-day Republicans. It has been confirmed in practice by actual events since May 1972.

34 Erer, *On Yıl*, 78 and Ankara Radio, 25 Sept. 1952, in *SWB*, iv/298/24. Seyfi Kurtbek recalled that, while he was Minister of Communications (11 Aug. 1950 to 10 Nov. 1952), he had the İnönü postage stamps overprinted with the star and crescent because, while they were in circulation, Republicans continued to claim that İnönü was still the president and they produced the stamps as evidence. (Conversation with Kurtbek.) The same reasons would have applied to the removal of banknotes and other symbols of the İnönü era.

35 Quoted in *Cumhuriyet*, 16 Sept. 1952.

36 İnönü, *Muhalefet*, i, 121-51 reproduces the speeches İnönü gave during this campaign.

37 *Cumhuriyet*, 5 Oct. 1952; Yalman, *Gördüklerim*, iv, 273-4. This was perhaps the earliest occasion when Menderes implicitly accused the RPP

of planning a national uprising; he had often accused the opposition of dividing the nation. Later he would accuse it of fermenting revolution.

38 The Turkish press 8 and 9 Oct. 1952. For İnönü's statement see his *Muhalefet*, i, 151. This is considered a key incident in rallying the intelligentsia to İnönü.

39 *Cumhuriyet*, 24 Nov. 1952; Yalman, *Gördüklerim*, iv, 278-80; Çetin Özek, *Türkiye'de Gerici Akımlar* (1968), 179.

40 Menderes's appeal in *Zafer*, 28 Dec. 1952. See also Yalman, *Gördüklerim*, iv, 302.

41 Ankara Radio, 29 June 1953, in *SWB*, iv/377/17.

42 The Turkish press 30 June and 1 and 2 July 1953; Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 88; Fürüzan Hüsrev Tökin, *Türk Tarihinde Siyasi Partiler ve Siyasi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi, 1839-1965* (1965), 87-8; Erer, *On Yıl*, 34. Conversation with Hikmet Bayur. The Nation Party was officially dissolved by court order on 27 Jan. 1954.

43 Bernard Lewis, 'Democracy in Turkey', *MEA*, x/2 (1959), 66; Giritlioğlu, *Halk Partisi*, ii, 12-13.

44 *Zafer*, 17 July 1953.

45 *Cumhuriyet*, 21-5 July 1953 and Giritlioğlu, *Halk Partisi*, ii, 14-15 and 18-20.

46 *Cumhuriyet*, 27 July 1953.

47 *Zafer*, 25 Oct. 1953.

48 The Turkish press, 15 Dec. 1953. The text of İnönü's speech is in *Muhalefet*, i, 224-5. It is worth noting that the Democrat Party was deeply divided on the issue of dispossessing the RPP.

49 *Cumhuriyet*, 5 Jan. 1954.

50 İnönü, *Muhalefet*, i, 247. The RNP was founded on 10 Feb. 1954. See Tökin, *Türk Tarihi*, 88-9. For a discussion of the social basis of this party see Muzaffer Sencer, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partilerin Sosyal Temelleri* (1971), 243-8.

51 İnönü, *Muhalefet*, i, 250-4 and 259-62.

52 See *Demokrat Parti, Kalkınan Türkiye* (1954), a 205-page book the party distributed in order to present its case in figures and achievements.

53 The Turkish press, 9, 11, and 13 Mar. 1954; Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 94-5, and Giritlioğlu, *Halk Partisi*, ii, 24.

54 For example the Democrats promised to sell to the consumer for only 20 kuruş a kilo wheat which the state had bought at 30 kuruş a kilo. See *Cumhuriyet*, 22 Apr. 1954.

55 See Menderes's indignant speech in the Assembly on 18 Nov. 1953 in Menderes, *Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları*, ed. Mustafa Doğan, i (1957), 243. Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 96 lists a number of such projects.

