

58 Weiker, *Revolution*, 125-7. Türkeş favoured forming a political party in order to contest elections but this proposal was rejected by the NUC. See *Cumhuriyet*, 16 June 1960.

59 In the reformed cabinet of Aug. 1960, Ulay became Minister of State and Özdilek was replaced by General Muzaffer Alankuş as Defence Minister. See Weiker, *Revolution*, 139-40, n. 37.

60 *Cumhuriyet*, 23 Sept. 1960.

61 Yalman, *Gördüklerim*, iv, 373.

62 *Cumhuriyet*, 29 Sept. 1960.

63 Ankara Radio, 1 Oct. 1960, in *SWB*, iv/453/c/3; *Cumhuriyet*, 2 Oct. 1960.

64 İpekçi and Coşar, *İhtilâl*, 492 and 491 ff. Faik, *Gazeteci*, 86-7.

65 İpekçi and Coşar, *İhtilâl*, 490-502 and Erkanlı, *Anılar*, 153-7.

66 Ankara Radio (7.30 a.m.), 13 Nov. 1960, in *SWB*, iv/489/c/1; the Turkish press, 14 Nov. 1960.

67 Erkanlı, *Anılar*, 157-9. Gürsel told a foreign journalist: 'Let "the Fourteen" thank God that I was involved in this business. Otherwise all of them would have been shot. I prevented that.' Quoted in Türkeş, *Milliyetçilik*, 115.

68 The Turkish press, 8, 12, 15, 16, and 17 Dec. 1960.

69 Faik, *Gazeteci*, 97-106; Erkanlı, *Anılar*, 142. *The Economist*, 21 Oct. 1961, is obviously referring to this body when it speaks of the *Ordu Şûrası*.

70 Faik, *Gazeteci*, 101. İpekçi and Coşar, *İhtilâl*, 504-5 also write that Gürsel had considered dissolving the NUC.

71 Gürsel's press conference, *Cumhuriyet*, 3 Mar. 1961.

72 *Ibid.*, 8 Mar. 1961.

73 Ankara Radio, 3 June 1961, in *SWB*, iv/W112/A/5; Weiker, *Revolution*, 136-7.

74 Faik, *Gazeteci*, 117.

75 Ankara Radio, 8 June 1961, in *SWB*, iv/W113/A/4, and *Cumhuriyet*, 9 June 1961.

76 *Cumhuriyet*, 12 June 1961; Faik, *Gazeteci*, 119; Weiker, *Revolution*, 137. The Tansel Affair became public only in late 1962. See *Cumhuriyet*, 8 Dec. 1962, 5.

77 *Cumhuriyet*, 10 May 1961.

78 *Cumhuriyet*, 29 June 1961 (communiqué) and Baban, *Politika*, 249-55. Baban was a member of the cabinet.

79 *Cumhuriyet*, 12 July 1961; Yalman, *Gördüklerim*, iv, 379; *The Economist*, 15 July 1961. This was the first time that army officers exercised their newly acquired right to vote. See Kışlalı, *Forces politiques*, 21. For an analysis of the referendum see Weiker, *Revolution*, 165-6.

80 Weiker, *Revolution*, 25-47 gives an excellent summary of the trials.

81 The Turkish press, 6 Sept. 1961.

82 Erkanlı, *Anılar*, 184.

83 *Cumhuriyet*, 21 Sept. 1961.

84 Weiker, *Revolution*, 45.

85 *Ibid.*, 163 and *Türkiye Yılığ 1963* (1963), 208-9.

CHAPTER VII

THE FAILURE OF TUTELARY DEMOCRACY 1961-1971

We believe that our national and most sacred duty is to support and assist the Armed Forces to accomplish, in peace, their noble task of safeguarding the country and defending democracy within the framework of their hierarchy and command, away from every political influence and movement. (Cries of 'Bravo' and prolonged applause.)

... We will take the necessary measures so that the personnel of the Armed Forces who operate under arduous and difficult conditions will be able to enjoy a standard of living suitable to the honour and pride of their vocation. (Applause from the left.)

Süleyman Demirel, programme speech in the Assembly, 3 November 1965

Abortive Coups 1962-1963

THE indecisive results of the general election of 1961 brought Turkey to the brink of another crisis. The army was divided as to the action it should take, and certain factions led by officers like Talât Aydemir wanted to annul the election results, abolish political parties and the NUC, and establish the rule of a military junta.¹ These groups were undoubtedly influential and potentially dangerous, but the commanders around Sunay were aware of the threat and therefore took timely measures to counter it. The method they used was to convince the interventionists that the High Command would act if the political situation warranted action. The generals had learned from the experience of the 27 May movement the danger of losing contact with junior officers and giving them the chance to act independently. If the army had to act politically it was better for the High Command to lead. The function of the Armed Forces Union was to keep one step ahead of the junior officers so as to retain the initiative. This became the

pattern for the next ten years and it culminated in the 'coup by memorandum' on 12 March 1971.

Immediately after the election the AFU treated the threat of intervention by the lower ranks seriously enough to take immediate measures to defuse it. One of Gürsel's first acts was to issue a communiqué praising the patriotism of 'the Fourteen' and making it public that there was no longer any reason to keep 'the Fourteen' outside the country.²

On 21 October Colonel Dündar Seyhan met some of them in Brussels to discuss the political situation in Turkey. Seyhan, who was representing the AFU, had brought a message from General Sunay asking 'the Fourteen' to delay their return. 'We want you to return to Turkey and the last communiqué is proof of this. But the situation is very confused as the election results have not been reassuring to a large section of the army. In order to rebel again, the interventionists are in search of a leader and they want you to return, recognizing you as the leaders. Your return to Turkey under these conditions would lead to major incidents. We are in search of stabilizing formulas and you can help us . . . ; for the moment please listen to me and do not come back.'³ Those members who were present agreed to postpone their return and went to Paris, where they gave a press conference stating that political events had proved them right.⁴

On the same day as Seyhan began his discussions in Brussels, ten generals including Cemal Tural, Martial Law Commander and Commander of the First Army (Istanbul), and twenty-eight colonels signed in Istanbul the '21 October Protocol'. They threatened to intervene in order to entrust the revolution to the true and competent representatives of the nation, to prohibit all political parties, and to annul the election results as well as abolish the NUC. The decision to intervene was to be implemented by 25 October.⁵

What was the rationale behind this protocol? According to Colonel AYTEKIN, one of the signatories and Cemal Tural's staff officer:

If intervention took place after 25 October, Parliament would have convened and its legality have been established. If intervention took place after Parliament convened, a new responsibility for revolution would have to be assumed. Yet in the three days before us a state of revolution already exists. During this period any intervention would be accepted as another act of the ongoing revolution. Apart from this, there is another reason which is very important. Any intervention which takes place after the Assembly is in session will be a very bloody affair. This time it will not be possible to halt the young officers. But if intervention were carried out

within the hierarchical framework an attempt from below can be prevented and the lives of many politicians saved.⁶

The protocol had the desired effect on the neo-Democratic parties. On 24 October the party leaders were summoned by the army commanders to the President's residence at Çankaya, where they signed a protocol of their own. They agreed not to have the Assembly pass laws reinstating officers retired by the NUC and not to seek an amnesty for the Democrats sentenced at Yassıada. They also promised to have General Gürsel elected President of the Republic, and to accept İnönü as Prime Minister.⁷ The two chambers convened on 26 October and Gürsel was duly elected President. Professor Ali Fuad Başgil, a stubborn supporter of the Democrat Party, had been forced to stand down as a candidate for the presidency and even to resign from the Senate.⁸

The armed forces had restored parliamentary democracy as they had promised. But they were unable to extricate themselves from politics, finding themselves in the ironic position of having to undermine democracy in order to save it. They had become guardians of two contradictory legacies: that of the 27 May movement and of multi-party democracy, both of which they were committed to defend. The first involved establishing a consensus which all parties would agree to respect and which the army would enforce, if violated. The second implied giving the parties autonomy in politics, even though this might clash with the legacy of 27 May. This contradiction created tensions which bedevilled Turkish politics throughout the sixties and into the seventies.

Even before the election the army had been sensitive to the criticism and political exploitation of 27 May. The commanders had forced the party leaders to make a joint declaration on 5 September promising not to question the revolution and its consequences. But the neo-Democratic parties would have acted out of character had they abided by this declaration. In the election campaign the revisionist propaganda paid rich dividends and the policy continued to be practised in the period of coalitions, finding expression in the amnesty question.

The constant exploitation of the amnesty question unsettled the coalition governments, and, to make matters worse, the interventionist faction of the armed forces interpreted this as a provocation. On 20 December, for example, Mucip Ataklı, a former member of the NUC and now a Life Senator, gave warning that an amnesty might trigger off another revolution: 'There is an attempt to show those who carried out the revolution as tyrants and those who caused it as the oppressed. Those who look back

with nostalgia to the period of oppression and the rule of gangsters must realize that the forces which carried out the revolution will not hesitate to prepare a more terrifying one for those people.⁹

Certain sections of the armed forces had been provoked sufficiently to begin considering a second *coup*. Extreme statements by politicians and rumours circulating in the press, claimed İnönü, were creating instability. 'On the one hand, there is a wind blowing to the effect that a second revolution is imminent; on the other hand an atmosphere is being created to the effect that efforts are being made to take revenge for 27 May.... It is out of the question to deny that such an atmosphere exists.... [But] neither of these two possibilities is likely to happen. The atmosphere in question is absolutely unjustified and artificial.'¹⁰ İnönü had sensed the mood of the times correctly, though he probably played down the possibility of a *coup* in order to avoid alarming the audience he was addressing. Intervention by the army was widely expected and this accounted for its failure when it came.

