

KEMAL H. KARPAT

Turkey's Politics

The Transition to a Multi-Party System



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THE TRANSITION
TO A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM



By KEMAL H. KARPAT

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INTRODUCTION

TURKISH history for the past century and a half is the history of transformation and modernization. The Ottoman sultans initiated the first reforms in the army and administration with the purpose of strengthening the military organization and balancing the West's superiority. These reforms started chain reactions which gradually affected the society's entire life, making imperative radical changes in all its phases. The idea of *ıslahat*, amelioration-improvement, which defined the first limited changes undertaken by the Ottoman Empire in the army, became *inkilâp*, reformism or revolutionism, in the Republic, and expressed a theory of the state aiming at total transformation of the society's traditional ways of life, concepts, and institutions according to the West's modern rationalist ideas. This change was considered an inescapable necessity in order to assure the society's survival and independence.

Political transformation appeared as a logical step in expanding and consolidating the reforms carried out in the army and administration. Political reforms were brought about by the pressure exercised simultaneously on the Ottoman sultans by two agents: in the interior, the newly rising intelligentsia educated in the modern schools and affected by western ideas; in the exterior, the Western powers which desired to deal with a relatively strong Ottoman state capable of fulfilling its political and economic commitments. The political transformation expanded as it developed; it involved additional social groups, defined its objectives more clearly, and at the same time became less dependent upon outside stimulants. Thus, the monarchy limited its own power in 1839, and became constitutional in 1876. Parliamentaryism and a multi-party system were adopted in 1908. Finally the monarchy was abolished in 1923 and the Republic substituted for it. A one-party system was instituted in the Republic and was enforced, with

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minor exceptions, until 1945-1946, when a new multi-party system was established. The Turkish transformation was cultural and political at the beginning, and not until the Republic was it expanded on a large scale, by necessity, into economic and social fields, a trend which is constantly intensified.

In the interior the transformation of Turkey was dominated and determined by the struggle of two groups, the conservative-religious and the modernist-secularist. Both of these were influenced at a later stage by nationalism, which was itself the result of modernism and Westernization. All other social, economic, cultural, and political currents appeared to be subordinate to one of these two tendencies; thus Turkey's transformation can be viewed as resulting essentially from a struggle between old and new.

The individualistic and secularist ideas of the French Revolution found wide acceptance among the Turkish intellectuals. These ideas, though accepted in a confused and vague manner, remained, in spite of the frequent fluctuations in the political regime, their final goal. The Republic, faced with the need for rapid modernization, imposed a series of reforms and established a one-party system, but in theory it still preserved the ideal of a parliamentary system to be installed when the cultural and material foundations necessary for the maintenance of such a system had been created.

The first two and a half decades of the Republic were dominated by the modernist-secularists, who, assisted by special historical circumstances during 1919-1922, had been able to gain and consolidate power by abolishing the traditional institutions of the Sultanate and Caliphate in 1922 and 1924. Significant changes occurred in the structure and mentality of the society during the Republican period, which necessitated a new political reorganization. The solid alignment of Turkey on the side of the West after the second World War added further impetus to the need for reorganization.

The ground for the liberalization of Turkey's political re-

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gime after 1945-1946 was prepared by these circumstances. The decision to institute a multi-party system was, however, the deliberate act of the government itself. This decision was gradually carried out and set off a chain of reactions which at the same time accelerated and changed the direction of the country's transformation.

The issues and ideas debated after liberalization varied in scope and profundity, but they centered around the two fundamental trends which had charted the course of the Turkish transformation: the conservative-religious, and the secularist-modernist. Between them there was a third tendency represented by the moderates, the most significant group created in the Republic, who favored compromise on most issues. New socio-economic considerations, which acquired fundamental significance in the Republic, strongly affected the views of each group, however, and gave to Turkey's transformation a new meaning and a wider scope.

During the struggle for liberalization the conservatives and moderates demanded recognition for their own views and interests and insisted that the regime's ideology and institutions be adjusted in the light of democracy and the multi-party system which was being introduced. The modernist-secularists, while insisting on preserving the main reforms, were forced to reevaluate and modify some of them. Thus, the Republic and all its reforms became subject, in fact, to reappraisal and testing.

Probably at no time in the history of Turkey, except in 1908-1911, has there been such intense political activity and debate as in 1946-1950. A proper study of this period provides the background necessary to understand the present and future internal politics of Turkey as well as the trend of her general transformation. The country's level of modernization can best be measured by studying the variety of problems and ideas debated and the arguments used in the period after 1946. The most eloquent evidence of Turkey's progress lies in this

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period. Its study, however frank and objective, constitutes on the whole a compliment to the political maturity of the Turkish people and to their successful efforts toward modernization and democracy.

The political struggle of 1946-1950 was in fact a new reform which aimed at achieving political Westernization—that is, democracy in the form of a multi-party system. This democracy, redefined and in part reinterpreted according to the country's own conditions and background, nevertheless had a purpose common to all democracies in the West: the establishment of political freedom.

One may rightly ask now whether this new experiment in democracy in Turkey was a failure or a success, whether it achieved any lasting results or merely enabled a group to acquire power and then use that power to entrench itself firmly in government. The developments in Turkey during the past few years seem to belie optimism. However, the fluctuating daily politics, the bitter and partisan controversies between the government and the opposition, and the incomplete news obscure some permanent democratic gains made in the past decade. Opposition parties, even though their efficiency has been reduced, are recognized and represented in the Assembly in an ever-increasing number, as shown by the last elections. The democratic election mechanism, although partly modified, is preserved; and the government party acquired power through legitimate free elections.

The cult and idolatry of personalities has suffered a deadly blow, and dictatorship has become a discredited institution which is denounced by both the opposition and government parties. There is an opposition press which courageously expresses its views. But beneath all this there is an even more fundamental basis which guarantees Turkey's democracy: a large body of citizens who matured in the centuries-old struggle against the sultans and their petty servants eagerly par-

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ticipate in politics in order to preserve their hard won freedoms.

The democracy of Turkey is not complete by any means; it is handicapped by a variety of shortcomings ranging from personalities to ideologies. Yet the experiment offers grounds for optimism; for the history of Turkey is a chain of attempts at democratization, each one stronger and lasting longer than the previous one.

The fate of democracy and modernization in Turkey does not stand as an individual case unrelated to the rest of the world. On the contrary it is a vital test of whether democracy and modernization are reconcilable or mutually exclusive for countries in Asia, the Near East, and Africa which, like Turkey, feel compelled to modernize rapidly their traditionalist societies and primitive economies. In other words, the democratic experiment in Turkey may well show whether democracy is a necessary and inherent result of modernization or a result of deliberate indoctrination; whether democracy accelerates modernization or becomes an obstacle to it; and finally whether countries striving to modernize themselves can acquire not only the West's technology but also its political institutions and spirit. A failure of the democratic experiment in Turkey might support the view that Western democracy remains alien to the rest of the world and that authoritarianism is the only way for modernization, thus further isolating the West from that part of the world which is in the process of an inevitable transformation.

The modernization of Turkey aimed at immediate practical ends and was charted by its society's conditions rather than by a well-defined ideology. Since social, economic, and political conditions in most of the countries which are striving towards rapid modernization are similar to those in Turkey, it may be assumed that they may follow the Turkish example. Modernization in the Arab countries in particular, although different in details and taking place amidst special circumstances, never-

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theless closely resembles that in Turkey in matters of organization and economic policies. A proper understanding of Turkey's general transformation and of her political system, of the variety of problems she faced and the solutions she found to dispose of them may greatly facilitate analysis of the transformation taking place in other countries. The question of capital formation—vitaly important in the newly developing countries—and its profound social, cultural, and political effects can be studied best in Turkey, which established the nucleus of an industry without foreign or domestic capital, utilizing governmental means to accumulate capital while preserving and promoting private property. Finally, a proper understanding of Turkey's transformation and political history may indicate whether the newly modernizing countries will adjust Western ideas and institutions to their own old forms and values, or actually create a third pattern of civilization and institutions quite different from those of both East and West.

This study is dedicated primarily to the analysis of the political transformation in Turkey—the transition to a multi-party system. This transformation is here viewed and studied not as an isolated phenomenon but as the synthesis of various interacting cultural, economic, social, and personal conflicts. The special emphasis placed upon socio-economic factors in the political development of Turkey is due primarily to the fact that the effects of such factors have been generally ignored.

This study deals primarily with the events in the crucial years 1945-1950. Nonetheless, in order to place these events in their proper perspective, the history of the Turkish transformation has also been outlined. Moreover, the general trends in the internal politics of Turkey have been analyzed up to date. Special emphasis has been placed on the history of thought in Turkey.

The study is divided into three parts. The first deals with the general history of the cultural-political and the economic-

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social transformation. This first part is not an exhaustive study but aims at providing background information to facilitate the understanding of events after 1945. The second part is a chronological study of the political developments in 1945-1950. The third part deals with the transformation in the regime's ideology, with various contemporary cultural, political, economic, and social problems, and with the country's present party structure. The final chapter is a summary-conclusion which comprises certain recommendations likely to strengthen democracy in Turkey. It is believed that this is the *first comprehensive study of politics in Turkey in any language*. Its main purpose has been to bring together a variety of data and to study them from a political viewpoint. It attempts to present the facts, express few opinions, and leave most of the conclusions to the reader.

The material for the first part comes from a variety of Turkish and Western sources, some primary, but most secondary. The material for the second and third parts comes chiefly from Turkish primary sources which have been supplemented by information from books and articles in Western languages.

The presentation and interpretation of events are, in great part, the author's; nevertheless, they express in general the Turkish intellectuals' view on the country's history and politics.

The translations of Turkish texts, if not otherwise specified, are the author's. A free translation has been used in order to convey more accurately in English the thought expressed in Turkish. Throughout the text and the footnotes, Turkish names and titles of books have been spelled as they appear in Turkish.¹ Names, book titles and expressions deriving from

¹ A short key to their pronunciation follows: ş=sh in short ç=ch in church c=j in join ı=o in seldom i=i in machine ü=u in the French tu ö=the German ö ğ is a soft g, much the same as the running together of the words *I am*.

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Arabic and Persian are spelled phonetically in Turkish and hence show some variation.

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K.H.K.

CHAPTER 1

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BEGINNING OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT

THE Ottoman Empire, the immediate predecessor of present day Turkey, came to an end in 1918, after an uninterrupted sovereign existence of more than six centuries (1299-1918). In the course of the first three centuries of its existence it became the world's most powerful country by gradually expanding from a small dominion in western Anatolia to the three known continents—Europe, Asia, and Africa—through a highly efficient and tightly interwoven civil and military organization.¹

The Turks were converted to Islam in the eighth century and together with the new faith accepted the *Cihad*, the doctrine to extend Islam by force of arms. With new and sustained ardor they resumed the drive of the Muslim world toward the West, centuries after the Arabs had renounced doing so. Islam gave to the Turkish state a purpose, a meaning, but at the same time it submerged the national characteristics of the Turks into its own, to the extent that "Turk" became synonymous with "Muslim," although Turks in general preserved such distinct characteristics as language and statehood.

The Ottoman Empire was successful until the West as-

¹ On the organization of the Ottoman Empire, see Albert H. Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent*, Cambridge, 1913; Barnette Miller, *The Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1941; W. L. Wright (Translation) *Ottoman Statecraft: the Book of Counsel for Vezirs and Governors*, Princeton, 1935; Mouradja d'Ohsson, *Tableau General de l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris, 4 Vols., 1788-1791; Ismail H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtına Medhal*, İstanbul, 1941. For a general appraisal of the Ottoman Empire, see A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. IV, London, 1940, pp. 68-189 *passim*, Vol. V, London, 1940, pp. 110-326 *passim* (also abridged edition, New York, 1947, pp. 177ff.).

serted its own military and political superiority, and thereafter, beginning towards the end of the seventeenth century, it rapidly declined.

Some of the factors which caused the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and had profound repercussions in the movement for reformation may be mentioned briefly. The *millet* system,² under which the Empire was administered, enabled each non-Muslim religious group to preserve its own cultural identity and thereby prevented the Ottoman Empire's general integration. In time, the Christian *millets*, receptive of Western nationalist influences at a much earlier date than the Muslim subjects, and economically relatively well developed, demanded and fought to achieve national independence within their historical boundaries. This nationalist struggle contributed greatly to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

Economic inertia was perpetuated in the Ottoman Empire by lack of capital. Capital was accumulated through war booty and was used for military and consumptive purposes. The capitulations to foreign powers, coupled with religious restrictions on economic occupations, and the subsequent social degradation of manual labor, destroyed the incentive for economic initiative.

Within a century after the conquest of Constantinople the ruling class of the Ottoman Empire came to separate itself from the masses, partly under the pervasive influence of Byzantine institutions and mentality,³ and partly because of the

² For a description of the *millet system*, see H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Vol. 1, Part II, London, 1957, pp. 207-261; A. S. Tritton, *The Caliphs and their Non-Moslem Subjects*, Oxford, 1930, pp. 5-12; Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, London, 1938, pp. 28ff.; Sir Harry Luke, *The Old Turkey and the New*, London, 1955, pp. 7-9, 66-101. Also, Henry E. Allen, *The Turkish Transformation*, Chicago, 1935, pp. 70-77; Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey*, London, 1955, pp. 22-25; Fuad Köprülü, *Les Origines de l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris, 1935.

³ For a view minimizing the influence of Byzantine institutions, see Köprülüade Mehmet Fuat, "Bizans Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine Tesiri Hakkında Bazı Mulâhazalar," *Türk Hukuk ve İktisat Mecmuası*,

motives which determined the acquisition of status in the ruling class. Social mobility in the Ottoman Empire enabled humble peasants and rank and file soldiers to raise themselves to the highest government positions. In time, however, a large number of people entered this ruling class based on consideration of interest, more than conviction, and this deteriorated its standards.⁴

Islam's obedience-commanding rules were stringently applied to preserve the loyalty of the subjects.⁵ In time the Islam of Turks, following the general trend in the Muslim world acquired dogmatic features, even more pronounced than in Arab countries.⁶ Furthermore the Ottoman Sultans, who, beginning with Selim I in 1517, acquired the title of Caliph

Istanbul, 1931, pp. 165-313 (also translated into Italian, *Alcune Osservazioni Intorno all' Influenza delle Istituzioni Bizantine sulle Istituzioni Ottomane*, Roma, 1953).

⁴ For the training of Ottoman administrators, see Miller, *Palace School*, pp. 7, 70-93, 105ff.; A. J. Toynbee, *An Historian's Approach to Religion*, New York, 1956, pp. 45-48, 198, and *A Study of History* (abridged), pp. 174-177; A. J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, *Turkey*, New York, 1927, pp. 3-58 *passim*; Gibb and Bowen, *op.cit.*, II, pp. 210ff. For the loyalty of this class to the state and dynasty, see A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty*, Oxford, 1956, pp. 11, 12-26.

⁵ For these rules sanctioning the subjects to obey even an unjust and tyrannical ruler, see Sir Thomas W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, Oxford, 1924, pp. 48, 49, 50; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic*, Vol. I, Part I, London, 1950, p. 28. For the pattern of relations between subjects, see A. Adnan Adivar, "Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey," *Near Eastern Culture and Society* (ed. by T. Cuyler Young), Princeton, 1951, p. 120. For various cultural factors affecting Islam in Turkey, see Howard A. Reed, "The Religious Life of Modern Turkish Muslims," *Islam and the West* (ed. by Richard N. Frye), The Hague, 1957, pp. 135-143; Bernard Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (ed. by Gustave E. von Grunebaum), Chicago, 1955, pp. 316-317, 322-327.

⁶ For the liberal religious attitude of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror (1451-1481), see Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Vol. III, New York (Modern Library), pp. 747-748; E. Jacobs, "Mehemmed II, der Eroberer, seine Beziehungen zur Renaissance und seine Büchersammlung," *Oriens*, No. 11, 1949, pp. 6-30. For a liberal Muslim sect among the population of Anatolia and Janissaries, see John Kingsley Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes*, Hartford, 1937, pp. 16, 20, 87ff. For the attitude of Mevlevi sect, see Luke, *Old Turkey and New*, p. 121.

(successor of the Prophet), made extensive use of it in the nineteenth century to preserve the loyalty of Muslims throughout the world.⁷

From the end of the seventeenth century onwards, Western superiority in all fields, enhanced by the rise of Russia in the north, shifted the balance of power to the detriment of the Ottoman Empire and forced it to seek ways and means to restore the balance. Concomitant with the rise of Western power was a general deterioration in the Ottoman Empire's administration,⁸ chiefly in the army; the Janissaries, by then elected at random, had abandoned their strict discipline and had become a financial burden on the state and a constant menace to the Sultan's own rule. It was in these circumstances that the Ottoman Empire turned to the West to seek inspiration for reforms, despite the fact that the West believed it had little in common with the Ottoman Empire and Turks.⁹ As early as 1720, Çelebi Mehmet was sent to Europe to seek

⁷ In 1876 Abdulhamid II inserted in the constitution his religious title and sent emissaries through the Muslim world to assert it. Later in 1908 and 1913 when Ottoman territories were ceded to Greece, Austria, and Bulgaria, a clause was inserted in the treaties stipulating that "the name of his Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, as Caliph, shall continue to be pronounced in the public prayers of the Mussulmans." See A. Vicomte de La Jonquiere, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, Vol. II, Paris, 1914, pp. 70, 179; Arnold, *The Caliphate*, pp. 95ff.; Alderson, *The Structure*, pp. 73-74. For treaties, see *American Journal of International Law* (official documents) Sup. Vol. 8, Annex II, 1914, pp. 37ff., 46, for quotation p. 49.

⁸ For a view on this administration see Lynton K. Caldwell, "Turkish Administration and the Politics of Expediency," *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (ed. by William J. Siffin), Bloomington, 1957, pp. 117-118.

⁹ For an Allied demand in 1917 to expel from Europe the Ottoman Empire which was so "radically alien to Western civilization," see A. J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, New York, 1922, p. 328; Gaston Gaillard, *The Turks and Europe*, London, 1921, pp. 5ff. For early attempts at inspiration from the West, see Niyazi Berkes, "Historical Background of Turkish Secularism," *Islam and the West*, pp. 48ff. On the Byzantine influence on Western views in respect to Islam and Turks, see Toynbee, *The Western Question*, pp. 32ff.; *Civilization on Trial*, New York, 1953, pp. 177ff., 184-212; also Gibbon, *The Decline*, pp. 750ff.; also Felix Valyi, *Spiritual and Political Revolutions in Islam*, London, 1925, p. 27.

and adopt whatever was of utility to the Turks, but his mission resulted chiefly in the adaptation of the printing press (it could print only non-religious books) during the *Lâle* (Tulip) period.¹⁰

The actual reforms in the Ottoman Empire, however, started first in the army in the eighteenth century in the form of military schools which were established on the Western model, chiefly French, and had teaching staffs from the West.¹¹ Thus, the non-religious books printed on the newly introduced press, and the military schools, established contacts with and spread information about the West. An even more favorable atmosphere for the reception of Western ideas was created, as pointed out by Professor Bernard Lewis, by the French Revolution and its secular views, which diminished the importance of religious differences.¹²

The Ottoman rulers, however, soon became suspicious of the secularist features of the French Revolution, which they feared would eventually undermine the cultural foundations of the Ottoman Empire.¹³ The relatively large body of military personnel, on the other hand, insisted on additional reforms. Thus, two groups had been formed: the modernists who demanded reforms and the conservatives who saw their

¹⁰ For this period, and the history of the printing press, see Ahmet Refik, *Lâle Devri*, İstanbul, 1932; Hamit ve Muhsin, *Türkiye Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1930, pp. 287, 291; Mümtaz Turhan, *Kültür Değişmeleri*, İstanbul, 1951, pp. 174ff., Berkes, "Historical Background," pp. 50-51; Selim Nüzhet, *Türk Matbaacılığı*, İstanbul, 1931.

¹¹ On these reforms, see Frank S. Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1942, pp. 25-38; Bernard Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey," *Journal of World History*, July, 1953, pp. 105ff.; Wilbur W. White, *The Process of Change in the Ottoman Empire*, Chicago, 1937; Edmond Chertier, *Reforms en Turquie*, Paris, 1858. Turhan, *Kültür*, pp. 177-219; H. W. V. Temperley, "Reform Movement in the Turkish Empire and Republic during the XIXth and XXth Centuries," *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, January 1937, pp. 449-460; Henry Elisha Allen, *The Turkish Transformation*, Chicago, 1935, pp. 4-27; Toynbee and Kirkwood, *Turkey*, pp. 48-58; Enver Ziya Karal, *Selim III ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları*, Ankara, 1946, pp. 36ff., 72ff.

¹² Lewis, "The Impact," pp. 106-110.

¹³ See Enver Ziya Karal, *Halet Efendinin Paris Büyük Elçiliği 1802-1806*, İstanbul, 1940.

salvation in clinging to old traditions. The gap between them continued to grow as new developments strengthened the modernists' position.

Sultan Selim III (1789-1808), faced with disorderly Janissaries, who had lost their combat effectiveness and who opposed reforms, attempted to create a volunteer army, *Nizamı Cedid Ordusu* (Army of the New Order), more loyal to himself. Eventually Selim was dethroned by the Janissaries, but not before having laid down the plans for some other reforms in administration, politics, and commerce.¹⁴ Thus, he is the first Ottoman Sultan to have planned large-scale reforms, although he was able to carry out only a small part of them.

His successor, Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839), started his reign with an acute awareness that his survival depended on the replacement of the Janissaries; the submission of the clergy who had been the faithful ally of the Janissaries in opposing reform; and on reasserting his rule over rebellious administrators in various provinces of the Empire, such as Ali Pasha of Yanina and Pasvanoğlu of Vidin, not to mention Mehmet Ali of Egypt.¹⁵ The new Sultan eventually destroyed the Janissaries in 1826, by taking advantage of the public resentment against them caused by their inability to

¹⁴ On Selim III and his reforms see *Cevdet Tarihi*, Vols. 4, 5, İstanbul, 1309 (1891); Karal, *Selim III*, pp. 11-21, 29-163. M. A. Ubcini, *Letters on Turkey* . . . Vol. II (tr. by Lady Easthope), London, 1856, pp. 42off.; W. S. Davis, *A Short History of the Near East*, New York, 1923, pp. 289ff.; Le Baron Antoine Juchereau de Saint Denys, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 1792-1844*, Vol. II, Paris, 1844, pp. 169ff.; F. W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam Under the Sultans*, 2 Vols., Oxford, 1929; Bailey, *British Policy*, pp. 26-28; Luke, *Old Turkey and New*, pp. 26-30, 36-37.

¹⁵ On Mahmud II and his attempt to strengthen the authority of the central government, see A. Slade, *Records of Travel in Turkey and Greece, 1829-1831*, Vol. I, London, 1833, pp. 113ff.; Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," *American Historical Review*, July 1954, pp. 856ff.; Luke, *Old Turkey and New*, pp. 34-35; Bailey, *British Policy*, pp. 13-33, 34-36, 271-276; Tahsin ve Muhsin, *Tarih*, p. 423; Dankwart A. Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East*, Princeton, 1956, p. 17.

put down a rebellion in the Balkans. Thus, having his own faithful modern army, Mahmud II dealt with the landlords, confiscated the military fiefs and established his own strong domination which gave rise to deep resentment. He went further and adopted new measures for the development of the army, new clothes, including the Venetian fez, and ordered shaving of beards. All these measures were imposed in a forcible manner, which earned him the title of Peter the Great of the Turks among the literates, while the masses called him *giavur* Sultan (infidel Sultan).¹⁶

The large scale modernization in the military field undertaken by Mahmud II necessitated new expenditures which were met by exploiting further the existing resources; this, in turn, had profound repercussions.¹⁷

Sultan Mahmud had committed himself to a policy of modernization and reform designed to fill the most conspicuous gaps between the Ottoman Empire and the West. This policy was a victory for the modernist intelligentsia—chiefly army officers and government officials in the foreign service whose influence expanded further and who found themselves engaged in a struggle with the conservatives.¹⁸

¹⁶ Sultan Mahmud was likened to Peter the Great more than once, and the relation between the two is more than accidental. Ibrahim Müteferrika, the first printer in the Ottoman Empire, had already pointed to the achievements of Peter the Great, who introduced reforms by force. The historian Asım also remarked that Russia emerged from backwardness by using drastic methods. (Peter the Great had abolished by force the *Streltsi* [the old Russian Army] in 1698 and brought about dress reforms.) On the above, see R. A. Walsh, *A Residence in Constantinople*, Vol. II, London, 1836, pp. 319ff.; Halide Edip, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*, Lahore, 1935, p. 65; Lewis, "The Impact," pp. 124-125; Berkes, "Historical Background," p. 51; M. A. Ubicini, *La Turquie Actuelle*, Paris, 1855, p. 240; Allen, *Transformation*, p. 6; Toynbee, *A Study of History* (abridged), 1957, pp. 169-170. See also G. Vernadsky, "On Some Parallel Trends in Russian and Turkish History, Especially in the 16th Century," *Connecticut Academy of Arts and Science Transactions*, 1945, pp. 25ff. For a parallel between Peter the Great and Atatürk, see Dorsey D. Jones and Henry Johnston, "Mustapha Kemal and Peter the Great, A Study in Parallelism," *Sociology and Social Research*, January-February 1938, pp. 212-222.

¹⁷ See Chapter 3.

¹⁸ For this struggle see Ubicini, *La Turquie Actuelle*, p. 240; Hamit ve

Once the initial army reforms had become relatively secure, steps were taken to supplement and consolidate them with further reforms in other fields. In 1838 Mahmud II had already introduced, and established parallel to the existing Ottoman institutions, three Western councils: military, administrative, and judiciary.

Thus, on the one hand, the idea of expanding the reforms into fields other than the military, and on the other, the insistent demands of the Western powers for equality and guarantees to the Christian population in the Ottoman Empire, prepared the way for political reform, which materialized in 1839 in the shape of the *Tanzimat* (Reorganization).

The Edict of *Tanzimat*, known as "*Gülhane Hattı Hümayunu*" (Edict of Gülhane), was conceived and written by Reşid Pasha—long-time Ottoman ambassador in London and Paris—with the consent of Sultan Abdulmecid (1839-1861) and read on the third of November 1839, in Gülhane Square in Istanbul. The *Tanzimat* Edict offered, but without guarantees, equal rights to all citizens; protection of their persons and property; and called for certain improvements in the financial (i.e., a reformed tax system), military, and judiciary fields.¹⁹

The *Tanzimat* was in fact the extension of reforms into

Muhsin, *Tarih*, pp. 423, 425-426; Rıza Nur, *Cemiyeti Hafıye*, İstanbul, 1330 (1914), p. 143 (Conversion of dates according to Faik Reşit Unat *Hicrî Tarihleri Milâdî Tarihe Çevirme Kılavuzu*, Ankara, 1940; Berkes, "Historical Background," p. 55. On the conflict of conservative and modernist groups in the Near East, see H. A. R. Gibb, *Les Tendances Modernes de l'Islam* (tr. by B. Vernier) Paris, 1949; "La Reaction Contre la Culture Occidentale Dans le Proche-Orient," *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, XXIII, 1951, pp. 1-10.

¹⁹ On the *Tanzimat*, see Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat*, 2 Vols., Paris, 1882; Luke, *Old Turkey and New*, pp. 47-50; Bailey, *British Policy*, pp. 38, 214, 228-229. For a Turkish analysis and appraisal of the *Tanzimat*, see a series of articles in *Tanzimat*, İstanbul, 1940. For a rich bibliography, see *ibid.*, pp. 979-990; see also Recai G. Okandan, *Amme Hukukumuzda Tanzimat ve Birinci Meşrutiyet Devirleri*, İstanbul, 1946, pp. 57ff. For a legal analysis of the edict, see Yavuz Abadan, "Tanzimat Fermanının Tahlihi," *Tanzimat*, İstanbul, 1940, pp. 31ff.

political and cultural fields hitherto not affected directly. During the Tanzimat era, 1839-1877, new modern schools were created and the ancient *medrese* were gradually left in neglect.²⁰ Foreign schools were established; Galatasaray in Istanbul, which became a French Lycee, was founded in 1868. Western literary and theatrical adaptations were introduced (they were almost entirely of French origin), and scientific books and magazines were published.

The Tanzimat Edict was followed by the *Islahat Fermani* (Reform Edict) which was accepted by the Porte as a condition for participation in the Paris Conference of 1856.²¹ It reiterated the promises made to the Christian population in the first edict of 1839.

It was with the above two Edicts that a new political concept began to emerge in the Ottoman Empire; the idea of conferring equal duties and privileges on all persons living in the Ottoman Empire under a common citizenship, but within the Muslim traditions of the Ottoman state. This was an attempt to integrate the minorities and neutralize their claims to national independence. This attempt, if carried out, would have logically put an end to the *millet* system under which the Ottoman Empire had existed since its inception.²² Ottomanism, that is the new theory of one citizenship for all subjects of the Ottoman Empire, was finally accepted under the Constitution of 1876, and remained valid in theory until 1918. In practice, resurgent nationalism among the minorities, soon adopted by the Turks themselves, rendered the one citizenship theory meaningless.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, political associations with nationalistic purposes were organized by the

²⁰ On the educational reform, see Sadrettin Celâl Antel, "Tanzimat Maarifi," *Tanzimat*, pp. 441-462. For the *medrese*, see M. Şerafettin Yaltkaya, "Tanzimattan Evvel ve Sonra Medreseler," *ibid.*, pp. 463-467.

²¹ For texts, see Bailey, *British Policy*, pp. 277-279, 287-291.

²² Davison, "Turkish Attitudes," pp. 844-853 *passim*, also Frederick Milligen, *La Turquie sous le Regne d'Abdul Aziz*, Paris, 1868.

Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. They were followed by organizations established by Muslims. The first was the secret *Fedayiler Cemiyeti* (Volunteers Society), organized in İstanbul in 1859 by some Muslim intellectuals chiefly as a reaction to the Sultan's granting equality to the Christians.²³ It was followed by the *Yeni Osmanlılar* (Young Ottomans) Society of 1865.²⁴ This was the first major Ottoman political organization which (activating in Paris and London) aimed at achieving a constitutional monarchy. The society also expressed the misgivings of some intellectuals regarding the reforms so far introduced, which in their view were of a syncretic and secular nature. The Young Ottomans criticized the secular character of the reforms which caused the Empire to be administered without due regard to religious laws, that is, in contradiction to the very foundations on which it stood. Namık Kemal, the leader of the group, found no justification to obey a Sultan who had established his own autocracy based on secular methods after destroying the Janissaries. His famous ode to freedom was actually a demand for freedom from a Sultan who ruled an Empire by violating the fundamental principles of Islam.²⁵

It was the demand on the part of intellectuals for additional reforms in the political field, namely Constitutionalism, the desire of the Sultan and his bureaucracy to enforce the new policy of Ottomanism, and the pressure of foreign powers

²³ Uluğ İğdemir, *Kuleli Vakkası Hakkında Bir Araştırma*, Ankara, 1937; Tarık Z. Tunaya, *Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler*, İstanbul, 1952, pp. 89-90. Dr. Tunaya's original work on the history of political parties has provided a valuable source of information.

²⁴ See Ihsan Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar," *Tanzimat*, pp. 777-857; M. C. Kuntay, *Namık Kemal Devrinin İnsanları ve Olayları Arasında*, Vol. 1, İstanbul, 1944; Tunaya, *op.cit.*, pp. 91-96; Davison, "Turkish Attitudes," pp. 851ff.

²⁵ The important passage reads: "How Magic art thou, oh freedom, that we have become thy slaves, though we have broken all other chains. . . ." Halide Edip, *Conflict of East and West*, pp. 198. On excerpts from articles by Namık Kemal written in the *Hürriyet*, see Sungu, "Tanzimat," pp. 800-801, 807, 811; also Berkes, "Historical Background," pp. 65-67.

which finally led the new Sultan, Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), to promulgate the first Ottoman Constitution on December 23, 1876.²⁶ This event marks the beginning of a period in Ottoman history known as the First *Meşrutiyet* (Constitutionalism), and which lasted until 1908. The Constitution of 1876 granted, in writing, certain individual rights to the citizens, and also established a Parliament composed of a House of Deputies and a Senate. But it preserved intact all the powers of the Sultan over the Legislature, which he could convene and dissolve at any time, even as he could the Executive, whose members he could appoint and dismiss at will. The first House of Deputies was convened on March 19, 1877. A second House was convened the next year, and after several months of bitter criticism of the government it was prorogued until 1908.²⁷ From 1878 to 1908, Abdulhamid established his own autocracy and ruled despotically.

As Abdulhamid gradually abolished all the freedoms and suspended the Constitution itself after 1877, a number of secret organizations, later known as the Young Turks Associations, were established in the Ottoman Empire and then abroad. Their chief purpose was to compel the Sultan to reinforce the Constitution of 1876. It was in Paris that Ahmed Riza Bey, following the model of an organization founded in the Istanbul Military Medical School by Ibrahim Temo, established the *Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Union and Progress Association) in 1889.²⁸ Other associations were established in various countries.

²⁶ For text see "The Ottoman Constitution Promulgated 7th Zilhidje 1293" (1876), *American Journal of International Law*, supplement 2 (official documents), New York, 1908, pp. 367-387.

²⁷ A succinct record of the debates in the House of Deputies is available in *Meclisi Mebusan 1293-1877* (ed. by Hakkı Tarık Us), İstanbul, 1940.

²⁸ Among the early organizations the most notable is Ali Suavi's committee. See İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Ali Suavi ve Çırağan Sarayı Vakası," *Belleten*, April 1944, pp. 71ff. See also, Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 104ff. For the actual Young Turks organizations, see Ibrahim Temo, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetinin Teşekkülü ve Hizmeti Vataniye ve İnkilâbı Millîye Dair Hatıratım*, Mecidiye, 1939; Ernest E. Ramsaur, Jr., *The Young Turks:*

BEGINNING OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT

In order to centralize all the Young Turks Associations formed in various countries and to establish a common line of action, a convention was held secretly in Paris on February 4, 1902. However, the convention split, partly on personality conflicts but mainly on the question of whether or not the army and foreign assistance should be used in the contemplated internal revolution.²⁹ The "interventionists," defending the second viewpoint and headed by Prince Sabahaddin, founded the *Teşebbüsü Şahsî ve Ademi Merkeziyet Cemiyeti* (Private Initiative and Decentralization Association), while the first group of "non-interventionists," headed by Ahmed Riza Bey, changed the name of their association to *Osmanlı Terakki ve Ittihat Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Progress and Union Association), and thereafter remained the leading Young Turks Organization.

The real strength of Ahmed Riza Bey's association came after it merged with the "Ottoman Freedom Association,"³⁰ established in Salonica in 1906, by a group of army officers and government officials.³¹ After this union, the Young Turks Associations rapidly grew in strength by receiving combined assistance from the Muslims, and also the Christian minority groups who, in the hope of achieving national independence, lent support to the Union and Progress. Meanwhile, Ahmed Riza Bey reached a temporary agreement with Prince Saba-

A Prelude to the Revolution of 1908, Princeton, 1957, pp. 14ff.; Joseph Denais, *La Turquie Nouvelle et l'Ancien Regime*, Paris, 1909, pp. 43ff.

²⁹ Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, p. 106; Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, pp. 66-74.

³⁰ See Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, *Inkilâp Tarihimiz ve Ittihat ve Terakki*, İstanbul, 1948, pp. 237-248; Tunaya, *ibid.*, pp. 108-117, 142-148; Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, pp. 95ff.

³¹ The "revolution" of 1908 was achieved primarily by the Association established in Salonica, whose members held the most responsible positions throughout the Young Turks' era, while the older members and the leaders of Young Turks Associations established abroad played only a secondary role. The Salonica Association was formed by minor government clerks, half educated people acting empirically rather than according to a well determined theory or plan. For first hand information on the Young Turks' background, see "Memoirs of Halil Menteşeoğlu," *Cumhuriyet*, October 13-December 11, 1946, *passim*.

haddin's group. Thus, on the eve of 1908, all the Young Turks Associations were united around one common purpose: to end the despotic rule of Sultan Abdulhamid and reinforce the Constitution. This was achieved, with the support of the Balkan population,³² with comparatively little bloodshed on July 23, 1908, and the Sultan reinstated the Constitution, the bi-cameral Parliament, and all the freedoms—amidst the unprecedented enthusiasm and joy of the population.³³ This date marks the beginning of the second *Meşrutiyet*.

The intelligentsia had finally succeeded in defeating the Sultan, and the army had played the decisive role as the chief agent of modernization, not only in the military and technical field, but also in the political.³⁴ The intelligentsia in power came from the lower middle classes.

Talat Pasha, the most famous of the Young Turks, was a post office clerk of humble origin. The other architects of the Revolution of 1908, from Salonica, were also of the humble origin. Once in power, notwithstanding some identi-

³² For the cables sent to the Sultan by the Balkan population, see Süleyman Külçe, *Firzovik Toplantısı ve Meşrutiyet*, İzmir, 1944, pp. 18ff., 60ff. For the general situation of the Ottoman Empire at the time of the Revolution, see *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914*, Vol. V (ed. by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley), London, 1928, pp. 247-308.

³³ On the joy of the people and their interpretation of freedom, see Charles R. Buxton, *Turkey in Revolution*, London, 1909, p. 108; H. Cahit Yalçın, *Talat Paşa*, İstanbul, 1943, p. 16. See also Sir W. M. Ramsay, *The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey*, New York, London (n.d.) pp. 57ff.

³⁴ On the role of the army as an agent of reforms see Majid Khadduri, "The Role of the Military in Middle East Politics," *The American Political Science Review*, XLVII, 1953, pp. 511-524. A revised form appears as, "The Army Officer; His Role in Middle Eastern Politics," *Social Forces in the Middle East* (ed. by Sydney Nettleton Fisher), Ithaca, 1955, pp. 162-183. Lt. Colonel Malletterre, "L'Armée Jeune Turque," *Revue des Sciences Politiques*, September 1911, pp. 734-755; A. de Bilinski, "The Turkish Army," *Contemporary Review*, September 1907, pp. 403-409; Felice de Chaurand de St. Eustache, "L'Esercito nel Movimento Costituzionale della Turchia," *Rivista d'Italia*, October 1908, pp. 513-532. Also Necati Tacan, "Tanzimat ve Ordu," *Tanzimat*, pp. 129-137; Rustow, "Politics," pp. 26, 31-33; Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, pp. 144-145. *Cumhuriyet*, November 30, 1946 (Memoirs of Halil Menteseoğlu).

fication with the dynasty, they clashed with the Sultan's own ruling group, which they first consented to obey and then ousted by installing their own rule and dominating the Sultan.

The Union and Progress, which until 1908 was a political association aiming primarily at forcing the Sultan to abide by the Constitution of 1876, suddenly found itself called upon to administer the country. Aware of its unpreparedness for government, the Association decided at first that it would not seek government power but would remain a *vatani* (patriotic) organization. Nevertheless, it entered the elections held in 1908, and its candidates were overwhelmingly elected to the House of Deputies.³⁵ The opposition *Ahrar* (Liberal) Party, established after July 1908 in order to check the domination of the Union and Progress, had just one member in this House.

After the elections, a rather strange situation developed: the Sultan's executive powers were tightly controlled by the Legislature, composed of Union and Progress members and sympathizers, while the Association itself claimed that it was not a political party but a cultural association. Yet, the secret Central Committee of the Association controlled all political activities.³⁶

The Union and Progress became increasingly involved in politics. It appointed one of its own members, Sait Pasha, as Premier. Reacting to criticisms of its domination, its secrecy, and personal abuses, the Association then proceeded to annihilate the opposition parties formed primarily by dis-

³⁵ The period from 1908 to 1918 was dominated by the Union and Progress Party and may be referred to as the Union and Progress era. However, the small group who created the "revolution" swelled to include most of the Young Turks at one time or another and, therefore, this period may properly be called the Young Turks' era.

³⁶ Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, p. 241; Ramsay, *Revolution*, pp. 8ff.; Toynbee and Kirkwood, *Turkey*, pp. 53-54. For constitutional amendments see Gotthard Jäschke, *Die Entwicklung des osmanischen Verfassungsstaates von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Berlin, 1917.

sidents from its own ranks. Taking advantage of the religious upheaval known as the *31 Mart Vakası*³⁷ (March 31 Event), on April 13, 1909, the Association abolished the *Ahrar* (Liberal Party), the *İttihadi Muhammedi* (Islamic Unity Party), the *Fedakâranı Millet* (National Volunteer Association), and the *Heyeti Müttefika-i Osmaniye* (Ottoman Alliance Association), on the pretext that they had incited the revolt. The Sultan, Abdulhamid II, was replaced by Mehmed V (1909-1918).

The opposition, nevertheless, continued to mushroom, chiefly with dissidents from the Union and Progress. Finally, the main opposition parties, such as *Mutedil Hürriyetperveran* (Moderate Liberals), *Islahatı Esasiyeyi Osmaniye* (Ottoman Radical Reform), *Ahali* (Peoples) Party, and the Greek, Armenian, Albanian, and Bulgarian minority groups in the Legislature, merged to form the *Hürriyet ve İtilâf* (Liberal Union) on November 21, 1911.³⁸ The Union and Progress, thus threatened with loss of power, arbitrarily amended the constitution and held new elections under heavy pressure and acquired full control of the House of Deputies.³⁹ However, mainly through the pressure of the *Halaskâr Zabitan Grubu* (Saviour Officers' Group), a terroristic revolutionary group formed by army officers, the Union and Progress was ousted from power for a short time in 1912, but came back to power through a *coup d'état* in January 1913. Shortly afterwards, the Union and Progress Association, in a convention, finally decided to become a political party and, as

³⁷ See Ramsay (*Revolution*, pp. 11ff.), whose description probably is the most detailed first hand account of the revolt. Also, *British Documents*, pp. 313-321; Naki Cevat Akkerman, *Demokrasi ve Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler Hakkında Kısa Notlar*, Ankara, 1950, pp. 26-27; T. Z. Tunaya, "31 Mart Vakası," *Vatan*, March 10, 1949; Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi*, Vol. 1, İstanbul, 1940, pp. 295-301.

³⁸ See Rıza Nur, *Hürriyet ve İtilâf Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Öldü*, İstanbul, 1334 (1919); Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 315ff.

³⁹ Recai G. Okandan, *Âmme Hukukumuzda İkinci Meşrutiyet Devri*, İstanbul, 1947, pp. 93ff. On elections, see Mustafa Ragıp, "Meşrutiyet Devrinde İntihap Mücadeleleri," *Akşam*, March 18, 1943.

such, it retained control of the government until 1918, when at the end of the World War which it had fought on the side of Germany and lost, it decided to dissolve itself.⁴⁰ (Towards the end of the war, in 1916-1918, it liberalized somewhat the press.)

The Young Turks' history (1889-1918) presented in outline in the preceding pages was accompanied and in great part determined by ideological and cultural developments which followed the two trends discernible in the Ottoman Empire since the eighteenth century: modernist and conservative.

The modernist group headed by Ahmed Riza Bey, although in appearance and theory bound to Islam, in practice had adopted unorthodox views on religion, which fundamentally differentiated them from their predecessors. Ahmed Riza Bey was a disciple of Auguste Comte. The *Meşveret*, the newspaper of the Young Turks abroad which he published, was a disseminator of positivist teachings.⁴¹ Ahmed Riza Bey was a strong defender of Ottomanism to be implemented through a centralized government in which the Turks—he did not advocate it explicitly—were to have the dominant role. He, like all the other Young Turks, viewed the dynasty as the unifying factor in the Ottoman Empire. On the question of religion he believed that Islam could and should be reformed along the lines of Auguste Comte's ideas.

In diametrical opposition to Ahmed Riza Bey there rose Murad Mizancı, whose literary activities in the country, the publication of the *Mizan* (Scale) in Egypt, coupled with his

⁴⁰ Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 197ff. On the circumstances which prepared the entry of the Ottoman Empire into war and on developments during the war years, see *British Documents*, Vol. v, London 1928. Luke, *Old Turkey and New*, pp. 148ff. Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey*, London, 1955, pp. 45ff.; also Ahmet Emin (Yalman), *Turkey in the World War*, New Haven, 1930, pp. 41-78.

⁴¹ On Ahmed Riza's philosophy, see Baron Carra de Vaux, *Les Penseurs de l'Islam*, Vol. v, Paris, 1921-1926, pp. 159-179. Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, pp. 24, 29-30; John MacDonald, *Turkey and the Eastern Question*, London, 1913, pp. 55ff.

Islamic views had secured him a large following. Mizancı favored the establishment of an Islamic Empire under a Caliph and hoped to see the Sultan head this Islamic world.⁴² He came eventually to Europe and established a Young Turks association in Geneva, and for a time seemed to threaten the primacy of Ahmed Riza Bey, whose positivist views and proud personality had caused resentment among the Young Turks. But Murad succumbed to the promises of Celaleddin Pasha, the Sultan's envoy and, giving up his opposition returned to İstanbul. The political and ideological leadership of the Young Turks thus was left to Ahmed Riza Bey who, having rejected the Sultan's offers decided, to continue the fight for constitutionality. Ahmed Riza Bey's ideas were challenged by Prince Sabahaddin, who envisaged a total transformation of the Ottoman Empire by decentralizing the administration and promoting individual initiative, and by inducing the intelligentsia to engage in productive occupations rather than seek government jobs. But Prince Sabahaddin's ideas were in a way too premature to be applied to a society in which the fundamental question of its political regime had not been decided and the actual force of socio-economic factors had yet not been understood.⁴³

After the establishment of freedom in 1908 the ideological discussions took a more definite form and gradually centered around personalities and publications and were quite systematically expressed. These currents had as their common practical purpose to find a remedy to the Empire's backward-

⁴² For Mizancı's ideas, see Mourad Bey, *La Force et la Faiblesse de la Turquie: Les Coupables et les Innocents*, Geneva, 1897; Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, pp. 38, 41-43; Temo, *İttihad*, pp. 182ff.; Kuran, *İnkılâp*, p. 70, also *İnkılâp Tarihimiz von Jön Türkler*, İstanbul, 1945, pp. 57ff.

⁴³ On Prince Sabahaddin, see Paul Fesch, *Constantinople aux Derniers Jours d'Abdul-Hamid*, Paris, 1907, pp. 38off.; O. Remzi Kazancıgil, *Le Prince M. Sabaheddine: ses Idees, sa Carriere*, Paris, 1948; T. Z. Tunaya, "Jön Türk ve Sosyal İnkılâp Lideri Prens Sabahaddin," *Sosyal Hukuk ve İktisat Mecmuası*, November 1948, pp. 12off.; Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, pp. 81-99.

ness and thereby save it from disintegration and place it in a respectable position among the nations of the world.

The conservative Islamists preserved a certain measure of unity, while the modernists separated into two main branches: Westernists, *Garpcular*, and Nationalists, *Türkçüler*.⁴⁴

The Islamists (Pan-Islamists) were led by Prince Sait Halim, M. Şemseddin, Musa Kâzım and Hacı Fehim.⁴⁵ They believed that the Ottoman Empire's regression was caused by

⁴⁴ The best description of these currents was given by Ziya Gökalp in the introduction to his classic book on the subject. "There exist in our country," says Gökalp, "three cultural currents. One can see from studying history that our intellectuals first felt the need for modernization. This started during Selim III. After *Meşrutiyet*, modernization has been accepted by intellectuals as a basic principle and it does not have a publication. Each magazine and each newspaper promotes in varying degree this idea [modernization]. Islamization is promoted by the *Sıratı Müstakim, Sebülürreşad*, and turkification [nationalism] by the *Türk Yurdu*. See Ziya Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslâmlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, İstanbul, 1918. Gökalp purposely omitted the *İçtihat*, the all too well-known publication of the Westernists with whom he was on bad terms. *İçtihat* was started in Egypt in 1880 and continued to be published in the Republic until the 'thirties. On these currents of thought, see T. Z. Tunaya, *Anme Hukukumuz Bakımından İkinci Meşrutiyetin Fikir Cereyanları*, İstanbul, 1948, mimeographed; Peyami Safa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar*, İstanbul, 1938; Yusuf Akçora, *Üç Tarzı Siyaset*, İstanbul, 1938. Akçora discusses Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turanism as ways of saving the Empire. His paper was originally published in Cairo in 1903. See also Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, London, 1950, pp. 149ff.; Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, New York, 1957, pp. 85-153; P. Risal, "Les Turcs a la Recherche d'une Ame Nationale," *Mercure de France*, August 14, 1912, also "Les Courants Politiques dans la Turquie Contemporaine," *Revue du Monde Musulman*, September 1912; Tekin Alp, *Turkismus und Panturkismus*, Weimar, 1915 (translated by the English Admiralty as *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Idea*, London, 1917).

⁴⁵ On Islamists see Dwight E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan Islamism," *American Historical Review*, January 1942, pp. 278ff.; G. Wyman Burr, *Pan-Islam*, London, 1919; P. Risal, "Le Panislamisme et le Panturquisme," *Revue du Monde Musulman*, March 1913; Kerim K. Key, "Jamal Ad-Din al Afghani and the Muslim Reform Movement," *The Islamic Literature*, October 1951, pp. 5-10. Jamaledin Afghani received a cold reception in the Ottoman Empire from the orthodox Muslim clergy; Halide Edip, *Conflict of East and West*, pp. 53-54. On Islamists, see also Safa, *Türk*, pp. 57-60; Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 261ff.; Hostler, *Turkism*, pp. 93-96; Celal Nuri, *İttihadı İslam*, İstanbul, 1918; C. H. Beker, "Panislamismus," *Islamstudien II*, Leipzig, 1924-1932, pp. 231ff.

deviation from its original Islamic foundations. This deviation consisted in the acceptance of Western ideas and institutions alien to the spirit of the Empire. They believed that Islam was adaptable to science and progress, and possessed creativeness as demonstrated by the various civilizations it had engendered. The Islamists believed also that Islam comprised codes capable of regulating every level of social development, and they favored borrowing only the West's technology and utterly opposed Western cultural, religious, and social ideas, which they believed inferior to those of Islam. They claimed that a return to the doctrine of original Islam was the sole means of revitalizing the Empire. In support of their thesis the Islamists pointed to the fact that the Ottoman Empire reached its zenith in the days of its orthodox adherence to Islam. They advocated abolition of all cultural reforms so far introduced, including the modern schools, and strict enforcement of the *şeriat*, religious law. As firm believers in the universality of Islam, they opposed nationalism.

The Islamists eventually conglomerated in the Islamic Unity Party (*İttihadı Muhammedi*) in 1909,⁴⁶ and were able to foment the rebellion of April 13, 1909. The party was abolished after the Young Turks won control of the government.

The Westernists were headed by Abdullah Cevdet, Celal Nuri, Süleyman Nazif, Kılıçzâde Hakkı, and Ahmed Muhtar, all of whom were united on the general question of modernization, but who differed on Islam and on the extent to which the West should be used as a model.⁴⁷ The more extreme Westernists believed that in order to attain the West's level of development and gain its recognition and respect it

⁴⁶ Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 261-270.

⁴⁷ Tarık Z. Tunaya, *Anne, Hukukumuz Bakımından İkinci Meşrutiyetin Siyasi Tefekküründe "Garıçılık" Cereyanı*, İstanbul, 1949, also *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 167-171; Safa, *Türk*, pp. 15-65; *İçtihat*, 1913, Nos. 52, 62-69, 75, 78, 89 (some cited by Tunaya). A collection of this valuable publication can be found in the Hoover Library in Stanford.

was necessary to adopt Western models in all fields. They accepted the syncretic nature of past reforms as inevitable in any modernization movement and believed that syncretism resulted chiefly from the fact that modernization efforts had not been thoroughly carried out. To Westernists modernization was an inescapable necessity regardless of whether the Turks stayed in Europe or retired to Asia. However, they defended a selective adaptation of Western culture by respecting national values and trying to blend East and West harmoniously. The government implicitly acquired a major responsibility both in carrying out reforms and defending them against the old order. The Westernists, although anticlerical to varying extents, believed in Islam as a faith and in its universal values. They accepted Ottomanism as a fundamental political principle for knitting together a multinational state, and as a logical complement of Islam, on which the Empire was built and from which it drew its strength. Consequently, they opposed the nationalists who dreamt of remodeling the Empire on the basis of the Turkish national character, and this led to long controversy over the future ideology of the Empire.⁴⁸

The chief method of modernization advocated by Westernists was enlightenment through education, since ignorance was considered the source of all the evils which had befallen the Ottoman Empire. This education was to be directed towards establishing the causal relations of events and phenomena instead of accepting the supernatural and fatalism as an explanation. They proposed *Irfañ* (enlightenment) as substitute to the nationalist ideal of Turan (Pan-Turanism). As practical measures, the Westernists advocated a monogamous family, emancipation of women, civil courts replacing

⁴⁸ The outstanding controversy in this respect took place between Süleyman Nazif and Ahmed Agayef (Ağaoğlu) and concerned the relative priority of the "Muslim" over "Türk," *İçtihat*, 1912, No. 56 and 1915, Nos. 71-76; *Türk Yurdu*, 1913, pp. 600-837 passim (some cited in Safa, *Türk*, pp. 18-43 and Tunaya, *Amme*, pp. 26-28).

religious ones by adapting the European Civil Code, a Latin alphabet, and closure of sects and monasteries to prevent the perpetuation of fatalism; in the economic field they advocated a national economy, industrialization, and better road communications.⁴⁹

The third and most important ideology developed in the Young Turks' era was nationalism. It originated in literature and history, and had at the beginning a purely cultural character.⁵⁰ Gradually, under the impact of the struggle of the minorities in the Ottoman Empire for national independence, and as a Turkish counterpart to it, nationalism acquired political features. The literary and historical studies by foreigners and Turks provided the necessary arguments for advancing its claims.⁵¹

The evolution of nationalism in the Young Turks' period might be divided into several phases. During the years in opposition, that is from 1889 to 1908, Turkish nationalism was not expressly defended since the Christian minorities were supporting the Young Turks in the belief that eventual victory against the Sultan would result in their own national

⁴⁹ *İctihat*, 1912, Nos. 13-16, 48-58, 67; 1913, No. 64; 1914, No. 108 (some cited in Tunaya, p. 28. A. Cevdet hailed the educational reform in 1927, saying, "Here lies [in education] the source of the might and power of civilized and progressive nations." *İctihat*, November 1927 (Safa, *Türk*, pp. 51-57).

⁵⁰ On the beginnings of nationalism in Turkey, see Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, İstanbul, 1955, pp. 5-6; Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, London, 1950, pp. 28ff.; Hostler, *Turkism*, pp. 85-140 *passim*; Hans Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in the East*, London, 1929, pp. 222-265; Lewis V. Thomas, "Nationalism in Turkey," *Nationalism in the Middle East*, The Middle East Institute, Washington, 1952. Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey," *International Affairs*, xxviii, 1952, pp. 38ff., and "History Writing and National Revival in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, June-July, 1953, pp. 218ff. Adivar, "Interaction," pp. 125-127.

⁵¹ The chief publication was Leon Cahun's *Introduction a l'Histoire de l'Asie*, Paris, 1896, which supposedly was given to Dr. Nazım, one of the leaders of the Young Turks, by the French Consul in Salonica. Toynbee-Kirkwood, *Turkey*, pp. 56ff. A. J. Toynbee, *Turkey; a Past and a Future*, New York, 1917, pp. 16ff.; Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün*, pp. 6-7; Hostler, *Turkism*, p. 141.

independence. The Young Turks, therefore, saw no advantage in alienating the minorities by openly advocating Turkish nationalism. From 1908 to 1913, the Young Turks' theory of nationalism took clearer shape in the form of a centralized Ottoman state to be recast according to the Turkish national character and dominated by the ethnic Turks. This policy was implemented forcibly both in the Balkans, inhabited chiefly by the Christian minorities, and in Albania and the Near East, inhabited chiefly by Muslims.⁵² It caused upheavals in Albania and in Syria, and played a considerable part in inciting the Balkan War of 1913, in which the Ottoman Empire was defeated and suffered the loss of most of its Balkan territories. The nationalists, however, undeterred by this defeat, intensified their efforts aimed at assimilating the Muslim minorities in the Empire and at uniting all the Turks living abroad in one single country according to the ideals of Pan-Turanism or Pan-Turkism.⁵³ (The Ottoman Empire's entry into the first World War on the side of Germany was motivated, as is well known, in great part by the Young Turks' dream of acquiring territories inhabited by Turkic groups in Russia and the Balkans.)

Eventually the Pan-Turanism of the Young Turks, and their developing secularist views, stimulated further Arab nationalism. It also played considerable part in the Arabs' decision to support Great Britain in the first World War, in which Muslim Arabs fought the Muslim Turks, despite the fact that all of them, in theory at least, were part of one undivided Muslim world, and despite the Sultan-Caliph's *Cihad*, proclamation of holy war, addressed to all Muslims.⁵⁴

⁵² For this nationalist policy, see Colonel Leon Lamouche, *Türkiye Tarihi* (translated by Kemal Söylemezoğlu), İstanbul, 1943, pp. 430-431; Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi*, Vol. II, Part IV, Ankara, 1952, pp. 398ff., 413-424. For Tâlat Pasha's views on the nationalist policy of the Young Turks, see his posthumous memoirs, *Current History*, November 1921, pp. 287-295. A complete edition is, *Tâlat Paşanın Hatıraları*, İstanbul, 1946.

⁵³ See my chapter on nationalism in Part III for the difference between the two names.

⁵⁴ See George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, London, 1938, pp. 106ff.;

Nationalism proved stronger than religion. The Arab attitude in the first World War discredited further Pan-Islamism in Turkey and this in turn strengthened the position of the nationalists. The idea of Ottomanism had already lost its meaning in the Balkan War of 1913.

It is during this period that Ziya Gökalp (1875-1924) emerged as the theorist of nationalism and established a large following among the Turkish intellectuals.⁵⁵ The nation, according to Ziya Gökalp, could not be founded only on race, geography, political affinity or mere will power, but must chiefly be based on culture—namely a common language, religion, ethics, and arts. *Turan*, therefore, the great country of all the Turks, based on cultural affinity, was the ideal to strive for.

Gökalp found it necessary for Turkey to undertake a series of reforms with the purpose of giving her culture a distinctly national character and of moulding the governmental structure accordingly. The language of the country was to be the vernacular Turkish pronounced according to İstanbul usage. Legal reforms were necessary to enhance the formation of a national state. Gökalp strongly advocated secularism, this is, the separation of Islam from the government and its puri-

Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism*, Ithaca, 1956, pp. 49ff. The text of *Cihad* proclamation is in Ahmet Emin, *Turkey in the World War*, pp. 174-177; see also Hostler, *Turkism*, pp. 147ff.

⁵⁵ For studies on Gökalp's life and ideas see Heyd, *Foundations*, pp. 19-40, 43ff.; Hostler, *Turkism*, pp. 101-108, 141-143; Nuzhet A. Göksel, *Ziya Gökalp*, İstanbul, 1955; Z. F. Fındıkoğlu, *Ziya Gökalp*, İstanbul, 1955; Niyazi Berkes "Ziya Gökalp; His Contribution to Turkish Nationalism," *Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1954, pp. 375-390; Enver Behnan Şapolyo, *Ziya Gökalp İttihad ve Terakki ve Meşrutiyet Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1943; Kâzım Nami Duru, *Ziya Gökalp*, İstanbul, 1949; Jean Deny, "Zia Goeck Alp," *Revue du Monde Musulman*, LXI, 1925.

For bibliography, see Cavit Orhan Tütengil, *Ziya Gökalp Hakkında Bir Bibliyografya Denemesi*, İstanbul, 1949. For Gökalp's literary writings, see *Ziya Gökalp Külliyyatı*, I, *Şiirler ve Halk Masalları* (compiled by Fevziye Abdullah Tansel), Ankara, 1952. Gökalp's articles on nationalism, published chiefly in the *Yeni Mecmua* and *Küçük Mecmua*, were assembled in his *Türkçülüğün Esasları*.

fication of Oriental characteristics.⁵⁶ Moreover, he favored the abolition of the canonical laws and that of the Ministry of Pious Religious Foundations, since he considered law making and enforcement the sole privilege of the government. In education he favored a unified system instead of the dual *medrese-mektep* (old canonical and modern schools). However, Gökalp, aware of Islam's importance in Turkish history, and its place in everyday life, considered it an essential part of the individual's life.

In matters of political organization Gökalp was strongly affected by Durkheim's collectivist philosophy, which seemed to coincide with the Islamic tradition of fraternity and equality among believers. He had defended, until 1913, the idea of a multi-national state, but afterwards, accepting the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as inevitable, he advocated the one-nation state and applied Durkheim's ideas to it. The society of Durkheim became the nation of Gökalp. Society was the source of all ideas, the supreme moral authority, the highest ethical arbiter of conduct. The individual for Gökalp had only physical meaning; he served the purpose of the group, the community (*ümmet*). Gökalp denied the individual's freedom of will, for the individual unwittingly obeyed the ideals of his society. Individualism for Gökalp was a source of despair and frustration, the end of ethical principles.⁵⁷

Gökalp considered the intelligentsia to be the elite that provided leadership in the society, but he showed warm feeling towards the lower classes of Turkish society in their unspoiled, primitive purity. Gökalp condemned the feudal and aristocratic groups more for their wicked moral standards than because of their social or political status. His political views in fact were a modern re-definition of the long-practiced Ottoman theory of state and its adjustment to new conditions.

⁵⁶ Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 14, 18-19, 73-94, 97, 103-108, 114. Heyd, *Foundations*, pp. 53, 56, 57, 63ff., 88-90.

⁵⁷ Heyd, *ibid.*, pp. 55-56, 57.

Gökalp's ideas in essence provided even a stronger basis and justification for the omnipotence of the state.

Gökalp made a distinction between culture and civilization. The latter was considered material; he therefore favored introducing into the Ottoman Empire only the civilization of the West, even that only after the country had developed a national culture, so as not to endanger her own cultural characteristics.⁵⁸

Gökalp's ideas were motivated in major part by the practical consideration of combining into one the three existing currents: Islamism, Westernism, and nationalism, and thus, of providing a united ideological front around the Union and Progress Party, of whose omnipotent Central Committee he was a member. His constant strivings to re-define his ideology—and there are few points on which he maintained a definite line—stemmed from the need to adjust his ideas to the changing conditions in the Ottoman Empire.

Ziya Gökalp's disciples inside and outside the ruling Union and Progress Party expanded swiftly to include some of the most prominent intellectuals of the time—Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Yusuf Akçora, M. Fuad (Köprülü), Halide Edip (Adıvar) Mehmed Emin, Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), Akil Muhtar, Hüseyinzade Ali, Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver).

The associations, *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland, 1911), and especially the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths, 1912), were established for the purpose of disseminating the nationalist concepts and of transforming ultimately the Ottoman Empire into a Turkish state.⁵⁹ (The *Türk Ocakları* were converted during 1930-1931 into Peoples House, and in 1949 were reestablished as private associations to disseminate a new type of nationalism.) The nationalists opposed the Islamists and the Westernists with whom they differed on the question

⁵⁸ Gökalp, *Türkleşmek*, pp. 34-35; Heyd, *ibid.*, pp. 70-81.

⁵⁹ Tunaya, *Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 378, 383; Yusuf Akçora, *Türk Yılı*, 1928, İstanbul, 1928, pp. 434-455.

of Islam and Ottomanism, as well as the internationalist, humanist currents, the latter being symbolized by the poet Tevfik Fikret.⁶⁰ Yet all this time nationalism was not officially recognized and Ottomanism remained the state ideology.

As the nationalists gained a strong foothold in the government, their position on modernization became clearer. Secularism was evolving into a fundamental policy in implementing modernization, while the reservations regarding the adoption of Western culture seemed to assume less importance. This secularist attitude which became evident in the Union and Progress Conventions from 1916 to 1918, reflected in a way the relation of nationalism to the other two major theories. The war had liquidated the Islamists as a political power, and greatly weakened the Westernists by depriving them of two of their central ideas, Ottomanism and Islam as the foundations of the Empire. The Westernists' ideas on modernization, however, were incorporated in nationalism and partly implemented. Thus, when the first World War ended, nationalism was the only ideology in existence, and the events ensuing after 1918 left no alternative but to extend it further by cleansing it of its Pan-Turanic features.

The Pan-Turanism of the Young Turks was in great part stimulated by refugees from Russia, and in a way was a replica of the Pan-Slavism of the Czars. And this accidental ideological analogy between the Ottoman Empire and Russia can be expanded to other currents. The Russian Slavophiles' ideas could be matched against the Islamists of the Ottoman Empire, while the Russian Westernists had their counterpart

⁶⁰ Tevfik Fikret was attacked both by nationalists and Islamists because of his condemnation of the injustice in the Ottoman Empire. *Tarihi Kadim* (Ancient History) was the most outspoken poem against the old order. For a dialectical interpretation of Tevfik Fikret, see Sabiha Sertel, *Tevfik Fikret, İdeolojisi ve Felsefesi*, İstanbul, 1946, pp. 2ff. For a translation of Fikret's mentioned poem, see Allen, *Transformation*, pp. 36-37. For a more recent nationalist attack on Fikret's ideas, see Çınaraltı, July 24, 1943, pp. 8, 14; for a more objective view see, Yaşar Nabi, *Tevfik Fikret*, İstanbul, 1957.

in the Ottoman Empire.⁶¹ The explanation may lie in the fact that both Empires had a similar composition, such as a multi-national, multi-religious, relatively backward social structure and an autocratic monarch ruling. The modernization of Russia, however, started earlier and was closely supplemented by a similar movement in the economic and social fields, which disrupted the old order by giving birth to a new intellectual class, the *raznotchinsky*, who provided the basis for future political movements. Gradually social thought gained preponderance in Russia and her modernization developed accordingly.

In the Ottoman Empire modernization efforts were restricted in the main to a small intellectual group without reaching the masses, and therefore limited to cultural reforms. After the war of 1905, the modernist Westernists of Russia were eventually superseded and their theories absorbed and reinterpreted by the socialists, while in Turkey it was the nationalists who did the same after 1908. In both countries therefore, the liberal Westernists were not successful, although in Turkey their influence was greater and their ideals partly preserved.

The Young Turks of the Union and Progress Party have been condemned in the Republic for two major faults: their entry into and subsequent loss of the war, and the authoritarian government established after 1911, at the expense of other political parties and individual freedom. The condemnation has been so strong that it has obscured some of the more constructive aspects of the Young Turks' government.

The ideal of the Union and Progress Party immediately

⁶¹ It may be added that the French philosopher Auguste Comte predicted that the most striking changes in the old order would start in Turkey and Russia. On Russian thinkers, see Alexander Herzen, *La Russie et l'Occident*, Paris, 1946, pp. 80ff.; V. V. Zenkovskii, *Russian Thinkers and Europe*, Ann Arbor, 1953, pp. 46ff.; Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Modern Russia*, New Brunswick, 1955, pp. 91, 104, 123; Richard Hare, *Pioneers of Russian Social Thought*, London, 1951. For similarities between Peter the Great and Mahmud II, see footnote 16.

after 1908 was to establish a parliamentary democracy on the Western model. It may be said that until about 1910, the Ottoman Parliament functioned on a relatively free basis. It failed to continue to function on that basis, chiefly because of the impossibility of reconciling the nationalistic aspirations of the minorities with the Union and Progress' own nationalist policy. Moreover the liberal, multi-party system envisaged by the Young Turks could hardly be established on the semi-primitive and undifferentiated social structure of the Ottoman Empire.

Yet, the Young Turks' ideas and attempts at modernization after 1913, and especially during the war years, set the foundation for a policy which was resumed, with many amendments, of course, in the Republic, although the Young Turks received little credit for it. The Young Turks' reforms, minor though they were, represented the breaking of new ground. Thus, domestic legal cases were removed from the jurisdiction of religious courts and were passed to civil ones. In fact, the Ministry of Justice undertook full responsibility for deciding judicial matters. Restrictions were imposed on polygamy which in fact rendered it impracticable. Women were admitted to medical and liberal arts schools, and books were written on women's emancipation. Secular schools were freed from ecclesiastical control. The Koran and certain prayers were translated into Turkish.

The idea of language reform had developed during this time, and Ali Canip and Ömer Seyfeddin had already published their works in the *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens) of Salonica in the vernacular Turkish, and had defended the language reform.⁶² Western masterpieces of literature were also translated (this program was resumed in 1941 in the Republic), and art, literature, philosophy, and daily publications showed a considerable increase. Cultural institutions,

⁶² Gökalp reports that J. Afghani urged the poet Mehmet Emin to write patriotic poems in vernacular Turkish. Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, p. 6.

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such as a national library, archives, and musical and geographical institutes were established. The calendar had been changed through adoption of the Western one so far as the months were concerned (the solar instead of the lunar month). Even a partial dress reform was introduced through adoption of a special military hat called *enveriye*.

In the economic field, the Union and Progress Party passed a resolution in 1914 to abolish the capitulations. It established a national bank to finance economic development and encourage the formation of cooperatives. The Party urged youngsters to enter productive professions and tried to promote, sometimes through unorthodox means, the business firms of ethnic Turks.⁶³ The Young Turks also provided an excellent experiment for the future leaders of Republican Turkey, which served not only as a school for political training but also as a testing ground for ideas and issues.

The Young Turks' greatest political contribution, paradoxically enough, lies in the field in which they failed most completely: freedom. Their idea of a multi-party, liberal democracy has been passed on to the coming generations. That freedom in all fields which was created by the Young Turks in the first six months of their domination remains well entrenched in public memory and has served as inspiration for the struggle for freedom and democracy in Turkey.

⁶³ On the reforms introduced by the Union and Progress, see Gökalp, *ibid.*, pp. 8ff.; Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 202-206; A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, Vol. 1, London, 1927, pp. 69-71; Ahmet Emin, *Turkey*, pp. 168-173; Safa, *Türk*, pp. 54ff.

CHAPTER 2

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPUBLIC

THE defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the first World War was sealed in the Mudros Armistice signed on October 30, 1918.¹ Two weeks later an Allied fleet of sixty vessels disembarked troops in Istanbul under the pretext of fighting the Bolsheviks in Russia but actually with the purpose of enforcing the secret Allied agreement for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.²

Events developed in fast succession. Venizelos, the Greek delegate, presented the Paris Peace Conference in February 1919 with a claim for the possession of İzmir (Smyrna). On May 15, 1919, a Greek division landed in that city in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, supposedly to assure the security of the Allied forces in Turkey but actually to take possession of that city as compensation for Greece's participation in the war, and for helping Great Britain establish spheres of influence in Turkey in the face of French and Italian competition. The landing of Greek troops in İzmir aroused immediate resentment throughout Turkey. Various incidents in İzmir in which the local population was fired upon and maltreated, added to the resentment.

A few days later, on May 19, 1919, Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) landed at Samsun in northern Anatolia as the Inspector-General of the Third Army. This date marked the

¹ *Tarih*, iv, İstanbul, 1931, p. 13.

² For background information on these agreements, see *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (ed. by H. W. V. Temperley), Vol. vi, British Institute of International Affairs, London, 1924, pp. 1-80; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 48ff.; also A. J. Toynbee, *Nationality and the War*, London, 1915, pp. 379-433, and *The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks*, London, 1917, pp. 29-32.

opening of a new chapter in the history of Turkey,³ and the initial stage of the country's division into two camps: The Sultan and his government in İstanbul cooperating with the Allies and interested chiefly in the monarchy's survival, and Mustafa Kemal and his followers in Anatolia striving to preserve territorial integrity and national independence.

After the Mudros Armistice, intense political activity had developed in İstanbul and Anatolia.⁴ Local groups in Thrace and Anatolia, many of them members of the Union and Progress Party that dissolved in 1918, established a number of patriotic organizations,⁵ known in general as the *Müdafaa-i*

³ On these events, see *A speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal* (hereafter cited as *Speech*), Leipzig, 1929, pp. 9ff. For data on events in this chapter, see the outstanding chronology of Gotthard Jäschke originally published in German in *Die Welt des Islams*, I, 1918-1928; II, 1929; III, 1930; IV, 1931-1932, Vols. 10, 12, and 15; V, 1933-1934; also in *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin*, XXXVIII, 1935; (in collaboration with Erich Pritsch) *Die Türkei seit dem Weltkrieg; Geschichtskalender, 1918-1928*, Berlin, 1929; also *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1935-1941*, Leipzig, 1943. See also the Turkish translation of the chronology, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, İstanbul, 1939; Enver Ziya Karal, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1944; Gaston Gaillard, *The Turks and Europe*, London, 1921, pp. 151-271, 290-369 *passim*. *Tarih*, pp. 27-39; Donald E. Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk*, Philadelphia, 1939; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 54ff. On Greece's action in Anatolia, see A. A. Pallis, *Greece's Anatolian Venture*, London, 1937; A. J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, New York, 1922.

⁴ In İstanbul a number of political parties and associations were established, some with nationalistic purposes, others cooperating with the Sultan. The major organizations in İstanbul were the following: *Selâmeti Amme Heyeti* (Committee of Public Safety), *Radikal Avam* (Peoples' Radical), *Osmanlı Hürriyetperver Avam* (Ottoman Peoples' Freedom), *Teceddüt* (Renaissance), *Osmanlı Sulh ve Selâmet* (Ottoman Peace and Safety), *Milli Kongre* (National Convention), *Ahali İktisat* (Peoples' Economic), *Sosyal Demokrat* (Social Democratic), *Vahdeti Milliye Heyeti* (National Unity Committee), *Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti* (Kurdish Advancement Association), *Milli Ahrar* (National Liberal), *İngiliz Muhipleri* (Friends of England), *Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist* (Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist—information on this party is to be found also in the chapter on communism), *Milli Türk* (National Turkish), *Vilson Prensipleri* (Wilsonian Principles), *Osmanlı Mesai* (Ottoman Labor), *Türkiye Sosyalist* (Turkish Socialist) parties. For a complete list, see Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 405-470, 539; also, *Speech*, pp. 12-14.

⁵ The Associations in Thrace-Pashaeli, İzmir, and Kilikaya were established toward the end of 1918. Tunaya, *Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 478-

Hukuk Cemiyetleri (Associations for the Defense of Rights), for the purpose of preserving national independence.⁶

Mustafa Kemal had established contact with some of these organizations before he left for Anatolia in May 1919, and as soon as he arrived there he proceeded to meet the local leaders and confer on the course of action to be followed. He had also secured a promise of assistance on the part of the army commanders in Anatolia, such as Kâzım Karabekir and Ali Fuad Pasha (later Cebesoy), while his two good friends in the Ministry of War in İstanbul, İsmet (later İnönü) and Fevzi (later Marshal Çakmak), kept him informed of the situation in the capital.

The Sultan's government in İstanbul meanwhile had become disturbed by Mustafa Kemal's activities in Anatolia and recalled him, but instead of obeying the order, he resigned from the army on July 8, 1919 and continued his work of establishing a common front to oppose foreign occupation and the partition of the country.

These activities eventually resulted in two major conventions—July 23 to August 7, 1919 in Erzurum and September 4-11, 1919 in Sivas⁷—which set forth the basic concepts of the Liberation Movement. According to these ideas, to be known as the *Milli Misak* (National Pact), the country

485; *Speech*, pp. 10-11. *Tarih* mentions the date of establishment as September 7, 1919 (p. 349).

⁶ The *Müdafaâ-i Hukuk Cemiyeti* (Association for the Defense of Rights) had for its purpose self-defense against foreign occupation, opposition to territorial secession and preservation of individual rights. By 1920 all the individual associations were merged into two large ones—the *Trakya Paşaeli* (Thrace Pashaeli) in the West, and the *Erzurum ve Şark Vilâyetleri Mudafaâ-i Hukuk Cemiyeti* (Association for the Defense of Rights of Erzurum and Eastern Provinces) in the East—and then into a single one. The Associations rejected partisanship and decided to work in unity for the common goal. See *Speech*, pp. 10, 31, 34-45; Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, p. 474; *Tarih*, pp. 38-39.

⁷ For these conventions see *Speech*, pp. 57ff.; *Tarih*, pp. 35-38; Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 56; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 79ff. For the text of the National Pact as accepted by the Ottoman House of Deputies, see J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, Vol. II, Princeton, 1956, pp. 74-75; Toynbee, *The Western Question*, p. 209-210.

was considered an indivisible whole opposed to foreign occupation. If the government in İstanbul failed to maintain the nation's independence, then a government elected by a National Congress would proceed to bring together the national forces and strive to preserve the country's sovereignty. Consequently, any policy such as accepting foreign mandates, giving special privileges to Christian minorities, or establishing political parties, which was likely to undermine national sovereignty, solidarity, or integration was rejected.⁸ Moreover, a message was sent to the İstanbul government asking for the immediate convening of the House of Deputies, but instead the Sultan concluded a secret agreement with the British accepting their mandate over Turkey.

The election for the House of Deputies in İstanbul was held, nevertheless, in Anatolia in the autumn of 1919, supposedly under the auspices of the İstanbul Government, but actually under the control of the Defense Associations. The deputies convened on January 12, 1920,⁹ and sixteen days later passed a resolution accepting the National Pact.

On March 16, 1920, İstanbul was occupied by Allied troops. This action swept aside whatever doubts uncommitted Turks might have had as to the Allies' ultimate purpose, and led the former fully to support Mustafa Kemal who, without wavering in the face of the İstanbul government's maneuvers, had continued to organize the national forces in Anatolia.¹⁰

The House of Deputies in İstanbul was eventually abolished by the Sultan on April 11, 1920, after the Allies had seized some nationalist deputies, journalists and intellectuals and exiled them to the island of Malta. The same day, Şeyhülislam (Counsel on religious matters) Durrizade Abdullah issued a *fetva* (Canonic opinion distributed by enemy planes all over Anatolia),¹¹ denouncing Mustafa Kemal and his nationalists

⁸ *Speech*, p. 58; *Tarih*, pp. 36-37; Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 56.

⁹ *Tarih*, p. 44, says January 12, 1919, an obvious printing error.

¹⁰ Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 81-82; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 58, 59.