56 In 1954 there were almost ten million registered voters; of these 88-63 per cent voted: 57 per cent Democrat, 35 per cent Republican, and 5 per cent Republican Nationalist. The DP victory was overwhelming: of the 67 Provinces they failed to win a majority only in Ankara, Bingöl, Gümüşhane, Erzincan, Muş, Urfa, Adana, and Uşak. The electoral system made their success seem even more spectacular: with 57 per cent of the vote the Democrats had 93 per cent of the seats (504), while the

Republicans had only 5.5 per cent of the seats (31) with 35 per cent of the vote. See the Turkish press, 23 May 1954; Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 96; Ecvet Güresin, '1950 ve 1954 seçimlerini tetkik ederek vardığımız neticeler ve illerin durumu', *Cumhuriyet*, 25-28 Sept. 1957; and CHP, *Seçim Neticeleri Üzerinde bir İnceleme* (1959). There is a useful commentary on the elections in *MEJ*, viii/4 (1954), 321-2.

57 Yalman, *Gördüklerim*, iv, 317. See also Baban, *Politika*, 74.

58 Conversation with Professor Turhan Feyzioğlu.

59 Conversations with Professor Turhan Feyzioğlu and Professor Aydın Yalçın.

60 President Bayar became notorious for using this phrase in the 1957 election campaign. But the same phrase had passed unnoticed when used by Deputy Premier Nihat Erim eight years earlier: 'If we do not run into any external calamity, I am very hopeful for the immediate future of the country. In the near future Turkey will become a little America ...' (*Cumhuriyet*, 20 Sept. 1949.) Bayar told his audience: 'In our country we work following the stages of American progress. We are so hopeful that after 30 years this auspicious country will become a little America with a population of 50 million'. (*Zafer*, 20 Oct. 1957.) Bayar's prognostication about the population seems destined to come true.

61 The Turkish press, 25 May 1954 and Öztürk, *Hükümetler*, 391-424.

62 The new Menderes cabinet reads as follows: Fatih Rüştü Zorlu (Deputy Prime Minister and State); Mükerrrem Sarol (State); Osman Kapanı (State); Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ (Justice); Ethem Menderes (National Defence); Namık Gedik (Interior); Professor Fuad Köprülü (External Affairs); Hasan Polatkan (Finance); Celâl Yardımcı (National Education); Kemal Zeytinioğlu (Public Works); Sıtkı Yırcalı (Economy and Trade); Dr Behçet Uz (Health and Social Assistance); Emin Kalafat (Customs and Monopolies); Nedim Ökmen (Agriculture); Muammer Çavuşoğlu (Communications); Hayrettin Erkmen (Labour); Fethi Çelikbaş (Management). See the Turkish press, 18 May 1954 and Öztürk, *Hükümetler*, 389-90, who also lists all subsequent resignations and appointments.

63 Öztürk, *Hükümetler*, 396-7.

64 *Cumhuriyet*, 3 July 1954 and *MEJ*, viii/4 (1954), 459.

65 *Cumhuriyet*, 16 and 17 Nov. 1954.

66 *Ibid.* 21 Oct. 1954.

67 *Ibid.* 24-7 Oct. 1954. Kasım Gülek was proposing isolating economic problems from politics and holding 'above-party' consultation on the economy. Even Democrats like Professor Feridun Ergin were now criticizing the government's policy. See Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 127.

68 B. Lewis, 'Democracy', *MEA*, x/2 (1959), 67-8; Giritlioğlu, *Halk Partisi*, ii, 21-2; Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 115-16. The measure against the high bureaucrats was prompted by the fact that many of them had stood on the Republican ticket in the 1954 election, lost, and then returned to their former posts. This had angered Bayar. See Toker, *İsmet Paşa*, i, 15 ff.

69 The Turkish press, 5 and 6 July 1954; B. Lewis, as in preceding note; Giritlioğlu, 16-17; Eroğul, 116-17.

70 *Cumhuriyet* and *Zafer*, 22 May 1955. İnönü's speech is given in his *Muhalefet*, i, 323-8, and Menderes's reply in his *Konuşmalar*, ii, 136-53. See also Toker, *İsmet Paşa*, i, 63 and 70-3.

71 *Cumhuriyet*, 27 Aug. 1955.

