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Author(s): Berdal Aral

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Fifty Years On: Turkey's Voting Orientation at the UN General Assembly, 1948–97

BERDAL ARAL

As is well known, the United Nations (UN) has been at the forefront of endeavours pertaining to the progressive development of international law for over 50 years. To realize its objectives, the UN has had to find ways of encouraging international co-operation designed to cope with certain economic, political and social problems that could not be resolved by individual states alone. These problems are varied, and are subject to an evolutionary legal process. They range from 'human rights' issues to the 'protection of the environment', from 'self-determination' to the 'rights of women', from 'the search for a new international economic order' to the 'rights of refugees and displaced persons', and so on. For its part, this study deals with three of the outstanding issues which fall into the category of 'progressive' international law:

1. Decolonization and the principle of self-determination;
2. Search for a new international economic order;
3. Human rights.

This particular focus derives from the fact that these themes reflect a great deal about the foreign policy choices of states. Secondly, they have had more far-reaching implications for the conduct of international relations than other issues of international law. Besides, there has been much controversy around these subjects since the foundation of the United Nations. This study accordingly tries to explore, within a chronological framework, Turkey's voting preferences in the UN over these subjects in the past 50 years.

The main crux of the analysis made here centres around the UN General Assembly (GA) discussions over various resolutions, declarations and decisions. It is generally agreed that the voting behaviour in the General Assembly is a clear expression of a given state's foreign policy orientation. It indicates the way in which the ruling elites define the nation's goals and expectations and reflects 'its actual behaviour rather than its claims or

pretensions'.¹ However, it is also generally agreed that the UN GA resolutions are devoid of binding force. They carry political and moral force and, at most, by their cumulative effect, contribute to the crystallization of customary international law. But it is equally true that even those states which refrain from adopting a certain resolution are expected to avoid actions contradicting its fundamental purposes.² It is often observed that states refer to the GA resolutions to justify their international actions.³

The three themes are the subject of analysis in this article which concerns itself mainly with Turkish perspectives on progressive international legal norms and principles. The reader should note that it is not concerned with the UN GA resolutions adopted by consensus (without voting) as they give no indication of Turkey's specific voting preferences. In respect of UN instruments relating to the process of decolonization, the principle of self-determination has been of cardinal importance.

It was typical of the post-Second World War era that organized political groups in Africa and Asia began fighting on behalf of a whole 'people' against colonial powers. This struggle also included liberation movements, particularly in Africa, fighting against racist regimes and alien domination. Many of these movements eventually acquired statehood, whilst others, like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), are still struggling to achieve an independent state. The fundamental principle on which these struggles are granted legitimacy is the right of peoples to self-determination. In the UN era, this principle was first enunciated under Article 1 of the United Nations Charter which declared that one of the principal purposes of this organization was 'to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples'. This reference was later invoked by certain non-Western states (including socialist states) on behalf of colonial peoples to speed up the process of decolonization. Accordingly, soon after the foundation of the United Nations, colonial issues began to be discussed in the UN GA with greater frequency.

Contrary to the posture adopted by most Asian and African countries, Turkey remained neutral or voted in favour of the French position at the UN GA regarding the independence of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco in the 1950s. In Turkey's view, France's relations with these territories were a matter for France, and therefore they were not within the competence of the United Nations.⁴ Turkish scholars tend to attribute this approach to Turkey's close alignment with the Western world after World War II.⁵ Turkish statesmen at the time believed that geographically and strategically, Turkey could not afford to become a part of the non-aligned movement. Since the imperatives of Turkish security in a bipolar world was guaranteed by the

Western world, in İnönü's words, Turkey was not 'inclined to seek political advantage through non-alignment'.⁶

At the time, Turkish foreign policy-makers had another immediate and specific concern. Greece had brought the question of Cyprus, which was then under British mandate, before the UN GA in 1954. Greece argued that the people of Cyprus had the right to exercise their right to self-determination and accordingly Cyprus should have become an independent state.⁷ This was however anathema to Turkey since the Greek majority of the island might then decide to unite with mainland Greece. Therefore in order to avoid such an eventuality, Turkey claimed in the GA that this was a matter for Britain alone.⁸ When the discussion in the Assembly was suspended, the Turkish Foreign Minister expressed satisfaction. Note that at the time Turkey's negotiation strategy had been prepared in close consultation with its Western allies.⁹

Indeed, throughout the 1950s, with few exceptions,¹⁰ Turkey either sided with Western countries or abstained on questions relating to non-self governing territories and the International Trusteeship system. The questions involved economic and social issues, transmission or examination of information, the future political status of these territories, etc. For instance, Turkey abstained when a 1952 resolution, which called for the granting of independence to non-self governing and trust territories, reaffirmed the principle of self-determination of 'all peoples and nations'.¹¹ This resolution was generally advocated by developing and communist states. Even in 1959, when decolonization was becoming a pressing issue in international relations, Turkey abstained when some Asian and African states proposed that the question of Algeria be included in the agenda of the GA.¹²

The process of decolonization, it is argued, helped relieve pressure coming from strong countries over the voting behaviour of already independent small nation states. The influx of new states enhanced the freedom of action enjoyed by small countries.¹³ This factor may in part account for Turkey's cautious co-operation with non-Western countries on decolonization after the 1960s. For instance, Turkey was a co-sponsor of the celebrated UN GA resolution no.1514, adopted in 1960 and entitled the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples'. This declaration was adopted on 14 December 1960 by a vote of 89 to 0, with 9 abstentions.¹⁴ This change of heart was partly a result, presumably, of the change of government after the army had overthrown the pro-American right-wing government on 27 May 1960. (Although the Turkish army was also pro-Western in orientation) The same year, Turkey voted in favour of resolution 1573(XV) which called on France to ensure the effective implementation of the principle of self-determination in Algeria. This resolution, adopted on 19 December 1960, was approved by 63 to 8 with 27 abstentions.¹⁵

However, despite growing rapprochement between the non-Western world and Turkey on the question of decolonization after the 1960s, the Turkish approach towards the principle of self-determination continued to be determined by 'political' considerations. In accordance with Turkey's perceived interests, this principle was given conflicting interpretations in different situations. This unprincipled approach occasionally amounted to undermining the Turkish position over Cyprus. For instance, Turkey supported the implementation of the principle of self-determination for the overwhelmingly Muslim province of Kashmir which was part of India, in order to show its support for Pakistan and to strengthen the CENTO links with this country,¹⁶ although it opposed the implementation of this principle in the determination of the future status of Cyprus.¹⁷

On questions regarding the granting of independence to colonial peoples, Turkey tended to vote favourably unless the resolutions specifically condemned some Western governments, particularly the USA with which Turkey had close military, political and economic ties after its inclusion among the European beneficiaries of Marshall aid in 1948. Indeed, during the 1960s, Turkey generally voted in favour of the granting of independence to colonies in southern Africa, Fiji, Spanish Sahara, Namibia, territories under Portuguese domination – Angola, Mozambique and Guinea [Bissau] and some other territories – as well as to non-self governing territories. By the same token, Turkey did not hesitate to join in the resolution which condemned Portugal and its NATO allies for 'waging war against the national liberation movements of the colonies and against certain independent States of Africa and Asia'. The resolution also confirmed:

... the legality of the peoples' struggle for self-determination and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation, notably in southern Africa and in particular that of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea [Bissau], as well as of the Palestinian people by all available means consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.¹⁸

Over the years, Turkey has retained its posture favouring self-determination of peoples living under colonial, alien or racist domination.