On 9 February 1962 members of the AFU met in Istanbul to discuss the unstable situation. As in October 1961, they signed a protocol declaring their intention to act by a certain date, in this case not later than 28 February. Once again the initiative was retained in the hands of the AFU generals in Istanbul, and not allowed to pass to the 'colonels' junta' in Ankara. Chief of the General Staff Cevdet Sunay, however, refused to support the protocol; moreover, the air force also opposed intervention by the army. There was now an ambivalent situation: on the one side there was the AFU's commitment to intervene, though this had been undermined by the attitude of Sunay and the air force. On the other side was the Ankara junta, which was totally isolated and open to governmental reprisals. It had been manoeuvred into a corner from which there was no escape. İnönü knew this and decided to call its bluff by assigning members of this group to new posts where they would cease to be a threat. In order to prevent this the Ankara junta raised the standard of revolt.¹¹

The abortive *coup* of 22 February 1962 was led by Colonel Talât Aydemir, Commandant of the War College. He had been a member of conspiratorial groups in the mid-fifties, but on 27 May he was in South Korea and was therefore unable to participate in the *coup* or to play a role in the military régime that emerged. This is said to have rankled and made him bitter, and he was one of those who believed that it would be a serious error to hand back power to civilians too soon. During the period of the National Unity Committee he was an influential member of the Ankara

group within the AFU. He disliked the results of the 1961 election and believed that the army ought to intervene; when this was not done he continued to talk of intervention. His constant and open threats were designed to undermine the morale of both the government and the armed forces so that when the *coup* was attempted there would be no serious resistance. He cannot have expected to overcome any serious opposition from the regular army by means of the forces at his command, namely the cadets from the War and Gendarmerie Colleges and some armoured units from the Ankara garrison. The authorities had no difficulty in suppressing this half-hearted *putsch* and Aydemir himself went to the headquarters of the Chief of the General Staff to surrender.¹²

For the moment, the abortive *coup* strengthened Premier İnönü's hand *vis-à-vis* his coalition partners and political opponents. But in fact it was the High Command which became even more influential than it had been. Article 111 of the new constitution provided for the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC—*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*) consisting of 'the Ministers provided by law, the Chief of the General Staff, and representatives of the armed forces'. The President, or in his absence the Prime Minister, was to preside over it, and its function was to assist the cabinet 'in the making of decisions related to national security and co-ordination'. These functions were in themselves broad enough to give great power and influence to the High Command. But in March 1962 a new bill increased the powers of the Council, enabling it virtually to interfere in the deliberations of the cabinet, through regular consultations and participation in the preparatory discussions.¹³ This led to rumours of differences between the Defence Ministry and General Sunay, but they were denied by the Ministry.¹⁴

İnönü found it impossible to have any controversial measure passed by the Assembly without support from the High Command. The Justice Party refused to sanction an amnesty for the rebels of 22 February unless it was also extended to the former Democrats, and the very existence of the coalition was threatened.¹⁵ The extremists in the JP wanted their members to leave not only the government but also the Assembly.

Once again Sunay came to the rescue. 'It's an ugly trick to mix the military amnesty with the other.... This is not something people with good intentions would do. Those people with bad intentions want to bring the nation and the army face to face.'¹⁶ This warning was sufficient and next day both the JP and the NTP agreed to vote for the amnesty bill and the crisis was over.¹⁷ The only concession they received in return was a pardon for those who

were ill amongst the convicted Democrats. A month later the same Assembly declared 27 May 'Freedom and Constitution Day', making it a national holiday, though of the 157 Justice Party representatives, 117 voted against the motion.¹⁸

With the High Command committed to supporting him, İnönü decided to resign on 30 May in order to end the impasse in the cabinet—the extremists in the JP had made it impossible for the cabinet to deal with problems which plagued the country, especially the stagnant economy. Once again it was not easy to form a coalition without prodding from the army. On 19 June İnönü consulted Sunay and Gürsel. The party leaders were called in next day and the press reported that there were now signs of a three-party coalition.¹⁹ On 24 June the usual protocol was signed by the leaders of the RPP, the NTP, and the RPNP, and by Necmi Oktem on behalf of the Independents. Next day İnönü announced his Second Coalition.²⁰

The army was totally engaged in politics; the question that troubled the politicians was how to bring about a divorce. İnönü's answer was to have the government and the constitutional order functioning smoothly, to establish the absolute sovereignty and prestige of the Assembly, and to end all activities likely to provoke the army.²¹ But that was easier said than done, and İnönü was guilty of wishful thinking if he believed that the High Command wanted to withdraw; for within its ranks there was a certain amount of ambivalence concerning total withdrawal from the political arena.

Political stability proved elusive. The Justice Party, now in opposition, continued to exploit the amnesty issue and the anniversary of Menderes's execution on 17 September 1962 became the occasion for demonstrations. This was precisely the kind of incident which provoked a response from the army. Groups describing themselves as the 'National Revolution Army' (*Millî Devrim Ordusu*) and the 'National Forces' (*Kuvayi Milliye*) distributed leaflets in Ankara and İstanbul warning the 'reactionaries' that they would be given no quarter when the revolution came.²²

That all was not well in the armed forces became clear on 2 December 1962 when İrfan Tansel, Commander of the Air Force, announced that he was retiring eleven officers because they were involved in politics and took their orders from Life Senator Mucip Ataklı. One of those dismissed was Halim Menteş, Commander of the Bandırma air base, who had been active in the AFU and was said to be very close to Talât Aydemir and Dündar Seyhan.²³ There were hints of a relationship between the Republicans and this 'air

force junta'. The Justice Party tried to uncover this relationship by raising the question in the Assembly on two occasions (12 and 14 December), but on both occasions it was rejected. İnönü claimed that he did not want to make military affairs an issue for debate and that is where the matter ended.²⁴

'The Fourteen' began returning to Turkey in this political climate. In their final meeting in Brussels they failed to reach agreement on a common programme of action and decided to work as individuals. Orhan Erkanlı returned in August and Orhan Kabıbay in October 1962. But the arrival of the charismatic Alparslan Türkeş on 23 February 1963 aroused the greatest interest.²⁵ Türkeş declared his intention to enter politics 'within the framework of the constitution and the law' in order to emphasize that he would keep away from conspiratorial groups in the army. But there is no doubt that his return stimulated such activity. The coups in Iraq (8 February, leading to Kasım's overthrow) and in Syria (8 March) must also have provided a stimulus to conspirators in the Turkish armed forces.

In the year and a half that had lapsed since multi-party politics were restored, the parties had failed to settle down and had not even begun to deal with the problems which weighed so heavily on the country. Amnesty was still the principal political and emotional issue. The government, not strong enough to resolve the problem conclusively, continued to make gestures which led to demands for more from the neo-Democrats. One such gesture was the conditional release of Celâl Bayar on 23 March. His journey from Kayseri, where he had been interned, to Ankara became a triumphant procession and a protest against the revolution. Enraged youths who considered themselves the guardians of Kemalist Turkey reacted by attacking the JP headquarters and right-wing newspapers.²⁶ Bayar was taken back into custody and the National Security Council decided that he would reside in a place chosen by the government and measures would be taken to deal with disorders.²⁷

Again there were those who claimed that İnönü had created this crisis in collusion with the High Command, that he was demonstrating to the opposition parties that amnesty would not bring tranquillity; on the contrary it could result in another coup that would bring about the demise of civilian rule.²⁸ It is doubtful whether İnönü would have taken such a risk for such minor gains. A sudden rise in political tension was usually manifested in a rise in conspiratorial activity, and this occasion proved to be no exception. The Defence Ministry announced on 22 April the arrest of five officers engaged in activities similar to those of Aydemir,

and promised further arrests. Next day five naval officers were taken into custody in Istanbul, accused of being members of the 'Kemalist Army' and inciting army units to revolt.²⁹

The anniversary of the student demonstrations which sparked off the revolution of 1960 was 28 April. Senator Mucip Ataklı used this occasion to propose that a 'legal revolution' (*Hukuki ihtilâl*) be carried out. 'The aim of this revolution ought to be to carry out much-needed reforms and to gather into one camp all those groups of our countrymen who are now divided. [To bring this about we must] make changes in the constitution and the electoral laws, end the activities of the parties for a certain period, and purge the mentality which is alien to Kemalist thought. If Parliament can show common sense it may be able to save the country and the régime.'³⁰ If Parliament refused to show common sense, implied Ataklı, there were worse prospects ahead.

This proposal reflected the general dissatisfaction with parliamentary democracy and the general desire to accelerate from above the process of social, economic, and political change which was believed to be impeded by party politics. It did not reflect any impending crisis; in fact since the excitement in April the situation had calmed down. Then, unexpectedly, on 14 May İnönü made a cryptic statement before his Assembly Group: 'The situation is most urgent. I repeat: it is most dangerous and critical. Anything may happen. Take great care. Keep calm. I am struggling very hard and making every effort [to master the situation]. At the moment I am not going to tell you anything more. Under the existing conditions I am trying to do what I can.'³¹

The press reported that a group calling themselves the 'Young Kemalist Army of the Turkish Republic' had sent a communication to the Senate rejecting Ataklı's proposal for reform. İnönü recalled the Deputy Premier Ekrem Alican from Erzurum and consulted President Gürsel and General Sunay. Members of the Assembly and Senators were asked to remain in Ankara and to maintain national unity. The cabinet held an extraordinary meeting and the chief of security, İhsan Aras, arrived in Ankara.³² The country had been told that a dangerous situation existed but İnönü refused to explain, even in the Assembly, where the danger came from. It is more surprising that he was not pressed for an explanation. During the past three years the country had become accustomed to living in the extraordinary atmosphere of an impending *coup*. There was no reason to doubt İnönü's warning; but at the same time no reason to take it seriously either. In the Senate, Mucip Ataklı repeated his proposal for a 'legal revolution'

and proposed vesting Premier İnönü with exceptional executive powers similar to those vested in General de Gaulle in 1958.³³

Talât Aydemir's abortive *coup*, which took place on the night of 20/21 May 1963, had no connection with İnönü's 'dangerous and critical situation'. On 2 June İnönü admitted that 'in spite of the prevailing gossip I did not anticipate the events of 21 May'.³⁴ Aydemir's action was expected, only the timing came as a surprise. The government knew that Aydemir was plotting with some of 'the Fourteen', and General Memduh Tağmaç, who was Deputy Chief of the General Staff, testified at Aydemir's trial in July that he, Tağmaç, had prevented a *coup* taking place as early as 31 March.³⁵ This would have been a more appropriate timing for a *coup*, since Bayar's release and the incidents that followed had raised the temperature in the country.