72 Frank Tachau, 'The Face of Turkish Nationalism', *MEJ*, xiii/3 (1959), 262-72.

73 *Ibid.* and Toker, *İsmet Paşa*, i, 105 (quotation). There were also riots in Ankara and İzmir.

74 See below, 90, where this incident is discussed more fully.

75 Tökin, *Türk Tarihi*, 89-119, and M. Sencer, *Sosyal Temeller*, 249-55.

76 The cabinet was presented in the Assembly on 8 Dec. and the programme on 14 Dec. See Öztürk, *Hükümetler*, 427-38. Adnan Menderes was Prime Minister and Defence Minister until Şemi Ergin's appointment on 28 July 1957; Mehmet Cemil Bengü, Şemi Ergin, Emin Kalafat and Celâl Yardımcı (State; the post of Deputy Prime Minister had been abolished); Hüseyin Avni Gökçürk (Justice); Ethem Menderes (Interior); Professor Fuad Köprülü (External Affairs); Nedim Ökmen (Finance); Ahmet Özel (National Education); Muammer Çavuşoğlu (Public Works); Fahrettin Ulaş (Economy and Trade); Nafiz Körez (Health and Social Assistance); Hadi Hüsmen (Customs and Monopolies); Esat Budakoğlu (Agriculture); Arif Demirer (Communications); Mümtaz Tarhan (Labour); Samet Ağaöğlu (Management; he also became Minister of Industries when the portfolio was created in Sept. 1957).

77 *Cumhuriyet*, 3 Dec. 1955. Conversation with a former Democrat.

78 Toker, *İsmet Paşa*, i, 146. It was also a very short programme.

79 *Ibid.*

80 *The Economist*, 14 July 1956 and Alp Kuran, *Kapalı İktidar* (1962), 139-40.

81 Kuran, *ibid.* The government amended the Press Law on 7 June, the Law on Meetings and Association on 27 June. It brought the judiciary under its control by retiring 16 judges on 3 May and six more on 12 June. The measure to prevent the press publishing Assembly debates of an 'offensive nature' was passed on 27 Dec. 1957. See Baban, *Politika*, 204-11, where he reproduces contemporary articles he wrote criticizing these measures. B. Lewis wrote: 'One of the major causes of these restrictions was the mounting economic crisis... And in a period of economic strain, political controversy inevitability becomes more tense, more acrimonious—and more dangerous'. 'Democracy', *MEA*, x/2 (1959), 69.

82 *Cumhuriyet*, 5 Dec. 1956.

83 Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 138 and *Cumhuriyet*, 12 July and 2 Sept. 1956.

84 *Zafer*, 6 Jan. 1957 and *Cumhuriyet*, 26 Dec. 1956 for the rumours.

85 *Cumhuriyet*, 18, 20 and 21 May 1957.

86 See Defence Minister Şemi Ergin's statement: 'Any foreign feet desecrating our homeland, whose soil reeks with the blood of our martyred ancestors, will be broken to pieces, not only by our army, but

tooth and nail by our men and women.' Ankara Radio, 14 Oct. 1957; in *SWB*, iv/376/12.

87 *Cumhuriyet*, 5 and 6 Sept. 1957; Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politikada 45 Yıl* (1968), 225 ff.; and Toker, *İsmet Paşa*, i, 207 ff.

88 *Zafer*, 9 Oct. 1957.

89 *Cumhuriyet*, 21 Sept. 1957; Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 142; and B. Lewis, 'Democracy', *MEA*, x/2 (1959), 71.

90 *Cumhuriyet*, 20 Oct. 1957.

91 For the best analysis of the 1957 election see Karpaz, 'The Turkish Elections of 1957', *Western Political Quarterly*, xiv/2 (June 1961), 436-59. See also Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 144 and CHP, *Seçim Neticeleri*, 5 ff.

92 İnönü, *Muhalefet*, ii, 167-75; and Toker, *İsmet Paşayla 10 Yıl*, ii (1957-60), 13-15.