¹¹ For the *fetva*, see Gotthard Jäschke, "Nationalismus und Religion im

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as bandits and declaring that it was permissible to kill them; and the Sultan started to assemble troops (the Caliphate Army) "to stamp out the rebellion."¹² The nationalists in Anatolia, however, were undeterred by the Sultan's decision and continued their efforts to establish a representative body of their own. Following a proclamation issued by Mustafa Kemal on March 19, 1920, the Grand National Assembly convened on April 23, 1920 in Ankara with the purpose, as stated by Mustafa Kemal in a telegram of April 21, 1920, sent to army corps and *vilayets* (provinces), of "securing the independence of the country and the deliverance of the seat of the Caliphate and Sultanate from the hands of our enemies."¹³

The National Assembly, composed of people of all ideological tendencies, opened with prayers in a most elaborate fashion, and a *fetva* was issued by the *mufti* (canon lawyer) of Ankara and endorsed by 152 other *muftis* from Anatolia calling on the Muslim population to do all to liberate the Caliph from captivity.¹⁴

Thus a unique situation had developed. On one side there was the National Assembly which aimed at securing national independence, and at preserving the Sultanate-Caliphate as part of this broad nationalist objective. On the other side there was the Sultan-Caliph who, a virtual prisoner of the Allies in Istanbul and motivated by dynastic interests, had estranged himself from public sentiment by condemning the nationalists. (Later, on May 11, 1920, the Istanbul government condemned Mustafa Kemal, *in absentia*, to death.) It was this situation which considerably undermined the monarch's prestige and, as pointed out by Professor Rustow, "did permanent damage to the status of organized religion in Turkey."¹⁵

türkischen Befreiungskriege," *Die Welt des Islams*, XVIII, 1936, p. 63. Also see Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 60; *Tarih*, pp. 6ff.

¹² Dankwart A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955," *Islam and the West*, p. 75.

¹³ *Speech*, pp. 364-366, 373.

¹⁴ Rustow, "Politics," p. 76.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

The National Assembly acted on the assumption of being the depository of national sovereignty and the only spokesman for Turkey and the Turkish people. Through a Tribunal of Independence it consequently declared null and void all the treaties, agreements, and conventions concluded by the Istanbul government after March 16, 1920.¹⁶

Meanwhile on June 22, 1920, the Greek troops started their march into Anatolia to liquidate the nationalist movement, and also indirectly to force the Sultan's government, which was wavering in expectation of a nationalist victory, to a peace treaty on Allied terms. The Greek advance into Anatolia was temporarily stopped in 1921 by the nationalists with the assistance of troops from the eastern part of the country, who after having defeated the Armenians there and forced them to sign a peace treaty, were moved to the western front.

The Sultan's government, nevertheless, had signed the Treaty of Sevres with the Allies on August 10, 1920. This treaty in fact reduced Turkey to the area around Istanbul and to northern Anatolia.¹⁷ The Nationalist government on the other hand concluded an agreement with the Soviets (August 24, 1920) which opened the way to Russian-Turkish collaboration and which was fruitful to both parties temporarily united against the same enemy: the West.¹⁸

Concomitant with the developments on the military and diplomatic fronts important events took place within the National Assembly. Mustafa Kemal submitted to the National Assembly a draft of a Constitutional Act and a national policy program which defined the nature and functions of that body. This in fact was an attempt to define the country's future regime and, as might be expected, gave rise to controversy

¹⁶ *Speech*, pp. 382ff.; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 86ff.

¹⁷ See *Tarih*, pp. 64-66. For the political clauses of the Treaty and the Tripartite Agreement, see Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 81-89.

¹⁸ See *Tarih*, pp. 60ff. For the relations of Mustafa Kemal's government with Russia, see Chapter 14. Meanwhile a Kurdish revolt in Anatolia, and Çerkes Ethem's military group, which first supported Mustafa Kemal then turned to support the Greeks, were liquidated.

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within the National Assembly, for the conservatives had sensed the beginning of a policy which could have led to abolition of the Sultanate. The Constitutional Act was adopted on January 20, 1921.¹⁹ According to the Act, sovereignty belonged unconditionally to the nation, all powers being concentrated in the National Assembly which administered the Turkish State. It then enumerated the powers of the National Assembly and the manner in which elections (every two years) were to be held. The Act also empowered the National Assembly to enforce the ordinance of sacred law, this clause in fact substituting the Assembly for the Caliphate.

After the adoption of the Act the relative unity within the Assembly was disrupted and several groups were formed, each with its own program and viewpoint,²⁰ but divided chiefly into modernists and conservatives. It is at this stage that Mustafa Kemal formed his own group in the Assembly and named it the Party for Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia. This group, while pledging itself to fulfill the aims set forth in the National Pact, had also included in its program a phrase inviting suspicion: "The party will henceforward exert its efforts within the compass of the Constitutional Act for the purpose of preparing and defining as far as possible the organization of the State and Nation."²¹ Kâzım Karabekir, the hero of the eastern front, expressed concern that some members in the Assembly (Mustafa Kemal's group) appeared intent on effecting a change of regime, and stressed the fact that among the people there was only an "infinitesimal minority who supported the new conceptions of organization" and advised that proper consultations be held before any drastic organizational changes were initiated.²² His fears were well

¹⁹ *Speech*, pp. 477-478. Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 64-65.

²⁰ *Speech*, pp. 503-504. Raif Efendi of Erzurum had already changed the name of his Defense of Rights Associations into the Union for the Salvation of the Sanctuaries. It was primarily opposed to the establishment of the Republic.

²¹ *Speech*, p. 504.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 505-506.

founded. The Assembly in fact was subjected to an as yet latent but steadily developing struggle between the modernist group, clearly aiming towards a Republican regime, and the conservatives,²³ in favor of maintaining the monarchy. (The Constitutional Act of 1921, as Mustafa Kemal remarked later, was in fact the proclamation of the Republic.)²⁴

Meanwhile, the Greek troops who had been halted resumed their march into Anatolia and the Turkish forces deliberately retreated into the interior in order to lengthen the Greek lines of communication. Mustafa Kemal became the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and the National Assembly, momentarily united by the imminent danger, vested him with dictatorial powers to mobilize all available material and human resources in order to oppose the advancing Greek Army. Mustafa Kemal eventually inflicted a heavy defeat upon the Greeks at the battle of Sakarya, which lasted from August 23, to September 13, 1921, and the National Assembly in gratitude gave him on behalf of the Turkish people the name of *Gazi* (Hero). By the end of September 1922 the Greek troops were definitely beaten and forced to evacuate Turkey. Mustafa Kemal's prestige was higher than ever. On October 11, 1922 an armistice between Turkey and Greece was signed in Mudanya, and encompassed, in the main, Turkey's present-day boundaries.²⁵

The victory of the nationalists in Anatolia rendered meaningless the Treaty of Sevres signed in 1920, and necessitated a revised international agreement in the light of the new situation. The Allies therefore issued on October 28, 1922 an invitation to the Ankara and Istanbul governments to attend a peace conference at Lausanne. The Sultan's government

²³ For the Assembly's composition at that period, see Rustow, "Politics," pp. 73ff.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

²⁵ *Speech*, pp. 513-568. On the military campaign, see *Tarih*, pp. 56-133; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 65-69; see also Halide Edip (Adivar) *The Turkish Ordeal*, New York, 1928; Ali Fuad Cebesoy, *Milli Mücadele Hatıraları*, 2 vols., İstanbul, 1953, 1956.

quickly accepted and advanced the viewpoint that, since victory had been secured, the division of the nation into two governments—Ankara, Istanbul—had to end, and that a common line of action should be devised at the Lausanne Conference and thereafter. A considerable number of deputies in Ankara and a part of the press in Istanbul had been rather unhappy over the conflict between Mustafa Kemal and the Sultan-Caliph. They welcomed this opportunity to heal the breach and give to the Ankara government a *de jure* status in the eyes of the Sultan.²⁶ Had such a rapprochement taken place at this time, the Sultan-Caliph would have consolidated his position to the detriment of the Grand National Assembly. Mustafa Kemal liquidated the menace in a radical manner by abolishing the Sultanate on November 1, 1922. The Caliphate was retained and a new Caliph, Abdulmecid, replaced Sultan Mehmed V (Vahdettin, 1918-1922).²⁷

The Lausanne Conference convened on November 22, 1922, and Turkey's only representation was a nationalist delegation headed by Ismet Pasha. The Conference concluded its sessions, after an interval of several months, on July 24, 1923, by settling the main disputes between Turkey and the Allies, including Greece. The agreements reached in the first phase of the Conference established the boundaries and decided on an exchange of population between Turkey and Greece; during the second phase agreements were reached between Turkey and the Allies to demilitarize the Turkish Straits; the question of navigation in the Straits was settled later in a final convention at Montreux. The capitulations were abolished,²⁸

²⁶ *Speech*, pp. 573-576.

²⁷ *Tarih*, pp. 124ff. Toynbee-Kirkwood, *Turkey*, pp. 149-162. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 70. At the investiture of the new Caliph prayers were said in Turkish instead of Arabic. It symbolized the fact that the state rested upon Turkish nationality. Toynbee-Kirkwood, *op.cit.*, p. 152. A foreign observer remarked afterwards, "Turkey has become a republic in all but name." Clair Price, "The New Turkey," *Current History*, December 1922, p. 457.

²⁸ See L. E. Thayer, "Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the

and Turkey agreed to assume part of the Ottoman debt. Foreign troops were to evacuate Turkish soil within six weeks; and the southern boundary of Turkey bordering Iraq was to be settled later with Great Britain.²⁹

While peace negotiations were being conducted in Lausanne some important political developments took place in the country itself, which ultimately were to solve the paradox that had resulted from the abolition of the Sultanate. Indeed the country had now a religious head, the Caliph, whereas the political power resided in the National Assembly. The alternatives were either to proceed and bring political developments to their logical conclusion and formally establish the Republic, or to revert to the old system and reinvest the Caliph with temporal powers, or separate the religious and temporal powers by placing the Caliph in charge of the first and the government in the charge of the second. The third alternative, however, seemed an impossible task because of lack of precedent in the Muslim world, the very nature of the Caliphate itself which did not conceive such a separation, and because of strong opposition among some conservatives in the National Assembly who considered the government and the Caliphate inseparable.³⁰ The National Assembly itself

Question of Their Abrogation as it Affects the United States," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 17, 1923, pp. 207ff.; Toynbee-Kirkwood, *Turkey*, pp. 136-148.

²⁹ On the Lausanne Conference see, *League of Nations Treaty Series*, xxviii, 1924, pp. 11ff.; Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne," *The Diplomats 1919-1939* (ed. by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert), Princeton, 1953, pp. 199-209; Roderic H. Davison, "Middle East Nationalism: Lausanne Thirty Years After," *The Middle East Journal*, Summer 1953, pp. 324-348; Joseph Clark Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years*, Vol. 1, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 475-526, 527-585; Yusuf H. Bayur, *Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti*, İstanbul, 1938, pp. 119ff.; *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923*, London, 1923; *Speech*, pp. 607-639; *Tarih*, pp. 125-130; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 73-74. See also, *Current History*, January, February, March 1923, pp. 531-535, 749-757, 929-930, respectively. On the dispute on the southern border of Turkey, see Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, pp. 511-531.

³⁰ *Speech*, p. 588; Rustow, "Politics," pp. 78-79.

seemed in no mood to undertake radical decisions. It was obvious that no further political reforms could be envisaged without an Assembly more receptive to changes and without some control over it to bring about a unity of views. Consequently the National Assembly was induced to dissolve itself on April 1, 1923, and submit to new elections—supposedly to face the Allies at Lausanne with a government which had a fresh mandate from the Turkish people and represented their current views. The election campaign which followed was dominated by Mustafa Kemal's group in the Assembly known as the Association for the Defense of Rights. Mustafa Kemal issued a nine-point election platform on April 8, 1923 in which he proposed to transform the Defense Association into a political party. The platform also included a declaration to the effect that the Caliphate, dependent on the National Assembly, was a lofty institution of the Muslim World.³¹

The elections returned to the Assembly a large body of deputies (one deputy elected for every 20,000 people instead of 50,000 as in the past), most of whom were generally in agreement with Mustafa Kemal.

The new Assembly convened on August 11, 1923, and Fethi Bey (Okyar) replaced Rauf Bey (Orbay) as Premier, the latter being a supporter of the Caliphate. Meanwhile on October 13, 1923, Ismet Pasha introduced a bill into the Assembly which moved the capital of Turkey from İstanbul to Ankara. This action, besides symbolizing the resurgence of the new Turkey, had the practical purposes of providing a central defensible location for the government and of keeping the National Assembly away from İstanbul, where a good part of the press and the public were in favor of the Caliph.

Fethi Bey, the Premier, resigned on October 27, 1923, following Mustafa Kemal's plan to precipitate a political crisis, and for two days no Cabinet could be formed. Mustafa Kemal

³¹ For the text of this platform see Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 580-582; on the formation of the party see Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 103ff.; also *Speech*, pp. 598ff.; and my section on the People's Party in Chapter 15.

explained to the Assembly that the difficulty lay in the Constitution, which did not properly regulate the relations between the Legislature and the Executive. He therefore proposed an amendment to the Constitution having the effect of declaring Turkey a Republic headed by a President to be elected by the National Assembly. The President would choose the Premier and could preside over the Assembly and the Cabinet if he so wished. The Assembly would approve the Premier and his Cabinet. The Assembly accepted the amendment on October 29, 1923, and Turkey became a Republic with Mustafa Kemal its President and Ismet Pasha its first Premier.³²

The establishment of the Republic had defined more clearly the positions of two major groups in the country and in the Assembly; the conservatives who rallied around the Caliphate,³³ and the modernists headed by Mustafa Kemal, controlling the Assembly and the government,³⁴ and aware of the fact that the Caliphate was a constant menace to their own power.³⁵ Mustafa Kemal, therefore, turned against the Caliphate, and after a preliminary campaign in which he questioned the historical origin and contemporary value of this institution in respect to Turkey, he abolished it on March 3, 1924, and expelled the Caliph from Turkey.³⁶

The decision to abolish the Caliphate, however, connoted a much more profound cultural and historical significance

³² On these points see *Speech*, pp. 642-643, 644-657ff.; *Tarih*, pp. 145ff.; Toynbee-Kirkwood, *Turkey*, pp. 157ff.; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 104-105; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 76-79.

³³ On the views of the conservatives, see excerpts from newspapers in Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 607; *Speech*, pp. 668ff.

³⁴ For Mustafa Kemal's attitude on this duality and the arguments in favor of abolishing the Caliphate a few months before the decision was taken, see Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, Norman (Oklahoma), 1956, pp. 136-141.

³⁵ Rustow, "Politics," pp. 78-79.

³⁶ *Speech*, pp. 684-685; *Tarih*, pp. 156-162; see also İnönü's *Speech, İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, Vol. 1, İstanbul, 1946, pp. 87-93; Toynbee-Kirkwood, *Turkey*, pp. 163-164, 177. For a dramatic description of the expulsion, see *Tarih Dünyası*, April 15, 1950, pp. 22ff.

than its apparent political purpose. It was the victory of the secular-modernists over the conservative-religious in a struggle which had started as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, a victory made possible only by the favorable political position of the secular-modernist group from 1920 to 1924.

The abolition of the Caliphate removed, in the eyes of the modernists, the major obstacle to Turkey's secularization, and hence, modernization. The far reaching cultural importance attached to abolition of the Caliphate is attested by the fact that the National Assembly decided the same day to replace the Ministry of *Şeriat* (Religious Law) and *Evkaf* (Pious Foundation) by a *Diyanet İşleri* (Directorate of Religious Affairs) under the Premier's office, and to unify all educational institutions into one single modern system under the Ministry of Education.³⁷ On April 8, 1924, the religious courts were abolished.

³⁷ Few topics concerned with Turkey have been studied as profoundly as religion and secularism. The main works in this respect are the following: Gotthard Jäschke, "Der Islam in der neuen Türkei," *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol. 1, 1951, pp. 1-174. A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, London, 1927, Vol. 1, pp. 25-90, 572-575. Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, VIII, 1954, pp. 267-282; also "The Religious Life of Modern Turkish Muslims," *Islam and the West* (ed. by Richard N. Frye), The Hague, 1957, pp. 108-148; also "Secularism and Islam in Turkish Politics," *Current History*, June 1957, pp. 333-338. H. A. Reed's additional articles on religion in Turkey are cited in the section on present day secularism in Turkey. See also, Rustow, "Politics," pp. 69-107. Niyazi Berkes, "Historical Background of Turkish Secularism," *Islam and the West*, pp. 41-68. Lewis V. Thomas, "Recent Developments in Turkish Islam," *Middle East Journal*, VI, 1952, pp. 22-40; also "Turkish Islam," *Muslim World*, XLIV, 1954, pp. 181-185. Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey," *International Affairs*, XXVIII, 1952, pp. 38-48. Uriel Heyd, "Islam in Modern Turkey," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, XXXIV, 1947, pp. 299-308. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "Modern Turkey: Islamic Reformation?," *Islamic Culture*, xv, xvi, Parts 1 and 11, January 1951, 1952, respectively; also *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton, 1957, which contains valuable analysis on the secularism of Turkey. John Kingsley Birge, "Islam in Modern Turkey," *Islam in the Modern World* (ed. by D. S. Franck) Washington, 1951, pp. 41-46; also "Secularism in Turkey and its Meaning," *International Review of Missions*, October 1944, pp. 426-432. For Turkish views on the subject, see Ali Fuad Başgil, *Din Ve Lâiklik*, İstanbul, 1955; Bülent Daver, *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde*

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On April 20, 1924, the National Assembly adopted a new Constitution, which with certain amendments mentioned later, is still in force.³⁸ The Constitution incorporated the principles of the Constitutional Act of 1921 and its subsequent amendments, and defined the regime and its functions in more elaborate fashion. The fundamental principle behind it was the concentration of all three government powers in the one-house National Assembly, which was to be elected by indirect vote. The Constitution also accepted Islam as the state religion.

The two major reforms, the establishment of the Republic and the abolition of the Caliphate, accomplished within a six months' span, represented a basic departure from Mustafa Kemal's initial apparent pro-Islamist-monarchist attitude in 1919-1921, and indicated a definite reorientation towards secularism, that is, a new cultural-political philosophy differing fundamentally from the theocratic foundations on which the Turkish State had stood since its inception at the end of the thirteenth century.

The deeply felt reaction to this secularist reform was aggravated by the bad economic conditions in the country and the government's restrictive measures on foreign commerce. The discontent was expressed in the National Assembly in the form of bitter criticism of the (People's) Republican Party, and of Ismet Pasha, the Premier; Mustafa Kemal's popularity, prestige and power still protected him from open criticism. Dissension in the Republican Party followed and some

Lâiklik, Ankara, 1955. *Lâiklik* (a publication of the Türk Devrim Ocakları) includes 19 articles on the subject, İstanbul, 1954; Nazım Poyraz, *Lâiklik Hakkında*, İstanbul, 1951, N. A. Kansu, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1931. Ihsan Sungu, "Tevhidi Tedrisat," *Belleten* Nos. 7-8, 1938, pp. 397-431. Bahri Savcı "Lâiklik Prensipleri Karşısında Öğretim ve Öğrenim Hürriyeti," *Siyasal Bilgiler Okulu Dergisi*, 11, 1947, pp. 277-294.

³⁸ For the early texts, see E. M. Earle, "The New Constitution of Turkey," *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1925, pp. 73-100; Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, p. 67. For amendments see Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, App. D., pp. 297-306; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 197-208, 209-210. (Lewis omitted populism as the sixth principle of the regime in Article 2 of the Constitution.)

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prominent members resigned. Kâzım Karabekir and Ali Fuad (Cebesoy)—who had resigned their military inspectorates and returned to the Assembly—Rauf (Orbay), Adnan (Adıvar), Refet Pasha, İsmail Canbulat, and some other deputies finally organized themselves in a political party, *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Progressive Republican Party), on November 17, 1924.³⁹

The Progressive Party's basic idea was that the concentration of all powers in the National Assembly without the control of an opposition would result in authoritarianism. Its purpose therefore was to strive to preserve individual freedom by "opposing the despotic tendencies of a few people and their oligarchic aims."⁴⁰ This paragraph obviously was aimed at Mustafa Kemal and his own supporters. The Party accepted the Republican form of government, liberalism, and democracy as its basic principles (Articles 1, 2). In Article 6 it professed respect for religious faith. The Progressive Party's liberalism, genuine though it might be, aimed specifically at protecting religion from the interference of a government whose secular views were already too manifest.

The establishment of this party created some concern in the government. Four days later İsmet Pasha, who seemed to be the Progressivites' chief target for attack, resigned and was replaced by Fethi (Okyar) Bey.⁴¹

On February 11, 1925, a Kurdish revolt headed by Şeyh Sait broke out in the East with the purpose of establishing an independent Kurdistan and restoring the Caliphate.⁴² The revolt was also a reaction to the government, which was tending to break the hold of feudal lords by extending its authority

³⁹ On this party, see Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 606ff.; *Türkiye de Siyasi Dernekler*, II (Published by the Ministry of Interior), Ankara, 1950, pp. 60-71; *Speech*, pp. 704ff.

⁴⁰ Declaration preceding the party program, text reproduced in Tunaya, *op.cit.*, pp. 615-616.

⁴¹ On these changes of government, see *Tarih*, pp. 153ff.; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 105ff.; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 84-85.

⁴² On the revolt, see Toynebee, *Survey*, pp. 507-511.

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and control over rural areas in the East. In order to deal with the revolt the *Takriri Sükûn* (Maintenance of Order Law) was passed on March 4, 1925. The law gave the government of Ismet Pasha, who had meanwhile returned to the Premiership on March 3, 1925,⁴³ extensive powers to deal with the rebels, reactionaries, and subversive elements.⁴⁴ Martial law was declared and the Independence Tribunals (revolutionary courts established in 1920 invested with supreme authority to try cases of treason and all activity against the regime) were reactivated.⁴⁵

The revolt was soon quelled; the rebels and the supporters of the rebellion, including some newspapers, were dealt with severely.⁴⁶ The government then turned against the Progressive Party, which the Tribunal of Independence had found to have been connected with the rebellion, although the proof was not clearly established. The party was finally abolished on June 5, 1925, marking the close of the first chapter of the Republic's history, which basic issues and personality conflicts played their part in shaping.⁴⁷

⁴³ Of 180 deputies present, 154 voted for Ismet Pasha, 23 against, and 3 abstained. *Inönünün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, p. 128.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 128-132, 192ff.; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 106; Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 86.

⁴⁵ For inside information on the Tribunals of Independence, see Kılıç Ali, *İstiklâl Mahkemesi Hatıraları*, İstanbul, 1955. (The author was the President of Tribunal #1.)

⁴⁶ For the trial of newspapermen see Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, pp. 151-157. Toynebee-Kirkwood, *Turkey*, pp. 189-190. A number of newspapers were closed and their publishers brought before the court as early as 1924 for defending the Caliphate.

⁴⁷ Kâzım Karabekir, the opponent of Mustafa Kemal, indirectly claimed to have been the first to organize the liberation movement in the Eastern part of the country. Kâzım Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimizin Esasları*, İstanbul, 1933, 1951, pp. 44ff. This book was suppressed in 1933. For a dramatized account of this suppression, see Kandemir, *Karabekir'in Kitabı Ne için ve Nasıl Yakıldı*, İstanbul, 1955. The conflict of personalities which the Progressive Party represented was later evidenced in 1926 with the discovery of a plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal in İzmir. The leaders of the Progressive Party, including Kâzım Karabekir, were arrested for having harbored and assisted the plotters. However, the Independence Tribunal found no evidence that they had really assisted the plotters and therefore acquitted

After the abolition of the Progressive Party, and in view of the fact that some of its leaders had been army commanders and also deputies, military personnel on active duty were forbidden to occupy seats in the Assembly. This decision marked the initiation of a policy of excluding the military from politics, an idea which M. Kemal had advocated in the Union and Progress days.

The *Takriri Sükkün* Law of 1925 can be considered the beginning of a new phase in the history of the Republic. The government dealt henceforth from a position of strength, having extended its authority in every part of the country and liquidated organized opposition.⁴⁸ Mustafa Kemal's group, composed chiefly of former army personnel and civil administrators, usually from the lower middle classes, had gained power; whereas the old Ottoman ruling group, although re-

them. Yet, the official history of the Republic depicts the Progressive Party as having given encouragement to the plotters. It is known that the acquittal of the Progressive Party leaders came as a result of strong public pressure. Later, there were other attempts to discredit the Progressive Party, and especially Kâzım Karabekir. See "Ankaralının Defteri," *Milliyet*, March 14-May 18, 1933. The controversy regarding the role of the Progressive Party in the plot to assassinate Atatürk still continues. The President of the Independence Tribunal, which sentenced the plotters to death, recently defended the view that the members of the Union and Progress—they were the leading plotters—had found shelter in the Progressive Party. Kılıç Ali, *İstiklâl Makhemesi Hatıraları*, pp. 26, 32. In the summer of 1956, relatives and friends of the plotters who were hanged in İzmir held a public *mevlüt* (requiem) in one of the İstanbul mosques, protesting their innocence and demanding posthumous rehabilitation. *Akis*, September 1, 1956, p. 4. For additional information on the Progressive Party and the attempt to assassinate Mustafa Kemal, see *Millet*, December-March, 1949 (Memoirs of Cafer Tayyar); *Millet*, July 28, 1948, p. 9 (Declaration of K. Karabekir). *Speech*, pp. 686, 687; Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 606-616. *New York Times*, August 4, 1926; also Kılıç Ali, *İstiklâl*, pp. 79ff.; *Tasvir*, April 3, 1948 (H. S. Tanrıöver's view); Rustow, "Politics," pp. 87-88; Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, pp. 147-151; Halide Edip, *Turkey Faces West*, New Haven, 1930, pp. 226ff. For a popularized account on the plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal see Kandemir, *İzmir Suikastının İcyüzü*, İstanbul, 1955.

⁴⁸ Most of the Progressivists were rehabilitated later after Atatürk's death. Kâzım Karabekir was admitted to the National Assembly in 1939, and Ali Fuad Cebesoy even joined the cabinet. Both men played a considerable role in the party struggle during 1946-1950; see Part II.

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tained in various capacities in the new structure, was left, nevertheless, in the minority. Mustafa Kemal, through his political genius had been able to reconcile temporarily various views within the Assembly, had balanced one group against the other whenever expedient and, by gradually eliminating the conservatives from leading positions, had then succeeded in establishing the supremacy of his own secular-modernist group. He had acted, as he often expressed it, in the sincere belief that he was clearing the way towards fulfilling "the great desire for progress which [he] sensed in the conscience and future of the Turkish people."⁴⁹

Three basic ideas emerged during 1923-1925 as the fundamental principles of the Republic: nationalism, secularism, and populism, although secularism was not enunciated until sometime later.

Nationalism was at the basis of the regime and secularism was its chief means of fulfilling the ultimate goal of a modern, national Turkish Republic, based on the sovereignty of the nation. The first World War and the subsequent internal developments involving the establishment of the Republic and the abolition of the Caliphate had widened the scope of Turkish nationalism, leaving it in effect the only predominant ideology in Turkey. Indeed Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism had lost their practical value by proving to be unrealizable. Moreover, the departure of minorities from Anatolia left Turkey culturally homogeneous, and thus the task of the Republic in building a national state, and in strengthening a feeling of national consciousness in the individual Turk,⁵⁰ was greatly

⁴⁹ *Tarih*, p. 146. Mustafa Kemal in a speech opening the Assembly stated: "Gentlemen, power can exist only in accordance with the will and ideals of the people and their rights, independence, dignity and desire for progress. Oblivion and disdain is the fate of those who do not follow the will of the people." Quoted by Yavuz Abadan, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi*, Ankara, 1954, p. 69.

⁵⁰ Lewis V. Thomas, "Nationalism in Turkey," *Nationalism in the Middle East* (The Middle East Institute) Washington, D.C., 1952, p. 5; see also his "The National and International Relations of Turkey," *Near Eastern Culture and Society*, pp. 167-187. For the various phases of Turkish na-

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facilitated. Secularism was a means of fulfilling this aim. According to the nationalists, Islam had originated among the Arabs; the language it used was Arabic; and its traditionalist spirit was contrary to the modernist-nationalist aims of the Republic. Consequently, they considered Islam the main hindrance which had obstructed the Turks in the Ottoman Empire from developing fully a national culture, and consequently a national state, and from adjusting themselves to modern times.

This nationalism, as well as its goal of modernization, differed to some extent from the ideas of Ziya Gökalp, the formulator of these principles.⁵¹ For Gökalp's nationalism, drawing on religion and history, there was substituted a rationalist, materialist and extreme secular one. Gökalp's secularism which in essence aimed at adjusting Islam to Turkish life and of interpreting its institutions accordingly, including the Caliphate, was modified by completely divorcing religion from the state and then establishing the supremacy of the latter. Gökalp's idea of Westernization which aimed at borrowing the West's technology only was broadened to accept the West as the source of all material and cultural modernization. Ziya Gökalp's importance in the Republic consequently diminished and he was less mentioned from 1925 until 1940-1945.⁵²

tionalism, see Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Millet ve Tarih Şuurunu*, İstanbul, 1948, pp. 140-168. See also Davison, "Middle East Nationalism," pp. 327-348.

⁵¹ Professor Berkes, in an article on Ziya Gökalp, states: "He [Gökalp] remains [nevertheless] as the best intellectual formulator of the main trends of the Turkish Republic: Westernism, democracy, political and economic national independence and secularism. Although, in actual practice, there have been deviations from some of his contentions, it is still his style of thinking with regard to the basic issues which has intellectually dominated the modern reform in Turkey." Niyazi Berkes, "Ziya Gökalp: His Contribution to Turkish Nationalism," *The Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1954, p. 376. Webster had a similar view when he stated: "Gökalp's theories have become the policies of Kemalist Turkey." *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 141. On Gökalp see the preceding chapter.

⁵² Mustafa Kemal had adopted at first a friendly attitude towards Gökalp. He sent him in 1920-1922 through the villages to bolster the government's policies. Gökalp strongly supported Mustafa Kemal in the *Küçük Mecmua*, and in 1923 represented his native Diyarbakır in the National

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Along with nationalism and secularism there developed the new idea of populism, *halkçılık*, which was both the result of nationalism, and a social-political justification for it. The idea of a government based on the people's sovereignty, which had been at the basis of the nationalist movement and of the National Assembly, was embodied in populism. It was, however, a fictitious sovereignty, for there was hardly any means through which people could effectively exercise that sovereignty and have a voice in changing the government. Populism was not a theory for the justification of revolutionary social changes, but the adaptation of Western ideas of democracy to domestic needs; it was the "nation's conscience," and a means of securing social unity around the ideals of nationalism.⁵³ The fundamental social structure was to be preserved, and the social, political, and economic developments were supposed to take place upon the basis of the existing social organization. It was implicitly accepted, therefore, that social differentiation would continue in the same old pattern, and that whatever changes might occur in the social structure were to be the natural result of this evolution rather than of revolution. The regime was politically revolutionary and socially conservative. (This was true in matters of social organization, although in matters of social custom it was revolutionary.)

Society was considered to be composed not of classes but of individuals assembled in occupational groups, such as businessmen, government officials, farmers, and craftsmen, mutually

Assembly. At his death in 1924 his family received a pension. Yet, after his death, as Mustafa Kemal's nationalist-secularist policy developed differently than advocated by Gökâlp, his importance also was minimized. His name was even omitted from some publications dealing with famous Turks. The chief reason was Gökâlp's religious beliefs, which had in one way or other affected his teachings. For differences between Turkey's regime and Gökâlp's teachings, see Berkes, "Ziya Gökâlp," pp. 377ff.

⁵³ On populism see *Tarih*, pp. 87, 171-189 *passim*; Necmeddin Sadak, *Sosyoloji*, İstanbul, 1936, pp. 69ff.; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 165-166; *Millî Mecmua*, September 1, 1927, pp. 37-41; also my Chapter 12. On the socio-economic transformation in the Republic, see the next two chapters.

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dependent on each other and having no conflicting economic interests.⁵⁴ Titles and social privileges had been nominally abolished, although in practice they continued to be used. (The term *pasa*-commander being the most common.) The Republican Party, "the synthesis of the people," was the sole representative of all these groups, the uniting link among them. The party intended to give to all these groups, collectively defined as "the people," the possibility of active participation in creating general and genuine prosperity for the whole nation.⁵⁵

In view of the identity of economic interest among these groups there could be no question of establishing more than one political party, because multiplicity of political parties was caused by divergent economic interests in society. When a political party was formed to defend the interest of one social class, another would be formed to defend the interests of other classes.⁵⁶ Although it was not said openly, the implication of this theory was that if individuals were free to activate economically, they would eventually undermine the national interest.

The most unusual aspect of populism lies in the fact that it envisaged social relations in the light of class struggle, which it seemed to accept as inevitable. The Republican Party program of 1931 stated that populism was the means of preserving the unity of Turkish society by not yielding to class struggle.⁵⁷ The official history of the Republic, published in 1931, stated that populism was the rejection of class-struggle.⁵⁸ Preparations to forestall any class struggle, when the class structure of the society was denied, can be attributed either to apprehension that conditions generating class struggle ex-

⁵⁴ These views were expressed by Mustafa Kemal in various speeches, the ones in Balıkesir of February 7, 1923 and Izmit in January 1923, being the most important ones. *Tarih*, pp. 168, 172-173; *Vakit*, 16, 18 June 1945.

⁵⁵ *CHP-25 Yılı*, Ankara, 1948, p. 23; *Tarih*, p. 170.

⁵⁶ *Tarih*, p. 168.

⁵⁷ *CHP-25 Yılı*, p. 23.

⁵⁸ *Tarih*, pp. 169, 183.

isted in the society, or to the fact that the anticipated future economic development would lead to such a struggle.

Developments in Turkey after 1925 took place along the ideological lines outlined above. Meanwhile the government had established effective control over the entire national territory by breaking the authority of landlords and religious leaders. This was indeed a great achievement in comparison with the old Ottoman governments which lacked authority beyond the limits of the big cities and easily accessible areas. The relatively large number of civil servants inherited from the Ottoman Empire, some of whom were excellent administrators, could be concentrated in a relatively small area and were put to effective use.

The Republican Party, on the other hand, secured control of the Assembly and became the promoter of reforms initiated by a relatively small group of leaders who controlled the party. Now with tranquility in the Assembly and in the country it was possible to tackle more fundamentally the task of modernizing the country. The reforms started in 1925 carried further the basic reforms of 1923-1924.⁵⁹ The ultimate purpose of all these reforms was the modernization of Turkish society by supplanting its traditionalist, emotional ways and customs with rationalist, modern ideas. The new individual whom the Republican regime wanted to bring out was a rationalist, anti-traditionalist, anti-clerical person, approaching all

⁵⁹ On these reforms, see Toynbee, *Survey*, pp. 71-81; Toynbee-Kirkwood, *Turkey*, pp. 242-258; Jäschke, *Kronoloji*; and his article "Der Islam"; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 127-170 *passim*; also his article, "State Control of Social Change in Republican Turkey," *American Sociological Review*, IV, 1939, pp. 247-256; H. E. Allen, *The Turkish Transformation*, Chicago, 1935. *Tarih*, pp. 202-230 *passim*; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 88-100, 106-111; John Kingsley Birge, "Turkey Between Two World Wars," *Foreign Policy Reports*, November 1, 1944, No. 16, pp. 194-207; L. Linke, "Social Change in Turkey," *International Affairs*, July 1937, pp. 540-563. For a view discrediting these reforms as "Laicism, Westernism, Democracy; these are but the passing fads of the present ruler," see E. (sic) "Turkish Facts and Fantasies," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1925, pp. 589-603.

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matters intellectually and objectively.⁶⁰ Thus, secularism came to play an important part in these reforms, for it was reasoned that a fundamental change in Turkish society could not be limited merely to separating the state from religion, but had to penetrate deeper in order to extirpate the regressive influences of Islam from the society's and the individual's cultural, economic, and social outlook. These reforms (which will be succinctly mentioned below) were carried out in that spirit.

In 1925 the sects, convents and monasteries were closed,⁶¹ the international solar calendar was accepted and replaced the Islamic lunar one (effective January 1, 1926), the fez was replaced by the hat, and the tithe tax abolished. In 1926 the Civil Code of Switzerland was accepted in its entirety, replacing the *Mecelle* based on *Şeriat*, and thus establishing family relations, including women's status, on new Western foundations.⁶² Penal and commercial law followed the same year, and the first statues of Mustafa Kemal (contrary to Islam, which opposed reproduction of the human figure) were unveiled in İstanbul. After a brief respite in 1927 the reforms were resumed. On November 3, 1928 the Arab letters were officially replaced by the Latin alphabet—numerals had been adopted a few months earlier—and the *millet mektepleri*

⁶⁰ A. A. Adivar, "Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey," *Near Eastern Culture and Society*, pp. 127-129.

⁶¹ Mustafa Kemal's view on these traditional institutions was the following: "Could a civilized nation tolerate a mass of people who let themselves be led by the nose by a herd of Sheikhs, Dedes, Seids, Tschelebis, Babas and Emirs; who entrusted their destiny and their lives to chiromanagers, magicians, dice-throwers, and amulet sellers? Ought one to conserve in the Turkish State, in the Turkish Republic, elements and institutions such as those which had for centuries given the nation the appearance of being other than it really was? Would one not therewith have committed the greatest, most irreparable error to the cause of progress and reawakening?" *Speech*, p. 722. For another similar quotation, see Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 91.

⁶² On legal reforms, see Count Leon Ostrorog, *The Angora Reform*, London, 1927; Luke, *Old Turkey and New*, pp. 174-183. See also a series of articles by Turkish jurists appraising these reforms in the light of 30 years of experience, "The Reception of Foreign Law in Turkey," *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. IX, No. 1, 1957, pp. 7-81.

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(national schools) launched a successful campaign to teach the new "Turkish letters." The same year the National Assembly decided to strike from the Constitution the clause which made Islam the official religion in Turkey. The drive for the creation of a national state continued. The courses in Arabic and Persian were deleted from the high school curriculum and the Turkification of the language began. This reform, which occasioned deep cultural repercussions, aimed at replacing the Arab and Persian words with the Turkish ones.⁶³ The language reform eventually led to various linguistic conferences, to the establishment of the *Türk Dil Kurumu* (Turkish Language Institute) and also to the Sun-Language Theory in 1936, which claimed that all languages stemmed from Turkish. By 1945 the Constitution had been translated into new Turkish.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, in 1930, women were allowed to vote in municipal elections and in 1935 they were elected (fifteen of them) to the National Assembly. Turkish names were to be used in addressing letters to Turkish cities. In 1934 ecclesiastical garb was forbidden outside the mosques. In 1935 a family law (*Soyadı kanunu*) replaced the Arab nomenclature with Turkish surnames, and the National Assembly gave Mustafa Kemal the name of Atatürk (Father of the Turks). The same year the weekly holiday (itself a reform in 1924) was changed from Friday to Sunday.

In 1930-1931 the Republican Party decided to convert the existing *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths) into People's Houses,⁶⁵ and expand their program to cover the main fields of cultural activity. The Houses were charged with emancipating the urban and village population of Turkey.

The reforms mentioned above were accompanied by intensive propaganda, which in essence exalted the virtues of the

⁶³ On language reform, see Uriel Heyd, *Language Reform in Modern Turkey*, Jerusalem, 1954; Luke, "Angora Language Reform," *Quarterly Review*, January 1935, pp. 65-72; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 97-100.

⁶⁴ For this text, see *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, IV, 1946, pp. 771-808.

⁶⁵ On People's Houses, see the second section in Chapter 14.

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Republic, of modernism, of Western culture and by the same token vilified the Ottoman Empire and its old traditions. Pre-Ottoman Turkish history gained in importance mainly in order to prove the past glory of the Turks who, away from denationalizing influence of Islam, had created civilizations and had had a national life of their own.

Modernization-Westernization continued at high speed,⁶⁶ and along with the reforms sanctified by law, a multitude of other Western habits, views, methods of work and business were adopted on an individual or group basis in all fields. Islamic education, on the other hand, was relatively neglected,⁶⁷ and in some instances anti-clericalist tendencies were encouraged,⁶⁸ although, worship or attendance at the mosques was never prohibited. Strong concerted attacks were aimed at obscurantism, mysticism, supernaturalism, and traditionalism; education in school stressed positivism and science.

This forced modernization-Westernization of Turkey in a sense symbolized a pact of defeat which Turkey signed on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire had

⁶⁶ See also Chapter 13.

⁶⁷ The Theological School had 284 students in 1925, in 1926-1933 the number fell from 167 to 20, and in 1941 it was closed (it had become meanwhile the Institute for Islamic Research) for lack of students. The *imam-hatip* (clergy) schools numbered 29 in 1924, fell to 2 in 1930, and were then closed. Some religious instruction was offered in *Hafız ve Kuran Kursları* (courses for memorizing the Koran), operated under the supervision of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. On the religious schools see Jäschke, "Der Islam in der neuen Türkei," pp. 119-123; *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 15, pp. 9-10 (Declaration by Tahsin Banguoğlu, Minister of Education). Howard A. Reed, "Turkey's New Imam-Hatip Schools," *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol. IV, 1955, No. 2-3, pp. 150-163. "The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara," Parts I and II, *The Muslim World*, XLVI, October 4, 1956, pp. 295-312, and XLVII, January 1, 1957, pp. 22-35, respectively.

⁶⁸ Two Turkish intellectuals appraising the past twenty years of secularist policy in Turkey wrote: "Within the last twenty years the vast majority of Turkish youth has been brought up without any official religious teaching, Western positivism being imposed on it just as Islamic dogma had been imposed in the past." Adivar, "Interaction," p. 128, Başgil wrote: "The anti-religious policy of some countries in the past thirty years is identical, except for minor differences, with Bolshevik Russia." Başgil, *Din ve Lâiklik*, p. iv, n.3.

started its drive in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries with the purpose of bringing the West under the domination of Islam, and the Republic, its successor, ended by accepting the terms the Empire had desired to impose on the West. Acceptance of Western culture as a model for the modernization of Turkey, a Muslim state, inevitably was bound to stir up controversy because of the Christian moral and ethical values imbued in the West's culture.⁶⁹ The distinction drawn between culture and civilization in the Ottoman Empire, and the definition of civilization as being in the main technology and therefore unrelated to social values, had stemmed from the desire to safeguard national values from the cultural influence of the Christian West while adopting its technology at will.

The Turkish intellectuals in the Republic, still aware of this problem, took pains to point out that Western culture and civilization in essence originated in the pagan-Greek civilization and that its greatness was achieved only when the West became secularized. Moreover they attributed the West's economic progress to the fact that Christianity had been remoulded and adjusted to economic development, while Islam remained orthodox and primitive, and ignored material progress.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ The Christian minorities in Turkey which had, in view of their faith, the special privileges of maintaining their own law on family and inheritance matters through the Lausanne Treaty (Art. 41) renounced this privilege in view of the "forthcoming introduction of a Western civil code."

⁷⁰ The relative prosperity of Christian countries and communities in comparison with the poverty and material backwardness of the Muslim countries and communities, has been one of the favorite arguments of Turkish intellectuals in proving Islam's supposed opposition to material progress as compared with the secularized West. The poet Ziya Pasha has best described this situation:

Diyar-ı küfrü gezdim beldeler kâşaneler gördüm
Dolaştım mülki İslamı bütün viraneler gördüm
(I visited the Christian land and palaces I saw
I visited Islam's lands and ruins I saw.)

This view was expressed in almost similar terms by a Turkish traveller,

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The modernization and secularization of Turkey after 1925 took place with relatively minor disturbances among the general population but produced deep repercussions among the older generation of intellectuals, as well as anxiety over Turkey's religious future among some Westernists.⁷¹ The old Westernists criticized modernization for imitating the West without due understanding of its intellectual foundations, morality, and principles. Others stressed with alarm the fact that the positivism promoted by the government led to worship of science and to seeking salvation in knowledge while discarding religion as harmful and backward.⁷² Fuad Köprülü, the foremost Turkish historian, in a slashing attack on the extremist aspects of modernization complained that the ancestral art monuments were being torn down to open up broad streets, that libraries containing the records of the nation's history were ridiculed, and that parents were seeking to educate their children in foreign environments. "These ideas," he wrote, "which have appeared under the mask of modernism and democracy and which no one dares to criticize, lest they be charged with conservatism, create even within our national

Evliya Celebi, as early as in the seventeenth century: "*Kâfiristandan ma'mur bir dar-ı diyar görmedim ve Islâm diyarı kadar harab-âbad görmedim*" (I have not seen a country more flourishing than the Christian lands, and lands more ruined than the Islam's). Cafer Erkılıç, *Evliya Çelebi*, İstanbul, 1954, p. 30.

⁷¹ Descriptions and evaluations of the cultural repercussions caused by Turkey's modernization and secularization are to be found in Lutfi Levonian, *The Turkish Press, 1925-1931*, Athens, 1932; also his *Moslem Mentality*, London, 1928; Allen, *Turkish Transformation*, pp. 10-27, 28-38, 85-142; *İkdam*, September 27, *Vakit*, August 8, *Milliyet*, June 30, 1929. Luke, *Old Turkey and New*, pp. 143-144; E. Wrench, "Country Without God," *Spectator*, November 22, 1936; Lilo Linke, *Allah Dethroned*, New York, 1937. Italo Zingarelli, *Il Risveglio dell'Islam, La Turchia Senza Corano*, Milano, 1928.

⁷² Lutfi Levonian wrote: ". . . at bottom there is a materialistic interpretation of human life, and a quite false understanding of religion. They are in revolt against Islam, because Islam is Arabian. . . . They are in revolt against all religion because they think religion and science, faith and knowledge can not agree; they are essentially opposed to one another . . . religious creeds, teachings, and books are unreliable. Religion is for primitive-minded people." *Moslem Mentality*, p. 141.

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schools an atmosphere which poisons the spirit of the youth,"⁷³ Köprülü also condemned the alphabet reform as a worship of form.⁷⁴

Yet, this modernist-secularist policy despite its outwardly anti-religious features had constructive and progressive aims. The paramount goal was the creation of a national state, and the chief obstacle to it was Islam. To promote Islam and nationalism at the same time was to defeat its purpose.⁷⁵

The obscurantist and fatalistic beliefs, many of them of pagan origin, inherited from the past cultures of Anatolia and now cloaked in and sanctified as part of Islamic teachings,⁷⁶ were in fact an obstacle to the causal understanding of events and phenomena so essential to progress in general.⁷⁷ Thus, the new modernist-secularist policy aimed at creating an environment in which the individual could freely follow his spiritual tendencies without having to embrace a predetermined religious dogma and constantly conform to its strict rules and rites. A person was free to be irreligious if he so wished without being hypocritical, while the other was free to be pious without being a zealot.⁷⁸ This, in a way, was cultural liberalism and individualism.

⁷³ *Hayat*, February 9, 1928, translated in Levonian, *Turkish Press*, p. 69.

⁷⁴ *Hayat*, February 2, 9, 22, 1928, translated also in Levonian, *op.cit.*, pp. 65ff. Yet, ten years later Köprülü hailed the alphabet reform as a deliverance from the Arab alphabet which, he wrote, "did not suit the structure of the Turkish language, could not express the Turkish sounds. This incomplete and primitive alphabet," he concluded, "oppressed our [Turkish] language for nine hundred years." *Ülkü*, September 1938, p. 1.

⁷⁵ See the chapters on nationalism and secularism.

⁷⁶ For descriptions of these influences see, Reed, "Religious Life," pp. 136-138; Mahmut Makal, *Memleketin Sahipleri*, İstanbul, 1954 (the entire volume describes these obscurantist traditions in the life of the Turkish peasants); Bernard Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," pp. 316, 326. Reşat Nuri Güntekin's novel, *Yeşil Gece* (Green Night) is an attack on obscurantist practices. See Allen, *Transformation*, pp. 30-31.

⁷⁷ One journalist complained that streetcar accidents happened because the motormen did not believe that such accidents could be prevented by precautionary measures since all was prescribed in advance by fate. *Vakit*, August 8, 1929.

⁷⁸ One's religiosity, as long as it was not imposed on others, never be-

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The Republic did not want to depart from Islam and accept a new faith,⁷⁹ as was thought by some,⁸⁰ but wished to rid Islam of those features thought, rightly or wrongly, to contradict the modernistic spirit of the new regime; that is, dogmatism, exclusiveness, and primitiveness. The Republic sought a purified, reformed Islam which was both modern and Turkish. An attempt to reform Islam failed chiefly because the ground was not ready for it and the inner urge to make such a reform was lacking.⁸¹ Reform could have occurred only when modern material and cultural elements were sufficiently entrenched to create need for spiritual adjustment, and to effect that adjustment while preserving their own identity.

The real views of the leaders and the country as a whole regarding religion and the importance attached to it came into the open in 1928 in a case of conversion which was gen-

came a hindrance to acquiring position in the Republic. The Grand National Assembly had over a dozen well-known clericals throughout the years from 1920 to 1950. For their names see, Rustow, "Politics," p. 85. Marshal Çakmak, who was very pious and pro-Islamist as proven during his chairmanship of the *Millet Partisi* (National Party) in 1948-1950, remained as Chief of Staff throughout Atatürk's lifetime. It was reliably reported that no alcoholic drinks were allowed in the Marshal's presence out of respect for his religious feelings. Throughout the Republic mosques remained open, and the two religious holidays (*Bayrams*) were officially recognized. Few new mosques, however, were built, and some of the mosques were used as army barracks. Among the populace there was apprehension about the secularist policy of the government. It was reported that immigrants from Rumania who were very willing to go to Turkey showed concern over the religious freedom, and one immigrant at least seemed determined to wear his fez covered under a turban, similar to the method adopted by many Muslims in Turkey. *American Scholar*, January 1936, p. 126 (a brief account on the immigration of Turks from Rumania to Turkey).

⁷⁹ Attacks on religion as a faith were punishable under the Penal Code, Article 175.

⁸⁰ In some circles there was the hope that Turkey "will respond to Christ now" and therefore it was suggested to propagate the faith without using the word "Christianity," that is, without this label which had acquired strictly political meaning. *Literary Digest*, June 6, 1925, p. 37. The article created considerable repercussion in Turkey.

⁸¹ A Committee for Reform of Islam headed by Köprülü advocated as first steps sanitary worshipping places, use of Turkish in the mosques, music in the religious service. *Vakit*, June 20, 1928; translated in Levonian, *Turkish Press*, pp. 123-124.

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erally interpreted as a symptom of Turkey's spiritual crisis.⁸² The nation's leaders emphasized that both in the life of the country and the individual there was need for a faith as a moralizing force and as a bond of solidarity.⁸³ This was, therefore, a pragmatic, not intellectual, approach to religion;⁸⁴ an approach which is found to be a general feature in Turkish politics.

Some intellectuals saw in all these religious developments the emergence of a new pattern of relationships between the material and the spiritual; between capitalism and communism, with emphasis on reason. The goal according to them was to spread among the masses the more developed ideas of

⁸² The case concerns three Muslim girls converted to Christianity in a school in Bursa operated by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Following the incident, which provoked a great reaction in the press, some teachers were arrested for having violated a regulation forbidding encouragement of students to take part in religious services other than their own. Many parents withdrew their children from that school. In the same year an organization called the Revolutionary Committee for the Protection of Islam was discovered in Bursa and five of its members were condemned to death for plotting against the state. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 102. It was at this time that a press campaign was launched against foreign schools in Turkey, which were accused of belittling Turkish culture. Allen, *Transformation*, pp. 150-154. *Hayat*, February 2, 9, 16, 22, 1928; some translated in Levonian, *Turkish Press*, pp. 12ff. Allen mentions the fact that there was increased interest in English for it represented the language of two peoples whose civilization stressed the importance of science and effort, as contrasted with French which represented refinement. American schools were favored for supposedly teaching how to build up a fortune. Allen, *op.cit.*, pp. 22-24, 143-150. In 1926-1927, 13,400 students attended foreign schools. Next year the number fell to 11,100. For foreign schools in Turkey during 1920-1924 and additional data on students, see Eliot Grinnell Mears, *Modern Turkey*, New York, 1924, pp. 117-140; Allen, *op.cit.*, pp. 147-149.

⁸³ As early as 1926, Yunus Nadi wrote in the *Cumhuriyet*, which had become a semi-official spokesman for the Republican Party, that there was no conceivable argument to justify a change of faith, and that reason played no part in it. He advocated restraint in discussing the society's faith.

⁸⁴ Allen best defined this policy in the following terms: "The truth of the matter seems to be that it [the state policy] is distinctly opportunist in its attitude: that it is favorable to whatever in Islam is consistent with the republican ideals, relentlessly opposed to anything which might endanger Kemalist success, and, for the rest, more or less neutral." Allen, *Transformation*, p. 175.

the upper classes, ultimately making them aware of the inner values of the religion itself. The concept of evolution accepted in social science needed to be accepted also in the realm of religion.⁸⁵

During the Republic's first two and a half decades, despite secularism, difference of religion was used to promote nationalistic goals. This policy, stemming from practical nationalist considerations, had also deep roots in history—in that sordid struggle in which differences of religion were exploited by Muslims and Christians alike for their own material ends.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ *Hayat*, February 16, 1928; *Vakit*, June 20, 1928; *Milli Mecmua*, March 1926, *Milliyet*, June 30, 1929; some translated in Levonian, *Turkish Press*, pp. 163ff.

⁸⁶ For instance, the number of non-Muslims in the civil service dwindled, and they could not get a commission in the army. (Kurds and other non-Turkish speaking Muslim minorities were classified as Turks.) Thousands of members of Christian minorities born in Turkey adopted in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries foreign citizenship in order to enjoy extra-territorial rights granted under capitulations to foreign states. The interference of foreign diplomats in favor of the Christian population in the Ottoman Empire gave place to animosity. The incessant allusion made to the Christian-Byzantine heritage in İstanbul and in other Turkish cities created deep resentment in the government and among the people. (Two missionaries once placed a poster on the walls of Saint Sophia mosque denouncing Mohammed as an impostor.) Moreover the Christian minorities held almost a monopoly in foreign trade in İstanbul and preserved it in many cases by purposely undermining the reputation of the Turkish firms. Finally, the War of Independence was won by the Turks themselves against foreign occupation during which many minority groups, born in Turkey, sided with the occupying forces. On the above points see Davison, "*Turkish Attitudes*," pp. 857-858; Allen, *Transformation*, pp. 82-83; Lewis, "Islamic Revival," p. 39; Paul Gentizon, *Mustapha Kemal, ou l'Orient en Marche*, Paris, 1929; see also, Chapter 4 of this work.

A more striking example in which religious differences were used for state purposes is to be found in the policy of migration. Turkish speaking Gagauzes, the descendants of Izzeddin Keykavuz, who settled around the Black Sea in the 13th century and became Christians and later migrated to Bessarabia, were not encouraged to migrate en masse to Turkey, despite the fact that they were willing to do so. H. S. Tanrıöver, who was Turkish Ambassador to Bucharest from the mid-thirties until 1944, actively sought to bring them into Turkey but was not successful. A number of individual Gagauzes came, nevertheless, under a scholarship program during the thirties. On the other hand, Bosnians, and Bulgarian Pomaks who spoke no Turkish and were not ethnic Turks, migrated freely to Turkey for they were Muslims, and also different from the Muslim Albanians, for they had

Turkey's audacious secularist-modernist policy instead of diminishing actually increased her prestige in the eyes of the Muslim world, despite certain Muslim leaders who strove to preserve the Caliphate.⁸⁷ Turkey's modernization reform was in fact the first step in what a considerable number of Muslim intellectuals wished to achieve in their own countries. Whether or not they wanted to follow the same path as Turkey was a different matter, to be decided by each country according to its own particular circumstances.⁸⁸ The Arabs were forced to fight political Westernism while attempting to adopt cultural Westernism; a frustrating dilemma not faced by Turkey after the Lausanne Conference. Modernization efforts similar to Turkey's started in the army in other countries in the Near East.⁸⁹ Intellectual and cultural conditions in Arab countries and their special affinity to Islam may necessitate a development other than Turkey's,⁹⁰ but one is bound to admit that Turkey proved that Islam could be subjected to secularization

been faithful subjects of the Ottoman Empire. On migration, see the following chapter.

⁸⁷ A. J. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, New York, 1953, pp. 201-211; also Allen, *Transformation*, pp. 61ff. Turkey also became a cherished example for the colonial countries of Asia trying to gain their independence. See Falih Rifkî Atay, *Nişin Kurtulmamak*, İstanbul, 1953. For attempts by Muslim leaders to retain the Caliphate, see Agha Khan's letter to Ismet Pasha and Caliphate Congresses in Egypt in Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, pp. 571-572, 576-581.

⁸⁸ Afghanistan openly recognized Turkey as a model to be followed. Allen, *op.cit.*, pp. 63ff. Riza Pahlevi of Iran followed Atatürk. Both countries, having a cultural basis different from the Arab countries, could afford to follow a secular policy without fear of self-destruction.

⁸⁹ For these attempts see Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, London, 1956, pp. 745-753; Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, pp. 184-212. For a skeptical attitude on the modernization of the Arabs, see A. S. Eban, "Some Social and Cultural Problems of the Middle East," *International Affairs*, July 1947, pp. 367-375.

⁹⁰ The reformist ideas of Jamaledin Afghani and Muhammad Abduh are too well-known to students of Islam to be discussed here. We shall mention only the fact that in Turkey, Ziya Gökalp was acquainted with Afghani's ideas and he speaks highly of him in his *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, p. 6. For modernization in Egypt, see Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, London, 1933; Kenneth Cragg, "The Modernist Movement in Egypt," *Islam and the West*, pp. 149-164; Osman Amin, *ibid.*, pp. 165-178.

and thereby provided a yardstick and precedent for future attempts to modernize Islam.⁹¹

The reforms which took place in Turkey during and after the period of 1922-1930 created, as might be expected, antagonism to the government. Moreover, the economic policy of industrialization,⁹² the creation of state monopolies in alcohol, tobacco, sugar, salt, and especially in shipping,⁹³ greatly added to the discontent. The government's policy of building a state owned economy and offering unsatisfactory conditions to foreign capital, while theoretically favoring the development of private enterprise, created stagnation in the economy. The world economic crisis and bad harvests in 1928-1929 further worsened this situation. Domination by the Republican Party and the personal advantages secured by some of its members through use of their positions also created resentment among the people.⁹⁴ Of Mustafa Kemal's followers, many who favored a more liberal policy, regarded with misgivings the strengthening of one-party rule and the political and economic restrictions imposed. Many of them had acquiesced in the government's strong measures as being a necessary step in a transition period when major reforms had to be carried out. Once these were achieved there was no justification for not returning to a "normal" government, controlled and checked by the Legislature and by some opposition, either in the Assembly or the press.

The experiment with the Liberal Party, *Serbest Cumhuri-*

⁹¹ For a view of the modern trends in Islam and problems connected with it, see H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, Chicago, 1947; "La reaction Contre la Culture Occidentale dans le Proche-Orient," *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, xxiii, 1951, pp. 1-10. See also *Islam and the West*, pp. 7-40, 179-197; *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization*, pp. 3-47, 167-335.

⁹² Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 101-102. See also the next chapter in this work.

⁹³ For the discontent caused by the state control of shipping, see Ahmed Hamdi Başar, *Atatürkle Üç Ay*, İstanbul, 1945, pp. 8-11. (The author was the Director General of the port of İstanbul.)

⁹⁴ Some acquired membership on administrative boards in the port of İstanbul and were paid from the workers' wages. Başar, *ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

yet Fırkası,⁹⁵ came about as the result of these conditions and circumstances. It is generally accepted that the government desired a loyal party to fill the role of an opposition. The purpose in establishing this party, therefore, was to air the accumulated discontent and provide some control over the government both to correct its shortcomings, and to stimulate it to seek new ways of coping with the economic situation. Whatever Mustafa Kemal's practical considerations were in establishing this party, it may be safely assumed that he had hoped to see it develop in time into a normal political party and play a vital function in the government.⁹⁶ The party was established on August 12, 1930 by Fethi (Okyar) at the direct suggestion of Mustafa Kemal, who also urged others to join it, including his own sister, Makbule. It was planned in secret but was presented to the public as a genuine opposition party. As soon as it was established it drew wide popular support.

The program of the Liberal Party consisted of a few general principles of liberal tendency, but its main policy consisted in opposing the Republican Party and criticizing its failure in the economic field. This attracted to it immediately a large group of enthusiastic followers who courageously defied the party in power, as shown by anti-government demonstrations in İzmir occasioned by Fethi's visit there.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ On the Liberal Party, see Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları*, İstanbul, 1950, pp. 8ff.; Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 622-635; *Türkiyede Siyasi Dernekler*, II, pp. 73-84; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 109-110; *Tarih*, pp. 196-197; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 101-105; Rustow, "Politics," p. 80.

⁹⁶ Mustafa Kemal wrote to Fethi (Okyar): "Since my youth I have been in favor of a system in which honest individuals and political parties would express and debate freely ideas in the Assembly or before the nation for the benefit of the country . . . consequently I consider it one of the bases of the Republic to have a new political party in the Assembly, which, based on similar principles [anti-clerical] will debate freely the affairs of the nation." *Cumhuriyet*, August 12, 1930. For similar views of Atatürk, as reported by Şemseddin Günaltay (Premier in 1949), see *Aydın Tarihi*, May 1949, p. 40; also Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 103.

⁹⁷ Less than a month after the establishment of his party, Fethi Bey was met in İzmir by thirty to forty thousand people who broke the windows of the newspaper *Anadolu*, which had criticized the new party, and demon-

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After his return to Ankara, Fethi Bey was made deputy for Gümüşhane, and thereafter he had a chance to criticize the government in the Assembly, especially for its railroad construction policy. Tension between the Republican and Liberal parties reached a climax after the municipal elections which were held under government pressure. Fethi, in a speech in the Assembly, bitterly denounced the government and the fact that it called his followers "reactionary."⁹⁸ To counteract the influence of the Liberal Party, the government promised reforms in the economic field and changed the ministers of Economy and Justice; but these moves failed to increase its popularity.⁹⁹ In their turn, the Republicans attacked Fethi for having signed the Mudros Armistice and for having personal ambitions directed against Mustafa Kemal. The tension increased further when Fethi asked Mustafa Kemal to remain neutral in the party disputes. Fethi's growing popularity, which might have allowed him to win the general elections, and his criticism of the government were interpreted by the Republicans not only as a threat to their own rule but to that of the regime itself. The support received by Fethi, in the eyes of the government, came chiefly from reactionaries. The Republicans finally persuaded Mustafa Kemal, who initially had professed neutrality with respect to both parties, to

strated against the ruling Republican Party. *Cumhuriyet*, September 5, 1930. In his speeches in İzmir and Manisa, Akhisar, Fethi was acclaimed enthusiastically by his listeners whenever he mentioned the economic difficulties and Mustafa Kemal, who was very popular, as distinguished from the rest of the Republican Party. *Cumhuriyet*, September 6, 1930; *Yarın, Son Posta*, September 10, 11, 12, 1930.

⁹⁸ *BMMTD* (Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), Session III, Vol. 4, pp. 319ff. (This is the Record of the Grand National Assembly, today known as *Zabıt Ceridesi*, its original name. We have used the "Turkified" *Tutanak Dergisi*, its official title in 1946-1952, throughout this study for the sake of consistency.) The elections were held under pressure, and in some cases where the Liberal Party candidates won, such as in Samsun, the elections were declared illegal. The town of Silifke, where the same happened, was downgraded from a provincial to a district seat. *Tasvir*, June 7, 1946.

⁹⁹ For the government's answer to Fethi Bey's criticism, see *Inönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, pp. 226-244.

change his position to support the Republican Party.¹⁰⁰ Placed in the position of being forced to oppose Mustafa Kemal, the Liberal Party leaders decided to dissolve their party on November 17, 1930. Other minor parties established during the same period were suppressed by the government itself.¹⁰¹

The Republican Party justified abolition of the Liberal Party by alleging that religious reactionaries used it as a cover for their own purposes, and cited in evidence a minor rebellion in Menemen which took place six weeks after the dissolution of the Liberal Party.¹⁰² Yet there is no definite evidence that this was true.¹⁰³ On the contrary, a long trip around the country undertaken by Mustafa Kemal to discover the real reasons for the success of the Liberal Party showed that it served as an outlet for people to express their discontent with general conditions in the country. People as a rule did not and probably could not in talking directly to Mustafa Kemal dispute the reforms, but they were utterly discontented with the living conditions.¹⁰⁴ Thus, the short-lived Liberal Party experiment

¹⁰⁰ Yunus Nadi, the influential publisher of *Cumhuriyet*, declared that there were no differences of principle between the opposition and government parties. The opposition party's role was to act as a check on the party in power, and this mere function did not justify its existence. *Cumhuriyet*, October 20, 1930.

¹⁰¹ The Populist Republican Party, *Ahali Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, established in Adana, and the Turkish Workers and Peasants Republican Party, *Türk Cumhuriyet Amele ve Çiftçi Partisi*, established in Edirne, were closed the same year as the Liberal Party. Actually the latter was not allowed to activate because it was considered communistic. *Cumhuriyet*, October 2, 1930. The creation of a number of political parties with programs undesired by the government may be another reason for ending the attempt at a multi-party system in 1930. On these two parties see Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 635-638; Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 105.

¹⁰² *Tarih*, p. 197.

¹⁰³ Webster accepts the official view (*Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 109) and Rustow disagrees ("Politics," p. 88).

¹⁰⁴ People complained to Mustafa Kemal of lack of transportation facilities; low prices for agricultural products; high taxes; bureaucracy; lack of credit, which left the peasant at the mercy of the money lender; compulsory labor; lack of employment for the idle villagers; but above all, lack of freedom for private enterprise. Başar, *Atatürk*, pp. 25, 43-46; *Tarih*, pp. 197-198.

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considered a mistake by some,¹⁰⁵ and by others a source of personality conflicts,¹⁰⁶ brought into focus the basic truth that a political reform, however profound, can survive only if supplemented by economic and social reforms, especially in a country such as Turkey, urgently in need of economic progress.

The failure of the democratic experiment with the Liberal Party in 1930, and the world economic crisis of 1929-1930, discredited political and economic liberalism in Turkey. A new policy developed after 1930, marked primarily by the strengthening of the one-party rule, and by an over-all effort at intensifying and generalizing the secularist-nationalist reforms. Indeed, after 1930 the fundamental principles laid down between 1923-1930, were spelled out more clearly and were broadened and incorporated in the Republican Party program in 1931, and in the Constitution in 1937 as republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, statism, and reformism.¹⁰⁷ There was also a marked change in economic policy;

¹⁰⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, July 6, 1945 (Opinion of Aka Gündüz).

¹⁰⁶ Mustafa Kemal, according to some, saw in the rise of the Liberal Party a danger to his own position. Others claimed that he wanted to curb İsmet Paşa's power. Sureyya İlmen, *Zavallı Serbest Fırka*, İstanbul, 1951, p. 78; Webster, "Turkey of Atatürk," p. 109; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 102, 103. This cannot be true. First, because Kemal's prestige was so great in 1930 that he would have carried any election. Secondly, his position was not in danger, for Fethi, the leader of the opposition, offered him a lifetime tenure as President. Kemal rejected this offer by saying: "I have received many similar offers. I would like to inform you and the public that I have not been pleased with them. My purpose is to establish in Turkey, on strong foundations, the sovereignty of the people, forever. I consider your offer as an offense to my ideal." *Cumhuriyet*, September 26, 1930. Mustafa Kemal is reported to have told the Minister of Finance of Greece, Pesmzoğlu, that he was saddened by the unsuccessful Liberal Party experiment. *Millet*, October 31, 1946 (Interview with Celal Bayar).

¹⁰⁷ Valuable information and evaluation of the general policy in Turkey in the 'thirties can be found in the following works: A. Adnan (Adıvar) "Ten Years of Republic in Turkey," *Political Quarterly*, April 1935, pp. 240-252; Hans Kohn, "Ten Years of the Turkish Republic," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1933, pp. 141-155; Birge, "Turkey Between Two World Wars," *Foreign Policy Reports*, November 1, 1946, pp. 194ff.; Frederick T. Merrill, "Twelve Years of the Turkish Republic," *ibid.*, October 9, 1935, pp. 190-200; Samuel Haig Jameson, "Social Mutation in Turkey," *Social Forces*, May 1936, pp. 482-496, especially pp. 484-489; Bur-

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the state, in accordance with its general tendency, acquired greater responsibilities in the management of industry and general control over the economy. The Republican Party also was subject to a shift in power in accordance with the new orientation. Until 1930, the group headed by Ismet (Inönü) held control. They believed in supremacy of the government's political responsibilities and, therefore, economic activities were considered of secondary importance. Another smaller group, known as the *Iş* (Work) Bank, headed by Celal (Bayar), believed in a government charged primarily with economic responsibilities, and although temporarily enjoying favor in 1924-1925 because of the *Iş* Bank's success, they had no power. In other words, Ismet (Inönü) placed priority on a state charged primarily with political duties while Celal (Bayar), a more "enthusiastic etatist than Inönü," emphasized statism.¹⁰⁸ After 1930, the economic considerations mentioned gained in importance within the government,¹⁰⁹ and Celal Bayar's prestige increased. He gradually acquired power, first as Minister of Economy in 1932, and finally as Premier in 1937, when he replaced Ismet Inönü.¹¹⁰

han B. Belge, "Modern Turkey," *International Affairs*, November 1939, pp. 745-762; J. Walter Collins, "Ten Years of Kemalism," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 144, 1933, pp. 182-191; Temperley, "Reform Movement," pp. 457ff.; W. Gilman, "Turkey Offers Her Own Ism," *Atlantic Monthly*, October 1939, pp. 377-391; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 106-111; Rustow, "Politics," pp. 89-90; *CHP-25 Yıl*, pp. 21-23. See also my Chapters 3 and 4.

¹⁰⁸ Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 112. See also my Chapters 3 and 4.

¹⁰⁹ *Mülkiyet*, No. 3, May 1946, p. 9 (Opinion of Celal Bayar).

¹¹⁰ In the summer of 1937, Celal Bayar's name appeared frequently in the newspapers. Soon a communique on the part of Mustafa Kemal stated that Inönü had gone on sick-leave and his place had been taken temporarily by Bayar, whose definite nomination followed. The program submitted by Bayar shortly afterwards was dedicated mainly to economic problems—a more equitable tax system, and emphasis on production and continued industrialization. The change in government was interpreted by some as aiming also at the democratization of the regime, but this did not materialize, except to the extent that Bayar's program was considered unofficially an attempt by the government to bring the problems of the country before the people. The illness of Mustafa Kemal, and his death on November 10, 1938, brought Inönü to the Presidency and led to the resignation of Celal Bayar as Premier. The rivalry between Bayar and Inönü was thus

It was in this period that there also developed in Turkey a socio-political current, centered in the magazine *Kadro*,¹¹¹ which reflected in a way the government's new secularist-economic orientation. The *Kadro* met with approval on the part of official circles, who hoped to see it develop a socio-political philosophy for the regime's new economic policy. *Kadro's* philosophy in fact was a superficial combination of Marxism, nationalism, and corporatism. The Turkish Revolution, in the view of *Kadro* ideologists,¹¹² was a struggle against capitalism and imperialism, and a part of the world-wide struggle for economic liberation.¹¹³ They believed in the leadership of a group, a "cadre," which represented the progressive section of the population, that is, the people who understood and knew how to solve the problems of their society. The "cadre" was entrusted with leading the masses who did not understand the existing problems but were submissive, ready to follow the leaders. The "cadrists" recognized that class struggle and accumulated capital did not exist in Turkey. They believed, consequently, that the state should be able to avoid class struggle and accumulate capital. Theirs was "a new type of economic state, which would lead the advanced social classes of the society to accumulate the surplus economic values on behalf of the society, and direct, establish, and operate in a well-planned way all the economic activities."¹¹⁴ They recognized the individual's limited rights to private property, but considered democracy part of history. The "cadrists" believed that for an underdeveloped country such as Turkey the main

based on their differences of opinion on economic policy. (The interpretation given by some to İnönü's resignation from the Premiership, as being a maneuver on his part to assure himself of the Presidency in case of Mustafa Kemal's death, hardly seems acceptable.) For the official announcements on these changes see *Cumhuriyet* and *Tan*, September 28, 1937; *Cumhuriyet*, October 10, 1937; *Ayın Tarihi*, October 1937.

¹¹¹ Its founders were Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), Şevket Süreyya, Burhan Asaf (Belge), and Vedat Nedim (Tör).

¹¹² Şevket Süreyya, *Inkulâp ve Kadro*, Ankara, 1932.

¹¹³ Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Devlet ve Fert*, İstanbul, 1933, p. 13.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

question was not the reconciliation of economic interests, as seen in economically developed countries, but the creation of an advanced technology, and of a society without social contradictions.¹¹⁵ The example of Turkey was unique in history because the state was going to be both the representative and the organizer of society with the right to interfere in all social activities.¹¹⁶

Kadro's theory actually was an artificially created hypothesis resulting from the combination of certain Marxist ideas with the concept of a totalitarian state formulated in order to explain the statism of Turkey.¹¹⁷ This theory appeared to originate in the class conception of Marxism, but deviating to the right, adopted the Fascist corporate theory of merging all social classes into a strong, "impartial" state.¹¹⁸ According to Ahmed Ağaoğlu, who interpreted the Turkish Revolution as individualistic in purpose, the *Kadro* had a mystical aim and was opposed to Kemalism, which was created to destroy mysticism and absolutism, and to provide freedom of thought and expression for the individual.¹¹⁹

The *Kadro* died as a result of the suspicions of Marxism and communism which it aroused as soon as it started discussing social classes, and tried to analyze Turkey's economic and social problems from a socio-political viewpoint. However, *Kadro's* approach to economic and social problems, in a

¹¹⁵ Süreyya, *Inkilâp ve Kadro*, p. 112.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 74-80, 159.

¹¹⁷ Halide Edip adopted a different explanation of *Kadro*. She claimed that *Kadro* accepted Ziya Gökalp's ideas with some modifications. No individual but society, no rights but only duty. She agreed that the *Kadro* had anti-clerical views (See *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*, Lahore, 1935, pp. 216-217).

¹¹⁸ Turkey has been likened to Fascist Italy of the 'thirties (Kohn, "Ten Years," p. 142; Merrill, "Twelve Years," p. 191; Gilman, "Turkey Offers," pp. 377ff.). See also M. Zapp, "Türkischer National Sozialismus," *Preuss Jahrb*, August 1933, pp. 105-112. For a new interpretation of Turkey's regime, see A. J. Fischer, "Der Kemalismus," *Deutsch Rundsch*, November 1950, pp. 923-933.

¹¹⁹ Ağaoğlu, *Devlet ve Ferd*, pp. 57, 59; see also his *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde*, İstanbul, 1930.

word, its socialistic view of society and its activities, survived and left a deep impression on the minds of many intellectuals.¹²⁰ The *Kadro* was the first comprehensive attempt to discuss economic and social problems from a political point of view, and produced a number of social studies. Incomplete and eclectic as were its views, they had the advantage of being the first in the relatively unplowed field of social studies.

Whatever direct connection may exist between the *Kadro's* revolutionary philosophy and the government's views (three of *Kadro's* founders are still active in public life and at least one is closely affiliated with the government) it must be admitted that the revolutionary method of change was adopted as the philosophy of the Republican Party after 1931. Mustafa Kemal's own initial method of gradual change, preparing national opinion, as he described it, "step by step towards the desired goal,"¹²¹ had given place to Recep Peker's philosophy of forceful change. Recep Peker, the Secretary-General of the party, declared in his lectures at the university that reform meant "to tear away from a social structure the backward, the bad, the unjust and harmful, and replace them with the progressive, the good, the just and the useful elements . . . and see to it that the old does not come back."¹²² Reforms were

¹²⁰ J. K. Birge claimed that *Kadro's* views in favor of a purely Turkish form of state socialism were accepted by the Republican Party in its program in 1937. Birge, "Turkey Between Two World Wars," p. 201.

¹²¹ *Tarih*, p. 145.

¹²² Recep Peker, *Inkılâp Dersleri*, Ankara, 1936, p. 7. Required courses on the Turkish reform were introduced into all universities in 1934. For the first lecture offered by İnönü, see *Ülkü*, March 1934, p. 32ff. Peker's own extremist views on reforms were widely publicized throughout the country by party newspapers and magazines. The book quoted was added as a supplement to *Ülkü* (official review of the People's Houses, financed and controlled by the Republican Party's Central Committee) and distributed. *Ülkü* had 20,000 readers in 1933. Peker, although opposed to the *Kadro*—he led the main fight against it, since he believed that the formulation of a philosophy was the responsibility of the party and not individuals—in practice, was very close to it by placing emphasis on will power and force. This atmosphere bred worship of force and of the material. On the revolutionary philosophy of the CHP, see also Sadi Irmak, "CHP Meseleleri," *Ulus*, October 9-12, 1947; Webster, *op.cit.*, pp. 110, 117. See also my Chapter 13.

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to be carried out by coercion and force, and the degree of force was determined by the number and the variety of the reforms needed.¹²³ Such a view implied that the reforms were decided and carried out by an "elite" which acted on behalf of the people. The elite praised the "new" and despised ignorance. They also could not avoid despising the "ignorant," that is, the people who had not succeeded in getting a formal education or acquiring "modern" manners.

It is in this atmosphere of force and coercion that the Republican Party gradually identified itself with the state and the nation. Placing itself above any control, and encouraged in part by the success of strong governments in Europe, it continued to expand its domination. The 1931 Party Convention, as previously mentioned, defined the six fundamental principles of the Republic. The Party Convention of 1935 appointed the Secretary-General of the Party to be Minister of the Interior and the Governors were appointed as heads of the provincial organizations; regional inspectors were placed in charge of both party and government affairs, while the whole nation were considered members of the Republican Party.¹²⁴ Recep Peker formulated the new philosophy retained until 1945 for a Turkish political party.¹²⁵ In his view, a "political party was an assembly of individuals who hold similar views as to the administration of the state . . . who have to trust and believe in each other in order to materialize their views regarding the policy of the government." A political party (the People's Republican Party) embodied in its program all the economic, social, and political needs of the group in which it originated. Members of a party bound together by a loyalty born of decisions jointly reached in the turmoil of events could devise the best solution to meet these needs.

¹²³ Peker, *Inkılâp Dersleri*, pp. 8-10.