Aydemir's rebellion, with no substantial support within the armed forces, was doomed to fail. It began just after midnight with the capture of the Ankara radio station. Aydemir was able to hold his own until first light when jets from the Eskişehir base buzzed the city and strafed the War Academy with gun fire, forcing the cadets to surrender. By dawn the rebellion had collapsed. Talât Aydemir went into hiding but was captured about noon. The curfew was lifted at 2 p.m. though the government took the precaution to proclaim martial law for one month in the cities of Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir.³⁶ Martial law, although proclaimed initially for one month, was not lifted till 21 July 1964 and assured the commanders an open and legal right to intervene if the political situation called for it.

For the moment, however, Aydemir's second try marked the end of overt political activity by the junior officers. All these activities of the past three years had been the remnants of the 27 May movement and it was some years before new movements, with their roots in the sixties, began to emerge. The High Command was in full control but its position in the political structure was ambiguous. The Turkish armed forces, stated Sunay, were at the command of the government. But they were also an element of equilibrium and stability in the life of the nation.³⁷

The 1961 Constitution and Radical Politics

The claim that power had been restored to the politicians without a fundamental change in the political and socio-economic structure was essentially correct. The Democrat Party was dissolved but nothing was done to prevent the return of neo-

Democrats. Since the socio-economic basis of power remained unaltered the old political forces were bound to come to the front.

Nevertheless Turkey of the sixties was different from the Turkey of the previous decade. The responsibility for this lay not so much with the army which carried out the coup but with the intelligentsia, especially the professors who drafted the constitution of the Second Republic. This constitution radicalized politics and held forth the promise of a liberal and democratic Turkey if it was faithfully implemented. This became the principal contradiction, because the neo-Democrats and conservative Republicans were determined to prevent its implementation. However, the constitution did permit groups who had been tightly controlled before 1960—the workers and the radical intelligentsia—to wage a political struggle against the entrenched forces.

The 1961 constitution was radically different from its predecessor. It provides for a bicameral parliament. The lower chamber, the National Assembly, consists of 450 members elected every four years by a system of proportional representation. The Senate consists of 150 members elected for a term of six years by a straight majority vote, with one-third retiring every two years; the former members of the NUC, who became Life Senators; and 15 members nominated by the President for six years. The two chambers together constitute the Grand National Assembly (under the previous unicameral system, that was the name of the single chamber).

The President is elected for a term of seven years by the Grand National Assembly, in plenary session, from among its own members, by a two-thirds majority. He appoints the Prime Minister, who chooses the rest of the cabinet, and the cabinet is responsible to the National Assembly.

A noteworthy innovation which proved a great annoyance to some future governments was the Constitutional Court. Its principal function was to review the constitutionality of legislation but it was also endowed with power to act as a high council for the impeachment of Presidents, ministers and certain high officials 'for offences connected with their duties'. It has become one of the most important and controversial institutions of the Second Republic.

Perhaps more important than the new institutions were the explicit guarantees of freedom of thought, expression, association and publication, as well as other democratic liberties, contained in the new constitution. In addition, it promised 'social and economic rights, with provision both for the right of the State to plan economic development so as to achieve social justice, and the right

of the individual to the ownership and inheritance of property, and the freedom of work and enterprise'. In theory, the state was given the right 'to plan economic development so as to achieve social justice'. In practice, the forces which controlled the state and whose interests it served obstructed any advance towards social justice until they were forced to give way. This was the kind of contradiction which made the politics of the Second Republic interesting as they had never been in the last decade of the First.

After a decade of struggle, the trade unions were given the right to strike, but within limits to be determined by legislation. 'Other clauses in the constitution [sought] to safeguard the secularist Kemalist reforms from reaction, and the democratic basis of government from a new dictatorship.'³⁸

The revolution of 27 May and the 1961 constitution introduced liberal politics without the underpinning of a structural base. For the first time in decades a party, the Workers' Party of Turkey (WPT—*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*), which openly represented interests clashing directly with those of the ruling classes, was allowed to function, albeit under great pressure from various quarters. Its influence on Turkish politics during its ten years of existence was totally out of proportion to its size and representation in the Assembly.³⁹ Thanks to the freedoms guaranteed by the constitution, intellectual societies (*fikir kulüpleri*) with radical, leftist tendencies were organized in the universities to debate and publicize Turkey's problems. The publication of political literature—especially in translation—flourished and speeded up the politicization of the bourgeois intelligentsia and even the working class.

These developments alarmed the government but it was not possible to reverse the process while the new constitution was in operation. Within a short time the government was using the 'threat from the Left' as the excuse for prolonging martial law. In August 1963 Defence Minister İlhami Sancar told the Assembly that members of an extreme leftist group who were conspiring to free Aydemir and his friends had been arrested.⁴⁰ The following month the press reported that the National Security Organization was being reorganized as the National Intelligence Organization (*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*, the notorious MIT).⁴¹ The main function of this organization was to keep track of conspiracies in the armed forces and radical, leftist activity elsewhere. The preoccupation with the reactionary Right was a hangover from the past and persisted in the intelligentsia. But successive governments concentrated more on the growing Left, which they diagnosed as the real threat to the existing order.

One of the factors making for the instability of the RPP-led coalitions was that the neo-Democratic partners viewed İnönü and his party as being too radical, too leftist for their taste. The Republicans were held responsible for the new constitution and for the concept of a planned economy, still under discussion in the early sixties. In each case the parties which formed a coalition with the RPP tended to become tainted pink in the eyes of their supporters. This led to dissension in the JP during the First Coalition, and the New Turkey Party (NTP—*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*) and the Republican Peasants' Nation Party (RPNP—*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*) seemed to suffer from the same ailment during the Second.

The Second Coalition collapsed immediately after the results of the local elections became known in November 1963. The Justice Party did well while the other two neo-Democrat parties suffered setbacks, which they blamed on their collaboration with İnönü. These two parties withdrew from the coalition, and İnönü, who was attending President Kennedy's funeral in Washington, resigned on 2 December. The fact that Ragıp Gümüşpala, Chairman of the JP, was asked to form the new government was most significant. It meant that the Justice Party had acquired respectability in the eyes of the commanders, who no longer viewed a JP-led government as 'counter-revolutionary'.⁴²

Gümüşpala failed to form a cabinet and the task was given to İnönü once more. The small parties refused to enter a coalition and finally İnönü formed a cabinet with Independents. The Cyprus crisis, which threatened to break into open hostilities with Greece, came to his aid.⁴³

Throughout 1964 the Cyprus question monopolized the attention of the country, forcing the opposition parties to show 'national solidarity' in the face of an external problem. No one wanted a cabinet crisis and İnönü was able to pressure the Assembly into passing the budget and other fiscal measures by threatening to resign.⁴⁴ The Cyprus crisis also exposed Turkish isolation in foreign affairs, making the Turks feel particularly bitter against their allies in NATO, and the Turkish press attacked the United States for the first time. No one had supported the Turkish thesis at the UN and in the months that followed there were hints that the government might be forced to consider a reorientation of its foreign policy.

The Cyprus dispute served to obscure internal political problems and the socio-economic crisis, which continued as before. The Senate elections of 7 June were a clear victory for the JP, exposing the fact that the policies of the new régime had not acquired any substantial support among the electorate. The main effect of this

political instability, now aggravated by the threat of war and martial law, was felt in the economy. However, the first year of the five-year plan, 1963, produced a 7.2 per cent increase in the gross national product, 0.2 per cent higher than the target. The 1964 harvest was also above average, but the economy was too depressed to react immediately to these stimuli.⁴⁵

In this climate of uncertainty, the High Command adopted a 'wait and see' attitude. The politicians were left alone so long as they behaved themselves but the commanders were always vigilant. They noted the growth of extremism in the JP after the death of General Gümüşpala. The struggle for the party chairmanship encouraged some groups to curry favour with the extremists in the party. Chief of the General Staff Cevdet Sunay drew the politicians' attention to the attacks being made by certain parties—a veiled reference to the JP—on the 27 May revolution, the army, and the commanders. The country, he warned, was being divided into two hostile camps; the army was being shown as an institution opposed by the people and the commanders and officers were unhappy with this situation. Should such provocations persist there was danger of armed revolution. The parties were asked to communicate their views on the prevailing situation by 22 November.⁴⁶

The party leaders issued a communiqué swearing fidelity to the 1960 revolution and promised to abstain from acts likely to provoke the army.⁴⁷ One of the results of Sunay's letter was that Süleyman Demirel, a moderate who could be expected to establish better relations with the commanders, was elected the new leader of the Justice Party on 29 November. On 10 December his meeting with the Life Senators, known as the National Unity Group, suggested that under his leadership the JP would try to pursue a conciliatory policy towards the 27 May revolution and its military guardians.⁴⁸

The days of the Third Coalition were now numbered. Confident of his strength in the country and tolerance within the High Command, Demirel issued a warning that the JP would bring down the government as soon as it secured the necessary 226 votes.⁴⁹ Sunay made no attempt to deter Demirel from taking the step designed to bring about İnönü's fall and create political instability. Demirel then began to plan openly to engineer the resignation of the government. The occasion chosen for this was the debate on the budget, which, when it came to the vote, failed to obtain a majority and İnönü tendered his resignation.⁵⁰

On this occasion there was no crisis. The High Command had come to accept the Justice Party and there was no longer any

question of forcing İnönü upon the country for the fourth time. The man chosen to form the caretaker government until the general election in October 1965 was Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, who, in 1961, had been elected Independent Senator from Kayseri on the JP list. The government, he announced on 20 February, was a four-party coalition with the Justice Party as the senior partner.⁵¹