The question of the apartheid regime in South Africa has frequently entered the agenda of the UN GA over the years. Although Turkey consistently voted in favour of resolutions condemning the racist regimes in southern Africa throughout the 1960s and 1970s, when it came to condemning a specific group of countries – that is, certain Western governments – for continuing to collaborate with these racist minority regimes, the Turkish posture was not as clear-cut. This was the case when

Turkey abstained in the face of a resolution which specifically criticized the three permanent members of the UN Security Council, France, the UK, and the USA, for vetoing proposals intended to impose effective sanctions against South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.¹⁹ Again Turkey abstained when a similar resolution, condemning Western governments as well as Israel and Japan, was adopted in 1977.²⁰ Meanwhile, Turkey abstained when a 1973 resolution, *inter alia*, declared that the armed struggle of a people against colonial or alien domination must be regarded as international conflict in the sense of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.²¹ Here we can see the traces of Turkey's attachment to 'classical' international law which sees states as the supreme sovereign in their territory and, accordingly, perceives them as the exclusive subjects of international society.

Turkey's politically motivated voting pattern was most visible in the case of East Timor. Turkey has since 1975 voted against, and occasionally abstained from, resolutions which condemned Indonesia's occupation of East Timor (soon after the Portuguese left the island in 1975), and called on respect for the right of the East Timorese to self-determination.²² The Turkish action was clearly political, in that both Turkey and Indonesia were close allies of the USA which also opposed these resolutions.

Turkey's policy towards the Palestine question, an ever-present menu on the table of the UN GA and the Security Council, had been another captive of Turkey's redoubtable pro-Western voting in the 1950s. Although Turkey had voted against the partition of Palestine between a Jewish and an Arab state in the GA in 1947 which was in tune with the position of the Arabs, later, in 1949, it became the first Muslim country to formally recognize Israel. Turkey declined to take an active stance on the rights of Palestinians and Palestinian refugees who had been expelled or were forced to flee from their lands after the Arab-Israeli war in 1948. Even in 1965, when Turkish diplomats were claiming to have launched a multidimensional and active foreign policy – and this would have been more in tune with the aspirations of the developing world and the Islamic countries – Turkey abstained when Pakistan and Somalia submitted amendments to the United States' draft resolution on Palestinian refugees. The amendments included the recognition and restoration of full Palestinian rights, as well as the right of the refugees to return to their homes.²³

Indeed, until the 1970s, Turkey refrained from mentioning the right of Palestinians to self-determination and independence. Instead the Turkish official line was limited to declaring occasional sympathy for 'the refugees of Palestine' which was intended to alleviate their plight 'in accordance with law and justice'.²⁴ On the Palestinian issue, the Turkish posture was aligned to that of the Western governments to such an extent that it did not hesitate to abstain when a 1966 resolution criticized the inadequacy of the

previous relief efforts regarding Palestinian refugees and called for greater efforts to remedy the situation.²⁵

However, after the 1967 war, which ended with a complete defeat of the Arab states involved, Turkish policy underwent a radical shift in favour of the Palestinians. In 1968, Turkey voted for a resolution which condemned the violation of human rights in the Arab territories captured by Israel in the 1967 war. The resolution also reaffirmed the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes and recover their property in territories occupied by Israel.²⁶ The following year, a more significant resolution was passed by the Assembly which referred to the Palestinians as a 'people', and received Turkish approval. This resolution condemned Israel's oppressive policies in the Occupied Territories, and reaffirmed 'the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine'.²⁷ Some years later, in 1975, Turkey voted in favour of a resolution, which declared that Zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination.²⁸ In this case, the Western bloc of countries declined to endorse the resolution which was indicative of Turkey's adoption of a more independent and assertive approach to the Palestinian issue. Turkey has since voted in favour of all resolutions condemning Israel and endorsing the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and independence. It must be said however that Turkey's consistent pro-Palestinian stance is partially an outcome of growing public pressure, its foreign policy interests, and its historical and cultural identity as a Muslim *and* Middle Eastern country. This is not to deny that Turkey has been an advocate of the right of peoples to self-determination for over two decades.

However, this statement is made with two qualifications: first, even when Turkey supported the resolutions advocating the right to self-determination, its ambivalent posture was still in evidence. Indeed, the identification of Western group of countries for criticism has frequently prompted Turkey to abstain from, and occasionally, vote against, resolutions calling for speedier implementation of decolonization. This conflict of loyalties has remained a major dilemma of Turkey's voting behaviour in the UN over progressive issues of international law. Second, Turkey has supported the principle of self-determination insofar as it applied to colonial, racist or alien (foreign occupation) regimes. It has not recognized any situations outside this framework as relevant to self-determination in the sense of independence (excepting of course Turkey's support for the self-determination claims in northern Cyprus and Kashmir out of political considerations).

This Turkish attitude is not uncommon given that self-determination outside the colonial context is a controversial matter. It is generally agreed that the right to self-determination as was enunciated, for instance, in Article 1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the same Article is also contained in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights –

both adopted in 1966) also applies to situations outside the colonial context.²⁹ But a major problem is that colonial self-determination since 1945 naturally gave an impression of independence as the usual outcome of self-determination. This is the major obstacle to a wider view of self-determination.³⁰ Scholars generally agree that self-determination has two dimensions. 'External' self-determination concerns the international status of a people as an independent political unit. 'Internal' self-determination relates to the freedom of choosing the desired form of government.³¹ External self-determination has remained the main focus of Third World strategies in the United Nations, while internal self-determination has been downplayed by most states for fear of secessionary demands from disaffected minorities. They have generally maintained that the new states emerging out of colonialism must have a right to territorial integrity, and that the form of their political regime and their human rights record are not central to the principle of self-determination.³² As we have seen in the preceding section, Turkey has generally subscribed to this thesis by denying the relevance of self-determination to groups within sovereign states (i.e. outside the colonial context).

Turkey's posture on the question of self-determination persisted in the 1980s. Turkey continued to advocate the self-determination of peoples living under colonial, racist or alien domination. Accordingly, it joined in the condemnation of South Africa and Israel, and agreed on the necessity to impose sanctions against these two states. (in the 1980s, the policy of apartheid was still in existence in South Africa) However, in cases which involved the condemnation of Western collaboration with South Africa, the Turkish position became ambivalent. Three such cases from 1987 are illuminating, and show the extent to which Turkey's global approach differs from most of the other non-Western countries.