¹²⁴ Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, p. 572. See also my Chapter 15.

¹²⁵ He was dismissed by Atatürk in 1936 supposedly for trying to gain, "like Stalin in Russia," control of the party for himself. *Cumhuriyet*, June 15, 1936. Peker was Premier during 1946-1947.

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The "chief," the leader, represented the basic views, the will, and the creative power of the party.¹²⁶ The best protection for the individual's freedom and opinions lay, not in individualism, but in group representation, that is, in the party.

The Labor Law, passed in 1936 and framed upon the principles of the Italian Labor Law, reflected these views. It denied the workers' right to organize, and declared strikes illegal. (The law promised certain social measures, which were not fulfilled until after the second World War.) The Association Law of 1938 categorically prohibited the formation of associations based on common interests, and as a consequence political parties and Masonic lodges were dissolved. The police were given full authority to seize and hold indefinitely without a warrant any persons considered dangerous. Government officials could not be held accountable before the courts for acts committed in the course of their duties except with the approval of those highest in the government hierarchy. The press was most tightly controlled, both in its daily work and in obtaining permission for founding new publications. A *Basın Birliği* (Press Union) was instituted in 1938 for the purpose of controlling the press.¹²⁷

Atatürk's death on November 10, 1938, and İnönü's succession to the Presidency did not bring visible changes in this stern policy but further stiffened it. Secularism was continued and the language reform was intensified. A shift in ministerial positions followed,¹²⁸ and gradually the rightist group

¹²⁶ Peker, *İklâp Dersleri*, p. 63; *ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

¹²⁷ For the history of the press in Turkey, see Selim Nüzhet, *Türk Gazeteciliği 1831-1931*; İstanbul, 1931; Server R. Iskit, *Türkiyede Matbuat Rejimleri*, İstanbul, 1939; Ahmet Emin, "The Turkish Press," *Modern Turkey*, pp. 448-475; H. Refik Ertuğ, "Cumhuriyet Devrinde Matbuatımız," *Siyasal İlimler Mecmuası*, November 1948, pp. 338ff.; *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 24, pp. 48ff.; *Aynı Tarihi*, April 1944, pp. 4-13. See also İsmet İnönü's views on the press as expressed in 1931, *İnönünün Soylev ve Demeçleri*, pp. 256-265, 268-271.

¹²⁸ Only five of the eleven ministers at the time of Atatürk's death retained their posts. Some of Atatürk's opponents were allowed to enter the National Assembly, some exiles returned, and certain rights of opponents of the nationalist cause were restored. Rustow, "Politics," p. 89.

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in the Republican Party acquired control of the government, which became in fact a party government. The *Şef* (leader), who was the permanent Chairman of the party and the President—head of the state—came to be idolized as the symbol of the state and nation. Some change occurred, however, in party-state relationships at the Republican Party Convention in 1939, when certain high government officials were deprived of key positions in the party. A *Müstakil Grup* (Independent Group) was created in the Assembly to simulate an opposition.¹²⁹ (In 1939 the district of Hatay was annexed, following the vote of the Hatay Assembly for union with Turkey and with the consent of France, the mandatory power for the district.¹³⁰ In the same year, on October 19, an Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty was signed providing mutual assistance in case of an attack leading to war in the Mediterranean or if Turkey were attacked by a European state.) The war years necessitated further stern measures in the economic field,¹³¹ examined in the following chapters, which greatly restricted personal freedom and placed the Republican Party in absolute control of the country. The regime seemed to have acquired rigid features and the government a self-satisfied and self-righteous view of its philosophy,¹³² which appeared, on the surface at least, to be permanent.

Yet, under this rigid and tightly controlled and seemingly omnipotent regime there had been constant cultural, political,

¹²⁹ See section on Republican Party in Chapter 15.

¹³⁰ Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 115-116.

¹³¹ On developments during the war years see *The Middle East in the War* (a publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs), London, 1953. See also my next chapter.

¹³² The Republic Party Parliamentary Group's report based on the Press Directorate Report recommending further restrictions on the press may well illustrate the point. "We have a regime in accordance with the history, character, and structure of the country. Its principles answer all the progressive needs of humanity. It does not go to extremes; it is balanced. In view of the principles on which it stands it is perfect, leaving no ground for imitating any other political systems from abroad. Our regime embodies all the qualities and the good principles of foreign regimes." For report, see *Ulus, Vatan* April 6, 7, 1944; *Ayn Tarihi*, April 1944, pp. 4-13.

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economic, and social evolution. The Republic had created and activated certain social and political forces for the sake of its own survival, and to justify its own existence as a new regime.

Within the span of three-quarters of a century Turkish society had evolved from absolutism to constitutional monarchy and then on to the Republic; from a multi-national theocratic empire to a national secularist state; from simple views to fully-developed ideologies; from small, secret, conspiratorial groups to political parties; from a peasant economy to industry, from total dependence abroad for industrial products to relative self-sufficiency; from group-thinking to more individualized forms. The evolution hardly followed an immaculate course. Conflicts, personal ambitions, lust for power, mismanagement—all marred the struggle, but the result, thus far, even if it has not justified the means, has made them more bearable. At the end of the war two alternatives were open to the Republican Party: to continue to develop and make the necessary adjustments to internal and external conditions or to preserve the status quo. The choice was between progress and regression, between the perils of the unknown and the safety of the tangible present, and maybe between life and death. What the regime accomplished was the miracle of surviving through a new evolution and progress.

CHAPTER 3

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

THE preceding chapters described the main events in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey from political and cultural viewpoints. This description would be incomplete if some aspects of socio-economic transformation which accompanied and, in part, determined those events were neglected. The present chapter, therefore, is an attempt to describe the socio-economic transformation in the late period of the Ottoman Empire and especially in the Republic.

It is generally accepted that the structure of the Ottoman society was simple and undifferentiated and that it consisted of two layers: the Sultan and the ruling classes on top, and the masses at the bottom. The ruling group in the Ottoman Empire "had evolved a regularized, symmetrical and detailed scale of precedence divided into three parallel and corresponding classes." First were the *Ulema*, the interpreters of the sacred law, headed by the office of *Şeyhülislam*. Second were the members of the administrative service, which was headed by the Premier or *Vezir* (later the Sadrazam), and the third, the army or *Ordu*, which was the backbone of the Empire and the human pool supplying a large number of the administrators. Each of these three ruling groups was divided into several hierarchal ranks whose heads and functions normally had a corresponding counterpart in the other two groups.¹

¹ On the social organization of the Ottoman Empire, see Harry Luke, *The Old Turkey and the New*, pp. 176-177; also Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Vol. 1, Part 1, pp. 10ff.; Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement*, p. 22; M. A. Ubcini, *La Turquie Actuelle*, Paris, 1855, pp. 235-236, 238; Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," pp. 326-327; Gibb and Bowen, *op.cit.*, pp. 108-137; Part II, pp. 81ff. For the administration of provinces, see Gibb and Bowen, Part I, pp. 137-173, and

The ruling groups in the Ottoman Empire, although subject to the Sultan, in practice came to dictate his policy, for after the seventeenth century these groups, especially the army, rebelled frequently and changed the Sultan almost at will.

It is also accepted that the Ottoman Empire had no landed aristocracy since state ownership of land prevented the establishment of such a group. A feudal land system, however, was instituted in eastern Anatolia, and the one found in the Balkans was generally preserved.² Some degree of social equalization had nevertheless taken place in the Ottoman Empire, though this was not the result of a social theory but chiefly the by-product of a practical policy conducted with the purpose of strengthening and preserving the government. The landed groups, faced with an omnipotent state in which military considerations were foremost, could never acquire legal status or political power as an organized group; al-

Part II, pp. 1-59; also W. L. Wright, *Ottoman Statecraft, The Book of Counsel for Vezirs and Governors*, Princeton, 1935.

² On land administration, see *Journal Asiatique*, Vol. xv, 1870, pp. 187-301; Ciro Truhelka, "Bosnada Arazi Meselelerinin Tarihi Esasları," *Türk Hukuk ve İktisat Mecmuası*, İstanbul, 1931, pp. 43-69; also *Revue de la Faculté des Sciences Economiques de l'Université d'İstanbul*, October 1945-July 1946, pp. 124ff.; *Annales d'Histoire Economique et Sociale*, Paris, 1933, pp. 445-462; Ebul-Ulâ Mardin, *Toprak Hukuku Dersleri*, İstanbul, 1947. On the land situation in the nineteenth century, see Louis Steeg, "Land Tenure," *Modern Turkey*, pp. 238-268; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Türk Toprak Hukuku Tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 [1858] Tarihli Arazi Kanunnamesi," *Tanzimat*, pp. 321-421; also *XV ci ve XVI nci Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Zırai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esasları*, 1, İstanbul, 1943. For a Turkish thesis in respect to Balkan feudalism defending the view that the Ottoman Empire adopted the policy of reconciling institutions and classes in the conquered territories with its own views and interests, see Halil İnalcık, "Stefan Duşandan Osmanlı İmparatorluğuna XV ci Asırda Rumelide Hristiyan Sipahiler ve Menşeleri," *Fuad Köprülü Armağanı*, İstanbul, 1953, pp. 207-248; also "Timariotes Chrétiens en Albanie au XVe Siecle, d'Après un Registre de Timars Ottomans," *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs*, Vol. IV, 1952, pp. 118-138. For a study of the dialectical-Marxist interpretation of Ottoman feudalism in the Balkans, see Wayne S. Vucinich, "The Yugoslav Lands in the Ottoman Period: Postwar Marxist Interpretation of Indigenous and Ottoman Institutions," *The Journal of Modern History*, September 1955, pp. 287-305.

though in practice, after the Ottoman Administration deteriorated in the eighteenth century, they exercised *de facto* control over a considerable part of the rural population.

The subjects formed the occupational or productive groups and included the peasants, the craftsmen, and the tradesmen. The peasants, the large majority, lived in villages which were relatively prosperous until the seventeenth century. Afterwards, unprotected, neglected, and exploited for military purposes, they regressed to the point of producing for subsistence only.³ The villages themselves disintegrated into small settlements which were established in hidden places to escape the government tax collectors and feudal lords.

The crafts in Anatolia seem to have been organized initially into guilds which passed gradually after the seventeenth century, along with trade, into the hands of non-Muslim minorities. Thus the ethnic Turks, who once excelled in economic occupations,⁴ were limited to agriculture if they lived in villages, and to government service if they belonged to the upperclass. The Islamic rule of forbidding risk and profit aggravated further the stagnation of the economy,⁵ although Islam's arresting effects on the economy were not the same everywhere among the Muslims.⁶ The under-developed econ-

³ For rural history, see H. Reşit Tankut, *Köylerimiz*, İstanbul, 1939, pp. 6ff.; İsmail Hüsrev, *Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı*, Ankara, 1934. On the legal status of agricultural dwellers, see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Çiftçi Sınıflarının Hukuki Statüsü," *Ülkü*, Nos. 49, 50, 53, 58; also "Türkiyede Toprak Meselelerinin Tarihi Esasları," *Ülkü*, Nos. 60, 63, 64, 1937, 1938.

⁴ Ziya Gökalp claimed that the Turks—he probably meant the Muslims—in the past had the trade between Russia, Iran, India, and Byzantium in their hands. He also deals to a great extent with Turkish craftsmanship. See *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 115ff. One of Gökalp's disciples echoes the same view: Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek, *Türk İnkılâbı Dersleri: Ekonomik Değişmeler*, İstanbul, 1935, p. 35.

⁵ See Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution in Turkey," pp. 107ff. Alfred Bonne, *State and Economics in the Middle East*, 2nd ed., London, 1955, pp. 360ff.

⁶ The Muslim Tartars of Khazan excelled in soap boiling, spinning and weaving, and trade, and were quite religious. See Toynbee, *The Western Question*, p. 355. Large numbers of Khazan Tartars went to Japan and

omy limited the opportunities for acquiring wealth and spending it, and this in turn prevented glaring disparities between rich and poor.

Both the ruling and the ruled groups visualized themselves as being inseparably bound together through the state and the dynasty, and as owing absolute allegiance to them. This subservience to the state-Sultan, supported by such a traditionalist philosophy and enforced through the state authority whenever necessary, played a unifying role in the society and prevented to a large extent conflict of political allegiance and class struggle. In the nineteenth century, however, because of the various political and cultural forces mentioned in the previous chapters, this unity began to break down.

For centuries economic relations in the Empire preserved an unchanged character. But the economic inertia which had become the landmark of the Ottoman Empire had reached its end by the time the reform movement started. Sultans Selim III and Mahmud II, induced as mentioned by the political superiority of the West and desirous of strengthening their own authority by replacing the Janissaries and subduing the landlords of Anatolia and Rumelia, introduced a series of reforms, of which the most important was the creation of a modern army. Training this growing army and providing for it arms and ammunition, most of which had to be imported from the West, necessitated new and great expenses.⁷ Furthermore, the new intelligentsia, most of whom entered government service, placed a further financial burden upon

some to New York after the Bolshevik revolution and continued to deal in trade. On the economic prosperity of the Khazan Tartars see Yusuf Akçora, *Türk Yılı 1928*, İstanbul, 1928, pp. 617-647.

⁷ See *Cevdet Tarihi*, İstanbul 1309 (1891), Vol. 4. (For the conversion of Ottoman dates used, see Faik Reşit Unat, *Hicri Tarihleri Milâdi Tarihe Çevirme Kılavuzu*, Ankara, 1940.) See also M. Belin, *Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi* (tr. by M. Ziya), İstanbul, 1931, pp. 261ff., 380ff. By the middle of the nineteenth century the total expenditure of the Ottoman state amounted to 159,252 million fr., out of which 69 million fr. were spent for the Army, 8.6 million for the Navy, 44.8 million for payment of officials, and the rest for other purposes. Ubicini, *La Turquie Actuelle*, p. xviii.

the government, which, compelled by the growing needs of the army, began to establish the first industries to meet such needs. These industries were limited to a few metropolitan areas, and in major part remained restricted in scope and effect.⁸ Through taxation the existing sources of revenue were further exploited to meet the growing government expenses. The *iltizam* system (tax auction to the highest bidder) came to be used widely. When the new taxes proved insufficient to meet the expense they were supplemented by foreign loans. The European Powers which tendered these loans, at high rate, also obtained special privileges in investing capital and in trading with Turkey. These new privileges were added to the extra-territorial guarantees given to the same powers under the capitulations. The cheaper goods of western Europe, entering the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century under extremely favorable conditions, competed with a native industry whose methods of production had remained quite primitive and which lacked accumulated capital. The local industries, chiefly handicrafts unable to compete with foreign capital, consequently collapsed. As unemployment increased in the towns of Anatolia there developed a strong xenophobia supported by religious orthodoxy. This feeling was caused in part by the fact that the foreign capital which entered the Empire came through agents from the non-Muslim minorities in the country. A new middle class that was composed chiefly of non-Muslims representing the foreign interests came into existence. It increased its own financial power and provoked the animosity of the native Muslims,⁹ who dealt

⁸ See Celal Sarç, "Tanzimat ve Sanayimiz," *Tanzimat*, pp. 435ff. For an economic appraisal of Turkey in the nineteenth century, see David Urquhart, *Turkey and Its Resources: Its Municipal Organization, Prospects of English Commerce in the East*, London, 1833. For a description of property relations in the Ottoman Empire, see De la Jonquiere, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris, 1914, p. 605.

⁹ The Muslim Ottoman intelligentsia of the nineteenth century wrote furiously against the new class of intermediaries. Namık Kemal's articles in the *Hürriyet* are the outstanding examples. See Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar," pp. 825-840 *passim*.

in agriculture and on whose products the new system thrived, but who could not share in its spoils. The members of this new non-Muslim middle class became strong supporters of the nationalist struggle of their respective cultural groups.¹⁰

The political struggle in the nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire, however, consisted basically of a fight for constitutionalism which assumed the features of a struggle for power between the intelligentsia (army officers) and the Sultan and his group, and was limited to the upper layer of the Ottoman society. The intelligentsia was chiefly concerned, not with the economic views, interests, and expectations of the middle classes or peasants, but with fulfilling its own cultural and political ideals. Economic questions were subordinated to this goal and envisaged as part of it. The intelligentsia hoped to fulfill its ideals by maintaining and strengthening the state apparatus, while the middle and lower classes complained against the increased state bureaucracy which had expanded and had become a heavy economic burden. The records of debates in the House of Deputies in 1876-1877 show that this body was divided mainly on the question of the functions of the state and its large bureaucracy. The deputies representing the government's viewpoint desired to institute new measures which logically necessitated an expansion of the government organization, whereas deputies who came from the provinces insisted on limiting the government bureaucracy and giving freedom to private capital and enterprises.¹¹

¹⁰ For the establishment and expansion of the Greek colony of Ayvalık (Cydonia), see Toynbee, *The Western Question*, pp. 121-122; George Finley, *History of Greece*, Vol. VII, Oxford, 1877; and Luke, *Old Turkey and the New*, pp. 142ff.

¹¹ Vasilaki, one of the Greek deputies from İstanbul, declared in the House of Deputies: "The peasant works in rain and heat and gathers his harvest. He cannot transport and sell it because there are no roads. His goods perish for there are no merchants to buy them. If the people in a country are rich that country becomes strong. . . . Let's trust our minerals and forests to foreign and local capital without raising difficulties and [setting] conditions. Let's get out to light our underground riches. We must bring the foreigner's capital into our country. If we could reduce our expenses and increase our revenue, and if we are able to find a way to

The Young Turks (Union and Progress) opened, as a consequence and corollary of their nationalist views, a new phase in the socio-economic history of the Ottoman Empire. The economic problem faced by the Young Turks was three-fold: first, to establish a national economy by abolishing the bonds which tied the Ottoman Empire to foreign capital; second, to replace, the minorities and foreign agents who held the economy of the country in their hands with ethnic Turks; and third, to induce the population to enter economic activities of all kinds besides agriculture, and to bring about the readjustment of social, cultural, and ethical values to the new developments.

The Young Turks made some small attempt to deal with all three aspects of the problem indicated above. A resolution to abolish the capitulations was accepted in 1914.¹² (The capitulations were abolished in 1923.) A national bank was established in 1916 with a capital of TL. 4,000,000 to support local economic enterprises. Cooperatives and various other associations with economic purposes were initiated, and whenever a local enterprise was established, it was widely publicized. The population was urged to learn some trades and to buy locally manufactured goods. A law to encourage industrial development was passed in 1913.¹³

The idea of placing the ethnic Turks in economic positions led the Young Turks to require by law that foreign companies

regularize our treasury, we can regain our financial credit." *Meclisi Mebusan 1293-1277* (ed. by Hakkı Tarık Üs), İstanbul, 1940, p. 323. See also the views of Nafi (Deputy of Aleppo) Nüfel (Syria), Ahmet (head of mat makers of İstanbul), and Hasan Fehmi (Journalist of İstanbul), *ibid.*, pp. 118, 124, 129, 157, 204.

¹² For a description of this attempt and the legal reasons of the West in opposing it, see *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 8, 1914, pp. 873-876. On capitulations, see Sir E. Pears, "The Capitulations," *Law Quarterly Review*, October 1905, pp. 408-425; also G. Pelissie du Rausas, *Le Regime des Capitulations dans l'Empire Ottoman*, 2 Vols., Paris 1902, 1905.

¹³ For a general view on these attempts, see *Tanin*, December 1913, January, April, May 1914; cited by Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 204-205.

include a certain number of Turkish citizens on their administrative boards. Furthermore, in many instances the shops owned by minorities were boycotted at the government's instigation with the purpose of boosting the business in the enterprises owned by ethnic Turks. This official policy of endorsing the acquisition of wealth was the beginning of a general practice of depending on wealth instead of government positions for political power, social prestige and influence.

The Young Turks' economic policy, which was a paradoxical, piecemeal combination of statism, liberalism, and nationalism, set the tone for an economic policy and philosophy which was developed fully in Republican Turkey.

The Republic met with economic problems similar to those faced by the Young Turks, but it was in a more advantageous position to solve them. The country was politically free to pursue its own economic policy, for the abolishment of the capitulations, already accepted by Mustafa Kemal's nationalists in 1920, was recognized by the West in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The foreign debts inherited from the Ottoman Empire were reduced considerably. The government was strong and in effective control of the entire national territory,¹⁴ and the population was culturally homogeneous.

The new regime was faced with the need for urgent economic development. Private capital in general was lacking and foreign capital was unwilling to come; first, because the conditions offered were unsatisfactory; and secondly, because the foreign capitalists were not sure whether the Turkish Revolution differed from the Russian. Moreover, the Republican leaders, recalling the capitulations, showed great suspicion of anything entailing economic responsibilities abroad. Finally, nationalism, accepted as the foundation of the regime,

¹⁴ The Republican government had to carry a struggle against landlords in the eastern part of the country to establish its own authority. For first-hand testimony see the memoirs of two governors: Ali Kemali, *Erzincan*, İstanbul, 1932, pp. 196ff.; and Cemal Bardakçı, *Bizde Siyasi Partiler*, İstanbul, 1946, pp. 47ff.

called for an economic policy in line with its own political views—self-reliance and self-sufficiency. Statism was born out of this multiplicity of economic, historical, and political circumstances.¹⁵ Yet adherence to statism as an economic doctrine was far from being rigid. On the contrary, the evidence seems to indicate that Republican leaders favored private capital in economic enterprise.¹⁶ Statism developed into a fairly comprehensive policy—more than a doctrine—later on.

The purpose of statism originally was to develop the national economy by liberating it from dependence on foreign capital and by supplementing and encouraging locally owned private industries through state action. The *İş* (work) Bank, established in 1924 by the government, was to provide capital to local industries. The *Sanayi ve Maden* (Industrial and Mineral Bank), established in 1925, had its name changed later to *Sümer* Bank, and was delegated to establish the industry of Turkey. Later, in 1930, the Central Bank was established as a basic financial pool for all the banks. The *Eti* Bank was established in 1936 for the development of mineral re-

¹⁵ For statism in Turkey, see A. H. Hanson, *The Structure and Control of State Enterprises in Turkey*, mimeographed by the UN Institute of Public Administration, Ankara, 1954, pp. 7ff.; see also *The Economy of Turkey*, a Report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, 1951; Bonne, *State and Economics*, pp. 274-284; Dragoslav Mihajolovic, *La Nouvelle Turquie Economique*, Belgrad, 1937; and Davide Cittone, "La Politica Economica della Repubblica Turca," *Rivista Bancaria*, Milano, 1938, pp. 281-302. For Turkish views on statism, see Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Davalarımız*, Vol. 6, İstanbul, 1943; also Celâl Sarc, "Economic Policy of the New Turkey," *The Middle East Journal*, October 1948, pp. 430-446. See also my Chapter 11.

¹⁶ Celal Mahmut (Bayar) officially declared even before the Republic was established that big capital would be welcome to develop national resources. See his speeches in the National Assembly on February 24 and March 10, 1921, reproduced in *Celal Bayar Diyor ki* (ed. by Nazmi Sevgen), İstanbul, 1951, pp. 21-22. Moreover, the National Assembly approved the Chester concession, which included railways and oil development concessions in the central and eastern part of the country. The concession was granted with the purpose of securing American support at Lausanne against the claims of European Powers for economic privileges in Turkey. On this concession, see Henry Woodhouse in *Current History*, March 1922, pp. 953-959, June 1923, pp. 393-400; for the text of agreement, see the latter, pp. 485-489.

sources. Meanwhile, a law of April 19, 1926, reserved all coastal shipping to Turkish vessels; another law for the encouragement of industry was passed in 1929.¹⁷ The nationalization of railways started with the gradual purchase of the tracks owned by foreign companies, and new ones were built with government capital.

Despite all these measures the economy developed at a low rate during the first seven years of the Republic, and with the world economic crisis in 1929, it slowed down. It was from 1930 onwards that the state participation in economy gradually expanded. The absence in Turkey at that time, as Professor Hanson has stated, of any strong body of opinion which favored private enterprise as a matter of principle or self-interest allowed this policy free rein. Law, rather than political economy, was the staple educational diet of the administrative elite, and there was virtually no bourgeoisie to feel its power and privileges threatened by planning and nationalization.¹⁸

By 1945, statism had enveloped all the major fields of economy, either by way of new enterprises or by nationalization (mines, forests, transportation, etc.). It extended into all fields. In agriculture there were thirty state farms; in forestry, one hundred twenty-one enterprises; in mining, eleven enterprises; in industry, twenty-two large factories such as steel, cement, leather, paper textiles (the two largest ones, at Kayseri with 33,000 spindles, and at Nazilli, were established with Russian credit and machinery); in monopolies such as tobacco and alcohol, forty-seven plants. Several organizations

¹⁷ On the development of industry see *Türkiye İktisat Mecmuası*, February 1948, pp. 26ff.; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 133-134; Hanson, *Structure and Control*, p. 9; Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*, New York, 1949, pp. 28ff.; Osman Okyar, "Industrialization in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, June-July, 1953, pp. 209ff.

¹⁸ Hanson, *Structure and Control*, p. 9. See also Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 133-134; and Thornburg et al., *loc.cit.* For a critical view of Thornburg's views on Turkish economy, see Osman Okyar, "Mr. Thornburg ve Türk Ekonomisi," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, July 1948, pp. 291ff.

were established for the distribution of soil products and of gas and coal; several others dealt in utilities; still others controlled ice plants, slaughterhouses, beaches, restaurants, and stadiums.¹⁹

Statism in Turkey was not a well-entrenched theory, but that it was accepted as a practical necessity is shown by the fact that its definition and meaning varied from one Minister to another. For instance, the late Şükrü Saracoğlu, Premier in 1942-1946, declared publicly and privately that the Turkish system was an "advanced type of socialism." Celal Bayar, on the other hand, the initiator of statism, insisted that statism was supposed to bolster private enterprise.²⁰

The position of the individual in statism appears equivocal; in theory, private capital and enterprise were recognized, but in practice the state's economic activities expanded to restrict and even eliminate those enterprises. The Prime Minister, introducing the first five-year plan drafted in 1934,²¹ said that the plan would give a great stimulus to private initiative and capital, and the Republican Party program accepted private enterprise as a basic element in the economy.²²

¹⁹ *Türkiye İktisat Mecmuası* (cited also as *Türk. İk. Mec.*), March-April 1948, pp. 50ff. and December 1948, pp. 39ff.; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 168-169, 248-249.

²⁰ On this point, see *Türk. İk. Mec.*, December 1948, pp. 18, 45ff. and August 1948, p. 30; *Tan*, August 11, 1945; Lewis, "Recent Developments," p. 324. Saracoğlu declared in the National Assembly in 1942: "We are not the students of Adam Smith or the disciples of Karl Marx. We are only the sons of the political party whose social religion is morality and whose doctrine is economic statism." *BMMTD (Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi)*, Session 6, Vol. 28, p. 14. See also Gotthard Jäschke, *Die Türkei in Den Jahren, 1942-1951*, Wiesbaden, 1955, p. 10.

²¹ For the plan, see *2 nci 5-Yıllık Sanayi Planı*, a publication of the Ministry of Economy, Ankara, 1936. Thornburg, et al., *Turkey*, pp. 27ff.; Bonne, *State and Economics*, pp. 277ff.; S. C. Wyatt, "Turkey: The Economic Situation and the Five-Year Plan," *International Affairs*, November 1934, pp. 828ff.; Hedley V. Cooke, *Challenge and Response in the Middle East*, New York, 1952, pp. 268-269; *Near East*, December 28, 1933, January 25, 1934, April 12, 1934.

²² Atatürk himself declared through Celal Bayar in 1935 at İzmir Fair that the meaning of statism was to "uphold the principle of private enterprise but to take into state hands the fatherland's economy, keeping in mind

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In effect, this statism was state capitalism, because the state used its political power to accumulate capital through taxation and the exploitation of the local markets and resources in a way similar to private capital. Political considerations were placed ahead of social and economic objectives; raw material was bought at a low price and state products were sold at a price several times higher than their actual cost.²³ Protection of labor, unemployment agencies, insurance, social security and assistance—that is to say, social measures—were neglected until 1946. In the southern parts of the country labor was sold at auction by entrepreneurs who would gather the unemployed men in the villages and offer them to the highest bidder in the cities, keeping for themselves the difference between the wages they paid to the peasant and the amount received from the employer.

This was indeed a one-sided statism, imposing heavy duties on and demanding abnegation from the major part of the population but unwillingly favoring a small minority. Moreover, this statism was incomplete, for the state participated only in one phase of the production process; it controlled directly neither the production of most of the raw materials nor the distribution of finished goods; it concentrated chiefly on transforming the raw material into finished or semi-finished products. Some basic raw materials, such as cotton, wool, beets, grapes, and tobacco, were produced by private individuals and purchased by the state, which finished them. The prices for these materials were established by the state, many

all the needs and the unaccomplished tasks of a great nation and a vast country." *Ayin Tarihi*, No. 27, p. 24, cited in Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 261. As late as 1945 the Government stated that private enterprise was essential for the country's industrial development, and with this idea in mind, it requested the industrial unions and chambers of commerce to advise it about measures to induce owners of private capital to invest in industry. *Ayin Tarihi*, May 1945, p. 131 (statement by Fuat Sirmen, Minister of Economy).

²³ *Türk. İkt. Mec.*, August 1948, p. 20, Başar, *Davalarımız*, pp. 239-248; *Vatan*, March 23, 1947 (Menderes in Kütahya).

times below their free market cost. But the state was thus able to create a large demand for some materials which had never been much in use before, with the result that an additional number of people found employment and that the income of independent producers increased,²⁴ despite the fact that there were constant complaints against the low prices paid by the state.

In urban areas a similar process took place. The semi-processed goods sold by state enterprises were finished in privately owned shops; for instance, shoe stores used leather manufactured by state enterprises to make all kinds of wearing apparel and sell it at the free market prices, although the state also began to sell its own shoes, usually of a lower quality. Furthermore, consumption goods, especially the monopoly products (tobacco, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, salt, matches) were sold mainly through privately owned firms with some profit margin left to the dealers. Trade as a whole, especially exports and imports, was left almost exclusively to individuals, while the state limited itself to supervising—rather rigidly—such activities. The conclusion is that statism provided certain sections of the population with additional income and employment possibilities.

The demands for goods of all kinds, and in particular for consumer goods, increased along with this rise in the buying power of some sections of the population. The state factories, with their low production, could not meet all these demands. Therefore, a number of privately owned enterprises, employing five to ten people and producing the same consumer goods as the state factories but at much lower cost, were established in the major cities of Turkey.²⁵ Since the market prices were

²⁴ For instance the Turhal sugar refinery accorded contracts for 150,000 tons of beets to 18,000 farmers. Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 251. On the purchase of goods from individuals, see also *BMMTD*, Session 6, Vol. 28, p. 15.

²⁵ For instance, the glassware factory of Paşabahçe produced only a fraction of the goods needed on the market. As a consequence, a number of small factories were established on the outskirts of İstanbul. They used

set by the state in accordance with the high production costs of its own products, private enterprises, which had lower production costs, made very high profits.²⁶

All these economic developments took place at the beginning in a rather slow and orderly fashion. But the second World War gave a sudden impetus to all these businesses and considerably changed the economic process. The shortage of imported goods on the market became extremely acute after 1939. The army was mobilized, and although Turkey did not enter the war, she maintained a large army throughout and after the war. All this resulted in a heavy drain on her economy. Naturally, the army increased the demand for goods on the market. In order to meet the swollen demand, the privately owned (and frequently illegally established) plants increased in number, and the prices of all consumption items went up.²⁷ Black-marketeering and hoarding of imported goods became standard practice. The great shortage of staple food, such as bread, enabled land owners, who could produce more wheat than their own needs and save it from state collections, to make big profits. (In order to keep down the bread price, the state bought wheat at a much lower rate than the free market price and this caused considerable discontent, as we shall see in the next chapter.)

waste glass to produce the additional glassware needed on the market. A more striking example was the textile industry. In the larger cities of Turkey small plants with two to ten looms produced a variety of wearing apparel and sold them primarily to the villages. Some of the factories used the fibers produced initially by the state enterprises, others used old clothes, and some used their own raw material. In İstanbul alone, there were several hundred small factories operating during the war years, usually in one or two rooms of a private dwelling and employing a limited number of people in order to evade the provisions of the Labor Law.

²⁶ Robert W. Kerwin, "Private Enterprise in Turkish Industrial Development," *The Middle East Journal*, 1951, p. 27.

²⁷ Premier Saracoğlu declared in 1942: "The hand looms are increasing at a surprising rate. Those who possess four looms in their homes easily become rich. . . . They can live very well by reselling the yarn which they buy from the state at low price. The state manufactures materials which are sold at low price, pass from hand to hand and are sold to people at four or five times their original price." *BMMTD*, Session 6, Vol. 28, p. 20.

The state, faced with the need for additional materials to meet the needs of the army and the civilian population, tried to increase production to maintain the normal standard of living. Since there was an acute shortage of manpower in mines and industry, chiefly because of low wages and the lack of a class of industrial workers willing to work in such enterprises, the state imposed compulsory work obligations on certain people under the *Milli Korunma Kanunu*, National Defense Law, passed in 1940.²⁸ This law, which was enforced without the prescribed ordinance (*kararname*)—probably to avoid bad publicity—empowered the responsible minister to require citizens (chiefly peasants) living in the areas in which the mines were located to perform work for a given period every year.²⁹ These measures caused widespread discontent among the peasants, and after 1945 served as arguments to criticize the government.

Statism in the economic sector, whatever its authoritarian aspects, had, nevertheless, helped increase the national income from TL 1,330 billion in 1933-1936 to 6,370 billion in 1942, although the real increase was actually only twenty-eight per cent, the rest being due to inflation. Per capita income also

²⁸ Article 9 of the law (#3780) stated that workers and qualified personnel be provided to industrial enterprises and mining enterprises in order to maintain their rate of production and avoid work stoppage. "For this purpose paid work obligations may be imposed upon citizens." Article 10 stated that workers and technicians could not leave their work place without an acceptable reason. Amendment Law #4648 of August 3, 1944, empowered the district and province governor to use security forces against those who fled the work place or failed to perform their work obligation. This applied in particular to peasants living in mining areas. The same law restricted greatly the freedom of trade of private enterprises.

²⁹ The Minister of Economy (Fuad Sirmen) declared in the National Assembly that the ordinance was not published because the work obligation was considered similar to military service and therefore exempt from ordinary procedure. He also claimed that the law was not being enforced and that the idea was to abolish it at an early date. Hikmet Bayur, who started the initial discussion on the subject, claimed that the work obligation was imposed in Ereğli, Kırkağaç and Soma, regardless of the fact that the people had their own work on the farms, that they had completed their military service, and that they received low pay in the mines. *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 17, pp. 218-225, 396-405.

went up from TL 82.10 in 1936 to 416.33 in 1944, although the real income increase was only about TL 2.62 per capita if prices were compared to those in 1936. (The official rate for the dollar was TL 1.80 until September 1946, 2.80 until August 1958, and 9.00 since then.) The price of raw material meanwhile quadrupled while wages and social benefits increased only twofold.³⁰

It is in this period that there was a slow but steady acquisition of capital in private hands. The existing figures in this respect do not reflect accurately the situation since a large portion of the capital was invested in land properties and houses, or was converted into gold and hoarded at home, or given in loans with high interest—the last two instances being most common in small towns and among small merchants. Nevertheless, the figures may well indicate the trend in capital accumulation.³¹

This accumulation increased greatly during war years and was also facilitated by the tax system, which, until recently, was based on gross earnings. While the tax applied rigidly

³⁰ Şefik Bilkur, *National Income of Turkey*, Ankara, 1949, p. 9; Thornburg et al., *Turkey*, pp. 145-146. Both these authors rely on official figures. Industrial production amounted to 16.2% of the national income between 1936-1937. The per capita national income in 1956 was TL. 875 at current prices and TL. 536 at constant prices. *National Income of Turkey*, a publication of the General Statistical Office, Ankara, 1957, pp. 24-34.

³¹ The following figures coming from two reliable sources indicate the bank deposits of private individuals (TL. in millions):

1924	13.	1940	274.6
1929	117.	1941	374.9
1931	116.	1942	369.6
1935	139.	1943	420.3
1938	227.	1944	498.4
1944	444.	1945	528.2
1948	813.	1946	607.6
		1947	702.8

In 1957 bank deposits amounted to TL. 6 billion. See *BMMTD*, Session 8, Vol. 25, p. 312; Thornburg et al., *Turkey*, p. 158. For further information on accumulation of capital, see Muhlis Ete, "Türkiyede Hususi Teşebbüsler," *Türk Ekonomisi*, September 1947, pp. 267ff.; *Zafer*, October 20, 1957 (Menderes in Elazığ).

to wages and salaries,³² it left the tradesman, whose enterprises multiplied during the war,³³ practically untaxed. The "invisible" accumulation of capital in certain hands, and its squandering, as contrasted with the bad economic situation of the wage and salary earners and peasants, was indeed so striking at the end of the second World War as to become a source of complaint in the National Assembly.³⁴ Statism and its multiple effects became one of the major issues in the political struggle after 1946, and underwent, as mentioned later, some amendment similar to other principles at the foundations of republicanism in Turkey.

The general background of politics in Turkey could be understood better if population movements were briefly studied. Such a study becomes even more important since group solidarity, either on the basis of kinship (*aşiret*) or place of origin, has tended to acquire an increasingly important place in party politics on the local level.³⁵ It is true that no group

³² For instance, in 1944, 45,057 contractors, in many cases undertaking work worth millions of lira, paid only TL. 8.4 million tax compared with TL. 186 million paid by small enterprises and wage and salary earners. The same year, the high income groups formed 41 per cent of the tax contributors, but their paid tax amounted only to 13.8 per cent of the total. Faik Ökte, *Varlık Vergisi Faciası*, İstanbul, 1951, p. 25.

³³ In İzmir, for instance, there were only nine big private business firms before the war; after the war they numbered forty-one. Halil Ahmet, "Köylümüzün Alım Kudreti Hakkında Araştırmalar," *Cumhuriyet*, January 31, 1946.

³⁴ Hikmet Bayur, a notable historian, declared in 1945, in the National Assembly: "Nobody knows their real number but there are about 30,000-40,000 war profiteers. Some of them, although not quite millionaires yet, possess hundreds of thousands [of liras] and together with their families they number several hundred thousand people. The expenditure of these people is without measure. This cannot be considered a rise in the standard of living." *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 20, pp. 119-120.

³⁵ For instance, to cite only a few examples from the general elections of 1957, in Mardin the Ademî and Mahmudî, in Hakârî the groups of Şeyh Kerim Ağa and Şeyh Selim Seven, in Urfa the Nemrudî and Halilî, and in Muş several other kinship groups have supported in common either the Republicans or the Democrats. Elsewhere, for instance in Eskişehir, the distinction of *Yerli* (indigenous) and *Yabancı* (outsider) played a major part in the campaign during the last elections. In Mersin, where a bloody riot took place between Republicans and Democrats, the leader of the former party,

has shown consistent internal solidarity, or lent constant support to one political party, nevertheless, in some parts of the country, in particular in the East and South where the rural population is divided into kinship groups, political allegiance is still decided in great part on a group basis. Group differences, however, have not created long-lasting animosities or profound disturbances. Thus, any movement in or out of the groups weakens the group attachment.

Turkey has been subject to intense population movements since the nineteenth century, caused by historical and political events. After the Ottoman Empire lost its European territories, through the Berlin Treaty of 1878 and especially the Balkan War of 1913, ethnic Turks living in those areas began gradually to migrate to the motherland. Few ethnic Turks ever emigrated to the United States or elsewhere. In the Republican regime this migration intensified through the agreement on exchange of population concluded with Greece, and later through agreements concluded with other Balkan countries.³⁶ The main reason for migration was cultural affin-

Mahmut Baytuç was supported by his countrymen from Urfa, while Zeki Budur was supported by the Fellah, i.e., the Arab speaking minority brought in during the Ottoman Empire to raise cotton in the region. In Adapazarı, a large immigrant community, voted mostly for the government because of propaganda conducted on a group basis. See *Cumhuriyet*, September 27, 29, October 11, 1957, February 7, 1958.

³⁶ Between 1912 and 1920, 557,111 (another figure is 413,922) Turks from Balkan territories came to Turkey. Between 1923 and 1954 a total number of 1,040,120 people emigrated to Turkey, approximately half of these being exchangees against 1.3 million Greeks who left Turkey in 1922-1924. The immigrants were settled in every province of Turkey, the distribution being rather heavy in Eastern Thrace and central and south Anatolia, where they were installed in the houses of the former Greek or Armenian owners. On the exchange of population, see Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey*, New York, 1932, pp. 335-584 *passim*; also chapter XXXIII. See also *Current History*, April 1923, pp. 86-90 (W. D. Lane); Toynbee, *The Western Question*, p. 138; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 113-114; *Toprak İskân Çalışmaları*, a publication of the Settlement Directorate, Ankara, 1955, pp. 57ff.; Ahmed Refik, *Türkiyede Mülteciler Meselesi*, İstanbul, 1926; and H. C. Wolfe, "Minorities Transplantation," *American Scholar*, January 1936, pp. 126ff. The censuses of 1935 and 1945 indicate the foreign born as 962,159 and

ity and, therefore, the cultural integration of the newcomers into the local communities took place without much difficulty,³⁷ except for occasional conflicts between the immigrants and native inhabitants because of distribution of land and other property.

The immigrants who had come to Turkey before the first World War were generally in the higher income bracket and established themselves in cities to become part of the new merchant and industrialist class. The later comers, however, the largest number of whom had resided in rural areas in their country of origin, lost their property or sold it there at a very low price. They came impoverished to Turkey. Since there was no scientifically planned settlement policy, this latter group encountered material hardships. Settled mostly in rural areas, a good many of them were unable to adjust to the new economic and social conditions, normally harder than in their country of origin, and so migrated to the cities and found employment in factories or specialized in crafts. A good part of the city proletariat was formed by these immigrants, and many politically active groups were formed among them.

832,616 respectively. The figure excludes 154,000 refugees from Bulgaria. *Istatistik Yıllığı*, Ankara, 1953, p. 82. In 1950, 154,000 Turks living in Bulgaria found refuge in Turkey. See Huey Louis Kostanick, "Turkish Resettlement of Refugees from Bulgaria, 1950-1953," *The Middle East Journal*, Winter 1955, pp. 41ff.; see also, *World Today*, January 1951, pp. 30-36. For movement of population in the Ottoman Empire, see also Ömer Lutfi Barkan, "Les Deportations comme Methode de Peuplement et de Colonisation dans l'Empire Ottoman," *Revue de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques de l'Universite d'Istanbul*, XI, 1949-1950, pp. 67-131. On the general policy of migration in the Republic and the Young Turks' era, as well as the deep attachment of the immigrants to their old lands in Rumelia, see Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. VIII, London, 1954, pp. 264-265.

³⁷ The Albanians were restricted from migrating to Turkey. Unlike other Muslim groups in the Balkans, they had developed a strong nationalism of their own and therefore appeared unassimilable. The Albanians already living in Turkey, however, were considered Turks. On this view and on the various measures taken by the government for the immigrants in 1924, see the declaration of Celal Bayar, then the Minister of Settlement, in the National Assembly. *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 30-39.

Although nowadays the word *muhacir* (immigrant) in Turkey carries with it a somewhat derogatory and occasionally suspicion-inviting meaning, and although the part played by immigrants as immigrants in national politics is insignificant,³⁸ it can be said that their coming into Anatolia helped break the closed circle of the traditionalist, isolationist Anatolian community, thus making it more receptive to new ideas, including political ideas. The effect of group affiliations are felt more distinctly in politics on the local level.

There was also a movement of population within Anatolia itself. The surplus population from the Black Sea region was settled in the interior of the country, while in other areas entire communities migrated elsewhere for economic reasons of their own. Some other communities established in forest areas were resettled by the government in places suitable for agriculture in order to stop the unrational exploitation and destruction of forests. The need for employment sent the inhabitants of mountain villages to valleys for seasonal work (to Adana for cotton picking, for instance), while others specializing in a particular occupation (cooks of Bolu, porters of Konya, seamen of the Black Sea region) spread throughout the country in search of work according to their specialization. Along with the movement of population there was also a reorientation toward economic occupations previously held by non-Muslim minorities, such as manufacturing and

³⁸ The National Assembly, tenth session, was composed of 541 deputies (seven vacant seats). Only twenty-two deputies were born outside of Turkey, and of these the majority appear to be over sixty years of age and not immigrants but probably members of the Ottoman administrators group which moved to Turkey once these territories were ceded. The most notable figure in politics among those born abroad is Samet Ağaoğlu. He was born in Caucasus in 1909, the son of Ahmet Ağaoğlu, a liberal-nationalist, who came to Turkey after the Bolshevik revolution. Occasionally S. Ağaoğlu's opponents have pointed to his non-Turkish birthplace in a devious move to question his patriotism. Ağaoğlu, however, is a fierce nationalist whose rightist views have been often criticized. *Onuncu Devre TBMM Albümü*, Ankara, 1954, pp. 85-134. For a comparison with the U.S. Congress, see Murray G. Lawson, "The Foreign-born in Congress, 1789-1949," *The American Political Science Review*, December 1957, pp. 1183-1189.

trade. This orientation was necessitated by the departure of non-Muslim minorities from Turkey between 1917 and 1924. (Minorities were left mainly in Istanbul and a few other large cities.) Practically all crafts and trades were in their hands (the supply of goods, the manufacture of home and agricultural utensils) and consequently shortages of all kinds of goods followed. Sheer necessity compelled the remaining population of Turkish descent to take on their own shoulders the tasks carried out previously by the minorities.³⁹ The hardship caused by adjustment to new occupations lasted only a few years, as the nation quickly learned to build and run factories, to fabricate goods, and to buy and sell them without intermediaries. Self confidence was born as Turks realized that there was nothing wrong with them, as they had been led to believe by Westerners and the minorities alike for centuries, that would prevent them from dealing with economic matters.

Thus, Turkey had established her economy and, together with it, changes in her social and economic relations, cultural views, and social habits. From the political viewpoint the most important effect of these changes may be summarized around two points: social differentiation and a change of values which provided a suitable ground for the birth and propagation of political ideas as well as the activities of political groups.

³⁹ A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. VIII, pp. 267-268; see also *Turkey and the West*, pp. 9-10.

CHAPTER 4

THE SOCIAL CLASSES AND WARTIME DEVELOPMENTS

SOcial classes in Turkey became differentiated in the Republic owing mainly to statism which created capital and allowed its accumulation (in part) in private hands.

Social and economic contradictions and conflicts were bound to arise throughout this economic process. The state had helped to create these contradictions, although in theory unwittingly it clung to the idea that its role was to distribute social justice, and to extend protection to all social groups on an equal basis. The state philosophy was not socialistic, although social considerations played a considerable part in shaping the ideology of the Republic.

The government had assumed the dual role of entrepreneur and mediator between various interests and social groups. It could, occasionally, use its economic power to support one particular social group while placing restraint and impositions on other groups. Hence there resulted in Turkey, especially during the war years, a tortuous economic and social policy that went from one extreme to another and usually ended in a rigid, middle-of-the-road conservatism. This policy left all groups dissatisfied. Especially during the war years, the accumulation of capital had gathered such momentum that it was hardly possible to maintain the old monolithic social philosophy and statist policy without causing general discontent. A clearer picture of the social groups, their situation and views, as well as special events concerning each one of them, should emerge if they are specifically studied.

A. The Peasants and Land Ownership

The largest social group in Turkey comprises the peasants who,¹ in 1945, formed eighty-three per cent of the population and lived in more than 40,000 villages spread all over the country.² The rate of rural population had fallen to seventy-one per cent in 1955. Although the land area of Turkey is rather large, the amount of arable land per capita is very small, because a good part of the total consists of mountains or arid and pasture lands.

The proprietorship of land, according to the existing and widely accepted table of land ownership,³ is divided as follows: the large properties over 5,000 *dönüms*, or 1250 acres, amount to 418 estates; the medium properties (between 5,000-500 *dönüms*) to 5,764, and the small properties (less than 500 *dönüms*) to 2,493,000 holdings. (A *dönüm* is equal to 0.10 ha.) These three groups represent 0.01, 0.23, and 99.75 per cent of the total land ownership, respectively. Although this table brings into focus one main feature of Turkish agriculture—the fact that the small property is the dominant type—it is, nevertheless, both inaccurate and outdated.⁴

¹ For a view of the peasants in Anatolia during the Ottoman Empire, see Sir W. M. Ramsay, "The Turkish Peasantry of Anatolia," *Quarterly Review*, January 1918. See also my Chapter 3, notes 12 and 13.

² For the names of Turkish villages, see *Son Teşkilâtı Mülkiyede Köylerimiz Adları*, published by the Interior Ministry, İstanbul, 1928.

³ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*, İstanbul, 1946, p. 33.

⁴ The table is inaccurate because the figures were obtained by generalizing, to include the whole country, the results of a survey of land properties conducted in only 35 provinces out of a total of 63 provinces as they existed at that time (Barkan, *Çiftçiyi*, p. 36). Furthermore, some of the lands shown as small properties are equivalent, in terms of capital, productivity, and manpower to some of the large properties. The industrial crops (cotton, tobacco, olives, and fruit) are grown on properties smaller than 500 *dönüms*, but the productivity of these holdings and the number of persons employed on them place their owners in the category of the big landowners. Moreover, the figure for the small properties does not indicate whether all these properties suffice to provide a normal standard of living

The village population of Turkey is estimated to number about 3 million families (each family averaging five members). A family, in view of the low quality of the land, needs about ten hectares in order to make an adequate living. Therefore, a total of 30 million ha. of arable land would be required to support the whole village population of Turkey. The cultivated land, including the vineyards and the gardens, amounted to 14.9 million ha. in 1953-1954, excluding 6.4 million ha. of fallow land.⁵ (This total represents a forty per cent increase in arable land compared to 1945.) Thus, if all the arable land available were distributed to the villagers it would not suffice. Moreover, the land in many areas, such as central Anatolia, is of such a poor quality that it has to stay fallow for as many as three consecutive years. In consequence, there is a rather large number of peasants who

for a family. Actually a large percentage of small property owners are in the category of needy peasants.

The table is outdated because it was originally compiled in 1935; the situation of landownership in Turkey has since undergone spectacular changes, especially after 1950, through United States economic aid which has resulted in farm mechanization. Farm production increased from 7,069,500 metric tons in 1946-1950, to 14,343,900 in 1952-1953. *Zirai Būnye ve İstihsal*, Ankara, 1955, p. 5. Turkey, in 1955, had over 40,000 tractors, as compared with only 2,227 tractors in 1946-1950.

Along with farm mechanization, there has been a great change in land ownership, methods of land cultivation, and agricultural relations; as a result large land ownership has steadily increased to the detriment of the small farms. There has also been a dislocation of sharecroppers and agricultural workers, who have migrated to the cities. See *Economic and Social Aspects of Farm Mechanization*, F. O. A., Ankara, 1952, pp. 45ff. On the agriculture of Turkey, see also G. E. Brandow, *Agricultural Development in Turkey*, F. O. A. (Ankara, 1953). For a view on villages and the impact of mechanization, see Richard D. Robinson, "Tractors in the Village—A Study in Turkey," *Journal of Farm Economics*, November 1952, pp. 451-462. For a case study in the area, see Nicholas Helburn, "A Stereotype of Agriculture in Semiarid Turkey," *Geographical Review*, July 1955, pp. 375ff. The number of dislocated farmers can be placed as high as 1.5 million. This figure roughly corresponds to the increase in urban population which has taken place in Turkey since 1950, as indicated by the general census of 1955.

⁵ *Zirai Būnye ve İstihsal*, p. 3. For land distribution according to crops, see *Zirai İstatistik*, a publication of the General Statistical Office, Ankara, 1957, p. 1.

are landless or who possess insufficient land for a normal living standard.⁶ Land distribution in Turkey, although it has followed a steady pace in the last decade, has so far only partially solved the problem of the landless peasants.⁷

With the exception of the groups with lands of larger size who have greatly improved their living conditions under the agricultural policy followed since 1949, the living standard of the peasant is low.⁸ The villages of Turkey are therefore confronted with two problems: how to meet the shortages of land, and how to improve farming methods and techniques.⁹ Moreover, in certain areas in the country there are

⁶ The number of landless or land-short peasants, a point on which the interested parties are very "sensitive," has been a matter of speculation owing to the lack of definite official figures. The International Bank Mission estimated the number of landless peasant families as from 126,000 to 787,000, and those with insufficient land from 900,000 to 1,600,000 families. *The Economy of Turkey—Report of the International Bank*, Washington, D.C., 1951, p. 62. Fevzi L. Karaosmanoğlu, while Minister of Interior in 1951, estimated the number of families in need of land as high as 2,251,000. *Ulus*, December 19, 1951. Remzi Yüregir, a deputy from Adana, placed the number of landless peasants at 8 million. *BMMTD*, Session 8.4, Vol. 25, p. 376. The Socialists' estimates are much higher. See Esat Adil, *Tan*, May 15, 1945. The Agricultural Bank of Turkey asserted in 1950 that 719,047 families, or 35 per cent of the existing village holdings, worked as sharecroppers or tenants because their own land was not sufficient to provide a living. *Ziraat Bankası Bülteni*, Ankara, April 1950. Although these figures need careful analysis before acceptance, they nevertheless indicate one of the main problems of Turkey: the peasant's need for land. See also Wilfred H. Pine, "Some Land Problems in Turkey," *Journal of Farm Economics*, May 1952, pp. 263-267.

⁷ Between 1947 and 1954, a total of 9,302,210 *dönüms* were distributed to 183,722 families. *Toprak-İskân Çalışmaları*, Ankara, 1955, pp. 26-27; also Zafer, July 16, 1955 (Declaration by Osman Kapani). Kapani's statement mentions 179,873 families and 14,754,984 *dönüms*. The difference in the acreage figures results from the fact that Kapani included also the pasture lands given to the villages. For a history of land problems, see Halil Inalcık, "Land Problems in Turkish History," *Muslim World*, July 1955, pp. 221 ff.; also Barkan, *Çiftçiyi*.

⁸ The capital of village enterprises in 1949-1950 in the poorest region in central Anatolia was TL. 427 for poor, 1,152 for medium, and 3,877 for rich farms. In the richest region in Anatolia (South) the capital was TL. 1,103, 2,542, and 9,949. *Ziraat Bankası Bülteni*. On land tenure see also, Reşad Mehmet Aktan, "Agricultural Policy of Turkey, with Special Emphasis on Land Tenure" (Microfilmed thesis), Berkeley, 1950.

⁹ The *Köy Kanunu* (Village Law) introduced in 1926 attempted to revo-

large estates,¹⁰ and the distribution of national income to the population in agriculture has been unbalanced.¹¹

It is against this rural background that industrialization took place in Turkey during 1930-1945, and it is on this agricultural structure that the state imposed new measures necessitated by war conditions. Industrialization in Turkey in its initial period was possible only by exploiting the internal markets, chiefly the rural ones. Heavy taxes were levied on agricultural products without regard to the peasant's financial capacity to pay.¹²

Two state organizations, the *Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi* (Office of Soil Products) and *Orman İşletmeleri* (Forestry Enterprise), created initially with the purpose of helping

lutionize village life through administrative measures, but except for some organizational gains it was a failure. See Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 262; Sıddık Sami Onar, *İdare Hukuku*, İstanbul, 1944. For village law and administration, see İbrahim Yasa, "The Village as an Administrative Unit," *Studies in Turkish Local Government* (Published by the U N Public Administration Institute), Ankara, 1955, pp. 53-77; see also Paul Stirling, "The Social Structure of Turkish Peasant Communities" (Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1951, pp. 12-13. A mimeographed copy of this dissertation has been obtained through the courtesy of the author and the Bodleian Library.)

¹⁰ In eastern Anatolia and in other parts of the country there are entire villages which belong to landlords. Şüküfe Nihal, "Doğu İllerinde Gör-düklerim," *Türkiye İktisat Mecmuası*, November 1949, pp. 21ff. See also debate on land reform in this chapter.

¹¹ Adnan Menderes, the present Premier, declared in 1949, during the debates on the budget law, that about 80 per cent of the population of Turkey was composed of peasants, but that only 44 per cent of the national income went to them; this meant that the remaining 56 per cent was in the hands of about 18 per cent of the population. According to him, this was evidence of economic unbalance and a problem of social justice. *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 16, p. 302. In 1949 the income per capita was TL. 382; in 1954 it rose to TL. 489; and in 1956 to TL. 536. *National Income of Turkey* (a publication of the Statistical Office), Ankara, 1957, p. 24. The real distribution of national income, and consequently the actual per capita income, does not, however, correspond to the above. It is certain that the distribution of income remains quite unbalanced, as in the past, and probably more so. See *Forum*, December 15, 1955, pp. 17, 18. See my Chapters 11 and 12.

¹² The *Toprak Mahsulleri Vergisi* (Tax on Soil Products) yielded TL. 229 million in 1944-1947, which was comparatively higher than the share actually due the peasants. Faik Ökte, *Varlık Vergisi Faciası*, p. 36.

the peasant, in time became a burden on him, and as such had a considerable part in shaping his attitudes toward the government in 1940-1946. The Office was created, indeed, to protect the peasant through price supports, and to accumulate farm supplies for the army, schools, and certain needy regions of the country.¹³ Scarcely had the Office been created when the war started. There resulted a sharp increase in the consumption of soil products and a diminution in agricultural production, made worse by the fact that former agricultural producers became consumers after being drafted into the army.

As can be seen from its expenditures for salaries (TL. 7,774,314 in 1945 to TL. 8,801,595 in 1946), the Office expanded rapidly.¹⁴ The growing shortage of bread made the Office enact a number of drastic decrees under the *Milli Korunma Kanunu* #3780 of January 18, 1940. (National Defense Law) for the collection of farm produce.¹⁵ Crop prices were established arbitrarily by the government below the local market prices. This was done to keep down the cost of bread, and, consequently, the cost of living in the cities, to the peasants' detriment.¹⁶

Antagonism to the Office and, consequently, to the govern-

¹³ The Office was created on July 23, 1938 by Law #3491. See *BMMTD*, Session 8.2, Vol. 12, pp. 35ff. See also, Namik Zeki Aral, "1950 Yılında Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi," *Vatan*, November 16, 1951.

¹⁴ This was from a total operational budget of TL. 73,621,263. *Report of the Office for 1946*, İstanbul, 1946, p. 60.

¹⁵ 2/14710, 2/14713, December 5, 1940; 2/14486, January 6, 1941; 2/15164, February 14, 1941. *Resmî Gazete*, December 1940 and January, February 1941. Niyazi Acun, *Ziraat Tarihimize Bir Bakış*, İstanbul, 1947.

¹⁶ The state enterprises and public institutions were charged the equivalent of cost prices for the foodstuffs they bought. Exports and sales to individuals envisaged certain profits. The prices paid by the state in buying farm produce (wheat, oats, barley, corn) varied according to the cost of transportation from the producing area to the main consumption centers. A kilogram of wheat in 1938 in distant Erzurum was 4.50 piastres, while in Yozgat, which is closer to Ankara, it was 5.50, and in the south, in Urfa, it was 4.25 piastres. Decree 2/9922; see *Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisine, İlgili Kanunlar, Kararname ve Nizamnameler*, Ankara, 1941.

ment and the Republican Party, was heightened by the compulsory contribution of crops demanded by the state. The contribution quota was pre-established. All crops in excess of the amount needed for family consumption and seeding were to be delivered to the state. In many cases peasants, under the compulsion of government officials, had to sell their belongings to meet the contribution quota.¹⁷ Furthermore, the Office, unable to foresee the needs of the country, sold agricultural crops abroad while people in the northern regions at home starved to death.¹⁸

It is true that the drastic actions of the state were partly justified by war conditions. But though the peasants, in general, recognized the need for emergency measures, they could not accept the authoritarian and unrealistic manner in which the Office carried out its policies, nor the uneven distribution of the burden. (After 1950 the Office was used by the Democratic Party Government to enforce its own policy of price support and played a major part in helping the Democrats

¹⁷ Peasants from Bursa (western Anatolia), explaining to Celal Bayar why they backed the opposition, said: "Despite the fact that we gave our entire crop to the Office, we still owe them 70 per cent in crops. We sold our oxen to pay them. . . . What can we do on the land without oxen; it stays fallow and we work on the land of the rich. We sell the wheat to city dwellers, yet they buy the bread for thirty piastres, while we pay thirty-five." *Cumhuriyet*, July 12, 1946. The Kaymakam, the district governor, hearing these complaints, became angry and shouted: "Communist instigation has really penetrated this village." These issues played a crucial part in providing support for the Democrats, who kept bringing up the issue for discussion. For other examples, see Ibrahim Yasa, *Hasanoğlan Köyü*, Ankara, 1955, p. 208.

¹⁸ In the Black Sea region, where land is divided into small pieces, the agriculture consists of tobacco and corn. People sell their own produce and buy wheat. In 1948 the Office had no stocks in the region, for 40,000 tons of wheat were sold abroad. *Vatan*, April 26, 1948. A vivid description of the famine in the northern regions is provided by one of the prominent members of the Democratic Party from that region. See Fevzi Boztepe, *Hür Ufuklara Doğru*, İstanbul, 1952, pp. 96-114; also *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, İstanbul, 1951, pp. 253-255. There may be a degree of exaggeration in these statements, but the fact remains that the Office could not properly cope with all the needs, and the result was bitter antagonism toward the government. See *BMMTD*, Session 8.2, Vol. 11, pp. 124ff.

win the peasants' support. This time farm prices far above world market prices were paid, to the detriment of other groups.)

The Forestry Enterprise was created to exploit the national forests (a number of which had been expropriated from private owners), conserve the existing ones, and reforest new areas.¹⁹ In order to achieve its purposes, the Forestry Enterprise started by first applying prohibitionist measures. The making of charcoal was subjected to strict and burdensome controls,²⁰ and flocks were not allowed to enter forests previously used as grazing lands. The villagers living in these areas, deprived of a living and in dire need of subsistence, violated the law and thus engaged in endless disputes with the government.²¹ The villagers in forest areas were supposed to be removed and settled in areas suitable for agriculture; however, lack of a well-defined policy of settlement and of the technical and sociological knowledge required for such an undertaking left this obligation barely fulfilled. The economic distress caused by government operation of the forests was aggravated by the large government bureaucracy required.²² Moreover, villagers were also required to help achieve educational reform by building schools. This practice amounted to forced labor.²³

¹⁹ Faik Tavşanoğlu, "Orman İşlerimize Toplu Bir Bakış," *İstanbul İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, April 1948, pp. 216-220. For the general situation on forests in Turkey, see E. G. Mears, "Forests," *Modern Turkey*, pp. 302-309.

²⁰ A petitioning peasant was first shown a certain area in which he was to cut the trees and for which he was paid. Then the engineer estimated the amount of charcoal to be extracted from the wood. The peasant then paid the price of the wood and was ready to light the charcoal pit. Thereupon, the engineer was called again to give permission for lighting it. After the charcoal was ready, the peasant was given another permit to authorize him to sell the charcoal in town. (As told by a villager to the correspondent of *Yeni Sabah*, April 14, 1948.)

²¹ *Yeni Sabah*, February 26, 1946 (open letter to the Forestry Directorate).

²² In Şile, a small town near İstanbul, the government forestry personnel amounted to 200 officials. *Yeni Sabah*, April 12, 1948.

²³ The villagers were required by the government to build their own

Economic development and its consequences, migration and the movement of the population and their socio-cultural effects, altered the mode of living,²⁴ the mental attitudes, and the habits of the villagers. As the thinking of the people became more individualized, the influence of religion in their at-

school houses by providing material and labor at their own expense. See *Ayn Tarihi*, May 1945, pp. 95ff.; *Cumhuriyet*, July 12, 1946; *BMMTD*, Session 8, Vol. 6, pp. 564ff.

²⁴ The surveys conducted in various parts of Anatolia by this writer and others indicate that immigration helped bring some changes in the mode of life in peasant communities of Anatolia. The immigrants brought the four-wheeled, steel reinforced horse wagon, usually known as the *muhacir arabası* (immigrant's cart), and this created a need for better roads, so different was it from the traditional two-wheeled wooden ox-cart which can use any kind of roads. The immigrants from Dobrujda (Rumania) settled in Eskişehir and Polatlı (today important wheat producing areas) introduced the cultivation of wheat on a large scale; the Bosnians introduced the cultivation of potatoes in Adapazarı, while the Lazzes from the Black Sea region, who settled in Düzcce and Hendek, introduced the cultivation of tobacco. Hüseyin Avni, *Reaya ve Köylü*, İstanbul, 1941, p. 85. The immigrants in central Anatolia brought a hygienic way of preparing bread and cooking it in ovens. They used wheat flour and left the dough to ferment, the natives cooked the bread on the hearth without prior fermentation. The immigrants in central Anatolia preferred to build their houses with large windows and triangular roofs instead of the flat roof normally used. The advice of the government contributed partly to building this kind of house. On the other hand, the immigrants substituted the water buffalo for the cow, because the former is more adaptable to the climate of Anatolia and serves many more purposes than the cow. Mümtaz Turhan, in his study of the cultural changes in five villages in eastern Anatolia during a period of fifteen years, found that a new type of house, new construction methods, and new interior arrangements were adopted. Similarly, new agricultural methods and new occupations were accepted, but only when people were sure that the changes proposed would bring them material benefits and when this was clearly explained to them. In view of the increase in economic activity, special attention was paid to communications with the cities. The villagers developed a great interest in agricultural machinery, and when news of the American economic aid was received, they requested the authorities to inform them immediately of the machines to be distributed through the aid funds. Turhan, *Kültür Değişmeleri*, pp. 89-110. Behice Boran, in a survey of eight Turkish villages in western Anatolia, arrived at the same conclusions as above. Behice S. Boran, *Toplumsal Yapı Araştırmaları*, Ankara, 1945, pp. 143, 164. See also Sadri Aran, *Evedik Köyü*, Ankara, 1938, pp. 128ff.; and S. H. Jameson, "Social Mutation in Turkey," *Social Forces*, May 1936, pp. 482ff. For a more recent study, see Yasa, *Hasanoğlan*, pp. 225-244.

titudes and concepts decreased greatly. The religious leaders lost much of their old prestige because people could question the wisdom of their teachings and of Islam in general, if they contradicted their interest and welfare. They preserved, however, interest in religion as a faith. Modern schools were accepted, and the villagers themselves even took the initiative in opening such schools, which they thought were better than the religious ones. The growing interest in establishing relations with the outside world and ideas was shown by the increased number of radio listeners and newspaper readers. The adoption of modern equipment and machines became a standard practice and medical science and drugs were welcomed by the villagers.

New groups arose within the village population. They tended to break the domination of old landed families, despite the fact that the latter tried to preserve their authority by adjusting to the administrative reforms in order to become *muhtar* (village heads).²⁵ Thus a competitive economic-social system and the intrusion of outsiders into the village helped break the monopoly of the old groups. As wealth instead of family background acquired priority in establishing positions in the village community, the old dom-

²⁵ Boran, *Toplumsal*, pp. 133, 139, 214, 242. Paul Stirling found that relations between town and village were slight. This assertion may have been true in 1949-1950 when Stirling conducted his excellent survey, but since the mechanization of farms this is no longer so. Moreover, Stirling takes the view that differences among villages in various parts of Turkey are not so wide as it is usually asserted. Villages in various parts of Turkey, greatly differ in their relations with cities, and in their mentality, occupational habits, and degree of modernization. Mümtaz Turhan's five villages in the Kayseri province differ even from the Sakaltutan village studied by Stirling in the same province. On the other hand, this author believes with Stirling that family life and marriage—that is, household habits and the social values arising therefrom—are fairly uniform in Turkish villages. In many other aspects Stirling's conclusions support the findings of Turkish sociologists, whose views have been described above. See Stirling, *The Social Structure of Turkish Peasant Communities*, pp. 18-280 *passim*. For a more recent, brief view on village life, see Norman Bentwick, "Village Life in Turkey," *Contemporary Review*, March 1955, pp. 174-177. See also my Chapter 13 for more recent behavioral changes.

inant groups disintegrated and few villages remained under the domination of one *ağâ* (landlord).²⁶ The relatively freer and more natural way of life in villages, which as a whole differed from the arch-conservative life in towns and cities, gained further impetus.²⁷ The villages seemed inclined to imitate, willingly, and without much opposition from inside, city manners, habits, and clothing. Small villages also seemed to disappear either by fusion with other smaller villages or by becoming part of larger ones.

The Turkish peasants had not yet developed a political doctrine of their own corresponding to the agrarian philosophies in the Balkans prior to the second World War.²⁸ Their views and demands resulting from their conditions of life had nevertheless become crystallized and sufficiently forceful to find political expression and to find representation in political parties.

B. *The Industrial Workers*

The most recent social group, one which was formed almost exclusively during the Republican regime, is the industrial

²⁶ This view does not apply to the eastern part of the country, where the economy is still in the primitive stage and where the landlords still are powerful. For a general description of villagers in the Near East, see Douglas D. Crary, "The Villager," *Social Forces in the Middle East*, pp. 43-59. An objective study on the social organization and property relations in Turkish villages is long overdue.

²⁷ Boys and girls could freely visit each other, if they were engaged, and daughters could choose their future consorts, rejecting the choice of their parents. In family life, however, the husband still enjoyed undisputed authority and privilege. Monogamy in the family seemed well established. Boran, *Toplumsal*, pp. 189-197. According to Turhan's study in the eastern part of Anatolia, the *nouveau riche* in the villages seemed to favor a polygamic family. The villagers still preferred the religious marriage (*imam nikâhi*) to the civil one because the latter was complicated and took too long. See "The Reception of Foreign Law in Turkey," *International Social Science Bulletin*, IX, 1957, pp. 7-81, *passim*. For a study of villages in central Anatolia, see Niyazi Berkes, *Bazı Ankara Köyleri Üzerinde Bir Araştırma*, Ankara, 1942; also Yasa, *Hasanoğlan*, pp. 126ff.

²⁸ For a survey of agrarian philosophies in the Balkans, see Felix Gross, ed., *European Ideologies*, New York, 1948, pp. 396-452.

working class. The formation of such a group was anticipated from the very beginning when economic development was planned. It was generally accepted that industrialization would create a group of industrial workers with attitudes and specific political tendencies of their own, and that this would have repercussions on the whole political development. Recollecting the class struggle in Europe, the leaders of Turkey arbitrarily assumed that the political tendencies of the Turkish workers would be "leftist." The first measures concerning the workers were consequently political in character and motive. Class struggle and related activities, such as strikes, were sternly punished, and any political literature concerning labor or labor problems was suppressed. The Labor Act (#3008) of 1936, enacted on the model of the prewar Italian labor law, regulated labor relations in a totalitarian manner.²⁹ In general, from the inception of the Republican regime until 1945, and despite statism with its theoretical policy of welfare, labor in Turkey was considered only as a factor in production. The human aspect of labor was disregarded; politically it was held to be a liability created by economic necessities.

The number of industrial workers increased steadily as industry expanded. Most of these workers came from rural areas or immigrant groups, and in many ways still preserved their relations with their villages. In 1923 the number of industrial workers in Turkey did not exceed 20,000-30,000 people. In 1948, 301,299 persons were employed in large factories alone,³⁰ while there were twice that number of workers

²⁹ Recep Peker declared in 1936 that: "the new law shall not allow the birth or the survival of class consciousness. . . . With this law we are not following one-sided purposes but are establishing a nationalist and populist front and an occupational life in which the rights and positions [interests of the parties involved] are mutually organized. . . . We are on our way towards performing our duty of establishing a society without a [class] struggle and exploitation based on principle of reconciliation." *BMMTD*, Session 5, Vol. 1, p. 84, debate of June 8, 1936.

³⁰ *Labor Problems in Turkey*, a publication of the I.L.O., Geneva, 1950, pp. 73ff. *Çalışma*, August 1947.

in agriculture and small industries. Together with their families, these workers totalled at least 1,500,000 persons.³¹ The number of industrial workers in 1953 was placed at 801,858,³² and as many as 150,000 people were members of the trade unions in the country-wide confederation.³³ This means that the total number of people depending for a living on industrial employment was well above 3 million.

The working class in Turkey, despite formal denials, has shown keen interest in politics, either by acting independently or by backing one of the major parties, although such political action was not always undertaken specifically on behalf of the workers' organizations. The mere fact that only a few months after the ban on the trade unions was lifted in 1946, several hundred trade unions—and this without much prior organizational experience—were established, shows that the Turkish workers' interest in class organization is similar to that shown by industrial workers elsewhere in the world. Most of these trade unions were dissolved in 1946 because, supposedly, they fell under the influence of "leftists." But after 1947, that is, after the Trade Union Law was enacted, new trade unions were again formed throughout the country and later federated on a country-wide basis in spite of controls and financial difficulties,³⁴ proving once more that the

³¹ *Türkiye İktisat Mecmuası*, June 1949, p. 23.

³² *Economic Development in the Middle East, 1945-1954*, United Nations, New York, 1955, p. 215. Actually the number of industrial workers is much higher since many workers are left out of the census. The U N Public Administration Institute in a recent study conducted in Adana found that the census indicated no increase of industrial workers between 1954-1957 despite the fact that the city population went up from 175,000 people in 1955 to 220,000 in 1957. *Developpement des Villes et Programmes Sociaux*, Ankara, 1958, pp. 10, 12 (mimeographed).

³³ Kemal Sülker, *Türkiyede Sendikacılık*, İstanbul, 1955, p. 266. A new socio-political study of labor in Turkey is urgently needed. Such a study will reveal some essential features of Turkish labor. Since 1947 labor has steadily organized itself and asked for wage increase and the right to strike. Within trade unions there has developed a group of leaders who show a remarkable understanding of the country's situation and the needs of the workers. They have courageously defended workers' viewpoints on many occasions despite pressure and intimidation.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 265. For a brief study on labor in Turkey, see Fuat M. Andic,

industrial workers were interested in organizing themselves.

Industrial workers did not benefit from any government welfare programs except for a few measures connected with work safety and hygiene until 1945, when a Ministry of Labor (Law #4763, June 22, 1945) was established and their welfare needs were tackled in a more basic fashion. Workers' insurance (#4772, June 27, 1945) and paid holidays (#5837, August 9, 1951) laws were later passed. Wages in industry, compared with the profits of private and state enterprises, remained extremely low and insufficient for an adequate standard of living.³⁵ Instead of diminishing interest in politics, unilateral government control barring the workers from political activity resulted in well-formulated views which needed to be expressed. In general, the birth of a working class in Turkey was the result of economic and social changes in the society and, in its turn, altered the structure of that society and affected the country's socio-political philosophy.³⁶

C. The Middle Class: Landowners, Businessmen, Intellectuals

Turkey does not have a class of capitalists who control the country's economy, but it does possess a fairly large middle

"Development of Labor Legislation in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, November 1957, pp. 366-372. For a general view on the industrial workers in the Near East, see Thomas B. Stauffer, "The Industrial Worker," *Social Forces in the Middle East*, pp. 83-98.

³⁵ The average daily wage in state enterprises during the war years was TL. 3 (\$1.30). At Kayseri in 1936, the daily wage was TL. 1.70. Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 249. The profits of Sumer Bank, the largest state enterprise, in 1943 amounted to 25.3 per cent of the capital invested, and in 1945 rose to 34.7 per cent of the capital invested. *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951-1952*, United Nations, New York, 1953, p. 36. For a discussion on workers wages, see *BMMTD*, Session 8.2, Vol. 9-11, pp. 31ff. In the recent years wages in private enterprises, especially in construction have increased between TL. 10 and 20 a day. Wages in state enterprises remained low, seldom amounting to TL. 10 (one dollar is worth 9 liras). Workers in state enterprises, on the other hand, benefit from social insurance, sometimes special aids and even housing. See my Chapter 12.

³⁶ For a discussion on trade unions and the causes for enacting the Trade Union Act, see Chapter 12.

class composed of landowners, businessmen, industrialists, and the intelligentsia,³⁷ including government officials, all of whom are influential in politics and as a whole direct the country's life.

Landowners originated in both the Ottoman Empire and the Republican regime. They accumulated land by inheritance, purchase (in some cases the moneylender became landowner by buying the mortgaged land of the indebted peasant), or by combining and preserving two or more properties on the basis of family relationship, such as inter-group and inter-family marriage, or by voluntary fusion of several land holdings. There is no definite criteria for "landlordism." Those who work their land with hired labor or rent it to tenants and sharecroppers are normally included in this category. Definite statistics are lacking in respect to this group, but it can be estimated safely to number about 50,000 families.³⁸

The landowners who deserve special attention are those who own farms which produce industrial crops such as tobacco, olives, cotton, and fruit, and who reside in a number of small towns in the Aegean, Adana, and Marmara regions.

³⁷ The middle classes in Turkey, according to our criteria in this study, would have the following characteristics: semi-manual or non-manual occupation, incomes above the average, a relatively comfortable living, a certain degree of education and refinement, and consciousness of their special status in the society as an actual or potential factor in politics and culture. For a discussion of definitions of social classes, see Aydın Yalçın, "İçtimai Sınıflar Meselesi," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, October 1946-July 1947, pp. 3-45. It is generally accepted that the Middle Eastern countries possess tiny middle classes and that this view is valid for Turkey too. However, this cannot be accurate in view of the fact that the urban population in Turkey—a relative measure of the middle class—according to the last census of 1955, increased to 29 per cent of the total population as contrasted with 17 per cent in the past. A detailed study of the Turkish middle class and its economic status is urgently needed to appraise more accurately political developments in that group. For a description of some aspects of demography in Turkey see Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 49-60. For changes in mentality in recent years, see my Chapter 13.

³⁸ A survey by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1953 showed that 25 per cent of the total arable land belonged to only 1.5 per cent of the farm families. *Forum*, April 1, 1956, p. 6.

They cultivate and process their crops, selling them to the government or directly to the consumers, or export them through their own business offices, which serve at times also as intermediaries for the small farmers raising the same crops.³⁹ They are thus a semi-urbanized group who deal with the populations of both towns and villages, and exert political influence in both areas, as was seen in the political struggle after 1946.