93 Excerpt from Şemi Ergin's diary, quoted at the Yassıada Trials and given in *Cumhuriyet*, 10 Sept. 1960.

94 *Ibid.* Ethem Menderes also noted the sense of fear among the Democrats. See excerpts from his diary in *Cumhuriyet*, 11 Oct. 1960.

95 Abdi İpekçi and Ömer Sami Coşar, *İhtilâlin İcyüzü* (1965), 57-67 and Ali Fuad Başgil, *27 Mayıs İhtilâli ve Sebepleri* (1966), 159 ff. The latter is a translation of *La révolution militaire de 1960 en Turquie* (1963).

96 The last cabinet included the following: Menderes (Prime Minister); Tefik İleri, Emin Kalafat, and Muzaffer Kurbanoğlu (State); Esat Budakoğlu (Justice); Şemi Ergin (National Defence); Dr Namık Gedik (Interior); Fatih Rüştü Zorlu (External Affairs); Hasan Polatkan (Finance); Celâl Yardımcı (National Education); Ethem Menderes (Public Works); Abdullah Aker (Economy and Trade); Dr Lütfi Kırdar (Health and Social Assistance); Hadi Hüsmen (Customs and Monopolies); Nedim Ökmen (Agriculture); Fevzi Uçaner (Communications); Hayrettin Erkmen (Labour); Samet Ağaöğlu (Industries); Sıtkı Yırcalı (Press, Broadcasting, and Tourism); Medeni Berk (Construction); Sebati Ataman (Co-ordination). The last three portfolios were new and reflected the government's concern for the economy. The Ministry of Industries was set up in Sept. 1957 and in the new cabinet it absorbed the Ministry of Management. See Öztürk, *Hükümetler*, 441-2.

97 *Cumhuriyet*, 15 Nov. 1957. The government passed two decrees on press advertising and the supply of newsprint on 25 and 26 Nov., making the press virtually dependent on the government. See the Turkish press, 26 and 27 Nov. 1957 and the *MEJ*, xii/1 (1958), 87.

98 The Turkish press, 20 Nov. 1957.

99 *Ibid.* 28 Dec. 1957; Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 156-7; Kuran, *İktidar*, 134-41; and Toker, *İsmet Paşa*, ii, 29. See also Nadir Nadi, 'İç Tüzük Değişikliği', *Cumhuriyet*, 12 Dec. 1957 for some of the implications of this measure.

100 Conversation with a former Democrat. On the Democrats' relations with the military see ch. 6 below.

101 *Cumhuriyet*, 2 Jan. 1958 and Toker, *İsmet Paşa*, ii, 42 ff.

102 *Zafer*, 6 Jan. 1958.