1. Turkey abstained when a resolution called for the prohibition of mercenaries whose activities violated human rights and impeded the right of peoples to self-determination.³³
2. Turkey abstained again when a resolution, *inter alia*, urged for the halting of relations between the UN agencies, like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and the South African government. The Turkish delegate objected to such reference, on the grounds that it infringed on the autonomy of these international institutions and the principle of universality of their membership.³⁴
3. Turkey voted in favour of a resolution which called for cessation of the occupation of foreign economic interests which were believed to impede the independence of Namibia and all other territories under colonial domination. The Turkish delegate argued, however, that the

draft resolution failed to recognize that some of these activities could be beneficial to the people living in these territories. He also objected to the singling out of certain Western states for condemnation and criticism.³⁵

In all these cases, Turkey was among the very few countries which advocated the position taken by most of the Western group of states (countries in Western Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia etc.) which favoured the continuation of economic relations with South Africa. On the other hand, although it was well known that foreign mercenaries, particularly from South Africa, were disrupting the political and economic stability in some newly independent countries in southern Africa, Turkey declined to endorse the resolution. Even when endorsing resolutions on decolonization, Turkey did not cease to object to the 'continued selective criticism of Western countries'.

Turkey's ambivalent attitude toward the adoption of concrete measures designed to bring about the self-determination of peoples under colonial or racist rule, or foreign occupation, was still in evidence during the 1991 session of the UN GA discussions. While supporting the GA resolution calling for an oil embargo against South Africa,³⁶ as well as the resolution which condemned those states which continued to violate the mandatory arms embargo and collaborated with South Africa,³⁷ Turkey abstained when a resolution specifically condemned Israel for engaging in military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa and requested the Security Council to take 'appropriate measures' against Israel.³⁸ Similarly, Turkey abstained when a GA resolution drew attention to the linkage between the right of peoples to self-determination and the effective protection of human rights. The resolution specifically reaffirmed the right of The Palestinian people to self-determination, condemned Israel for its acts of aggression against Lebanon, and called on the international community to support the transition to a non-racial and democratic South Africa. The resolution, *inter alia*, called for an end to the practice of using mercenaries against sovereign states and national liberation movements. An overwhelming majority of non-Western states supported the motion.³⁹

In 1992, Turkey supported a resolution which asked for the withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 and reaffirmed the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people.⁴⁰ Almost identical resolutions were adopted in 1993 and 1995 which again received Turkish support.⁴¹ Finally, in 1997, Turkey voted in favour of a resolution which affirmed the significance of the 'Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People'.⁴²

Turkey abstained when, in 1992, a resolution emphasized the

'importance of the universal realization of the right of people to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights'. The resolution reaffirmed the Palestinians' right to self-determination and condemned South Africa for failing to dismantle apartheid. The resolution also condemned 'certain countries' (presumably Western) for prematurely relaxing sanctions against South Africa. Finally, the resolution called the international community to assist the national liberation movements.⁴³ Turkey abstained again when an identical resolution was adopted the following year.⁴⁴

Turkey opposed a 1992 resolution which called on states not to interfere with the 'internal affairs of states in their electoral process'.⁴⁵ Turkey voted similarly when identical resolutions were adopted in 1993 and 1995.⁴⁶ Back in 1992, Turkey abstained when a resolution called on states to accede to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. The resolution also criticized certain states and transnational corporations that collaborated with the South African government.⁴⁷

In 1993, Turkey abstained when a resolution called on the administering powers to recognize and implement the right of non-self-governing territories to self-determination and independence. The support for the resolution was so overwhelming that only 19 countries abstained and 2 voted against the resolution.⁴⁸ The same year, Turkey voted against a resolution which called for an end to the activities of foreign economic and other interests which impeded the realization of self-determination of peoples under colonial domination.⁴⁹ Turkey also opposed a resolution, adopted on 1993, which called for an end to harmful military activities of colonial powers in territories under their administration.⁵⁰ Turkey abstained when two resolutions adopted in 1995 and 1997, in addition to affirming the right of the people in non-self-governing territories to self-determination, called for the dismantlement of the military bases belonging to the administering states in these territories.⁵¹

In 1995, Turkey voted against a resolution which called for an end to the activities of foreign economic and other interests that impeded the right of self-determination of peoples under colonial domination. This resolution also emphasized the right of these people to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.⁵² Turkey similarly voted against a 1995 decision which wanted an end to foreign military activities that ran contrary to the interests of the people in territories under colonial domination.⁵³

In 1993 and 1997, Turkey abstained when two identical resolutions denounced and called for an end to the use of mercenaries which impeded the right of peoples to self-determination.⁵⁴ Turkey voted against a similarly worded resolution in 1995. This resolution, without being explicit, targeted certain Western governments for criticism.⁵⁵

The gradual dismantlement of colonial empires in the aftermath of the Second World War, which unveiled the real conditions of colonial territories, highlighted the urgent need of the latter for comprehensive assistance. These newly independent countries, as well as other (economically) underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, were characterized by low living standards and relatively low levels of labour productivity due to the shortage of capital, machinery, managerial competence, and high levels of unemployment and underemployment. This meant that they depended on developed countries for flows of foreign exchange in the form of export earnings, foreign loans, and foreign aid, which made them vulnerable.⁵⁶ Their backwardness was partially the result of European colonialism and the de facto economic domination of industrialized countries.

As a result, the developing countries, which are also described as the 'third world', evolved an increasing awareness of their moral right to achieve better living conditions and greater say in international relations. Accordingly, they have developed a pattern of international solidarity, and sought to gear international legal institutions to the needs of development. Not surprisingly, therefore, these countries have been at the forefront of demands for a new international economic order (hereinafter referred to as NIEO). In this context, they have used the UN platform, as well as other multinational forums, to press for the elaboration of new legal norms which would be responsive to the acute problems faced by their backward economies.

However, over the years, it has become clear that the Western group of states and Japan, which are the main addressees of these demands, have been reluctant to accept any radical shift in this direction. They have argued that these attempts are neither desirable nor possible since it is premature to try to codify them into legal rules at a time when the international community has not even agreed on the main principles applicable in this area. In their view, this field of international law has not been sufficiently identified or accepted to be codified. Therefore, they argue, the existence of political agreement is a prerequisite for any progressive development of the principles relating to the NIEO. As a result of this disagreement over the desirability or the credibility of standard-setting for a NIEO, it is difficult to speak of an 'international development law' as a separate legal discipline. At most, one can speak of the existence of 'soft' law, consisting mainly of international resolutions, charters and declarations. The focus of this section will be directed at the legal instruments adopted within the UN GA, with special reference to Turkey's voting behaviour therein.

Due to the numerical weakness of non-Western states in the UN during the 1950s and the immediate concerns of decolonization until the 1970s, discussions on NIEO were incipient in the first two decades of the UN era.

Before the 1960s, leaving aside the economic issues relating to non-self governing territories and the international trusteeship system, GA resolutions focused on the question of financial and technical aid from the rich to the poorer countries, as well as on the need to give due consideration to the terms of trade in primary products of developing countries the price of which was subject to fluctuations in the market. In the 1950s, many of the resolutions on economic and social questions were adopted without objection, due mainly to the essentially unspecified and abstract nature of the adopted texts. When the resolutions imposed a concrete set of legal obligations, the Turkish position was generally in tune with that of Western states.⁵⁷ Turkish delegates at the time were careful to avoid any confrontation with Western powers, particularly the USA. When, in 1954, an amendment by Brazil, Peru and the USA to a proposed resolution on self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natural resources, requested the Commission on Human Rights to have due regard to 'the rights and duties of states under international law', Turkey voted for this resolution which was finally adopted, despite a large number of abstentions and some opposition from communist and Afro-Asian countries.⁵⁸ This amendment in fact diluted the real significance of the resolution, by reaffirming one of the very principles against which the resolution was launched in the first place.