The industrialists and businessmen, the latter group including the shopkeepers, have grown considerably in number during the Republican regime.⁴⁰ Their business capital varies from a few thousand Turkish pounds to several million.⁴¹ Statistics in respect to this group are scanty, but a moderate estimate would be that the group numbers not less than 300,000 families.⁴²

These two sections (landowners and industrialists) of the middle class are politically conservative, in general. A good many of their members lack a sense of social responsibility, and to some extent reflect the old mentality of the ruling groups of the Ottoman Empire:⁴³ the inclination to luxury,

³⁹ A typical example of such landowners could be found in the town of Ayvalık on the coast of the Aegean Sea, the capital of the olive growers and oil and soap makers of Turkey. The town has the greatest percentage of millionaires in Turkey—over 50, in a population of about 15,000 people. The largest part of the population is composed of immigrants from Greek Islands, who replaced the former Greek residents. For the history of Greek residents, see Toynbee, *The Western Question*, pp. 121-122.

⁴⁰ Small privately owned industries, exclusive of home industries, vendors, utility enterprises, mines, construction, defense works, and municipality and state sponsored activities, amounted to 96,626 enterprises in 1950, employing 225,346 people. *Istatistik Yıllığı*, p. 283.

⁴¹ For instance, one business association, *Kolad* (the truck, car, and tire dealers), in Turkey, has 183 members, and the total capital of 91 of them is estimated at more than one billion Turkish pounds. *Cumhuriyet*, December 10, 1955. Premier Menderes claimed during the 1957 election campaign that each *mahalle* (neighborhood) in cities had 10-15 millionaires.

⁴² For the basis of this estimate see *Istatistik Yıllığı*, pp. 383ff.

⁴³ For a description of the mentality of the middle (ruling) classes in the Ottoman Empire, see Sabri F. Ülgener, *Iktisadi İnhilat Tarihimizin Ahlâk ve Zihniyet Meseleleri*, İstanbul, 1951, pp. 196-197.

imitation, indulgence in epicurean consumption habits, and the use of expedient means for making quick profits. The morality preached and applied here presents wide discrepancy. The West has penetrated the society partly through this group, which, although outwardly critical of Western materialism, has nevertheless adjusted itself quickly to it.⁴⁴

In general, the rural middle class in Turkey favors religious freedom, while the upper urban class, partly because of its cosmopolitan nature, favors secularism. In matters of social policy they are equally conservative. Again different from the rural middle classes, the urban middle class includes rather large numbers of people who, although of modest origin, have acquired wealth through personal initiative and effort in the Republic. Many of these businessmen are dynamic and self confident, and are inclined to adopt the ways of modern business and even to accept social responsibilities in accordance with the concepts of "modern businessmen."

The urban and rural middle classes in Turkey were affected during the war years by two major laws passed by the government with the purpose, among others, of establishing social justice and stimulating agriculture. They were *Varlık Vergisi* (Tax on Capital) and *Toprak Kanunu* (Land Reform Law). The *Varlık Vergisi*, submitted to the National Assembly by Şükrü Saracoğlu's cabinet, was adopted on November 11, 1942 as Law No. 4305 after a debate that lasted only a few hours.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ For a view on the attitude of these classes in the Near East, see Gibb, "La Reaction Contre la Culture Occidentale," pp. 6-7. For a description of the businessman in the Near East, see Charles Issawi, "The Entrepreneur Class," *Social Forces in the Middle East*, pp. 116-136; for Turkey, see pp. 129-130.

⁴⁵ On this tax see *Resmî Gazete* No. 5255, *V. Vergisi Tatbikat Kararname*sî, No. 19.288, January 1943; *BMMTD*, Session 6, Vol. 28, pp. 20-30; *Vatan*, March 25, 1948 (Celal Bayar in Erzincan); also *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, p. 248; Ökte, *Varlık*; Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 117-120; Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1952, pp. 95-98; and Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 10. The debate centered chiefly around measures to prevent ill reactions

The law was the product of wartime difficulties. Its purpose was to secure additional revenue for urgent military expenditures by levying a tax upon incomes and capital accumulated through unorthodox means, which could not be subjected to ordinary taxes. In other words, it was supposed to levy taxes upon the profiteers, businessmen, and intermediaries who had acquired wealth by speculating and black-marketing with imported goods and essential items, and thus provide moral satisfaction for the low-income groups which suffered economic privations.⁴⁶ Its justification is rather easy up to this point. Criticism arose because of the manner in which the law was applied.

The tax was imposed on businesses,⁴⁷ industrial enterprises, building owners, real estate brokers, and landed estates, according to the recommendations of a committee composed of government officials and selected businessmen.⁴⁸ All properties, including those owned by ethnic Turks, were subject to taxation, with the difference that while their assets and financial ability to pay the tax were estimated realistically, the firms of the minorities were subjected to the tax in an arbitrary and unrealistic way.⁴⁹

that may be felt on the market because of the law (K. Karabekir). Premier Saracoğlu, in introducing the *Varlık Vergisi* Law to the National Assembly, declared that he rose from among simple people (he was the son of a saddle maker in Ödemiş), that he was "a son of the people," and that by passing that law he was making a moral repayment to those people. *BMMTD*, Session 6, Vol. 28, pp. 20ff. Refik Ince, who emerged in 1946 as a staunch opponent of the Republican Party, declared: "I would like to answer those who would say that this law is against the principles [of law] that law is worth respecting only the day it follows the needs of life." *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁴⁶ Ökte, *Varlık*, pp. 10ff. The author cited was chief financial official in İstanbul charged with enforcing the tax.

⁴⁷ The Premier, defending the law, said that the businessmen had profited because of the war and that therefore they had to bear the burden. He called them a "class," which contradicted the idea of the classless society defended by the government. *BMMTD*, Session 6, Vol. 28, pp. 20ff.

⁴⁸ Ökte, *Varlık*, pp. 75ff.

⁴⁹ The excuse was that most of the import business was in their hands, and that the imported goods were on the black market and caused a sharp rise in the general cost of living. Without attempting to excuse the tax,

SOCIAL CLASSES AND WARTIME DEVELOPMENTS

In order to bring hoarded goods onto the market, the tax was supposed to be paid in fifteen days. Those who would not pay the tax, or paid it only partially, were to be subjected to forced labor until the completion of payment. The law was enforced by authoritarian methods and those newspapers, such as *Vatan*, which dared criticize it, were closed. However, the law's effects were detrimental to the country in all fields; it did not provide the government with the necessary income,⁵⁰ and it worsened the general economic situation. The big firms were able to survive, but these, in a furious effort to recover their losses, increased the prices of goods.⁵¹ The government, already under the pressure of internal and ex-

we may say that it carried in it reminiscences of the past. The foreign firms preferred to deal with the minority firms, partly because of a tradition originating in the days of the Ottoman Empire when trade with foreign countries was handled exclusively by minority groups. The minority business firms in the Republic tried to perpetuate this advantage both by labeling the firms of the ethnic Turks as incompetent to conduct business properly and by complaining of unfavorable, discriminatory treatment by the government. The tax had precedent, but of a different nature. During the occupation of Turkey by the Allies after the first World War only the Muslims had to pay a tax on coal. Moreover, the coal magnates of Turkey, chiefly French, refused to buy for distribution to the population the coal extracted by Muslim (Turkish) miners in Ereğli. See Celal Bayar's speech *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 22-23. Ultra nationalistic ideas played an important part in this tax in 1942 because it aimed also at the firms of the Turkish businessmen, the so-called *dönme*, that is, Turks of Jewish origin converted to Islam, who were taxed twice as much as the ethnic Turks. Ökte, *Varlık*, pp. 39, 85. The arbitrary aspect of the tax, according to Ökte, was also demonstrated by the fact that, in many cases, the friendship or enmity felt within the government for the taxpayer contributed greatly to lowering or increasing his tax. *Ibid.*, pp. 176-186.

⁵⁰ The number of taxable individuals amounted to 114,368, and the total estimated tax to TL. 465,384,820. However, the total tax collected was only TL. 314,920,940, and 2,057 people were taken in to be sent to a forced labor camp at Aşkale for non-payment of taxes. *Ibid.*, pp. 157, 197, 237.

⁵¹ Firms owned by foreign citizens were exempt from taxation, although even this rule was not uniformly applied. A great number of small firms which were unable to pay the tax were sold at auction. They were bought by people who had accumulated capital through various means during the war. The new owners were both inexperienced and avid for profits. Their inexperience created confusion on the market and their avidity for profits contributed to the rise in the cost of living.

ternal criticism, could no longer curb them without causing a great uproar. The cost of living naturally went up fast, and the low-income groups suffered further.

The reaction to the tax among businessmen, regardless of their ethnic origin, and the criticism from abroad were so effective that less than one year after the enactment of the law, tax enforcement was greatly relaxed, and on March 15, 1944 it was entirely abolished.⁵² However, this measure did not dispel the animosity toward the government nor the fear that as long as the state was motivated by anti-property considerations, capital would not have political security. This view was shared both by minority and ethnic Turkish businessmen and industrialists. The only means of neutralizing the anti-property threat was to put an effective check on the government, and, if possible, replace it with a new government which would provide and effectively enforce property guarantees together with other individual freedoms.

The *Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*, or Land Reform Law (No. 4753), was of much wider scope than the *Varlık Vergisi* (Tax on Capital) and produced violent criticism of the government. The law was submitted to the National Assembly by the government headed by Şükrü Saracoğlu, the author of *Varlık Vergisi*. At this time the Assembly was largely composed of Republican Party deputies who usually had been, with minor individual exceptions, in agreement with the party and the government.⁵³ The plenary debates on the draft began on May 14, 1945,⁵⁴ and ended with the

⁵² *Vatan*, March 15, 16, 1944. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 23.

⁵³ The *Müstâkil Grup* (Independent Group) was composed of Republican Party deputies in order to provide a kind of fictitious opposition. There were also four independents nominated by the Republican Party.

⁵⁴ The debate started five days before İnönü's crucial announcement that the establishment of opposition parties would be allowed. One may say that the opposition to the government during the debate on the Land Reform Law was greatly enhanced if not caused by this announcement. Yet the evidence on hand (cited later in this study) clearly indicates that there was opposition to the government in the Agricultural Committee months before İnönü's announcement. That committee had been widely split, as had the

passage of the law on June 11, 1945.⁵⁵ The Land Reform Law was basically a social reform intended to ameliorate the situation of the peasant, as advocated repeatedly by Atatürk himself,⁵⁶ and to further social democracy in Turkey, the lack of which was criticized abroad, especially in socialist countries.

The purpose of the reform was to distribute land sufficient to provide a living, and furnish equipment for its continuous cultivation, to the landless and land-short peasants and to those wanting to become farmers.⁵⁷ The land was to be provided by expropriation from state lands, *vakıfs* (pious foundations), municipalities, and privately-owned large estates in excess of 5,000 *dönüms* (1 *dönüm* = 0.10 ha.). If that proved insufficient, then expropriation would be made from the properties of over 2,000 *dönüms*, that is, the average properties (Articles 14, 15, 16). Article 17, on the other hand, provided a sweeping provision in respect to densely populated areas in which the existing land of the state, *vakıfs*, and municipalities was insufficient. In such cases, even properties of 200 *dönüms* or less, cultivated by sharecroppers, tenants, and agricultural workers without land or with insufficient land of their own, became subject to expropriation. The original landowner was free to choose and retain a minimum of 50 *dönüms* only. (The landowners were to be reimbursed according to a long and cumbersome procedure.)

The farms from 200 *dönüms* upward form the basis of land ownership in Turkey and the great majority of small farms of 200-2,000 *dönüms* are in densely populated areas in which land is scarce. A literal enforcement of Article 17

Assembly itself, on the law, and it took strong pressure from the government to have it pass the draft and bring it to the plenary session of the Assembly.

⁵⁵ *Official Gazette*, No. 6032, June 15, 1945. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 46.

⁵⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, November 2, 1936, 1937.

⁵⁷ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 17, pp. 97-102.

would therefore have eliminated the medium sized farms or the landowning class in the villages and small towns.

The deputies in the Assembly divided into two groups as soon as the debate on the law started; one in favor of the law, the other opposed to certain parts, namely to the drastic expropriation aspects of the law (Article 17). The first group was composed mostly of intellectuals and government officials who adopted a social-intellectual approach to Land Reform.⁵⁸ The second group, composed mostly of deputies with some personal land interests involved,⁵⁹ adopted a technical viewpoint. They insisted on preserving the existing agricultural structure and on strengthening it by improving the cultivation methods instead of partitioning the land.⁶⁰ This second group demanded the respect for and guarantee of the right to private property granted by the Constitution. They appeared determined to assure it by any means, including defiance of party discipline and regulation. The controversy between the two groups, greatly augmented by the new liberal atmosphere spreading in the country after İnönü's liberalization promise of May 19, 1945, led to the first concerted opposition to the government and formed some basis for the future opposition party, the Democratic Party.⁶¹

The Land Reform Law, according to its proponents, was

⁵⁸ Alaeddin Tiridoğlu defended Article 17 of the Law as an attempt to end the "medieval institutions" of sharecropping, which had made entire villages the property of one man and had forced the peasants to work for generations without any rights over the land on which they lived. *Ulus*, November 27, 1947.

⁵⁹ *Son Telgraf, Vakit* (editorial), May 16, 1945.

⁶⁰ Technically speaking, the latter group was right. An immediate increase in agricultural production could not have been achieved by disbanding the large properties, nor could machinery have been introduced. On the other hand, socially speaking, a proper land reform could not have been achieved without an advanced degree of expropriation.

⁶¹ İbrahim Arvas, at the time of the statement a member of the Republican Party and presently in the Democratic Party, remarked: "Some friends left us in anger against Article 17 and alike [of the Law] and established the nucleus of democracy which we are happy to witness." *BMMTD*, Session 8.4, Vol. 25, p. 325.

the natural social consequence of the principle of populism accepted in the Constitution.⁶² It brought social justice and "protected the Turkish peasant from becoming serf or slave to this or that one."⁶³ The law was a "national necessity imposed by the course of [our] history and the economic structure of [our] society,"⁶⁴ to save "millions of citizens from working the land as the sharecroppers and servants of landowners or for subsistence." It was "the proof of the fact that we are a nation without classes and social privileges."⁶⁵

The Land Reform Law aimed at fulfilling a promise the Republican Party had made to the farmers; it was most needed, and was already overdue. In order to back the land reform, one deputy claimed that in one province there were forty-three villages, established on eighteen estates, in which the peasants did not have "one inch of land of their own."⁶⁶

The opponents claimed that certain provisions in the law violated the private property rights granted under the Constitution and the Civil Code. The law, in their opinion, had a number of shortcomings: it paid no attention to the production capacity of the farms and the means of cultivation; it overlooked the fact that the expropriation would create stagnation in the country's economy; it liquidated in effect the average sized farms; it neglected the problems of settlement and rational cultivation of land; and finally, it took away the land from the citizens.⁶⁷

⁶² *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 17, pp. 59ff. See also Volume 18, pp. 37ff. *Vatan*, May 15, 1945.

⁶³ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 17, p. 100, Feyzullah Uslu (Manisa).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 125, H. Oğuz Bekta (Ankara). *Ayn Tarihi*, May 1945, p. 39.

⁶⁵ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 17, pp. 124-125.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 118ff., 130, Sadi Irmak (Konya), E. Erişirgil (Zonguldak); p. 141, Salahattin Batu (Çanakkale); p. 79, Recai Güreli (Gümüşhane), who supplied also an example of unorthodox land acquisition in the Ottoman Empire.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 63ff., 101ff., Cavit Oral (Seyhan), Hamdi Şarlan (Ordu); p. 78, Halil Menteşe (İzmir); p. 83, Damat Arıkoğlu (Seyhan); pp. 64ff., Cavit Oral (Seyhan); pp. 131ff., Naci Eldeniz (Seyhan). Seyhan province is situated in the Çukurova valley where there are extensive land estates.

The strongest opposition was voiced by two deputies who were to be among the future founders of the Democratic Party, Refik Koraltan and Adnan Menderes. Koraltan demanded respect for certain constitutional principles. According to him,

. . . the most important element in a modern society, which requires careful handling, is, first, and above all, the right to think, speak, write, associate, and express ideas, and finally, to have a guarantee of property and home. Humanity's fight throughout the centuries has capitalized on obtaining a guarantee of these rights. If an individual in a community cannot speak, think, associate, live freely, and let his conscience work freely, if he cannot accumulate wealth and preserve it, and is deprived of a guarantee that he may benefit from it, it is difficult to believe that such a community will last long. . . . My friends, whatever is said, the spirit of this Law is to take Ali's fortune and give it to Veli.⁶⁸

And this was done in spite of the Constitution, which upheld as a basic principle the property rights of the individual.⁶⁹

Menderes (himself descendent from an ancient land-own-

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁶⁹ Emin Sazak, a very rich landowner and a deputy from Eskişehir, became a fierce opponent of the government because of the land reform. He acquired a short-lived popularity in 1946-1948. His views on the land reform and his motives in opposing it are clear in his declaration: "I haven't abused my position or anything else. I cannot avoid suffering when I give away my lands which I have acquired with my sweat and intelligence [ability]. I have feelings. What would anyone of you do if you were subject to the same treatment? The Turkish people put me by chance among you [in the Assembly]. They placed me in a position to be able to fight for my rights. But the interests of other people are here involved." Discussing social philosophy he continued; "We cannot change peoples' *dough* [nature]. One becomes a commander, a marshal, while the other remains a private. We cannot make marshals of all of them. Friends, this question of workers [agricultural workers to receive land] will create turmoil in all the villages. The farmers will get out of it [land reform] relatively more easily. But if this principle [distribution of property] is generally accepted the worker then will be entitled to request a room in any apartment house. Brothers, this is the principle we are accepting." He concluded, "Now that the land to be left to the owner will be only something like fifty *dönüms* (5 ha.) it is impossible for someone like me who feels this loss not to become crazy [sic]. Laughter and, God forbid, voices in the Assembly." *Ibid.*, pp. 80, 81.

ing family of Aydın) accused Premier Saracoğlu of having intervened in the debates of the Agricultural Committee after the two mandatory committee debates had been concluded, and of having introduced Article 17 in violation of established procedure.⁷⁰ According to Menderes, Turkey had no large landed properties. The shortage of land resulted from not opening up new lands for agriculture, and the Ministry of Agriculture, instead of achieving this, was dealing in erroneous statistics. "After twenty years," he declared, "we are far from victory in the battle against the *Kağm* and the wooden plough;⁷¹ as a matter of fact, the battle has not started yet." In his view, the law, in effect, restricted agriculture to the villagers only and thus severed the relations of the city dweller with the land, raising impassable barriers between town and village.⁷²

Menderes held that the Turkish peasant needed agricultural credits and measures to protect his produce. The Land Reform Law instead proposed "ideas and provisions taken almost intact from the National-Socialist [Germany] Erhhof Law on Land and Settlement."⁷³ He declared that free debate, which had been developing in the country and which was essential for its welfare, had been stopped when the draft law came for discussion, because free discussion in this case was deemed to be detrimental.⁷⁴ He added, "as long as we remain a one-party system the situation [unconstitutional] will become more deplorable."⁷⁵

Menderes declared his support of the Land Reform Law with the exception of Article 17. He favored an emphasis on the technical aspects of the land problem and land cultivation, as opposed to those who saw only the social aspects of the

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁷¹ The two-wheeled wooden oxcart of the Hittites, considered the symbol of agricultural backwardness in Turkey.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 116.

⁷⁴ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 18, p. 37.

⁷³ *Loc.cit.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

problem and who were ready to go to extremes.⁷⁶ Menderes' farm policy after he became Premier in 1950 followed this line of thought.

Premier Saracoğlu, on the other hand, accused Menderes of having long opposed, as the spokesman of the Agricultural Committee, many aspects of the Land Reform Law,⁷⁷ and of having made attempts in the Committee to ease the terms of the law to the detriment of those who would receive the land. The heated discussions on the law, especially concerning Article 17, resulted in a petition initiated by Alaeddin Tiri-doğlu and signed by 321 deputies who declared their support of this article. This petition assured the passage of Article 17 by the Assembly and seemed to imply that those who criticized the law were opposed to land reform.⁷⁸

The public in general, although keenly interested in the opposition to the Republican Party, greeted the law as an overdue social reform.⁷⁹ Whatever may be the validity of the arguments for and against the Land Reform Law, the fact remains that the victory of those defending rational agriculture and mechanization meant the preservation of the *status quo* of landed property in Turkey. The discussion on land reform in 1945 brought into evidence, nevertheless, the fact that when basic social or economic interests are endangered,

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁷⁷ *Ayın Tarihi*, June 1945, pp. 37-42. *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 18, p. 106.

⁷⁸ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 18, pp. 31, 32, 68. It has been rumored that immediately after gaining power in 1950, the Democrats summarily recalled Tiridoğlu by cable from his Ambassadorial position in Saudi Arabia. Tiridoğlu who has meanwhile joined the National Party, submitted a proposal to the last convention of the party to the effect of making it a socialist party. "Turkey must direct herself towards doctrinal parties," he said. "A socialist party which will aim at the establishment of social justice and security and prevent working people from falling into communism will also be a defender of democracy." *Vatan*, January 12, 1959. His proposal was rejected and he resigned from the party. Compare with my Chapter 14, n.83.

⁷⁹ *Vakit*, *Tasvir*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Tan*, May 16, 1945. *Aksam* (editorial), May 18, 1945.

superficial political ideas which seem temporarily to unite members of a party are swept aside, and dissension begins.

Land reform continued to affect profoundly political developments after 1945, and therefore it is necessary to provide some information on further developments in this respect. The expropriation provisions of the Land Reform Law concerning private property were barely applied, the area thus expropriated amounting to only 36,000 *dönüms*.⁸⁰ It is known that a number of landlords distributed the land among members of their family in an effort to keep intact their property within the family. Although in some instances the lands belonging to members of the opposition parties were purposely distributed first, this was done only on a limited scale.⁸¹ On the other hand, land secured from other sources was distributed on a larger scale. (See note 7 in this chapter.)

The owners of large estates and medium sized farms bitterly opposed the law and showed their opposition by strongly supporting the Democratic Party following its establishment six months after the debate on land reform. The Republican Party decided to amend the law, in its convention of 1947, to appease the opposition. This decision resulted also from the fact that, after 1947, the power in the Republican Party passed into the hands of moderate intellectuals and groups with landed interests. The actual amendment, accepted originally by the Republican government in 1948 but delayed for technical reasons, was approved by the National Assembly in 1950. Article 17, along with some articles giving land to those who wanted to become farmers and restricting the right of property, were abolished, thereby limiting, in essence, the land to be distributed to that owned by the government and *vakıfs*. Those who opposed the amendment, and they were the ones who had supported the initial law in 1945, stated

⁸⁰ *BMMTD*, Session 8.4, Vol. 25, p. 344. For additional debates on Land Reform, see *ibid.* pp. 281ff., 286-290, 325-368, 500, and *passim*; *Vatan*, December 4, 1947 (Hasan Saka's declaration).

⁸¹ *Tasvir*, June 8, 1948.

that land reforms had not been carried out to satisfy the peasants, that the law was applied sluggishly, and that if the government lands had sufficed there never would have been need or question of a land reform law in the first place.

The defender of the amendment was the new Minister of Agriculture, Cavit Oral, who in 1945 had defended the technical approach to land reform. (Oral is no longer with the Republican Party. He joined the Democratic Party, in whose government he also became Minister of Agriculture.) Oral placed importance on the technical aspects of land problems and asserted that the state lands would suffice for the landless peasants. Raşit Hatipoğlu, who had been Minister of Agriculture in 1945 and had introduced the original law, was in defense in 1950. Previously he had been a professor of Agriculture in the Agricultural Institute of Ankara. Both men were in the Republican Party but their views were diametrically opposed. Hatipoğlu has continued to remain *persona non grata* in the eyes of the Democrats until the present day, and his name is used by them as an anathema of vicious designs. Hatipoğlu and the group sponsoring the Land Reform Law have never been allowed, as have many other ex-Republicans, to rehabilitate themselves and gain some position in the Democratic Party Government.

The defenders of the amendment in 1950 pointed out that Article 17 had created distrust and a sense of insecurity, and actually had lowered agricultural production. The debate on the amendment was limited and the major speakers in the 1945 debate did not participate, despite the fact that three political parties (Republican, Democratic, National) were represented in the Assembly at the time. This limited debate resulted from the fact that after the enactment of the Land Reform Law, political theory in Turkey underwent fundamental changes and the political parties, to a certain extent, became alike, for in a way they had settled their major ideological differences and concentrated on the race for power.

The last group in the middle class, if it can be included there at all, contains the intellectuals, the "problem children" of the Republican regime.⁸² Since there are no definite criteria for defining the term "intellectuals," it has been viewed in this study as including individuals with a minimum of high school or equivalent education, although this is a rather arbitrary choice and does not give a qualitative appraisal of their abilities. Many individuals in the two preceding middle class groups are included here. The "intelligentsia," according to the available statistics, at present may number at least 600,000 people.

The intellectual group in Turkey can be divided, organically, into two parts: the first section includes those who received their education during the days of the Empire and who formed their views in its spirit, tradition, and philosophy; the second and larger section includes those educated during the Republican regime.⁸³

The Ottoman intellectuals, especially of the Young Turks period, were brought up in the political and economic chaos which resulted in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and which reflected itself partly in their own mentality. They

⁸² The intellectual is referred to as *aydın* (enlightened) or *münevver*. In the past intellectuals were also called *letre*. Falih Rıfke Atay, *Niçin Kurtulmamak*, İstanbul, 1953, pp. 57ff.

⁸³ The first group includes all the high ranking families who were transferred from the Monarchy to the Republic. They lost their titles in the Ottoman Empire but preserved their wealth and attitudes. In many ways this group, whose social status was due to government position, represents the "aristocracy" as compared to the second group, who normally came from the grass roots of Turkish society and whose education was made possible by the extended educational facilities of the Republic or by the wealth acquired by their families through economic activities. The two groups are mixed in all professions and government jobs; the first group is inclined to view the other classes with some feeling of superiority. Its consequent tendency is to restrict the affairs of state to a small, select group capable of leadership, that is, to an "elite." The "aristocratic" group can be found primarily in İstanbul, İzmir, or Bursa, while the second group is spread all over the country. Since the advent of political parties, the influence of the intellectuals in the second group, in particular professionals such as lawyers and doctors, has grown considerably.

witnessed this disintegration and, unable to prevent it, turned in frustration and animosity against the outside world. The Ottoman intellectual, wrapped in his paternalistic philosophy of life, was socially, economically, and culturally aloof from the masses. His rigidity of thought, his belief in the use of force, and finally, his almost fatalistic feeling of inferiority to all that was Western, deprived him of constructive ideas for charting the political, cultural and social transition of the Empire. The Ottoman intelligentsia, aware of the fact that the West judged them in the light of its own standards, came to judge themselves in the same way. An inner unrest and the need to justify themselves arose. In some cases there was a tendency to cling to the traditional ways of life, while in other cases there was an eagerness to abandon totally those ways and to accept Western views and manners unconditionally.⁸⁴ All these shortcomings and psychological problems the intellectual reflected onto his own people, whom he despised and mistreated. Once in a government position of some kind, he acquired an arrogance which had become proverbial in those days.

The Republican regime, by accepting the Western system of education with its rationalist and universal spirit, pitted the intellectual against his own family background in which Islamic, traditionalist, contemplative views and social values were dominant. The intellectual could not accept fully Western standards without estranging himself from his own society, which preserved its Islamic traditions and was slow to change. Unable to effect an assimilation between the two, the intellectual was forced into passivity. Dependence and asso-

⁸⁴ For a view on intellectuals in the Near East, see A. H. Hourani, *Great Britain and the Arab World*, London, 1945; and Morrison, *Middle East Tensions*, pp. 128ff. For patterns of modernization among the intellectuals in the Near East, see Raphael Patai, "The Dynamics of Westernization in the Middle East," *The Middle East Journal*, Winter 1955, pp. 1-17; see also Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "The Intellectuals in the Modern Development of the Islamic World," *Social Forces in the Middle East*, pp. 190-204.

ciation with the government is another limiting factor. A large number of intellectuals earn their living in government jobs. Many of them have studied in the country or abroad based on government subsidies, and are bound to work for it a given number of years. This identification with the government deprives many intellectuals of unbiased or even free thought, although in recent years the total identification with the government has lost much of its prior rigidity.

Recently there have been some honest efforts on the intellectual's part to achieve some true assimilation between his own and Western culture. It is the new group of younger intellectuals who, coming from the grass roots of the society and being closely acquainted with the problems and mentality of the Turkish masses, are searching for a new philosophy which can preserve the intrinsic values of the Turkish society and yet allow it to progress and adjust to modern requirements.⁸⁵ Their aim is no different from the one professed by the older generations, but their method and mentality is different, for liberalism—an equal respect for and acceptance of other values—receives expression from them. There is, however, a definite clash between this group which is more liberal and tolerant, socially conscious and realistic,⁸⁶ and the older generation of intellectuals and some of their successors who tend to remain conservative and aloof from the people and continue to live in their romantic world.

In politics the participation of intellectuals as a group is rather insignificant. Between 1946 and 1950, there was an upsurge of intellectual interest in politics, but this interest

⁸⁵ Among them about 25 thousand graduates from Village Institutes, although not all of the same quality, deserve special mention for having brought village problems to national attention and for having the courage to defend their views vigorously. See *Varlık* (Istanbul, 1945-1955), whose editor, Yaşar Nabi gave them a chance to express their views.

⁸⁶ For current discussions of the intellectual problem, see Metin And, "Türkiyede Aydınlar," *Forum*, December 15, 1955, January 15, 1956, and March 15, 1957. *Varlık*, October-December 1956 (N. Ataç); *Türk Yurdu*, October 1955 (C. Tanyol); see also, *Kadro*, February 1932 (Y. Kadri).

faded away in the following years as interest groups and especially professionals in small towns became influential in politics. The idea that the intellectual should be the guide of the masses instead of opening avenues for their development (an idea inherited from the Ottoman Empire and one party paternalism) seems to prevail.

One could not finish this subject without dealing with government personnel, who formed the intellectual backbone of the Ottoman society for several centuries. The Republic inherited an Ottoman bureaucracy whose personal ability was as worthy of praise as its general efficiency was lamentable.⁸⁷ The number of government officials in the Republic expanded as new positions opened in government enterprises.⁸⁸ The original remuneration of government officials was through the *barem* (an inflexible statutory salary plan soon to be changed), which divided all officials into groups on the basis of seniority and placed all those within a given category on the same salary level.⁸⁹ Their salaries were originally computed at a time when prices were stable. During the war years, as prices on the market soared and a variety of staple items became scarce, the economic situation of the salaried personnel became extremely difficult.⁹⁰ To remedy this situation the government passed a law with the purpose of providing its personnel with assistance in kind, e.g., coal, clothing,

⁸⁷ For a critical view of the Ottoman bureaucracy, see Celal Nuri, *Tarihi Tedenniyatı Osmaniye*, İstanbul, 1915. See also my Chapter 1.

⁸⁸ Officials and employees who drew their salaries from state, local, and municipal budgets, excluding personnel in the utility and military services and orphans and pensioners, numbered 127,000 in 1938 and rose to 184,000 in 1945. Bilkur, *National Income*, pp. 13-14.

⁸⁹ Caldwell, "Turkish Administration," p. 132. On Turkish administrators, see also B. Kingsbury, *The Public Service in Turkey: Organization, Recruitment and Training*, Brussels, 1955. For a historical survey, see N. Osten, "Administrative Organization of Turkey: Historical Summary and Present Day Administration," *Asiatic Review*, October 1942, pp. 407ff.

⁹⁰ The index of wholesale prices rose from 100 in 1938 to 126.6 in 1940, 175.3 in 1941, 339.6 in 1942, and 590.1 in 1943. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 118.

sugar, fats, rice.⁹¹ The number to be aided in this way amounted to 1.6 million people.⁹² Thus there was on the one hand the government *memur* who enjoyed a relative bounty amid general privations, and on the other hand the peasants and the low income groups in the cities who had to lower their own living standard because of taxation and the forced delivery of goods to meet the war-time emergency. The government was quite legitimate in protecting its own personnel, but by so doing it acted as though its interests and survival were above and unrelated to those of the people. During the war years a wedge was driven between the government as an institution and the large part of the population which saw itself as existing for the government's sake. This state of affairs profoundly affected the struggle for a multi-party system after 1946.

The present-day bureaucracy in Turkey has changed considerably in the light of political developments in the country, but it still possesses the power, owing to its long-entrenched habits and skill, to mould the policy of any government to accord with its own mentality and views.⁹³

The Republican government, through its efforts at over-all development, accelerated the social transformation of Turkish society, which in two and one-half decades came to differ

⁹¹ *Dar Gelirlilere Yardım Kanunu* (Law for assistance to the fixed income groups, No. 4306 of November 13, 1942). In the latter years the government officials were occasionally assisted by double salaries. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 10. Recently salaries were doubled.

⁹² *BMMTD*, Session 6, Vol. 28, pp. 14-24, 18, *passim*; Declaration of Premier Saracoğlu.

⁹³ A considerable number of government officials now come from families who had held government positions in the past. Some no longer regard as desirable the tradition of government jobs. The liberal professions, such as engineering, medicine and politics seem to appeal to them. For the new mentality of the new bureaucracy and their organization, see A. T. Matthews, *Emergent Turkish Administrators*, Ankara, 1955; and Caldwell, "Turkish Administration," pp. 131-135; also *Studies in Turkish Local Government*, UN Public Administration Institute, Ankara, 1955. For the change of mentality in the government bureaucracy after 1946, see my Chapter 13.

greatly, both in structure and mentality, from that of the Ottoman Empire. Social differentiation in Turkey was caused directly by the government and developed rather fast. The resulting social classes have not yet reached the cultural, organizational, and political level of Western society, and some of them, such as the peasants, are still in an amorphous stage. These classes have, nevertheless, outgrown the initial stage of organization and continue to develop and differentiate rapidly.

The most important aspect of these social changes lies in the fact that the various groups formed, in time, some opinions about their own status and interests, and demanded appropriate measures to improve and defend them. The middle class which had accumulated capital desired to invest it without being faced with government restriction, competition, interference, and controls. It wanted full returns on its investments. The villagers needed land, an equitable tax system, relief from the burden of industrialization, improved farming methods, financial protection for farm products, and better social measures. The workers demanded an improved standard of living, wage increases, and the right to organize trade unions freely and generally to defend their interests. All these demands were addressed *pro forma* to the government, but in essence they criticized it.

The government that initially started the economic process became in time a hindrance to many who had originally benefited from it. Thus, on the one hand, the government developed its own institutions and philosophy, and political omnipotence in all fields; but on the other hand, by initiating the economic development and by preserving the social classes and the process of social transformation along traditional lines, it prepared the basis for the end of its own absolute political domination.

At the end of the second World War, Turkey had ap-

proached the crucial point at which profitable war conditions for some groups had to end and a new economic adjustment to peacetime conditions was necessary.⁹⁴ In the light of the transformation which had taken place, statism was bound to be altered drastically. Two alternatives clearly appeared before the government. It was bound either to expand in order to embrace the minutest detail in production and distribution and to apply an equalizing rule to every social group, or to limit its economic activities in favor of private enterprise. The new course was to be determined by the philosophy prevailing in the government, by social and economic forces, by political developments in the country and abroad, and last but not least, by the vision of the country's leaders.

Statism, through its excesses and deviations from its initial social purpose, had become an obstacle to the development and the interests of all social groups. The benevolent paternalism of the Republican Party no longer corresponded with the needs of any group.⁹⁵ Their common purpose, not expressly stated but manifest in complaints, was to limit the government's harmful functions and authority and then use the government for their own purposes. The middle class demanded freedom in economy. The peasants and workers demanded liberation from a system which, though established to promote the welfare of all groups, had aided only some specific groups.

When Hikmet Bayur rose and spoke in the National Assembly against this state of affairs he expressed a sincere and quite general view. "People are so tired of the existing economic conditions which . . . they think stem from the principle rather than from mal administration. They are inclined to think that this results from statism and industrialization

⁹⁴ For the economic situation of Turkey at the end of the war, see A. C. Edwards, "Impact of the War on Turkey," *International Affairs*, July 1946, pp. 389-390.

⁹⁵ Lewis, "Recent Development in Turkey," pp. 329-333.

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and other causes. The time will come for some of them to say how tired they are of statism and industrialization, and that will take such proportions that nobody will be able to stop it. We must take measures before this happens. We ought not to deceive ourselves with the thought that all is well. A storm is brewing."⁹⁶

⁹⁶ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 20, p. 120. See also my Chapter 11.

CHAPTER 5

THE BEGINNING OF LIBERALIZATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OPPOSITION PARTIES

THE transition of Turkey's one-party regime to a multi-party system was prepared domestically by the political, social, and economic developments described in the preceding chapters and by the liberal concepts at the foundation of the Republic. The transition was made imminent by external factors such as the signing of the United Nations Charter, and Turkey's need to adjust her political regime to political philosophies made dominant by the victory of the democracies in the second World War. It was brought about by the decision of the Republican Party government under the direct influence of İnönü, the President.

The liberal and individualistic ideas of the French Revolution which had inspired the Young Turks and had an impact on their Constitution in 1908, were preserved by the Republican regime.¹

The Constitution of 1924 defined individual rights and freedoms in their broadest liberal meaning, but designated the National Assembly as supreme, embodying in itself all three government powers: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. (The Judiciary was independent in the discharge of its daily functions [Article 8, 54]. Theoretically, the Republic granted rights and freedoms to the individual, but deprived him of any means to assure their enforcement. In practice, the concentration of all power in the National Assembly, and the resulting lack of any check or balance of government powers, rendered rather meaningless the liberal provisions regarding human rights and freedoms. These, therefore, could be granted and restricted at will as the government saw fit, as

¹ Hüseyin Nail Kubalı, *Devlet Ana Hukuku*, İstanbul, 1950.

happened in the experiment of the Liberal Party in 1930, and especially during the war years. Yet the government justified all these restrictions, not as logically stemming from the regime's political theory, but as an imperative, practical necessity in order to concentrate all powers in the Assembly so that it might carry out modernization.²

The justification, and the necessity for the strong government which prevailed in Turkey between 1923 and 1945 will be a matter of discussion for years to come. Whatever turn these discussions may take, one still can rightly question whether or not any other solution existed to bring about the urgent reforms Turkey needed. A society emerging from social and economic inertia, with a large section of the population dominated by fatalism, and without a large progressive and far-sighted intelligentsia, could not have done otherwise. Whatever faults one may attribute to Atatürk, one cannot say that he lacked enlightenment, and his enlightenment was Turkey's great fortune.

The individualistic nature of the Republican regime was brought up repeatedly by Atatürk himself.³ Dictatorship in general, as a political theory, had never been accepted and was even considered harmful for Turkey,⁴ even during the time of the most rigid enforcement of one-party rule. This rule did not resemble the Western dictatorship, for it had no terror and a relative freedom of publication was recognized.⁵ Various reforms and the new system of education were introduced not for the purpose of enhancing dictatorship, but to liberate the individual from the age-long effects of personal, despotic rule.

² *BMMTD, Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi (Zabıt Ceridesi)* (Records of the Grand National Assembly), Session 7.3, Vol. 20, p. 7 (Inönü's speech).

³ John Parker, *Modern Turkey*, London, 1940, pp. 76, 77.

⁴ Richard D. Robinson, "The Lesson of Turkey," *The Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1951, p. 427.

⁵ Lewis, "Recent Developments in Turkey," *International Affairs*, July 1951, p. 320.

The government itself recognized that the individual's rights limited somehow its own power by re-establishing the *Devlet Şurası* (Supreme Administrative Court). Although this Court was not entitled to judge the constitutionality of laws, it did provide the individual with some rights to sue the government for damages to his own property and person. The implicit conclusion was that the government recognized the temporary nature of the restrictions imposed upon individual rights and freedoms. Once the conditions which necessitated the restrictions disappeared, there remained no justification for continuing them.⁶ In other words, once the reforms became generally accepted and the danger of reaction was reduced, the individual's rights and freedoms could be restored to him again.⁷ The general public had viewed with misgivings the strengthening of one-party rule, especially after Atatürk's death in 1938, when a small bureaucratic-minded group in the Republican Party gained power and exercised a rigid control over all activities.⁸ Some open discontent was already visible at the party convention of 1939, but the second World War started and the desire of preserving a united front during those crucial years caused postponement of talks for liberation. During the war years, Turkey, after a cautious policy of neutrality (she had an alliance with France and England in 1939 and the non-aggression pact of 1941 with Germany) and occasional fluctuations which irritated the Allies, finally came

⁶ The spokesmen for the Republican Party, somewhat in a sudden change, claimed in 1946 that the Party's intention was not to establish a dictatorship but a democracy like those of Western Europe. The Party encouraged the establishment of opposition parties in the past, they said, with that purpose in mind, such as the Liberal Party. *Ulus*, August 22, 1946.

⁷ Allen remarked in 1935 that when the country had become sufficiently enlightened to understand democracy one might look for the relaxation of the one-party rule. Henry Elisha Allen, *The Turkish Transformation*, Chicago, 1935, p. 48, n.9.

⁸ It has been often said that after Atatürk's death an administrative and political oligarchy in the Republican Party firmly established its own power in the government appearing as a dictatorship. *Ulus* (editorial), July 4, 1946; also Lewis, "Recent Developments," p. 320.

solidly to the West's side. She cut her relations with the Axis in 1944, declared war on Germany and Japan on February 23rd in order to qualify for United Nations membership, and on February 24, 1945 she embraced the United Nations Declaration.⁹

It appeared certain at the end of the war that Turkey's political and economic interests lay in the West, and that these could be best served by a closer rapprochement to it. Thus, the destruction of the one-party regimes in Italy and Germany,¹⁰ the adherence of Turkey to the United Nations Declaration, and her closer rapprochement to the West considerably weakened the foundations of one-party rule at home. Moreover, the political atmosphere abroad, especially in the United States, made it apparent that without a democratization of her political system Turkey would not be able to gain in the West the proper moral recognition she desired and needed. Furthermore, the strains of discontent at home, stemming from various political, social, and economic measures

⁹ The Turkish declaration in this respect reads: "Turkey having already, at the time of signing her alliance with Great Britain on October 19, 1939, embraced the cause of the Allied Powers in their struggle against aggression, has since then broken off her diplomatic and economic relations first with Germany and later with Japan, and having declared war on those powers on February 23, 1945, has decided to adhere to the United Nations Declaration." *Department of State Bulletin*, XII, March 4, 1945, pp. 373-374; also *United Nations Documents 1941-1945*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, New York, 1947; Gotthard Jäschke, *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942-1951*, Wiesbaden, 1955, pp. 40, 41, 42. Professor Jäschke's outstanding chronology has been of very valuable assistance in checking dates and completing the information in this work. For the beginnings of democracy in Turkey, see also the memoirs of Hilmi Uran, Vice-Chairman and Secretary General of the Republican Party in *Dünya*, October 19, 1958.

¹⁰ Adnan Menderes best described the effects of war on the Turkish politics in a speech in Aydın: "The difficulties encountered during the war years uncovered and showed the weak points created by the one-party system in the structure of the country. The hope in the miracles of one-party system vanished, as the one-party system countries were defeated everywhere. Thus, the one-party mentality was destroyed in the turmoil of blood and fire of the second World War. No country can remain unaffected by the great international events and the contemporary dominating ideological currents. This influence was felt in our country too." *Cumhuriyet*, July 18, 1946.

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taken during the war, had become so serious that it was necessary to "open a safety-valve" to prevent a general upheaval.¹¹ All of these helped to prepare the ground for liberalization.

By accepting the Charter of the United Nations Turkey pledged to liberalize her political regime in accordance with the democratic principles of the Charter. The Turkish delegate to the San Francisco Conference in 1945 declared to the *Reuters* correspondent that, "The Republican regime, as a political institution, is determinedly progressing on the way to modern democracy. Our Constitution can be compared with the constitutions of the most advanced countries; it may even prove better than some of them . . ." and added that after the war every democratic tendency would be allowed to develop in Turkey.¹² A few days after this declaration, President İnönü declared on May 19, 1945, ". . . the political régime and the government of the people established by the Republican regime shall develop in all aspects and in every way, and as the conditions imposed by war disappear, democratic principles will gradually acquire a larger place in the political and cultural life of the country. The Grand National Assembly, our greatest democratic institution, had the Government in its hand from the very beginning and constantly developed the country in the direction of democracy."¹³

¹¹ Lewis, "Recent Developments," p. 323. This writer, who had a chance to talk to several people from various parts of the country at that time and was told of the general discontent among the populace, also subscribes to Professor Lewis's idea which he attributes to the Democrats. For the situation of Turkey after the war and the emergence of the multi-party system, see also A. C. Edwards, "The Impact of the War on Turkey," *International Affairs*, July 1946, pp. 392-399 *passim*.

¹² *Ayın Tarihi*, May 1945, p. 633. The CHP Parliamentary Group met on March 27 and 28, 1945 and discussed the pending San Francisco Conference. *Ayın Tarihi*, March 1945, pp. 10, 11. The announcement in respect to these meetings was very succinct but from private information gathered it appears that the Turkish delegation to San Francisco was instructed to declare that liberalization was under way in Turkey. See also Dankwart A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955," *Islam and the West*, p. 90, n.40.

¹³ *Ayın Tarihi*, May 1945, pp. 52-53. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 45.

The opposition to the government formed over the years, became somewhat personalized during the debates on the Land Reform Law, and was encouraged by İnönü's declaration and the signing of the United Nations Charter by Turkey. It first came into the open when the Charter was submitted to the National Assembly for ratification. Adnan Menderes, who appeared as the outspoken critic of one-party rule, pointed out that the Charter "requested respect for the sovereignty of the people in the administration of the country by establishing mutual respect in the observance of civil and the political rights of the individual and the state . . . through free voting . . . consequently the liquidation of obstacles to the will of the people will strengthen the freedom and independence of nations."¹⁴ In his view, the United Nations Charter and the Turkish Constitution were in perfect harmony, but that this harmony was disrupted in practice, however, by the restrictions imposed on freedom by the Republican Party. According to Menderes, the acceptance of the Charter entailed the liquidation of these restrictions to fulfill the obligations undertaken by the Turkish Government under the United Nations.¹⁵

This speech against one-party rule met violent reaction in the Assembly on the part of the old guard Republicans, but the demand to conform to the United Nations Charter soon became the main theme of the press.¹⁶

The effect of international events and pressure on Turkish internal politics has always been a subject of controversy, especially in the light of the country's extreme sensitiveness to criticism from abroad. It was said that international pressure, embodied in the United Nations Charter, made the Re-

¹⁴ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 19, pp. 170, 171. Debate on August 15, 1945. Jäschke, *ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁵ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 19, p. 171.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 174ff. (remarks of M. Ökmen). *Tan*, August 23, 1945; *La Turquie*, August 22, 1945. The left wing papers protested against the one-party rule in strong terms. Some of the Republican newspapers also appeared critical of the one-party rule and its restrictions. See Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 50.

publican Party accept political liberalization, as in the past foreign pressure had brought about the *Tanzimat* of 1839 and the Reform Edict of 1856.¹⁷ Although the effect of indirect moral pressure for democratization from outside cannot be minimized,¹⁸ it would be erroneous to consider it as the exclusive factor in the introduction of the multi-party regime in Turkey. To do so would amount to the denial of the social and cultural forces within Turkish society, and would make the transition appear to be dictated only by opportunistic motives. The acceptance of the United Nations Charter, nevertheless, decidedly set the stage for the opposition to one-party rule, since it provided the dissidents with legal and moral arguments against the one-party system and encouraged them to bring their opposition into the open and to seek popular support.

It was under the pressure of all these internal and external developments in 1945 that the Republican Party philosophy gradually underwent a fundamental change. Premier Şükrü Saracoğlu, who one year earlier in 1944 had declared that the Turkish political regime was likely to be a postwar model for other countries,¹⁹ agreed to "a review of this or that measure which had been adopted in order to protect the new regime."²⁰

¹⁷ *Ayn Tarihi*, September 1945, p. 23 (remarks attributed to opposition newspapers). *Yeni Sabah*, February 19, 1948 (Sadık Aldoğan's views); also *The Times*, London, November 1, 1945.

Hamit ve Muhsin, *Türkiye Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1930, p. 654; also Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," *American Historical Review*, July 1954, pp. 849, 850.

¹⁸ The idea of outside pressure for democratization was so persistent even later on, that the British Ambassador to Turkey, during a visit paid to the Newspapermen's Association, found it necessary to deny publicly any interference by Great Britain in the internal affairs of Turkey. *Cumhuriyet*, September 3, 1946; also *Ulus*, September 5, 1946.

¹⁹ Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 27; also *Vatan*, September 16, 1945 (remarks of A. Menderes).

²⁰ *Ulus*, September 6, 1945. One and a half years earlier *Ulus* wrote edi-

Spokesmen for the Republican Party declared that in Turkey the sovereignty of the people was recognized and that basically the regime was democratic, consequently they declared that democracy had been in existence in Turkey for twenty-three years, since the inception of the Republic.²¹

The Republicans' first opportunity to prove these liberal intentions came with the İstanbul by-elections. These elections, in which candidates were freely nominated as contrasted with the past when the Republican Party Central Committee had supreme control over nominations,²² were held on June 17, 1945. The elected deputies, however, belonged to CHP (Peoples Republican Party).

Martial law, on the other hand, enforced in İstanbul throughout the war years, was extended for an additional six months.²³ This law gave the government supreme authority to take all measures as it deemed necessary for the country's security. Since the main and the most important part of the Turkish press was concentrated in İstanbul, which was also, politically speaking, the most "sensitive" spot, such over-all authority could be used, as happened repeatedly, for political purposes.

The opposition within the Assembly gradually took a more definite form. The sharp criticism of the government voiced during the debate on the budget of the Ministry of Commerce in 1945, and the seven votes cast against it were the beginning of an ever increasing opposition to the government.²⁴ Formal opposition developed with the submission

torially that freedom could be restricted whenever necessary to materialize populism. *Ulus*, January 6, 1944.

²¹ *Ibid.*, May 23, 1946; July 28, 1946 (Declaration of the Minister of Justice, A. R. Türel); also Lewis, "Recent Developments," p. 321.

²² *Vatan*, June 8, 1945; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 46.

²³ *Ayın Tarihi*, June 1945, p. 5.

²⁴ *Vatan*, May 30, 1945. Four votes belonged to the future founders of the Democratic Party: A. Menderes, C. Bayar, R. Koraltan, F. Köprülü. The remaining three votes belonged, respectively, to H. Bayur, an old critic of the government, R. Peker, dissatisfied with the economic policy, and

to the Republican Party's Parliamentary Group of a proposal known as the *Dörtlü Takrir* (Proposal of the Four) of June 7, 1945. The signatories were Celal Bayar (ex-Premier), Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan.

They mentioned the democratic nature of the Turkish Constitution, the attempts of Atatürk to give a more liberal character to the government, and finally the fact that the fear of reaction had necessitated the imposition of restrictions on the Constitution and that the second World War had prolonged the enforcement of these restrictions.²⁵ Now, since the war was over and the intellectuals and peasants were ready for democracy, they proposed to restore to the National Assembly effective powers of control over the government, grant to individuals the rights and freedoms which had been prescribed in the Constitution, and finally allow the development of political activity based on more than one party. In an effort to arouse public backing, the signatories requested an open debate on the proposal. Although very carefully worded, and apparently submitted in order to produce a change in the Republican Party from within, this proposal, if accepted, would have produced a sudden and radical change in the political life of the country.

The Republican Party's Parliamentary Group met on June 12, 1945, and after seven hours of closed-door discussions rejected the proposal on the ground that it aimed at certain amendments in the existing laws and regulations and that the National Assembly and not the Group was the proper place to discuss such requests.²⁶

E. Sazak, rich landowner who, according to Premier Saracoğlu, "became an oppositionist from the day the Land Reform Law came under discussion." *Ulus*, May 30, 1945. See also my Chapter 4.

²⁵ For text, see Naki C. Akkerman, *Demokrasi ve Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler Hakkında Kısa Notlar*, Ankara, 1950, pp. 72-75; also *Vatan*, September 22, 1945 (Declaration of A. Menderes). *Cumhuriyet*, July 18, 1946; *Ulus*, November 26, 1950.

²⁶ *Aynı Tarihi*, June 1945, p. 13. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 14. See also Chapter 15.

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It is rather difficult to explain the rejection of the proposal in question, for in fact it was the denial of all the liberalization promises made by the Republicans during the spring of 1945. It may be assumed that a majority in the Republican Party found the idea of sudden political liberalization too radical, but it may also be true that in an effort to establish a genuine opposition party, the Republican hierarchy decided to reject the proposal and thus create between its authors and the rest of the Republicans certain differences which eventually would have led the signatories to separate from the Republican Party. Indeed, a number of democratic measures adopted by the Republican Party only a few months later, if accepted entirely or partially at that meeting, could have met the demands formulated in the proposals and would have left little ground for the signatories to maintain a critical attitude toward their own party.

Public opinion seemed to be in sympathy with all efforts to criticize the Republican Party; therefore it voiced approval of the four signatories. Encouraged by this reaction, three months after the debate on the proposed party reform, Fuad Köprülü and Adnan Menderes brought their opposition into the open by criticizing the government, the Premier, and some "undemocratic" laws in the *Vatan*, which had already turned against the government. The Republican Party asked the two to explain their critical attitude but did not receive a satisfactory answer, and consequently found their activities "contrary to the spirit and letter of the Republican Party and decided to expel them." Refik Koraltan, the third co-signatory of the proposal was also expelled from the party for criticizing the decision regarding his two colleagues.²⁷

Celal Bayar, the fourth co-signatory, had prepared for submission to the Grand National Assembly a request for amending Articles 17 and 50 of the Press Law restricting

²⁷ *Vatan*, September 13, 14, 18, 1945. *Ibid.*, September 22, 1945; October 2, 1945, November 27, 1945.

freedom of information, but his request was rejected by the Republican Parliamentary Group.²⁸ Bayar resigned from the Assembly as Deputy of Izmir and on December 2, 1945, from the Republican Party itself, in order, according to his biographer, to give the opposition a genuine aspect by founding a new party.²⁹

Thus, in the winter of 1945, about five months after the proposal was submitted, the four signatories had severed their relations with the Republican Party. Meanwhile in opening the Assembly on November 1, 1945, İnönü made further declarations encouraging the opposition. He declared that the country was progressing in freedom and security towards democracy and that its only shortcoming was the absence of an opposition to face the party in power. He expressed his hope that such an opposition party might be established in accordance with the principles of democracy and the country's needs. This democracy, however, had to suit the character and culture of the Turkish people, and the structure of the country. İnönü had in mind at this stage a rather limited democracy that would not challenge the Republican Party's rule. He nevertheless promised that the anti-democratic laws were to be amended and urged the dissidents in the Republican Party to come into the open.³⁰

While these developments took place in the Republican Party, the opposition's issues were defined in the press. A common opposition front was created in the summer of 1945 around the newspapers *Vatan* (Homeland) and *Tan* (Dawn). Some other publications still dubious of the outcome of the democratization efforts followed reluctantly. Immediate liberalization demands concentrated on a number of issues con-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, June 14, 1945.

²⁹ Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 54. *Tasvir*, July 9, 1946 (open letter of Cemal Kutay). For some general information, see also Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, Norman (Oklahoma), 1956, pp. 221-224.

³⁰ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 20, p. 7. Jäschke, *ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

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nected with restoration of the rights and freedoms granted by the Constitution. Among them were freedom of the press, amendment of the Associations and Penal Laws, amendment of the Police Law (especially Article 18 which gave the security forces the right to seize and hold indefinitely any person deemed "dangerous" and to search houses without a warrant), autonomy for universities, direct elections, and the separation of the President of the Republic from the Chairmanship of the Republican Party.³¹

Meanwhile, discussions in the precinct meetings of the Republican Party, known in the past for conformance to the wishes of the party hierarchy, gradually became more critical. They grew vehement when the critics realized that they were not silenced or expelled from the party as would have been the case in the past.³²

A violent political polemic which degenerated into personal slander between Ahmed Emin Yalman, the editor of the opposition newspaper *Vatan* and Falih Rıfki Atay of *Ulus* (State), the official newspaper of the Republican Party, besides dissipating the fear of criticizing the government and its representatives, forced *Ulus* to adopt a strictly Republican Party line and give up its claims of general representation. Moreover, the impact of public opinion was being felt, as proved by the fact that *Yeni Ekonomi* (New Economy) of İzmir, which had been suspended by the governor of İzmir for having published news of an automobile accident caused by the governor's son, was reopened at the insistence of the press.³³

It was this general atmosphere of political relaxation that led Nuri Demirağ, a rich İstanbul industrialist, to request on July 6, 1945, and obtain on July 18, 1945, permission to

³¹ *Tan*, June 22, 26, 1945.

³² See *Vatan*, September 19, 20, 1945 (meetings at Üsküdar [Scutari] and Eyüp). On developments in Turkey during this period, see Malcolm Burr, "Politics in Turkey," *Spectator*, July 13, 1945.

³³ See *Yeni Ekonomi*, *Vatan*, November 17, 18, 1945.

establish a new political party, thus acquiring the honor of having formed the first opposition party in Turkey after the second World War.³⁴ This party, *Milli Kalkınma* (National Resurgence), lacked a concrete and detailed program and limited its activities to a policy drawn up personally by the founder. It therefore played only a minor part in the political struggle. But by allowing its establishment, the government proved its willingness to accept opposition parties.

It would be inaccurate to envisage all these developments as taking place without any reaction on the part of the Republican Party. Sharp attacks were directed against the press, in whose criticism certain party extremists saw a real danger to the nation's security, and who openly invited the youth to "silence" the opposition newspapers.³⁵ As mentioned before, the opposition was centered around the *Vatan* and *Tan*. The first paper adopted liberal and the second socialistic views. (The editors of *Tan*, Zekeria Sertel and Sabiha Sertel, were among the very first to open fierce and bitter attacks on the Republican Party and its members. *Tan* voiced strong support of the Land Reform Law and continued thereafter to publish a number of articles on the social and economic problems of the country, all examined from a socialist viewpoint.) Premier Saracoğlu complained that the "two newspapers which we thought had different political views were united in opposition,"³⁶ thereby causing *Vatan* to state its political views as not being socialistic.

³⁴ *Vatan*, July 8, September 8, 22, October 27, 1945. On this party, see also *Türkiyede Siyasi Dernekler*, 11 (A publication of the Ministry of Interior), Ankara, 1950, pp. 105ff. Tarık Z. Tunaya, *Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler*, İstanbul, 1952, pp. 638ff. See also my section on minor parties in Chapter 15.

³⁵ *Vatan*, May 23, 1945. *Ibid.*, September 11, 1945.

³⁶ *Aynı Tarihi*, September 1945, p. 23. *Tan* was accused of communistic leanings, and *Vatan* of supporting foreign capitalist interests. *Tan* denied in an editorial any communistic sympathies. Both papers had been accused of being Jewish by Rasih Kaplan, probably because the editor of *Vatan* was a *dönme*, converted Jew (that is of the Jewish group which accepted Islam in the sixteenth century), and the editor of *Tan* was an immigrant. *Tan*, October 10, 17, 1945.

The mounting antagonism to *Tan* was increased further by its editors' publication of *Görüşler* (Views), a political magazine, which violently attacked the Republican Party and the President and asked for a new reorientation in internal and in external (pro-Soviet) politics.³⁷

The expected reaction to *Tan's* criticism occurred on the morning of December 4, 1945. A huge crowd, carrying anti-communist as well as anti-oppositionist posters,³⁸ stopped in front of the *Tan* offices. In a matter of minutes the printing presses of *La Turquie*, *Yeni Dünya* (New World) and *Görüşler*—all these had socialist tendencies—were destroyed. Several places (*Berrak*, *ABC*) selling leftist publications were also wrecked. The newspaper *Akşam* (Evening), which criticized the destructive aspects of the demonstration, was forced by the demonstrators to take out the critical remarks. According to the Minister of Interior, "the police followed the manifestation step by step," but were unable to stop the wreckers, although they successfully prevented them from reaching certain foreign representations.³⁹ Despite the fact

³⁷ See *Görüşler*, December 1945.

³⁸ One poster read: "In no other democratic country in the world is there as much freedom as in ours." *Ayn Tarihi*, December 1945, p. 3.

³⁹ *Ulus*, December 5, 1945. *Ayn Tarihi*, December 1945, p. 3. It is a truth that *Tan* and *La Turquie*, whatever their ideology and purpose, were among the very first newspapers to criticize the one-party regime and ask for a more liberal system. Mehmet Ali Aybar, professor at the University of İstanbul (later dismissed; and also publisher of the pro-left *Zincirli Hürriyet* [The Enchained Freedom]) was one of the first to write violent anti-government articles in the *Vatan*. The best known is his "Democracy on Paper." See *Vatan*, August 24, 1945. Ahmet Emin Yalman in his recently published memoirs—rather fragments of memoirs—treats casually the destruction of *Tan*. He mentions the fact that in the morning of the demonstration he walked to his office and soon his building was surrounded by gendarmes and police. Actually *Vatan* narrowly missed meeting the same fate as *Tan*, and the police were there to protect the building. The buildings of *Tan* and *Vatan* are at a distance of 500 yards from each other. This writer, who was studying at the University of İstanbul at that time and had, by chance, learned how the "manifestation" was organized, found out that it was decided to spare *Vatan* in the last moment in order to give the manifestation an anti-communist only and not an anti-opposition feature. For Yalman's views, see *Turkey in My Time*, p. 226.

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that Istanbul was under martial law, the demonstration lasted several hours and took place three blocks from police headquarters. This destructive action, contrary to the Republican Party's liberalization promises, could be explained partly by the fact that during this period Turkish-Soviet relations were deteriorating because of the Soviet's demands for a revision of the Montreaux Convention.⁴⁰ Moreover, it created unfortunate precedent for forceful action against "leftist" ideas. It also covered the beginnings of democracy in Turkey with a cloud of fear and suspicion that force would eventually be used to silence all opposition to the government.⁴¹ The destruction of the left-wing publications and book stores was treated with mild criticism in the press, but in the Republican Party there seemed to be a certain relief that the leftists were finally silenced.⁴²

By this time it was clear that the four signatories of the proposal had decided to form an opposition party, and, indeed, on January 7, 1946, the Democratic Party was formally established under the leadership of Celal Bayar. Thus, the Democratic Party, like many other parties in the past, was formed directly within the National Assembly instead of developing from the people upwards. (Three of the founders were still deputies.)

The government and the Republican Party welcomed the establishment of the Democratic Party and expressed the hope that it would soon emerge as a party with a program different from that of the Republican Party.⁴³ Meanwhile,

⁴⁰ See my Chapter 14.

⁴¹ For an inside view of the prosecutions following the destruction of *Tan*, see Sabiha and Zekerya Sertel, *Davamız ve Müdafamız*, İstanbul, 1946. It was the publishers of *Tan* who were sent to the court, supposedly for some instigatory writings appearing in their newspaper. See *The New York Times*, March 24, 1946.

⁴² For opinions, see *Vatan*, *Akşam*, December 5, 6, 7, 1945; also Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 54. *Cumhuriyet*, January 20, 23, 1945, March 24, 1946.

⁴³ *Ulus* (editorial), January 8, 1946; *Akşam* (editorial), January 9,

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Hikmet Bayur, the old critic of the government, was expelled from the Republican Party and added his own prestige to the opposition.⁴⁴ (He worked for the Democratic Party but did not become a member.)

Within two months after its establishment, the Democratic Party had opened branches in sixteen provincial seats out of the existing sixty-three provinces, in thirty-six district seats, and in an indefinite number of villages. Nevertheless, this was rather slow development, for a considerable number of people were convinced that the new party, like the Liberal Party of Fethi Okyar in 1930, was not born from genuine opposition. This belief was widespread, and in order to shatter it the Republicans and Democrats had to assert repeatedly the genuine character of the opposition.⁴⁵

During the first few months following the establishment of the Democratic Party, relations between the Democrats and Republicans were friendly. This favorable attitude on the part of the Republicans, according to the Democrats, was based on the assumption that the Democratic Party "will not establish organizations in the eastern part of the country, in border provinces and in villages; and instead would limit its activities to a few provinces deemed to be politically advanced enough to accept new ideas"; would register members gradually, one by one, and not advance claims for power for at least forty to fifty years to come, thus playing the part of an ornament of democracy.⁴⁶ In fact, having been in power for

1946; also Jäschke, *op.cit.*, p. 56. See also my section on this Party in Chapter 15. For text of Program, see *Siyasi Dernekler*, pp. 169-182; *Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 662-673.

⁴⁴ *Ulus*, January 24, 1946.

⁴⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, March 14, 1946 (C. Bayar's statement). *Tasvir*, April 23, 1946. *Ülke*, March 10, 1946.

⁴⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, July 18, 1946 (speech of Menderes in Aydın). For a general view of political developments in 1946-1947, see Ahmed E. Yalman, "The Struggle for Multi-Party Government in Turkey," *The Middle East Journal*, I, 1947, pp. 46ff.

twenty-three years, the Republicans felt that an opposition party could not easily take root.⁴⁷

However, as the Democratic Party expanded, the friendly attitude of the Republicans changed. Indeed, after the relatively stagnant first three months, the Democratic Party suddenly began to expand greatly, mainly because people became convinced of the genuine character of its opposition. Thus, in the Spring of 1946, the Democratic Party came to represent within its own ranks almost the entire opposition. In towns and villages groups of citizens would get together and form a local branch of the Democratic Party,⁴⁸ and then establish contacts with the central body with little regard for the fact that the Democratic Party did not yet have a program accepted by the party, nor were its views clearly formulated: its only distinctive character being its opposition to the government.

It became apparent to the Republicans that in a very short time the expanding Democratic Party would offer a real challenge to the Republican Party and might even oust it from government in the forthcoming election, scheduled to take place early in 1947.

The Republican Party decided to call a party convention to discuss certain matters connected with democracy and to change the date of the municipal elections from September to May 1946;⁴⁹ this last decision forecasting imminent general elections in the summer of 1946. The amendment to the municipal law to provide for an early election was submitted by the Republican Government and debated and passed the same day in the Assembly, but not without the first open clash between the party in power and the opposition. The opposition claimed that the holding of the elections at an earlier date than actually due aimed at delaying the organiza-

⁴⁷ *Son Saat*, March 30, 1947 (Köprülü's views).

⁴⁸ See *Tanin* (editorial), July 8, 1947.

⁴⁹ *Ayın Tarihi*, April 1946, p. 6.

tion of the Democratic Party, and demanded measures to assure the integrity of elections and amendment of undemocratic laws, notably the Press, Association, and Police Laws. The Republicans, some of them in plainly threatening terms, claimed that the opposition needed to "mature" before it could advance any claims to office. They claimed that new elections were necessary to determine whether they still had the confidence of the people, through an Assembly elected in a new democratic direct election instead of the old indirect system.⁵⁰

The Republican Party Convention met on May 10, 1946, and following the opening speech of President İnönü it proceeded to consider the agenda. İnönü pointed out that the internal and external situation of the nation made imperative the holding of new elections, and that there was need to democratize the election system. Should the Republican Party lose the elections, İnönü said, he would go into opposition as the Chairman of the Republican Party, a position he did not wish to relinquish despite criticism levelled at him for being both President of the Republic and Chairman of the Republican Party. İnönü recommended the following: (a) lifting the ban on the formation of associations and political parties based on class interest; (b) adoption of the direct voting system in place of the old indirect system; (c) amendment of the party by-laws in order to nominate and elect the party chairman, instead of having him nominated for a lifetime (*değişmez başkan*), and change the name of *şef* (chief, leader) to "party chairman"; and, (d) abolition of the Independent Group in the Assembly—and as a conclusion to all these, the holding of new elections.⁵¹

⁵⁰ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 22, p. 216 (Menderes's speech). *Ibid.*, p. 222 (R. Koraltan). *Ibid.*, p. 218 (R. Peker); also *Ayın Tarihi*, April 1946, p. 22 (views of R. Peker).

⁵¹ *Ulus*, April 27 and May 11, 1946; *Ayın Tarihi*, May 1946, pp. 32ff. *İnönünün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, İstanbul, 1946, pp. 401-407; also Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 60.

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The convention concluded after İnönü's proposals were accepted and he had been elected chairman of the party.

The decisions reached at this convention were of crucial importance. The recognition of the fact that there were social classes in the country and of their economic interests as the basis for political associations was diametrically opposed to the concept of a classless society, which had been preached for the previous twenty-five years. The direct election also was indeed a profound reform enabling the average Turkish citizen, for the first time, to assert his own opinion directly by vote instead of through an intermediary.

The decision to call the elections one year early was, however, motivated by practical considerations. Early elections, in addition to keeping the Republicans in power, could destroy, or at least lessen the zeal and enthusiasm of the opposition, which found in the approaching elections the source of strength for its activities. Moreover, it was thought that if the elections were won by the Democratic Party only a few months after its inception, when neither its leaders' ideas nor the party's principles were clearly known, it could be done only by a coalition based on all the discontented elements—from the religious reactionary to the landless peasant—which might in the end menace the very bases of the regime itself.

The reaction of the Democratic Party to the decisions of the Republican Convention was indeed very strong. The Democratic Central Committee accused İnönü of having broken a promise to hold general elections at the regular time, that is in 1947, and if early elections were necessary, that decision should have been taken in agreement with the opposition parties. İnönü was criticized because as President he had legal immunity, but as party chairman he had to intervene in daily politics, thus being forced to use his immunity and privileges in favor of his party.⁵² Fuad Köprülü,

⁵² *Vatan*, May 14, 1946; also *Celal Bayar Diyor ki* (edited by N. Sevgen),

in an interview accorded to the correspondent of the *New York Times*, accused the government of opposing the establishment of political parties by unorthodox means, such as telephone tapping and the use of secret police to follow opposition members. In reply, the Republicans compared the statements of the Democrats to the broadcasts of Radio Moscow, and accused them of demagoguery, and censured Köprülü bitterly for having involved the foreigners in a discussion of domestic affairs.⁵³

The municipal elections were held amidst this controversy on May 26, 1946. The Democratic Party decided to abstain in view of the existence of undemocratic laws and of the intention of the party in power to obstruct the establishment of a real opposition.⁵⁴ The National Resurgence Party, which had lost a considerable number of its followers to the Democratic Party, at first decided to participate in the elections, but then quit them in İstanbul at 11:00 A.M. on the day of the elections, accusing the government of partiality.⁵⁵ Popular participation in these confused elections, according to the opposition, was very small,⁵⁶ but according to the Minister of Interior, it averaged fifty to sixty per cent.⁵⁷ Although officially not participating in the elections, the Democrats voted in great number for the non-Republican candidates, in Kastamonu, for instance, while in other places they backed the National Resurgence Party which won some seats in a few

İstanbul, 1951, pp. 107-110. This book contains excerpts from some of Celal Bayar's speeches in 1920-1950, mainly reproduced from newspapers.

⁵³ *New York Times*, May 14, 1946. *Cumhuriyet*, May 15, 22, 1946. Also *Ulus*, May 15, 24, 1946.

⁵⁴ For the discussions of the Democrats and their decisions for non-participation in elections, see *Tasvir*, May 6, 9, 1946; *Ulus*, May 8, 1946. *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 106-107.

⁵⁵ *Tasvir*, May 27, 1946.

⁵⁶ İstanbul 49, İzmir 22, Adana 45, Manisa 30, Balıkesir 25 per cent, respectively. *Vatan*, May 27, 1946.

⁵⁷ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 23, p. 240 (statement by Hilmi Uran). Actually low participation was in areas in which the Democrats had established their organization and could induce the citizens to abstain.

places, notably in the town of Kırikkale (six seats), near Ankara.⁵⁸

The municipal elections provided the first opportunity for citizens to nominate their own candidates, instead of having them imposed by the Republican Party, and to vote freely for them, and thus freely discharge their duties as citizens and voters. Furthermore, the elections brought into the open a number of personality conflicts in the Republican Party organizations and gave evidence of the strength of the Democratic Party. Finally, it evidenced a number of technical shortcomings in the voting system which had to be corrected before general elections.

The elections were held in relative freedom, despite cumbersome procedures, lack of secrecy, and partisanship by government officials not used to facing an opposition.⁵⁹

Inönü's trip around the country during the month of May, prior to the municipal elections, when he urged all the people to vote, was one of the first results of multi-party life. It meant that the government was gradually realizing its dependency on the people for its power.

The effects of liberalization were felt in other fields also. The sale and pricing of goods was partly taken out from government control and retailers were given broader opportunity to sell the products of state enterprises (Sumer Bank in particular). The emergency work obligation, which had been imposed upon villagers residing in some mining areas in order to meet the manpower shortage in the mines, was abolished.⁶⁰

Criticism from all quarters was bitter and sharp at all times, but the government limited itself to answering the charges,

⁵⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, May 29, 1946.

⁵⁹ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 23, p. 239 (interpellation by Hikmet Bayur).

⁶⁰ For a description of this work obligation, see *Ayn Tarihi*, May 1945, pp. 154-156; *Ulus*, May 14-16, 1946; *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 17, pp. 218-225, 396. See also my Chapter 3, n.28.

instead of silencing the critics as it had in the past,⁶¹ and continued the liberalization. Article 50 of the Press Law, which greatly restricted the freedom of the press, was amended with the explanation that modern institutions and reforms brought about by the Republican regime were generally accepted and were no longer likely to be subject to controversy. A partial press amnesty was instituted. As a result of these amendments to the Press Law, authority to close a newspaper was taken from the administration and given to the courts, which were supposed to conduct inquiries and request evidence in accordance with legal procedure.⁶² The Turkish Press Union, *Basın Birliği*, established under Law 3511 to control the press was disbanded, and the newspapermen were left free to join professional associations (Law 4932). A few months later a further amendment to the law abolished those requirements connected with the publication of a newspaper, such as the procurement of a publishing license from the highest local government official, the deposit of money (TL. 5,000), information on the publisher's educational background and certification of a good reputation in the community.⁶³

The universities were given autonomy in their administration and in internal affairs, even though their expenditures were financed from the national budget.⁶⁴ The duly established academic bodies alone could judge and penalize, if necessary, the faculty members for their actions or views. Siddık Sami Onar, an eminent professor of administrative law, was elected dean of the University of İstanbul by defeating the former dean, Dr. Tevfik Sağlam, who was considered the government's candidate.

⁶¹ *Ayn Tarihi*, June 1946, p. 17. (Premier Saracoğlu's statements); also *Ulus*, June 5, 1946; also Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 61-62.

⁶² *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 24, p. 262. Law 4935 of June 13, 1946.

⁶³ See Law 4955 of September 20, 1946; also *Siyasal Bilgiler Mecmuası*, November 1948, pp. 328ff. For laws see also Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 61-62, 65.

⁶⁴ *Ayn Tarihi*, June 1946, pp. 5, 12. Law 4936 of June 13, 1946.

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The Law on Associations was amended (Article 9) which forbade the establishment of associations on a class basis. Furthermore, instead of government officials, only the courts could decide to close an association after due inquiries.⁶⁵ Similarly, a number of old laws infringing upon the right of association were abolished, and the right of association was to be regulated primarily in accordance with the liberal provisions of the Civil Code.

Despite the fact that the affiliation of local associations with associations abroad was forbidden, and that the Democrats considered the right of association in Turkey still lagging behind the freedom of association enjoyed even in the Young Turks' era, the right of association was, nevertheless, placed on a relatively liberal basis.⁶⁶

The government also introduced an amendment to the Election Law in accordance with the decision taken by the Republican Party Convention, but the Democrats deemed it insufficient to assure the secrecy and safety of the ballot.⁶⁷ The elections were controlled by the government instead of the Judiciary, as requested by the opposition. Proportional Representation was not accepted because some right wing Republicans considered that there were no class differences in Turkey, and that such a system would be against the established tradition of a majority election.⁶⁸ (Nowadays the Republicans demand P. R.)

In a matter of months the Republicans abolished or greatly liberalized many of the restrictions that took them twenty-five years to impose.

Thus, with a certain degree of liberalization achieved the government decided to hold the general elections. Conse-

⁶⁵ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 24, pp. 48ff. Law 4919. See also Malcolm Burr, "Politics in Turkey," *Spectator*, September 13, 1946.

⁶⁶ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 24, p. 49.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 23, pp. 246ff., Vol. 24, pp. 39ff.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. 23, p. 250 (S. Sırer).

quently, the date for general elections was set for July 21, 1946.

The Democratic Party hierarchy favored the boycotting of the general elections, but following the wishes of the local organizations as expressed in a general consultative meeting held at party headquarters, it decided to participate in the elections, despite "the great handicaps in the election system."⁶⁹ The assurance of impartial elections given by the government, and the danger of being deprived of representation in the Assembly, and, consequently, of publicity and direct contact with the government, were other factors which determined the decision of the Democrats. Indeed, political parties in Turkey not represented in the Assembly have seldom, whatever the worth of their program and ideas, achieved popularity or attracted the attention of the press.

On the eve of elections the Democratic Party had already established organizations in over forty-one provincial "seats" out of the existing sixty-three provinces, in 200 district "seats," and in "a large number of villages."⁷⁰

Meanwhile, the Democrats gained a most valuable support in the person of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak. One of the closest friends of Atatürk and Chief of Staff during the War of Liberation and the only living Marshal of Turkey, pious and honest of character, he enjoyed respect and popularity among the young and the old and also the religious groups. Sent into retirement, he had shown his antagonism to the Republicans by refusing membership in the Republican Party and a seat in the Assembly.⁷¹ Instead, he decided to enter the forthcoming elections as an independent candidate on the Democratic Party ticket.

⁶⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, June 16, 17, 19, 1946. Sevgen, *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 111-113.

⁷⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, June 27, 1946 (Bayar's statement).

⁷¹ See *Ulus*, June 29, 30, 1946 (Saracoğlu's declaration); Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 62, 63. On Marshal Çakmak, see my Chapters 7 and 10, n.51.