The policy of the new government began to veer to the right, following the line laid down at the last congress of the JP. Ürgüplü promised to fix the boundaries for the state sector in order to allay the anxieties of private enterprise, and Trade Minister Mâcit Zeren also stressed that the government believed in a mixed economy in which private enterprise was the dominant strain.⁵² Gone—except for lip service—was the emphasis on social justice which had been one of the dominant themes of the new régime. In keeping with this new trend was Demirel's reliance on foreign capital 'for the rapid, balanced, and stable development' of Turkey. The Republicans were not opposed to foreign investment; they were more cautious and wanted to retain control of such primary resources as oil. While İnönü led the coalitions there had even been talk of nationalizing the oil industry. Demirel made it clear that he was opposed to such measures. 'Are we to seize the property and areas of the foreign oil companies?' he asked indignantly, and added: 'For us it is unthinkable to withdraw and unlawfully seize rights that were ceded by law ...'⁵³

The policy of the Fourth Coalition towards the Left also became more stringent and repressive. Earlier governments were by no means favourable to the Left and the meetings of the Workers' Party had often been attacked by armed gangs and its publications banned by local officials. But such measures had never been executed openly with governmental sanction—state officials had operated against the Left with a sense of guilt, knowing that they were acting against the constitution, which permitted socialism. Demirel had no such qualms. Addressing the meeting of the Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the Union of Bourses, he said the government would not permit class struggle and that the time had come to unite against the 'group of perverted minds' who wanted to create it.⁵⁴

To this, Mehmet Ali Aybar, the leader of the Workers' Party, replied: 'If the Deputy Prime Minister wants to prevent class struggle, let him nationalize oil immediately, give land to the landless, tax everyone according to his capacity, pass the unemployment insurance law. In short let the constitution be implemented perfectly and in its totality. Otherwise the true implications to emerge from the words "to prevent class struggle"

will be simply to maintain today's rotten system on its feet.'⁵⁵ Events proved Aybar's evaluation to be correct. On the same day as his statement was published in the press, the cabinet demanded new measures against the 'extreme Left' [*aşırı sol*]. The parties were determined to prevent the WPT from contesting the general election.

The election campaign was fought by the Justice Party on the emotional slogans of anti-Communism and Islam. Demirel's Samsun speech of 29 June illustrated the theme: 'We are the enemies of communists. We have decided to combat communism without giving way... We have decided to combat extreme leftist tendencies... Communism will not enter Turkey because our population is 98 per cent Muslim. We must be able to call ourselves a Muslim nation.'⁵⁶ The Republicans, unable to make headway against such propaganda, appealed to President Gürsel and Prime Minister Ürgüplü: 'The charges of leftism and communism which Justice Party leader and Deputy Premier Demirel continues to throw around in an irresponsible way are dividing the people into hostile camps. I urge that you intervene urgently in order to save the country from being dragged into a civil war ...'⁵⁷

The High Command was no longer willing to intervene and the Republicans were forced to fend for themselves as best they could. The JP propaganda was particularly effective because the Republicans had introduced the 'left-of-centre' slogan as a part of their campaign to win back the intelligentsia from the Workers' Party, and to project a new progressive image of themselves. But the use of the term 'Left' was enough to damn them in the eyes of a population conditioned to give a Pavlovian response. Nor was the voter sophisticated enough to understand Professor Erim's explanation that, although Sweden, Norway, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany had left-of-centre governments, they were not communist countries. Professor Feyzioğlu defended his party's policy from another angle. The RPP was not an irrational enemy of communism; its enmity was logical because a left-of-centre policy was the best antidote to communism.⁵⁸

The Justice Party and the Army

The Justice Party confounded all predictions and won an overwhelming majority with 52.9 per cent of the vote and 240 seats. The system of proportional representation, whose aim had been to prevent the domination of the Assembly by one party, had not worked. The result was disastrous for the RPP, which polled only 28.7 per cent of the vote, the lowest in the multi-party period.

But proportional representation enabled it to have 134 Representatives in the Assembly. The parties of the Right—the Nation Party, the RPNP, and the NTP—lost their voters to the JP and between them succeeded in polling only 12.2 per cent of the votes and winning 61 seats. The Workers' Party, which had aroused great interest, did not fare as well as many had prophesied. But it did obtain 3 per cent of the votes and 15 seats, a respectable performance for a party with very limited financial means, which had suffered from official repression throughout its existence. In spite of its limited representation, the Workers' Party played an important role in opposition, one which changed the character of political debate. It introduced the ideological dimension, absent among parties which differed in emphasis rather than substance.

Many Turks showed their unhappiness and disillusionment with the system by refusing to vote. The turnout for the election—71.3 per cent of the registered voters—was the lowest since 1950. It declined from 88.6 per cent in 1954 to 76.6 per cent in 1957 and rose again to 81.0 per cent in 1961. But the period of coalitions, with all the bickering over such issues as amnesty while the economy stagnated, had alienated many potential voters. Throughout the sixties voter participation continued to decline and in the 1969 election the percentage of registered voters who bothered to exercise their civic right had dropped to 64.3 per cent.⁵⁹

The initial response to the JP victory was one of relief that the country had left behind the period of unstable coalitions. Moreover, the army had acquiesced in a neo-Democrat party coming to power on its own. This time there was no meeting of the Armed Forces Union followed by a protocol. Demirel must take the credit for this, for it was he who consciously made an attempt to win over the commanders. It is not surprising that the largest number of retired officers elected to the Assembly was from the JP.⁶⁰

The government had become sufficiently confident of the army to propose a partial amnesty bill which would apply to the former Democrats as well as to those who had participated in Aydemir's abortive *putsch* of 1963. There was not a word of warning from the High Command, though the National Unity Group in the Senate issued a statement denouncing the measure. They described it as an attempt 'to destroy the principles laid down in the preamble of the constitution' and warned the government that it was exhausting the legality it had acquired through the elections.⁶¹ The Justice Party was no longer intimidated by the threats of former soldiers, knowing that they had no following in the army. In the

Assembly its Representatives even taunted the military critics by heckling: 'Go on, carry out another revolution.'⁶²

The government's standing with the High Command improved even further when Cevdet Sunay was elected President. Cemal Gürsel, who had been ailing for many years, was sent to America for treatment in February 1966. It was clear that he would not be able to resume his duties and the parties soon arrived at a consensus to elect Sunay. He resigned from the army on 14 March and was appointed to the Senate. Next day Cemal Tural replaced him as Chief of the General Staff.⁶³ Sunay was elected President on 28 March by 461 votes; his opponent Alparslan Türkeş received only 11.⁶⁴ Abdi İpekçi noted the difference in the JP's attitude: in 1961 the party had opposed Gürsel's candidature strenuously; in 1966 it led the way to Sunay's election. Sunay may not have been Demirel's man but it helped Demirel if it appeared as though he were.⁶⁵

Within a short time, Sunay came to be identified with the Justice Party and its policies and there was even a whisper campaign by the opposition parties suggesting that Sunay and the High Command had 'sold out' to Demirel. Sunay repudiated this in his speech of 19 May, declaring that 'the Turkish armed forces ... and commanders are not the tool of one policy or another. ... In this connection and as the President of the Republic who gave his word of honour to the nation in the Grand National Assembly and before his great nation that he would maintain strict impartiality, I reject strongly and with loathing all tendentious and slanderous statements against me.'⁶⁶

Three days later Osman Bölükbaşı, the leader of the Nation Party, aired the entire controversy in public. In a radio broadcast made during the campaign for the partial Senate elections, he declared:

In no country run really democratically and where the national will is respected has a person leading the army become President of the Republic in the way Cevdet Sunay has done. It is not even possible to imagine such a thing in those countries....

We are sure there is not a single citizen who finds it compatible with democracy and national sovereignty or who considers it normal and constructive. No citizen can but feel anxious about the future of our country and democracy if electing the Chief of the General Staff for President becomes a custom, and a kind of 'heir to the throne tradition' is created.

In view of such a picture, how can the world believe that democracy exists in Turkey? Let Demirel, if he dares, address the nation, give his reasons, and enlighten the nation about the calculations he made and save

it from anxious thoughts. President Sunay must also explain why he accepted the Presidency... We ask Demirel: What happened to your national will, to democracy which emerges from the ballot box in the case of Sunay's election?... Has the Justice Party made secret calculations? We hear the JP propagandists throughout the country claim that the wily Demirel has taken the army in hand. The Turkish army is nobody's tool. If the JP has sought safety in the election of General Sunay as President it should remember that 27 May has proved how unsound is the security based on individuals.⁶⁷

Bölükbaşı had raised important questions about Turkish democracy which went unanswered, but he was wrong—and Sunay right—to think that the army was being manipulated by Demirel. Politicians, like soldiers who prepare for future wars on the basis of the last one, still thought in terms of the Democrats and the army. But the situation had changed radically since the fall of Menderes.

The Army's New Role

During the Democrat period there had been no ideological differences between the parties; only the difference of emphasis on how to implement the same ideology. In that situation the majority party had tried to make the army its instrument, and the opposition parties had endeavoured to use the army against the government. In neither case was the nature of the régime threatened. But after 27 May 1960 the army became an autonomous institution, recognized as the guardian of the new régime it had set up. It was sucked into both the political life of the country and its socio-economic life. New legislation improved the economic status of military personnel and their social status rose accordingly. Junior officers were no longer taunted by landlords or waiters and they began to live in the best residential areas. Retired officers were recruited into the upper levels of the bureaucracy or into private and state enterprises and generals were sent abroad as ambassadors. The creation of the Army Mutual Assistance Association (*Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu*, better known by the acronym OYAK) in 1961 brought the military directly into business and industry and within a few years OYAK became one of the largest conglomerates in the country, described by some as the third sector.⁶⁸

Therefore in the sixties the military was more concerned to defend the régime than a particular party. Its primary concern was stability and it was willing to intervene against any party which undermined or threatened this. The High Command was naturally

antagonistic to a socialist party like the WPT which sought a change of régime, just as it was sympathetic to parties like the JP which promoted the existing order of private enterprise. The commanders, who had become a privileged group with a major stake in the *status quo*, no longer needed to link their fortunes with those of a party leader like Demirel. It was party leaders who tried to link their fortunes to those of the commanders.⁶⁹

But the Demirel government failed to provide the country with the much-needed stability. His own party was divided politically between his group and the followers of Sadettin Bilgiç, whom he had defeated for the leadership. Demirel was therefore as preoccupied with consolidating his position in the party as with the problems facing the country. The economy continued to stagnate, with prices and unemployment constantly rising. Tension over Cyprus continued and Turkey's isolation amongst even her allies increased the xenophobia in the country. Hostility towards the United States after revelation of the Johnson-İnönü correspondence over Cyprus became more marked and spilled over into criticism of the Demirel government—which was denounced, especially by the Left, as a puppet government.