From the early 1960s to 1973, the focus of third world strategies shifted from financial and technical aid to issues of trade. Three developments were conclusive in this new approach: first, it became clear that existing international machinery and standards were inadequate to cope with the far-reaching problems of developing countries; secondly, the prices of primary commodities were steadily declining in the face of steady increase in the price of manufactured or semi-manufactured goods, which worsened the balance of payments deficit in developing countries – it became necessary to reconsider the whole international economic system, and propose substantive remedies accordingly; thirdly, many African and Asian countries gained political independence in the 1950s and 60s which increased the self-confidence of the third world groupings. All these factors contributed to 'the emergence of a wholesale "doctrine" of development, a doctrine which poor nations soon endeavoured to translate into international standards and institutions'.⁵⁹ Among the main principles of the new development strategy were the following:

1. Development of less advanced countries should be the concern of the whole international society. These countries were entitled to international help, particularly from industrialized countries;
2. Existing trade barriers against primary commodities originating in

the developing countries had to be eliminated by developed countries;

3. Developing countries asked for most favoured nation treatment in their commercial dealings with developed countries. But this ought not to be reciprocal on the part of the developing countries. Developed countries were also asked to make preferential concessions, both tariff and non-tariff, to developing countries. These principles clearly represented a departure from the basic principles of classical international law, such as the sovereign equality of states and the principle of reciprocity, since they were premised upon 'positive discrimination' in favour of the less developed countries.⁶⁰

In the 1960s, the Turkish position shifted towards supporting resolutions which sanctioned positive discrimination in favour of developing countries. For instance, Turkey voted for the GA resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 on 'Permanent sovereignty over natural resources'.⁶¹ The same year Turkey voted in favour of a resolution which incorporated 'The Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries'. This declaration proposed ways of realizing speedy economic progress in developing countries.⁶² Similarly, Turkey voted for a proposed draft of the Economic and Social Committee in 1969 which stated, *inter alia*, that 'the concept of reciprocity...is not equally valid where contracting states are at greatly different stages of economic development'.⁶³ Finally, Turkey did not hesitate to vote for the readjustment of the International Monetary Fund so as to give developing countries a larger share in its total quotas, despite opposition from Western and communist countries.⁶⁴

As is well known, during the 1970s, having achieved their independence and striving to exert greater influence in the conduct of international politics, the third world countries turned their attention towards the establishment of a NIEO. The new strategy that had been adopted in the 1960s was later expounded in 1973–4 to cover not only a specific sector (international trade) but a whole group of existing economic relations between North and South. This new 'normative' framework came about as a result of a complex set of factors. To start with, the Arab oil boycott which was mainly directed at the industrialized world in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, was very effective. This encouraged other developing countries to put forward more radical proposals in the reshaping of international economic relations. On the other hand, the relaxing of international tensions arising out of the cold war allowed third world countries to play a more assertive role in international relations. Finally, by 1973, traditional colonialism had nearly come to an end, which encouraged

developing countries to turn their attention to neo-colonialism.⁶⁵

A major step in this direction was taken when the Algiers Conference of Non-Aligned Countries of September 1973 drew, *inter alia*, on the significance of the association of oil-exporting countries (OPEC) as a model for concerted action in other products. In their view, such an association held vital significance in 'the establishment of a new international economic order which would meet the requirements of genuine democracy'.⁶⁶ The following year, the GA adopted two resolutions which formulated the basic principles of a NIEO. Resolution 3201-S. VI, of 9 May 1974 containing a Declaration on the Establishment of NIEO, and Resolution 3202-S. VI, of 16 May 1974 containing a Programme of Action on the Establishment of a NIEO were adopted by consensus, despite serious misgivings expressed by Western countries. However, these two texts were loosely formulated and contained general guidelines and objectives for future action. It was with the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the GA on 12 December 1974,⁶⁷ that these guidelines were turned into specific obligations. Although not claiming to be binding, the language of this text was more akin to legislation.⁶⁸ Not surprisingly, therefore, this charter aroused intense opposition from Western industrialized countries and Japan. As far as the main tenets of NIEO are concerned, the proposals specifically affirmed the need to gain permanent sovereignty over natural resources by regulating and controlling the activities of multinational corporations and/or by naturalizing or expropriating foreign property on payment of equitable compensation. Another main tenet of NIEO was concerned with achieving more equitable conditions of trade that favoured developing countries. This new strategy did not, however, do away with earlier practices in that the resolutions reiterated the need to continue with 'traditional' economic and technical assistance from industrialized countries.⁶⁹ All these deliberations make up a set of standards which have political and moral, if not legal, value as regards the process leading to NIEO.

As far as Turkey was concerned, it was well aware that there existed striking similarities between its interests and aspirations, and those of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In spite of its commitment to the Western alliance, the extent of Turkey's economic problems and domestic public pressure prompted it to join this novel process.⁷⁰ Indeed Turkey has since supported resolutions on trade and development which were often proposed by third world and (the then) communist states, and were adopted with an overwhelming majority. However, it was then clear that when the duties of rich countries were specified within a resolution concerning the questions of social and economic development, Turkey tended to take a more guarded approach, like abstaining or voting against such resolutions.

To start with, Turkey was not a co-sponsor of the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, which was proposed by the non-aligned bloc of countries and adopted unanimously. Meanwhile, it voted in favour of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the principal purpose of which was to establish an improved system of international economic relations with due consideration to the development needs of poor countries. The following year, Turkey voted in favour of a resolution which called on states to take appropriate measures for implementing the aims laid down in that charter. Those abstaining or voting against belonged to the Western bloc of states.⁷¹

Constant attempts have been made by developing countries to turn the postulates of NIEO into legally binding rules through adoption of a multilateral convention. But they have met vigorous opposition, particularly from Western governments. This has equally been true of the GA resolutions intended to codify the norms relating to NIEO. All along, the Turkish posture regarding codification has been ambivalent. In 1980, Turkey abstained when a resolution called on the UN bodies to prepare a study of existing and evolving international norms and principles for the progressive development of international economic law.⁷² Turkey had voted for identical resolutions in 1982 and 1985, but abstained again a few years later.⁷³

Turkey has equally been ambiguous over initiatives intended to link economic issues with other global questions, like disarmament. Indeed Turkey abstained when a resolution, adopted in 1981, declared that scientific and technological progress should be used for the peace and benefit of mankind, and called on all states to make use of science and technology in such a way as to promote peaceful social, economic and cultural development.⁷⁴ However, Turkey supported the two GA resolutions in 1982 and 1983, the first of which called for a halt to the arms race, while both resolutions urged for measures to ensure that the results of scientific and technological progress are used for peaceful purposes, such as social, economic and cultural progress.⁷⁵ Turkish policy was reversed once again in 1984 when it abstained in the face of a resolution calling for an end to the arms race. The resolution further stressed that the additional resources released by disarmament should be utilized for social and economic development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.⁷⁶