The election campaign developed at a fast tempo. The bulk of the opposition in the country had centered almost exclusively around the Democratic Party and took the form of a crusade for liberation, a march against "despotism," as the Democrats described it, which was epitomized in their famous poster—a raised hand with the caption *artık yeter!*, it is enough! Huge crowds, in a surge of unequalled enthusiasm, carried the Democratic Party leaders on their shoulders wherever they campaigned.⁷²

The Democrats accused the Republicans of slandering the members of their own party, of pressure and ill-treatment by the gendarmes,⁷³ of attempts to cast ballots before election day, and all kinds of interferences on the part of government officials.⁷⁴ The government's instruction to examine the party credentials of those going into villages for campaigning—a measure intended to stop propaganda by religious reactionaries—was interpreted by the opposition as an attempt to obstruct political activities in the villages.⁷⁵

The Republican Party headquarters sent a circular letter to its party branches advising them to avoid using forceful means in the campaign, and to abstain from accusing the opposition of receiving funds from abroad or threatening to abolish the opposition party.⁷⁶ Furthermore, instructions were given by the Ministry of Interior "to see that the citizens vote in full freedom without any hindrance . . . in the direct elections held for the first time in the country."⁷⁷ Despite these measures, there was a fear that the elections would not be impartial. A secret letter revealed by one of the district governors, in which he was asked to cooperate with one of the Republican deputies campaigning in his district for re-

⁷² *Cumhuriyet*, June 30, 1946 (Bayar in Adana).

⁷³ *Tasvir*, July 8, 14, 1946.

⁷⁴ *Yeni Sabah*, July 16, 1946. *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 115-130.

⁷⁵ *Ulus*, July 11, 12, 1946. *Vatan*, July 10, 1946.

⁷⁶ *Tasvir*, June 20, 22, 1946. *Cumhuriyet*, June 25, 1946.

⁷⁷ *Ulus*, July 2, 1946. *Aynı Tarihi*, July 1946, p. 7.

election, added further to the fear of government pressure on the elections.⁷⁸

The Republicans in turn accused the opposition of talking about installing "people's courts" to sentence the "oppressors" and distribute the wealth; of acting with the sole purpose of destroying the Republican Party;⁷⁹ and of injecting religious propaganda, such as the promise to introduce the Arabic script and allow the reading of *Ezan* (call to prayer) in Arabic.⁸⁰ Both parties, however, kept the issue of communism out of this campaign, and the governor of Yozgat, who accused the Democratic Party of communistic aims, was brought before the court and sentenced.⁸¹

The right wing of the Republican Party portrayed the campaign of the Democrats as being directed against İnönü, who declared that he wanted to remain Chairman of the Republican Party because he was elected President by the majority in the Assembly and not by the people, and that he was bound to remain attached to one party. On behalf of the Republican Party he promised to ease the obligations imposed on villages to build their own school houses, but defended the Land Reform Law (which was criticized by the Democrats), promised to fight the rising cost of living, and gallantly pledged no ill-feeling for propaganda abuses during the election campaign.⁸²

Possibly the most interesting features of the campaign were the active participation of the people in the campaign and their enthusiastic support of the opposition, and the change in the relations between the people and the candidates for deputy. For the first time, candidates who, during one-party rule, had seldom visited their constituencies, had to go

⁷⁸ *Tasvir*, July 16, 1946 (letter revealed by Fuat Arna). Later in 1948 he opposed the Democratic Party leaders and went to the National Party.

⁷⁹ *Ulus, Tanin*, July 29, 1946.

⁸⁰ *BMMTD*, Session 8, Vol. 1, pp. 92ff.

⁸¹ *Aksam*, August 4, 1946.

⁸² *Ayn Tarihi*, July 1946, pp. 9ff.

into their election districts as early as possible, to talk to people and ask for their votes, promising in return whatever the people needed. The task of the opposition candidates was easier, for nobody asked them for a program; the mere fact of being in opposition seemed sufficient reason to justify their candidacy. Meanwhile a good many of the major newspapers of Istanbul, together with some newly published ones—the number of which continued to increase—had gone over to the support of the opposition.

A brief analysis of the social background of the 250 Democratic candidates for deputy in the elections of 1946 shows that there were fifty-two lawyers, forty-one landowners, forty doctors, thirty-nine businessmen, fifteen retired generals, fourteen engineers, thirteen teachers, and the remainder of other professionals.⁸³ A similar analysis of the Republican list shows that the great majority were retired military men, known political personalities or high government officials (ex-governors, etc.), and some professionals.⁸⁴

The elections took place on July 21, 1946, in a calm and orderly atmosphere, with eighty-five percent of the electorate participating.

As the results became known, an outcry was raised, for they were a disappointment to so many people. In the cities the Democratic Party normally had the lead, but the returns from towns and villages were overwhelmingly in favor of the Republican Party.⁸⁵ In Istanbul, announcement of the results, expected the night of the election, came out only three days later. According to the opposition, this announcement followed "secret talks to change the election results in favor of the Republican Party," and after Marshal Çakmak visited the governor and asked "as a citizen and as a candidate respect for the ballot."⁸⁶ Eventually the result of the

⁸³ *Cumhuriyet, Vatan*, July 21, 1946.

⁸⁴ *Vatan*, July 19, 1946.

⁸⁵ *Ulus*, July 26, 1946.

⁸⁶ The government was accused of having changed the election results

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elections in İstanbul (the workers and especially the minority groups had voted overwhelmingly for the Democrats) was announced, with the outcome being that the Democratic Party won eighteen seats out of twenty-seven seats contested. The over-all result in the country (465 seats) was 395 seats for the Republican Party, sixty-four for the Democratic Party, and six for the Independents.⁸⁷ This figure changed constantly during the following years.

The denunciations of government and the mounting popular resentment caused by accusations of fraud could not be quieted even by İnönü's conciliatory speech "mutually to forget the harsh words expressed during the elections."⁸⁸ When all attempts at pacification proved fruitless, the martial law authorities in İstanbul issued a stern announcement accusing certain newspapers of "continuing to publish instigatory reports which may arouse suspicions in the minds of the citizens, especially in respect to the result of elections, and thus bring damage to order in the country."⁸⁹ The notice forbade any criticism of elections. Yet, that very day, two newspapers—*Yeni Sabah* (New Morning) and the socialist *Gerçek* (Truth)—published Celal Bayar's indictment of the Government:

I declare, I even accuse; wickedness has interfered in the elections. The results of the elections are far from indicating the real will of the nation. If the lawless actions and various pressures

in the district election boards charged with drafting the final affidavits of results from the precincts which counted the ballots but sent only the figures to the district polling quarters. The district election boards were under the supervision of government officials and could easily be influenced to change the election results without danger of contradiction because the ballots were destroyed after the count at the polling precinct. For a detailed account, see Kenan Öner, *Siyasi Hatıralarım ve Bizde Demokrasi*, İstanbul, 1948, pp. 26ff. *Yeni Sabah*, July 23, 24, 1946.

⁸⁷ Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 63; also *Ayın Tarihi*, July 1946, p. 5 (with slight difference).

⁸⁸ *Vatan*, July 25, 1946. For the elections and events thereafter, see the *New York Times*, July 22-27, 1946.

⁸⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, July 25, 26, 1946.

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imposed upon citizens had not reached a maximum level our party would have won the elections all over the country . . . when these pressures and lawless actions proved insufficient the party in power was forced to falsify the election records . . . despite official announcements, the nation chose the Democratic Party. The Republican Party is preserving power only through the forceful methods applied before and during the elections and thanks to the falsifications of election records.⁹⁰

As a result, the two newspapers were closed, but the pro-government *Tanin* (Echo), which printed the same statement, was spared.⁹¹

The enforced silence imposed on the newspapers and people by martial law authorities in the area under its jurisdiction had no effect elsewhere in the country, where thousands of people enthusiastically supported the leaders of the Democratic Party, who denounced the elections.⁹²

Protest meetings continued for days afterward, to the point of causing police intervention, as depicted by Recep Peker, the Premier in the new government established after the elections. On the evening of August 5, 1946, while being given the responsibility of forming the new cabinet, Peker was in the Assembly building, and, as he describes it, "the sidewalk across the street was filled by a simply clothed crowd. They yelled 'long live the Democrats.' They were shouting other things which I was unable to understand. The mounted police had to draw their swords in order to disperse the crowd at the gate of the Assembly. Not only the door of the Grand National Assembly was forced but also its moral integrity."⁹³ Somehow the meetings died down as the new Republican government took office, but the feeling of antagonism to the government persisted.

In order to understand the nature of the political develop-

⁹⁰ *Yeni Sabah*, July 25, 1946.

⁹¹ *BMMTD*, Session 8.1, Vol. 1, p. 271.

⁹² *Cumhuriyet*, July 29, 30, 1946 (trips to Bursa, İzmir, Konya).

⁹³ *Ayn Tarihi*, August 1947, p. 22.

ment until the elections of 1946, it is necessary to analyze the structure of the opposition and its ideas.

The Democratic Party attracted the main opposition groups in the country regardless of the differences of opinion and interest, and regardless of the fact that its program, views, and mentality were not known in any detail. Peasants, workers, intellectuals, and landlords rallied around to give it the character of a movement. The party moved directly into the political fight for power from the very beginning, not as a direct decision of its leaders, but forced by its supporters. The leaders became heroes overnight, and few people, if any, ever bothered with their opinions or their past affiliations and support of the Republican Party, which they now criticized.⁹⁴

The specific issues put forth by the Democratic Party in general involved the high cost of living, lack of freedom, the existence of undemocratic laws, and some abuses by the administration. The Democrats failed to present a systematic election program or detailed views on economic or social problems. Their basic theme was to blame the Republican Party for all the shortcomings, discontent, and feelings of hardship accumulated during the war years and the reform period, regardless of the actual value of the criticism.

The general public, on the other hand, now found the first chance to express their discontent against the party in power. A vote for the opposition meant simply a vote against the Republican Party.⁹⁵ As one newspaper put it, "the Democratic Party did not win the election; the Republican Party lost it."⁹⁶ This indiscriminate support of the opposition actually gave cause for concern for the future of party politics in Turkey,⁹⁷ but under the existing circumstances matters could hardly have been otherwise.

⁹⁴ See Ahmet H. Başar, "D. P. ve Muhalefet Fikiri," *Cumhuriyet*, August 10, 1946.

⁹⁵ *Tasvir* (editorial), July 24, 1946.

⁹⁶ *Vatan*, July 24, 1946. ⁹⁷ *Akşam* (editorial), July 27, 1946.

The Democratic Party showed courage to criticize openly the political deficiencies of the Republican administration and to discuss them before the public. From the beginning, it based its power on the masses instead of the few chosen ones. It brought a hope for improvement, awakened a general desire for freedom.

Political life was developing so fast that no one had time for ideological speculation, but a trained mind could have easily distinguished certain disquieting signs in the campaign speeches. The deputy candidates of the opposition, normally people of a certain educational background, would limit themselves to denouncing the government in general terms. The average citizens listening to them would ask specific questions, for instance: how to lower the cost of certain basic items, and raise the price of agricultural products; how to improve the communication system and provide additional employment and better nutrition; how to lift the pressure on the part of gendarmes and tax collectors, and speed up the distribution of land. The answer they received was, in general, "Let us get freedom first and the rest will come by itself."⁹⁸

Despite the heated discussions and certain partisan provocations, the public showed the greatest sense of discipline, order, and respect for authority. In many instances, average citizens would question the candidates or government officials, and would insist in a spirit of self-confidence and dignity on getting a satisfactory answer. The average citizen, hitherto considered incapable of exercising political freedom, proved the "elite" wrong. It was no small surprise to the politician to discover that the simple citizen in village and town had an accurate understanding of the situation and a sounder common sense than the rising politicians. The ones who lacked understanding were the small groups of pseudo-leaders in search of glory and fortune who wanted to go down in history for having headed the masses to some spectacular feat. Many

⁹⁸ Başar, *Cumhuriyet*, August 10, 1946.

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who had enthusiastically backed the one-party regime and searched for spoils there, now turned to support the multi-party system with the same selfish motives as before. They spoke for democracy in the vehement, and uncompromising tone of the one-party days, but as though the mere purpose of the struggle was to change the title "one-party regime" to a "multi-party," shift the people at the head, and keep the rest intact.

The smaller political parties had only a minor role in the elections of 1946. The campaign concentrated around the two major parties, and the minor parties were indeed overwhelmed by them. As a matter of fact, a political party based on issues other than those of the Republicans and Democrats had no chance of success at this time.⁹⁹

As the result of the elections, the Republican Party retained power, but it realized it lacked large popular support; while the Democratic Party by the same token realized the extent of its power, a fact of paramount importance in determining the relationships of the two parties in the future. In the National Assembly the number of Democratic deputies increased from three to sixty-four, or about fifteen per cent of the total number, thus affording them a better chance for participation in debates.

Personalities played a great part in the campaign, taking preponderance over ideas. On the other hand, new individuals achieved popularity through the simple fact that they could state their views strongly, especially in criticizing the government. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that emotional, eloquent, and colorful speeches and vehement denunciations of the government brought the greatest popularity to the insurgent politicians.

⁹⁹ For the small parties established during this period, see Chapter 15.

CHAPTER 6

THE STRUGGLE TO ASSURE THE SURVIVAL OF THE OPPOSITION

THE amendment of some undemocratic laws in 1946 provided sufficient freedom to enable the establishment of opposition parties, but no real basis to assure them equality with the government party.

The period between the elections of July 21, 1946 to the declaration of İnönü of July 12, 1947 is the most important period to root the multi-party system in Turkey. It ended by providing the opposition parties freedom of action and equality with the Republican Party.

The deputies elected to the eighth session of the Assembly, which lasted until March 24, 1950, met first from August 5, 1946 to September 20, 1946. The Republicans, through their great majority in the Assembly, elected General Kâzım Karabekir Chairman of the Grand National Assembly.¹ Because of his former opposition to Atatürk, Karabekir's election was considered likely to arouse reaction among the orthodox Kemalist faction of the Republican Party. However, the feared reaction did not materialize. The purpose in electing Karabekir was to counteract Marshal Çakmak with another military figure who supported the Democrats, and to forestall Karabekir's possible defection to the opposition, which, had it materialized, would have greatly weakened the Republican Party. In the election for the President of the Republic, İsmet İnönü, the candidate of the Republican Party, received 388 votes,² while the Democratic candidate,

¹ *Ayın Tarihi*, August 1946, p. 3. On Karabekir see my Chapter 2 and General Remarks in Part III. For a general view of Turkey in 1946, see A. J. Fischer, "Turkey After the First Free Elections," *World Affairs Quarterly*, October 1946, pp. 220-230.

² *Ayın Tarihi*, August 1946, p. 4; also Jäschke, *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942-1951*, Wiesbaden, 1955, p. 63.

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Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, received fifty-nine votes and Yusuf Tengirşek two votes.³

Recep Peker was entrusted with the formation of the cabinet. He was known to be a defender of the one-party system and of strong leadership, opposed to compromise and inclined to use force even in cases when differences of opinion could have been solved with a minimum of diplomacy. His appointment aroused certain suspicions on the part of the opposition regarding the intentions of the Republican Party, and thus marked with misgivings the beginning of the eighth session of the Assembly.⁴

On the other hand, the increasingly aggressive propaganda of the opposition, and public unrest, caused real anxiety in the Republican Party. The appointment of a "strong man," like Recep Peker, to head the government was considered the best means of checking these tendencies. Recep Peker's policy brought into evidence the existence of two groups within the Republican Party whose views on political parties and freedom differed greatly. The first group, composed mainly of veteran members of the party, clung to authoritarian methods of government and was likely to interpret any sharp criticism of government as the beginning of a reaction against the regime.⁵ The second group, composed of younger and more liberal Republicans, was in favor of the multi-party system; of free discussion, and in general of a democratic government. Recep Peker was considered the leader of the first group and an advocate of a slow, "procrastinated" transition to the multi-party system.

³ The discrepancy between the total number of deputies elected to the Assembly (465) and the votes cast in this election arises from the fact that some deputies, like Marshal Çakmak and Celal Bayar, were elected from two districts and had to make a choice between them, leaving the other place vacant.

⁴ *Tasvir* (editorial), August 6, 16, 1946. For a list of Recep Peker's Cabinet, see *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, VII-VIII, 1946, p. 498. On Peker's political philosophy, see my Chapter 2.

⁵ *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), August 9, 1946; also *Ulus*, December 4-12, 1947.

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The first clash between the opposition and the Republicans occurred as soon as Recep Peker presented his cabinet's program, which he insisted on having debated and accepted the same day.⁶ The opposition claimed that "as usual the Democratic Party was rushed into a position making it unable to express its views."⁷

The program of the new Republican government contained promises to allow the return home of the people who had been removed from the eastern part of the country,⁸ to merge the gendarmes with the police, to stop the forceful collection of "donations,"⁹ to redefine the authority of provincial governors in accordance with the liberal spirit of the Constitution, and to establish lower appeal (*istinaf*) courts (which never materialized) as a better guarantee of individual freedom. Democracy was to be a supreme credo, and freedom was to be granted, but the government defined its authority in "defending" them in such a way that the very liberalization appeared jeopardized.

Premier Peker declared:

The preservation of the Grand National Assembly's authority, the defense of the honor and dignity of citizens and political parties, will be government's basic idea . . . our first duty will consist of defending and developing with attention and vigilant, alert care a democratic administration for the welfare of our people. The authority we are talking about and to which we ask absolute obedience [respect] is not the supremacy of the individuals but the authority of laws entrusted to us now . . . we shall fulfill our duty without the slightest hesitation, regardless of the pressure of the "shows" [meetings of the opposition] against the law. If the ex-

⁶ For program, see *Ayın Tarihi*, August 1946, pp. 5ff. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 63-64.

⁷ *BMMTD*, Session 8.1, Vol. 1, pp. 38ff.

⁸ These were the approximately 3 to 4 thousand Kurdish families removed from Tunceli province to the western part of the country in 1936 to forestall revolt. Some of the people returned to their native place. See the *New York Times*, June 16, 1946.

⁹ *Ayın Tarihi*, August 1946, pp. 18ff. This was a reaction to the obligatory donations practiced in the Bursa region in order to erect certain public buildings.

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isting laws do not suffice to uphold order we shall come to you with proposals for new laws.¹⁰

Behind these words, expressing in a "democratic" way some old conceptions of state authority and unconditional obedience, there was the same Recep Peker who had built a rigid party oligarchy in his days as the Secretary General of the Republican Party.

In the economic field, the program contained promises for a number of liberal measures: abolition of the Import and Trade Offices of the Government; distribution of the products of state enterprises (Sumer Bank products) to retailers without wholesale profits; lowering of clothing prices; freeing the sale of sugar, coffee, and tea; enforcing equitably the Land Reform Law; softening the obligation imposed on villages to build their own school houses; ending the forceful procurement of raw materials for industry; and permitting private capital to venture into waterway transportation.¹¹

The most important aspect of these economic measures concerned foreign trade, and came to be known as the 7 *Eylül Kararları* (September 7 Measures).¹² In their essence, the measures aimed at stabilizing the economy and helping its transition to peacetime conditions by adjusting, on the basis of free competition, the prices of local commodities to the international market prices.¹³ Consequently, import quotas were suddenly liberalized and the foreign currency accumulated during the war was spent on imports without waiting to balance imports with exports. The Turkish pound was devalued in accordance with the Bretton Woods Agreement, \$1 = TL. 2.80. Moreover, import formalities were eased

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹¹ *BMMTD*, Session 8.1, Vol. 1, pp. 38ff.

¹² *Aynı Tarihi*, September 1946, pp. 16ff.

¹³ See *Son Telgraf*, September 11, 15, 22, 1946 (views of Professor Şükrü Baban); *Tasvir*, September 11, 12, 1946, March 6, 1947; *Cumhuriyet*, September 9, 30, 1946; *Aksam*, September 12, 1946; *Cumhuriyet*, September 1, 12, 1946 (views of Professor F. Neumark).

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considerably, and the sale of gold by the Central Bank was freed.

These measures were taken without actual regard for the society's economic and social conditions. They disregarded the fact that money had been accumulated in a few hands and was spent for noneconomic purposes; they ignored the extremely limited buying power of the masses and seemed aimed at satisfying the needs of a relatively small group of businessmen. Some businessmen learned in advance about the forthcoming measures and took the necessary steps to take advantage of them.¹⁴ The devaluation of the currency caused an automatic rise in the price of imported goods, and those possessing such items hoarded them to make a large profit later. Indeed the imported goods became scarce and their prices increased by about fifty per cent in a matter of weeks.¹⁵ Gold sales reached such a huge volume (one-third of the reserves were sold) that sales had to be stopped.

The sales of the basic consumption items which were freed from government control rose immediately. A general increase in the cost of living followed, and the index, which was 2,805 in July 1946, rose at the end of the year to 2,923 and continued its upward trend.¹⁶ In a few months new fortunes were built and existing ones increased. The liberal imports exhausted accumulated foreign currency mainly on items of secondary economic importance such as cars and home utilities, which could be bought only by a limited part of the population.¹⁷

The government's economic measures liberalized trade but

¹⁴ See debate in the National Assembly, *BMMTD*, Session 8, Vol. 7, pp. 109-141.

¹⁵ *Aksam*, October 26, 1946 (C. Nizami).

¹⁶ See *Tasvir*, March 6, 1947 (Z. Aral). For the effects of these measures, see *Siyasal İlimler Mecmuası*, September 1946 and November 1946 to March 1947. *Vatan*, December 6, 1948 (C. Bayar in Edirne).

¹⁷ These items such as cars, refrigerators, washing machines, corresponded to the middle class standard of comfort. In Turkey such items are within the reach of only the well-to-do, and appear as luxury items to the great majority living a modest life.

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left other sectors of the economy, production and investment in particular, unaffected. Since wages and salaries remained stable, the rising cost of living meant a further relapse in the living standards of the low income groups. The gap between the living standards of various social groups sharpened, and the existing antagonism toward the government increased.

Thus, Recep Peker's government started its term with ill-applied economic measures which ultimately undermined its prestige and increased the popularity of the opposition. As soon as the Assembly opened on November 1, 1946, the Democrats introduced a motion censuring the "September 7 Measures." In turn, they were accused of attempting to undermine the government's economic policy.

The subsequent discussions on the budget for 1947, which started with the usual financial statements, immediately took a political turn. The budget offered a deficit of TL. 114,983,530.¹⁸ Adnan Menderes presented the views of the Democrats. The budget, according to him, lacked clarity and any fundamental financial or economic measures to deal with the worsening economic situation. All attempts to place the blame on heavy military expenditure was unfounded. The method so far used, instead of strengthening the national economy, aimed at exploiting its financial resources for nonproductive purposes. A large state bureaucracy that could be termed a luxury in relation to the economic condition of the country, and lack of support for agriculture, were its main defects.¹⁹

The Premier, in answer, directed a bitter attack at the opposition by describing the views of Menderes as the "expression of a psychopathic soul." Furthermore, he accused Celal Bayar of inciting people to revolt. According to Premier Peker, Bayar had stated that "the will of the people and not the gendarme is sovereign in the country," and had told the people in Germenek that they were living in misery and that

¹⁸ *Ayn Tarihi*, December 1946, p. 26.

¹⁹ *BMMTD*, Session 8.1, Vol. 3, pp. 15-23.

pressure dominated the country. In Silivri, a town near İstanbul, which was, according to Peker "a paradise in a dream-like Marmara . . . a part of Thrace which thanks to the economic measures of the government had a happy year," Celal Bayar told the people, "you are crying, I see tears in your eyes and I know the cause."

In resume, all the opposition was doing, according to the Premier, was to tell the people they were in misery and were kept enslaved. Consequently he stated that the government intended to end the opposition's attempts at instigating the people to revolt and disobedience. The Premier's remarks, following a motion from the floor, were printed and distributed throughout the country.²⁰

Peker's violent accusations against the opposition seemed to contradict the conciliatory and liberal views of İnönü expressed, only a short time before at the opening of the Assembly, to the effect that the two parties worked in harmony and, if necessary, the government could be entrusted to the opposition parties.²¹

As soon as Peker attacked Menderes personally, the Democratic Party deputies left the Assembly and boycotted it for days thereafter. Fuad Köprülü invited the Premier to apologize if he did not believe his own utterances, but if he really believed that the Democrats had anarchistic intentions he invited the Premier to ban the Democratic Party, although he said: "nobody would dare to do so by violating Turkish Law . . . the Democrats will pursue their course . . . and based on the rights accorded to them under the Constitution they will continue to march toward their goal."²²

Cables from all over the country backed the decision of the opposition to boycott the Assembly, and some people even

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-36. *Vatan, Yeni Asır*, November 15, 1946. *Vatan*, October 24, 25, 1946.

²¹ *Ayn Tarihi*, November 1946, pp. 14-15.

²² *Kuvvet*, December 21, 1946.

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requested the resignation of Recep Peker,²³ a very great act of courage indeed.

Outside the Assembly, the Democrats "continued their opposition among the people," as defined by Samet Ağaoglu, a rising politician who resigned his position in the Ministry of Economy to join the Democratic Party.²⁴ Finally the Democratic deputies returned to the Assembly after several interviews with İnönü, apparently assured that such an incident would not recur.²⁵

The government's policy of stern measures nevertheless continued. Martial law had already been extended for another six months,²⁶ the tense international situation being given as the reason. A new law barred Turks married to foreign women from becoming reserve officers or entering the government service.²⁷ The newspapers *Vatan*, *Yeni Türkiye*, *Tasvir*, and *Yeni Mersin* were brought into court for having directed "offensive" criticism at the government. The *Yeni Sabah*, which had adopted a sharp oppositionist attitude, had already been

²³ *Tasvir*, December 21, 22, 26, 1946. *Vatan*, December 22, 1946.

²⁴ *Başkent*, December 8, 1946.

²⁵ *Kuvvet*, December 27, 1946. *Vatan*, December 24, 26, 1946. The relations between the Democrats and Republicans deteriorated further because the credentials of two Democratic deputies were rejected by the Republican Party majority in the Assembly; the first, Zeki Sporel, for having evaded military service, and the second, A. Munip, for tax evasion, despite the fact that the latter's sentence did not deprive him of eligibility for the Assembly. Munip's credentials were rejected by a majority of only fifteen votes in an Assembly in which the Republicans had an over-all majority of about 300. Actually, these rejections were part of a Republican campaign to undermine the prestige of the opposition by showing it to be composed of unreliable individuals. The Republican Party had advised its members to follow in the party newspapers the discussions expected to take place on the credentials of the two deputies-elect from İstanbul. A few months later a third Democratic deputy, Burhan C. Morkaya, was deprived of his seat for evasion of military service. *Vatan*, February 4, 1947. See *BMMTD*, Session 8.1, Vol. 3, pp. 37ff.; *Tasvir*, *Vatan*, November 29, 1946. The Democrats answered back by accusing some Republicans of evasion from military duty. *Tasvir*, December 12, 1946 (Koraltan's charges).

²⁶ *Ulus* (editorial), December 5, 6, 1946.

²⁷ *Vatan*, March 8, 1947.

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closed indefinitely under the authority of martial law because it had involved the army in politics by criticizing the Chief-of-Staff for his unfriendly remarks to Marshal Çakmak.²⁸

The sternest action by Recep Peker's government was taken on December 16, 1946. Two political parties,²⁹ almost all trade unions formed exclusively after the amendment permitting establishment of associations on class bases, and six newspapers and magazines were closed indefinitely.³⁰ A number of persons were arrested. According to the martial law authorities, the action was caused by the fact that these publications, trade unions, and political parties violated the penal code by promoting concepts of class struggle.

Since on the question of leftism both the opposition and the government parties were in agreement, there was no reaction to this measure,³¹ but soon it became apparent that the decision taken against the leftists had broader political purposes. On January 29, 1947 the Minister of Interior, Şükrü Sökmensuer, an ex-army officer, in a long statement described communist activities in Turkey, and divulged a number of letters from Zekeria Sertel (publisher of *Tan*, destroyed in December 1945) and Cami Baykut, both known as leftists, and addressed to Marshal Çakmak.³² The letters mentioned C. Bayar and A. Menderes as having promised articles to the left wing magazine *Görüşler* (Views).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, February 27, 1947.

²⁹ Turkish Socialist Party and the Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party. See my Chapter 14. Also Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 67-68, 69.

³⁰ *Ulus*, December 16, 17, 1946.

³¹ Nadir Nadi, the publisher of *Cumhuriyet*, one of the largest Turkish newspapers, felt constrained to write: "It is goodbye to Democracy." *Cumhuriyet*, December 20, 1946. Peker became so feared that even innocuous measures were interpreted as a further attempt to curtail democracy. For instance, the Governors' Convention, assembled for the purpose of studying and exchanging views on administrative matters, was described by Menderes as a further attempt to obstruct the development of democracy. *Vatan*, January 25, 1947.

³² *Ayn Tarihi*, January 1947, pp. 17ff. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 69.

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In one letter Sertel and Baykut urged the Marshal to leave the Assembly as protest against the frauds committed during the general elections in the summer of 1946 and continue his opposition directly among the people, by declaring that the new Assembly, the Government, and the President did not represent the will of the people. The Minister congratulated the Democratic Party leaders for having avoided these instigations but implied tacitly that somehow Marshal Çakmak had not shown the same alert attitude.³³ A few letters of Şefik Hüsnü Değmer, Chairman of the Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party, read by the Minister, stated that the Republicans were ready "to sell the country to the English," and that his party was ready to support the Democrats and the Marshal, if they decided to leave the Assembly.

The references of the Minister to the Democratic Party and the Marshal in his expose of communist activities had a three-fold political purpose. First, it sought to discredit the Marshal for having supported the leftists,³⁴ and thus deprive the Democrats of his support. The Republican *Ulus* printed the Marshal's picture between those of Baykut and Sertel, with the captioned explanation: "he sent his greetings to the leftist."³⁵ Other pro-government newspapers criticized the Marshal for inept political conduct.³⁶ Secondly, the expose aimed at separating the Marshal from the Democratic Party itself by indicating that he was already compromised by having associated himself with people known as leftists, while the Democratic leaders themselves did not do so.³⁷ Finally, the Republicans wanted to jeopardize the Democratic Party Convention's decision—to be discussed in the next pages—which instructed Democratic deputies to leave the Assembly if their requests for liberalization were not met. Such a withdrawal would have

³³ *Aynı Tarihi*, January 1947, pp. 18ff. See also my Chapter 14.

³⁴ *Vatan* (editorial), February 1, 1947.

³⁵ *Ulus*, February 2, 3, 4, 1946.

³⁶ *Son Posta* (editorial), February 4, 1947.

³⁷ *Kuvvet* (editorial), February 6, 1947 (Hikmet Bayur).

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been portrayed as communist inspired. Moreover, the withdrawal of the Democrats would have left the Republicans alone in the Assembly and would have implied a *de facto* accusation of that body's illegitimacy. It would have also further strained the precarious position of the Government, already shaken by the worsening economic situation,³⁸ and might have resulted in new elections.

In defense, Marshal Çakmak angrily stated that since he had entered politics he was being called all kinds of names: "reactionary" because he visited his daughter's grave; "bigot" for having addressed people as "my children" (a traditional address by elders); and finally "communist" for having spoken up for people's rights and freedom.³⁹ The anger of the old Marshal did not lessen even later,⁴⁰ although meanwhile he himself in turn accused the Republicans of backing the "leftists."

In a formal declaration, the Democratic Party contended that the Minister of Interior, who had in the past accused their party of communism,⁴¹ now contradicted himself by congratulating them for not having followed the communist line.⁴² Furthermore, the Democrats pointed out that the left-

³⁸ The opposition showed an acute desire to do so because it had already boycotted the municipal elections held in September 1946. *Ulus*, September 1, 5, 1946.

³⁹ *Vatan*, February 6, 1947.

⁴⁰ According to one of the leading members of the Democratic Party, the Marshal in 1950, on his deathbed, refused to see İnönü, who had come to visit him, because İnönü brought along Şükrü Sökmensuer, the ex-Minister of Interior who had accused him of leftist connections. Fevzi Boztepe, *Hür Ufuklara Doğru*, İstanbul, 1952, pp. 217-218.

⁴¹ *Vatan*, February 8, 9, 1947. *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 148-152.

⁴² The Minister declared on June 19, 1946 in Hatay province: "I want to point out that our opponents [Democrats] are championing freedom without any logical basis or knowledge of it. . . . You ought to know that these people are not for Kemalist freedom but for that of Red Fascism, a real slavery . . . those whispering into their ears want to use the brave and honest children of this land as slaves. They are puppets whose strings are in the hands of those behind the curtain." Kenan Öner, *Öner ve Yücel Davası*, Vol. 1, İstanbul, 1947, p. 4. For Sökmensuer's hand-written letter, see *Tasvir*, February 15, 1947.

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ists in the country had always been against them and inquired as to why individuals known as communists were left free to form associations. Although the government justified its action by claiming that the right to association was universal,⁴³ it apparently did not satisfy the Democrats because they did not believe "in granting freedom to those who did not recognize it."⁴⁴

Meanwhile, the Democratic Party was preparing itself for the first general party convention. The delegates to the general convention had been elected by local branches during the past month amidst complaints of pressure and interference on the part of government officials. Finally, 906 Democratic delegates arrived in Ankara in the middle of a severe winter, at times forced to travel for days on horseback from the most isolated parts of the country.⁴⁵ The delegates were people of certain material means and belonged normally to the middle class group, the greatest majority of them having never participated in politics before. The convention opened on January 7, 1947.⁴⁶

The purpose of the convention was to discuss the past activities of the party and make plans for the future, to study and accept the party program, and elect members to the party organizations. It was opened by Celal Bayar, who described the events of the previous months, criticized the government for its discriminatory attitude toward the opposition, and formulated three basic conditions for the establishment of a real democracy: amendment of the anti-Constitutional laws restricting the freedom of the individual; an election law to assure the safety of the ballot; and the separation of the President from the chairmanship of the Republican Party.⁴⁷

⁴³ *Ulus*, February 10, 1947.

⁴⁴ *Kudret* (editorial), September 28, 1947. *Son Saat*, March 8, 1947 (Köprülü's views).

⁴⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, January 8, 1947.

⁴⁶ Orhan Mete, *Demokrat Partinin İnci Büyük Kongresi*, İstanbul, 1947, p. 17. *Tasvir*, October 18, December 1, 1946. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 68.

⁴⁷ *Vatan*, January 8, 9, 1947; Mete, *Demokrat*, pp. 5-16. *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 139-148.

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The discussions in the convention centered mainly around the issue of freedom and the restrictions upon it imposed by the government, either by law or in practice by officials. The poverty of the peasants, the dire condition of the villages, was also one of the favorite topics. Among other topics discussed were the introduction of courses on religion, the abolition of the government's trade organizations, election of the President by the people, revision of the Village Institutes' curricula. (Many of these demands were taken up and enforced by the Republican Party itself.)

The convention did not appear concerned with basic ideological decisions. Its favorite theme—varying in emphasis but not in content—was criticism of the government and its daily policies, rather than the charting of a long-range course to be followed by the Democratic Party itself. The program of the Party prepared by the founders was summarily accepted without extended discussion. Few bothered to see whether it differed from the program of the Republican Party or whether it could provide an answer to all the country's long-range needs. The striving for unanimity was apparent and whenever someone opposed the views prevailing in the convention, the immediate reaction was to stop him from talking.⁴⁸ The most popular individuals were those who made the most inflammatory anti-government speeches.

The structure of the convention and the debating procedure, however, were indeed democratic, and in this respect few, if any, could find fault with it.

The entire purpose of the convention seemed to find ways for enabling the Democratic Party to come into office, a great mistake in a country in which the principles of democracy had been only barely touched upon and the checks and balances of government's powers had not been properly regulated. In a general meeting, bringing together all tendencies and individuals at every level, it is rather difficult to discuss at great length basic questions, but attempts could have been made.

⁴⁸ *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), January 11, 1947.

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The convention concluded after accepting unanimously the *Hurriyet Misaki*, "Freedom Charter,"⁴⁹ consisting of the three conditions for democracy formulated by Celal Bayar in his opening speech: amendment of the anti-Constitutional laws, an election law controlled by the judiciary, and separation of the President from the chairmanship of the Republican Party. The most important part of the Charter, however, consisted of the instructions addressed to the Party's Central Committee to submit to the National Assembly proposals to meet the above requests. In case the requests were rejected, the Charter empowered the Central Committee to call on the Democrats to retire from the Assembly.

The last point was an exceptionally valuable tactical weapon. The Democratic Party, not as a party with a certain program, but as an anti-government movement uniting the sum total of the opposition, had tremendous popular backing. If it left the Assembly, the Republicans would have remained alone again as a single party. This situation might have drawn criticism from all over the country and the world as being due to the Republicans' unwillingness to establish democracy. Therefore, the threat to boycott the Assembly, if used properly, could, as it happened, greatly help the Democratic Party.

At first the Republicans and their newspapers hailed the Democratic Convention very favorably—"a start to mature after a period of apprenticeship."⁵⁰ After the acceptance of the Freedom Charter the atmosphere changed. The Republicans considered the Charter anti-democratic in essence, for it aimed at forcing the National Assembly to accept certain measures favorable to the Democrats.⁵¹ Such an attempt was therefore doomed to failure from the point of view of procedure, all of which proved that the Democratic Party was

⁴⁹ *Vatan*, January 12, 1947. Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 650-651. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 68.

⁵⁰ *Ulus, Akşam* (editorial), January 7, 11, 1947.

⁵¹ *Akşam* (editorial), January 28, 1947.

deprived of common sense, ideas, and originality.⁵² The moderate wing in the Republican Party assured the opposition that the government had no intention of hindering the development of democracy in Turkey: President İnönü had already left his active duties as Chairman to the Vice-Chairman of the Party, Şükrü Saracoğlu, and thus had met one of the demands of the opposition.⁵³

By this time the Democratic Party realized its strength and affirmed through Menderes that "were it not for the provincial, district, and county governors and the party inspectors appointed by the central organization, the remaining few members of the Republican Party, even if they did not resign, would undoubtedly remain inactive."⁵⁴

The election of elders (*muhtar*) in the villages in February 1947, gave cause for further tension between the Democratic and Republican parties. The Democrats accused the government of having interfered in favor of its own party's candidates to such an extent that the village balloting could hardly be called "elections."⁵⁵ The real purpose of the Republicans, they said, was to uproot the Democratic Party organization in the villages, but the result was that it only made it stronger.⁵⁶

Some opposition parties had been established in Turkey but their existence was uncertain. Indeed, except for a few amendments to the anti-Constitutional laws and the govern-

⁵² *Tanin* (editorial), January 15, 1947.

⁵³ *Ulus*, January 12, 22, 1947 (Nihat Erim's views).

⁵⁴ *Vatan*, March 23, 27, 1947 (Menderes' views).

⁵⁵ *Vatan*, March 1, 7, 27, 1947 (statements of Bayar and Menderes).

⁵⁶ The elections were held in 35,588 villages. The Democratic Party won only in 1,225 and the independents in 1,960 villages. According to the government, the gendarmes only went into 3,000 villages. There were only 373 complaints of malpractice in the elections. *Ulus*, March 2, 7, 8, 1947 (speeches of R. Peker). Just before the village elections there were the municipal elections of Uşak. The elections were won initially by the Democratic Party, but the Supreme Administrative Court declared the elections void and ordered new ones, which this time were won by the Republican Party through exertion of heavy pressure, according to the Democrats. *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), January 30, 1947.

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ment's promise of freedom, there was no legal guarantee to assure that liberalization could not be wiped out by some new development or a whim.⁵⁷ And as long as Recep Peker was Premier nobody was certain that he would not attempt to enforce his own understanding of "authority," as he had done with the press since he had taken over the government.

In this atmosphere of political instability, the survival of democracy in Turkey was completely dependent upon the Republican Party. There was need for a true guarantee that freedom was going to stay, and the best guarantee seemed to oust the Republican Party from power. Apparently, nothing short of that could satisfy the people.

After the Democratic Party Convention, liberalization in Turkey came to a standstill and political tension continued to mount. Finally the expected showdown between the opposition and the government took place—and the way was opened to new developments.

The Democratic Party had scheduled a meeting in Izmir to decide whether or not to participate in the İstanbul by-elections. The meeting was to take place in the beginning of April 1947. A few days before the meeting, Menderes delivered, in Kütahya, one of the most violent attacks on the government, accusing the Premier of certain "hidden" intentions regarding the opposition, warning that the "Democratic Party has become so identified with the masses that it is impossible to uproot it," and concluding, "free speech is such a strong weapon that the secret type of political administration cannot resist it for long."⁵⁸

Presumably vexed by these attacks, Recep Peker arrived in Izmir on March 31, 1947, just one day before the arrival of the leaders of the Democratic Party for their scheduled meeting. He was met by a group composed mainly of school children, factory workers (given a day's wage to participate in

⁵⁷ *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), January 11, 1947.

⁵⁸ *Vatan*, March 27, 1947.

the welcoming ceremony) and Republican Party members drafted from the neighboring towns. The crowd was rather large but not very friendly. According to Bayar, Peker was heckled by 80,000 people, a statement which was made the subject of an inquiry in the Assembly but which was denied by the Minister of Justice.⁵⁹

The next day Celal Bayar arrived in İzmir and was met at the railroad station by an immense crowd which filled the entire surrounding district. The government considered the meeting (officially described as a "mob") as violating the law and attempted to disperse it, but without much success.⁶⁰ Premier Peker was expected to make a conciliatory speech, but instead he repeatedly accused the Democratic Party in a series of speeches of lacking any basic ideas or definite program.⁶¹ The Democratic Convention, in his view, had ended without any constructive achievements, and their Freedom Charter was a gross imitation of and an attempt to associate with the National Pact (*Milli Misak*) of Atatürk,⁶² which had laid forth the bases for the Republic. Furthermore, Peker defended the existing anti-democratic laws (Police, Press, Election, and Martial Laws) as still being necessary, although they were enforced very infrequently.

Peker believed that the existence of political parties, and especially of an opposition in the Assembly, guaranteed a stable political life, but the tactics used by the Democratic Party in inciting the populace against the government were likely to delay their establishment. The duty of a political party—the Premier had in mind the forthcoming by elections in İstanbul—was to participate in elections; voting was a citizen's privilege and an obligation.⁶³ Peker censured the newspapers and reminded them, as well as the opposition parties,

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, November 12, 1949.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, April 2, 1947.

⁶¹ *Ulus*, April 1, 3, 1947.

⁶² For the *Milli Misak*, see my Chapter 2.

⁶³ *Ulus*, April 5, 1947 (speech in Manisa).

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that the "Independence Courts" were still legally in existence.⁶⁴

All these threats on the part of the government had no effect on the Democrats. They decided to boycott the by-elections in Istanbul despite the fact that the Secretary General of the Republican Party, Hilmi Uran, gave assurances of honest elections, evidently in good faith since a new election law had already been introduced into the Assembly.⁶⁵ The Democrats based their refusal on past guarantees for a free and impartial election and deemed insufficient the verbal assurances given.⁶⁶

Actually, the refusal of the Democrats to participate in these by-elections was motivated by tactical considerations. It was apparent that the government had decided to hold impartial elections, and besides, in a city like Istanbul, it would have been very difficult to exercise much pressure. If the Democrats had won the six contested seats, it would have proven the government's good intentions and this would have deprived them of their best propaganda weapon: pressure and ill intentions on the part of the government.⁶⁷ Moreover, it would have weakened the arguments in favor of judiciary control demanded by the Democrats as the sole guarantee of honest elections.

The Democrats not only refused to participate in the by-elections, but they went further and answered Premier Peker's threats by organizing an extensive tour of the country with mammoth rallies wherever they went—in İzmir, Balıkesir, Bandırma, Gönen, Kütahya—⁶⁸and sharply criticized the gov-

⁶⁴ The Courts established in 1920 to deal with the rebels could, after summary procedures, convict and sentence individuals considered to be plotting against the regime. These courts were used to liquidate the enemies of the regime. They were abolished in 1949. For the beginning of these courts, see my Chapter 2.

⁶⁵ *Ulus*, March 23, 30, 1947.

⁶⁶ *Vatan*, April 2, 4, 1947. *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 160-161.

⁶⁷ *Akşam* (editorial), April 3, 1947.

⁶⁸ *Vatan*, *Tasvir*, *Son Posta*, April 6-11, 1947.

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ernment for its undemocratic attitude. These rallies showed the following the Democratic Party had among the people and served as a warning to Peker's intentions to suppress it, and served also as a means of exercising pressure on the government to enforce the Freedom Charter.

The tour of the Democrats had the aura of a hero's progress. People from all social groups would meet the Democratic leaders, travel with them, dressed for a holiday in native costumes, and kill sheep as *Kurban* (offerings) at each stop. These events, besides having shaken off the political apathy that seemed to have overtaken the people, were interpreted by the Republican Party as preparatory to the Democrats' withdrawal from the Assembly. In consequence, the Republican Party prepared itself to meet such a withdrawal, if it should take place, by asserting that it would be communist inspired and that the withdrawal would mean the end of the Democratic Party and its leaders.⁶⁹ The rumor was then bruited that in anticipation of this withdrawal the Republicans intended to allow the conservative, socialist, nationalist, and middle-of-the-road groups in their own party to become political parties of opposition. The purpose was to deprive the Democratic Party of indiscriminate public support by fragmenting the people into separate groups according to their political tendencies.⁷⁰

Meanwhile, politically neutral groups and some businessmen attempted to find a rapprochement between the government and the opposition. However, the prolongation of martial law,⁷¹ for an additional six months, the rejection of a Democratic Party proposal for a new election law,⁷² the demand that Menderes be deprived of his deputy's immunity, and bitter editorials ("Freedom for Intrigue and Revolt," "Blood-thirsty Freedom Heroes") appearing in Republican papers

⁶⁹ *Ulus* (editorial), April 15, 1947; *ibid.*, April 13, 1947.

⁷⁰ *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), April 18, 1947.

⁷¹ *BMMTD*, Session 8.1, Vol. 5, pp. 226ff.

⁷² *Vatan*, May 1, 1947.

and accusing the Democrats of revolutionary intentions,⁷³ kept the political atmosphere tense.

Activity seemed paralyzed by political fever and uncertainty. The necessity for some radical change was evident. It was obvious that there was need for intervention by someone in a neutral position commanding respect and following. In an open letter, Halil Menteseoğlu, former Chairman of the Young Turks Parliament, had already described İnönü as "being placed by fate in a position of deciding events of great scope" and had urged him to make attempts at "a genuine acceptance of democracy."⁷⁴ These suggestions had been received favorably in the press.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, a group of Turkish deputies visited England as the guests of the British Parliament.⁷⁶ It was said that during this trip Fuad Köprülü of the Democratic Party and Nihat Erim, a rising figure in the Republican Party, both university professors and friends, discussed at great length the party relationships in Turkey and reached an agreement to the effect that the Republican Party would accept certain measures of democratization requested by the Democrats, who in turn would abstain from unorthodox means of propaganda.

However, the important event affecting party politics in Turkey was the acceptance by the United States Congress of the Truman doctrine, which entailed immediate military aid to Turkey and Greece in an effort to save democracy and freedom.⁷⁷ During the debates in the United States Congress on this aid some strong views on Turkey's political system

⁷³ *Tanin* (editorial), April 27, 1947; *Akşam*, April 27, 1947.

⁷⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, February 24, 25, 1947.

⁷⁵ *Son Posta* (editorial), February 25, 1947; *Tasvir* (editorial), February 26, 1947.

⁷⁶ *Ayın Tarihi*, April 1947, pp. 5ff.

⁷⁷ U.S., *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947, XCIII, Part II, pp. 1980-1981. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 71. For a critical appraisal of this attempt to fill the vacuum left by Great Britain in the eastern Mediterranean, see Harold J. Laski, "Britain Without Empire," *Nation*, March 29, 1947, pp. 353-356.

were expressed in the Senate and House. Representative George H. Bender of Ohio, for instance, declared:

It will be an unparalleled act of hypocrisy for this House to vote an act which guarantees the freedom of the press to the American newspapers when that freedom we know for an absolute fact does not exist in Turkey today. That arrogant Turkish military dictatorship is asking us for money with the full knowledge that they intend to violate every provision required by the Congress.⁷⁸

The heated discussion on this aid in the United States press had focused attention on Turkey and her political regime. A number of letters, especially from Armenian organizations,⁷⁹ and editorials,⁸⁰ appearing in the American newspapers, pointed out that the purpose of the aid was to defend democracy against despotism and that Turkey did not have democracy. Meanwhile a U. S. delegation headed by Senator Barkley visited Ankara on April 12, 1947. The aid bill was eventually accepted by the Congress with little enthusiasm, and a feeling that it was necessitated by the international situation rather than by a genuine desire to perpetuate the Turkish political system. The bill included a provision allowing American radio and newspapermen freely to transmit news concerning the implementation of the aid program.

The Turkish government followed the debates in Congress very closely.⁸¹ The views expressed in the U. S. Congress, and the necessity of establishing closer relations with the West, may be assumed to have had some impact on political developments in Turkey. President İnönü declared to a correspondent of the Associated Press, in discussing the aid, that American aid was a step toward the defense of democracy, and that closer relations between Turkey and the United States

⁷⁸ *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, 1st Session, Part II, Appendix, pp. 1883-1884; *ibid.*, Part III, pp. 2995, 3826-3827; also Senator Taylor's remarks, *ibid.*, pp. 3386, 3394.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Appendix, pp. 2155ff.

⁸⁰ *Chicago Daily Tribune*, March 13, 1947; *Chicago Sun*, March 12, 1947; *New York Times*, March 29 and April 23, 1947.

⁸¹ See *Ayın Tarihi*, August 1947, pp. 26, 27.

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of America would contribute to the firm establishment of democracy in Turkey.⁸²

All these prepared the ground for new political developments. During the month of June, İnönü conferred privately with Celal Bayar, Premier Peker, and with Republican Party members and government officials.⁸³ In these interviews Bayar complained of the pressure exerted by the government on the opposition and asked the President for measures to establish the multi-party system on safe foundations,⁸⁴ such as: abolition of martial law, non-partisan use of the Peoples' Houses and the state radio, safe elections, and a declaration asking impartiality on the part of government officials in their treatment of all political parties. Peker refused to accept, but İnönü promised to do his best to see democracy established in Turkey.⁸⁵

Peker claimed that publication of the statement requested by Bayar would imply admission of the pressure of which he was accused, but promised to maintain friendly relations between the two parties and denied the existence of pressure on the opposition. He stated that Bayar had promised to reorganize the Democratic Party and admonish the extremist Democrats for their propaganda excesses. All these, in his view, left the impression that the Democrats were finally becoming a stable political party.⁸⁶

Celal Bayar finally directed a slashing attack on Peker accusing him of being a political reactionary, of using tactics to delay the establishment of democracy, and of having proved that "there cannot be democracy with Peker and his Cabi-

⁸² *Ulus*, May 12, 13, 1947; *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), May 14, 1947; *New York Times*, April 12, 1947. On American influences on Turkey, see also Maurice Pearlman, "Report on Turkey," *New Statesman and Nation*, March 27, 1948, p. 250.

⁸³ *Vakit*, June 17, 1947; *Ulus* (editorial), June 29, 1947; *Vatan*, June 18-25, 1947.

⁸⁴ *Tanin* (editorial), June 25, 1947.

⁸⁵ *Vatan*, June 28, 29, 1947 (Bayar in Sivas).

⁸⁶ *Ulus*, July 2, 1947.

net."⁸⁷ Pointing to the great increase in the budget of the police forces during the previous two years, Bayar asked an end to all these undemocratic actions as a step toward meeting international obligations. He declared:

We are living in a new era in which the freedoms guaranteed by the constitutions to the nation are safeguarded in the mutual international obligations. . . . It would be appropriate to say that undoubtedly all patriotic Turks have heard with satisfaction the views expressed by the President of the United States . . . that the safeguard of world peace and internal order resides in the recognition and guarantee of rights and freedoms to all individuals, and in a government which takes its power and authority, without any shadow of doubt, from the people.⁸⁸

Following Celal Bayar's speech, İnönü had another interview with Peker, who insisted on his previous views.⁸⁹ President İnönü thereupon issued a long and formal statement, known as the *12 Temmuz Çok Partili Beyanname* (July 12, Multi-Party Declaration),⁹⁰ which established the foundations of a normal multi-party system.

The declaration began by describing the past events and the unsuccessful interviews with Bayar and Peker, but:

. . . difficult and discouraging as they were, the experience of the past one and one-half years, however, provided successful grounds for hope for the future. It is therefore the duty of the opposition and the government parties to preserve and continue to build on the results already achieved . . . from this moment on. The last complaints I heard contain, whatever the exaggerations, truth to some extent too. An opposition party which uses legal methods and not revolutionary ones must enjoy the same privileges as the party in power. On this ground I consider myself, as the head of the state, equally responsible to both parties. . . . The responsibility of

⁸⁷ *Vatan*, July 8, 1947; also *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 181-188.

⁸⁸ *Vatan*, July 8, 1947. It should be mentioned that a weaker party in Turkey welcomes moral support from abroad but once in power does its best to discredit opposition parties expecting it.

⁸⁹ *Vatan*, July 11, 1947.

⁹⁰ *Ulus*, July 12, 1947; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 75. For text, see *Aydın Tarihi*, July 1947, pp. 14ff.

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the government to maintain law and order is a fact, but its impartial attitude towards all the political parties established legally is the basic guarantee for political life. . . . Whichever political party comes to power is expected to give an assurance that it will act with due respect for the rights and the positions of people in government service. . . . The conclusion [result] I seek is establishment of the basic condition [for relation] between the two parties: security, which in my view is the security of the country and therefore very important. The opposition will work in a security without fearing [dissolution by] the party in power. The Administration will consider that the opposition demands only the rights legally conferred upon it, while the citizen at large will view with confidence and tranquility the possibility of having the government powers in the hands of one or the other party. The obstacles to this end are mainly psychological and in order to overcome them I should like to ask the genuine cooperation of the leaders of the opposition and the government [parties] who are guiding the course of political life of the country.⁹¹

The Declaration of July 12, was hailed by Celal Bayar as having "historical value" and as "an expression of good will and foresight."⁹² Fuad Köprülü wrote:

The President, acting with full understanding and absolute impartiality, has pointed out the conditions and means needed to bring the political situation to normal and thus has ended the deadlock. . . . in order to fulfill properly his obligations as chief of state İnönü has decided to remain impartial; thus, here is a personality of historical stature who raised himself above parties and in this capacity he belongs to both parties as a national personality.⁹³

The press similarly hailed the declaration with great satisfaction, calling it the turning point, as in fact it was, in the relations between the two parties.⁹⁴

İnönü's statement indeed called for the establishment of new bases for the future relations between the government and opposition parties. With such an approach and inter-

⁹¹ *Aynı Tarihi*, July 1947, pp. 15-16.

⁹² *Vatan*, October 5, 6, 1947 (Bayar in Erzurum).

⁹³ *Kuvvet*, July 12, 1947; also July 17, 1947.

⁹⁴ *Vakit*, *Vatan*, July 13, 1947; *Cumhuriyet*, July 22, 1947.

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pretation, İnönü differed from Peker and his government, and indirectly supported the opposition's complaints of government pressure and impartial treatment.

Thus, conflict had developed between Peker, as the head of the government, and İnönü, as the head of the state and Chairman of the Republican Party. Both people were constitutionally independent in respect to each other and a deadlock could have resulted. This situation stemmed from the very principles of the Constitution. The Premier is chosen by the President. Thereafter the Premier and his cabinet are responsible exclusively to the Assembly, and consequently a strong Premier, popular with the Assembly, can monopolize the control of the government. The President cannot dissolve the Assembly nor is he entitled to interfere in the administration (or make any decisions affecting the political parties) except indirectly, as İnönü did, on the basis of his own prestige. The President's only means of exercising influence on the government is through party channels.

Peker was aware of this constitutional situation. Months before answering the open letter of Halil Mentешеoğlu, who had recommended that İnönü remain impartial in party disputes and appoint a cabinet headed in turn by the opposition and government parties, Peker bluntly declared that İnönü did not have such a right, and even if he tried to do so he may be overruled by the majority in the Assembly.⁹⁵

Peker rejected the idea of an arbiter between political parties, as being undemocratic. The government party, in his view having received in elections the governing mandate from the people, was charged with carrying out that mandate in direct contest with other political parties. The only arbiter to decide between one or the other party was the nation—the people—at election time. Therefore, İnönü, as Party Chairman, was not above and beyond his own party which had elected him to the Presidency. By the same token the request of the Democratic

⁹⁵ *Ulus*, April 3, 4, 1947.

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Party for an arbiter was undemocratic. Peker believed that the July Declaration was "an advice to the two political parties to avoid bitter fights and fulfill their obligations with understanding. It did not have the substance or the power to change the functions of the government and its responsibility to the Assembly as established by the Constitution" and it was bound, therefore, to have a short life.⁹⁶

The choice open to Peker after İnönü's declaration of July 12 was to accept the declaration for a multi-party system, or reject it and consequently resign. However, Peker did not resign since he considered İnönü's declaration a violation of the prerogatives given the President by the Constitution, and trusted that the majority of the Assembly would be with him. He insisted on remaining in office despite the open breach with İnönü, and it was not until a few months later that he had to resign.

The July Declaration brought peace and established normal relations between the political parties. It offered the Democrats certain immediate advantages, but also some disadvantages, because it deprived them of their main propaganda weapon, the claim of pressure and partiality on the part of the government. With tranquility and freedom established, the antagonism to the government somewhat diminished.⁹⁷ (Some have expressed the opinion that the declaration was İnönü's subtle idea to deprive the Democrats of their main propaganda weapon, and thus with the calm restored make the public face the fact that the Democrats' program and ideas were not different from those of the Republicans.)⁹⁸

The declaration also implied that the Democrats were using unorthodox means of party propaganda, mass meetings, and inflammatory speeches. The acceptance of the declaration by the Democrats carried with it an indirect confession of the

⁹⁶ *Ulus*, December 4, 1947.

⁹⁷ *Millet*, No. 126, July 8, 1948, p. 9.

⁹⁸ *Mülkiyet*, No. 1, March 1948, p. 11.

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improper nature of their own methods, and recognition of the government's good intentions. Such a recognition, even if implicit, was an error in party tactics which the Democrats soon realized. Menderes declared a few months later that the declaration was merely recognition of the equal rights of all political parties, a definition of the idea of law and order, and an attempt by the party in power to seek a rapprochement with the Democratic Party.⁹⁹ Celal Bayar himself declared two years later that the declaration was "an expression of the Administration's desire to depart from the forceful and violent policy it had pursued until that day . . . and despite all opinions, it was a unilateral act. It could not be otherwise, since the Democratic Party was placed in a position of self-defense from the very beginning."¹⁰⁰

Inönü declared that only a short time after the declaration was issued, the Democrats went back to their previous methods of violent propaganda and criticism.¹⁰¹

Despite the controversial legal status and its debatable purpose, the declaration remains one of the major documents in the development of party politics in Turkey. Its value rests in the purpose for which it was issued, the spirit in which it was written, and the profound effects it had on the future relations between the opposition and government parties and on the organization of the parties themselves. It is one of Inönü's chief achievements.

⁹⁹ *Vatan*, January 10, 1948 (in Mersin).

¹⁰⁰ *Vatan*, November 9, 1949 (interview in Bandırma).

¹⁰¹ *Vatan*, October 1, 1949. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 110.

CHAPTER 7

DISSENSION IN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION PARTIES

THE conflict between President İnönü and Premier Peker, although denied in the *Ulus*,¹ was in fact the result of different tendencies developing around and within the Republican Party, especially among the deputies in the Assembly. The first group, the "extremists" headed by Peker and a number of other old guard Republicans, opposed to any compromise, wanted to give the opposition a subordinate role vis-a-vis the party in power. They claimed that the opposition included reactionaries directly opposed to the regime and seeking means of re-establishing their own supremacy.²

The second group, the "moderates," *otuzbeşler* or the "thirty-fives," was comprised mainly of younger Republicans. They were headed by Professor Nihat Erim, and adopted a liberal approach to party relations in line with İnönü's views. They accepted the fact that the Republican Party was a conglomeration of individuals with different economic, social, and political views who had been kept together by the historical and political necessities, and opportunistic purposes, for the past twenty-five years. However, since the Republican Party itself now decided to relinquish its prerogatives and accept other political parties, its own philosophy and structure had to undergo a necessary adjustment.

After the positions of İnönü and the Premier became clear, the Republicans favoring the one or the other viewpoint freely expressed their opinions in the *Ulus*.³ The "extremists"

¹ *Ulus*, July 28, 1947.

² *Vatan* (editorial), July 30, 31, 1947; *Son Posta* (editorial), August 4, 1947.

³ *Ulus* (editorial), July 31, 1947. It is most amazing to see the *Ulus*,

were obviously displeased with İnönü's stand, but his definite decision to remain as Chairman of the Republican Party, as well as awareness that their dissent from the Republican Party at that time would have fatal results for them, kept them in the Party. (İnönü's views, as expressed in the July Declaration, were embodied in a special letter sent by Hilmi Uran, Secretary General of the Republican Party to all branches. Cevdet K. Incedayı, an extremist deputy from Sinop, in several speeches made it appear that the letter had a double meaning.)⁴

It was known that the Democrats' main purpose was to separate İnönü from the Republican Party, and the first favorable Democratic reaction to the July 12 Declaration stemmed from their hope that it expressed the decision on the part of İnönü to remain impartial.⁵ Thus, the interests of both groups in the Republican Party coincided in retaining İnönü as the Chairman of the Party, and this in itself was the strongest factor holding the Republicans together. The Republican Party, despite all expectations, was ultimately able to confine differences of opinion within its own ranks, thus avoiding further splits.

Observers felt that the Republican Party was undergoing an internal crisis from which it could emerge stronger and more progressive.⁶ Meanwhile, the "moderates" in the Republican Party, acting with the moral support of İnönü, gradually increased their influence and were able to offer a stiff resistance to the "extremists" headed by Premier Peker.⁷ Their position became quite clear after the Republican Parliamentary Group's seven hour debate in August 1947 on the

which two years previously had violently insisted on party discipline and conformity, become the forum of intraparty disputes, but disputes carried out in a democratic and orderly fashion.

⁴ *Kudret* (editorial), August 23, 1947; *Vatan*, August 24, 1947.

⁵ *Tanin* (editorial), August 8, 1947.

⁶ *Tanin* (editorial), August 15, 16, 1947; *Akşam*, August 20, 1947.

⁷ The public, encouraged by İnönü's attitude, did not miss any occasion

policies of Recep Peker's government. At the conclusion, 303 deputies voted in Peker's favor, and thirty-four against him.⁸

During the debate, Peker declared that he accepted the July Declaration in so far as it concerned the establishment of normal relations between parties, but rejected the Democratic accusations of pressure on the opposition and partiality by government officials.⁹ He denied the existence of differences of opinion between İnönü and himself. In an effort to secure the deputies' support he asserted that if such differences existed, he was ready to resign.¹⁰

Despite the great number of votes in his favor, Peker's position was shaken because the thirty-four votes cast against him expressed İnönü's viewpoint, and meant that the government did not have the confidence of the party hierarchy. In a quick move to satisfy the critics, Peker changed six members of his cabinet, including the Interior and Commerce Ministers, the latter under attack for mishandling wheat exports.

This quick and arbitrary change was criticized bitterly by the Republicans themselves, for Peker made the decision without consulting the Republican deputies, as is normally done.¹¹ As a consequence, Peker had a violent disagreement with İnönü, who threatened to reconvene the National Assembly if Peker did not immediately submit the cabinet nominations to the Assembly and not wait until after the recess which the Assembly was about to take.¹²

Eventually the Assembly approved the cabinet changes,

to show its own antagonism to Peker. For some incidents at Haydarpaşa ferry station, see *Ayın Tarihi*, August 1947, pp. 19ff.

⁸ *Akşam*, August 28, 1947; *Ayın Tarihi*, August 1947 p. 9. Also Jäschke (*Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 76), who says 35 deputies against Peker.

⁹ For accusation, see *Ayın Tarihi*, July 1947, p. 11.

¹⁰ *Akşam*, August 27, 1947. On the "moderates" and their struggle with Recep Peker's group, see also Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 563-564.

¹¹ *Tanin* (editorial), September 7, 1947.

¹² Nihat Erim, "Bay R. Peker ve Meselesi," *Ulus*, December 4-7, 1947.

but three days later Peker resigned, apparently in conflict with the new Minister of the Interior, Hüsrev Göle, a man of moderate character who followed the views of İnönü on party relations.¹³ In his own view, Peker resigned "because there was no diminution in certain adverse currents and views in the party, regarding the cabinet, and among some friends . . . even after the cabinet received a vote of confidence . . . and because [he] wanted to avoid anarchy likely to shake the country's entire structure."¹⁴

However, Peker's resignation followed his unsuccessful efforts to gain control of the Republican Party, and of the National Assembly in particular. It was charged publicly that the extremists in the Republican Party intended to liquidate the Democratic Party and isolate İnönü in his residence at Çankaya by placing the responsibilities of government entirely in the hands of the Assembly. For that purpose they even requested (during the first stage of the plan) the assistance of the Democratic Party by promising to liquidate the Führer system.¹⁵ However, these charges, put forth by Ahmed Emin Yalman, were not backed by any conclusive evidence.

It is known, however, that prior to the resignation of Peker's cabinet, certain Republican deputies, opposing Peker, were under surveillance by the secret police.¹⁶ Moreover, Peker, assuming that he would remain Premier, had intended to submit a proposal to the forthcoming Republican Convention to make the Premier also the Vice-Chairman of the Party.¹⁷ The amendment would have resulted in concentrating government and party power in one person.

¹³ *Vatan*, September 1, 1947.

¹⁴ *Ulus*, December 4, 1947 (speech by Peker at the Republican Convention).

¹⁵ *Vatan* (editorial), October 4, 1947. *New York Times*, October 12, 1947.

¹⁶ *Son Posta* (editorial), October 11, 1947.

¹⁷ *Ulus*, December 5, 6, 1947. These conflicts between the Premier and the President and the various political maneuvers described above are

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Peker's resignation—he was elected to the Party Council in 1947 but resigned—was the natural outcome of the July 12 Declaration. It meant that a period of political insecurity and expediency had come to an end and that a new phase in the political life of Turkey was about to begin.

In this struggle between President and Premier, İnönü's own position was shaken. In order to regain his popularity and fulfill the promises expressed in the July Declaration, İnönü took a long trip through the country. He advised the Republican Party's local branches and government officials everywhere he went to give equal and impartial treatment and consideration to all political parties, and that those who felt incapable of doing so should resign.¹⁸ İnönü visited the headquarters of various Democratic Party local branches and assured their members "as President, as a man, and as İnönü" that he never advised pressure on the Democratic Party as claimed by Celal Bayar.¹⁹

Upon returning to Ankara, İnönü was met by a large friendly crowd, including one of the leaders of the Democratic Party, Fuad Köprülü. Following this, a letter from the Ministry of Interior was sent to all administrative officials emphasizing the determination of the government to follow the policy adopted by the President and advising them to prosecute all those committing offenses against the Democratic Party.²⁰

İnönü now was indeed in control of the Republican Party. When the Republican Convention met a few months later and elected him party chairman, Peker, the other candidate

quite natural developments in any political system. They are worthy of mention here because they happened for the first time in Turkey, and only one and one-half years after the establishment of the opposition parties.

¹⁸ *Vatan, Ulus*, September 16, 17, 20, 25, 27, 1947. Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 125-126; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 77.

¹⁹ *Vatan*, September 22, 25, 26, 1947 (İnönü in Giresun and Samsun).

²⁰ *Ulus*, September 28, 29, 1947. The first effects were seen in Kayseri, where Bayar was met by the province governor upon his arrival in the city. *Vatan*, October 5, 1947.

for the chairmanship, could muster only twenty-five votes out of the several hundred votes cast.²¹

Falih Rifkî Atay, who for years had been the chief editor of the *Ulus*, and a close associate of Atatürk, resigned, by his own decision, from the staff of the *Ulus* because the intrigues in the Republican Party made it difficult for him to continue to hold his position. He accused the moderates of working hand in glove with the opposition to destroy their own party.²² Actually, he had defended the views of Recep Peker's group. His resignation was not a definite break with the party for he continued to write occasional articles in the *Ulus*, but his place as editor was taken by Nihat Erim, one of the moderates.²³

Viewing these developments in historical perspective, one realizes that Peker was to some extent the victim of circumstances, of the need for changes and adjustments which he was not able to conceive in time. He was defeated by his own temper, for he could not argue reasonably for his own viewpoints, but tried to impose them, although basically he was deeply concerned with preserving the regime's modernist foundations. Despite his honest intentions and justified concern that compromises would undermine the modernist-reformist basis of Turkey he is remembered now as a defender of strong methods. Among those included in Peker's group many were really concerned with the same fundamental problems. Behind the claims for democracy, they saw the beginning of compromises on the very principles and bases of the Republic, on secularism, the very foundation which shaped the whole philosophy and the mind of the Re-

²¹ *Ulus*, December 4, 7, 1947 (Erim's article). Also Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 79.

²² *Cumhuriyet*, November 16, 1947.

²³ Falih R. Atay at present publishes *Dünya* (World), which is in opposition to the Democratic Party government. Nihat Erim is an inactive member of the Republican Party after having lost his bid for Secretary-General of that party. Erim has been accused of "flirting" with the Democrats.

public, on statism, and eventually on freedom itself.²⁴ The unfortunate aspect of these events lies in the fact that worthwhile opinions of the extremists could not be heard in the "frenzy of democracy" which seized everyone in 1946-1950, and thus some of their opinions were condemned unjustly, along with Recep Peker's harsh policies.

The cabinet of Hasan Saka (the Turkish Foreign Minister who signed the San Francisco Charter), was established after Peker's resignation on September 10, 1947, and included middle-of-the-road Republicans. It was expected that Saka would better the relations between the government and the opposition, and would devise measures against the extremist currents of left and right.²⁵ But the cabinet was expected to be a short-term transitional one.²⁶ It did not seem to satisfy the opposition which demanded radical changes,²⁷ and some even suspected that it would follow Peker's policy, but these fears did not materialize.

In his program, Premier Saka pointed out that his main purpose was "to work toward achieving political security as the basis of a democratic system which is gradually establishing itself in the country," through equal treatment of all political parties and due respect for the Republican institutions.²⁸

The opposition wanted specific mention of the amendments to laws considered anti-democratic and challenged the right of the Republican Party to call itself the "founder of democracy."²⁹ The government's program, in the eyes of the opposition, was likely to destroy the friendly atmosphere created by the July Declaration, despite the assurances of democratic measures which it contained.³⁰

²⁴ The ideological implications of the party struggle in 1946-1950 have been studied extensively in Part III.

²⁵ *Tanin* (editorial), September 11, 12, 15, 1947.

²⁶ *Son Saat*, September 11, 1947.

²⁷ *Kudret*, September 22, 1947.

²⁸ *Ayn Tarihi*, October 1947, pp. 16ff.

²⁹ *Vatan*, October 14, 1947 (Menderes' views).

³⁰ *Tasvir* (editorial), October 14, 1947.

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Inönü, however, differed in his view, for according to him "democratic life in Turkey based on two political parties had already been established, and henceforth it will function with the mutual collaboration of the two parties. The establishment of legal bases to regulate relations between the Administration and political parties was of major importance now."³¹ Whatever may be the partisan views on the government's program, the truth is that relations between Republicans and Democrats entered a new and friendly phase and with it came a relaxation of political tension.

Thus, with relative political tranquility established, the Republican Party, with public opinion shifting slightly in its favor, began planning for its next convention. Despite various changes taking place in the government and its philosophy, and despite general liberalization throughout the country, the program and by-laws of the Republican Party had remained unchanged, that is, suited to the one-party system. A change of party program and by-laws was necessary in order to adjust them to new political developments.

The program of the party actually was an eclectic Constitution. It was drafted originally in order to satisfy all social groups, and incorporated all political tendencies from socialism to liberalism. But now by the end of 1947, the situation had radically changed. Confronting the Republicans was the Democratic Party which did not differ in program and basic ideas, but in terms of practical policies, methods, organization, and the interests it defended, it resembled more closely a political party. In particular, the Democrats' claim of establishing democracy gave them certain precise and limited objectives, and consequently a force and vigor, as compared with the broad, over-all views of the Republican Party. Moreover, since the Democratic Party represented new political tendencies it appeared bound to replace the Republican Party by leaving it a mere skeleton organization; a dying

³¹ *Ulus*, November 2, 1947.

symbol of a movement which had fulfilled its historical mission and was due to disappear.³²

Consequently, the chances of survival for the Republican Party depended on its own ability to make the necessary adjustments to become a normal political party in philosophy and organization. It was compelled to redefine its objectives, make its program more specific, and direct its activities by taking into account public opinion and the positions adopted by other political parties on various issues.

Such an adjustment was necessary in view of the newly accepted multi-party system. The party could survive only by conforming its philosophy and activities to the ideas and wishes of the average citizen, the voter. It had to change its revolutionary, intellectual, and "idealistic" philosophy to an evolutionary, empirical, and utilitarian one.

The party members had already expressed their views and discussed at great length the reforms needed in the precinct meetings throughout 1946 and 1947. Speakers demanded free discussion on every subject and an end to the imposition of party views from the top.³³

The need for intra-party liberalization and political adjustment was accepted by the party hierarchy, too. With this purpose in mind, the Party Council met early in 1947 and decided to form a committee to prepare the amendments for

³² Political parties in Turkey have come into existence based chiefly on one fundamental idea—Constitutionalism in the Young Turks' era, national independence in 1920-1923—and after fulfilling their main idea have stayed in power by enlarging and expanding their ideology, while in power, chiefly in accordance with political realities and the exigencies of the moment. Usually such parties would disappear at the first crisis. The Republican Party was breaking now with this pattern by trying to adjust itself to changing conditions.

³³ With the inception of the opposition parties a considerable number of Republicans resigned from their party. Others purposely submitted certain premature or radical proposals for reforms which could not be accepted, and then resigned because of the "refusal" of the party to reform. For many, the Republican Party was a lost cause and they had to get out. However, a core, motivated partly by intellectual considerations, partly by past commitments, stayed in the party and tried to reform it from within.

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the party program and by-laws to be submitted to the party convention due to meet later in the year.³⁴

The convention, which was expected to alter fundamentally the whole philosophy and organization of the party, aroused widespread reaction which varied according to the outlook and expectations of each group. The Democrats, hoping to see İnönü abandon the Republicans, wishfully claimed that the Republican Party could become a true political party only if it renounced the use of İnönü's personal prestige and power as President.³⁵ The conservatives and those dissatisfied with the Republican Party had serious doubts and expressed them rather vehemently. The weekly *Millet* (Nation), representing the views of these groups, best epitomized them in an article:

The Republican Party, based on personal interest and ambition, on a totalitarian mentality and the desire to rule, has let deep roots in the past 25 years. It is impossible to think of this party without these features. Having deviated from its initial purposes it has gradually become very much like a limited corporation seeking to provide profits to its members. . . . This conception of personal interest, the desire for absolute despotism, is ingrained in its structure, and as long as this concept endures, there is no one who can believe in the honest democratic intentions of the Republican Party. Especially, so long as the frightful effects of the misery and destruction caused by its administration to our social and financial structure and even moral values continue to live, one wonders what good will come to the country from the future activities of this party.³⁶

The majority of the intellectuals, however, still believed in the creative ability of the Republican Party.³⁷

The seventh Republican Convention, composed of 274 delegates from the local organizations and about 400 deputies,

³⁴ *Ulus, Vatan*, January 16, 27, 1947; *Akşam*, January 29, 1947; *Vatan*, March 18, 1947.

³⁵ *Kudret* (editorial), November 14, 15, 1947.

³⁶ *Millet*, November 27, 1947, p. 9. This periodical had turned pro-religious in guise of democracy.

³⁷ *Ulus*, November 18, 1947 (İnönü's speech).

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the latter ex-officio members of the convention, met on November 17, 1947 in Ankara.³⁸ The discussions centered on a number of points connected with party organization and functions, with the press, cultural and youth organizations, statism, and the teaching of religion in schools.³⁹ On all these points the convention adopted certain amendments which in essence changed the program and philosophy of the Republican Party, from revolutionary to moderate. On social issues the convention adopted a position right of center. Article 17 of the Land Reform Law, which had entitled the government to expropriate even the small farms, was recommended for abolition;⁴⁰ the curricula of the Village Institutes were to put more emphasis on culture rather than on field activities, while all leftist activities were to be strictly supervised and checked. The *Halk Evleri* (People's Houses) which had been created to bring about the people's cultural emancipation (but had become agents for the Republican Party) were to become cultural foundations for the general use of the public.⁴¹

The party constitution was changed too. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman were to be elected for two years, and if the former became President the latter would be the acting Chairman (Article 69). The Party Council of forty members, which had been limited in the past to the inner circles of the party, was to elect its members from the party members at large. The Secretary General, previously nominated by the Party Chairman, was to be elected by the Party Council, which was to elect also the Central Committee (the executive) from among its members.⁴² Seventy per cent of the deputy candidates were to be nominated by the local organizations, in con-

³⁸ For this convention see the records: *CHP Yedinci Kurultayı Tutanağı*, Ankara, 1948; *Aynı Tarihi*, November, December 1947. Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 575-576. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 79. *Ulus*, November 17 to December 6, 1947.

³⁹ *Ulus*, January 27, December 2, 3, 1947. Also *CHP Yedinci*, pp. 442ff. See also my Chapter 10.

⁴⁰ *Vatan*, December 2, 16, 1947. See my Chapter 4.

⁴¹ *Ulus*, December 9, 1947. For the final outcome, see also my Chapter 14.

⁴² *CHP 25 Sene*, Ankara, 1948, p. 30.

trast with the past when the Central Committee had absolute jurisdiction in nominating all the candidates.⁴³

The delegates to the party convention were to be chosen mainly by the local organizations, so as to direct party activity in accordance with the party members' views rather than those at the top, as in the past. In general, the amendments to the party constitution aimed at investing the power in the party convention and not in the Chairman. The convention elected İnönü Chairman, while Hilmi Uran became Vice-Chairman of the party, and since İnönü was the President, the latter became acting Chairman.