- 103 *Cumhuriyet*, 2 Feb. 1958 and T. Z. Tunaya, *Siyasi Müesseseler ve Anayasa Hukuku* (1969), 172-81.
- 104 *MEJ*, xii/1 (1958), 87; and *Cumhuriyet*, 23 Nov. 1957 (cotton farmers' protest) and 1 May 1958 (Chamber of Commerce report).
- 105 Toker, *İsmet Paşa*, ii, 100-3; Z. Y. Hershlag, *Turkey*, 147; Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic* (1963), 194; and *Cumhuriyet*, 4 Aug. 1958 and following.
- 106 *Zafer*, 12 Aug. 1958.
- 107 Erer, *On Yıl*, 341-2; and Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 160-61.
- 108 İnönü, *1958 de İnönü* (1959), the preface. This book was issued by the RPP Research Bureau.
- 109 *Zafer*, 7 Sept. 1958; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, iii, 377-8.
- 110 The Turkish press, 22 Sept. 1958; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, iii, 379-88; and Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 162.
- 111 The Turkish press, 13 Oct. 1958. Sabiha Sertel, *Roman Gibi* (1969), 335, observes that the idea of the Fatherland Front was not original to the Democrats and that some Republicans had proposed it in Dec. 1945.
- 112 Tökin, *Türk Tarihi*, 89; Baban, *Politika*, 369 and 371-2.
- 113 See ch. 4 below.
- 114 Speech of Server Somuncuoğlu, Minister of Press, Broadcasting and Tourism, to the Budget commission. Ankara Radio, 4 Feb. 1959, in *SWB*, iv/774/13.
- 115 *Cumhuriyet*, 12 Feb. 1959.
- 116 'At the head of the nation is a leader who has been appointed by the Prophet, nay by God himself; he is Menderes'. Himmet Ölçmen, Representative for Konya, quoted in *Cumhuriyet*, 9 Mar. 1959.
- 117 *Cumhuriyet*, 26 Mar. 1959.
- 118 CHP, *İnönü'ye Atılan Taş ve Akisleri* (1959). In a survey covering 52 towns and 6,120 people, *Cumhuriyet*, 1 Jan. 1960 reported that the Uşak Incident was considered the most important event of 1959.
- 119 *Cumhuriyet*, 12 May 1959.
- 120 *Cumhuriyet*, 14 June 1959.
- 121 On 20 July the Assembly postponed the by-elections *sine die* and went into recess. See *Zafer*, 21 July 1959.
- 122 In a DP meeting in Diyarbakır a member of the National Assembly shouted: 'Close down the RPP, that nest of sedition and evil.' *Cumhuriyet*, 14 Sept. 1959, quoted in Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 168.
- 123 Nadir Nadi, 'Kapansa ne olur?' *Cumhuriyet*, 23 Sept. 1959.
- 124 See the chronology in *Vatan 1960 Yılı* (1960), 5-28 and *passim*.
- 125 *Cumhuriyet*, 10 Feb. 1960.
- 126 *Ibid.*, 2 Mar. 1960.
- 127 *Ibid.*, 12 Mar. 1960.
- 128 *Ibid.*, 13 Mar. 1960. See also Koç's own account in his autobiography *Hayat Hikâyem* (Istanbul, 1973), 150-1.
- 129 Conversation with a former Democrat.
- 130 The Turkish press, 4 Apr. 1960, and İnönü, *Muhalefet*, iii, 74-5.
- 131 *Zafer*, 6 Apr. 1960.

- 132 *Milliyet*, 8, 9 and 13 Apr. 1960; Başgil, 27 Mayıs, 118-20; Erer, *On Yıl*, 394-5; and Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 173-4.
- 133 14 Apr. 1960.
- 134 *Resmi Gazete*, 28 Apr. 1960 and the Turkish press, 19 Apr. 1960 and following. See also Nuri Eren, *Turkey Today—and Tomorrow* (1963), 37; Başgil, 27 Mayıs, 120-1 and 128 ff.
- 135 Ankara Radio, 28 Apr. 1960, in *SWB*, iv/320/c/2-3. İnönü's speech did not appear either in the minutes of the debate or in the press because of the censorship. It was published only after the revolution of 27 May. See İnönü, *Muhalefet*, iii, 92-7.
- 136 Karaosmanoğlu, *45 Yıl*, 232-5.
- 137 Bayar, *Başvekilim Menderes*, 170.
- 138 Ankara Radio, 29 Apr. 1960, in *SWB*, iv/322/c/2-3; and *Cumhuriyet*, 30 Apr. 1960.
- 139 Ankara Radio, 3 May 1960, in *SWB*, iv/325/c/1.
- 140 *The Times*, 7 May 1960 and İnönü's interview of 6 May in İnönü, *Muhalefet*, iii, 100-3.
- 141 Erer, *On Yıl*, 9. The report of the Investigating Committee has recently been published by the man who wrote it. See Nusret Kirişçiöğlü, *12 Mart, İnönü-Ecevit ve Tahkikat Encümeni Raporum* (1973). See also George Harris, 'The Causes of the 1960 Revolution in Turkey', *MEJ*, xxiv/4 (1970), 438-54.
- 142 '...But you cannot succeed. Was Syngman Rhee saved? ... He had the army, the police and the administration in his hands. You do not have the army, the administration or the university, or even the police in yours. How can this be an oppressive régime? How can it succeed?' See İnönü, *Muhalefet*, iii, 96.