All along, Turkey has been reluctant to endorse any resolutions which imply criticism of Western governments or single them out for specific action, as well as those which appear to refer to politically sensitive issues. The problem of economic coercion against weaker countries is a case in point. In 1984, Turkey voted against a resolution which reaffirmed Article 32 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, by declaring that no state could exercise coercive economic measures against other states. As

a result, the resolution called on developed countries to refrain from threatening or applying trade restrictions, blockades, embargoes and other economic sanctions against developing countries as a form of political and economic coercion which damage their economic, political and social development. Turkey was among the few non-Western countries not to have voted in the affirmative.⁷⁷ In the face of similarly worded resolutions adopted between 1985 and 1991, Turkey either voted against or abstained.⁷⁸ Meanwhile, in 1984, Turkey abstained when a resolution, entitled 'Confidence building in international economic relations', called for 'structural adjustments in the international financial and trading system' which was declared a necessary step to improvement in the economic situation of developing countries. Turkey was one of the few non-Western countries to abstain.⁷⁹

However, in cases which involved abstractly worded guidelines for prospective action, Turkey has taken a more positive attitude, even if they were opposed by Western governments. For instance, Turkey voted in favour of a 1984 resolution which stressed the need to promote access of developing countries to information and development of communications to that end. Western states declined to vote in favour of the resolution.⁸⁰ The same year, Turkey voted for greater industrial development co-operation between developed and developing countries, a resolution emphasizing the importance of facilitating transfer of technology to developing countries.⁸¹ In 1986, Turkey voted in favour of a resolution reaffirming the urgent need to halt the net transfer of resources from developing to developed countries.⁸²

Turkey has also advocated the principle of the 'right to development' which, as a legal concept, emerged at the beginning of 1970s, and since has been embodied in a number of resolutions. It did not, for instance, hesitate to vote for a 1986 resolution on the 'right to development', which stated that all human rights and fundamental freedoms were indivisible and interdependent. Accordingly, equal attention should be given to the protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. The resolution declared that the right to development was an inalienable human right, and that the funds released by disarmament should be used for comprehensive development, especially in developing countries. States were also asked to take all necessary measures to realize the right to development for every individual on their territory.⁸³

In the 1990s, resolutions relating to the NIEO were almost always adopted by consensus, that is without a vote. Therefore it is not possible to evaluate the Turkish position, save for a number of resolutions with strong political dimensions. In 1992, Turkey abstained when a resolution reaffirmed that the right to development was an inalienable human right and that international peace and security were a vital precondition for the 'full

realization of the right to development'. The resolution also called on states not to infringe on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states.⁸⁴ Interestingly, Turkey supported a 1997 resolution which *only* reaffirmed the right to development.⁸⁵

Turkey voted against a 1993 resolution which condemned the use of 'economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries'.⁸⁶ In 1995 and 1997, Turkey abstained when two similarly worded resolutions were adopted. The main target of all these resolutions was developed countries which abused their superior economic position.⁸⁷ Similarly, Turkey abstained when a 1997 resolution called for an end to coercive measures, in particular against developing countries, that impeded the full enjoyment of human rights, foremost being the right to development.⁸⁸

In summary, we may describe the Turkish attitude as one of 'unprincipled sympathy' for the long fought struggle of the third world nations towards a fairer share of world economic resources. Except in the 1950s, Turkey generally sided with non-Western countries on the question of the NIEO, unless the resolutions in question did not fundamentally undermine the confines of its pro-Western foreign policy. However, Turkey has not been actively involved in the north-south dialogue: it has hardly co-sponsored any resolutions calling for the establishment of a NIEO. Furthermore, it has often sided with the Western bloc when the latter played down substantial issues, and preferred to question the validity of UN resolutions as legal instruments. Turkey is not a member of the G77 group of countries. Instead it has been a part of the OECD since its foundation in 1948. This may have played some part in Turkey's apparent conflict of loyalty, and its frequent change of heart regarding the search for a NIEO. Turkey's position becomes all the more ambiguous when one recalls that most of these resolutions have been adopted by an overwhelming majority of non-Western states. Predictably, this ambivalence will continue unless Turkish foreign policy undergoes a dramatic change.

The classic formulation of standards of human rights suggests that group rights would be protected by guaranteeing the rights of individuals. Such is the concept of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the two human rights covenants of 1966. They provide for civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights. However, for social, political and historical reasons, collective categories like 'people' and 'minorities' are also accorded certain rights under international law. Meanwhile, non-Western states insist that the right to development is an essential part of human rights, a view generally rejected by Western states.

As far as Turkey is concerned, civil and political rights, as well as the economic, social and cultural rights – within the confines of available public funds – and the principle of non-discrimination against individual citizens is expressed in the Turkish Constitution. Turkey has also been a signatory to various multinational conventions and UN resolutions which aim to protect aspects of human rights and/or prohibit any discrimination by states against their citizens on the basis of race, language, religion, and so forth. Among them are the following instruments: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees⁸⁹ (28 July 1951), United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (20 November 1963), International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (21 December 1965), Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment (10 December 1984). The UN GA decision of 1984 called on states to abolish the death penalty,⁹⁰ to which Turkey subscribed in 2002.

However, Turkey declined to adopt internationally binding instruments during the period under investigation which, *inter alia*, include the rights of peoples to self-determination and/or reaffirm the rights of minorities as a distinct legal category. Among them are the Convention against Discrimination in Education (14 December 1960), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 1966), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966). (Turkey eventually signed the two covenants of 1966 in 2000 as part of human rights reforms designed to catch up with European Union standards.) Since minorities are not recognized under the Turkish Constitution (with the exception of Christians and Jews whose rights are guaranteed under international treaties), Turkey's reluctance to accede to these documents is understandable.

Another prominent human rights document which has not yet been adopted by Turkey is the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (30 November 1973). It is interesting to note that in 1979 Turkey voted in favour of a resolution which condemned those governments which continued to collaborate with the South African regime, and which invited all member states to accede to this convention.⁹¹ Turkish reluctance to sign the convention was based on its reservations on some of its 'legal problems'.⁹² It is presumably due to the fact that this convention, *inter alia*, condemned the continued collaboration of certain Western states with the racist minority regime in South Africa. The fact of its binding character may also account for Turkish rejection.

Human rights, until the 1970s, were mostly discussed in the colonial

context. Otherwise, resolutions on human rights were generally adopted without objection since they imposed no clearly defined obligations, excepting those conventions already cited. However, even in those cases which involved opposition – abstention or negative voting by Western governments – Turkey did not hesitate to endorse resolutions on human rights. This included Turkish endorsement of a resolution condemning the apartheid regime in South Africa, calling for the elimination of racial discrimination wherever it occurred.⁹³ Similarly Turkey voted for a resolution that members of national liberation movements should be treated as prisoners of war in case of their arrest, which also reaffirmed prohibition of air bombardment of civilians, and of chemical and biological weapons in times of war.⁹⁴

In the 1970s, the violation of human rights, particularly in certain non-Western countries, became an international concern and received growing attention in UN bodies. To start with, in 1970, Turkey voted in favour of a resolution which urged member states to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination in their territory.⁹⁵ On the other hand, during the period between 1974 and 1980, Turkey consistently participated in resolutions which condemned gross and systematic violations of human rights in Chile, and called on the Chilean government to restore and guarantee basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁹⁶ It must be pointed out that the USA voted in the same way during the adoption of these resolutions. It is also worth noting that although Turkey joined in November 1978 the condemnation of gross human rights violations in Chile⁹⁷ despite large-scale opposition or abstention by other parties, it abstained when a resolution welcomed the founding of an ad hoc working group which had been set up to investigate, on the spot, the human rights situation in Chile.⁹⁸ This posture may be attributed to Turkey's fear that human rights issues might gradually lead to wide-ranging derogation of its sovereignty, and that they might justify external intervention in its domestic affairs. Given Turkey's human rights record, its cautious handling of international 'supervision' is understandable.