During convention debates, the two groups, the "extremists" and "moderates," in the party clashed. The spokesmen for the former denied having any intention of opposing İnönü and criticized those who caused such rumors as trying to divide the party. Moreover, they accepted the existence of the opposition parties which, they claimed, came into existence due to the Republican Party's liberalism and to its desire to bring about democracy.⁴⁴ The moderates pointed to the need for reforms in the party and demanded freedom of criticism in the party and a friendly attitude towards the opposition.⁴⁵

Along with the changes in the program of the Republican Party, some fundamental transformations occurred in the thinking of the average citizen. Political associations were formed throughout the country and citizens joined them freely, on the basis of political opinion and interest. To be critical of the government was no longer considered a betrayal of the country, lack of patriotism, or proof of evil intention. The opposition newspapers, at first called "rags," "pulp," or other names, had been duly accepted.

On the other hand, discussions on the fundamentals of the society and on social matters were still frowned upon. Especially after charges of communism were exchanged between

⁴³ *Ulus*, November 30, December 9, 1947.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, November 23, 1947 (N. Erim and H. Tanrıöver).

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Democrats and Republicans, the discussion of social problems, in a manner more than casual, could bring unpleasant consequences.

Public opinion became a major factor affecting government decisions and political parties. As a consequence, a number of changes in the behavior of government officials took place. (The special trains carrying state dignitaries were abolished, and ministers could be seen riding in ordinary city buses, the first cases creating a real sensation.) It was realized that people became restless if decisions were made without due attention to their opinion or if there was insistence on measures unpopular with them. Once the citizen was sure that the decisions made could be changed according to public consensus, the restlessness disappeared.

It took the Republican Party two years to realize that it had to conform to the wishes of the people if it were to survive. It was rather difficult for the Republican hierarchy to obey public opinion at the beginning but eventually they became used to asking for the advice of the local branches instead of informing them of the decisions reached at the top level. Thus the Republican Party avoided any major split in its organization because it adopted a liberal policy in respect to all the groups in the party, who could express their views freely without fear of being expelled, as would have happened two years earlier.

The transformation in the concept of the Presidency was also startling. Prior to 1946, the President was a demi-God, idolized by citizens, party members, and newspapers. Any criticism of him was punished severely. By the end of 1947 the President had become a normal human being, criticized, and even abused, by every discontented publication or citizen.⁴⁶ The President himself had to go to the people, speak

⁴⁶ Today one can often see President Bayar taking a walk on the streets or having lunch in a public restaurant, accompanied only by his aide. İsmet İnönü walks freely on the streets without any precautions whatsoever and enjoys the privilege of being an unglamorous but "safe" private citizen. On changes of behavior, see also my Chapter 13.

to them, and ask for their opinion and consent on various matters.

The beginnings of democracy in Turkey followed empirical necessities rather than a well-defined doctrine. As a matter of fact, the theoretical discussions on the foundation of political development had been extremely limited. The lack of solid ideological foundations, a shortcoming witnessed throughout the nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire, was evident again in this period. Public opinion had guided political leaders in the preliminary stages of the party struggle and was inspired chiefly by the existing conditions. It could not by its nature chart the way to farsighted fundamental decisions. A long-range policy could have been devised only by party leaders. Public opinion could only accept or reject the policy chosen.

Without plans for a long-range policy, fundamental principles, and theory, it was doubtful whether political parties could discharge their function as agents of transformation and progress through a democratic process. This shortcoming was to become evident after the immediate conflicts had been settled and one of the parties having acquired power, and unable to maintain it through ideas and programs, would cling to power through force. But ideological shortcomings become evident in the long run only. Two years of intense political struggle allowed no time for profound reflections. Social and economic forces pressed the development further. Indeed, after the July Declaration and after the Republican Party Convention, political life in Turkey continued to develop in a new way.

The decisions of the Republican Party Convention and the resignation of Recep Peker convinced even the most skeptical that the government's liberal policy, as advocated in the July Declaration, was to stay. The changes in the program and constitution of the Republican Party, as well as various views expressed in the convention, showed the sincerity of its lead-

ers. As a proof the government abolished martial law in İstanbul and vicinity—it had been for so long the target of attacks by the opposition—in December 1947, that is, more than two years after the end of the war.⁴⁷ This was indeed so special an event that even Menderes, who seemed to be the bitterest critic of the Republican Party, could confess in a speech in İzmir that government pressure on the Democratic Party had eased considerably.⁴⁸

The end of the government pressure on opposition deprived the latter of one of its major arguments: the claim that the government did not favor genuine opposition parties. Indeed, the fear that the government might attempt to abolish the opposition subdued all personality conflicts and maintained the unity of all the groups in the Democratic Party. But as soon as this fear disappeared, the latent personality conflicts came into the open.

As early as January 1947, the rumor circulated that during the Democratic Party Convention a group was formed around Marshal Çakmak and Kenan Öner, and opposed the four founders of the party. However, the conflict did not break into the open until after İnönü's July Declaration.⁴⁹ The Democratic Party newspaper, *Kuvvet* later *Kudret* (Force) expressed the opinions of two different groups within the party in respect to this declaration. Fuad Köprülü, expressing the views of the higher echelons of the Democratic Party, adopted a favorable attitude. Hikmet Bayur, representing the views of the extreme wing, distrusted and criticized the Declaration as being aimed at undermining the Democrats' fighting spirit. He also complained of the secrecy in which the Central Committee of his own party conducted its meetings.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ *Vatan*, December 10, 1947 (declaration of Premier Saka). Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 80. Martial law had been imposed since 1940.

⁴⁸ *Vatan*, February 19, 1948.

⁴⁹ *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), January 10, 1947. Rumors of internal conflicts in the Democratic Party had circulated as early as in 1946. *Tasvir*, September 16, 1946.

⁵⁰ *Kuvvet* (editorial), July 27, 1947.

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(Dr. Mustafa Kentli, one of the founders of the Democratic Party organization in Izmir, had been expelled from the party in the summer of 1947 for having criticized the Party Chairman, Celal Bayar.)

The existence of two groups with conflicting opinions in the Democratic Party became more obvious after the *Ulus*, in a sharp editorial, complained against the "revolutionary methods" still being used by the Democrats and their attacks against İnönü.⁵¹ The Democrats of Izmir had indeed criticized İnönü for having retained the chairmanship of the Republican Party. Only two days afterwards, *Ulus* published a very mild editorial explaining that such attacks could be considered incidental.⁵² Meanwhile, the *Vatan*, which had become an ardent supporter of the Democrats, began publishing a number of editorials and articles with the obvious purpose of discrediting Kenan Öner, the Democratic chairman for İstanbul, by accusing him of having attempted to divide the Democratic Party and of becoming a tool of the communists.⁵³ This was indeed surprising. Only a year previously the *Vatan* had given front page coverage to Kenan Öner's violent and indiscriminate attacks on communists, and under that guise, to all that was connected with the Republican Party.

A few days later Kenan Öner resigned from the Democratic Party. His letter of resignation, sent to the party headquarters was kept secret for some time, until the *Yeni Sabah* (New Morning), which became Öner's supporter, made it public.⁵⁴ According to Öner, his resignation was caused by the Democratic leaders' desire to dominate the party, by over-

⁵¹ *Ulus* (editorial), December 17, 1947.

⁵² *Ulus* (editorial), December 19, 1947. The editorial writer of *Ulus*, Nihat Erim, who was on good terms with the opposition, was informed that the Democrats' sharp attacks against İnönü and the Republican Party were the views of a minority only.

⁵³ *Vatan* (editorial), January 8, 1948; *Tasvir* (editorial), January 14, 1948.

⁵⁴ *Yeni Sabah*, January 17-20, 1948.

looking the wishes of the people, for the sake of their own personal ambitions.⁵⁵ According to Öner, Celal Bayar came to Istanbul in person to see that he was not re-elected chairman of the Istanbul organization. Moreover, Öner claimed, attempts were made to single out a group within the Democratic Party opposed to İnönü, and to liquidate it to please him.⁵⁶ For instance, the best proof was the information first transmitted by Köprülü to Nihat Erim that Sadık Aldoğan had been advised to stop his attacks on İnönü. All this, Öner concluded, proved that Celal Bayar and İsmet İnönü were in secret agreement to simulate an opposition. In his memoirs published in 1948, Kenan Öner stressed the point that the tolerance shown by the Republicans toward the Democratic Party was the result of this secret agreement, and that according to certain rumors Celal Bayar had even received financial assistance from the government to start the opposition party.⁵⁷ These statements have never been proved.

One fact that became evident in the course of the controversy was that certain persons who had not participated in politics during the one-party system—in many cases because they opposed its secularist policies—remained somewhat reluctant to accept the leadership of the four founders of the Democratic Party. They believed that these people had been long associated with the Republican Party and considered them partly responsible for some of the activities which they now criticized. They suspected that these two groups, so long associated, could never become real enemies. As long as the violent attacks on İnönü and the Republican Party continued, the neophytes had no doubts about the genuine character of the opposition. As soon as the leaders of the opposition and the government parties came to an understanding and the tension disappeared, the doubts were renewed.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, January 17, 1948.

⁵⁶ *Vatan*, February 12, 1948.

⁵⁷ Öner, *Siyasi Hatıralarım ve Bizde Demokrasi*, p. 22. On the sources of financial assistance received by the Democrats, see my Chapter 12.

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Kenan Öner's group, on the other hand, was composed mainly of individuals with strong personalities who could not long be kept within the bounds of party discipline. They could not follow orders from the top and were ready to rebel against strict, conformist methods and personal domination in any party. They were liberal in their own general outlook but militant in opposing the Republicans. The July Declaration, although accepted formally at a party caucus,⁵⁸ did not satisfy them, for they favored absolute opposition to the Republicans.

The main purpose of the Democratic Party according to them was to liquidate the one-party dictatorship, and until this was achieved there should be no truce or halt to the fight.⁵⁹ They felt that the July Declaration had made the Democratic leaders forget their main objective, relent their fight, and agree to act in accordance with İnönü's wishes. As a consequence, the fighting spirit shown by people in 1946 disappeared, and the establishment of democracy was deliberately delayed.⁶⁰ Moreover, the strict party discipline demanded by the Democratic leaders displeased them. Celal Bayar, at a meeting, insisted on having accepted "the decision of the Party's Central Committee as the decision of all the Democrats." This, in the eyes of the dissidents, aimed at establishing the party founders' supremacy.⁶¹ Furthermore, Bayar made a speech in Balıkesir saying in effect that those violating the party regulations would be brought "by the ear" before the Disciplinary Committee, and that if this should prove insufficient they would be expelled from the party. This was interpreted by the dissidents as an indication that if the Democrats came to power they would establish their own brand of oppression.⁶² Osman Bölükbaşı, now the Chair-

⁵⁸ *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 181, 240.

⁵⁹ *Yeni Sabah*, February 19, 1948 (views of Sadık Aldoğan).

⁶⁰ *Millet*, July 8, 1948, p. 9.

⁶¹ *Vatan*, March 1, 1948.

⁶² See *Yeni Sabah*, January 20, 30, 1948 (views of H. Bayur).

man of the *Millet Partisi* (National Party), defined the views of the founders of the Democratic Party as "evidence of persistence of old habits in a new house."⁶³

The dissidents, furthermore, accused the party's founders of lacking the desire to form a real opposition. Whatever opposition was formed, they claimed, was the result of popular pressure, but when this pressure manifested itself in the form of an acute desire to force a change in the government, the founders of the Democratic Party backed away and thus separated themselves from the majority of the people.⁶⁴

The Democratic Party hierarchy officially interpreted the conflict as being caused by a group which, acting under various pretexts and chiefly animated by militant objectives, could only weaken and disintegrate the party. The dissidents interpreted the authority to withdraw from the Assembly, given to the Central Committee by the party convention, in such a way as to further their own aims (in connection with the Freedom Pact).⁶⁵ Internal conflict in the Democratic Party was further aggravated and brought into the open by the dispute on the deputies' honoraria. The government brought before the Assembly a proposal to increase the deputies' honoraria. The Democrats, with one exception, voted against it. The deputy who voted for the increase, when accused of dissenting from his party, claimed in defense that, although some Democrats were actually in favor of the increase and so expressed themselves in private, they voted against it, knowing that the measure would be passed anyway by the Republican majority in the Assembly.⁶⁶

Soon the Democratic Central Committee passed a resolution requesting that the surplus in the honoraria resulting from this increase be turned over to the party headquarters.

⁶³ *Tasvir*, March 2, 1948; *Yeni Sabah*, March 6, 7, 1948.

⁶⁴ *Yeni Sabah*, April 1-4, 1948 (opinion of Mustafa Kentli).

⁶⁵ *Vatan*, February 27, 1948. Also, *Celal Bayar Diyorki*, p. 241.

⁶⁶ Kemal Silivrili was the deputy. He accused Fuad Köprülü of double dealing.

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Meanwhile, the Democratic Party's Parliamentary Group considered its Executive Board as having resigned and decided to elect a new one. The Board, which followed the views of the party leaders, wanted to enforce the Central Committee's decision. In the election, Fuad Köprülü, the Vice-Chairman of the group, was left out.⁶⁷ But the Central Committee considered this election as violating the party regulations, while Köprülü denied that he had ever resigned.⁶⁸

The conflict took the form of a legal battle concerning the privileges and jurisdiction of the Party Central Committee over the Parliamentary Group. The Central Committee demanded absolute conformity to party regulations while the Parliamentary Group insisted on not having confidence in its vice-chairman.⁶⁹ The conflict appeared solved when the contested election was declared valid. A few days later, however, Celal Bayar resigned from the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Group on the ground of inability to reconcile his duties as the chairman of both the Democratic Central Committee and the Parliamentary Group.⁷⁰ Bayar's resignation was actually a decision on his part to support the former.

Finally, the Central Committee, through its Disciplinary Committee, expelled from the party five deputies for actions weakening the party solidarity.⁷¹ Six members of the Central Committee resigned in protest against this decision and in their turn were expelled from the party.⁷² The expulsion, according to Fevzi L. Karaosmanoğlu, Chairman of the Disciplinary Committee (in 1955 he himself was subject to similar hasty treatment), was caused by the fact that the ex-

⁶⁷ *Vatan, Ulus*, February 6-10, March 6-8, 1948.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, March 8, 1948. *Yeni Sabah*, March 6, 1948 (views of O. N. Koni).

⁶⁹ *Yeni Sabah*, March 5, 1948 (views of Sadık Aldoğan).

⁷⁰ *Vatan*, February 12, 1948.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, March 11, 1948. The expelled: O. N. Koni, Necati Erdem, Mithat Sakaroğlu, Sadık Aldoğan, Kemal Silivri. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 83.

⁷² *Vatan*, March 25, 1948. The expelled: Yusuf K. Tengirşek, Emin Sazak, Enis Akaygen, Ahmet Oğuz, Hasan Dinçer, Ahmet Tahtakılıç.

pellees had created dissension in the party and deviated from party discipline, because "a party reaches its goals on the basis of discipline."⁷³ In defense, the expelled pointed out that it was necessary to have solidarity in the party, but based on mutual respect and affection among party members, with the rights of criticism liberally recognized. They claimed that the policy of the Central Committee during the past few months had followed a course likely to destroy mutual affection and respect and put an end to the right of criticism.⁷⁴

In a new disagreement with the Central Committee—because of its refusal to allow the expelled deputies to participate in the meetings of the Parliamentary Group until the party convention decided on the validity of their expulsion—ten more deputies decided to boycott the meetings of this body. At the end of all the expulsions and resignations the loyal Democrats' membership in the Assembly was reduced to thirty-one seats.

Whatever truth there may be in these obviously mutual partisan accusations, the conflict within the Democratic Party originated primarily in the differences of personalities amalgamated in a single organization. The increase of deputy honoraria was interpreted by Bayar as a device used by the Republican Party to involve the opposition in a measure unpopular with the people while he was away from Ankara.⁷⁵ Actually, the Democrats took an ambiguous position on it, which they clarified only later under popular pressure.⁷⁶

Accusations against the Democratic leadership of relenting in its fight against the Republicans were exaggerated. The apparent disappearance of political tension was caused by the

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Vatan*, March 11, 1948.

⁷⁵ *Son Posta*, February 10, 1948. *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 239-242.

⁷⁶ *Yeni Sabah*, March 5, 1948 (S. Aldoğan). The discussions on deputy honoraria have reoccurred several times since 1948, each time the honoraria were increased. The opposition usually opposes the increase in order to maintain its popularity. The last increase took place in February 1959. The net monthly pay of a deputy is now about TL.4000.

liberalization policy of the government and by its recognition of the opposition parties' right to exist.

The question of party discipline is somewhat different. The forceful and arbitrary manner in which opposition within the Democratic Party was liquidated, supposedly in order to enforce this discipline, cannot be justified or explained except by a tendency to domination from the top. This was not assessed properly at that time by the press or by the public, because maintenance of solidarity within that party was considered essential for a final victory to end one-party rule and establish a stable democratic regime. The press insisted on a quick end to the conflict,⁷⁷ regardless of means used or price paid for it. In the fight to end one kind of despotism a new method of oppression was favored.

The antagonism to Ismet İnönü and the attacks on his person, as the symbol of one-party rule, no longer pleased the public, as was the case in 1946. The liberal policy advocated by İnönü in 1947, and his conflict with Premier Peker in order to implement that policy increased his popularity and left no justification for attacking him. As a matter of fact, the public became weary of continuous personal polemics and demanded constructive action. Consequently, the Democratic leaders saw fit to end the attacks on İnönü, and this decision did not please the extremists in the party.

The conflict within the Democratic Party had little effect on its branches. Immediately thereafter, the Democratic Party leaders toured the country and vigorously defended their own policies. Their prestige, acquired in the previous two years of courageous struggle against the government, was indeed great, and this won the public to their side. As a matter of fact, the Turkish people, with their profound common sense, realized that any backing away from the Democratic

⁷⁷ *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), March 11, 1948; *Tasvir* (editorial), March 15, 1948; *Son Posta*, March 12, 1948.

Party at that time would only serve to strengthen the party in power.

Some resignations from the Democratic Party and incidents, such as the one in Afyon where expelled members were admitted to a party meeting despite the leaders' disapproval, did not fundamentally weaken it.⁷⁸ Those who resigned or were expelled from the Democratic Party proceeded, as expected, to form a new party. Even before their party was born, the press in general—except the *Yeni Sabah* and the *Kudret*, which were backing the dissidents—seemed to hope for its failure, lest it would divide the opposition. The would-be party was depicted in advance as being composed of strong personalities unable to cooperate and as inclined to violence.⁷⁹ In general, the party was considered doomed to a short life because it was born of personal feuds.⁸⁰ Some of the leaders of the would-be party were Marshal Fevzi Çakmak's close friends, and it appeared that he would back them. In order to diminish the Marshal's influence, the Republicans and Democrats alike played down his importance and prestige,⁸¹ precisely the opposite of the course followed in 1946 when he was *persona grata* among the Democrats and greatly helped the party with his prestige. The main reason for the negative attitude towards this party was caused by the fact that its anticipated liberal policy on religion, and the conservative and religious elements supporting it, would give place to religious reaction. The great hostility of the leaders of the incipient party to the Republicans, and to İnönü in particular, made it even more unacceptable to the government than it was to the Democrats. Therefore, both the Republican and the Democratic Parties had reasons to be united against it. By the time Turkey's third major party, the *Millet Partisi* (National

⁷⁸ *Yeni Sabah*, March 19, 1948. The party organization in Afyon was headed by the father of one of the expelled.

⁷⁹ *Son Telgraf* (editorial), May 6, 1948, June 22, 1948.

⁸⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, May 7, 8, 1948 (Burhan Felek's views).

⁸¹ *Son Posta* (editorial), February 11, 1948, also February 4, 1947.

Party) was officially established on July 20, 1948,⁸² its importance and the prestige of its founders had been greatly and purposely damaged.

In an effort to present their party as being born as a result of the peoples' demands, the founders modestly called themselves only *sunucu* (presenters).⁸³ Marshal Çakmak, the Chairman, declared that the National Party was a direct answer to the needs of the Turkish people who were dissatisfied with the Democratic Party and wanted a new party which would not be afraid of the Republicans, and would be able to find a balance between growing-misery and wealth.⁸⁴ The purposes of the National Party, in his view, were: to bring a new government into office through honest elections; to place the state at the disposal of the individual and not vice-versa; to end state capitalism; to lower and/or abolish some taxes, to offer the individual greater opportunities for work and enterprise; to raise living standards; and, finally, to uplift moral standards by strengthening the family and by giving the youth a nationalistic and religious education.⁸⁵

The official birth of the National Party was greeted by press criticism sharper than during its organizational stage. It was criticized for every conceivable fault: for taking the name "national" as though the party included the whole of the nation;⁸⁶ for being likely to degenerate into an extremist party similar to the pre-war Balkan political parties and those of Latin America; for lacking experience; for the advanced age of its founders; for its conservative, religious tendencies; for a preconceived intention of opposing everything; but above all, for dividing the opposition.⁸⁷

⁸² *Siyasi Dernekler*, p. 489; Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 712ff. See also my section on this party in Chapter 15.

⁸³ Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, Kenan Öner, Hikmet Bayur, Sadık Aldoğan, Mustafa Kentli, Enis Akaygen, Osman Bölükbaşı.

⁸⁴ *Kudret*, July 22, 1948.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), July 23, 1948.

⁸⁷ *Tasvir* (editorial), July 23, 1948; *Vatan*, July 25, 26, 1948.

In order to secure popular support, the National Party organized a number of meetings, some of which, such as the meeting in Izmir, were sabotaged through unorthodox means by the Democratic Party organization.⁸⁸ It criticized the Democrats and the Republicans for secret agreements, and complained against the newspaper's biased attitude in respect to its own organization.

The establishment of the National Party changed the composition of the National Assembly and at the same time affected the policies of the Democrats and Republicans. There were now in the Assembly Republicans, Democrats, and Nationalists, and also the ten deputies who awaited the decision of the Democratic Party Convention. (The latter, known as the "Independent Democrats," led such an existence until July 5, 1949, when they merged with the National Party after the Democratic Party Convention backed the Central Committee's decision to sever their ties with the party.)⁸⁹ Thus the National Assembly harbored four different groups with different viewpoints in 1948, only three years after one-party rule came to an end. A multi-party system, in appearance at least, had come into existence.

The National Party eventually forced the Democratic Party to adopt a more definite, and at the same time a more cautious attitude on certain economic and cultural issues. For the Republican Party, the National Party was above all a bitter critic demanding radical changes in government, but at the same time it eased the attacks likely to come from the Democrats for it divided the opposition.

All three political parties, impossible as it might appear, were now also bound to take into consideration the possibility of a coalition between the other two, which they therefore tried to avoid by every means, either by political strategy or compromise. The fact that the Republican Party did not ex-

⁸⁸ *Vatan*, *Kudret*, August 27, October 3, 1948. *Akşam*, September 14, 1948.

⁸⁹ *Kudret*, July 6, 1949.

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plot for its own purposes the internal feuds in the Democratic Party provided ground for friendship between Democrats and Republicans and helped bring peace in party relations and gave proof of ethics in politics.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Hilmi Uran, the Vice Chairman of the Republican Party, made an allusion to these feuds in his speech in Kastamonu. *Ulus*, March 8, 1948.

CHAPTER 8

THE STRUGGLE FOR GOVERNMENT POWER

TOWARD the middle of 1948 the political situation in Turkey acquired relative stability, and liberalization followed in rapid succession. The Republican Party, despite expectations, did not produce any dissident groups. In order to secure popular support for the forthcoming elections, it continued its liberal policy in compliance with popular wishes. As a corollary, the government brought before a special High Court the ex-Minister of Monopolies, Suat Hayri Ürgüplü—who was later acquitted—for certain transactions in his Ministry.¹ Atif Inan, ex-Minister of Trade, also went on trial on charges relating to the exporting of wheat, which had caused a great shortage of bread in the country.² The much criticized Article 18 of the Police Law, entitling the police to arrest individuals without a warrant, was abolished without a great deal of discussion, while only a very few opposition deputies were present in the Assembly.³ The major laws considered undemocratic were abolished or amended, and thus the demands of the Freedom Charter formulated by the Democratic Convention in 1947 were granted or promised. A new era, as Bayar put it in a speech in Yozgat, had started.⁴ For instance, in Çiçekdağ, the Republican mayor of the town offered a special dinner to Celal Bayar, which the governor of the district also attended.⁵

The government's position on the Election Law—the re-

¹ *BMMTD*, Session 8.2, Vol. 1, p. 56, Vol. 7, p. 43. *Ayn Tarihi*, March 1948, pp. 20-26. Jäschke, *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942-1951*, pp. 83, 88.

² *BMMTD*, Session 8.2, Vol. 12, pp. 32ff., 88, Vol. 7, pp. 144ff. Boztepe, *Hür Ufuklara Doğru*, İstanbul, 1952, pp. 95ff. See also my Chapter 4, the section on peasants.

³ *BMMTD*, Session 8.2, Vol. 10, pp. 26off.

⁴ *Vatan*, February 7, 1948.

⁵ *Ibid.*, February 2, 1948.

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maining point of dispute between the Democrats and Republicans—was to amend it immediately, in time for the by-elections of 1948, and then work out a completely new draft for the general elections of 1950.⁶ The amendment, including the principle of “secret ballot, open counting” was accepted by the Republican Parliamentary Group with only thirty-three people opposed out of a total of about 400 Republican deputies.⁷ Similarly, government officials violating the Election Law were to be prosecuted directly in civil courts without prior permission for prosecution from highest administrative authority.

This appeared to be the general understanding of the election law until the Democratic Party changed its position. It agreed that the amendments contemplated were a step forward but still insufficient, and insisted on supervision of the elections by the Judiciary and not by the Administration.⁸ In order to force the government into accepting its own views, the Democratic Party organized huge mass rallies in Bursa, Adana, İstanbul, and Ankara, in which the main discussions centered around demands for judicial control of elections. Should this be denied, the Democrats let it be understood, there would be sufficient ground for return to the forceful methods used in the period prior to the July Declaration.⁹

Actually, the Democrats' rallies had two purposes: to press the government, as mentioned, for judicial control of elections; stir new controversy and keep the public united around the Democratic Party in order to forestall desertions to the

⁶ *Ulus*, January 6, 1948.

⁷ *Vatan*, January 14, 1948; *Son Saat, Tasvir, Cumhuriyet*, January 17, 1948.

⁸ *Vatan*, May 10, 16, 17, 1948 (C. Bayar in İstanbul and Sakarya). *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 263-267.

⁹ *Cumhuriyet, Vatan*, May 15, 23, 24, 30, 1948. The posters at the Bursa meeting read: “We want a system which does not protect the guilty.” “We want a state which does not make soda pop, *gazoz*, but drains the swamps.” “Those who steal the citizen's vote will steal his money too.” “An end to the literate thieves.” The rally ended with the chant: “Sovereignty belongs to the people unconditionally.”

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National Party. The forthcoming by-elections of 1948 were of minor importance, and the government had already agreed that a new election law was to be submitted to the Assembly in the light of the experience gained in those elections. Thus the Democrats' negative reaction to the proposed amendments can be attributed merely to party tactics.¹⁰

The only difference between the government and the Democrats was limited to whether or not to entrust the supervision of the elections to the Judiciary. During the discussions in the Assembly, the Democrats insisted that supervision of the elections by the municipal authorities could not bring good results.¹¹ The Republicans, however, refused to yield, ostensibly on the ground that the judicial control of elections would involve judges in politics, but primarily because they did not want such a concession to appear as wrung by pressure.¹² Moreover the government rejected a demand for a judiciary control of elections signed by eighty per cent of Istanbul newspaper editors, representing forty per cent of the country's press.¹³

In view of all this, the Democratic Party decided, on Bayar's insistence, not to participate in the by-elections to be held in October 1948, and thereby attracted criticism, even from those who had backed the party unconditionally on other occasions. These erstwhile supporters now found that the party believed the panacea to all evils lay in its immediately taking over the government.¹⁴ Others wondered at the reasons for which the party had overlooked certain objective benefits that could have resulted from correcting the technical shortcomings of the Election Law.¹⁵

¹⁰ *Yeni Gazete* (editorial), April 2, 1948.

¹¹ *BMMTD*, Session 8.2, Vol. 12, pp. 599ff.

¹² *Ulus*, May 30, 1948 (views of Cemil Barlas).

¹³ *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet*, *Son Saat*, *Son Posta*, *Tasvir*, *Vatan*, *Yeni Sabah*, July 7, 1948.

¹⁴ *Vatan* (editorial), July 11, 17, 18, 1948. For Democrats' decision for non-participation in elections, see *Vatan*, July 7, 1948; *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 279-281.

¹⁵ *Akşam*, July 13, 1948 (Adnan A. Adıvar).

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The National Party's view on the issue was rather confused. Some thought that before trusting the control of elections to the Judiciary, Article 57 of the Constitution, defining the duties of judges, needed to be amended. Others considered an agreement reached by the Republicans and Democrats to keep the political parties in the process of organization out of election boards as a move directed against the National Party, which was in the process of organization.¹⁶

The much debated elections were held on October 17, 1948, with the Republicans unopposed. The Democrats, although not participating officially, nevertheless decided to send observers to the polls and in some places supported the independent candidates.¹⁷ The popular participation in the election, very low in some places (twenty-one per cent in Istanbul), averaged about forty per cent on a country-wide basis. This indicated that the Republican Party was regaining some popular support, although the press asserted, with some bias, that the people lacked enthusiasm.¹⁸ (By-elections in Turkey pass rather unnoticed and forty per cent participation is quite high.) There was also very little interference on the part of the government in favor of the Republican candidates in these elections.¹⁹

Immediately after the by-elections, President İnönü journeyed through the towns in Ankara province and insisted that party politics be conducted with due respect for personal dignity and consonant with efforts to avoid social and political disruption.²⁰ Although the political purpose of these speeches

¹⁶ *Kudret*, July 8, 11, 1948.

¹⁷ *Ulus*, October 13, 15, 1948.

¹⁸ *Tasvir, Vatan, Cumhuriyet*, October 18, 20, 1948.

¹⁹ In Mardin province, however, the votes of one district so overwhelmingly favored the Republican Party candidate that it upset the returns from other districts in favor of an independent candidate. *Tasvir*, October 31, 1948. A classified government letter requesting information on the percentage of electoral participation was interpreted by the opposition as interference. It was, in fact, requested for informational purposes only. *Akşam, Cumhuriyet*, October 23, 25, 1948.

²⁰ *Ulus*, October 24, 25, 1948.

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was not clear, it nevertheless further contributed to the political relaxation which seemed to have taken hold of the country, and which remained undisturbed even by the Democrats' insistence on new general elections.²¹

However, the mutual attacks between the National Party and the Democrats maintained their intensity. The former continued to attack personally the Democratic leaders who, in turn, pointed to the narrow-minded policy adopted by the National Party. The Republican Party, on the other hand, benefited from the duel of the two opposition parties and worked to strengthen its own position.²²

It was due to this general policy of relaxation that the Republicans accepted for discussion a general interpellation, *gensoru*, on the rise of sugar prices introduced by the Democrats immediately after the National Assembly reconvened in November 1948.²³ It was the first general interpellation in twenty years introduced in the Assembly, but the fact that the Republicans had given a vote of confidence to the government of Hasan Saka even before the issue was discussed in the Assembly rendered any further debate useless. The Democrats therefore withdrew from the subsequent discussions and complained that party considerations nullified the Assembly's control over the government.²⁴

Toward the end of 1948, when inflammatory political topics had been exhausted, the Democratic Party shifted to a discussion of economic issues, particularly the high cost of living, which, indeed, had increased sharply. Along with political freedom, there came also a certain degree of freedom in the economic field. This contributed greatly to intensi-

²¹ *Vatan*, October 18, 1948; also *Yeni Gazete*, September 10, 1948; also *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 285-290.

²² *Son Telgraf* (editorial), September 17, 1948.

²³ The *gensoru* (general interpellation) holds the whole cabinet responsible for a specific measure; therefore a vote of no confidence on that issue may bring about the downfall of the government. *BMMTD*, Session 8, Vol. 13, pp. 42-43, 111ff.

²⁴ *Vatan*, November 16, 19, 20, December 6, 1948 (Bayar in Edirne).

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fyng and expanding economic activity, creating new demands and needs. In fact, the economic and social causes motivating some of the feverish political activities in the previous three years came into the open as the barriers to free expression were lifted. The economic *malaise*, felt at all social levels, was described in an editorial in *Cumhuriyet*: "the peasant suffered, the city dweller worried, the businessman hesitated, and the worked grieved."²⁵ On the other hand, prospective American military and economic aid raised hopes that it might be possible to intensify economic activity, either by using American funds directly for economic aid, or by diverting into economic fields local funds earmarked for military expenditure.

The Ministry of Agriculture had already prepared a program for agricultural development based on mechanization and technical improvements.²⁶ But the economic measures taken were insufficient, or remained on paper, so the economic distress continued. It was under these circumstances that the Democratic Party bitterly criticized the government's economic policy. Bayar's speech in Edirne set the tone for this criticism,²⁷ which soon was taken over by other Democratic leaders. (None of them suffered prosecution, although their criticism went beyond normal measures.)

Meanwhile Hasan Saka's cabinet, accepted from the beginning as a middle-of-the-road transitional one, was increasingly overwhelmed by economic difficulties. Politically it went to the limit of its liberalism by fulfilling the ideas expressed in the July Declaration and bettering party relations. Actually the cabinet had lasted longer and produced even more than expected, but in any case it had outlived its usefulness. Consequently, Hasan Saka's first resignation in June and the inadequate program which he then produced,²⁸ and his final

²⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, June 8, 1948.

²⁶ *Yeni Gazete* (editorial), December 11, 1948.

²⁷ *Yatan*, November 16, 19, 20, December 6, 1948.

²⁸ *BMMTD*, Session 8.2, Vol. 12, pp. 223ff. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 85.

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resignation in January 1949 because of the great budget deficit, came as no surprise.²⁹

Şemseddin Günaltay formed the new cabinet after Hilmi Uran refused to do so by indicating that the former would be the right person. Günaltay, a professor of History at the University of Ankara, was known to be inclined to moderation, political and cultural liberalism,³⁰ and had a sympathetic but balanced approach to religious matters. Indeed along with the political liberalization on the surface, a radical transformation was taking place in religious, cultural, social, and economic matters (all of which are studied in the next chapters) and necessitated adjustment of government policies accordingly. The new cabinet was to recognize officially the inner changes, in order to please the people, and whenever necessary attempt to contain and direct them.

After some difficulties (opposition criticism made government responsibility rather hazardous), the new cabinet was formed, mainly of Republican "moderates," that is, the group which had opposed Peker and backed İnönü.

The program of Günaltay's cabinet was liberal indeed,³¹ for the new Premier was convinced that the country was undergoing a profound transformation, and believed that its future lay in a true democracy established on solid foundations. The Premier believed in free discussion, free press, and a safe, impartial election system; consequently he promised to take all measures necessary for a free election in 1950.³² Considering the freedom to worship a part of the basic freedoms, he promised to introduce religious courses into grade schools with due respect to secularism. In the economic field the program envisaged encouragement of private initiative. The budget, presented two months later than usual, included

²⁹ *Vatan*, January 14, February 5, 1949; also *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, XIII, 1948, pp. 161-162.

³⁰ *Vatan* (editorial), February 6, 1949. Jäschke, *op.cit.*, p. 93.

³¹ *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 15, pp. 113ff.; *Ulus*, January 23, 1949; Jäschke, *ibid.*

³² *BMMTD*, Vol. 15, p. 198.

a tax reduction and the promise that a new income tax would be introduced to correct social injustices in the tax system.³³ A number of economic projects were to be initiated, some of them to be financed through the forthcoming American aid. There was, however, little change in the basic functions or organization of the budget.³⁴ The Democratic spokesman, Adnan Menderes, criticizing the new budget, found unsatisfactory the explanation that economic difficulties were caused by war. He consequently advised the government to put less hope in American aid and give more importance to the exploitation of local resources.³⁵

In general, the new government was greeted warmly by the public because of its liberalism. Had the same liberal measures been adopted from the very beginning, it was claimed, there would have been less antagonism toward the Republicans.

The Günaltay government, the fourth since the 1946 elections, was actually enforcing the decisions of the Republican Party's Convention of 1947, both to transform itself into a normal, middle-of-the-road political party and to complete the transition to a multi-party system. Its liberalism in religious matters—a radical departure from the fundamental policy of secularism practiced since the Republic—caused considerable reaction among secularists and greatly encouraged the conservatives to work towards undermining the modernist foundations of the regime.³⁶

In implementing its decisions, the government decided to draft a new election law by taking into consideration the opinions of all the competent and interested groups in the

³³ *Ayın Tarihi*, February 1949, pp. 6-126. *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), February 23, 1949.

³⁴ The budget indicated TL. 1,371,740,427 as expenditure and TL. 1,251,802,894 as revenue. In terms of a population of 20,000,000 people this budget was extremely inadequate for any drastic economic improvement. *Ayın Tarihi*, p. 8.

³⁵ *BMMTD*, Vol. 15, pp. 167, 168.

³⁶ See next six chapters in Part III.

country. The views of all major political parties were to be brought before a committee composed of university professors teaching Constitutional Law, who would draft the law. Afterwards it was to be submitted to the press for discussion, and finally to the Assembly.³⁷ The government went one step further and proposed to study amendment of the Constitution to make it suitable to the multi-party system.³⁸ Use of state radio by political parties during election campaigns, similar to the English pattern, was also accepted. The *Isiklâl Mahkemeleri* (Independence Courts) were officially abolished.³⁹

The new Premier spoke with sincerity of all the improvements needed, and in many instances he visited Bayar to confer with him on certain measures of mutual interest, especially on measures against communism.⁴⁰ Democracy he said often must be the joint enterprise of the opposition and government parties alike.

These good relations produced a genuine relaxation. Since the Republican Party was the real gainer from these peaceful relations, the Democrats kept rather alert, introducing from time to time topics likely to awaken the voters' interest. For instance, at mass rallies the Democrats demanded new general elections before 1950, instead of holding by-elections in 1949.⁴¹ They emphasized the economic difficulties, the high cost of living, and claimed that the amendments to the Press Law were insufficient to provide freedom of information.

Impatience seemed to prevail within the opposition and among the people. Certain rumors kept the public uneasy,

³⁷ *Vatan*, April 22, 1949.

³⁸ *Ayn Tarihi*, May 1949, pp. 40ff. *Ulus*, January 1, 1950.

³⁹ *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 18, p. 720. *Tasvir*, May 5, 1949. The courts had been first established in April 1920, reactivated in March 1925, and used to liquidate the "enemies of the Republic." They had been in disuse for quite a few years but their legal existence made them appear a potential menace in the hands of the government.

⁴⁰ *Ayn Tarihi*, June 1949, p. 28; *Vatan*, April 29, 1949.

⁴¹ *Vatan*, May 8, 13, 1949.

such as the report that there were inner conflicts in the government party over liberalization, that certain "extremists" had gained control of key positions in the party, that the laws in preparation were more drastic than the old ones, and that the government party wanted to stay in power by using every possible means.⁴² The very fear that the Republican Party might continue in power, despite its liberalization policy, was a strong reason for many people to suspect its every move. On the other hand, the National Party pounded on the "honeymooning" of the Democrats and Republicans by describing it as a proof of Democrats' acceptance of the latter's permanent supremacy. The average citizen thought that a real political liberalization could not be achieved except by sending the Republican Party into opposition.⁴³

This was the political atmosphere prevailing in the country when the Democratic Party opened its second general convention on June 20, 1949. The basic purpose of this convention was to discuss past and future party policies, to mend the rift created by the National Party and eliminate the dissidents' influence on the party rank and file. The convention discussed and disposed first the question of dissidents. The party leaders justified their expulsion by the fact that the dissidents had tried to create dissension in the party.⁴⁴ The convention approved all the decisions of the Central Committee in respect to the expulsions from the party. The Democrats opposed amending the Constitution because they found it democratic in spirit, the only shortcoming being its illiberal enforcement.⁴⁵ The convention also accepted certain amendments to the party by-laws; a Supreme Disciplinary Committee was formed; the Party Central Committee was given the right to nominate twenty per cent of the deputy candidates; the Chairman was entitled to convene, if necessary, extraor-

⁴² *Tasvir* (editorial), April 26, 1949.

⁴³ *Vatan* (editorial), June 7, 1949.

⁴⁴ *Ayn Tarihi*, June 1949, pp. 43, 47, 48; *Vatan*, June 21, 1949.

⁴⁵ *Zafer*, June 21, 23, 1949.

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dinary party conventions; and the number of delegates to the convention was reduced. Religious freedom was defined as being part of the basic freedoms, provided it did not violate the principle of secularism. (Bayar declared, "The Turkish Nation is Muslim. It will stay Muslim. It will reach its God as Muslim. Religious education is entirely a technical matter.") The trade unions' right to strike for non-political purposes was also recognized.

The election system was the most important question discussed. The convention insisted, in accordance with the Central Committee's report, on safe elections guaranteed under the supervision of the judiciary. The delegates were very sensitive on the issue. They considered a violation of free balloting and falsification of election results as an attack on life and property, and consequently believed that such violations should be opposed by force. Interpreting Article 13 of the United Nations Charter as sanctioning the right to rebel in case the people's will was violated, some delegates declared that if necessary they would sacrifice their lives to protect the sanctity of the ballot box. As a corollary to these views the Committee on Basic Problems submitted its report, which was subsequently known as the *Milli Husumet Andı* (National Hostility Oath).⁴⁶ Accepted at the plenary session of the convention, the report expressed the view that any infringement upon the Election Law was equivalent to a violation of the individual's natural rights which placed the citizens in a position of self-defense.⁴⁷ In conclusion, the report advised everyone to refrain from violating citizens' natural rights in order to avoid being subjected to national hostility, *milli husumet*.

As expected, the government reacted by issuing a formal statement and defining the report as irreconcilable with the

⁴⁶ For debates and additional information, see *Zafer, Ulus*, June 22-26, 1949. Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 652-653; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 104; Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 127; *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 347-355.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

idea of law and order, for it recognized the citizen's right to interfere in government any time he deemed that there was a violation of the elections.⁴⁸ The government found the explanation for the Democrats' attitude in their desire to create unrest and take advantage of it. The only way to power was through elections, it contended, yet the Democratic Party had not submitted its views on the Election Law in preparation. For its part, the government declared that it wanted to establish democracy but would not yield to force or pressure. In order to confirm the last statement, İnönü travelled through the country, especially in the Izmir region, "from town to town to tell the people not to take politics out of the jurisdiction of law."⁴⁹ He declared emphatically that he would defend to the end the law passed by the National Assembly.⁵⁰ He insisted that friendly relations and democracy should prevail among the people. Some of the mass rallies organized by the Democrats, such as the one in Izmir just one day before İnönü visited the town, were considered a direct challenge to the government's authority. This, however, did not deter the old soldier from going there and firmly defending the idea of respect for law and order.

The sudden resumption of "revolutionary" methods by the Democrats came as a surprise to everyone, especially since there was no important reason for it. Premier Günaltay declared that the antagonism of the Democrats astonished him, especially after Celal Bayar had promised to do his best to maintain the existing good relations.⁵¹

Eventually, İnönü's determined stand against intimidation, and the unfavorable public reaction to the appeals for mass pressure, made the Democrats change their tactics and adopt

⁴⁸ *Ayn Tarihi*, June 1949, pp. 58ff. Jäschke, *op.cit.*, pp. 104-105. For Democrats' reaction, see *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 355-356.

⁴⁹ *Vatan*, August 15, 1949 (İnönü in Ödemiş). Jäschke, *op.cit.*, p. 107.

⁵⁰ *Ayn Tarihi*, August 1949, pp. 10ff. (İnönü in Kemalpaşa).

⁵¹ *Vatan*, September 4, 6, 1949 (Günaltay in Bursa and Kars); also *Ulus*, January 16, 1950 (Nihat Erim in Kayseri).

a more conciliatory attitude. Celal Bayar declared that the "Hostility Oath" was only a warning against lawless acts and not a means of intimidation, and that the label itself was the government's own invention.⁵²

Actually, the Democratic Convention's resolution was a deliberate attempt to stimulate the party members' interest in party affairs and apparently was conceived and prepared before the convention.⁵³ Similarly, it served notice to the government that the Democratic Party was determined to defend the rights of the citizen. It also asserted the party's independence, indirectly answering the charges of the National Party that they, the Democrats, followed the wishes of the party in power. The Democratic Party Convention consolidated the leaders' control over the party organization and deprived the National Party of any influence among its own rank and file. The influence of the Nationalists diminished thereafter, despite the fact that their deputies in the Assembly equalled in number the Democrats.

The prestige of the Nationalists further deteriorated. A plot to assassinate President İnönü and Celal Bayar was divulged by one of the members of the National Party and led to the arrest of three members of that party's Central Committee. They were soon released when the information regarding the plot proved false; the informant was sentenced to jail.⁵⁴ This incident raised additional doubts about the membership and purpose of the National Party. Despite the fact that its deputies showed some activity in the Assembly, frequently submitting the government to interpellations,⁵⁵ it was not able to gain much popularity.

⁵² *Vatan*, August 10, 1949 (Bayar in İzmir). *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 360-369.

⁵³ *Akşam*, *Ulus*, June 27, 1949.

⁵⁴ The deputy, Reşat Aydın, apparently was trying to leave his party and looked for an excuse to do so and join the Republican Party in which he saw chances for his own re-election. *Ayn Tarihi*, November 1949, p. 11. Also *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, XVII, 1949, pp. 257-258. Jäschke, *op.cit.*, pp. 112-113.

⁵⁵ *Ayn Tarihi*, November 1949, p. 37.

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Meanwhile the government began to plan a series of economic development projects. The American aid funds were profitably used to import tractors and mechanize the agriculture, develop a successful road building organization, and expand port facilities. A new income-tax system was accepted, plans for a meat industry were drawn up, new ships ordered, and Turkey became a member of the European Payments Union. The Republicans were also planning for the future of their own party. They had come to accept the fact that sooner or later they were to go into opposition and therefore demanded to know whether they would enjoy protection. Celal Bayar after mentioning that they, the Republicans, could establish such a protective system, gallantly informed them that it was the Democrats "intention to achieve a system in which the opposition's rights were firmly consolidated."⁵⁶ But the Democrats, unable to find any real issues for discussion, went back and forth into the past history by discussing the elections of 1946, Recep Peker's policy, and so forth, all done in order to keep alive the anti-government feeling.

The economic revitalization and the Democrats' inability to stir wide spread popular reaction gave the Günaltay government a sense of confidence in the future, which could not be shaken even by the opposition's non-participation in the by-elections held in the fall of 1949.⁵⁷ On the contrary, the fact that one independent deputy, Emin Soysal (the violent critic of the Village Institutes, that is, the Republic's most important educational reform) joined the Republican Party, and other independent deputies were rumored to be intending to do so, increased the confidence of the Republicans that finally their party had taken a turn for the better and was gaining popular support.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ *Vatan*, September 4, 1949 (Bayar in Ödemiş); *Celal Bayar Diyorki*, p. 274. For an optimistic appraisal of political developments in Turkey during this period, see K. M. Smogorzewski, "Turkey Turns Towards Democracy," *Contemporary Review*, October 1949, pp. 213-220.

⁵⁷ *Ulus*, October 17, 1949.

⁵⁸ *Vakit* (editorial), January 5, 1950. (Meanwhile, Ali F. Cebesoy, a

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As the general elections were approaching the Democratic Party held a strategy and policy conference. At the end it issued a declaration in which it pointed out once again that the so-called "National Hostility Oath" was invented by the government party to create confusion. This idea was contrary to the orderly activity followed by the Democratic Party since its inception.⁵⁹ The Democrats reasserted their decision to pursue the same peaceful policy as before in the hope that the new Election Law would be enacted soon so as not to force them to boycott the elections. Finally, the new draft Election Law, prepared by specialists on the matter, combining the government and the opposition's views, came before the Assembly. Its main feature comprised acceptance of the Judiciary as the supreme supervisory authority of the elections.⁶⁰

The debates in the Assembly followed a pattern of reasonableness. Certain suggestions made by the Democrats were accepted in good faith by Republican deputies, and finally the law was passed, with the Democrats voting in its favor. Men-deres, in a speech, lauded the Assembly's progressive attitude and hoped that the atmosphere would remain unchanged during the elections.⁶¹ The National Party voted against the law, objecting to certain technical points it considered inadequate.

As the general elections approached, the activity of all three political parties increased, and along with it new political tension developed. An amnesty law, backed by opposition parties, was postponed until after the election.⁶²

The Democrats' mass meetings, at which Bayar requested that a coalition cabinet supervise the elections in order to avoid repetition of the events of 1946, brought angry accusa-

popular Republican deputy and ex-Chairman of the National Assembly and also co-founder of the Progressive Party in 1924, resigned from his party.)

⁵⁹ *Zafer, Vatan*, January 8, 13, 1950.

⁶⁰ *BMMTD*, Session 8.4, Vol. 24, pp. 149ff., Law #5545. Jäschke, *op.cit.*, p. 116. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 127.

⁶¹ *BMMTD*, Session 8.4, Vol. 24/2, p. 706.

⁶² *Vatan*, March 23, 1950.

tions from the Republicans that the Democrats were resorting again to the methods used prior to the July Declaration.⁶³

The growing tension between the Democrats and the Republicans was brought within reasonable bounds by the death of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak and the events which stemmed from it in April 1950. A sudden reaction by the religious conservatives who objected to a modern funeral ended by disrupting all plans for the event. A mob, led by chanting *imams* dominated the area on the way to the cemetery. This mob could have easily won control of the city if it had planned to do so or anticipated the reaction it could provoke.⁶⁴ The National Party was held responsible for this outbreak. It was accused of having attracted the religious groups in its own organization because of its liberal attitude on religion, and of an attempt to gain power through religious support.

Indeed the National Party's criticism of İnönü and the Republican Party as the promoters of secularism represented, in fact, the views of these groups. Marshal Çakmak and his own religious views as Party Chairman attracted conservatives to the National Party.⁶⁵ It was under the influence of religious groups that the party advocated, especially toward the end of 1949 and the beginning of 1950, closer ties with the Arab countries on the basis of similarity of religion, and took an equivocal attitude on the question of work for women.⁶⁶

The danger that religious reaction was likely to burst forth at any favorable moment compelled the Democrats and the Republicans to adopt more reasonable propaganda for the elections. Celal Bayar visited Premier Günaltay and asked for a common policy on matters pertaining to the forthcoming elections.⁶⁷ The maintenance of law and order in these elec-

⁶³ *Vatan*, March 20, 27, 1950; *Ulus*, March 31, 1950. *Celal Bayar Di-yorki*, pp. 409-423 *passim*.

⁶⁴ This event and the underlying causes have been studied in Chapter 10.

⁶⁵ *Kudret* (editorial), February 9, 27, 1950.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, February 8, March 1, 20, 1950.

⁶⁷ *Vatan*, April 20, 1950; *Celal Bayar Di-yorki*, p. 413.

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tions was to be the Democrats' policy in order to upset "various forces" (the religious and leftist groups) which might try to use the elections for their own ends. In order to oppose such forces the Democratic Party considered it to be its duty to assist the government in its efforts to achieve a lawful and orderly election.⁶⁸

As was disclosed later, during the Democratic Party's fourth convention in 1955, representatives of the Republican and Democratic Parties had agreed, in a secret discussion initiated by the Democrats, on peaceful and fair conduct of elections.⁶⁹ In order to prove to the people that the two parties were on good terms, the Democrats asked for a place in the cabinet during elections, but were refused on the ground that the new Election Law was already the expression of a coalition between the two parties.⁷⁰ Moreover, in order to allow the leaders of the two parties to be elected to the Assembly, it was suggested during the meeting that special arrangements be made so as to leave open places in the lists of candidates. The Republicans appeared certain of winning the election and offered the Democrats fifty seats so that they could be represented in the Assembly, but no definite result came out of these discussions except that they contributed to peaceful relations between the two parties.⁷¹

The three parties published their election platforms successively. The Republicans promised further limitations on statism and the encouragement of private initiative, credit facilities, favorable conditions for foreign capital, tax reforms, and measures to protect the national currency. They envisaged also the creation of an Upper House, redefinition of the President's functions, and elimination from the Constitution of the regime's six basic principles (they were to remain party principles). In order to improve the condition of the peasants and

⁶⁸ *Ayın Tarihi*, April 1950, p. 11.

⁶⁹ *Vatan*, October 17, 1955 (A. Menderes).

⁷⁰ *Son Havadis*, October 20, 1955 (Faik A. Barutçu).

⁷¹ *Vatan*, October 17, 1955 (A. Menderes).

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the villagers a number of measures (land distribution, schools, water, credits facilities, and farm equipment) were promised. Similarly, urban dwellers were promised better housing, utilities and roads. In administrative matters the Republicans promised more autonomy for local governments.⁷²

The Democratic election platform, published just a few days before the elections, devoted much space to criticism of the Republican election platform. On the constructive side it promised to strengthen the country's economy by increasing production and reducing taxes, abolishing government monopolies, and finally drafting a balanced budget in accordance with the financial abilities of the country—the best way to increase national income was to provide a secure political and financial basis for private as well as foreign capital.

The Democrats believed that the country's economic and social shortcomings were caused by a defective political organization; consequently the initial remedy lay in a political reorganization based on a democracy. A change of government by popular vote, the Democrats claimed, would give the people a feeling of self-confidence and train them for democracy. The primary obligation of the Democrats and the government was to work towards this goal. They gave assurances that the change of government would not affect any specific social class or the regime and its principles. The Constitution was to be amended according to democratic necessities; the relations of the three branches of government were to be reorganized so as not to concentrate all powers in the National Assembly. (None of these has been fulfilled.) In foreign policy the Democratic view was similar to that of the party in power.⁷³

The National Party's election platform, published on behalf of the deceased Marshal Çakmak, stated that political developments since 1946 seemed directed to strengthen İnönü's position by using the threat of leftists or rightists to eliminate

⁷² *Ulus*, March 26, April 28, 1950; also *Ayn Tarihi*, May 1950, pp. 46-52.

⁷³ *Vatan*, May 9, 10, 1950; *Ayn Tarihi*, May 1950, pp. 53-61.

unwanted individuals in various ways, even by abolishing their parliamentary immunity. The purpose of the National Party was to achieve a government by the people and for the people.⁷⁴

The election campaign was, in general, orderly with no pressure.⁷⁵ İnönü declared he would accept whatever the people decided, while Bayar declared that the past would be forgotten,⁷⁶ although both leaders criticized each other's ideas or the tactics of each other's respective party.

The elections took place on May 14, 1950 in an orderly and quiet fashion. An overwhelming percentage of the electorate voted. Out of 8,905,576 eligible voters, 7,953,055, or 89.3 per cent went to the polls.⁷⁷ The candidates of the Democratic Party received 4,242,831 votes and the Republican candidates 3,165,096 votes. The National Party received only 240,209 votes and the Independents 258,698 votes. Since the majority system is accepted in Turkey, out of the total of 487 seats in the Assembly, 396 went to the Democrats, sixty-eight to the Republicans, seven to the Independents, and one to the National Party, while fifteen remained vacant.⁷⁸ The result, measured in terms of the votes received, was in a way exactly the natural outcome. The Democrats, to their own amaze-

⁷⁴ *Kudret*, April 9, 1950; *Aynı Tarihi*, May 1950, pp. 61-68.

⁷⁵ Geoffrey Lewis mentions the fact that just before the elections the U.S. Information Office distributed copies of a brochure entitled *A Government Founded by the People*, describing the American political system. On the front page there was a passage from the Declaration of Independence in which the right of people to alter or abolish a government was mentioned, but contained the sentence: "Prudence, indeed will dictate that Governments long established shall not be changed for light and transient causes." *Turkey*, p. 129.

⁷⁶ *Vatan*, May 4, 1950 (in İzmir); *ibid.*, May 7, 1950 (in Diyarbakır).

⁷⁷ *Turkish Elections and U.S. Reaction*, Turkish Information Office, New York, 1950, pp. 3, 4; also *İstatistik Yıllığı 1953*, Ankara, 1953, p. 177; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 121. For another table with slightly different figures, see the *Contemporary Review*, August 1954, p. 81; see also *World Today*, July 1950, pp. 289-296.

⁷⁸ *İstatistik Yıllığı*, p. 177. The Assembly was composed at the end of the by-elections of September 16, 1951 as follows: Democrats, 411 seats; Republicans, 61; the Independents, 12; National Party, 1; and 2 vacant seats. *Ibid.*

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ment, won as a result of the accumulated discontent with the Republican Party. This discontent had not disappeared but had only substantially decreased. If the elections had been held in 1947 or 1948 the Republicans would have obtained probably half the votes they received in 1950 when, thanks to a wise and liberal policy, the party's prestige had increased. But regardless of what it did or what it promised to do, the Republican Party was doomed to lose, as the symbol of the one-party system. Had it won the elections the feeling would have subsisted that the one-party rule still continued.

The transfer of government into the hands of the Democratic Party followed a normal and quiet pattern.⁷⁹ Celal Bayar was elected President, Adnan Menderes became Prime Minister, while İnönü, elected deputy for Malatya, took his place at the head of the opposition. Turkey had achieved one more great evolution. Power had changed hands, peacefully, according to the people's wishes. This was democracy in form and spirit; the outstanding crowning of an era of reforms and achievements. A new phase was about to open in the political history of Turkey.

(The developments between 1950 and 1958 have been studied in a general way in the chapter dealing with Political Parties in Part III. Similarly developments concerning cultural, social, economic matters between 1946 and 1950, and 1950 to 1957 are in the respective chapters in Part III.)

⁷⁹ It was not possible to check the authenticity of certain rumors that some army officers offered their services to İnönü as soon as the election results were made available so as to enable him to stay in power. According to the rumors, İnönü refused the offer and stepped down to fight as the leader of the opposition.

GENERAL REMARKS

THE struggle for a multi-party system in Turkey between 1946 and 1950 brought about a reinterpretation of the Republic's ideology, stirred far-reaching controversy on communism, and led to the establishment of the present party system.

This struggle has been studied in the following chapters in a rather broad historical and political perspective in order to provide not only a general picture of Turkey's transformation but also a description of her type of democracy and the concepts and issues at its foundations. Many of the debates in this struggle resumed ideological and political controversies whose roots lay in the Ottoman Empire.

The political struggle which began in 1946, had two immediate practical goals: first, to neutralize the ideology and the political means which favored the establishment and maintenance of one-party rule; second, to assure the free existence of opposition parties, and to devise an impartial election mechanism to allow the people to express freely their preference for a specific political party.

As a corollary of the first goal, the opposition, as soon as liberalization started, attacked the laws which protected the government and the Republican Party from criticism and which enabled them to silence undesirable individuals, publications, and associations. The Press Law became the first target and was followed by the Police Law, the Association Law, the Settlement Law, and the Election Law, all of which had enabled the Republican Party to establish and maintain its monopoly of power. The opposition justified its demands for amending these "undemocratic" or "anti-democratic" laws by claiming that they violated the individual's rights and freedoms granted by the Constitution.¹

¹ *Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, April 1, 1946 (Menderes), April 3, 1946 (Government reply); *Vatan*, March 23, 1947 (Menderes in *Kütahya*). *Ulus* (editorial), September 13, 1946.

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These laws were gradually amended by the National Assembly, in which the Republican Party had an overwhelming majority. Though in many cases the decisions of the National Assembly were affected by the opposition's pressure, the liberalization was carried out chiefly through the Republican Party's own decisions.

The dispute over the election system was not solved satisfactorily until 1950, when the elections were placed under the supervision of the Judiciary, as had been uncompromisingly demanded by the Democratic Party. (The Republican Party previously had amended the Election Law to render it more suitable to the requirements of the multi-party system, but this had not satisfied the Democrats.)

After the one-party system had been considerably weakened and the existence of opposition parties relatively assured, the political debate progressed to other fundamental ideas and issues. By common consent of almost all the political parties and the public, some issues were left out of the discussion. The person of Atatürk, who was considered the symbol of the Turkish Republic and the factor which could unite all the political groups around common purposes,² was the chief of these. Even when Kâzım Karabekir, former opponent of Atatürk, was elected chairman of the National Assembly by the Republicans in 1946, his election was not made a political issue, in order to avoid involving Atatürk's name in daily politics.³ Although the religious groups, ultra nationalists, and reactionaries were still very antagonistic to Atatürk and eager to seize upon any occasion to minimize his achievements, they were without success.⁴

² *Yolumuz Demokrasiye Doğru* (Towards Democracy), March 1947 (Celal Bayar's views).

³ *Dikkat*, November 8, 1946 (Fuad Köprülü). See my Chapter 2.

⁴ This group generally depicted Karabekir as instrumental in first starting the movement against the foreign occupation of Turkey after 1918, and thus accorded Atatürk a secondary role in the War of Liberation. They claimed that the movement for liberation would have succeeded even without Atatürk. This idea also found acceptance among individuals with ideas of regional supremacy—that is, among the political extremists in

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The political leaders in 1946 and thereafter, unlike the Young Turks, who ultimately decided political struggle through military support, did not involve the army in politics. Attempts to do so were quickly silenced by the government, with the tacit approval of the opposition and the press in general.⁵ The role of the army in the political struggle from 1946 to 1950 was not important at all, although the political liberalization and American military assistance in the training of troops contributed to changing the Prussian type of rigid army discipline and training into a more flexible and humanitarian one.

the "Anatolian" current. In the extremists' view, Anatolia, with the majority of its population of Turkish descent and Islamic culture, was the cradle of Turkism. They looked upon the Turks left abroad after the partition of the Ottoman Empire as "second-class Turks." Atatürk was made subject to this discrimination in 1922, when a proposal was submitted to the National Assembly which would have deprived him of his seat as a deputy because he was born outside the territory of Turkey, in Salonica, Greece. In 1947 a new attack was directed against him. A conservative magazine, trying to revive this old controversy, wrote: "The young, sincere, and brave sons of Anatolia, with the help of Kâzım Karabekir, started the action. Mustafa Kemal was the commander of the national forces and President of the First National Assembly. That is all." *Meşale* (Torch), June 1947. Even later in 1952 another publication, *Büyük Cihad*, wrote that, "It is not at all true that the nation is indebted to the Atatürk revolution," quoted by Rustow in "Politics and Islam in Turkey, 1920-1955," p. 101. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal's own followers did not hesitate to use similar weapons when advantageous. When Rauf Bey, who opposed Mustafa Kemal, had refused to take the oath for the Republic on the ground that he did not have to do so every time someone doubted his allegiance, Ali Bey, Deputy of Karahisar, declared: "Then you will not be able to remain on this soil. You will have to go back to the country from whence your father and your ancestors came [Rauf's father was from Caucasus]; this soil demands that from you." *Speech*, Leipzig, 1929, p. 704.

⁵ The Chief of Staff was criticized in the *Yeni Sabah* for the "unlimited" allegiance he offered to the President in a congratulatory cable sent on New Year's Day. The newspaper considered such an attitude contrary to the principles of democracy, according to which allegiance is offered to the country and not to a person, as was customary under one-party rule. The *Yeni Sabah* was closed but reopened soon. *Kudret*, January 4, 1948. The ultimate consensus was that in a democracy the army also should be subject to public criticism and supervision. It was pointed out that control of the army by civilian authorities was the natural outcome of democracy and did not involve it in party politics. *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 24, pp. 599ff. (debate on February 15, 1950); also *Vatan*, February 21, 27, 1950.

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Apart from these subjects, practically all topics of interest to political parties were debated. These debates did not follow any sequence but took place at random according to the occasion and circumstances. They were centered as a whole around five of the six principles at the basis of the Turkish Republic: nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism, as embodied in the Constitution in 1937. They will be studied in the next chapters in the order in which they relate to each other.

In 1946-1950, the leaders of the major parties felt that the reforms undergone by Turkey, and the Constitutional principles themselves sufficed, for the time being at least, to meet the country's immediate political needs. They believed that the political and ideological foundations of the regime were broad enough to permit the establishment of democracy, provided that the Constitutional principles were correctly and liberally interpreted; they therefore opposed Constitutional amendments.⁶

The leaders did not overlook the fact that the Constitution was drafted in 1924 primarily to meet the immediate needs arising from the special conditions of a regime in transition and that it had concentrated all powers in the National Assembly, which was likely to fall under the influence of the Executive through the party mechanism. They nevertheless

⁶ This attitude limited the scope of debate and consequently excluded from the start discussions regarding social and economic reorganization, a great shortcoming, the effects of which were soon evident. The intellectuals and politicians of the period constantly avoided discussion of basic economic issues, and instead concentrated on exploiting existing complaints. With the exception of the discussion on the budget laws and on a few other scattered items of legislation, such as Land, Tax, and Trade Union Laws, there were practically no discussions pertaining to a new economic organization and to social measures to accompany the political changes. There were constant warnings—see F. O. Menteşoğlu, "Muhalefete Prensip Lâzım" (The Opposition Needs Principles) in *Yeni Sabah*, November 16, 1946—that a political struggle devoid of ideas in the social and economic fields to supplement political concepts was bound to end sooner or later in failure, but these warnings did not induce the politicians to adopt more basic views. (See also my Chapter 15.)

preserved the existing Constitutional mechanism with the purpose of giving the government enough power to take the necessary measures if liberalization and political struggle were to threaten the foundations of the regime. If democracy proved acceptable through practical experience for some time, then the Constitution was to be amended according to the needs of a stable multi-party system. It was with this purpose in mind that the acceptance of republicanism (*cumhuriyetçilik*) as the political regime of the country was imposed on all political parties.⁷

All the Turkish political parties formed during 1946-1950 and afterwards, are, therefore, Republican Parties, regardless of whether or not they genuinely accept republicanism.

⁷ This condition was necessitated by apprehension that any discussion regarding the country's political regime would lead to a debate on the restoration of the monarchy and the Caliphate. It was assumed that the surviving religious groups, anxious to regain their old privileges and supremacy, would try, purposely, to debate the political regime of the country as a step preparatory to the restoration of the Caliphate. The National Party advanced the view that in a multi-party system all issues, including the country's political regime, should be discussed freely; but the question of the regime, with the common agreement of the Democrats and Republicans, was nevertheless kept out of the political debate. See *Kudret*, January 22, 1950 (opinion of Dr. Mustafa Kentli); and *Vatan*, April 3, 1948 (opinion of H. S. Tanrıöver).

CHAPTER 9

NATIONALISM – *MILLIYETÇİLİK* – AND RACIALISM

A. Nationalism

NATIONALISM is the foundation of the Republic and a basic tenet in the program of all the political parties of Turkey.¹ In its external aspects, it renounced all expansionist ideas, including Pan-Turanism, in respect to territories inhabited by Turks or those which were once part of the Ottoman Empire. This policy brought peace to Turkey by making possible friendly relations with her neighbors in the Balkans and the Near East.

In internal affairs, nationalism became the supreme force dominating all activities in the society, visualizing problems and moulding ideas in the light of its own conceptions. Idealistic Turkish intellectuals had viewed nationalism,² cleared of Islamic influences, as an avenue leading to the creation of a national culture and universal understanding. The Republic was to start a new life under the aegis of nationalism; consequently it tried to dissociate itself from the past and all that it entailed.³

In practice, however, nationalism in Turkey followed a path different from the anticipated one, one more in accordance

¹ See sections in Chapters 1 and 2 dealing with the foundations of Turkish nationalism.

² See *Memoirs of Halide Edip*, New York, 1926, pp. 326ff.; also L. Levonian, *Moslem Mentality*, London, 1928, pp. 55ff.

³ It is for this reason that history was rewritten in the Republic in order "to destroy what remained of the Ottoman and Islamic feelings of identity, and replace them by one that was purely Turkish," and to restore national self-respect, which had been badly undermined in the past by the West's own biased anti-Turkish history. See Bernard Lewis, "History-Writing and National Revival in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, June-July 1953, pp. 224-225. See also Lewis V. Thomas, "The National and International Relations of Turkey," *Near Eastern Culture and Society*, pp. 179-187.

with the existing political and cultural conditions in the country rather than idealistic wishes.

A few words about these conditions may be necessary to depict the situation. Present-day Turkey was born from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire and accepted nationalism, by necessity, as its main ideology to replace the broader concepts of Islamism and Ottomanism. The birth of Modern Turkey resembles that of national states in Western Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire. The birth of national states in Europe was preceded and then accompanied by a centuries-long cultural and economic evolution which eventually gave nationalism in Europe (except in Germany) a liberal form. In Turkey, however, nationalism was identified with and represented in the form of a political state almost from its inception, and this identification gave to it both exclusiveness and cultural-political absolutism in all fields of human activity. Ziya Gökalp's idea that the individual's happiness lies in emotional subservience to the group became nationalism's chief feature, and the trend was to emphasize this idea rather than to soften it.

Nationalism became an outlet for expressing practically all the problems likely to arise in a society in transition, and at the same time served as a cloak for the promotion of old aspirations, habits, and ideas.

The pious conservatives, who had lived in the past for and through religion, were faced with the restrictions which the Republic imposed on religious-clericalist activities. Unable, therefore, to utilize Islam, they used nationalism as a safe shield against ideas that seemed new or unorthodox. They displayed on behalf of nationalism the same general intolerance they had displayed on behalf of Islam in the Ottoman Empire. Nationalism for many of them became also a means for psychological defense. Indeed, they felt psychologically secure in delivering themselves to one absolute, omnipotent idea in the same unconditional, ardent manner in which they had de-

livered themselves to Islam in the past. This very attitude contradicted one of the most basic aims of the Republican regime: the freeing of individuals from the hold of all dogma.

Nationalism, moreover, became an outlet for expressing all the bitterness and pain caused by the downfall of an Empire which had stood for centuries on equal footing with the major powers of the world.⁴ The generation which had witnessed in impotent despair the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire from 1913 through 1920 and which saw most of the world take an anti-Turkish attitude during that time, expressed in nationalism its deep resentment and distrust of the outside world. Even when modernization opened the doors to Western ideas, it could not dislodge this peculiar type of distrust which in a way undermined the effectiveness of modernization. The famous and oft-used slogan, *biz bize benzeriz* (we resemble none but ourselves), expressed an egocentric tendency rather than national pride.

Nationalism in Turkey did not remain immune to the social and economic transformation. The rising middle classes used nationalism to protect themselves against social currents. The historical-cultural aspects of nationalism described above were bound to lose intensity as the goals which they served were attained. But socio-economic considerations, growing in importance, led the middle classes to maintain the intense, all-embracing character of nationalism, either by insisting on old slogans, or, when these became obsolete, by finding new ones, supposedly for maintaining national solidarity against social currents disruptive of unity.

⁴ The rulers and the bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire found themselves overnight, at the end of the first World War, the citizens of a small and powerless country bound to follow the policy of bigger nations which had been its equals only a few years earlier. Although the new regime did its best to adjust public opinion to the country's new conditions, the older generation could not easily accept the situation. Thus the mourners for the past found in nationalism an outlet to express their bitterness against all the "enemies of the nation" who caused the downfall of the Empire. For additional views on the aspects of nationalism in Turkey, see Lewis, "History-Writing," pp. 223-225.

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Though nationalism in Turkey was of Western origin, the form it took in Turkey differed substantially from the original model, not only because of the popular interpretation it received in Turkey, but also because it was deliberately amended by the Turkish leaders to suit the needs of the country in the light of their modernist-secularist views. (H. A. R. Gibb's now classical observation that the Westernized classes of the Middle East had seized upon nationalism to gain the support of the masses, and that nationalism lost its Western character by being understood by the masses in the light of their own traditional ideas of the state and the society,⁵ seems to apply only partly to Turkey.)

Turkish nationalism during the first twenty-five years of the Republic appeared to be rationalist, secularist, and materialist—that is, in a form acceptable only to a rather small intellectual group. The masses, although affected by its cultural aspects, accepted nationalism by identifying it with religion. This dual, i.e., popular and intellectual, interpretation of nationalism clashed, as we shall see soon, when liberalization started and public opinion gained importance.

Nationalism in Turkey, whatever its form, produced practical results: it unified various sections of the Turkish population around common cultural goals; it created a feeling of national solidarity; it oriented the cultural development of the country in accordance with the original character of the nation; and finally, it gave to the individual Turk a feeling of national pride. This policy was carried out in many cases by deliberately attempting to assimilate non-Turkish Muslim minorities, such as the Kurds—which gave rise to revolts in 1930 and 1937—in the same manner and spirit as the Young Turks. This was considered natural, since anything done on behalf of nationalism and for its consolidation was deemed acceptable; results were what counted.

⁵ Gibb, "La Reaction Contre la Culture Occidentale dans le Proche Orient," *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, XXIII (1951), p. 7.

The liberalization after 1945 affected nationalism to the extent of changing some of its ideas. The fundamental reason for concern was the insinuation that a rationalist and materialistic nationalism prepared the ground for the infiltration of leftist ideas.⁶ Awareness of this possibility came after the statement of the Minister of Interior in January 1947, concerning leftist activities in Turkey.⁷ The fact that Marxist ideas affected a large part of the trade unions, several publications, and two political parties was a great surprise to the political leaders, since they had believed that nationalism and some vague theory of "social harmony" were the strongest bulwarks against all leftist ideas. The conclusion reached was that a materialistic and anti-clerical type of nationalism did not and could not oppose the leftist ideology. Moreover, such a nationalism could not be reconciled with the contemplated liberalization of religion.

Beginning late in 1946, a new interpretation of nationalism gradually developed. Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver,⁸ the proponent of a new interpretation, demanded that Turkish nationalism be based on history and religion, because the source of national strength lay in history, particularly the history of the Ottoman Empire, and because Islam lived in the spirit of the Turkish communities. Between these two there was such a close relation that one could not be envisaged without

⁶ *Vatan*, May 11, 1949.

⁷ See Chapter 14.

⁸ H. S. Tanrıöver was a disciple of Z. Gökalp, and headed the *Türk Ocakları* until 1931. During the days of Atatürk he was anti-clerical and a defender of the nationalism based on language and culture. It was under the influence of such ideas that he advocated, during the early days of the Republic, anti-clericalism in *Türk Ocakları*. This anti-clericalism was symbolized in the motto: "Every minaret is a tombstone under which there lies buried a Turkish village," a reference to the ignorance in which the Turkish masses had been kept as a consequence of religion. *Ulus*, December 3, 1947 (remarks of Behcet Kemal Çağlar at the Republican Party Convention); also *Ulus*, December 2, 1947. For discussions, see *CHP Yedinci Kurultayı Tutanağı*, Ankara, 1948, pp. 462ff. Tanrıöver was in the Republican Party but later resigned and was elected deputy for İstanbul on the Democratic Party list. In the elections of 1957 he was one of the unsuccessful candidates from İstanbul of the Freedom Party.

the other. Moreover, he demanded that nationalism be freed from the impact of dogmatism, racialism, materialism, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Antolianism, xenophobia, minority-hating, and that it instead acquire traditionalist, historical, and religious-emotional characteristics.⁹ The immediate practical purpose of this new nationalism was to combat communism, which the old materialistic and rationalist form of nationalism could not successfully do. On the surface this new nationalism appeared to be rather liberal, but in fact its heavy reliance on religion and history would most probably lead it to the very xenophobia, Pan-Turkism, and cultural exclusiveness it purported to fight.

Tanrıöver's views aroused great interest in the press and public. He succeeded finally in reestablishing the *Türk Ocakları* on May 10, 1949.¹⁰ The size of these organizations, as well as their direct influence, is insignificant today, perhaps because their ideas have been absorbed generally and the association is no longer needed. Their ideas thus reflect accurately the present trend of thought on nationalism in Turkey.¹¹

⁹ *Vatan*, May 12, 1949. *Vatan* said editorially that Tanrıöver started his action to fill the gap created in the past twenty-five years in the ideals of nationalism and to fulfill the demands of the people.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*; also Jäschke, *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942-1951*, pp. 100-101. Later in 1954-1957, *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), the classical review of the *Türk Ocakları*, also reappeared and disseminated the ideas of the new nationalism.

¹¹ The new *Türk Ocakları* constitution defined nationalism as a feeling of unity among people brought about by the same kind of education, purpose, and interests (Article 2). It rejected the idea of territorial expansion, the opening of branches abroad (Article 3), and interference in politics. It criticized the attempts to minimize, in the Republic, the historical importance of the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, all actions corollary to this attitude were condemned, such as the closing of the mausoleums of the Ottoman Sultans, the antagonism to the old Arabic letters "which ornament all our old monuments," and the attempts to "nationalize" the language (Article 4). Its purpose was to fight three groups of individuals: first, the communists, who should be stopped from propagandizing; second, the "parasitic [sic] defenders of the reforms" who are afraid of history and religion—that is, of the two pillars on which the state rests and which survive even after the political state disappears; and third, the religious

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The Republican Party Convention of 1947, while stressing the fact that nationalism was to be used to fight communism, decided to amend its own definition of it in the party program.¹² According to the new definition (Article 5), political nationalism was replaced by one based on language, common culture, and history to distinguish it from racialism and socialism.

While the debates on nationalism were taking place in the inner circles of the Republican Party and the ground was being prepared for its formal redefinition, Recep Peker, the Premier, contradicting his authoritarian attitude on other matters, rather unexpectedly delivered a speech at the University of İstanbul, offering the government's new view on nationalism. According to Recep Peker:

Every individual in this group [nation] becomes part of an indivisible whole on the basis of common language and destiny born from living together on this land and is equal in sharing duty, privilege, and honor. The idea of considering the Christians second class citizens is part of history now. . . . It is not enough to regard as Turks, only in respect to the law and Administration, those whose race and religion is different. In our private lives too, we must come closer to each other with warmth, and intermingle . . . a [national] culture enriched by the science, technique, and art owned in common by all mankind will strengthen Turkish nationalism . . . anti-Semitism will remain the shame of the twentieth century, and if in our legislation there are anti-minority provisions they will be amended . . . we are to accept as natural the different [Muslim] sects such as the Shii [Alevi] and embrace [sic] the Kurds with fondness . . . racial nationalism is irredentist and entirely anti-democratic and imperialistic . . . we should be careful

reactionaries who live in hopes of reviving the past (Articles 5, 6ff.). *Vatan*, May 11, 1949.

¹² *Ulus*, December 3, 1947. A proposal was submitted to the convention with the purpose of establishing a ten-man committee to investigate, on behalf of nationalism, the individuals in the universities and the publishing field who were suspected of leftist tendencies. The proposal was rejected. *Ibid.*, December 2, 1947 (proposal of Fahri Kurtuluş). For discussion on nationalism in the convention, see *CHP Yedinci Kurultayı Tutanağı*, pp. 468ff.