The military High Command had to deal with a political situation which was becoming ideologically polarized. The workers were becoming increasingly militant and a minority had broken away from the moderate trade union federation, *Türk-İş*, and formed the militant Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* or DİSK). The universities had become politicized, especially on the issue of a non-aligned Turkey independent of NATO and the United States. If one judges by the clandestine leaflets, this sentiment had also found its way into the armed forces. The leaflets issued by 'The Committee of Free Officers' (January 1966) and 'National Liberation Committee' (March 1966) called for unity and action against 'this anti-national government policy' and America, which had made Turkey into her satellite.⁷⁰

The General Staff issued a warning to 'opponents of the present régime' that the 'exploitation of the name of the armed forces for such underground activities designed to disturb the unity, concord and solidarity among Turkish citizens is tantamount to treason against the country'.⁷¹ The High Command recognized that the struggle against opponents of the régime was ideological and in April Cemal Tural, the new Chief of the General Staff issued a circular that the book *Komünizmle Mücadele Metodları* (Methods of Combating Communism) must be read throughout the armed forces.⁷² Supporters of the Right, who had already taken the

offensive against radicalism, were naturally encouraged to attack the Left with greater vigour.

By May 1966 the political situation had become sufficiently grave for President Sunay to consult party leaders, Senators, and the commanders. There was talk in the press of possible military intervention and Sunay's aim was to warn the parties and nudge them towards moderation.⁷³ The appeal for moderation came just in time for the partial Senate election campaign which began on 15 May, and succeeded in persuading the politicians to be a little more moderate than they would normally have been. These election results marked no change since October 1965; if anything, the JP and the TWP improved their positions—with 56.29 and 3.92 per cent of the vote, while the votes cast dropped to 54 per cent of the registered voters.⁷⁴

The situation calmed down after the election and a more confident Justice Party decided to postpone legislation to amend the Election Law and introduce the amnesty bill. In return, the opposition parties agreed to withdraw all censure motions and permit the Assembly to deal with more vital legislation. But the division on the Right was too deep and only an amnesty for the former Democrats could help heal the wound. The first sign that amnesty was on the way was the pardon for Celâl Bayar on 8 July. The amnesty law was passed on 3 August and included all political prisoners save those who had violated Articles 141 and 142 of the penal code, namely those guilty of 'communist propaganda'. The National Unity Group opposed the bill and appealed to Sunay to veto it. There is said to have been some opposition among the commanders, and Sunay's personal secretary, Cihat Alpan, sought the approval of the generals before taking it to Istanbul for Sunay's signature.⁷⁵

Both major parties were too involved with internal dissension to be able to give undivided attention to national affairs. Demirel was occupied with pressure from his party's right wing which was alarmed by the impact of a burgeoning capitalist economy on the small Anatolian merchants and artisans, who found it difficult to survive against the competition. The RPP was torn with the dissension caused by the very slight turn to the left. In both parties the right-wing factions broke away to form parties of their own. Turhan Feyzioğlu and his friends left the RPP and formed the Reliance Party (RP—Güven Partisi) in May 1967; the JP retained its unity until 1970, when the Democratic Party (DP—Demokratik Parti) was formed.⁷⁶

The government's offensive against 'the Left' continued unabated. It was as though the country was faced with an

imminent threat of subversion and revolution but nothing could have been farther from reality. Persecution of the Left had taken place under the coalition governments, but Demirel's government became hysterical. The intelligentsia was the principal target and writers and artists were constantly harassed; some were prosecuted under Articles 141 and 142 of the penal code for disseminating communist propaganda. Such was the hysteria that the police went so far as to prosecute a 15 year old schoolboy for writing an essay on Atatürk and Lenin!⁷⁷ Minister of Industries Mehmet Turgut appealed to the private sector to combat the enemies of capitalism.⁷⁸

The government's repressive policies brought a response from the intelligentsia, especially the students, who were a new political factor in the sixties. Politics had entered the university, and the factory, and on occasion spilled out into the street. By the mid-sixties student demonstrations were a fact of political life. The government, having learned the folly of using the army against demonstrators, had created a riot squad, euphemistically described as the 'Community Police' (Toplum Polisi), which was specially armed and equipped to deal with demonstrators. Street politics created a permanent atmosphere of crisis and were therefore an element of instability. The parliamentary régime, unable to control the situation, was discredited and again there were rumours of military intervention. Credited Sunay in his New Year message confirmed the rumours. But he stated categorically that the armed forces would neither be instruments nor spectators of such events.⁷⁹

In November 1966 General Tural issued an order to the armed forces to prepare themselves for the struggle against subversive activities, by which he meant activities of the Left. The order was made public on 23 January 1967. It caused great political turmoil and was severely criticized as a threat to freedom of expression and democracy. However, Demirel supported Tural, stating that the government knew of the order; and the Assembly Group of the Justice Party even demanded an end to all criticism of the Chief of the General Staff, as well as new measures against 'anarchy'. Tural defended his action on 1 February, claiming that what he had done had been common practice during the Atatürk period and that the army was duty bound to awaken the nation whenever necessary, and that was all he had done.⁸⁰

The implications of Tural's logic were dangerously clear. Abdi İpekçi warned his readers that the creation of the myth of a communist menace could be the prelude to a military take-over that would be justified on the grounds of saving Turkey from communism.⁸¹ The Workers' Party brought a motion of censure

against Tural but it was defeated in the Assembly; even the Republicans voted against. Such was the atmosphere in the Assembly that when Behice Boran of the TWP tried to speak she was shouted down with cries of 'Throw her out of the country', 'To Moscow, to Moscow'.⁸² Encouraged by this show of support from the politicians, Tural repeated his call on 1 March. The military High Command's political allegiance had been stated openly. It was totally committed to the existing régime and no longer pretended to stand outside or above politics.

For some time the Right had been claiming that the 1961 constitution was 'closed to socialism'. This question aroused great emotions and fears on both sides, and Sunay's support for the interpretation that the constitution was closed to socialism, as well as communism and fascism, strengthened the position of the Right.⁸³ His comment sparked off a constitutional controversy which inflamed political feelings. Ever since the beginning of the Second Republic, political debate had focused on the interpretation and implementation of the constitution; the form of the new republic depended entirely on this. Sunay's statement was partially supported by the Constitutional Court's compromise decision that the constitution was open to only 'limited socialism'.⁸⁴ This was an important decision, for if it was enforced, it would restrict the political spectrum to parties of the centre and the Right which shared a similar ideology. It would therefore be a step back towards the politics of the fifties.

Under Demirel's leadership the economy began to pick up and expand, but at the cost of constantly rising prices and spiralling inflation. The emphasis was now on industry and foreign investment, preferably in collaboration with local capital. The government retained the principle of low wages in order to keep down the cost of industrialization and provide the investor with a handsome margin of profit. However, this principle was impossible to reconcile with the concept of social justice, especially for a working class growing more politically conscious and militant. But the economy did not expand rapidly enough to absorb the ever-growing work force, which, fortunately for Demirel, found an outlet by temporary emigration to Europe. According to Mehmed Ali Aybar, the WPT's research showed that, by the beginning of 1968, the economy had started to slow down and this trend was expected to continue for the rest of the year, becoming more pronounced, with a strong possibility that 1969 would be the year of intense crisis. Turkey, he predicted, had entered a period of economic retrogression similar to that of the years 1954 to 1957.⁸⁵

If Aybar's prediction was accurate the political implications would be grave.

Another significant feature of the late sixties was the extraordinary degree of radicalism espoused by Turkish youth. Turkish universities were undoubtedly affected by the world-wide trend, especially by the student insurrection in Paris in May 1968; their students, concerned with local problems, demanded that the government deal with them. They called for, among other things, reform of the archaic system of education, of land ownership which was both unjust and inefficient, and the end of an alliance with the West, which, they believed, restricted their country's freedom of action. Because of the continuing frustration over Cyprus anti-imperialism became the most emotional issue, an issue of great embarrassment to a government totally committed to the United States. This was particularly true when the students began to demonstrate against the visiting Sixth Fleet or American dignitaries like Dean Rusk.⁸⁶

Young people on the Right were also active in the 1960s; if anything they were better organized than those on the Left. The government was sympathetic, and they were dealt with more leniently than the radicals. Their platform was a virulent anti-communism and their principal target was the WPT, whose meetings they attacked and disrupted, especially before any election. They claimed to be anti-imperialist, but the imperialism they opposed was Russian imperialism, which was no longer seen as an obvious threat in Turkey.

The political situation in Turkey had polarized and Demirel observed that the 'polarization of ideological movements is a fact of life in our world. Certain ideological movements have spread through various foreign countries as fashions do. In our country they have been pushed to such extremes as to be repugnant.' This, he declared, was brought about by too much freedom in the Turkish political system and he warned that 'Freedom of thought, expression and criticism ... should not be allowed to stretch to such a limit that an ideology could threaten those freedoms.'⁸⁷ Hereafter Demirel began to stress the existence of 'too much freedom' with proposals to rectify the situation by amending the constitution.