However, the Turkish position regarding human rights violations changed somewhat in the 1980s. Turkey refused to condemn continuing human rights violations in Chile by abstaining from a 1981 resolution.⁹⁹ Similarly, it voted against a resolution which condemned human rights violations in El Salvador, and required the government of El Salvador to ensure full respect for human rights in its territory.¹⁰⁰ Turkey also voted against a resolution which called for the government of Guatemala to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the UN for the improvement of human rights in that country.¹⁰¹ The new posture may be attributed to the military take-over in September 1980, and the pro-USA orientation of the new regime whose human rights record went from bad to worse. At the

time, Turkey happily signed the NATO documents which condemned human rights abuse in communist Poland, while angrily reacting to Norway's criticism of human rights violations in Turkey.¹⁰²

Although free elections were held and multi-party democracy was restored in 1983, the Turkish position on human rights in Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala persisted. Indeed, throughout the 1980s, Turkey consistently abstained from resolutions condemning gross and systematic human rights violations in these countries.¹⁰³ In all these cases, the USA voted against the resolutions or abstained.

Turkish perception of human rights in respect of content has generally been more akin to the individualistic western position than the collectivist and multidimensional approach adopted by many developing countries and the ex-communist countries in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This Turkish position is obvious in respect of certain UN GA resolutions in the 1980s. For instance, in 1982, Turkey abstained when a resolution (No.37/199) reaffirmed that the right to development was an inalienable human right, and called for greater disarmament as essential to the realization of human rights.¹⁰⁴ The same day, a group of Western states drafted a resolution whose content was identical to Resolution 37/199, with the exception that, while the latter focused on the collective aspects of human rights, the new resolution (No.37/200) emphasized individual protection of human rights.¹⁰⁵ During discussions in the GA, the Turkish representative expressed the view that Resolution 37/199 failed to provide a balance between individual and collective aspects of human rights. He stressed that Resolution 37/199 should have stressed the independence of human rights from all other issues. As a result, Turkey voted in favour of the Western-sponsored 37/200 on the grounds that it maintained a balance between individual and collective rights, and civil and political rights and economic and social rights.¹⁰⁶ The following year, Turkey abstained once again when another resolution similarly emphasized collective human rights and the relevance of peace and the establishment of a new international economic order for the furtherance of human rights.¹⁰⁷ Finally, in 1987, Turkey refused to endorse a resolution which stressed the need for greater international effort to promote economic, social and cultural rights. It is significant that, together with Chile – at the time, a 'client' of the USA, Turkey was the only non-Western state to abstain.¹⁰⁸

This pattern does not seem to have changed in the 1990s. For instance, Turkey abstained in 1991 when a GA resolution reaffirmed that human rights were indivisible and that equal consideration should be given to the protection of civil and political rights on the one hand, and of economic, social and cultural rights on the other.¹⁰⁹ Turkey also abstained in 1993 when an identical resolution was adopted, reaffirming that the right to

development was an inalienable human right.¹¹⁰

In 1992, Turkey supported resolutions which condemned the 'grave' violations of human rights in Sudan, Cuba and Iraq, while abstaining when a similar resolution was adopted about Iran.¹¹¹ Turkey acted similarly when identical resolutions were adopted the following year.¹¹²

In 1995, Turkey voted in favour of resolutions that condemned the violations of human rights in Nigeria, where the military had taken over the government by cancelling the results of multi-party elections in 1993, Sudan, Iraq, and Cuba.¹¹³ In the Cuban case, Turkey was among a handful of non-Western countries to have voted in the affirmative.

Somewhat surprisingly, condemnation of human rights violations in most developing countries did not receive conventional support from Turkey in 1997 when Turkey only supported a condemnatory resolution on the plight of human rights in Iraq,¹¹⁴ while abstaining from a resolution on Cuba.¹¹⁵ Interestingly, the Turkish delegate preferred not to vote at all on alleged human rights violations in Iran, Sudan and Nigeria.¹¹⁶ This tactical change may have been a result of Turkish discontent with recent growing international concern about the plight of human rights in Turkey. Claims of the Turkish maltreatment of the Kurdish minority, in particular, may have woken the Turkish government to the possibility of Turkey's own condemnation by the UN GA. However, this new strategy did not deter Turkey from supporting a resolution which condemned the human rights violations committed by Israel in the occupied territories.¹¹⁷

It can be concluded that Turkey has not actively participated in international attempts to transform international law by creating and extending international standards to bring about a more peaceful and equitable international system. Turkey has generally remained suspicious about 'progressive' issues such as human rights, protection of minorities, self-determination, and demands for a NIEO. Turkey's voting preferences on these issues have tended to coincide with western views more than any other developing country over a period of 50 years, irrespective of the colour of governments.

This is not to deny that Turkey has generally sided with other developing countries on the question of self-determination and NIEO, albeit not with much enthusiasm. Turkey is outside the non-aligned movement, frequently the sponsors of draft proposals on these two topics, which has inevitably set it apart from other developing nations. However its status within the Western bloc of countries has equally been dubious. First, Turkey has consistently supported the GA resolutions on the right of the Palestinians to self-determination since the 1970s, despite opposition from Western

countries. The second conflict relates to human rights problems in Turkey: undeniably, for the past 50 years, human rights standards in Turkey have been far below those of any other country in Western Europe. Thirdly, Turkey is poorer than any of the countries that belong to the 'Western world'. On account of this divergence, Turkish perception of the 'progressive' international law has oscillated between western and non-western approaches.

Thus, the Turkish case also shows the range of the freedom of action enjoyed by non-Western countries which seek to align themselves with the Western world. While Turkey has tended to support general resolutions containing a rather broad programme of action, this support suddenly disappeared when certain Western group of states were specifically criticized, condemned or called for action. Indeed, the lack of coherence in Turkey's voting preferences reflect the inevitable friction between Turkey's status as a developing country and its close identification with the Western world.