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of ideologies which trespass national boundaries and penetrate into the country to seek out and subject ideas and people to the service of foreign states . . . the best means of fighting communism is nationalism.¹³

Following this official statement, a number of restrictive measures which had resulted from the excesses of nationalism in the past were gradually abolished. For instance, members of the minorities were allowed to serve in the army as reserve officers, whereas in the past they could serve only as privates, regardless of whether or not they met the requirements for commission. The Kurdish tribes from the East, which had been settled in the Western part of the country as a precautionary measure against the instigations of their chieftains and landlords to rebellion, were allowed to return to their birthplace. Finally, travel formalities were eased,¹⁴ refugees and Greek exchangees were permitted to enter Turkey to visit their relatives, and the Freemasons were allowed to re-open their lodges.¹⁵ Ottoman history gradually received greater attention in schools, and its interpretation was less biased than in the first twenty-five years of Republicanism.

The Democrats, in opposition, accepted nationalism as one of the basic principles of their program, but criticized the abuses made on its behalf in the past. They considered a "Turk," and professed to treat as such, regardless of race and religion, any citizen who considered himself to be a "Turk."¹⁶

The Democrats promised full cultural freedom for minorities, and by adopting a moderate type of nationalism were able, at that time, to attract the minority (Christian) groups.

¹³ *Ulus*, March 29, 1947.

¹⁴ See Bernard Lewis, "Recent Developments in Turkey," *International Affairs*, July 1951, p. 327.

¹⁵ Jäschke, *op.cit.*, pp. 82, 95. In 1951 a law was introduced to the National Assembly by Ahmet Gürkan of Tokat to abolish the Freemason lodges. It was rejected 169 to 56, with 7 abstentions. *Cahiers de l'Orient, Contemporain*, XXIII, 1951, p. 116.

¹⁶ *Vatan*, January 9, 1949 (Celal Bayar in Iskenderum); also *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, p. 324.

It was thus, through the support of the minority groups, that İstanbul, which had the largest number of minorities, became one of the strongholds of the Democratic Party.

Nationalism has been adopted by all the major political parties of Turkey as a fundamental principle, as Ottomanism had been by all the political parties in the Young Turks' era. Their nationalism is opposed to internationalism, either cultural or political, though membership in the United Nations or its agencies is accepted, and all political parties or propaganda based on differences of culture are officially prohibited. Consequently no political party which does not embrace a strictly Turkish nationalism could expect to succeed.¹⁷ Since nationalism is an intrinsic part of the program of all the major political parties in Turkey, no single organization can claim its exclusive monopoly, although some small parties have been established on the basis of an extremist kind of nationalism.¹⁸

Nationalism in Turkey is so important and yet so delicate an issue that it cannot be judged or analyzed objectively without immediately attracting a variety of comments and criticism. The most unfortunate aspect of nationalism in Turkey lies in the fact that it has become an exclusive, politico-cultural dogma which is confused with patriotism,¹⁹ and is susceptible to any interpretation. The chief defect of this dogmatic nationalism, despite some liberalization and reinterpretation

¹⁷ In 1919 a Kurdish Political Association was established in İstanbul with the purpose of creating an independent Kurdistan. It had a few branches in the southern part of Anatolia. The Association relied on the help it hoped to receive from England. With the victory of Mustafa Kemal, whom it opposed, it was dispersed. Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 429-431. For Kurdish independence activities, see also W. G. Elphinston, "The Kurdish Question," *International Affairs*, January 1946, pp. 91-97. Today a political party representing a minority could not be established, although in 1950 there were 1,476,562 Kurdish and 247,204 Arab speaking people in Turkey. *Istatistik Yıllığı*, p. 81.

¹⁸ "Yalnız Vatan İçin" (For the Homeland Only), the Party of Yaşar Çimen, created in 1946 according to the ideas of Italian Fascists, was dissolved in 1952. *Siyasi Dernekler*, pp. 371, 379.

¹⁹ For the various forms of nationalism in Turkey, see Yaşar Nabi, *Nereye Gidiyoruz*, İstanbul, 1948, pp. 57ff.

tation which has taken place since 1946, lies in the fact that it undermines a broader and more tolerant cultural and political orientation in Turkey.

The patriotic goals of nationalism in Turkey would be legitimate and perfectly acceptable in any country in the world. Yet the spirit in which nationalism is promoted, the self-righteousness it entails,²⁰ the extremes to which it easily goes and the many forms it takes, end by defeating its own purpose.²¹ The chief cultural problem of Turkey today, as this writer sees it, is the need for a liberal atmosphere in which thought could develop naturally and without any strings attached to it. Nationalism as it stands today is hardly conducive to this end. Such an atmosphere could not be created throughout the Ottoman Empire because of rightist elements, both religious and later extremist nationalist, who acted under the assumption that a more critical view on some cultural values would undermine the foundations of the government and the nation itself.

There is now a new generation in Turkey which fully accepts the objectives of the Republic but is satisfied no longer with narrowly defined nationalism.²² They point out that extreme nationalism runs against the very spirit of democracy which Turkey strives to achieve and denies its own ultimate purpose—namely, a more progressive, liberal, and modern country.²³ Yet attempts to point out the irreconcilability of chauvinist nationalism with democracy may be easily de-

²⁰ For examples see Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 189-190.

²¹ An incident, an action can be easily excused on behalf of nationalism, regardless of the universality of the principle it violates. Student organizations, which generally are not supposed to enter politics, can, nevertheless, freely advocate political nationalism, and in this respect they are more than encouraged. Such encouragement imbues the youngsters in the process of formation with a feeling of self-satisfaction, causes them to reject the self-analysis so necessary for the intellectual, and ultimately makes them envisage themselves as political missionaries rather than modest individuals trying to achieve unglamorous but essential social goals.

²² Lewis, "Recent Developments," p. 323.

²³ Nabi, *Nereye*, pp. 6off.

picted as the work of "subversives" trying to undermine the country's existence. Such "subversives," generously labeled also as "unpatriotic," "traitors," or "foreign agents," are in many instances liberals and honest intellectuals who see in excessive nationalism a latent danger to the very survival of Turkey.

Nationalism in Turkey today is in danger of becoming identified with Islam, not only on the popular but also on the intellectual level. It is losing its secular character and becoming an outlet for the expression of religious ideas and a means for their defense. The identification of Islam with nationalism in Turkey may cause the disappearance of the national characteristics of the new Turkish State. Arab nationalists may find Islam, which through its spirit, language, and birthplace is inextricably part of the Arab culture, akin to them. But Turkey, which found her own cultural identity by departing from a universal Islam, can preserve that identity only by maintaining a certain independence toward Islam,²⁴ while such an attitude on the part of the Arabs would destroy them culturally.²⁵

The identification of nationalism with Islam in Turkey may cause a reaction among the secularists to reassert the modernist features of nationalism in Turkey; and this reaction, which may take place without fear of condemnation, may bring about a more liberal and progressive nationalism in Turkey. The *Türk Devrim Ocakları* (The Reform Hearths),²⁶ established to protect Atatürk's reforms—in a way, the national identity of Turkey—may be considered as a nationalistic self-defense against Islam.

Nationalism in Turkey is a dynamic power in politics and a major factor in cultural development. The advantages to be

²⁴ See G. E. von Grunebaum, "Problems of Muslim Nationalism," *Islam and the West*, p. 22.

²⁵ For differences between Turkish and Arab nationalism, see Gibb, "Social Change in the Near East," pp. 56-58; also "La Reaction," p. 2ff.

²⁶ See *Oriente Moderno*, XXVII, 1952, pp. 76-77.

drawn from its exploitation in political life cannot be easily overlooked by any political party. But for the future of the country it is most essential to rid it of all the reactionary and regressive features that have encumbered it and to bring into evidence its progressive and useful aspect; in other words, to make patriotism its dominant characteristic, as it was originally intended to be. And indeed, in the last few years there have been encouraging signs that nationalism is evolving toward this goal.

B. Racialism—Irkçılık—and Pan-Turkism²⁷

Racialism and Pan-Turkism in Turkey are closely knit and both are the by-product of nationalism. Racialists are supposed to have found the basis for their views in Mustafa Kemal's six-day speech of 1927. The relevant paragraph in that speech,²⁸ if taken at face value, may have some racialist implications, but if considered in the light of the general meaning attached by Turks to the word *kan*, blood, the understanding of it would be different.²⁹ Moreover, that speech appealed

²⁷ For differences between Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism, see Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, pp. 199-206.

²⁸ The key sentences are the following: "Turkish youth! Your primary duty is ever to preserve and defend the National independence, the Turkish Republic. This is the only basis of your existence and your future." After describing the sad conditions in which the country may find itself, M. K. urges the youth to safeguard national independence, and concludes: "The strength that you will need for this is mighty in the blood which flows in your veins." *Speech*, pp. 723-724.

²⁹ Turks use in everyday language *kanı temiz* (he has pure blood) to mean that one has good upbringing and comes from a good family. For instance, Hasan Ali Yücel, Minister of Education, while explaining that students in the schools (Village Institutes) had offered no ground for complaint about lack of morality or discipline, was interrupted by Rasih Kaplan of Antalia with the expression, *ırk temizliği, kan temizliği* (purity of race, purity of blood), which actually meant that the students had good upbringing. *BMMTD*, Session 6, Vol. 10, p. 86. The same is true about *ırk* (race), which is used extensively as synonymous with culture. Reşide Bayar, the wife of the President, used the term *göçmen ırkdaşlar* (immigrants of the same race) in discussing assistance to the immigrants; this expression simply meant people of the same culture. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 137.

to the youth with the purpose of stirring emotion, bolstering their national pride and self-confidence, in the same way and for the same purpose as the Sun-Language theory and the National History thesis.³⁰ Unfortunately Mustafa Kemal's allusion to "race" was interpreted by the Turkish racialists as expressing a fundamental philosophy. Moreover, they interpreted to their own advantage the findings of certain studies carried out in the Republic on skull structure in order to establish the relation of the Turks to the Indo-European races.³¹ Yet at no stage did Turkey have a well-formed theory of racialism, except for some German racist ideas which penetrated the country in one way or another after 1935.

Pan-Turkism, however, is in a different situation. Turks, in general, preserved an interest in the welfare of their kinsmen living abroad. The Pan-Turanic and Pan-Turkic currents in the Young Turks period were a more virulent form of this interest. The Republic, having officially rejected Pan-Turanianism, that is, expansion abroad based on cultural motives, had greatly undermined the force of this current. Beneath this policy, however, interest in Turks living abroad continued to be kept alive by various sporadic nationalist publications and organizations throughout the Republic, by the older generations, educated in the Pan-Turanic ideals of the Young Turks, and by the relatively large and influential group of refugees from the Turkish-speaking regions of the Soviet Republics.³²

The government had wholeheartedly welcomed back to Turkey the Turks who had originally emigrated from Ana-

³⁰ On these theories, see Lewis, "History Writings," p. 224. Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Middle East*, Princeton, 1956, pp. 14-15. Thomas, "The National," pp. 183-184.

³¹ Professor Lewis mentions the fact that studies concerning the history and culture of Anatolia were carried out in order to establish a connection between present-day Turks and the peoples and cultures which had lived there, and to discourage Pan-Turanic dreams. Bernard Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (edited by G. E. von Grunbaum), Chicago, 1955, p. 315.

³² Yusuf Akçora's *Türk Yılı 1928* (Turkish Almanac), İstanbul, 1928, is a typical example of a highly effective attempt to keep alive interest in the Turks living in the Soviets.

tolia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and lived in the Balkan territories which were once part of the Ottoman Empire. But it showed a certain reluctance in respect to the Turkish groups in the Soviet Republics,³³ which it considered to be culturally somewhat different from the Anatolian Turks, although individuals from these groups seeking refuge in Turkey were generally admitted without much difficulty.³⁴

At the beginning of the second World War, as the German armies advanced into the Soviet Union, their diplomatic mission (Von Papen) in Turkey established contact with some of the Pan-Turkish groups and refugees with the purpose of securing support from and information about the Turkish speaking areas of Soviet territory and of exploiting the Pan-Turkic sentiment in the country to their own advantage. The refugee groups seized upon this contact as a chance to realize the national independence of their own respective areas. Their close associates, the racialists, joined them, partly because of their own political ideology, which envisaged the reunion of all Turks in one country, and partly because of their lust for power and position in a world which they hoped would be fascist or nazi. (Some units of Turkish-speaking people had already been formed by the Germans from among prisoners and people living in conquered areas.)³⁵ The Ger-

³³ These groups were also subject to some discrimination, chiefly on the basis of their past affiliation with the Ottoman Empire. The Crimean Tartars, the Azerbaijan Turks, and even those living in Georgia were more favored than the Volga Tartars and the Uzbeks. After the second World War the government refused to accept the Kalmuks of Turkic culture from the Caucasus region, who were in refugee camps in Germany.

³⁴ The literature in respect to Turkish people in the Soviet Union is large. See *Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism*, British Naval Staff, London, 1918. Stefan Wurm, *Turkic Peoples of the USSR, Their Historical Background, Their Languages and the Development of Soviet Linguistic Policy*, London, 1954. See also *Encyclopedia of Islam*, related section; Walter Kolarz, *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East*, New York, 1954; Hostler, *Turkism*, pp. 4-84. On immigration to Turkey, see related sections in my Chapter 3.

³⁵ Nineteen unattached battalions and twenty-four companies were formed by the Germans from among the captured Tartar-Turkic Soviet soldiers. Hostler, *Turkism*, p. 179.

man efforts were successful at the beginning,³⁶ but by 1942 the suspicions of the Germans themselves in respect to the ultimate outcome of the Pan-Turkic movement coupled with the fact that the Turkish government finally refused actively to support the movement—but not before it wavered for some time in an ambiguous situation—led the Germans to discontinue their attempts at Pan-Turkism.³⁷

Thus, on the one hand the fertile ground prepared by nationalism for extreme deviation to the right and the government's lukewarm attitude towards groups operating under the guise of nationalism, and on the other the German military successes in the Soviets and their propaganda in Turkey,³⁸ created the proper atmosphere for the racialist Pan-Turkic movement.³⁹

This movement, torn from the beginning by internal strife caused by trivial reasons,⁴⁰ eventually divided into four groups,⁴¹ each embracing nationalism and drawing, in varying degrees, its strength from racialism. All aimed at one goal: the union of all Turks in the world in one single country.⁴²

³⁶ The diplomatic correspondence of Germany in respect to Turkey has been published by the Soviets. Von Papen's dispatches, thus reproduced, mention the names of various private citizens and government officials who were involved in one way or another in the Pan-Turkic movement during the war years. See *Documents Secrets du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères d'Allemagne*, Vol. 1, Turquie 1941-1943 (Translated from the Russian by M. Eristov), Paris, 1946. See also Hostler, *Turkism*, pp. 171-177.

³⁷ George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Ithaca, 1956, p. 143.

³⁸ Von Ribbentrop is supposed to have sent five million D.M. to Turkey in 1942 to back the pro-German elements. *Ibid.*

³⁹ The writer found no evidence to support the rumor that extreme nationalists and racialists were backed by Şükrü Saracoğlu, the Premier, to fight Hasan A. Yücel, the Minister of Education who, supported by the leftist intellectuals, aspired to the Premiership. (The racialists have lately identified themselves as "extreme nationalists.")

⁴⁰ The polemic between Reha Oğuz Türkkân and Nihal Atsız, two racialist leaders, in 1941-1942, centered around mutual accusations of lack of "blood purity" and each one of the contestants dug into the other's genealogy to prove that neither was a one hundred per cent ethnic Turk.

⁴¹ For those groups, see Hostler, *Turkism*, pp. 180-183.

⁴² For a post-war "re-interpretation" and justification of the racialist

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The ideology of the Pan-Turkic current could be described as a mixture of racialism and fascism, nazi myths and slogans, an arch-social conservatism, a romantic passion for the past (antedating the Ottoman history), an irrational belief in and exaltation of personal valor and of war, purity of blood, and discrimination against all groups considered non-Turkish.⁴³ The racialists expressed their ideas in a number of periodicals, such as the *Tanrıdağ* (Sacred Mountain), *Bozkurt* (Grey Wolf), *Gökbörü* (Blue Wolf), *Orhun* (name of a river in Asia around which were established Turkish settlements), *Çmaraltı* (Under the Plane Tree), *Büyük Doğu* (Great Orient), *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), *Özleyiş* (Longing)—all these names being connected with the early, pre-Islamic history of the Turks. The nationalist-racialist groups organized in semi-secret associations and carried on their work

movement in Turkey, see R. O. Türkkan's own article, "The Turkish Press," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, May 1950, pp. 142ff. For a critical view of Türkkan's article, see Lt. Colonel Charles W. Hostler, "Trends in Pan-Turanism," *ibid.*, Vol. III, January 1952, pp. 3-13, *passim*.

⁴³ Nihal Adsız's philosophy (he is a high school teacher who still has a pronounced taste for imitating Hitler in dress and manner), if it can be so called, is a mixture of racialist and nationalist slogans. Some of his private correspondence, which has been made public (Hasan A. Yücel, *Davam*, Ankara, 1947), gives a fair idea of his views. He is in favor of a lifetime President of the Republic chosen by a few, and of conducting the affairs of the country through an Assembly representing only the very "best." "The cause of race and blood," he says, "is right. Those who deny it are non-Turks and those ignorant of history. We, the Turks, despite the fact that we are a nation of 60 million people, we are not united yet. Race is the basic factor of morality. By race we understand a pure unmixed blood. Nations can exist only through war. We are wrong to think that we are to fight only when attacked." *Ibid.*, p. 16. Advocating alliance with Nazi Germany, he wrote: "At the end of this war we can at least conquer Cyprus, Syria, Iraq, Iran and the Russian Azerbaijan and by following the model of the Axis Powers we can rid ourselves of Jews, communists and freemasons, and build a regime of discipline and morality." *Ibid.*, p. 17. In an analysis of the countries of the world, he finds all of them in one way or another inimical to Turkey. He chose the army to support his aims. Similar views are well expressed by Reha Oğuz Türkkan, in *Türkçülüğe Giriş*, İstanbul, 1940, pp. 116ff. For excerpts on Türkkan's views, see also Hostler, *Turkism*, pp. 181-182; "Trends in Pan-Turanism." For a program of Turkism, see *Bozkurt*, March 12, 1942 (R. O. Türkkan).

in an atmosphere of mystery, romanticism, and the exaltation of leaders and leadership.

The turn of the war against the Germans in 1943-1944 and the pressure on Turkey for neutrality diminished somewhat the pan-Turkist racialists' enthusiasm and, by the same token, encouraged the elements of the left and the liberals to state more freely their own opinions. The racialists reacted violently to this,⁴⁴ and the government, eager to show its neutrality, seized upon this occasion to curb racialist actions—although they had been conducted rather openly in the past. It arrested all the racialist leaders on May 9, 1944,⁴⁵ and indicted them for plotting to overthrow the government. Though they were condemned to various terms in jail by the lower court,⁴⁶ the Military Court of Cassation reversed the decision on October 31, 1945,⁴⁷ and the indicted were released. This resulted partly from the democratization of the regime, but largely from the Soviet demands for military bases on the Straits. These demands shifted public opinion in favor of the nationalists and, in general, of all currents opposed to communism.

Meanwhile, the government had defined racialism as an evil opposed to the basic principle of the Republic,⁴⁸ and the press, in a concerted, almost unanimous agreement, attacked the racialists.⁴⁹ Later in 1945, in a dramatic move to show its

⁴⁴ The writer, Sabahaddin Ali, known as a leftist, was called "traitor" by Atsız and then beaten by a group of pro-Atsız youngsters on his way to the court to follow a libel suit. Thus encouraged, Atsız addressed an open letter to Premier Saracoğlu denouncing all intellectuals suspected of leftist tendencies and asking for action. *Orhun*, April 26, 1944.

⁴⁵ On the arrest of racialists, see *Ulus*, May 6-10, 19, 1944. *New York Times*, May 16, 19, 20, 1944; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 25-26; Hostler, *Turkism*, p. 185; Lenczowski, *Middle East*, p. 146.

⁴⁶ *Tan*, March 30, 1945. Jäschke, *op.cit.*, p. 42.

⁴⁷ Jäschke, p. 52; *Vatan*, November 1, 1945.

⁴⁸ *Ulus*, May 20, 1944.

⁴⁹ All these articles were assembled in *Irkiçlik-Turancılık*, Ankara, 1944. This book in its turn was described by Kenan Öner in 1947, during the action brought against him by H. A. Yücel, as being the work of the leftists in the Ministry of Education. See my Chapter 14.

disapproval of racialism, the government returned to the Soviets 195 refugees of Turkish origin who had escaped to Turkey during the war,⁵⁰ and refused to admit into Turkey from 20,000 to 30,000 Crimean Tartars who had found refuge in Rumania during the war.

Historically, racialism had no roots in Turkey;⁵¹ few countries in the world are less suitable to racialism than Turkey.⁵² The country's population is a mixture of those races

⁵⁰ Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 49; Hostler, *Turkism*, p. 186.

⁵¹ Racialism as a theory and practice found no acceptance in the Ottoman Empire. The persecuted Jews of Spain found refuge in the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth century, and have lived peacefully since, preserving the same language they spoke in Spain. In the Republic, the same attitude was preserved. Atatürk rejected Pan-Turanism together with racialism. Later, when the Fascists in Italy and the Nazis in Germany became strong and their impact in Turkey could be felt, the regime as a whole did not change its views on racial issues. There was one minor incident in Kırklareli in 1934 which proved this. Someone who had spent some time in Germany tried to drive the Jews out of that town. (*Tasvir* [editorial], December 7, 1948.) At that time M. Kemal sent the Minister of Interior, Sükrü Kaya, into that region to investigate the incident. The mayor, the chief of police, and the president of the Chamber of Commerce were arrested. An official declaration was issued to the effect that the Turkish Government strongly disapproved of such anti-Semitic sentiments and would deal severely with all who were found to have persecuted the Jews. (*New York Times*, July 16, 1934.) Later Turkey admitted a large number of Jewish professors escaping from Nazi Germany. (See declaration by I. Hertzog in praise of Turkey's role in saving European Jews. *Ibid.*, February 13, 1944.) In 1948 Cevad Rifat Atilhan attempted to form a Turkish volunteer group to assist the Arabs in the fight against Israel, but his attempt was unsuccessful. (*Ibid.*, February 11, 1948; Rustow, "Politics," pp. 98-99.) A special target for the racialist attacks in 1941-1944 were the Jews converted to Islam, who had been integrated in the population of Turkey but still presented some group feeling which was greatly exploited by the racialists. This group, known as *dönme* (converted), has many members in prominent positions in Turkey, in government as well as in business, and thus incites the envy of other groups. On this group, see *Islam Ansiklopedisi* under *dönme*; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 282. Atilhan is presently conducting a one-man anti-Semitic campaign by publishing several books on the subject and articles in various rightist publications, such as *Yeni Adam* (New Man).

⁵² It was pointed out that only 79 Premiers in the Ottoman Empire out of a total of 214 were ethnic Turks. The Ottoman Empire was concerned only with the considerations of religion and not nationality. Any Muslim, even if converted, could achieve prominence there. (Y. Abadan, *Türk İnkilâbı*, Ankara, 1954, pp. 28-29.) The Ottoman dynasty itself was far from being pure in blood. Alderson calculated that the Ottoman dynasty kept

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which have populated Anatolia since time immemorial, and which have mixed freely with each other for centuries—the Circassians, Albanians, Bosnians, Kurds, Georgians, and, by way of conversion to Islam and marriage, the Greeks, Armenians, and Slavs. Thus there was left very little of the purity of blood that the racialists (themselves of very dubious origins) tried to claim.

The only way to explain racialism in Turkey is to define it as an imitative, regressive, emotional reaction to the loss of the Empire. It is a theory which substitutes race for religion and thus serves the lust for power and expansion of certain groups by creating artificially a theory of an elite.

Racialists today are generally accepted in society, and if they have not compromised themselves beyond repair, they can achieve prominence. It is generally believed that the “rightists” do not represent any danger for Turkey, the main danger being the “leftists.”⁵³ Encouraged by this attitude, the racialists can remain active disguised as “nationalists.”⁵⁴ For instance, as late as 1951, N. Atsız could write that it was undignified for Turkey as a nation to resign itself to remaining within the present boundaries instead of trying to unite by war all the Turks in the world. Later two Ministers reportedly resigned chiefly because they were criticized for having encouraged racialist activities, and two deputies were expelled (later re-admitted) from the Democratic Party for having established an organization (The Turkish Nationalists Association) with racialist purposes, which was disbanded by an

only 1/16.384 Turkish blood in its veins because of intermarriages with non-Turkish women. (Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty*, pp. 91ff.; also Luke, *The Old Turkey and the New*, p. 97.)

⁵³ *BMMTD*, Session 9.2, Vol. 10, pp. 120, 240 *passim* (remarks by Premier Menderes).

⁵⁴ In fact, many of the racialists arrested in 1944 were defended in the Kenan Öner-Hasan A. Yücel trial as being nationalistic and idealistic innocent youths, and were depicted as martyrs suffering at the hands of an Administration instigated by “leftists.” Kenan Öner, *Öner-Yücel Davası*, İstanbul, 1947, p. 117.

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Ankara court.⁵⁵ One fact remains certain, however; the developments of the past ten years—the relative democratization, the increase in economic activity, and the new general atmosphere in favor of tolerance—have deprived the racialists of suitable grounds for success and have isolated them as a small group lacking relationship with reality.⁵⁶ The younger generation, which seemed eager to listen to racist propaganda fifteen years ago, now shows lack of interest in racist slogans and seems to prefer to deal with more realistic ideas. Despite this unfavorable atmosphere, the fact that the racialists can express themselves in devious ways while waiting for favorable conditions to become active again makes racialism in Turkey a latent danger.

⁵⁵ The Ministers were Tevfik İleri and Samet Ağaoğlu; the deputies, Sait Bilgiç and Tahsin Tola. *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, xxvi, 1952, pp. 87-89. Some racist literature was found in high schools and picked up. *Ibid.*, xxiii, 1951, p. 115.

⁵⁶ R. Ö. Türkkan has published his memoirs but was violently criticized for doing so on the ground that he had insufficient public importance to publish "memoirs." Türkkan regularly writes in the *Cumhuriyet* on various aspects of life in the U.S., where he lives. See *Cumhuriyet*, November 5, 6, 1957 (article, "The American"). For a confused type of cultural-social racialism, see Arın Engin, *Atatürkçülük ve Moskofluk Türklük Savaşları*, İstanbul, 1953, pp. 73-76. He advocates absorption of all the minorities in Turkey.

CHAPTER 10

SECULARISM – *LÂIKLIK* – RELIGION AND POLITICS

THE Republic's first major reforms were closely connected with secularism.¹ Secularism, which gradually emerged in the Ottoman Empire as a practical necessity and a condition for modernization, thus became one of the pillars of the new regime. This principle was officially enshrined in the Constitution in 1937.

Secularism's purposes in Turkey—as part of the broader purposes of nationalism—were of a multiple character: to help create a modern national state without the bias of religion; to liberate the society from the hold of Islam; and to bring about a new type of free individual. It was a rationalist, scientific-minded, anti-traditionalist, and anti-clericalist secularism.

The policy followed by the government in implementing a secularist policy, although never impairing the freedom of worship nor imposing a new creed upon the society, acquired in time excessive anti-clerical positivistic characteristics which were labeled later as “an official dogma of irreligion.”²

Secularism affected most profoundly the intellectuals, who were already prepared to accept it. Villages and small towns as a whole, however, continued to preserve their basic Islamic customs and traditions, and the cultural goals of secularism were only superficially fulfilled there. The country's social structure and the institution of the family, which were preserved relatively intact, continued, however, to generate a pattern of thought contrary to the rationalist and scientific

¹ See Chapter 2.

² A. A. Adivar, “The Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey,” *Near Eastern Culture and Society* (edited by T. Cuyler Young), Princeton, 1951, p. 128.

features of secularism.³ The government's increasing antagonism to clericalism and its control of religious activities, which in a way were a violation of secularism,⁴ caused great resentment among conservatives and even common citizens. It was no secret that many of the religious reforms were observed through the force of law rather than out of conviction. (Turkey's population is ninety-eight per cent Muslim.)

Yet secularism in Turkey, despite its limited success in the cultural field, had partly achieved, by the end of the second World War, one of its major political objectives. People in general realized and accepted the fact that lay matters could be conducted better and more profitably by the government, and that Islam in general could not cope with the complex necessities of modern life. Moreover, personal and group interests have been developed on the basis of secularism.

Increased economic activity; the expanded educational facilities; the movement of population, which broke the narrow cultural circle of the village; the strict government control which reduced substantially the dissemination of religious propaganda; and the growth of an intellectual group which gradually took control of the government were among the main factors which brought about the relative consolidation of secularism in society.

This was the general situation in respect to secularism in Turkey at the beginning of the multi-party struggle in 1946. The debates on democratization brought religion into discussion, too. It was obvious that the broadening of political freedom would necessitate a reinterpretation of secularism.⁵

³ See Bülent Ecevit, "Sözde Kalan Bir Devrim" (A Reform in Words), *Forum*, November 1, 1955, pp. 27-28.

⁴ A. F. Başgil, *Din ve Lâiklik*, İstanbul, 1955, pp. iv-v.

⁵ Masterly works have been written on present day secularism in Turkey. See Gotthard Jäschke, "Der Islam in der neuen Türkei," *Die Welt des Islams* n.s. 1, 11, 1951, 1953, pp. 1-174, 278-287; Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, VIII, 1954, pp. 267-282; "The Religious Life of Modern Turkish Muslims," *Islam and the West* (edited by Richard N. Frye), The Hague, 1957, pp. 108-148; "Secu-

Moreover, in view of the possibility of obtaining votes by religious propaganda, it was expected that the political parties would raise the issue of religion, sooner or later.

Indeed, as expected, the discussions on Islam's role in Turkey started after 1946, and whatever views and feelings on this issue had accumulated during the years of the government's disfavor toward clericalism came into the open. Intellectuals, government officials, statesmen, politicians, and bigots all had some views on the subject. The debates grew out of the discussions on liberalization and the establishment of a multi-party system and gradually revolved around religion. The proponents can be assembled into three groups according to the intrinsic meaning they attached to religion and to its relation to society and the state. The first group, the conservatives, regarded religion primarily as an inherent spiritual need of the individual and as an educational institution. The second group, the moderates, although partly agreeing with the conservatives, regarded religious freedom chiefly as a part of the individual's rights. The third group,

larism and Islam in Turkish Politics," *Current History*, June 1957, pp. 333-338; Dankwart A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey, 1920-1955," *Islam and the West*, pp. 69-107; Lewis V. Thomas, "Recent Developments in Turkish Islam," *Middle East Journal*, VI, 1952, pp. 22-40; "Turkish Islam," *Muslim World*, XLIV, 1954, pp. 181-185; Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey," *International Affairs*, XXVIII, 1952, pp. 38-48; Uriel Heyd, "Islam in Modern Turkey," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, XXXIV, 1947, pp. 299-308; Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "Modern Turkey: Islamic Reformation?" *Islamic Culture*, XV, XVI, Parts I and II, January 1951, 1952; W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton, 1957; John Kingsley Birge, "Islam in Modern Turkey," *Islam in the Modern World*, Washington, 1951, pp. 41-46, "Secularism in Turkey and its Meaning," *International Review of Missions*, October 1944, pp. 426-432. For the Turkish bibliography, see Ali Fuad Başgil, *Din ve Lâiklik*; Bülent Daver, *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Lâiklik*, Ankara, 1955. *Lâiklik* (Türk Devrim Ocakları) includes 19 articles on the subject, İstanbul, 1954. See also Nazım Poroy, *Lâiklik Hakkında*, İstanbul, 1951; N. A. Kansu, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1931; Ihsan Sungu, "Tevhidi Tedrisat," *Belleten*, 7-8, 1938, pp. 387-431; Bahri Savcı, "Lâiklik Prensibi Karşısında Öğretim ve Öğrenim Hürriyeti," *Siyasal Bilgiler Okulu Dergisi*, II, 1947, pp. 277-294. See also my Chapter 2.

the secularists, were opposed to religious liberalization, that is, clericalism.

The first group represented the views of a considerable number of devout Muslims and also some intellectuals, all of whom expressed a strange longing for the past, for the lost ethical-cultural values of the society, and for the quiet, serene life of the old days away from the evils of modern society.⁶ They attacked secularism as having undermined the cultural-ethical basis of the society.⁷ Islam in their view was a basic spiritual necessity for the Turkish society, and they claimed that Islam's negative impact on science and modern society was purposely misjudged and misrepresented. The weekly conservative *Millet* (Nation) wrote in answer to *Yem Çağ* (New Era):

You should not forget that we (Turks) are Muslims. The real Islam holds the name of God in reverence and respect. Can anyone find in the real Islam any principle or idea contrary to modern society and civilization? Based on the Koran I can point out to you that the real Islam is not against humanitarian principles, civilization, science and the institutions of our modern world; on the contrary it supports them.⁸

An inquiry on the religious needs of youth and the introduction of religious courses into schools aroused a certain public interest.⁹ Moreover, some intellectuals searched for some

⁶ *Vatan*, December 2, 1949 (R. Bilginer). The author of these ideas, returned from a trip in Anatolia, claimed that people there felt a longing for the past.

⁷ See Rustow, "Politics," p. 98. ⁸ *Millet*, February 4, 1946, p. 4.

⁹ It was advertised thereafter as "The New Generation's Longing for God," *Millet*, June 6, 1946, p. 6. *Millet*, March 13, 1947, p. 3. One reader wrote: "How wonderful it would be, if the government took over the education of our children according to God and His ways. Then nobody would defeat us." (*Ibid.*) Others took advantage of the occasion to express their opposition to women's working as spoiling the warmth of family life by hardening their maternal feelings. Ahmet E. Yalman, in an editorial in the *Vatan* entitled "Inkilâp ve Din" (Reform and Religion), wrote: "One must embrace religion wholeheartedly on condition it does not interfere in politics, government, law, and science and takes love, morality and virtue as its purpose. The time for religious reformation, which the whole

spiritual values, of which they had been deprived, they thought, by the positivist thinking imposed on them during the Republic.¹⁰ (Books dealing with the place of religion in spiritual life, such as Alexis Carrel and Link's *Return to Religion* and Liebman's *Peace of Mind* were translated into Turkish and widely read.)

These intellectuals seemed seized by a desire to know the ultimate goal of the new educational system and the final purpose of the society.¹¹ They had been told that every social evil came from Islam, but they were not offered a newer, cleaner faith than the indicted religion. Islam had perpetuated the autocracy of the Sultans, they had been told, but they discovered in the Republic that oppression could also be established without Islam. Education and travel abroad disclosed to many intellectuals that religion occupied a great part in the individual's life in the Western countries which they took as models in science, art, education, and politics.¹²

The conservatives looked upon Islam also as an educational institution, and believed that the elimination of religion from life weakened family ties and lowered the moral and ethical

Muslim world expects (especially) from us, is nearing." *Vatan*, August 7, 1948.

¹⁰ A professor of Constitutional Law at the University of İstanbul, turned defender of religion, wrote: "I write about and defend religion not because I am a religious person or follow the prescriptions of religion. On the contrary, I do it because I am saddened by my inability to follow those prescriptions and envy the individuals who have gained inner peace through faith." Başgil, *Dim ve Lâiklik*, p. vi. Later Başgil dismissed the complaints and fears of a religious upheaval as unfounded. *Türklük*, March 20, 1951; *Irtica Yaygarası*, İstanbul, 1951; Jäschke, *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942-1951*, Wiesbaden, 1955, pp. 140-141.

¹¹ One symptom of the surge of religious feelings among the youth was the growing interest in Mehmet Akif, the Turkish poet and the author of the Turkish national anthem. He had fallen into disgrace in the early days of the Republic because of his views on an Islamic-national Turkish state.

¹² This writer read several letters from Turks stationed in certain communities in the Midwest and the South in the United States in 1947-1948. They were surprised to see how strong religion was in America. One of them wrote to his family that in his town everyone went to church services on Sunday, and that he felt so embarrassed because of his indifference to religion that he ended by praying in his own way, too.

standards of the society, in particular of the youth. They interpreted the diminution of the traditional respect shown to the elders and the increase of materialism and opportunism as symptoms of youth's moral deterioration.¹³ Some of them went to extremes in considering as evidence of moral deterioration even certain individualistic tendencies in the relationships in the family and between men and women.¹⁴ Religion—that is, Islam—appeared to them, therefore, as the best educational means of restoring the moral values of youth and society.¹⁵

Islam's main educational value, however, was seen in combating "leftist" tendencies which, during the second World War, had gained some ground in Turkey. The defenders of this viewpoint claimed that the anti-clerical, positivist philosophy of the Republic, as represented by secularism, did not effectively oppose the "leftist" currents but on the contrary enhanced them. In order to counteract these currents, to protect the youth against the "evils of materialism," and to develop in them the spirit of abnegation and attachment to the country, they advocated an education based on religion and nationalism.¹⁶ The first necessary measure, therefore, was to change the government policy on religion and introduce religious education into the schools. Moreover, the apologists for Islamic education envisaged a *rapprochement* to the Arab world and a government which would interpret more

¹³ *Vatan*, January 8, 1944 (Şevki Yazman); also January 19, 20, 1947, February 22, 1948.

¹⁴ A deputy complained in the National Assembly, for instance, that young boys and girls in the Village Institutes married without the prior consent of their parents. *BMMTD*, Session 8.1, Vol. 3, p. 457 (Emin Soysal). For Soysal's satisfaction because of the abolition of the coeducational curriculum in Village Institutes, see Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 159; see also my Chapter 13.

¹⁵ *BMMTD*, Session 8.1, Vol. 3, pp. 427, 438. The first movement to introduce religious education in schools started with the debate on December 24, 1946 in the National Assembly. The first speaker was Baha Pars (Bursa), the second H. S. Tanrıöver (İstanbul). Jäschke, *op.cit.*, p. 68.

¹⁶ *BMMTD*, pp. 428, 438ff. (Tanrıöver and B. Pars). See also my Chapter 9.

“progressively” the role of religion in life and provide financial support for the clergy.¹⁷ Since this issue transcended the boundaries of party politics and became a matter of national interest, its apologists urged all the political parties to include these views in their programs.

The second group, the moderates, defended religious freedom mainly as being part of the individual’s rights, but they were also affected by the views of the conservatives. They claimed that since secularism meant the absolute separation of religious from political affairs, the government in its turn should not interfere in religious matters.¹⁸ In their view the old conception of the state subordinated to religion had been replaced by the conception of religion bound to the state, and both conceptions violated the principle of secularism.¹⁹ The course to be followed, therefore, was to leave all religious matters exclusively to the individual or to private associations, without allowing religion to interfere in politics, administration, law, or science.²⁰ This group claimed that the actual and current importance of Islam could not be minimized. Because Turkish society was Islamic, a democratic government had to conform to the needs of the society and allow people to believe and worship as they pleased. They held that the Republic would not be endangered by religious liberalization, that interests had been established on the basis of secularism, and that the secular state and a fairly large group of secularists now in existence could effectively oppose the reactionaries. The individual also, in their view, was politically and socially mature enough to consider religious practices as a part of life in an advanced society. They criticized those who detected in every religious idea the beginnings

¹⁷ *Vatan*, August 5, 1947 and February 11, 1949 (interview and statements by H. S. Tanrıöver); also *Ulus*, December 2, 1947.

¹⁸ *Vatan*, February 16, 1949.

¹⁹ Başgil, *Din ve Lâiklik*, p. 154.

²⁰ *Vatan* (editorial), August 7, 8, 1948; Rustow, “Politics,” pp. 98ff.

of religious reaction, and those who labeled as "backward" anyone who conceded some rule to religion in society.

The secularists, on the other hand, considered any concession to religion a regressive step and a compromise of Republican principles. They did not oppose Islam as a faith, but condemned its dogmatism and its supposedly inherent opposition to technical and social progress. They believed that the whole Islamic world, including Turkey, had not yet succeeded in reforming Islam sufficiently to make it receptive to modern ideas. Until such reform was achieved, they believed in maintaining state supremacy for the sake of progress. They claimed that whenever the state appeared weak and the religious elements acquired some liberty of action, they turned to destroy the Republican regime, as in the Şeyh Sait's revolt,²¹ and in the upheaval in Menemen in 1931.²² (The latter revolt was interpreted as, but not proved to be, the consequence of freedom granted through the establishment of the Liberal Party in 1930.²³) The secularists believed that any small concession to religion would entail further concessions, until Islam gained complete control of society.

It was apparent, however, that the establishment of political parties necessitated a change of government policy on religion, without affecting, if possible, the essentials of secularism.²⁴ The stand of political parties and the public on this issue varied according to the views described above. The National Party, which became increasingly pro-clerical, defended religious freedom as an historical and social necessity and as a means of preserving the moral standards of the society.²⁵

The Democratic Party adopted the legal and historical approach to religious freedom by considering it a part of the

²¹ *Tarih*, IV, İstanbul, 1931, p. 190.

²² See *New York Times*, February 3, 5, 1931; Demirkan, *Şehit Kubilay*, İstanbul, 1931; also my Chapter 2.

²³ See Chapter 2.

²⁴ *Ulus* (editorial), February 17, 1948.

²⁵ Marshal Çakmak, Chairman of the National Party, openly said: "We want to give religious education to our children." *Vatan*, April 25, 1949.

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basic liberties. The speakers for this party pointed out that since Turkish society was Islamic,²⁶ the citizens ought to be free to satisfy their religious needs in the way and in the language they chose, without involving religion in daily politics.²⁷ Secularism, according to the Democrats, needed to be applied moderately by respecting freedom of thought and by refusing to allow the use of religion for political purposes.²⁸

The Republican Party, the initiator of secularism, afraid of losing voters to other parties, after much hesitation finally debated and accepted religious liberalization by placing emphasis on Islam's educational aspects. The Republican Party Council passed, early in 1947, a resolution proposing to empower the government to allow the teaching of Islam in the new Latin alphabet by private individuals outside the public schools, under supervision of the Ministry of Education.²⁹ Furthermore, private individuals were to be allowed to open schools for the training of *imams* under the guidance of qualified teachers and using textbooks approved by a special committee nominated by the Ministry of Education.³⁰ In 1951 these schools expanded with the government's cooperation, although they were still considered private schools.

The Republican Party Convention of 1947 took up these proposals and debated at greater length the amendment to secularism.³¹ Delegates from the provinces pointed out that secularism brought many benefits but also gave rise to doubts because of its extreme anti-clerical features. Secularism, according to them, caused a certain regression in moral stand-

²⁶ *Vatan*, April 4, 1950.

²⁷ *Vatan*, January 9, 1949 (Bayar in Iskenderun). *Vatan*, April 25, 1949 (Bayar in Ankara).

²⁸ *Kudret*, December 5, 1947 (statement by Bayar).

²⁹ See Jäschke, "Der Islam in der neuen Türkei," pp. 135ff.; also *Ulus*, January 27, 1947.

³⁰ On these schools, their curricula, and students, see Howard A. Reed, "Turkey's New Imam-Hatip Schools," *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol. IV, Nos. 2-3, 1955, pp. 150-163; also *Ulus*, May 7, and June 22, 1947; *Vatan*, July 3, and October 4, 1947.

³¹ See C. H. P. *Yedinci Kurultayı Tutanağı*, Ankara, 1948, pp. 448-462.

ards and views.³² In order to strengthen the society's moral foundations, it was therefore necessary to accept a more liberal attitude on religious education without fear that this would lead to religious reaction.³³ Islam, in their view, was a force in itself, an inherent part of the society, which could not be dismissed by defining religion as just a matter between God and the individual. The importance of religion, therefore, had to be recognized by giving Islam a proper place in the new democratic political framework.

In order to meet the people's need for religion, H. S. Tanrıöver, the defender of the new approach to religion, advocated seminaries for the training of *imams* to officiate at the rites, and asked that the tombs of the "saints" and Sultans be opened to the public.³⁴

After the convention, the Republican Party Parliamentary Group took up the question. Some members pointed out that in fact religious education would amount to a deliberate compromise of the basic principles of the Republican Party in order to compete with the opposition parties in gaining votes.³⁵ The liberalization was, nevertheless, accepted. (Tanrıöver resigned from the Republican Party four weeks after the convention in protest against opposition to wide religious education within the party, despite the fact that the Republicans had departed substantially from their original attitude of no compromise on secularism in 1946 and 1947.)

At all events, the laws on religious education were introduced to the National Assembly in 1948 and 1949, one of

³² *Ulus*, December 3, 1947.

³³ C. H. P. *Tutanağı*, pp. 451-460; *Ulus*, November 21, 1947 (F. Daydaş, S. Nayman-Kayseri; Karpuzoğlu-Maraş).

³⁴ *Ibid.* The government had been accused in 1945 of letting the mausoleums of historical personalities deteriorate. Hasan Ali Yücel, the Minister of Education, who was accused later in 1947 of supporting the leftists, answered that the *Vakıf* Directorate (pious foundations) spent TL. 1.5 million in restoring 700 mausoleums out of the existing 2,000. *Ayın Tarihi*, May 1945, p. 105.

³⁵ Rustow, "Politics," p. 93; *Vatan*, February 20, 1948.

them, concerning schools for Muslim priests, by two members of the Republican Party on behalf of the other twenty deputies with the justification that there were no priests left in the villages to officiate at the Islamic rites and that without religious guidance people seemed to become more entangled in superstitions. The chief legislation in respect to religious liberalization finally was passed by the Assembly during the premiership of Günaltay, in 1949,³⁶ when the creation of a Faculty of Divinity in Ankara was also authorized.³⁷

The educational courses on religion were optional at the beginning, but later became compulsory for Muslim children only.³⁸ The religious liberalization expanded; religious publications were more freely published; the tombs of Sultans closed in 1925 were gradually opened to the public; and people who had been married to members of the Ottoman dynasty, that is, the Caliph's family, but who were single now, were allowed to enter the country with the permission of the Council of Ministers.³⁹

The discussion originally confined to the interpretation of secularism gradually extended to other connected topics. Osman Nuri Koni of the National Party questioned the Government in the Assembly in order to find out what happened to the Sultan-Caliph's property.⁴⁰ He claimed that this prop-

³⁶ For a complete account of these laws, see Jäschke, "Der Islam," pp. 122ff.; also *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942-1951*, pp. 92-93; Reed, "Turkey's New Schools," pp. 153-154; *Tasvir*, December 31, 1948; *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 15, pp. 168, 188ff. B. K. Çağlar (Erzincan) resigned from the party during this session in protest against the compromise on secularism. *Ibid.*, pp. 172ff.

³⁷ On this Faculty see Howard A. Reed, "The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara," *The Muslim World*, XLVI, October 1956, pp. 295-312, XLVII, January 1957, pp. 22-35.

³⁸ Birge, "Islam in Modern Turkey," p. 45. Parents must ask in writing if they want their children not to attend such classes. Religious courses were also introduced in the junior high schools as promised by the Premier in a speech in Konya. See *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, XXXIII-XXXIV, 1956, p. 183.

³⁹ For comments and later developments, see *Son Posta* (editorial), May 15, 1948; also *Cumhuriyet*, October 22, 1953.

⁴⁰ *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 18, pp. 443ff.

erty was sold to various individuals for a low price. His purpose was to defend indirectly the rights of the Sultan's heirs to royal property.⁴¹ The secularists, on the other hand, pressed hard for additional reforms in religion, such as translating the Koran into Turkish.⁴²

The discussions on freedom of religion produced at the beginning neither mass reaction,⁴³ nor any significant organ-

⁴¹ The Turkish Supreme Court had ruled that Law No. 431 (abolishing the Caliphate and confiscating the Caliph's property) had exempted the property of the Sultans who were not alive at the time the law was passed. Thus, Abdulhamid's property was supposedly exempt, and some of his estimated fortune of TL. 1.5 billion given to his heirs. (Declaration of Ismail R. Aksal, Minister of Finance), *ibid.*, p. 448. A similar request for information on the property of the Sultans was introduced by A. Remzi Yüregir to counteract Koni's interpretation, *ibid.*; also Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 99, 100.

⁴² The discussion in this respect illustrates well the opinions of secularists and conservatives on the question of translating and reading the Koran in Turkish. Ahmet Hamit Selgil (Ankara): "Why does not our Great Turkish nation read the Koran in Turkish? Why [don't we] translate the Koran in Turkish [for use in the mosques and prayer]? I beg the chief of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri*) to do it." İbrahim Arvas (Van): "Fifty million Muslims read it in Arabic." Ahmet Hamit Selgil (in continuation): "I am speaking from this rostrum not on behalf of fifty million Muslims but twenty million Muslim Turks. I demand it for the Turk who wants to read his religious book [Koran] in his own language. The language we speak is Turkish; therefore I request that our sacred book be read in Turkish. I want to know when the government intends to translate it." İbrahim Arvas (Van): "Imam Ebu Hanefi [the founder of the orthodox Muslim sect] says this couldn't be done. . . ." Necati Erdem (Mugla) (reciting a verse from the Koran amid shouts): "This is not a *madrasah*—'İyyake na'budu ye İyyake nestain' [Thee we worship and Thee we support] . . . I am proving the eloquence of the Koran, the most venerated—can it or can't it be translated into Turkish? . . . if you translate it [the verse he read] with many words in Turkish it would not preserve the same meaning and eloquence. There are in it many meanings, many nuances. If translated, it [the Koran], the Illustrious Ordinator, loses its value. The Government consequently cannot interfere in the Muslim's faith and Book." *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 16, pp. 450-451.

⁴³ According to the Minister of Justice, Şinasi Devrim, ninety-three cases went to the court in 1946 for violating Law #677, which prohibited obscurantist and sectarian practices. Some of the cases are the following: 29 for magic healing, 15 for amulet making, 6 for fortune telling, 5 for sectarian rites, 3 for witchcraft, 2 for convent opening, 2 for tomb worshipping, 2 for claiming to be Messiahs, 3 for sect promoting, 2 for reading the call to prayer in Arabic. (This is a rather low percentage since

ized political action on behalf of Islam,⁴⁴ and various cases of religious propaganda were confined to small towns.⁴⁵ But as religious liberalization became more general, several reactionary outbreaks followed: the first being the activities of the *Ticani* sect,⁴⁶ and the second taking place on the occasion of the funeral of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, who died on April 10, 1950.

The ground for this latter reaction was prepared by the increasingly violent attacks of religious and conservative

many violations of the law in the villages remained undetected by authorities.) *BMMTD*, Session 8.1, Vol. 7, p. 211.

⁴⁴ In 1946, *İslam Koruma Partisi* (The Party for the Defense of Islam) was established in İstanbul but was disbanded the same year by the martial law authorities. (Necmi Güneş, Mustafa Özbek, Ziya Süer founders.) In 1951 the *İslam Demokrat Partisi* (Islam Democratic Party) was established by Cevat Rifat Atilhan, but it went to the court for using religion for political purposes. Tunaya, *Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 708-709, 742-744. Atilhan had also established, in 1947, the *Türk Muhafazakâr Partisi* (Turkish Conservative Party) which remained active but without much consequence; see Tunaya, *op.cit.*, pp. 701-711; Jäschke, *Die Türkeri 1942-1951*, p. 75.

⁴⁵ The *Büyük Doğu* (Great Orient) was suspended for four months for reproducing a poem by Rıza Tevfik, published twenty-two years previously: "Request for Help from Abdulhamid's Soul." *Vatan*, June 7, 13, 1947; *Cahiers*, IX-X, 1947, p. 236; Jäschke, *ibid.*, p. 74. The *İmam of Düzce*, in a public sermon in the mosque, which was received unfavorably by the public, defended the government by stating that God placed the state as an intermediary between Himself and the individual, and therefore it was sanctified. *Cumhuriyet*, June 26, 28, 1946.

A letter addressed to newspapers from Varto in eastern Anatolia, inhabited mostly by Kurds, caused some debate. The letter stated that the *şeyhs* (religious leaders), who were also landowners and had great influence in that region, used the opposition parties to promote their own religious interests. They supposedly distributed among the populace a number of religious pamphlets with the ultimate purpose of destroying the Republic and reestablishing theocracy. See *Tanin*, November 6, 1947; also *Vatan*, November 11, 1947; *BMMTD*, Session 8.2, Vol. 7, p. 205.

⁴⁶ Two members of the *Ticani* sect—North African dervish order which became iconoclastic in Turkey—read the *ezan* in Arabic right in the National Assembly in 1949 in open defiance of the law. *Aynı Tarihi*, February 1949, p. 5; *Vatan*, February 5, 6, 1949; also Reed, "Faculty of Divinity," 1, p. 306. Later in 1951 the same sect destroyed some of Atatürk's statues and a law was passed, after encountering great opposition in the Assembly, to protect them. Law 5816 of July 25, 1951; Jäschke, *op.cit.*, p. 149. On July 24, 1953, Law 6187 once more increased the penalties for the use of religion for political purposes.

publications, such as *Sebilürreşad*, *Büyük Doğu*, and *Millet*, on the Republican Party Government and especially on İnönü, who was held chiefly responsible for the deterioration, through secularist policies of Islam and morality in Turkey. Moreover, through Law 5566 of March 1, 1950 the government had opened to the public the mausoleums of Ottoman Sultans and generals (Suleiman the Magnificent, Hayreddin Barbaros, and Osman Pasha among others) just a few days before the Marshal's funeral on April 12, 1950.⁴⁷ The Marshal was admired as a person of character and virtue, a historical figure evoking a mystical recollection of the ancient and famous Turkish army commanders of the Empire days, and as such his personality appealed to the old religious conservatists and to the nationalist youth. Since he was one of the heroes of the War of Liberation, the government decided to hold a state funeral.

Thousands of people from neighboring towns came to participate in his funeral; from Ankara alone there came 1,200 university students.⁴⁸ Some of the youth groups, out of respect for the memory of the Marshal, insisted that the radio cease broadcasting music. They also forced many of the cinema and theatres in Istanbul to close, despite the fact that the Governor had ruled that they could stay open. On the day of the funeral a crowd estimated at about 150,000 gathered around the mosque of Beyazit in which the last rites were to be performed and, led by a religious group which opposed a modern funeral as a violation of Islam, completely upset the official program. The call to prayer was read in Arabic, against the law. The coffin was snatched from the gun carriage and carried on the shoulders of the crowd led by chanting *imams*. All shops on the route of the funeral procession were forced to close their doors in token of respect. Despite the presence of the army—unprepared for such an event any-

⁴⁷ *Ayın Tarihi*, April 1950, pp. 2, 10. Jäschke, *op.cit.*, p. 120.

⁴⁸ *Ayın Tarihi*, April 1950, p. 6.

way—control of the area along the route to the cemetery was entirely in the hands of the crowd led by religious fanatics.⁴⁹ For a time there was fear that there might be a repetition of the religious reaction of 1909 known as the “31 March Event,” because there was again a display of antagonism against “modernism,” “intellectuals,” and “secularism.” However, the demonstration ended with the burial of the Marshal; although later seventy-six persons were arrested.

After the events at the funeral, the National Party was accused of having instigated the disorders because it had not been allowed to organize the funeral of its own Chairman, the Marshal, and because the party leaders could not take their place in the funeral ceremonies among the members of the Marshal’s family.⁵⁰ Since the Republicans and İnönü were considered personally opposed to the Marshal, the absence of a state funeral would have proved that there was, indeed, antagonism to the Marshal.⁵¹

This event had a crucial “cooling” effect on major political parties (except the National Party) and forced them to adopt a cautious common attitude on religious propaganda. Nevertheless, religious propaganda, in the form of promises to permit greater religious freedom, to allow the wearing of

⁴⁹ For details see *Vatan, Ulus* of April 11-14, 1950. Jäschke, *loc.cit.*

⁵⁰ *Ulus*, April 22, 1950.

⁵¹ Apparently the request of the National Party to organize a funeral of its own was motivated by a desire to perpetuate this impression. It was even rumored that just prior to the general election the National Party intended to organize *mevlut* (requiems) for the Marshal in twenty İstanbul mosques in order to create a state of emotionalism and win the elections. The National Party denied any such intentions and attributed them to the Republicans and Democrats, who had become concerned over the growth of the National Party. It may be correct to assume that the National Party did intend to benefit from the Marshal’s great popularity, but in any case it did not organize the religious reaction (*Vatan*, April 20, 1950). The Premier, as usually happens on occasions of mass reaction in Turkey, saw in the outbreak “the meddling of a foreign power” but never proved it. The Democratic Party maintained a rather significant silence on the Marshal, even at the time of his death, despite the fact that his prestige greatly helped that party during the 1946 elections and immediately thereafter.

fez, to open religious schools, etc., was used in the election campaign of 1950 and thereafter, mainly by opposition parties. The most generous promises were, undoubtedly, those made by the National Party in the belief that they would bring it immediate popular support, but the party had a limited success.

The hierarchies of all the political parties ostensibly favored secularism and were cautious in the use of religious propaganda. The local organizations, however, away from government control used religious propaganda extensively, with little regard for its possible effects.

The Republicans avoided discussing religious liberalization until they realized that other parties, despite denials, used it as a means of gaining popular support. Faced with this situation and pressed from within the party for more religious freedom, they ended by going further than anticipated and made the compromises mentioned previously. (The Democratic Party Government permitted the reading in Arabic of the *ezan*, call to prayer, after it won the elections in 1950, and the Koran was read over the state radio in accordance with its promises, which were denied during 1946-1950). This liberalization created discontent among intellectuals, but villagers and townspeople were pleased with it because prayers in Turkish, chiefly the *ezan*, lacked the mystical appeal they had in Arabic.⁵² Encouraged by this and similar religious

⁵² Few people understood Arabic, but to many it appealed as "the language of the Prophet and of the Koran." It was reported that after 1950 there was a sharp increase in the sale of religious publications. The Koran in Arabic script, imported from Egypt, sold 250,000 copies in one year. Other religious publications, some of them intended to teach Arabic and some to disseminate nationalism among the Kurds, were sold by the thousands. Few books in Turkey had ever sold more than a few thousands copies a year. As soon as the demand for religious publications became known, several printing firms requested use of the old script printing presses left over from the Ottoman days, in order to "save currency from being spent abroad." *Cumhuriyet*, November 15, 1951. From 1951 to 1954, 628,000 books were sold by the Presidency of Religious Affairs; Reed, "Religious Life," p. 118.

liberties, additional outbursts against secularism took place.⁵³

The establishment of a multi-party system in Turkey produced as a consequence a more liberal interpretation of secularism. This liberalization, although allowing wider scope to religious education and practices, has not yet affected, to any large extent, the state institutions. It may be said that religious liberalization was a natural consequence of democracy and a necessary adjustment to it. One may add, furthermore, that the Republican regime had become so deeply rooted and its institutions so generally accepted that not much ground was left for the restoration of theocracy. One may go as far as to say that after twenty-five years of enforced secularism, the religious revival in Turkey results from a genuine spiritual demand for a purified and modernized Islam and that this demand may force a reform within Islam itself. (One may hope that the sixteen [as of 1956] Clergy and Divinity Schools in Turkey with their supposedly modern curriculum will produce enlightened teachers to give a contemporary interpretation to Islam in Turkey.)

If one considers, however, the actual reasons for religious liberalization and the socio-cultural background against which this liberalization took place, one may not be too optimistic. The liberalization demands started in December 1946, under the guise of a defensive measure against the leftist currents and were taken over by political parties.

Liberalization of Islam in Turkey prematurely freed the obscurantist, the charmer, and the entire reactionary group in towns and villages before the modern schools and modern teaching could penetrate even half of them to establish a safe

⁵³ A resolution was introduced at the Konya D. P. Convention of 1951, to abolish the hat and introduce the fez, restore the veil and Arab letters, destroy the existing statues and reestablish the *Şeriat* and polygamy. At Afyon, a deputy, Huseyin Nabat, requested that Islam become the state religion. *Cahiers*, XXIII, 1951, pp. 114-115. For similar statements by other Democratic Party members—H. F. Ustaoglu (Samsun) and Ömer Bilen (Ankara)—see Jäschke, *op.cit.*, p. 139. For a view on religious reactions, see Rustow, "Politics," pp. 98-101.

foothold on behalf of secularism.⁵⁴ Turkey in 1946 was not in danger of being de-Islamized, but rather of not having established secularism on sufficiently safe grounds. The liberalization of Islam, the various restrictions imposed on the curricula of some schools, and the curtailment of various cultural reforms since 1948 have helped undermine the secularist spirit to the benefit of Islam, not the enlightened progressive Islam, but the same old obscurantist, fatalistic type which has dominated the Turkish masses since time immemorial. One may say that the changes, if any, in the inner structure and understanding of Islam in Turkey which have taken place in the Republic have been generally limited to the upper classes—that is, to the same group which was already secularist in its thinking and way of life; the villages have been little affected.

In discussing secularism in Turkey one is apt to overlook the fact that this principle was not voluntarily accepted at the end of a natural and peaceful evolution, but was imposed upon the society by Mustafa Kemal's modernist-secularist group taking advantage of special historical circumstances from 1919 to 1923, which had discredited the Sultan-Caliph. Had not Mustafa Kemal acted quickly in these decisive days, Turkey would have remained a primitive theocratic state, and the sordid struggle between the secularists and conserva-

⁵⁴ H. A. Reed reports that the Ministry of Interior expressed concern over the reactionary tendencies of roughly more than a hundred obscurantist religious journals and reviews. He doubts the accuracy of the figure on the basis of official statistics, which list only ten to twelve religious publications for 1951 and 1952. Reed, "Religious Life," pp. 118. Actually many of the religious publications labeled themselves as "literary" (10 in 1951, 27 in 1952), "social" (10 in 1951, 22 in 1952), and "political" (110 in 1951, 225 in 1952); *Istatistik Yıllığı*, 1953, p. 172. Presently a number of periodicals such as the *Hak Yolu* (God's Way), *Hilâl* (Crescent), *Serdengeçti* (Self Sacrifice), *İslâm*, *Hür Adam* (Free Man), just to mention a few, freely disseminate their views which, in most instances are critical of modernization. A large number of pamphlets are also issued which bitterly attack all that was done in the past thirty years. Sample titles from the *Serdengeçti* series: "How They Destroyed a Generation," "Why Does This Nation Cry?"

tives, which started at the beginning of the nineteenth century, would have continued with the secularists on the losing side.

The modernization of Turkey was possible only through secularism, and the restrictions imposed upon religion in the 'thirties and early 'forties were not the result of inner animosity to religion, but the result of practical and urgent considerations of holding Islam in check and letting the reforms take root in the society. It was only by means of somewhat stern and excessive measures that the Republic found itself on relatively safe secular foundations.

The Democratic Party, which has been in power since 1950, and the National Assembly, despite their liberal interpretation of secularism, have so far taken care not to allow religious reaction to wipe out the reforms. The danger of reaction does not lie in the present government, whose members belong to the secularist generation of the Republic; it lies in the future generations which may come to power and, lacking the relative prestige of the present leaders, may give in to demands for restoring Islam's priority in government affairs.

Political parties seek votes by promising additional religious freedom; governments incline to sacrifice secularism to maintain popularity; and politicians who have acquired positions through religious propaganda are ready to go to extremes to preserve them. Conservatives and religious groups find in this situation an admirable opportunity to undermine the modernist reforms and the regime itself.⁵⁵

It is true that the present-day secularists of Turkey form

⁵⁵ As long as the economic development continues at a rate high enough to effect changes from the inside, to alter the traditional pattern of thinking, and to break resistance to change, the secularist reforms are relatively safe. The turning point will arrive when this development slows down and demands for material benefits are not met. The only way to calm the aroused masses would be to use religion to stamp out worldly materialistic demands. It is too well known that Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) promoted religion in Turkey, partly for foreign policy purposes, but mostly with the purpose of dominating the dissatisfied masses in the interior, where the socio-economic balance had been broken by the penetration of foreign capital and the local industries destroyed.

a fairly large group, although their interpretation of secularism varies. If left on their own, if allowed to use freedom of discussion with some latitude, they may successfully affect the thinking of the society, for the actual battle between secularists and clericals usually does not take place in the government, but in the society at large, each group trying to affect it in its own way and through its own means.

The purpose of both groups is to convince the moderates.⁵⁶ The militant clericals hammer and scoff incessantly and insidiously at the women's Western dresses, at the present modern family system, civil marriages, the Latin alphabet, at those who do not follow the Islamic rites (fasting, praying), and even at those who associate with Christian foreigners or study in foreign countries or marry non-Muslims.⁵⁷ Hatred and discrimination against non-Muslims is frequently part of their program, and the four to five million followers of the Alevi (Shii) Sect, who are Turks by culture and tradition more than any other group in the country, are not spared at all.⁵⁸ On the political front, the clericalists use democratic slogans and organizations as a cover for their activities. They demand that the Presidency of Religious Affairs be taken from the Prime Minister's Office and be made an independent one using the funds from the *Vakıfs*,⁵⁹ the old pious foundations.

The secularists are hampered in their struggle by the restricted freedom of discussion. In Turkey, one cannot openly

⁵⁶ On the groups involved in debate over religious liberalization in Turkey, see also Rustow, "Politics," pp. 101ff.

⁵⁷ One may see in the Beyazit book dealers' center quite a few pamphlets put out by the religious groups advising "young Muslim girls" not to marry people of other faiths.

⁵⁸ The Shii (Alevi) have been accused of communist practices by the Orthodox Sunnis: See Fahrettin Erdoğan, *7 Milyonluk Alevi Türklerine Kızıl Komünist Damgasını Vuran Sebülürreşatçılara Cevap* (Answer to the Publishers of *Sebülürreşat*, Who Have Labeled as Red Communists the 7 Million Alevi Turks), Ankara, 1951. On this sect, see J. K. Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes*, Hartford, 1937. See my Chapter 1.

⁵⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, January 5, 1949; Rustow, "Politics," p. 103. On the activities of clericalists, see also Reed, "Secularism and Islam in Turkish Politics," pp. 337-338.

discuss the essence of religion, its desirability and place in life; one cannot compare it with other religions from a critical viewpoint lest one be called infidel (*dinsiz*) or communist.

The future of Islam in Turkey is not clear. Despite some encouraging individual attempts to reinterpret Islam in the light of contemporary views,⁶⁰ it still lags far behind in intellectual development. Islam has not acquired the features of a pure faith raising itself above mundane interests and views, but on the contrary continues to preserve the character of universal dogma covering all human activities, and as such is being used as a vehicle for all purposes.

A good many intellectuals, although they believe in the pragmatic social value of Islam, are apathetic to it in their personal life chiefly because Islam, in their eyes, has not raised itself to the level of their own education and expectations. But few of them feel inclined to undertake the task of reforming Islam; they are neither equipped nor inspired to do so.⁶¹ They find, in the light of their own Western nationalistic-materialistic indoctrination that Islam is still irreconcilable with the truly modern Turkish society they want to build; a dynamic nationalistic society based on the monogamous family, placing value on moral and physical self-exertion, and having national characteristics of its own. They accuse Islam of having prevented the Ottoman Empire from acquiring its own distinctly national characteristics and of having wastefully exhausted the human and national resources for the defense of Islamic myths.

They claim that Islam was rejected in Turkish life only to the extent that it was an obstacle to the establishment of

⁶⁰ For some modern Islamists in Turkey, see Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey," pp. 276-277, and "Religious Life," p. 140; also Samiha Ayverdi, *et al.*, *Kenan Rifai ve Yirminci Asrın Işığında Müslümanlık*, İstanbul, 1951 (a rather exalted praise of Kenan Rifai).

⁶¹ Professor B. Lewis thinks that the Turks will not produce a Luther or Calvin, because they lack theoretical genius, but that they may produce an Anglican Church type of Mosque. See "Turkey: Westernization," p. 327.

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a national Turkish state. They believe that this objective has not yet been fully reached, and that until it has, should Turkey go back to orthodox Islam she will drown sooner or later in the Muslim sea. This should not be allowed to happen. The only possible reconciliation between Islam and nationalism in Turkey depends on Islam's becoming Turkish and reformed.⁶² This, however, in view of the powerful social and political forces now operating against secularists in Turkey, seems an extremely difficult task.

⁶² For a declaration of one of the party leaders to this effect, see Emile Marmorstein, "Religious Opposition to Nationalism in the Middle East," *International Affairs*, July 1952, pp. 349ff. Some believe that Islam in Turkey today is both Turkish and modern. See citation from a pamphlet by H. Z. Atatug in Rustow, "Politics," p. 103. One may suspect that this is said in order to conform to the nationalistic trend.

CHAPTER 11

STATISM – *DEVLETÇİLİK* – AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

THE Republic was established on the fundamental idea that all sovereignty belonged to the people and that the National Assembly was its depository. Thus the Legislature, following the model of parliamentary democracies, acquired supremacy. This, however, was only a theoretical supremacy, for the Republican Party controlled the elections and the government. Thus, the Executive had in fact become supreme during the one-party rule during the period from 1923 to 1946. Consequently the government emerged as the omnipotent body by identifying itself with the nation and the state.

The Republican Party itself was considered the personification of the nation, the concrete expression of the state, and therefore immune to criticism.¹ The theory of government for the people turned out to be in practice the people for the government. The idea of state omnipotence inherited from the Ottoman Empire, was preserved and expanded with the justification that the state acted no longer according to the monarch's will but fulfilled the mandate of the sovereign people. The state based on this omnipotence found it only too natural to interfere in every conceivable field of activity.

The liberalization after 1946 brought forth demands for modifying the concept of an omnipotent state to the advantage of the individual. These demands aimed first at altering the political philosophy of the state and, secondly and chiefly,

¹ *Kuvvet* (editorial), January 2, 1946 (Köprülü's views). For the history of economic statism, capital accumulation, and social differentiation, see my Chapters 3 and 4, also Chapter 12. (We use "state" *devlet* close to the meaning of "government" in the English speaking world.)

at limiting the state's functions in the economic field. (Statism has been a Constitutional principle since 1937.)

According to the defenders of the first view, the source of the individual's rights was other than the state's will. The Democrats asserted that human rights originated from sources above the state and beyond its reach,² and declared that the Republican Party could never call itself "democratic" because that party's by-laws accepted the idea that the source of all human rights was the state. It was on the basis of that assumption, they declared, that the Republicans had abolished all political parties in the past.

A systematic defense of the classical theory of natural rights was undertaken by the *Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti* (Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas). The Association represented to a great extent the views of the opposition and was composed mainly of university members and newspapermen. The Association defined in its bylaws the individual as capable, through his own moral ability, of discerning Good and Evil. (This contradicted the Islamic dogmatist view that the individual lacked such an ability.) Therefore, every individual was entitled to equal freedom and rights (Article 1). Human society, according to the Association's bylaws, was founded on property, individual morality, and honesty (Article 3). It was regulated not only by state laws, but also according to the individual's own natural aptitudes. Furthermore, the state's authority became legitimate only when the individual freely decided to accept the duties and obligations it imposed upon him.

The welfare of the individual should be the state's supreme goal (Articles 5, 7, 8). In consequence, the existing state philosophy needed to be modified in accordance with that goal, and all activities—political, educational, and economic—needed to be directed at achieving it in a natural way,

² *Vatan*, October 14, 1947 (Adnan Menderes' remarks).

without imposition from above.³ (Liberal in political matters, the Association adopted rather conservative views on cultural and social problems as a result of its leaning toward natural rights.) The defenders of liberalism, representing a general tendency in the country, secured their first and major victory through acceptance of a law which granted autonomy to universities.⁴

The strongest criticism of the state concerned its activities in the economic field. Two social groups criticized statism, but for different reasons of their own. The first group, composed of farmers and low income groups, was against statism because it achieved some industry by lowering their own standard of living.⁵ The second group was composed of those who had accumulated capital and sought economic security to invest it. The state control of the economy hindered their economic ambitions.

The first group formed the great majority of the population and provided the votes which, in a multi-party system, could decide the fate of the government. The second group had the financial means to back and the intellectual ability to guide a movement opposed to economic statism.

The criticism of statism was brought to a climax by the end of the favorable conditions under which Turkey's economy had operated during the war years. The demand from foreign markets for Turkish goods greatly decreased at the end of the war, and Turkish commodities, abnormally high-priced because of the demand during the war, could not compete with other cheaper goods on the international market. The measures known as *7 Eylül Kararları* (the September 7, Measures) aimed at facilitating the transition of the country's

³ *Vatan*, October 2, 1947, April 30, 1948.

⁴ On this law and the debates on it see *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 24, pp. 105-106 (C. Bilsel), Law 4936 of June 15, 1946).

⁵ See Fethi Çelikbaş, "Devlet ve Hususi Teşebbüs İktisadı," *Türk Ekonomisi*, February 1949, pp. 27-29.

economy to peacetime conditions.⁶ However, because of the way in which these measures were applied, they aggravated rather than eased the economic pressure, to the detriment of the low income groups and of the entire economy in general.

Thus a certain economic stagnation resulted during 1946-1948. Business activity was rather slow,⁷ and this was attributed to the state control of the economy, and to the lack of favorable conditions for capital investment.⁸ Consequently, the groups which had accumulated capital demanded that the state limit its economic activities, provide political stability and security,⁹ and establish an atmosphere favorable to capital investment. The new political system they demanded was to be based on respect for private property. Private enterprise was to become the characteristic of the economy, and profit the incentive for all economic activities. They demanded that the enterprises presently in the hands of the state be turned over to individuals.¹⁰ Attempts were made to define specifically the fields into which the state could venture. The question of social security, according to Fethi Çelikbaş, who became Minister of Economy in the Democratic Government and was one of the leaders of the Freedom Party, could be satisfactorily solved in economies dominated by private capital, as had been demonstrated by experience in some capitalist countries.

Statism, in the view of this group, had secured economic independence, had established the basis for a national economy, and had provided protection for the development of a native industry; with this its historical mission came to an end. Thus statism, they declared, though a cherished principle

⁶ These measures and their political effects have been studied in some detail in Chapter 6. On the situation of Turkey at the end of the war, see also A. C. Edwards, "Impact of the War on Turkey," *International Affairs*, July 1946, pp. 389ff. For a general view on the debates on statism, see Wayne S. Vucinich, "Turkey 1948," *Current History*, January 1949, p. 23.

⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, June 27, 29, 1946.

⁸ *Tasvir*, April 21, 1946; *Akşam*, June 12, 1948.

⁹ *Türk Ekonomisi*, No. 68, February 1949, p. 29.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 83, May 1950, p. 101.

at the beginning of the Republic, has now become an obstacle to further economic development.¹¹

The Economic Congress held in İstanbul from November 22 to 27, 1948 expressed even more distinctly the new views of the middle class on statism.¹² The three committees, on statism, Foreign Trade, and Tax Reform respectively, formulated the demands of the business world. The first committee stated that since the state had completed its pioneer work in establishing and expanding economic activities, it should henceforth limit its activities to basic public services such as education, communications, defense, postal services, and research and supervision, and leave the economy to the individual, who should not have to face the state both as supervisor and competitor.¹³ The Statism Committee also demanded for private enterprise privileges equal to those of the hitherto favored state enterprises. It also emphasized the fact that private enterprise should not be allowed to establish monopolies, and recommended that foreign goods entering the country should be submitted to high tariffs in order to protect the local manufacturers. The Committee stated also that the state should remain active in those economic fields into

¹¹ *Türk. İk. Mec.*, December 1948, pp. 39ff.; *ibid.*, January 1948, p. 20; *ibid.*, February 1948, p. 29.

¹² See *Siyasal İlimler Mecmuası*, cited also as *Siyasal İl. Mec.*, January 1949, pp. 461ff.; Jäschke, *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942-1951*, p. 90.

¹³ *Türkiye İktisat Mecmuası*, December 1948, pp. 7ff. A typical example of the state's competition, supervision, and bureaucratic mentality in economy is evident in the case of the Kavaklıdere Cigarette Company. This enterprise was established in 1944 by three businessmen with the purpose of selling Turkish cigarettes on western European markets. Indeed, after the war the acute shortage of tobacco in Europe provided an excellent opportunity for Turkish cigarettes to get a solid foothold there. The government, however, showed great reluctance to cooperate. A great number of bureaucratic difficulties were raised. The Director General of State Monopolies opposed the use of the crescent on these cigarettes on the ground that it was the label of the State Monopolies. This difficulty only delayed the project for six months, and it was overcome by rather devious methods. Afterwards new difficulties arose, and by the time production started almost two years later the tobacco shortage in Europe had already been met. Finally the company declared itself bankrupt and put in storage its very expensive machinery. (The associates were L. Banat, A. Kadri, and C. And.)

which private capital could not enter, either because it saw no profit or because it lacked the necessary large capital.¹⁴

The Committee on Foreign Trade recommended measures which would raise the quality of production and would stimulate exports "even to the detriment of internal consumption."¹⁵ All export restrictions were to be abolished while imports were to be limited by the state in cooperation with the businessmen. The Committee on Tax Reform recommended a total tax revision and the abolition of the tax on agricultural products in accordance with the new needs of the country.

The Union of Industrialists of Istanbul had already published a report claiming that the state enterprises, and especially the Sumer Bank (textile bank), had become harmful to the nation.¹⁶ The state enterprises were accused in the National Assembly of having lowered the country's living standard.¹⁷ The businessmen, moreover, demanded respect and acceptance by society, different from the past, when their occupation was considered rather undignified by a society accustomed to considering economic activities as of secondary value. For instance, the Businessmen's Association of Istanbul demanded, in addition to measures to promote the accumulation of capital, that government officers should act respectfully and not treat them any longer as "thieves with a necktie." The business world claimed, with due reason, that the eastern part of the country had a closed type of primitive economy which had remained in isolation. It was, therefore, necessary to let private capital enter that area in order to assure the flow into the market of certain basic commodities, such as meat, which the East produced, and ultimately to create there the "economic and social revolution" which the state had failed to achieve.¹⁸

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁵ *Siyasal Il. Mec.*, January 1949, pp. 463ff. ¹⁶ *Vatan*, May 12, 1945.

¹⁷ *Ayn Tarihi*, May 1945, pp. 132, 169, 183, *passim*. (views of Hikmet Bayur).