The government's position in the Assembly was still secure but turmoil in the universities, the factories, and sometimes in the streets created the potential for military intervention and this was an unsettling factor for Demirel. There were some who encouraged the junior officers to act in order to fulfil a 'national duty'. But there was no response, at least none that we know of. The only

echo was a circular from cadets at the Naval War College which threatened the reactionaries and enemies of Atatürk's reforms with violence.⁸⁸

The High Command remained quiet. In the circumstances President Sunay's New Year message was unusually mild. He regretfully observed that the students were drifting away from their original attitude under the provocation of a small minority which had no discipline and hampered educational activity. He reproached young people for the breakdown of discipline and asked them to stop acts of disruption in educational institutions.⁸⁹ A week later, totally disregarding Sunay's appeal, students demonstrated against the American ambassador, Robert Komer, who was visiting the Middle East Technical University, and burned his car.⁹⁰ İnönü, a good judge of the times, predicted that Turkey had entered a stormy period. His evaluation was based not on student activity, but on the militancy of the workers. 'We are seeing the first sign of this in the Sümerbank strike. It is difficult to understand a misunderstanding that goes on so long.'⁹¹

Still there was no response from the High Command, though the National Security Council met more frequently and received greater publicity. The High Command may have been suffering problems within its own ranks and was too divided to act. General Tural was showing signs of political ambition. But he was isolated and lacked the ability to deal with the collective power of the High Command. His term as the Chief of the General Staff ended on 11 March 1969 and he was replaced by General Memduh Tağmac.⁹²

A general election was due in 1969 and as the summer drew to a close the parties began to prepare. The restoration of civil rights to former Democrats was still an issue which aroused emotion and was worth many votes for the party which seemed to support the measure. Demirel was bound to exploit the issue but this time İnönü also decided to make political capital out of it when the Bill came before the Assembly on 11 May. And with the support of the RPP it was passed on 15 May.⁹³

The commanders, however, opposed the restoration of rights and made that clear to the parties. However, instead of holding Demirel responsible for introducing the Bill, they blamed İnönü for helping it to pass. They had no objections to Demirel exploiting the issue in order to tap the former DP vote; but they did not like İnönü using the same weapon. Neither Demirel nor the commanders wanted political rights restored since the return of the former Democrats to the political arena would undermine Demirel's position, not İnönü's. But all was not lost, for the measure had yet to go through the Senate. The parties, apprehensive of military

intervention and in no position to challenge the military domination, decided to withdraw the Bill on the advice of their respective leaders.⁹⁴

The general election of 12 October brought no change; not that any was seriously expected. No opposition party offered an alternative to Demirel's Justice Party. The RPP was still recovering from the damage done to its old identity by the left-of-centre controversy. The WPT was torn by internal squabbles and factionalism, and by 1969 it had become too respectable for the 'revolutionary' youth who had supported it in 1965. The main element of interest was again the electorate. This time it showed its displeasure with the parties and the politicians by registering the lowest vote (64.3 per cent) of all the elections held since 1950. Demirel's share of this reduced vote was down by 6.4 per cent to 46.5 per cent, lower than the DP vote in 1957. The RPP and the WPT also lost votes and with the ending of the national remainder system the WPT's representation in the Assembly was reduced to two.⁹⁵

The election was a setback for the small parties, confirming the hold of the centrist, conservative Justice Party. The poor performance of the Republicans and of the Workers' Party alienated a large section of the intelligentsia—especially the radicals and the Left—from the system. They had hoped that a change of government might lead to the implementation of reforms promised in the constitution, but Demirel's victory made that improbable. Demirel, now weaker than ever in the party and faced with a split, was unlikely to take any risks with an unpopular policy. Before the election an army officer had noted that a JP victory would be useful because the party's continued failure to solve problems would mobilize 'fresh forces' to put an end to the present system.⁹⁶

The Régime under Pressure

After the 1969 election Turkey was led by a weak government under siege from every side. The majority party was divided by internal factionalism and its leader discredited. The opposition parties, disillusioned with the system in which they performed so badly, were in no mood to compromise with the government—an attitude that aggravated the instability. The general economic situation continued to decline rapidly, and 1970, with one of the most severe droughts of recent years, was declared the year of crisis. The universities were paralysed by student agitation and violence and the factories by worker militancy and strikes. Even the traditionally 'apathetic peasant' stirred himself and occupied land legally not his

own. The mass media, especially the influential Turkish Radio and Television, constantly highlighted the shortcomings of the government and the ruling party. On 11 February 1970, within months of his electoral triumph, Demirel was forced to resign when JP dissidents voted against the budget and in so doing brought the government down. Sunay reappointed him Prime Minister but he was never able to recover from this set-back; after 11 February it was downhill all the way for Demirel.⁹⁷

The unstable political environment encouraged adventurism in the armed forces, prompting the National Security Council to step in and issue a warning. On 27 March it took the unprecedented step of issuing a strong statement against the disorders in the universities and threatened counter-measures which paid scant attention to university autonomy. The NSC had gone beyond its consultative and advisory duties assigned by the constitution. But its members were not deterred by mere legality when the existence of the régime was at stake.⁹⁸

That there were rumblings in the army is borne out by a communiqué from the General Staff revealing the arrest of two colonels charged with inciting the armed forces to carry out a military revolution.⁹⁹ There were reports of repressive counter-measures to uproot any conspiracy. Officers were forbidden to visit other units, and the press reported that about 700 colonels had been retired.¹⁰⁰

The High Command's measures confirmed its commitment to the government. Demirel, confident of the generals' support, ridiculed the talk of revolution: 'Is the nation', he asked, 'to be frightened of its armed forces—the apple of its eye—charged with protecting the unity of the country, its régime and independence? These fears are as out of place as they are laughable.'¹⁰¹ But Demirel was virtually dependent on the commanders for his very survival, and imposition of the 'Yahya Khan formula' in Turkey seemed only a question of time. After the massive workers' demonstration in Istanbul and Kocaeli on 15/16 June, which the government described as a dress rehearsal for revolution, martial law was declared. According to Mehmed Ali Aybar, this was the first step towards the 'Yahya Khan formula'.¹⁰²

Even the commanders were having difficulty in maintaining a consensus in the face of the politicians' failure to maintain order and introduce reform. Some of them lost their patience and wanted to impose a solution from the top. The first indication of this was the Batur memorandum presented to the commanders. Muhsin Batur, a member of the NSC, had recently become Commander of the Air Force. He had the reputation of being a young, innovative,

and reformist commander who was unhappy with the political situation. In his memorandum Batur concluded that an orderly parliamentary régime could be maintained only if a radical programme of reform was introduced immediately and backed by the armed forces.¹⁰³

However, no reforms were introduced and on 24 November Batur presented a second memorandum, this time only to Sunay, proposing that the NSC be broadened to include all ranks of officers from lieutenants to generals (rather like the Armed Forces Union), and that a Constituent Assembly be set up to examine objectively the country's problems. His memorandum stated that, because of the prevailing political and socio-economic crisis, unrest in the armed forces had reached a dangerous level, and he advised that immediate measures be taken.¹⁰⁴ Sunay informed Demirel of the situation and set out on a tour of the military commands to feel the pulse of the armed forces for himself.

The other commanders held back and decided to find a solution to the crisis within the context of the existing political structure. On 4 January 1971 Sunay began discussions with party leaders and learned that they would not collaborate with him in order to rescue Demirel. The opposition leaders were disappointed to find that the aim of Sunay's consultations was only to protect Demirel and to throw the army's weight behind him.¹⁰⁵ Demirel met Sunay again on 8 January and when he left the meeting assured the press that the régime was in no danger.¹⁰⁶ On 22 January the NSC met again and reaffirmed its support of the government.¹⁰⁷

In the new year law and order declined dramatically, almost inviting military counter-measures. Urban guerrilla activity in the form of bank robberies and kidnappings, followed by the government's measures against the universities whence the guerrillas were said to be operating, increased the tension. There were attempts to divide the army and involve it in anti-governmental activity. The commanders were alarmed by propaganda which sought to create the image of an alliance between the government and the High Command in the service of the United States. Such propaganda had already been partially successful in planting the notion that the Turkish Army was purely a 'NATO army' and in holding the commanders responsible for this. The implications of such propaganda were dangerously subversive and the commanders saw the threat. Chief of the General Staff Memduh Tağmaç issued a warning that

... A group of miserable persons who have been trying for some time to drag our country into the dark pit of their ideology have now directed

their attacks at destroying the national belief, unity and reputation of our armed forces which is the greatest source of security for the State. Those who have not observed anything like the present indecent defamation of the Turkish armed forces, which have represented the honour and dignity of the great Turkish nation since its foundations, are now witnessing with admonition and disgust the attacks, which consist of repulsive expressions such as 'corrupt', 'fascists' and 'lackeys', against the forces and commanders—the symbols of the national sanctuaries.

It is not possible any more to determine how much longer the armed forces will patiently resist the hostile attacks of these lackeys. In conducting their fundamental duty within the Constitution and democratic system, the armed forces deem imperative a return to the course of Atatürk's reform through concerted action by all State organs to achieve a categorical and speedy solution to ideological clashes, destruction, sabotage and intimidation, which aim at the complete collapse of the country. The Turkish armed forces will oppose any such view and concept, and confront all activities which might drag the country into calamities....¹⁰⁸

Even after the NSC meeting of 24 February there was no indication that Demirel would soon be dismissed. After the meeting he told journalists that the government was not even considering martial law in order to deal with the 'anarchic situation'.¹⁰⁹ Yet within the week something occurred which forced General Tağmaç to describe the situation as critical. On 3 March he addressed 300 officers and ordered them to steer clear of the incidents—bank robberies, kidnappings, student violence—and stated that the army must remain united. The army, he promised, would be the final arbiter if the situation required it, but such a situation had not yet arisen.¹¹⁰

A week later, on 10 March, Tağmaç called an extraordinary meeting of the Supreme Military Council (*Yüksek Komuta Konseyi*). We do not know exactly what was discussed but we do know that there was a demand for Demirel's dismissal. The deliberations continued the following day but no decisions were made public. Evidently the decision to remove Demirel had been taken, and Sunay was informed of it immediately after the meeting.