NOTES

1. Kul B. Rai, 'Foreign Policy and Voting in the UN General Assembly', *International Organization*, Vol.26 (1972), pp.589-94, 590.
2. G.K. Dmitrieva and I.I. Lukashuk, 'The Role of the UN General Assembly Resolutions in the International Norm-Making', *Indian Journal of International Law*, Vol.28, No.2 (1988), pp.236-48, 243.
3. *Ibid.*, p.246.
4. See for instance, 'Tunisia', *Yearbook of the UN*, 1952, pp.266-78; 'Morocco', *idem.* 1954, pp.85-6; 'Algeria', *idem.* 1955, p.68.
5. See for instance, Mehmet Gönlübol and Haluk Ülman, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, 8th edn (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1993), pp.191-209.
6. Orhan Soysal, 'An Analysis of the Influence of Turkey's Alignment with the West and of the Arab-Israeli Conflict upon Turkish-Israeli and Turkish-Arab Relations' (unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1983), p.54.
7. *Yearbook*, 1954, pp.94-6.
8. *Ibid.*, 1955, p.77.
9. Haluk Gerger, *Mayınlı Tarla'da Dış Politika* (İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 1983), p.58.
10. Such as the UN General Assembly Resolution 1188(XII), adopted by Assembly on 11 Dec. 1957, *Yearbook*, 1957, pp.205-6.
11. General Assembly Resolution 637 A(VII), *Yearbook*, 1952, pp.444-5.
12. *Ibid.*, 1959, pp.51-6.
13. Bedjaoui, *Towards a New International Economic Order* (Paris: UNESCO, 1979), p.147.
14. *Yearbook*, 1960, pp.44-50.
15. *Ibid.*, pp.132-6.
16. Both Turkey and Pakistan, together with Iran, Iraq and Britain, had been a member of this military pact since 1955. While initially, the official name of this alliance was the Baghdad Pact, it was renamed as CENTO when Iraq left the pact following a revolutionary regime

change in that country in 1958.

17. Mahmut Dikerdem, *Üçüncü Dünya'dan* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1977), p.115.
18. General Assembly Resolution 2787 (XXVI), adopted on 6 Dec. 1971, *Yearbook*, pp.423–4.
19. General Assembly Resolution 31/33, adopted on 30 Nov. 1976, *Yearbook*, pp.581–2.
20. Resolution 32/35, adopted by the General Assembly on 28 Nov. 1977, *Yearbook*, pp.858–60. See also Resolution 33/40, adopted on 13 Dec. 1978, *ibid.*, pp.844–6; Resolution 33/183 G, adopted on 24 Jan. 1979, *ibid.*, pp.210–11. The latter resolution called on the termination of nuclear collaboration between France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel and the United States, on the one hand, and South Africa, on the other.
21. Resolution 3103(XXVIII), adopted by the General Assembly on 12 Dec. 1973, *ibid.*, pp.552–3.
22. Resolution 3485(XXX), adopted on 12 Dec. 1975, *ibid.*, pp.865–6; Resolution 31/53, adopted on 1 Dec. 1976, *ibid.*, pp.754–5; Resolution 33/39, adopted on 13 Dec. 1978, *ibid.*, p.869.
23. Draft Resolution rejected by Special Political Committee on 17 Nov. 1965, *ibid.*, pp.223–6.
24. Mahmut Bali Aykan, *Ideology and National Interest in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Muslim World: 1960–1987*, (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Virginia, 1988), p.123. See for instance, Resolution 1725(XVI), adopted by Assembly on 20 Dec. 1961, *Yearbook*, pp.160–1; Resolution 1856(XVII), adopted by Assembly on 20 Dec. 1962, *ibid.*, p.144; Resolution 2052(XX), adopted by Assembly on 15 Dec. 1965, *ibid.*, pp.226–7; Resolution 2341 A(XXII), adopted by Assembly on 19 Dec. 1967, *ibid.*, pp.266–8.
25. Resolution 2154 (XXI), adopted by the General Assembly on 17 Nov. 1966, *ibid.*, pp.186–7.
26. Resolution 2443 (XXIII), adopted by the General Assembly on 19 Dec. 1968, *ibid.*, pp.555–6.
27. Resolution 2535 (XXIV), adopted by the General Assembly on 10 Dec. 1969, *ibid.*, pp.241–2.
28. Resolution 3379 (XXX), adopted by the General Assembly on 10 Nov. 1975, by roll call vote of 72 to 35, with 32 abstentions, *ibid.*, pp.599–600.
29. See, for instance, James Crawford, 'Self-Determination outside the Colonial Context', in W.J. Allan Macartney (ed.), *Self-Determination in the Commonwealth* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1988), 1–22, pp.3–6.
30. *Ibid.*, p.2.
31. Michla Pomerance, *Self-Determination in Law and Practice* (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), p.37.
32. *Ibid.*, pp.40–1.
33. Resolution 42/96, 7 Dec. 1987, *Yearbook*, pp.750–1.
34. Resolution 42/75, 4 Dec. 1987, *ibid.*, pp.961–4.
35. Resolution 42/74, 4 Dec. 1987, *ibid.*, pp.964–8.
36. Resolution 46/79 E, 13 Dec. 1991, *ibid.*, pp.115–16.
37. Resolution 46/79 C, 13 Dec. 1991, *ibid.*, pp.118–19.
38. Resolution 46/79 D, 13 Dec. 1991, *ibid.*, p.120.
39. Resolution 46/87, 16 Dec. 1991, *ibid.*, pp.545–8.
40. Resolution 47/64 D, *ibid.*, 11 Dec. 1992, pp.397–98.
41. Resolution 48/158 D, 20 Dec. 1993, *ibid.*, pp.529–30; Decision No.50/412, *ibid.*, 6 Dec. 1995, pp.649–50.
42. Resolution 52/49, *Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the First Part of its Fifty-Second Session*, 16 Sept.–22 Dec. 1997, 9 Dec. 1997, pp.53–65.
43. Resolution 47/82, *Yearbook*, 16 Dec. 1992, pp.728–30.
44. Resolution 48/94, *ibid.*, 20 Dec. 1993, pp.872–4.
45. Resolution 47/130, *ibid.*, 18 Dec. 1992, pp.773–5.
46. Resolution 48/124, 20 Dec. 1993, pp.918–19; resolution 50/172, 22 Dec. 1995, *ibid.*, pp.740–1.
47. Resolution 47/81, *ibid.*, 16 Dec. 1992, pp.779–80.
48. Resolution 48/52, *ibid.*, 10 Dec. 1993, pp.153–4.
49. Resolution 48/46, *ibid.*, 10 Dec. 1993, pp.159–60.