On 12 March President Sunay and the Chairmen of both chambers received a memorandum signed by Chief of the General Staff Memduh Tağmaç and the Commanders of the Land, Sea, and Air Forces, acting on behalf of the armed forces. The memorandum demanded the formation of a strong, credible government capable of implementing the reforms envisaged by the constitution. Unless this was done immediately the armed forces would assume power. Knowing that the basis of his power had

been removed, Demirel resigned, but not without protest. 'It is not possible', he wrote in his letter of resignation, 'to reconcile the memorandum with the constitution and the rule of law [literally, legal state]. In view of this I am submitting, with respect, the resignation of the government.'¹¹¹

The motives for this intervention, and its timing, are still far from clear. The memorandum held the Assembly and the government responsible for driving 'our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife and social and economic unrest', with the consequence that the 'future of the Turkish Republic is... seriously threatened...'. This was the justification for the intervention. If these were the reasons then they had existed for a year or more and therefore the timing becomes significant. It seems that the memorandum was prompted by information that officers, including generals, outside the circle of the High Command, were going to intervene. There had been inklings of such intervention as early as Batur's first memorandum; it is said that Batur was even asked to lead such a movement.¹¹²

Generals close to the High Command were again approached by the conspirators and told of the impending intervention. The generals informed the High Command—which may explain Tağmaç's meetings with the officers and commanders, designed to establish a consensus and bring into play the armed forces as an institution rather than a cabal. This was the technique used by the commanders ever since the formation of the Armed Forces Union in 1961. The memorandum of 12 March forestalled action from below. Having defused the movement by taking a step which seemed radical and reformist, the commanders gained the initiative and dealt with the insurrectionist officers and their civilian allies in their own good time.

NOTES

- 1 Yalman, *Gördüklerim*, iv, 385; and Türkeş, *Milliyetçilik*, 119.
- 2 Ankara Radio, 16 Oct. 1961, in *SWB*, iv/771/c/2; *Cumhuriyet*, 17 Oct. 1961.
- 3 Quoted in Erkanlı, *Anılar*, 187. See also Türkeş, *Milliyetçilik*, 117-21.
- 4 *Cumhuriyet*, 31 Oct. 1961. Those present at the Brussels meeting were Alparslan Türkeş, Orhan Erkanlı, Orhan Kabibay, İrfan Solmazer, Numan Esin, and Mustafa Kaplan.
- 5 The text of the protocol is in Faik, *Gazeteci*, 174-5, but see also 172-6; Dündar Seyhan, 'Gölgedeki Adam', *Milliyet*, 21 June 1966; Yalman, *Gördüklerim*, iv, 385-6.
- 6 M. Emin Aytekin, *İhtilâl Çıkmazı* (1967), 79.

- 7 *Milliyet*, 25 Oct. 1961; Faik, *Gazeteci*, 168 and *passim*.
- 8 *Milliyet*, 26 and 27 Oct. 1961; Faik, *Gazeteci*, 161 ff.; Baban, *Politika*, 257 ff.
- 9 *Cumhuriyet*, 21 Dec. 1961; *MER* 1961, 575-6.
- 10 İnönü's speech to industrialists and businessmen, *Cumhuriyet*, 2 Feb. 1962.
- 11 Faik, *Gazeteci*, 188-94; Aytakin, *İhtilâl*, 181-8. Talât Aydemir, who led this revolt, told his own story. See his *Ve Talât Aydemir Konuşuyor* (1966), 116-43.
- 12 There is considerable literature on the Turkish army in politics. Apart from the works cited in nn. 3, 5, 6, and 11 above, see also Can Kaya İsen, *Geliyorum diyen İhtilâl* (1964); Erdoğan Örtülü, *Üç İhtilâlin Hikâyesi* (1966); Walter Weiker, 'The Aydemir Case and Turkey's Political Dilemma', *MEA*, xiv/9 (1963), 258-71; Kemal Karpaz, 'The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution', *American Historical Review*, lxxv/6 (1970), 1654-83.
- 13 *Cumhuriyet*, 31 Mar. 1962. Conversation with Seyfi Kurtbek who had become one of the leading figures in the Justice Party. See Article III of the bill; the text is given in *MEJ*, xvi/1 (1962), 215-38.
- 14 Ankara Radio, 3 Apr. 1962, in *SWB*, iv/914/c/1.
- 15 The Turkish press, 6, 7, 8, 11, and 21 Apr. 1962.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 24 Apr. 1962.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 25 Apr. 1962.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 27 May 1962 and Avni Eevli, *1960-1965 Olayları ve Baturilamıyan Gemi 'Türkiye'* (1967), 289.
- 19 *Cumhuriyet*, 20 and 21 June 1962. The fourth volume of Toker, *İsmet Paşa*, deals with the years 1961-4 from İnönü's perspective.
- 20 *Cumhuriyet*, 25 and 26 June 1962. The cabinet is given below, 228, n. 19.
- 21 See İnönü's speech following the vote of confidence in the Assembly, *Cumhuriyet*, 8 July 1962.
- 22 *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*, 6-10 Oct. 1962. Faik, *Gazeteci*, 231 suggests that Turhan Feyzioğlu (Minister of State) and Life Senator Ekrem Acuner were responsible for these leaflets. In a conversation with the author, and in a further private communication, Feyzioğlu ridiculed Faik's allegation in the strongest terms.
- 23 The Turkish press, 3 and 4 Dec. 1962 and 5 Dec. for Mücîp Ataklı's reply. See also *TY* 1963, 44-6.
- 24 Faik, *Gazeteci*, 226-47 devotes a chapter to this incident in order to establish a relationship between the RPP and the eleven officers.
- 25 Erkanlı, *Anılar*, 191-2 (Brussels meeting). Türkeş's return received wide coverage in the press on 24 and 25 Feb. 1963. See also *The Economist*, 2 Mar. 1963. Türkeş was arrested in May 1963 in connection with Aydemir's abortive *coup*. This, he claims, destroyed his chances of taking over the Justice Party. On 31 Mar. 1965 he and four other former exiles joined the RPNP, which he took over in June. Under Türkeş the party began to change its character, acquiring fascist, populist overtones, and he even organized para-military youths to use against the Left. In

- 1969 the name of the party was changed to the Nationalist Action Party (NAP—*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*). Since 1965 Türkeş has been Representative for Adana.
- 26 *Cumhuriyet*, 22-5 Mar. 1963.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 27 Mar. 1963.
- 28 *The Economist*, 30 Mar. and 6 Apr. 1963.
- 29 *Cumhuriyet*, 23 and 24 Apr. 1963.
- 30 *Ibid.*, 29 Apr. 1963.
- 31 *Ibid.*, 15 May 1963.
- 32 *Ibid.*
- 33 *Cumhuriyet*, 17 May 1963.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 3 June 1963. Toker, *İsmet Paşa*, iv, 88 says that they were caught unaware. See also the works listed in n. 12 above.
- 35 *Cumhuriyet*, 4 July 1963.
- 36 The Turkish press, 22 May 1963; *TY* 1964, 69-107.
- 37 Sunay's statement to the French press cited in *Cumhuriyet*, 21 July 1963.
- 38 The quotations are from Bernard Lewis, 'Dustür: Turkey', in *EP* (1966). The text of the constitution is given in *MEJ*, xvi/1 (1962), 215-38 with comments by Kerim Kâmi Key. The same issue of *MEJ* includes İsmet Giritli, 'Some Aspects of the New Turkish Constitution'. Giritli was one of the professors responsible for drawing up the constitution. See also Münici Kapanı, 'Outlines of the New Turkish Constitution', *Parliamentary Affairs*, xv (1961/1962), 94-110; Joseph Szyliowicz, 'The 1961 Constitution—an Analysis', *Islamic Studies*, ii/3 (1963), 363-81; Robert Devereux, 'Society and Culture in the Second Turkish Republic', *MEA*, xii (1961), 230-9. Perhaps the best analysis of the 1961 constitution is Mümtaz Soysal, *Anayasanın Anlamı* (1969), 58-144.
- 39 On the Workers' Party see Kemal Karpaz, 'Socialism and the Labour Party of Turkey', *MEJ*, xxi/2 (1967), 157-73; and excerpt from *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Kimlerin Partisidir?* (Istanbul, 1962) translated in Karpaz, ed., *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (1968), 358-60; Kışlalı, *Forces Politiques*, 103-12; and the party's programme: *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Programı* (1964).
- 40 *Cumhuriyet*, 20 Aug. 1963.
- 41 *Ibid.*, 5 Sept. 1963. A more efficient intelligence service has played a major role in keeping track of and disarming conspiracies in the army.
- 42 See the Turkish press, 3 Dec. 1963 and following.
- 43 *Cumhuriyet*, 26 Dec. 1963 and Toker, *İsmet Paşa*, iv, 135-40 and *passim*. The cabinet is given below, 230, n. 44.
- 44 *Cumhuriyet*, 20 and 21 Mar. 1964. The Cyprus question is discussed in ch. 14 below.
- 45 The economy is discussed in ch. 10 below.
- 46 Sunay's letter to the Chairman of the Assembly, Fuad Sirmen, was delivered on 12 Nov. and published in the press on 18 Nov. 1964, also in *TY* 1965, 244-6. See also his statement to *Kim*, 3 Dec. 1964.
- 47 *Cumhuriyet*, 23 Nov. 1964.
- 48 *Ibid.*, 11 Dec. 1964. According to Seyfi Kurtbek, it was Demirel's

policy to appease the commanders, but he practised this policy with circumspection so as not to alienate the extremists in the party.

49 *Cumhuriyet*, 19 Dec. 1964; Toker, *İsmet Paşa*, iv, 141 ff.

50 *Cumhuriyet*, 12-14 Feb. 1964. See below, 223.

51 *Ibid.*, 17 Feb. 1965; *TY 1965*, 308-9. For the cabinet see below, 230, n. 57.

52 For Ürgüplü's programme see the press, 27 Feb. 1965 and Öztürk, *Hükümetler*, 583 ff.; and for Zeren's statement, *Cumhuriyet*, 13 Mar. 1965, 7.

53 Ankara Radio, 16 May 1965, in *SWB*, iv/1862/c/3-4.

54 *Cumhuriyet*, 30 May 1965.

55 *Ibid.*, 31 May 1965.

56 *Son Havadis*, 30 June 1965. For Demirel's election speeches see his *Seçim Konuşmaları* (1966, published by the JP Central Committee).

57 Deputy Secretary-General Suphi Baykam's telegram, *Cumhuriyet*, 1 July 1965.

58 *Milliyet*, 8 Aug. (Erim) and 22 Aug. 1965 (FeYZioğlu).

59 See Nermin Abadan, 'Turkish Election of 1965', *Government and Opposition*, i/3 (1966), 335-44, and her very detailed study *1965 Seçimlerinin Tahlili* (1966). The official results were given in the press on 15 Oct. 1965.

60 J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: the Military Dimension* (1969), 505, n.9.

61 *Milliyet*, 17 and 18 Jan. 1966.

62 *Ibid.*, 3 Feb. 1966. By 1966 so confident was the JP of its standing with the generals that some of its members assaulted retired General, former Minister and Senator, Sıtkı Ulay in the Assembly (the press, 7 May 1966). Compare this with the Nuri Beşer incident of January 1962 when a Justice Party Representative 'insulted the army' while intoxicated. He was expelled from the party, had his parliamentary immunity removed, and was sentenced to one year's imprisonment with hard labour and four years of provincial exile in Tatvan.

63 *Cumhuriyet*, 14-16 Mar. 1966.

64 *Ibid.*, 29 Mar. 1966. Brigadier General Cihat Alpan replaced the civilian Nasır Zeytinoglu as the President's personal secretary, *Cumhuriyet*, 10 Apr. 1966. Alpan is said to have been very influential politically, acting as liaison between the commanders and Sunay. See *Ortam*, 2, 26 Apr. 1971. *Yankı*, 148, 20 Jan. 1974, 4, claimed that 'there is a widespread belief that Alpan was the brains behind every important decision of the presidency'.

65 *Milliyet*, 30 Mar. 1966.

66 Ankara Radio, 19 May 1966, in *SWB*, iv/2169/c/1-2.

67 For reports see *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*, 23 May 1966.

68 OYAK will be discussed in the context of the economy in ch. 10 below. As for retired officers in the bureaucracy and other sectors, a few examples will suffice. Admiral Fahri Korutürk, who is President today, was sent to Moscow and Madrid; General Kızıloğlu to the Vatican; General Tansel to Ottawa. Colonel Agasi Şen became director of Turkish

Airlines after he left the post of personal secretary to Gürsel. This tendency has been accelerated since 12 Mar. 1971 and needs to be studied with some care.

69 On 29 June 1966 the press reported that houses were being built for the commanders in Çankaya, the most fashionable embassy district of the capital. See İlhami Soysal, 'Komutanlarımızın Yuvası', *Akşam*, 29 June 1966.

70 *Ulus*, 20 Jan. 1966 and *Cumhuriyet*, 5-6 Mar. 1966.

71 Ankara Radio, 12 Mar. 1966, in *SWB*, iv/2112/c/1.

72 *Cumhuriyet*, 29 Apr. 1966.

73 The Turkish press, 13-14 May 1966.

74 *Ibid.*, 7 June 1966. For an analysis of the results see Cavit Orhan Tütengil, 'Seçim Sonuçları', *Cumhuriyet*, 19 June 1966, 2.

75 *Cumhuriyet*, 20 July and 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10 Aug. 1966. The Bill became law when it was published in *Resmi Gazete*, 9 Aug. 1966.

76 Muzaffer Sencer, *Sosyal Temeller*, 304-12 (Güven Partisi) and 373-81 (Demokratik Parti).

77 *Cumhuriyet*, 9 and 10 Mar. 1966. The schoolboy Gürbüz Şimşek was defended by Muammer Aksoy and acquitted on 30 Sept. See *Cumhuriyet*, 1 Oct. 1966.

78 *Ibid.*, 28 Sept. 1966.

79 *Ibid.*, 1 Jan. 1967; *MER 1967*, 511.

80 *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*, 31 Jan., 1 and 2 Feb. 1967; *MER 1967*, 512.

81 *Milliyet*, 5 Feb. 1967. A few months later, when the Greek army overthrew George Papandreou, the Turkish press noted that the junta had intervened against a left-of-centre government, similar to the type İnönü and Ecevit wanted to set up. See the press, 22 Apr. 1967 and following.

82 The Turkish press, 10 Feb. 1967; *MER 1967*, 512.

83 Ankara Radio, 27 May 1967, in *SWB*, iv/2478/c/3-4. For a criticism of Sunay's statement see Nadir Nadi, 'Niyetler İyi Olsa da', *Cumhuriyet*, 30 May 1967, reproduced in Nadir Nadi, *27 Mayıs'tan 12 Mart'a* (1971), 344-5; and *MER 1967*, 512-13.

84 *Resmi Gazete*, 25 July 1967 and the press, 26 July 1967.

85 Ankara Radio, 18 May 1968, in *SWB*, iv/2776/c/2-3. Professor Besim Üstünel corroborated this view a year later, claiming that the economy was heading for a situation similar to that of 1958 (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 May 1969). In Aug. 1970 the Turkish lira was devalued by 66 per cent.

86 The Turkish press, 20 and 21 Apr. 1966; *MEJ*, xx/3 (1966), 382.

87 Ankara Radio, 23 Mar. 1968, in *SWB*, iv/2731/c/1-2.

88 *Milliyet*, 3 and 4 Nov. 1968; Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiye 1968* (1969), 122. See also İlhan Selçuk, 'Harbiye Konuştu', and Sezai Orkunt, 'Deniz Subaylarının Bildirisi Üzerine', *Cumhuriyet*, 4 and 9 Nov. 1968, respectively. Both articles are reproduced in *VY 1969*, 407-13.

89 *Cumhuriyet* and Ankara Radio, 1 Jan. 1969, in *SWB*, iv/2964-c/1-2.

90 The Turkish press, 7 Jan. 1969. The university was closed down until 10 Feb.

91 *Cumhuriyet*, 26 Jan. 1969. This was the longest strike in Turkish history.

92 *Ulus*, 12 and 18 Mar. 1969. *Yankı* 18, 4 July 1971, 5 claims that General Faruk Gürler refused to support Tural. Gürler was Under-Secretary at the Defence Ministry and a very popular general in the army.

93 The press, 11-16 May 1969.

94 *Ibid.*, 22 May 1969; *The Economist*, 31 May 1969. Just before the election Tural announced that the armed forces had played no role in preventing the passage of the Bill, implying that Demirel alone had been responsible. Demirel refused to join issue (*Cumhuriyet*, 29-30 Aug. 1969).

95 The official results were published in the press, 19 Oct. 1969. For an analysis of these elections see Michael Hyland, 'Crisis at the Polls: Turkey's 1969 Elections', *MEJ* xxiv/1 (1970), 1-16.

96 Sami Kohen in the *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 Oct. 1969.

97 A good account of the internal dissension in the JP in 1970 is given in *Milliyet 1970* (1971), 30-48. This will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.

98 On the criticism of the NSC statement see Bahri Savcı, 'Büyük Hastalık', *Cumhuriyet*, 6 Apr., and the panel discussion in *Milliyet*, 12 Apr. 1970. There was also a response from a clandestine group in the armed forces. See İlhan Selçuk, 'MGK Bildirisi ve Devrimci Ordu Gücü Karşı Bildirisi', *Cumhuriyet*, 5 Apr. 1970.

99 *Milliyet*, 26 May 1970 and Sami Kohen's report, *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 June 1970.

100 *Cumhuriyet*, 27 July 1970. The actual figures, 56 generals and 516 colonels, were announced on 28 Aug. Some members of the National Unity Group in the Senate were also thought to be involved in the conspiracy and the government tried to have their parliamentary immunity lifted, but failed. However, they were unable to escape so easily after 12 Mar. 1971. See *Madanoğlu Dosyası* (1973), the indictment prepared by Süleyman Takkeci, a martial law prosecutor.

101 *Cumhuriyet*, 29 May 1970.

102 Aybar's interpellation in the Assembly on 22 June 1970 in Mehmet Ali Aybar, *12 Mart'tan Sonra Meclis Konuşmaları* (1973), 5-26. The term 'Yahya Khan Formula' (*Yahya Han Formülü*) enjoyed wide currency in Turkey during 1970 and 1971. It was used to describe the anticipated open domination of the politicians by the commanders, as was the case in Pakistan. Fahri Özdilek, leader of the NUG in the Senate, had already asked Sunay to replace Demirel but Sunay refused (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 June 1970). He told Kemal Aydar that he would never use this formula (interview in *Cumhuriyet*, 14 June 1970).

103 *Le Monde*, sélection hebdomadaire, 9-15 July 1970; *Yankı* 129, 9 Sept. 1971 (cover story), 5-10.

104 *Yankı*, as previous note. This memorandum was published in the press on 12 Dec. 1970.

105 See the statements of the NUG, İsmet İnönü and Dündar Taşer (NAP) in the press, 6-7 Jan. 1971.

106 *Cumhuriyet*, 9 Jan. 1971.

107 *Ibid.*, 23 and 24 Jan. 1971.

108 Ankara Radio, 6 Feb. 1971, in *SWB*, iv/3605/c/1; see also *Cumhuriyet*, 6 Feb. 1971. For examples of attacks on the army see Tayfur Ketenci, *Türk Silâhlı Kuvvetleri ve Aşırı Sol* (n.d. [1971]).

109 *Cumhuriyet*, 25 Feb. 1971.

110 *Ibid.*, 4 Mar. 1971. For a description of this period, see my article, 'The Turkish Guerrillas: Symptoms of a Deeper Malaise', *NME*, 55 (Apr. 1973), 13-16.

111 See the Turkish press, 11-13 Mar. 1971 and *Milliyet 1971* (1972), 42-64.

112 Uğur Mumcu's article in *Devrim* 50, 29 Sept. 1970, partially quoted in Metin Toker, *Solda ve Sağda Vuruşanlar* (1971), 80.