50. Resolution 48/421, *ibid.*, 10 Dec. 1993, pp.160-1.
51. Resolution 50/39, *ibid.* 6 Dec. 1995, pp.237-38; resolution 52/78, *Resolutions Adopted.*, 10 Dec. 1997, pp.74-7.
52. Resolution 50/33, *Yearbook*, 6 Dec. 1995, pp.242-3.
53. Decision 50/412, *ibid.*, 6 Dec. 1995, pp.244-5.
54. Resolution 48/92, *ibid.*, 20 Dec. 1993, pp.876-7; resolution 52/112, 12 Dec. 1997, *Resolutions Adopted*, pp.396-8.
55. Resolution 50/138, *ibid.*, 21 Dec. 1995, pp.737-8.
56. Michael P. Tadoro, *Economic Development in the Third World*, 4th edn (New York: Longman, 1990), pp.27-44.
57. See, for instance, Resolution 623(VII) of 1952, yearbook, pp.377-8; and Resolution 1317(XIII) of 1958, *ibid.*, p.142.
58. Resolution 837(IX), 1954, *ibid.*, pp.211-12.
59. Antonio Cassese, *International Law in a Divided World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp.358-9.
60. *Ibid.*, pp.359-61.
61. *Yearbook*, 1962, *ibid.*, pp.498-504.
62. Resolution 1820(XVII), adopted by the General Assembly on 18 Dec., *ibid.* 1962., pp.250-3.
63. Resolution 1430(XLVI), adopted by Economic and Social Council on 6 June 1969, *ibid.*, p.367.
64. Resolution 2565(XXIV), adopted by the General Assembly on 13 Dec. 1969, *ibid.*, pp.271-2.
65. Cassese, *supra*, note 59, p.364.
66. Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P. Sauvant (eds.), *The Third World Without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries* (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1978), Vol.1, 214-26, p.222.
67. Resolution 3281(XXIX), *Yearbook...*, pp.402-7.
68. Cassese, *supra*, note 59, p.365.
69. Resolution 3281, *supra*, note 67.
70. Gerger, *supra*, note 9, p.27.
71. Resolution 3486(XXX), adopted by the General Assembly on 12 Dec. 1975, *Yearbook*, pp.390-1.
72. Resolution 35/166, adopted by 15 Dec. 1980, *ibid.*, pp.532-3.
73. General Assembly Resolution 37/103, 16 Dec. 1982, *ibid.*, p.1405; Resolution 40/67, 11 Dec. 1985, *ibid.*, pp.1195-6; Resolution 42/149, 7 Dec. 1987, *ibid.*, pp.1083-4.
74. Resolution 36/56 A, 25 Nov. 1981, *ibid.*, pp.977-8.
75. Resolution 37/189, 18 Dec. 1982, *ibid.*, pp.1141-2; Resolution 38/112, 16 Dec. 1983, *ibid.*, pp.904-5.
76. Resolution 39/134, 14 Dec. 1984, *ibid.*, pp.885-6.
77. Resolution 39/210, 18 Dec. 1984, *ibid.*, pp.397-8.
78. Resolution 40/185, 17 Dec. 1985, *ibid.*, pp.422-3; Resolution 41/165, 5 Dec. 1986, *ibid.*, pp.397-8; Resolution 42/173, 11 Dec. 1987, *ibid.*, pp.380-1; Resolution 46/210, 20 Dec. 1991, *ibid.*, p.348.
79. Resolution 39/226, 18 Dec. 1984, *ibid.*, pp.396-7.
80. Resolution 39/98 B, 14 Dec. 1984, *ibid.*, pp.352-4.
81. Resolution 39/232, 18 Dec. 1984, *ibid.*, pp.562-3.
82. Resolution 41/180, 8 Dec. 1986, *ibid.*, pp.491-2.
83. Resolution 41/128, 4 Dec. 1986, *ibid.*, pp.717-9.
84. Resolution 47/137, *ibid.*, 18 Dec. 1992, pp.756-8.
85. Resolution 52/136, *Resolutions Adopted*, 12 Dec. 1997, pp.450-4.
86. Resolution 48/168, *Yearbook*, 21 Dec. 1993, p.665.
87. Resolution 50/96, *ibid.*, 20 Dec. 1995, pp.836-7; Resolution 52/181, *Resolutions Adopted*, 18 Dec. 1997, pp.204-5.
88. Resolution 52/120, *Yearbook*, 12 Dec. 1997, pp.414-6.

89. Turkey accepted the Convention with the proviso that it would only accept refugees from Europe. The same proviso persisted when a Protocol to the Convention was adopted on 16 Dec. 1996 which concerned the rights of those who became refugees after the adoption of the Convention in 1951.
90. Decision 42/421, *ibid.*, *Yearbook*, p.760.
91. Resolution 34/27, adopted on 15 Nov. 1979, *ibid.*, pp.813–4.
92. *Ibid.*, p.811.
93. Resolutions A and B(XXI), adopted by the General Assembly on 26 October 1966, *ibid.*, pp.450–1.
94. Resolution 2674(XXV), adopted by the General Assembly on 9 Dec. 1970, *ibid.*, pp.538–9.
95. Resolution 2647(XXV), adopted by the General Assembly on 30 Nov. 1970, *ibid.*, pp.507–8.
96. Resolution 3219(XXIX), adopted by the General Assembly on 6 Nov. 1974, *ibid.*, p.687; Resolution 3448(XXX), adopted on 9 Dec. 1975, *ibid.*, pp.627–8; and etc.
97. *Ibid.*, Resolution 33/175, 20 Dec., 1978, *ibid.*, pp. 707–8, pp.707–8.
98. Resolution 33/176, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 Dec. 1978, *ibid.*, p.709.
99. Resolution 36/157, 16 Dec. 1981, *ibid.*, pp.954–5.
100. Resolution 36/155, 16 Dec. 1981, *ibid.*, pp.962–3.
101. Resolution 36/435, 16 Dec. 1981, *ibid.*, pp.964–5.
102. Gerger (*supra*, note 9), p.62.
103. Chile: 1982, Res.37/183; 1983, Res.38/102; 1984, Res.39/121; 1985, Res.40/145; 1987, Res.42/147. El Salvador : 1982, Res.37/185; 1983, Res.38/101; 1984, Res.39/119; 1985, Res.40/139. Guatemala : 1982, Res.37/184; 1983, Res.38/100; 1984, Res.39/120; 1985, Res.40/140.
104. Resolution 37/199, 18 Dec. 1982, *Yearbook*, pp.1097–8.
105. Resolution 37/200, 18 Dec. 1982, *ibid.*, pp.1098–9.
106. *Ibid.*, pp.1096–7.
107. Resolution 38/124, 16 Dec. 1983, *ibid.*, pp.858–60.
108. Resolution 42/102, 7 Dec. 1987, *ibid.*, pp.770–1.
109. Resolution 46/117, 17 Dec. 1991, *ibid.*, pp.572–3.
110. Resolution 48/123, *ibid.*, 20 Dec. 1993, pp.896–8.
111. Respectively: resolution 47/142, 18 Dec. 1992, pp.783–4; resolution 47/139, 18 Dec. 1992, pp.802–3; resolution 47/145, 18 Dec. 1992, pp.790–2; resolution 47/146, 18 Dec. 1992, *ibid.*, pp.788–9.
112. Respectively: resolution 48/147, 20 Dec. 1993, pp.927–8; resolution 48/142, 20 Dec. 1993, p.953; resolution 48/144, 20 Dec. 1993, *ibid.*, pp.937–8. No resolution was adopted on Iran.
113. Respectively: resolution 50/199, 22 Dec. 1995, p.785; resolution 50/197, 22 Dec. 1995, pp.792–4; resolution 50/191, 22 Dec. 1995, pp.802–3; resolution 50/199, 22 Dec. 1995, *ibid.*, pp.821–2.
114. Resolution 52/141, *Resolutions Adopted*, 12 Dec. 1997, pp.467–70.
115. Resolution 52/143, *ibid.*, 12 Dec. 1997, pp.472–4.
116. Respectively : resolution 52/142, 12 Dec. 1997, pp.470–2; resolution 52/140, 12 Dec. 1997, pp.462–7; resolution 52/144, 12 Dec. 1997, *ibid.*, pp.474–6.
117. Resolution 52/64, *ibid.*, 10 Dec. 1997, pp.512–4.