¹⁸ *Vatan*, November 23, 1949; *ibid.*, October 5, 1947 (Bayar in

Along with the businessmen's demands for liberalization, others expressed the view that liberalism had outlived its age, that the state's interference in public life and its authority needed to be reduced, but not totally discarded, because the state was still needed to supervise society's transition to a new political system in which ideas could be formed around well-defined issues.¹⁹ Similarly others emphasized the fact that in addition to economic initiative by private individuals there was need for a general policy to develop and promote the spirit of initiative in all fields.

Statism in Turkey was subject to a similar cross fire of criticism from abroad. The United States criticized Turkey for not sufficiently freeing the economy, and a certain moral pressure was exercised in this respect to ease the government control of the economy.²⁰ Thornburg's report, which was a frank analysis of the Turkish economy but strictly from the viewpoint of American economy,²¹ expressed such a criticism. Thornburg assumed in his preface "that the government of Turkey and the people themselves wish American aid in effective forms, and therefore that so far as they can, they will bring about such internal conditions as will make that aid possible. . . . Turkey must adopt methods suited to its own conditions—even though not necessarily to ours—if it wishes to achieve the same type of individual and national freedom at which our own national policy is aimed. If Turkey does not wish freedom, American aid will not be useful either to the Turks or to American policy."²² On the other hand Turk-

Erzurum). He believed that it was necessary to industrialize that area. *Vatan*, March 5, 1948 (letter of F. Arna).

¹⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, September 1, 1946 (A. H. Başar); *ibid.* (editorial), January 8, 1948.

²⁰ See *Türkiye İktisat Mecmuası*, December 1948, p. 23; also Lewis, "Recent Developments in Turkey," p. 323.

²¹ Osman Okyar, "Mr. Thornburg ve Türk Ekonomisi," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, July 1948, pp. 288-303.

²² Max Weston Thornburg, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*, New York, 1949, p. viii. (Thornburg's views had been given great publicity in

ish newspapers complained that England accused the Turks of not following a sufficiently strong and complete statist (dirige) policy.²³ It is indisputable, however, that as the political influence of the United States grew in Turkey after 1947, American economic views had a definite impact on Turkey, probably strongest during 1949-1953.

The political parties during 1946-1950 adopted certain views on statism in accordance with these internal and international influences. The Democratic Party's views on the subject, some of which became government policy after 1950, were expressed by Celal Bayar, the original promoter of statist policy in Turkey. According to him, the new statism was to be a middle-of-the-road solution. Economic liberalism being a part of history, was to be replaced by a moderate protectionist policy in industry and agriculture. In Bayar's view, countries with sufficient capital and manpower could afford a liberal economic policy, but since the private capital accumulated in Turkey was still limited, the country could not adopt economic liberalism.²⁴ Celal Bayar believed, nevertheless, that in view of the amount of accumulated private capital in Turkey during the previous two decades,²⁵ the state's economic role needed to be adjusted accordingly.²⁶

Turkey in *Vatan* even before the report was published.) For a succinct but thorough analysis of Turkish economy in 1951, see William H. Nicholls, "Domestic Trade in an Underdeveloped Country—Turkey," *The Journal of Political Economy*, December 1951, pp. 463-480.

²³ *Tanin* (editorial), September 19, 1947. The late H. C. Yalçın, who wrote the editorial, used this expression to illustrate the situation: *Açıkçası iki cami ortasında kalmış bir binemaz durumundayız.* (Frankly, we are like some one stranded between two mosques and without worship.)

²⁴ *Vatan*, April 7, 8, 1947 (Bayar in İzmir); also *Celal Bayar Diyor ki* (edited by Nazmi Sevgen) İstanbul, 1951, pp. 162-164.

²⁵ *Millet* (originally established by Remzi Oğuz Arık in 1942) was published under the direction of Cemal Kutay, the biographer of Celal Bayar. Kutay wrote in 1946 that privately-owned industries were not properly regulated and that individuals in this field believed that Bayar would provide the necessary measures to facilitate their work. If Bayar succeeded in fulfilling their expectations, he would have much more support from the middle classes than he would expect. *Millet*, No. 4, February 1946, p. 3.

²⁶ In 1935, in a report submitted to the Premier, Celal Bayar had ad-

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The state, according to Bayar, should not intervene in the economy directly by investing its own capital, developing industry, and competing with the individual in all fields. Its function should be limited to coordinating and regulating the forces participating in the economic process. Private enterprise henceforth should have priority and the state should intervene only in these fields in which private capital did not achieve the desired results. Refuting accusations that he was the principal promoter of statism in Turkey, Celal Bayar stated that while he was not opposed to statism as a whole, he was against its excesses and extremes in the form of state capitalism. The worst form of statism, according to him, was the accumulation of state capital by heavy taxes, which in the end produced results inimical to the social purpose of statism by lowering living and cultural standards.²⁷

The Democratic Party Convention of 1947 accepted a resolution embodying Celal Bayar's views on statism as described above without any major debate. Some claimed that had the question of statism been thoroughly explored and debated in that convention, it would have been rejected.²⁸

vocated statism as a means of coordinating the scattered national economic forces "to utilize properly the national energy and follow the trend of thought in the world economy." Nevertheless, private enterprise, he thought at that time, could still play an important part in economic development. (*Millet*, No. 3, February 1946, p. 3.) Celal Bayar changed his views in 1946. According to him, the state had played its part in the economy by helping individuals accumulate enough capital to invest in larger economic ventures. The state's role in the economy now, in his view, should be regulated in such a way as to allow more freedom to private capital. (*Cumhuriyet*, June 30, 1946 [Bayar in Adana].) Private and state capital should enjoy in the future equal treatment on the part of government. State capital would be invested in areas offering no profit for private enterprise (communications, defense, postal services) and some of the state enterprises would be sold to private capital. (The latter promise has never materialized because of the public reaction it produced.) Competition would regulate all economic exchanges. In trade, non-intervention was to be the principle. (*Tasvir*, April 29, 1946.)

²⁷ *Vatan*, April 7, 1947 (Bayar in İzmir); also *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 162-164; *Ulus* (editorial), June 18, 1948; *Vatan*, April 7, 1947; *Millet*, July 11, 1946, p. 3; Celal Bayar, "Devletçiliğe Dair," *Millet*, December 19, 1946, pp. 3ff.

²⁸ *Yeni Sabah*, April 1, 1948 (Mustafa Kentli). (Kentli was "purged")

The Republican Party, following the general trend of thought on statism and anxious to preserve its popularity with all social groups, and in particular with the middle class, changed its old view on the subject. The Republicans claimed that statism originally was intended as a quick means to raise living standards, and that initially the Government had no intention of restricting private enterprise. Though wartime conditions had necessitated some restrictions, now that the war was over statism could be adjusted to the new postwar situation. In the Republicans' view, statism in Turkey was not the result of any economic theory but the outcome of historical circumstances and of the country's immediate needs. Since there was no ideological difficulty, the concept of statism could be modified to suit the country's new demands. Other Republicans advised a shift in statism's emphasis from economic to purely social purposes, because a state having broad social aims (a welfare state) could curb the class conflicts expected to arise as a result of industrial expansion and the growth of a working class.²⁹

The Republican Party Convention of 1947 debated and finally agreed to amend the principle of statism in its program by limiting its scope in favor of private enterprise and private capital.³⁰ Accordingly, statism was more liberally redefined and the state's economic responsibilities were specifically established,³¹ so as not to leave any chance for its expansion

from the D. P. in 1948 for having opposed the leaders' domination.) During the discussions on statism only about 100 out of a total of 906 delegates were present in the convention hall.

²⁹ *Akşam* (editorial), January 25, 1947; *Ulus* (editorial), January 17, 1948; *ibid.* (editorial), November 29, 1948; also *Türk. İkt. Mec.*, No. 57, April 1953, p. 223; *Ulus*, January 20, 1947 (Sadı İrmak); also *Akşam* (editorial), January 25, 1947.

³⁰ *CHP Yedinci Kurultayı Tutanağı*, pp. 350ff. *Ulus* (editorial), January 17, 1948, also December 2, 1947. It may be mentioned that there were only 125 Republican delegates in the room while statism was debated. The total number of delegates was about 700.

³¹ Günaltay's Republican cabinet in 1949 included in its program a plan for economic development, and an expert was sought for this purpose. (*BMMTD*, Session 8.4, Vol. 25, p. 309.) This was interpreted by some

beyond the desired limit, as had happened prior to 1945. The operation of heavy industry, mines, power installations, national defense, and communications were to be retained by the state, but the remaining fields were to be left to the individual. The Republicans accepted the thesis that the state should intervene in the economy only when private capital was insufficient to initiate certain enterprises needed for the public good, or in operations which provided no profit for private capital. Under no circumstances, however, was the state to go into agriculture or other economic activities likely to raise the cost of living.³²

Statism in Turkey was originally necessitated by and then evolved in accordance with the socio-economic conditions in the country rather than according to a well-established theory. One may safely assume that the same will be true in the immediate future. The main difficulty which faces economic development in Turkey arises from lack of capital and an atmosphere conducive to investment, and above all from the backward mentality of private enterprise, which sees an exclusive relation between economic development and social welfare. There is a class in Turkey which demands to take over and run the state enterprises, but without having demonstrated that it is really able to do so.³³ Individual enterprise has not produced any convincing evidence (and certainly it has not been given much chance) that the country's economy will be better off if placed entirely under private management. On the contrary, overlooking the country's semi-colonial status in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries under a system of liberal economy, this group still supports its

people as an attempt by the Republicans to continue the policy of statism. This interpretation resulted from a confusion of state planning with general planning for economic development. In general, the confusion about statism and its limits has been one of Turkish economic policy's chief characteristics. *Tanin* (editorial), September 19, 1947.

³² *Vatan*, December 2, 1947. For a general description of the position of political parties on statism, see *Vatan*, March 18, 1950 (O. N. Bayman).

³³ Lewis, "Recent Developments," pp. 329ff.

own claim to manage industry with half-assimilated slogans of nineteenth century liberalism.

Private enterprise proved, whenever it had the opportunity, that its unique motive in business was profit secured in a manner closely remindful of the early days of the Industrial Revolution,⁸⁴ utterly disregarding the workers and the public at large. It is the lack of social responsibility on the part of the new entrepreneurial class which creates general distrust of private enterprise. No wonder that the public in general has viewed with hostility and termed as outright gifts out of the taxpayers' money the attempts made to pass on to private enterprise the state-owned factories. The government bureaucracy, which has generally regarded private enterprise with hostility, looks with pride to the bulk of industry in Turkey as created chiefly through its efforts and ability, and points out that the methods of production and management in state enterprises are superior to those in private ones. They also claim that state enterprises are motivated by social considerations while the private ones are not. The past few decades of statism have had odd psychological effects on the public and those who acquire wealth. The public tends to suspect generally the methods through which wealth was acquired by disregarding the fact that it might have resulted from initiative and originality. The rich, on the other hand, acting as though conscience-stricken at holding property and not sharing hardship with the rest of the society, deny being wealthy, adopt extremist attitudes towards discussions involving social injustice, or simply plunge into squandering their wealth with the haste of a man who fears that all will come soon to an end.

⁸⁴ This entrepreneur class is eager to solicit financial assistance from abroad, but it shows utter obstinacy in reviewing its old views on management, and especially on labor relations current with new developments, with the dogmatic view that "such methods won't work in Turkey." American businessmen who have newer ideas on labor-management relations and on business in general and are not afraid to defend them in public are looked upon with as much suspicion as the labor leaders demanding wage increases or trade union rights. But foreign capital has not hesitated to establish its monopoly whenever it had a chance. For an example of oil monopoly prior to 1938, see Nicholls, "Domestic Trade," pp. 467-468.

STATISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

There is a sense of urgency for economic development in Turkey. The country is still far from a level of economic development that would provide an adequate standard of living for the entire population. This urgency is evidenced by the fact that the demand for industrialization and economic development now comes directly from the people, who are in need of additional employment outlets. (Deputy candidates seek office by promising factories to their constituents, and once in office, if influential in the government, they succeed in keeping their promises, even if at times the factory has more prestige than economic value.)

Private enterprise in Turkey depends financially, politically, and socially on the state in securing foreign exchange, protection against internal disturbances and foreign competition, and correcting its incompetence in providing for adequate social welfare. Moreover, the state's role in life has become an accepted pattern since the early days of the Ottoman Empire. People are apt to decline all personal responsibility, expecting all that is needed from the state and placing the blame on it for everything that is wrong in the society.

Thus, the state unwittingly continues to play a three-sided and partly contradictory role; first, by promoting private enterprise and facilitating the accumulation of private capital; second, by developing state enterprises, thereby expanding its own field of activities; and third, by being a welfare state.

After 1950, there were some serious attempts to ameliorate statism and assign some of the state-owned factories to private enterprise,³⁵ but these attempts were only half success-

³⁵ On the liberalization of statism, see H.A.R.P., "Turkey under the Democratic Party," *The World Today*, September 1953, pp. 385ff; also "Democracy in Turkey," *Contemporary Review*, August 1954, pp. 82-83; Lewis, "Recent Developments," p. 328; K. Grunwald, "Dawn and Twilight of Statism," *Economic News*, v, October-November 1952, pp. 33-42. Also "Where Capitalists are Popular," (interview with Menderes) *U. S. News*, December 4, 1953, pp. 77-79; C. B. Randall, "Can We Invest in Turkey," *Atlantic*, November 1953, pp. 48-50; see also article by ex-U.S.

ful. The forces and conditions described above showed that statism in Turkey was to stay, for awhile at least.

There was, nevertheless, a distinct shift in the new statism. The pressure on agriculture was removed and the state concentrated on developing agriculture through farm mechanization, farm credit, and subsidized farm prices that were well above world prices. Industrial workers and salaried personnel were taxed to support public services. With the shift in support of agriculture, privately owned industry was deprived of foreign currency to buy raw materials or equipment from abroad, which resulted in its partial paralysis—in the same way that industrialization in 1935-1945 paralyzed agriculture.

Yet this “new statism” in agriculture resulted in the improved welfare of only a small number of landowners and neglected the population at large. As William H. Nicholls, one of the members of the International Bank Mission to Turkey which drew a comprehensive report in 1951 recommending support for the small farmers, wrote four years later:

“Through 1953, the Turkish farm mechanization program has probably directly benefited only 25,000-27,500 [scarcely over 1 per cent] of Turkey’s farm families. These few families probably enjoyed average annual gross cash incomes in excess of \$15,000 each and were the recipient of at least 25 per cent of the public farm credit outstanding to all Turkish farmers at the end of 1952. . . . However, the arrival of the tractor has not directly helped Turkey’s 2.5 million small farmers, of whom a substantial majority still used wooden plows. . . . Turkey has tended to follow—first in industry, now in agriculture—what I would call the “showcase” type of economic development. That is at the expense of the population at large, some small group of producers is heavily protected, subsidized and otherwise favorably treated to become a symbol of progress in which few of their fellow citizens

Ambassador to Turkey, George C. McGhee, “Turkey Joins the West,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 1954, pp. 627-628; also *Challenge*, August 1954, pp. 19-23.

can share. A few islands of privilege in a sea of poverty nonetheless are a poor indicator of economic development."³⁶

Because of this, the cost of living rose fast and the government adopted the *Milli Korunma Kanunu* (National Defense Law) in 1956 by imposing heavy economic measures similar to those imposed during war years. This law is to be abolished now following the new economic policy adopted in the Fall of 1958, which, with the new economic aid from abroad is intended to settle the economy on its normal bases of supply and demand in accordance with the world markets.

Statism in Turkey is in urgent need of definition. In its present confused condition it is a hindrance to all progress. It was born in Turkey because of special political and social reasons of an urgent nature. This urgency, while still valid, has considerably eased. It is consequently possible to direct statism in such a way as to combine economic development with political democracy and yet accomplish the desired social goals. Private enterprise can regain social recognition and respect if it can evolve beyond primitive conceptions of profit making, invest its capital with due regard to social considerations, and manage its enterprises with better and more efficient methods than the state. It is also necessary for the society as a whole, and the government bureaucracy in particular, to consider economic activities as vital to the individual and society and not treat them with misgiving, as annoying necessities perturbing the serenity of a traditionalist way of life. The misconceptions and lack of understanding about economic activities inherited from past centuries must be totally eradicated. Creativity and production, ability to display one's own gifts in economy, as in other fields, should be the goal. The economic regime ought to be decided on this basis.

³⁶ William H. Nicholls, "Investment in Agriculture in Underdeveloped Countries," *American Economic Review*, May 1955, pp. 64, 67, 71. These views have been supported by Turkish sources. See also my Chapter 4, the section on peasants.

CHAPTER 12

POPULISM – HALKÇILIK – AND SOCIAL CLASSES

POPULISM was one of the three fundamental principles (republicanism and nationalism were the other two) accepted initially by the Republicans. According to this principle, the country was composed not of social classes but of individuals who belonged to various occupational groups. The establishment of more than one political party was denied on the assumption that there was identity of economic interest among the populace and that Turkey lacked large well-differentiated social classes with specific interests of their own to be defended in separate political parties.¹ The striking aspect of this argument for the rejection of the multi-party system lies in its temporary nature. In other words, if social classes came into existence and developed economic interests of their own, there would then be no justification for continuing the one-party system.

The establishment of several political parties in 1945-1946 necessitated a radical change in the social theory concerning political parties, which, in turn, meant a change in the principle of populism. This change contradicted fundamentally all that had been advocated under populism in the previous twenty years.

One of the first decisions reached by the Republican Party in its extraordinary convention of May 10, 1946 was to allow the establishment of political parties and associations based on class interest.² Following this decision, the government introduced into the National Assembly a proposal for

¹ *Tarih*, IV, İstanbul 1931, p. 168. See also my Chapter 2.

² *Ulus*, April 26, 27, May 11-15, 1946; *Ayn Tarihi*, May 1946, pp. 35ff.; Jäschke, *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942-1951*, p. 60.

amending the Association Law, which, inspired by the old monolithic philosophy of the Republican Party, had forbidden the formation of political parties, and associations (including trade unions) based on class interest.³ The implication of this amendment was that Turkey now had social classes with special economic interests of their own. That is, the government recognized the difference of economic interests, as well as of ideas, as the social basis of the new multi-party system.

The original concept of giving multi-party development a class orientation belonged to the Republican Party. Some of the underlying reasons for this decision lay in the discussions regarding the Land Reform Law, when the opposition of the landowners to land reform caused a rift in the party. The idea was that since the landowners could so strongly defend their own interests, despite allegiance to and prior support of the Republican Party, other social groups should be left free to defend their own interests through different political parties. Indeed, during the first half of 1946 the political parties in Turkey were established somewhat on the understanding that they could function on the basis of class differences.

However, after the general elections of July 21, 1946, and especially after the leftist parties began to spread rapidly, the concept of class representation gradually changed into the idea of general representation, i.e., political parties were to represent all the social groups, without any class distinction. The reason for this attitude may lie in the fact that all the conditions for a truly class party did not yet exist, that the danger of leftist influence was too great, and that there were dominant groups in the country which wanted to make minor and outward adjustments in the political system, and only insofar as they suited their own purpose.

³ *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 24, pp. 48ff. (Law No. 4919 of June 5, 1946).

The reinterpretation of populism, as it relates to the political parties of Turkey, has been subject to many fluctuations since 1946, and no political party has taken any final stand on it. As a matter of fact, all these parties have avoided such discussions; whenever attempts were made in this direction they were generally attributed to the "leftists." Whenever a political party made a move toward defining more clearly its own social basis, the next move was an immediate reaction in the opposite direction that left it, socially, more confused than ever. The Republicans felt after their convention of 1946 that they had gone too far in their outright recognition of class interest as a basis for a political party and, afraid of attracting communists into the party and thus of giving the opposition further ground for criticism, they returned to the idea of general social representation.⁴

Prior to the convention of 1947, some Republicans, however, defended the view that their party ought to have a class orientation, because by the nature of certain social reforms it had carried out—land reform, social security, worker's insurance—and its defense of populism and statism, it could attract the largest social groups, the peasants and the workers.⁵ Since the party accepted the idea of sudden (revolutionary) change and not gradual evolution, it was qualified to adopt a radical attitude on all social problems. Even the party's economic views were regarded not as economic but as social statism. It was reasoned, therefore, that the Republicans could have greater success if their party became the defender of and spokesman for the landless, the small landowners, and the workers. The defenders of this thesis believed that the principle of nationalism could also be adjusted to the new social philosophy.⁶

⁴ Yaşar Nabi, *Nereye Gidiyoruz*, İstanbul, 1948, p. 43.

⁵ Sadi Irmak, "CHP Meseleleri," *Ulus*, October 9-12, 1947. Premier Günaltay declared in 1949 that political parties were established with various purposes, among which was the safeguarding of class interests. *Vatan*, November 28, 1949.

⁶ *Ibid.*, October 10, 1947.

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The Republican Party Convention of 1947, however, disregarded these views and moved toward the middle of the road. The Land Reform Law amendment, which in effect spared the average farm from expropriation, was the most striking proof of the new orientation.⁷ The convention decided to amend the party view on populism. The Republicans, during the one-party rule, had defined the country as “not composed of separate social classes . . . but of individuals grouped in accordance with divisions of labor.” The new definition, still avoiding the word “class,” nevertheless pointed out that “various social groups make up the whole of the nation” (Article 6). The Republican Party considered that its duty was to harmonize the interests of these social groups and also to adopt necessary measures to raise the living standard of the peasants. This last point was accepted by the convention chiefly because it was a convenient device to attract popular support, not because it expressed a definite trend of thought or a political theory. One fact remains well established: the Republican Party’s original interpretation of social organization in 1923-1945 was strongly affected by national-socialist ideology which changed later into a somewhat nebulous middle-of-the-road attitude.

The position of the Democratic Party on the principle of populism, and more specifically in respect to the rule of the social groups in the new political structure, has been too generally stated. The party program stated broadly that “it was necessary and possible to harmonize the mutual relations and interests of the working and occupational groups, such as farmers, workers, tradesmen, industrialists . . . within the framework of general interests and according to the principles of social justice and human solidarity” (Article 6).

The Democratic Party leaders from the beginning opposed very strongly the idea of organizing political parties on a class basis.⁸ As a corollary of this viewpoint, Proportional Rep-

⁷ See Chapter 3, the section on the middle classes.

⁸ *Kudret*, November 17, 1947 (Köprülü’s views).

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resentation was rejected because it meant class representation. Adnan Menderes declared that "instead of basing ourselves on destructive class interests we believe that all individuals, from all social classes, feel that it is to their general benefit to be united around national parties which believe in principles that will bring about the essential reform; the most important one that our country must achieve today."⁹ (The speaker meant the establishment of a true democracy.) The Democrats denied that theirs was the party of the rich and the bourgeoisie, and declared that:

We recognize the social classes. We completely accept that they have special interests and that if not regulated these interests may contradict each other. We find it useful and necessary for various classes in a modern society to organize themselves for work and activity in professional associations, trade unions, and cooperatives . . . but we cannot accept the fact that the social classes have irreconcilable interests and have to struggle with each other. Such a conception in our view is outdated and baseless. . . . This is the sole reason why the Democratic Party is not a class party producing conflicts of interests among the social classes, but on the contrary is a "national party" assembling around itself all those citizens believing in the above principles.¹⁰

The true position of the Republican and Democratic parties on the question of social classes and of organization based on class interest is best illustrated by their attitude on trade unionism and the workers' right to strike. This attitude faithfully mirrors also the political parties' new interpretation of populism in general, and their view on the relations between social classes and political parties in particular.

The trade unions were freely formed in early 1946 following the amendment of the Association Law, which permitted the establishment of associations based on class interest. Most of them were closed for having been influenced by leftists

⁹ *Tasvir*, October 11, 1946; see also *BMMTD*, Session 7, Vol. 23, p. 250.

¹⁰ *Kudret*, September 30, 1947 (Köprülü's views); *ibid.*, September 26, 1947; see also *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, 1946, pp. 503-504.

six months later.¹¹ The Republican government hurriedly introduced the Trade Union Act (#5018) on February 20, 1947 because of international obligations and, as a deputy expressed it, chiefly because: "this Assembly which wants to avoid adventures cannot delay the organization of workers into associations which would protect them from having a black mark on their foreheads and which would remain pure, honest, nationalistic, patriotic and Turks forever." (Other deputies acknowledged the fact that the establishment of organizations based on class interests was necessitated by the country's social structure.)¹²

The law did not grant the workers the right to strike. The Democrats criticized many of the law's restrictions, and described it as show-piece legislation passed in order to keep up a fictitious pace with the trends of social thought in the world. They declared that "as long as the right to strike is not recognized, one cannot claim there is freedom for trade unions and workers in the democratic meaning of the word," and that a trade union without the right to strike defeated its own purpose.¹³ The Democrats claimed that:

The Republican Party still preserved an attitude of tutorship and proved that it did not believe in the workers' political maturity by refusing to recognize their right to strike. The Democratic Party, as a consequence of its democratic views, believes in the political maturity of the Turkish nation, and of the Turkish worker, and trusts in his patriotism.¹⁴

¹¹ See my Chapter 14.

¹² *BMMTD*, Session 8.1, Vol. 4, p. 316. (Hulusi Oral, the speaker for the Labor Committee, stressed the fact that it was necessary to organize the workers into trade unions to protect them against "evil currents.") *Ibid.*, p. 315.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 306 (Fuad Köprülü); also *Kudret*, November 29, 1947; *Vatan*, August 17, 1948 (Köprülü in Eyup).

¹⁴ See *Kudret* (editorial), September 30, 1947; also Köprülü's speech to the same effect in Eyup, *Vatan*, August 17, 1948. *Cumhuriyet* in an editorial advised Köprülü to appeal also to the patriotism of the employers to accept the legitimate demands of the workers and thus not give place to strikes. He said that in reality the situation was different and that there was a conflict of interests between the workers and employers and that

Discussion of the right to strike was renewed on the occasion of an amendment to the Labor Law in January 1950 to establish labor courts. The Minister of Labor, Şemseddin Sırer, declared that the workers did not want the right to strike and accused the Democrats who brought the issue into discussion as being "non-Kemalist."¹⁵ A Republican deputy backed him by declaring that anyone who defended the right to strike was "not one of ours."¹⁶ (Sırer was the Minister of Education in 1947 who "purged" the so-called leftist professors from Ankara University.) Sırer cited the Taft-Hartley Law to prove that when a democratic country like the United States passed a law restricting the right to strike it meant that the right, having played its historical part in the democratization process, was bound to disappear, and that in a country like Turkey applying statism there was no use for strikes.¹⁷ The Minister's claim that the workers themselves did not want the right to strike caused a wave of denials from workers, who in many places resisted the Administration's requests for signatures to back the Minister's statement.¹⁸

The discussions on the Trade Union Law showed that large sections within the Republican Party, and in the country in general, were not yet prepared to accept a fundamental change in the concept of social classes, but were satisfied with a mere change in name.¹⁹ Many of the liberal views put forth

the question of the right to strike should be settled without involving nationalism. *Cumhuriyet*, August 18, also October 1948.

¹⁵ *BMMTD*, Session 8.4, Vol. 23, pp. 220ff. *Ayın Tarihi*, January 1950, pp. 61ff.

¹⁶ *Ulus*, January 28, 1950 (remarks of F. Kurtuluş).

¹⁷ *Ayın Tarihi*, January 1950, pp. 31-36, 61-70 *passim*. İnönü himself declared that the discussions on the right to strike were premature. *Vatan*, May 5, 1950.

¹⁸ *Vatan*, February 1, 2, 4, 1950, March 16, 1950. It was reported that the Textile Free Trade Union was closed by the government because it demanded the right to strike. *Vatan*, April 5, 1950.

¹⁹ During the discussions on the draft of the Trade Union Act in 1947, the government wanted to replace the words "trade union" (*sendika*) with "workers organization" or a similar name in an effort not to give the

in this respect were due to partisan sentiments rather than inner convictions. For instance, the Democratic Party's liberal and frequent promises on the freedom of trade unionism and the right to strike,²⁰ made during the years of opposition, have not yet materialized, apparently because of pressure from interest groups.²¹ Moreover, the Democratic Party government has opposed the workers' participation in politics organized on the basis of class,²² and recently disbanded some

workers the idea of class organization. (Kemal Sülker, *Türkiyede Sendikacılık*, İstanbul, 1955, p. 55.) Even A. Emin Yalman, the publisher of *Vatan* and supposedly a defender of democratic ideas, expressed regret that the question of the workers' right to strike was made the subject of party discussions. He advocated the use of arbitration as a substitute for strikes. (He disregarded the fact that a form of undemocratic state arbitration of labor disputes had existed in Turkey since 1936 and did not satisfy labor, and that the right to strike was a most natural right in a democracy.) *Vatan* (editorial), February 7, 1950.

Yet since 1947 great progress has been achieved in this field, for prior to this date, as a worker put it at the Democratic Party Convention of 1947, only to mention the name "worker" was an indication of communist leanings, while a forthright defense of workers' rights, in the words of the late Marshal F. Çakmak, was a sure proof of such tendencies. "Once only the mentioning of the name 'trade union' awakened fright and was considered a sin." (*Vatan*, February 6, 1950.) Thus the freer discussion of workers' problems moved a great step forward. *Vatan*, January 9, August 15, 1947.

²⁰ The Democrats brought the issue up for discussion several times during 1947-1950. See *Cumhuriyet*, August 17, 18, September 7, 1948.

²¹ There have been repeated reports that a law granting the workers the right to strike is being introduced into the National Assembly. (*Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1955, March 12, 1956.) The official reasons for not granting the right to strike are the following: the trade unions are not strong enough; the majority of industrial workers are not trade union members; there is abundant manpower to take the place of strikers; an increase in workers' wages will raise the cost of living. (*Forum*, February 15, 1956, p. 6.) Management opposes the right to strike in order to avoid being forced to revise its mode of production on a more rational basis which would necessitate new investments. Its own mentality is contrary to the acceptance of a new type of labor organization. The workers themselves have not put pressure on management for a more rational organization of production.

²² A political committee formed by workers on the eve of the 1954 elections to back candidates favoring labor was quickly disbanded by the government. The committee's initiators were brought before the court for involving the trade unions in politics. Sülker, *Türkiyede Sendikacılık*, p. 282.

trade union federations on the ground that they incited class struggle, but chiefly because they expressed opposition to the government's inflationary economic policy which had lowered the workers' living standards.²³ The Republicans who had opposed, while in power, the workers' demands for the right to strike, once in opposition, have made generous promises.²⁴

Following the acceptance of the Trade Union Law a second discussion on class organization took place on the occasion of the (*Esnaf Dernekleri ve Esnaf Dernekleri Birlikleri Kanunu*) Law on the Tradesmen-Artisans Guilds. The purpose of this law was to organize in associations all the shopkeepers and small merchants to provide some government control over them and to use them as a balancing power against other social groups.²⁵

It would be appropriate to study further the principle of populism in the light of the interest in politics shown by various social groups and their understanding of political parties, and to determine whether any social group supported financially or otherwise any specific party in order to promote its own interest.

It would be a mistake to consider the Democratic Party as being established exclusively through the support of the rich landowners and businessmen, as is often asserted, but it

²³ *Forum*, March 15, 1957, p. 8.

²⁴ The Republicans promised to recognize the workers' right to strike in their convention of 1953, and thereafter made a wide use of this promise, apparently in good faith. İnönü visited the İstanbul Trade Union Federation in 1956 and was scolded thereafter by the Minister of Labor for placing that organization in danger, that is, involving it in politics. *Akis*, March 17, 1956.

²⁵ Sadi Irmak (ex-Minister of Labor) declared: "Dear friends, we are faced now with a law concerning a social group whose numbers exceed a few million . . . friends, we are creating a new type of society. With the Trade Union Law passed some time ago we have created an organization in accordance with the characteristics of a big social class. This new law will create a new type of organization according to the structure of a social group which includes large numbers of people. . . . Along with the proletariat there comes into existence a balancing power. This is why it is a good undertaking to preserve the *esnaf* (the small traders) as a whole and derive social benefits from it." *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 17, pp. 38ff., 50-51.

is equally wrong to assume that such interests had no effect on the establishment of this party.²⁶ The leadership of the party was formed in part by landowners, who in certain places (chiefly in the eastern part of the country) gained supreme control of the local party organization, a control which they still retain;²⁷ and business groups contributed financially to the party.²⁸ The overwhelming popular support for the Dem-

²⁶ Kenan Öner reveals in his memoirs the fact that he was approached by Yusuf Ziya Öniş, one-time director of the Deniz Bank and influential among business groups, who, without having met him previously, proposed that he take over the chairmanship of the Democratic Party organization in İstanbul. (*Siyasi Hatalarım ve Bizde Demokrasi*, p. 5.) Premier Günaltay in a speech in Erzurum complained that some Democrats acted in their respective provinces defiant of government authority similar to certain old feudal groups in the past (*Karaoşmanoğluları, Candaroğulları*) who would not allow the representatives of the state to enter their lands. (*Vatan*, September 4, 1949.)

²⁷ The same was true in some areas in the western part of the country. For instance, the founders of the local branches of the Democratic Party in Aydın and Tire (Ethem Menderes, Sadık Ediz, Dr. Mustafa Ali, etc.) were owners of large estates. See Faik Şemseddin Benlioğlu, *Demokrat Partinin İçyüzü ve Hataları*, İzmir, 1947, pp. 24ff. For more recent information on these groups, see *Cumhuriyet*, October 11, 1957.

²⁸ Kenan Öner, the organizer of the Democratic Party branch in İstanbul, states: "I was informed that three people, C, S, and I [the names shortened by this author], were to work with me. I asked who they were . . . I was told that C had raised his fortune to millions during the war; he went to Ankara even before the Democratic Party was organized and to show his support he donated to the party [leaders] TL. 10,000. . . and he promised that he himself and his connections would be available for further financial help. I was told that S, although not as rich as C, was also in business and could provide some financial help and had ideas that could be of use, for he was a graduate of the School of Political Science. His past experience with the Liberal Party in Trabzon could be of use, too." (Öner, *Siyasi*, pp. 11-12.) It was rumored also that the businessmen of İzmir donated TL. 100,000 to the Democratic Party. (*Cumhuriyet*, February 13, 1946.) During the Democratic Party's first convention in 1947, the debt (TL. 2,000) incurred by the party was paid right up in the meeting by one of the delegates, Nuri Lefef, himself a rich man, while the delegates from prosperous regions were urged to contribute to the party funds. (Metec, *Demokrat*, p. 39. *Tasvir*, January 14, 1947.)

In 1951, after the Democrats took office, the businessmen formulated more clearly, on the basis of their influence in the government, their demands, such as credit facilities and cooperation with foreign capital in an industrial convention sponsored by the government. Moreover, they asked for the amendment of social legislation to decrease the employers' contribution to the workers' insurance fund, on the grounds that it delayed the ac-

ocratic Party, however, came from the landless peasants and small proprietors, who hoped to find in the new party a remedy for their own economic and social problems, or at least a means showing their criticism of the government.²⁹ Industrial workers have generally supported the Democratic Party both during its years in opposition and while in power since 1950, despite the fact that the Democrats have not fulfilled the workers' cherished demand: the right to strike. The worker's attitude is determined by the fact that the Democrats have recognized labor as a power and do not treat it condescendingly as did the Republicans from 1923 to 1945. Moreover, a number of projects, such as housing and better insurance pay to workers, have been initiated by the Democrats.

The political struggle in 1946-1950 was not marked by sharp class antagonism. Even in cases where people complained bitterly against the high cost of living, they criticized the government for its inability to control prices on the market; they did not show open animosity against the profiteers and the businessmen as a group, who were partly responsible for it.³⁰ Even some disputes between landlords and

cumulation of capital. The convention supposedly represented all personnel in industry, but the hundred-odd trade unions were represented by only four members, while from İstanbul alone there were fifty industrialists. *Sanayi Kongresi*, Ankara, 1951, pp. 26, 33, 35, 53.

²⁹ On his way from Çiçekdağ to Kırşehir (central Anatolia), Celal Bayar was met by peasants who bitterly complained of their situation. (See *Vatan*, February 2, 1948. For similar views in the Düzce region, see Necati Yaşmut in *Vatan*, November 1945.) In Yenice, Adana (southern Turkey), cotton growing peasants complained to Bayar that they did not have anything to wear, for they sold the Kg. (2.16 lb.) of cotton for only 125 *piastres* but found no clothing on the market. (*Vatan*, March 17, 1947.) In the Aegean region, cotton growers paid no attention to cultivating cotton for fear of seizure of their crop, and because of low cotton prices and the discrepancy between the prices of cotton and clothing. (*Cumhuriyet*, January 31, 1946.)

³⁰ Some middle class publications defended specifically the interest of that group as a class. For instance, the periodical *Millet* strongly urged the government to institute measures to preserve the middle class and its cultural values from the danger of disappearance. (*Millet*, No. 9, March 28, 1946, pp. 3ff.) Another publication, the *Mülkiyet* (Property), de-

peasants, reminiscent of class antagonism, appeared to be dictated by empirical needs rather than predetermined by class consciousness or a desire for class struggle.³¹

There have also been occasional rumors that industrial workers went on strike in various parts of the country during the period from 1946 to 1950, despite the prohibitions of the law.³²

The present reinterpreted form of populism is not sufficiently liberal in scope to provide a solid, durable, and harmonious basis for the relations between political parties and

manded special protection for the real estate owners who had been treated inequitably by the government in the previous nine years. (*Mülkiyet*, No. 1, March 1948, p. 15.)

³¹ In the province of Denizli, landless peasants and share croppers seized the Adacabir farm of 100,000 *dönüms* (10,000 ha.) belonging to an absentee landlord, and divided the land among the villages established on that estate. The villages are Çeşmebaşı, Dönemenli, Ada, Aptal, Cabir, Döşeme, Küçükada, and Halasbaşı. (*Cumhuriyet*, April 7, 1946.) The same happened in the Bursa region, in the villages of Bakırköy and Hotinli, where peasants by common agreement divided the land and refused to pay the landlord their crop shares. *Vatan* (editorial), October 7, 19, 1949. In some cases peasants believed that democracy meant partition of land and since democracy was established—so they thought—there was time to divide the land. This writer recalls vividly a conversation with peasants in Gönen region in 1946. He was asked—in great confidence after several hours of conversation—when would the city dwellers give up some of their property?, for they had heard that the government was preparing a new confiscatory law similar to the Land Law passed in 1945 to bring about social justice everywhere. During 1946-1950 there were a series of sudden and abundant publications which depicted the misery and backwardness of the villages. Such publications awakened in the intellectuals a sentimental and sympathetic leaning toward the peasants and, politically speaking, helped to swing them to the Democrats.

³² The dockers of İzmir went on strike in 1946 but returned to work after the intervention of the port authorities. *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, 1946, p. 506.

It is rather difficult to obtain reliable information on this subject because of a certain reticence on the part of the press, at that time, to give publicity to such "dangerous" events as the workers' strikes. Only recently have strikes obtained some publicity. In the summer of 1954 the dock workers of İzmir went on strike and a few weeks later they did so again despite the fact that all the strikers had been brought before the court. Workers in Aydın and Söke also went on strike in the spring of 1956 as a protest against a reduction in wages. *Cumhuriyet*, March 3, 1956.

social classes in Turkey. It does not correspond to the social development of the country.

Turkey's political parties claim to represent all the social groups in the country, a claim which is only partially true. The middle classes in Turkey almost exclusively retain the political leadership of the major parties, and they are socially conservative. Consequently, the principle of populism needs to be redefined to enable all social classes and individuals to express their views without fear of public ostracism or official prosecution and to be represented in political parties accordingly.

Today this need for redefinition is no longer a matter of academic speculation but an urgent necessity that would affect Turkey's entire political and economic life. Social and economic changes in Turkey were initially imposed by law and strictly regulated. In the first two and a half decades of the Republic they followed a steady, though slow, development. Beginning in 1949, however, through American military and economic assistance, various foreign loans, and through a new policy of investment, economic and social changes were speeded up to a tempo never seen before throughout the history of Turkey.³³ These changes have reached the most remote layers of Turkish society, have broken the culturo-social resistance to change, and have created a wide divergence of views and interests which needs to be reviewed and regulated from an entirely new and modern point of view.³⁴ Assistance from outside, whatever its purpose, must take into consideration these inner developments in the Turkish society.

³³ For these changes, see Chapter 3, Chapter 13, and the section on the Democratic Party in Chapter 15.

³⁴ H. A. R. Gibb, in his penetrating study of social changes in the Near East, had pointed out that such changes were uneven, non-homogeneous and limited to small groups. See "Social Change in the Near East," *The Near East: Problems and Prospects* (edited by P. W. Ireland), Chicago, 1942, pp. 35-38; on Turkey, see pp. 45-48. The social changes in Turkey since 1949 are markedly different because they have affected the masses in a profound, although not evenly beneficial, way.

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First and above all, it must not encourage regressive and anti-democratic tendencies or increase the power of arch-conservative groups. Failure to adjust this assistance to the historical, cultural, and political aspirations of the people, that is to those aspirations which have guided developments in Turkey for the past two centuries, will entail, in the long run, condemnation of the assistance and of the country providing it.³⁵

Economic change, although slowed down in the last two years, still continues. Farm mechanization constantly dislocates sharecroppers and tenants from rural areas,³⁶ who then crowd into cities, while investment in industry cannot provide sufficient employment to absorb them. A constantly increasing industrialization, regardless of consequences and the price paid for it, seems to be the only way to meet the situation.

Meanwhile, the national income has increased,³⁷ either through actual rise in production or through inflation and speculation in land values (the value of land around the major cities has increased 50 to 100 times since 1946), and individual fortunes have been acquired quickly, after little, if any, social consideration. The danger of this unbalanced economic development lies in the fact that little is done to accompany it with social measures and adjustments. One cannot forget the fact that illiteracy in Turkey was as high as sixty-five per cent in 1950,³⁸ and that very little was done to tackle this problem as a whole although partial action con-

³⁵ For a penetrating study of this problem, see Charles Issawi, "Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy in the Middle East," *International Affairs*, January 1956, pp. 27-42.

³⁶ For essays on the dislocated peasants, see Yaşar Kemal, *Çukurova Yana Yana*, İstanbul, 1955. (The book won the İstanbul newspapers' award.)

³⁷ The gross national income, according to the Central Statistical Office, was TL. 9.370 billion in 1950, TL. 12.965 billion in 1952, TL. 15.484 billion in 1954, TL. 22.634 billion in 1956. A considerable part of the increase is due to inflation. *National Income of Turkey*, published by the Central Statistical Office, Ankara, 1957, p. 4.

³⁸ *İstatistik Yıllığı*, 1953, p. 79.

tinues at a steady pace. The unjustifiable discrepancy between progress on one hand and backwardness on the other gradually is reaching the point when life on two such disparate levels cannot be tolerated any more. Class differences are sharpened because of the unbalanced distribution of income, and because those benefiting from this inbalance favor the strengthening of government control. Members of the middle class, in particular the landed ones, while benefiting most from these changes continue to preserve their conservatism in the belief that it would be possible to continue the socio-economic, and political relations among various social groups on the same patriarchal foundations on which they had previously existed.³⁹ This class, which holds the economic and political power in its hands, seems to follow the same trend of thought and to make the same mistakes that its counterpart in Europe did in the nineteenth century.

Great events are in the making in Turkey. A small measure, a patch here and there, may thwart their development for a short time only; a rigid political control may create an appearance of quiet but cannot substitute for the broad political, cultural, and social adjustment which has become imperative. The greatest problem before Turkey today is social adjustment, yet social problems and their solution cannot be defined in the narrow technical sense. There is a demand for broad and systematic reorganization. At the base of this need for adjustment is the people's honest and increasingly impatient yearning for enlightenment, freedom, and progress; in a word, for democracy in its truest meaning. How can this true democracy be defined and how can populism be embodied in it? The best definition was formulated by the Democratic

³⁹ At one time appeals to patriotism and abnegation, coupled with strong government control, could check certain conflicts arising from the socio-economic transformation since it was limited in scope. Today, when the changes are so general and widespread, new views and new regulations corresponding to the nature and magnitude of the problems are necessary.

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Party itself in its years of opposition when it sincerely fought to establish a true democracy in Turkey:

“We do not believe that the cause of justice and freedom can be accomplished merely by [formally] accepting beautiful promises and debating great principles. We want the ideas motivating this struggle [for democracy] to penetrate and root themselves in our daily life in all forms; to cover all activities from donating the skin of sheep-offerings [*kurban*] to the equal and legal distribution of national obligations and to the benefits of national services. We, the citizens living in these parts [of the country] are simple people. An understanding on principles only may suffice for the policy makers at top level. But for us, individuals combined as a single body by economic conditions, by financial and social needs, the real problems are: a shortage of sugar; donations, the collections of fines without partisan considerations; the ill-treatment received from our elderman [*muhtar*] and the misuse of taxes by the tax collectors without punishment, the squandering of our money. All these [issues] make up our lives. . . . They say that the place for discussing such issues is the National Assembly. The National Assembly is the place to enact the law but the law takes its shape according to the people’s general will expressed in streets, homes, shops and meetings . . . the political parties debate the issues before the public and try to secure a majority . . . all these are not a street [low] form of democracy but democracy itself. Any other kind of democracy is back-stage politics and lobby tactics.”⁴⁰

⁴⁰ *Vatan*, March 27-29, 1949 (from the report of the Democratic Party Organization in Balıkesir).

CHAPTER 13

REFORMISM – *INKILÂPÇILIK* – WESTERNIZATION AND BEHAVIORAL CHANGES

MODERNIZATION, undertaken by Selim III (1789-1808) in the Ottoman Empire in the form of scattered military and administrative measures, culminated in the Republic in one of the regime's six fundamental principles: reformism. Modernism was the goal of the new regime and reformism (*inkilâpçılık-devrimcilik*) was the means to achieve it.

The Republic accepted the West as its inspiration and model in cultural and economic reforms with few reservations, although in practice it considerably modified the original. The West has been generally regarded in Turkey as a bloc including all the countries west of the Baltic-Adriatic line. The influence exercised by some particular countries in this bloc has varied depending on Turkey's economic and political reliance upon these countries and upon her evaluation of what was "best" in them. German influences have been felt strongly in the army and, somewhat less so, in industry; English influences appeared in the philosophy of government; while the French continuously influenced politics, literature, arts, philosophy and, to a large extent, social habits.¹ Since the

¹ Selim III asked for advice from the French in carrying out his reform, and many French ideas found easy acceptance in Turkey because their secular character avoided the clash between Islam and Christianity in Turkey. See Enver Ziya Karal, *Selim III 'ün Hat-ı Hümayunları*, Ankara, 1946, pp. 16, 30; also Bernard Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey," *Journal of World History*, July 1953, pp. 107ff. For a general discussion of Westernization in Turkey, see also A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. VIII, London, 1954, pp. 239-268 *passim*; also abridged edition, London, 1957, pp. 167-171; also my Chapters 1 and 4; also Bernard Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (edited by G. E. von Grunebaum), Chicago, 1955, pp. 311-331; also Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, *The United States and*

second World War, American ideas have made a general impact on the country and have replaced some of the previous influences.²

The chief original inducement which led the Ottoman Empire to seek modernization was the West's political superiority.³ In the Republic a second compelling reason was added to it. Only new cultural and political foundations—cast in accordance with the new ideology in a nationalist mould—would have justified and assured the new regime's survival. This meant, in turn, that a fast modernization was needed and the only model to be followed was the West. Thus, modernization had to be imposed, regardless of the consequences, upon a society whose original culture was considered irreconcilable with that of the West. Modernization through Westernization, faced with this urgency was bound to be, at the beginning at least, a typical Herodism, as Toynbee would define it.⁴ It was unavoidable, therefore, to adopt institutions and ideas from the West without much discrimination. Practical consideration forced the government to overplay modernization before foreign nations and underplay it at home before the conservatives.⁵

The modernization efforts at the beginning followed the

Turkey and Iran, Cambridge (Mass.), 1952, pp. 47-57, 113-129 *passim*; also Henry E. Allen, *The Turkish Transformation*, Chicago, 1935, pp. 39-69; Donald E. Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk*, Philadelphia, 1939; Lewis V. Thomas, "The National and International Relations of Turkey," pp. 167-187 *passim*.

² For a discussion of these influences, see Halide Edip Adıvar, *Türkiyede Şark, Garp ve American Tesirleri*, İstanbul, 1955; Thomas and Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran*, pp. 139-152; also speech by American Ambassador to Turkey, *U. S. Department of State Bulletin*, February 11, 1957, pp. 214-216; also N. Marbury Efrimenco, "American Impact upon Middle East Leadership," *Political Science Quarterly*, June 1954, pp. 202-218.

³ For a general discussion, see von Grunebaum, "Problems of Muslim Nationalism," *Islam and the West*, pp. 23ff.

⁴ Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, p. 188.

⁵ Von Grunebaum, "Problems," p. 26; also Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East*, Princeton, 1956, p. 30.

same pattern as in the past; that is, they were carried out according to middle class conceptions, ideals, and tastes, and affected first social habits and appearances rather than substance and structure.⁶ The idea of Western superiority, long accepted in the Ottoman Empire, reached its peak in the first two decades of the Republic; Western personnel, methods of work, and goods, *Avrupa malı*, were unconditionally accepted as superior to anything of indigenous origin. Moreover, some reforms, such as the one in language, went to an extreme and occasionally ended by doing what they originally were intended to undo.⁷ The modern educational system, hastily expanded after 1924, presented alarming gaps in its curricula, while academic pursuits lacked scope and depth. But once the initial difficulties were overcome the artificially planted system started producing more worthwhile results.

The fundamental achievement of the over-all attempt at Westernization consisted in the fact that it prepared the ground, the conditions, and the atmosphere in which ideas and events were created according to a pattern similar to the West's. The ideals of Turkish society, framed now according to the Western ones, became the goal of large groups in the population. In the long run some institutions and ideas brought from the West were totally rejected, but the general pattern of development for them was to remain and be consolidated.

⁶ See H. A. R. Gibb, "Social Change in the Near East," *The Near East: Problems and Prospects* (edited by Philip W. Ireland), Chicago, 1942, p. 36. For a general discussion of cultural factors at the foundation of change in the Near East, see E. A. Speiser, "Cultural Factors in Social Dynamics in the Near East," *Social Forces in the Near East* (edited by S. N. Fisher), Ithaca, 1955, pp. 1-22; for references to Turkey, see pp. 13-16, 20; also Speiser, *The United States and the Near East*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1947, pp. 141-163.

⁷ The language reform, which was supposed to take Arabic and Persian words and expressions out of Turkish, went to the extreme of adopting, in some cases, other foreign words which had little meaning for the common people. For instance, *İzmir Enternasyonal Fuarı Enformasyon Bürosu* (İzmir International Fair Information Bureau). Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey*, London, 1955, p. 100.

Westernization necessitated the establishment of political, economic, social, and cultural relations and views in the society on a broader popular basis than in the past, and this in time broke the pattern of the narrow, formal modernization envisaged by the middle class. The search for a national and cultural identity was one of the chief ideas imbued in the modernization of Turkey. Thus language reform, despite its extremes, succeeded in making the vernacular the language of the country.⁸ Acceptance of folklore as the basis of national art and literature was an indirect recognition of various ancient cultures which existed in Anatolia and which were absorbed and preserved in Turkish folklore.⁹ Reforms for the emancipation of women extended to the city the freedom to a natural way of life and work which the great majority of Anatolian peasant women had always enjoyed.¹⁰

A good measure for Turkey's Westernization in the last thirty years can be found in her literature, which accurately reflects the society's transformation and the various conflicts arising from it. Literature served as a safe means to state thoughts and feelings that one could not or was not allowed to express otherwise. In this process of general transformation in Turkey, literature itself evolved from a means of amusement and self-expression into an effective weapon of social

⁸ William A. Edmonds, "Language Reform in Turkey and its Relevance to Other Areas," *Muslim World*, January 1955, pp. 53-60; Uriel Heyd, *Language Reform in Modern Turkey*, Jerusalem, 1954. See also my Chapter 2.

⁹ See William Mitchell Ramsay, *Asiatic Elements in Greek Civilization*, London, 1928; Reed, "Religious Life of Modern Turkish Muslims," pp. 135-136; Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," p. 313; Mahmut Makal, *Memleketin Sahipleri*, İstanbul, 1954.

¹⁰ The women in some parts of Anatolia are in charge of most of the work in the fields and at home; the husbands, true to an old tradition that men are made for battle, avoid work. This custom is disappearing now. It is too obvious that the cry of the conservatives in Turkey that emancipation of women destroys family life is only a way of continuing the domination by men. For a description of Turkish home life and the beginnings of family emancipation, see *Current History*, October 1922, pp. 126-132 and May 1923, pp. 305-310. See also my Chapter 4.

and cultural change.¹¹ (A significant contribution to Turkish literature was the translation of world classics through a program undertaken by the Ministry of Education in 1941, which resulted in the translation of at least 600 volumes.)

Literature represents an accurate picture of the modernist state of mind in Republican Turkey. New names in the short story, the novel, and poetry have left the classics in relative obscurity. The realistic and powerful poems of Nazım Hikmet (banned from circulation because of his leftist leanings but still read in secret), those of Orhan Veli, Cahit Sıtkı, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Oktay Rifat, Melih Cevdet, Necati Cumalı, F. H. Dağlarca, Yahya Kemal, Cahit Külebi, and the short stories of Sait Faik, Yaşar Kemal, Halüdün Taner, O. F. Saba, Aziz Nesin, İlhan Tarus, novels of Orhan Kemal, Kemal Tahir, Talip Apaydın, Fakir Baykurt, Mahmut Makal, all of them with various political leanings and literary tendencies, would provide a good sample of Turkey's present literary tastes.¹² Periodicals such as *Varlık* (Existence) through its eminent publisher-poet Yaşar Nabi, and *Yedi Tepe* (Seven Hills) have actively promoted the Anatolian current, which in its literary aspects deals with the life of the peasant and common folk of Turkey.

¹¹ It is significant that a book highly praised in France, *Le Drame Intérieur de Mallarmé*, written in French by Professor Adile Ayda of the University of İstanbul, did not cause much publicity in Turkey, as would be the case with other publications written by Turks and praised abroad. The reason probably lies in the fact that the very topic of the book did not correspond to the literary tendencies of present-day Turkey. See *Cumhuriyet*, December 9, 1955 (Cahit Tanyol).

¹² See also Troni Armando, "Nuovi Orientamenti della Letteratura Turca Moderna," *Rassegna Mediterranea*, July-August 1948, pp. 12-14 and September-October 1948, pp. 14-15; also Julius Germanus, "The Awakening of Turkish Literature," *Islamic Culture*, April, July 1933, pp. 178ff., 353ff. For related studies, see G. E. von Grunebaum, "The Spirit of Islam as Shown in its Literature," *Studia Islamica*, 1953, pp. 101-121; Francesco Gabrieli, "Literary Tendencies," *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization*, pp. 101ff.; Alessio Bombaci, *Storia della Letteratura Turca dall'Antico Impero di Mongolia alla Turchia Moderna*, Milano, 1956. For the translation program, see Adnan Ötügen, *Klasikler Bibliyografisi, 1940-1950*, İstanbul, 1952, and *Tercüme* (Review of Translations), Nos. 41-42, March 19, 1947, pp. 438-504.

One cannot discuss Westernization and literature in Turkey without mentioning the late Nurullah Ataç (1898-1956), whose often contradictory ideas (especially on Westernization and language reform) have not only caused considerable controversy, but also have left a deep impact upon the intellectuals. Ataç advocated the "new," the total change in living, thinking, outlook, and habits, so as to become identified with the West as closely as possible. He believed that the first intellectuals who went to the West brought back its image and awakened interest and yearning for Westernization, and that now society, no longer satisfied with merely the image, wanted to identify itself with and become part of the West. The complete Westernization of Turkey for Ataç was a way of no return and consequently any obstacles opposing it could only be temporary.

In order to accomplish the inevitable Westernization he advocated the destruction of the old as soon as possible, and without mercy. Ataç advocated rationalism and extremism, applied without any compromise, as the surest and fastest method of achieving the desired result.

He believed that the modern French language, which he had fully mastered, was the result of a deliberate process of word creation that had taken place in France in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and, consequently, he attempted to adopt the same method in modernizing Turkish. At the end of this "modernization" his writing became rather incomprehensible.¹³

¹³ Ataç's style of writing in ordinary "Turkish" was excellent. One of his idiosyncrasies in writing in modern Turkish was not to use the conjunction *ve* (and). In his everyday living he was an Easterner; although he disliked Western music, he still advocated its introduction. He disliked Western manners but had concluded that in a period of transition one has to accept ideas contrary to one's own and learn to live with them. For some of his ideas, see *Karalama Defteri*, İstanbul, 1952, pp. 49ff., 74ff.; *Ararken*, İstanbul, 1954, pp. 30ff.; *Diyeelim*, İstanbul, 1954, pp. 40ff. See his articles in *Varlık*, 1935-1956. Among the latest is "Yazar ile İşçi" (The Writer and the Worker), *Varlık*, October 15, December 1, 1956, pp. 4, 5. On Ataç, see also *Forum*, September 1, 1957, pp. 22-23 (Erdal Öz).

REFORMISM AND WESTERNIZATION

The modernization of Turkey, at the beginning of liberalization in 1945, had evolved to a new stage. Relationships in society were placed on a relatively new basis; new social groups had come into existence, which, out of conviction or interest, supported the Republican regime. Resistance to reforms had diminished and the regime seemed safe; the leaders' sense of urgency for reforms had consequently lost its acuteness. The general atmosphere seemed propitious for questioning the wisdom of some reforms and finding answers to certain fundamental questions which had been in the making for some time: What was national identity? Could it be divorced from a nation's history, from society and its mores, and be established on a purely calculated rationalistic basis? Was not Western culture, which was copied, the result of a combination of history, science, art, and religion, all of which existed in various degrees in Turkey? Had not the modernization of the past twenty-five years reached a point at which a relative balance between old and new had been established by holding back traditionalism and religion and promoting science and rationalism? Was not forced cultural modernization destroying some of society's vital cultural foundations? And finally, was there any ground for asking these questions and had modernization-Westernization really penetrated society? The answer depended on one's modernist or conservative orientation.

In society at large, the two groups stood as far apart as ever in answering the question. The dissatisfied modernists demanded additional and even profounder reforms, the conservatives, who had somewhat modified their views in favor of some technological improvements, were bitterly opposed to reforms and demanded a reevaluation. In the middle there was a third large group holding the balance, the moderates, who had accepted the reforms so far introduced—although they thought some of them rather excessive and in need of

readjustment—and who found them quite sufficient for the country's modernistic existence.

The liberalization which started in 1945 was a step aimed at achieving political Westernization—democracy. It served at the same time as a means to test the general effect of the reforms and to redefine the future pattern of reformism. The battle between old and new, although still under the vigilance of a pro-modernist state, nonetheless, was going to be based on the relative strength of each group, their ability to affect the moderates and to control the government apparatus. We shall attempt to define in the next few pages the pattern of political struggle after 1945 and its impact on general social behavior within the context of reformism and Westernization.

The liberalization after 1945 aimed at establishing a parliamentary multi-party democracy according to the Western model. The decision to liberalize the regime and allow the establishment of opposition parties, whatever the reason, is to be attributed to the Republican Party. The actual establishment of a relative multi-party regime, however, was the by-product of the Republican, Democratic, and National parties' joint activity. The Republicans, who wanted a second political party and encouraged its establishment in order to give a democratic appearance to the regime, were utterly unprepared, however, to let that party start a race for power too soon.¹⁴ As the Democrats, the main opposition party, expanded rapidly after their establishment in 1946, they caused anxiety among the Republicans, who pondered whether or not the Democrats should be allowed to become too strong. It seemed at one moment, during the Premiership of Recep Peker in 1947, that the Republicans had decided to abolish the Democratic Party on the pretext of seditious political propaganda. The fact that the Republican Party did not resort to such

¹⁴ For a considerable time the Republicans believed that they should hold power for at least twenty-five years to come in order to ensure the survival of reforms and to consolidate democracy in Turkey. *Ulus*, December 21, 1948.

drastic action and instead chose to compromise with the opposition is a point in its favor.

The Democratic Party, on the other hand, relentlessly criticized the government and defended its own views, and by making tactical and timely use of their popularity, eventually forced the Republican Government to undertake far-reaching liberalization. The greatest achievement of the Democrats during the period from 1946 to 1950 and even thereafter, consisted in their ability to mobilize popular support through a forthright faith in the common man. The recognition of the individual's inborn abilities, the very idea of securing his active participation in politics on the basis of his own understanding of issues and ideas, was a profound reform in itself.¹⁵ It ended the old practice under the Ottoman Empire, and the one-party system in the Republic, in which the individual's inborn ability to judge a public issue was denied, the common citizen was despised because of his ignorance, and an "elite" acted on his behalf.¹⁶

The response of the common man to this new approach exceeded the best expectations. His enthusiastic participation in politics, his understanding of the issues debated, and finally, his stubborn insistence on a democratic system, chartered the course of political developments from 1946 to 1950, as testified to by the leaders themselves.¹⁷ The opposition leaders'

¹⁵ The Democrats accused the Republicans of not believing in the people's political maturity. *Vatan*, July 16, 1946 (Bayar in İzmir). But in due time the Republicans also appealed directly to the voters and took into consideration their opinions. See also *Celal Bayar Diyor ki* (edited by N. Sevgen), İstanbul, 1951, pp. 120-127.

¹⁶ The idea of letting national affairs be decided by "büyükler" (the elders or men in leading positions) thus received a great blow. This idea still persists in Turkey since it was part of the traditional pattern of relations, but its hold on the society has been greatly weakened.

¹⁷ Refik Koraltan declared: "The longing for democracy which I saw everywhere has brought enthusiasm to the people. City folks and villagers everywhere are competing with each other, orderly and reserved, to bring into the Turkish people's lives a progressive, human, and modern understanding of democracy." (*Vatan*, June 28, 1946.) Adnan Menderes himself attributed indirectly to the people in general, and not to the special

part in the struggle in this period was limited in the main to organizing and systematizing the people's views and voicing them in the National Assembly.

It would be appropriate to mention that the press played a major role in stimulating interest in politics and brought about active popular participation in the political struggle of the 1946-1950 period and thereafter. All the newspapers promoted the idea that the basic condition for the establishment of a multi-party system and democracy depended on the citizens' direct interest in political affairs.¹⁸

The idea of respect for law and order prevailed throughout the period. It was repeatedly emphasized from the beginning that the Grand National Assembly, as the supreme and duly qualified body, had to sanction with its ultimate approval all political changes. The respect for procedure and institutions was a convincing proof of Westernization.

One of the major disputes between the government and the opposition parties actually developed around the issue of re-

abilities of the leaders, the success of the Democratic Party, when he declared: "In no part of the world is it possible to find any other party which developed so much in so short a time despite government interference. The Democratic Party, like emotion and love, has covered the whole country. This makes it impossible to look upon the Democratic Party only as a political party and analyze it as such. It can be said that this [the support for the Democratic Party] is the people's active search for justice and freedom!" (*Vatan*, April 20, 1947. For a similar view, see *Tasvir*, January 8, 1947.) Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, after giving a brief history of the *Meşrutiyet* (1908), declared: "I go among people and I look at them. Their alertness is praiseworthy. I see for the first time in our country such a mass which expresses its wishes so clearly. . . . Wherever I went I saw that people demanded democracy." (*Cumhuriyet*, July 19, 1946.)

¹⁸ Newspaper editors and reporters repeatedly interviewed leaders of the political parties and brought their views to public attention, and vice versa. Newspapermen courageously defended certain views and published speeches critical of the government, such as the speech of Adnan Menderes in İzmir which resulted in the arrest of several newspapermen, later acquitted by the court. (*Son Posta*, August 8-10, 1947.) Many newspapers, determined to criticize the government at any price, saw only one aspect of the problem, or reproduced the views of a small minority; for instance, the *Vatan's* criticism of the governor of Kayseri, who had actually distinguished himself by excellent public service.

spect for law and order. The Republicans frequently accused the Democrats of violating the accepted ways and means of political campaigning;¹⁹ that is, instead of proposing political changes through the National Assembly, they tried to force such changes upon the government through mass pressure. Indeed, the Democratic Party's interpretation of the concept of law and order may be divided into two phases, the first from the inception of the party to the July Declaration in 1947, and the second thereafter. During the first period, the Democrats, motivated by the absence of legal measures to assure the survival of their party, relied heavily on the support of the masses to exert pressure on the government to bring about equalization of political parties. Cooperation between the opposition and the government during this first period, according to Recep Peker, the Republican Premier, consisted of the Democrats' acquiescence in the views and policies of the government. After the July Declaration, which assured the existence of the opposition, the Democrats to a great extent renounced mass pressure and instead used the National Assembly to propose political changes. Cooperation between government and opposition during this second period was based on equality.²⁰

The respect for law and order prevailing in Turkish society as a whole was also observed by the Democratic and Republican Parties alike.²¹ While it is true that this respect for law

¹⁹ *Vatan*, May 20, 1948 (speech of İnönü); see also *Tasvir*, April 3, 1948 (Tanrıöver's views).

²⁰ Indeed, it was after the July Declaration that the Democratic Party made it clear that it disapproved of some of the speeches made by Sadık Aldoğan, the government's foremost critic and the exponent of the idea of violent opposition to government officials. The name of the Democratic newspaper, *Kuvvet*, implying sheer force, was changed to *Kudret*, implying strength, resourcefulness, omnipotence. *Vatan*, July 14, 16, 1947 (Bayar's remarks); *Son Telgraf*, July 12, 13, 14, 1947. For the July Declaration, see my Chapter 6.

²¹ This trait has been acknowledged by foreign observers. See, for instance, A. H. Hanson, "Democracy Transplanted; Reflections on a Turkish Election," *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. IX, 1955-1956, pp. 65ff.

and order was in some part the by-product of conservatism, it was due largely to an inherent respect for procedure and orderly change. It is for this reason, although events at times took a very dangerous turn, that relations between the parties remained within the limits of the law. Occasional disorders occurred in the country,²² and in the Assembly itself,²³ but their scope was extremely limited. As a matter of fact, the only major disturbances in Turkey due to political reasons were after the elections of 1957, when some of the results were contested and the army had to intervene in various localities to break up or prevent rioting.

The right to criticize the government was voluntarily accepted by the Republicans. They gradually recognized the fact that the basic condition of a democracy was freedom to criticize the government, and the Republican Government set the example by tolerating criticism which often exceeded normal limits, and bowed to the opposition's demands. This "meek" attitude became so general, especially after the

²² Mass arrests took place in Senirket and Aslanköy, supposedly for breaking the peace, but the court acquitted the persons indicted. (*Vatan*, May 24, October 8, 10, 1947; *Son Posta*, editorial, October 26, 1948.) For alleged pressure during the municipal elections, see *BMMTD (Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi)*, Session 8.1, Vol. 2, pp. 42ff. Party allegiance in certain places, especially in some villages and towns, caused occasional antagonism. Feuding groups in these communities used the political parties as a means of combating their rivals. (*Ulus*, June 27, 1946.) These feuds in no case, however, resembled the fights and physical violence encountered in the party struggle in the Balkans prior to the war.

²³ One of them was the attack by a Republican deputy on Ahmet Tahtakılıç of the National Party in 1948. (*Vatan*, December 30, 1948.) There were several instances of intra-party polemics and slanderous attacks in the press, too. The funds deposited in banks abroad by a number of people in government and business were made an issue by the National Party, but it died down without revealing anything substantial. So did the threat by the Democratic Party to denounce a number of people who had avoided military service during the War of Liberation in 1919-1922. (*Yeni Sabah*, December 12, 1946; *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 12 [speech of İnönü, November 1, 1948]; also *Ayın Tarihi*, November 1948, pp. 42-43.) The refusal of the Democrats to stand up when the President entered the Assembly according to an old custom, at first came as a great shock to the Republicans and was considered a grave breach of the established customs, but they soon grew accustomed to it.

July Declaration in 1947, when the government made several voluntary concessions to the opposition, that according to some Republicans it gave the impression of following the opposition's views rather than those of its own party.²⁴

Relations among the various party leaders, despite often-recurring tensions, remained friendly from 1946 to 1950, and whenever a more basic question arose they were able to forget party differences.²⁵ This attitude on the part of party leaders continues although occasional partisan considerations seem to have acquired priority. The National Party is an exception since it has always opposed both the Republicans and the Democrats.

The foreign policy of Turkey was not made an issue from 1946 on; all parties agreed on a pro-Western foreign policy,

²⁴ Some dissident Republican deputies claimed that the government reacted to the opposition as though conscience-stricken at holding office. *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 15, pp. 172ff. (Kemal Çağlar).

²⁵ The friendly relations between Republicans and Democrats were determined partly by their common social background and their past associations. The upper hierarchy in both parties had similar social and educational backgrounds. Except for a few political ideas, there were no basic differences in their views. Moreover, the leaders of the Democratic Party had belonged to the Republican Party in the past, and thus had concurred in many of the Republican Party measures which they now criticized. One of the Democratic leaders had been very critical of the Liberal Party in 1930, and at that time he had violently opposed the idea of a multi-party system. It was rather difficult for them, therefore, to carry their criticism of the Republican Party beyond a certain point. The past association of the Democratic leaders with one-party rule often has been used to attack them, and even today this is made a political issue whenever the Democratic Party's interpretation of democracy is questioned. It was because of this closeness that the Republicans and Democrats were accused at one time of having agreed secretly to maintain the political supremacy of the Republican Party, while offering outsiders the façade of a multi-party system, as was done in 1930 with the Liberal Party of Fethi Okyar. Public reluctance to join the Democratic Party immediately after its inception originated in these suspicions, which remained a sporadic issue until 1950, when the ousting of the Republican Party from office proved them wrong. This fact compelled the Democrats to preserve an independent attitude toward the government, at times at the price of resorting to untimely denunciations of the government in order to dispel the suspicions of a secret agreement. *Cumhuriyet*, February 27, 1946 (statement of Ekrem Üstündağ); *ibid.*, March 3, 1946 (Republican Party letter); *Tasvir*, April 23, 1946.

except the Communist Party. The National Party, in absolute opposition to the Republicans and Democrats, advocated vaguely closer relations with the Arab countries, but at the end it, too, accepted the government's viewpoint. (Once in 1948 the *Kudret*, which became the voice of the National Party, demanded rejection of American help because President Truman had praised the development of democracy in Turkey, which their newspaper claimed did not exist.)

American military and economic aid profoundly affected Turkey's whole political life. It played a considerable part in shaping the political parties' views on foreign affairs. It was indirectly responsible for the government's efforts to re-adjust the political system to democracy, but no direct political pressure was involved in liberalizing the regime. Close relations with the English-speaking world also prompted some suggestions that the Turkish multi-party system be based on the model of the English-speaking world—namely, a political system based on two major political parties which would successively hold government office.²⁶

Acceptance of the idea of a multi-party system brought in turn a change in the method of carrying out reforms. The multi-party system in itself was a guarantee that the necessary reforms would be proposed through different political parties, giving the people the choice, through the election system, of accepting or rejecting the reform proposed. This in effect meant a departure from the previous system, in which reforms had been imposed from the top by the government. The *Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti* (Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas) expressed a fairly general opinion about these methods when it criticized the manner in which language reform was carried out:²⁷

²⁶ See *Yeni Gazete* (editorial), December 14, 1948; *Vatan*, March 17, 23, 1950.

²⁷ For criticism of language reform, see *Vatan*, October 25, November 1, 1948; *Tan*, September 28, 1945; *Akşam*, November 1, February 16, 1948. For the old method of forceful change as advocated by R. Peker, see my Chapter 2.

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The government with the means at its disposal is forcing this language upon the country. People do not understand the language used by the Government and Administration, or parents the language of their children [taught at school]. . . . the National Assembly cannot change the language of the country by law, because it [the Assembly] is a political, not a cultural body, and although it has the highest lawmaking authority, its powers are limited by the needs and traditions of the people, by the principles of humanity and morality . . . the unnecessary interference in the language by a small group with the means of government at its disposal cannot be accepted.²⁸

Such opinions showed their impact after the Democrats came into power, when the forced language reform was stopped along with some other reforms, as mentioned in previous chapters.²⁹

The Republican Party, itself the initiator of reforms, took the first step, under pressure from the opposition and the public, to modify its stand on reformism. The Republican Party convention of 1947—the convention which marked a turning point in the history of the party—defined reformism as a means to dispose of the country's backwardness and to replace it with an advanced civilization based on national values. It also promised to strive incessantly to achieve this goal and to preserve the reforms accomplished (Article 16).

The Democrats in their program defined reformism as an effort to adjust life in Turkey to the world's changing conditions and to achieve progress by disposing of harmful traditions (Article 15). The views of the two parties on this issue do not differ fundamentally and their actual stand is determined by practical party considerations rather than ideology.³⁰

²⁸ *Vatan*, February 13, 1948; also January 16, 1949; also *Türk Yurdu*, 1953-1957.

²⁹ For instance, the Constitution, which had been "Turkified" on January 10, 1945 (*Resmî Gazete* 5905; Jäschke, *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942-1951*, p. 38), went back to the old text on December 24, 1952.

³⁰ The Republicans used in their program the newly invented word *devrimcilik* for reformism, while the Democrats preserved the old name,

It is only too obvious that these changes in favor of a moderate view were bound to encourage those conservatives who had never accepted the reforms and sought an opportunity to denounce them. Many of the institutions introduced for the purpose of cultural reform came under fire as being communist-inspired or conducive to undesirable ideologies. (Reactions to reforms have been studied in detail elsewhere in the course of this study and they will not be dealt with in this chapter.³¹)

All the developments described in the preceding pages caused profound behavioral changes in the government and among the people.³² High government officials who had enjoyed seclusion in the past—traveling in separate coaches, never seen in public except on special occasions—began to talk directly to the people, and annoyed as they were at the beginning, nevertheless answered the questions raised in public.³³

The authority of the police forces in towns and cities was restricted. The village police (gendarmes) were attached to the Ministry of the Interior, that is, they were placed under the jurisdiction of civilian instead of military authorities. These gendarmes, "the masters of villages," had coerced, on behalf of the state, the peasants into paying taxes or fulfilling work obligations, frequently without any control; conse-

Inkilâpçılık. On the other hand, the Democrats used the word *gelenek*, supposedly invented by İnönü himself, for "tradition," instead of the old commonly used word, *anane*.

³¹ On this important point, see Chapters 10 and 14.

³² Even the idea of departing from the unitary form of government and accepting a government based on the separation of powers so as to enhance the multi-party system came often into discussion but did not lead to any practical result. The late Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, who was deputy chairman of the CHP Parliamentary Group in 1948, declared that the intention of this party was to accept the doctrine of separation of powers and replace the unitary one then (and now) practiced in Turkey; the GNA is the sole depository of all legislative, executive, and judiciary powers. *Ulus*, December 20, 1948; *Cumhuriyet*, December 23, 1948.

³³ For instance, Premier Saka in Yalova (*Son Telgraf, Cumhuriyet*, August 3, 1948).

quently, this measure produced a feeling of relief in the villages. (The further restriction of the gendarmes' power under the Democratic Party after 1950 met with approval in the villages; even today one of the chief propaganda devices of the Democrats in the villages is their claim that they have liberated them from the oppression of the police.)

A very slow and most difficult change had, indeed, begun among government personnel. The bureaucracy—an independent class in itself with several centuries of experience, separated by mentality and habits from the rest of the population and encouraged in these tendencies by the one-party system from 1923 to 1945—had considered themselves the representatives of the state. This idea began to be replaced by the view that the primary function of a government official was to assist individuals in their daily needs and dealings. Government officials now could be brought before civilian courts for offenses committed in the course of their duties, without securing the prior consent of the highest government official.

The impact of the new outlook could also be seen in the relations between government personnel and the public; a government position became less envied than in the past,³⁴ and officials acted more courteously and were sensitive to possible public criticism. In many instances the public was even encouraged by the government itself to complain to higher authorities if not properly treated in a public office.³⁵

The army, also, lost a great deal of its political importance. While it is true that the army did not participate in politics

³⁴ Lewis, "Recent Developments," pp. 324, 331.

³⁵ The attitude of government officials may seem only too natural to a Westerner, but in Turkey it marks a profound departure from previous practices, as would be the case in any Middle Eastern country where the state and its personnel had acquired omnipotence since the very beginnings of organized society and had continued to exercise it until recent time. Thus individualism is resurging in Turkey now. On the early emergence and role of the state in the East, see Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, pp. 6ff. For discussions of the role of the state in economic affairs, see also my Chapter 11.

during the one-party regime, it nevertheless was the actual power on which the Republican Party had based its domination; consequently, it had great political prestige. Since power in the multi-party system had to depend on the popular vote, the army's role was strictly limited to the discharge of defense duties.³⁶ The period of military service, in part due to the more favorable international situation, was reduced by approximately one year for all branches of the armed forces. In addition, interest in the army as a career had diminished greatly, partly because of the increased economic activity.³⁷

School textbooks underwent certain changes aimed at eliminating a number of references lauding one-party rule and the supremacy of the state, although some of the remarks eulogizing the head of the state were later restored by the Democrats.

As a result of these developments the invisible but ever-present atmosphere of oppression and intimidation in society disappeared, and the individual, liberated from control, became more active and resourceful. The attitude of passive obedience gradually disappeared. Social groups and classes began to mix freely, creating at times the impression that discipline in society had diminished. The circulation of newspapers and magazines, which had remained relatively constant from 1928 to 1936,³⁸ and rose only slightly during the war,

³⁶ It has been mentioned that the army in Turkey had been in the past the main factor in modernization and political change (see Chapter 1). The army still continues to symbolize and promote modernization; technical innovations are easily introduced; it provides education for illiterates; army officers in various towns throughout Turkey live according to the modern conceptions of life (they are generally secularists) and this provides a model which is followed there. (Army service is compulsory for every male citizen.)

³⁷ This is particularly true in large centers where there are increased opportunities for work. In smaller towns the army still provides free education, a career, and chances for a better living. For instance, the Erzincan Military School had 3,000 applicants for the 400 places available in 1957. *Cumhuriyet*, September 27, 1957.

³⁸ See Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 199-209.

increased considerably.³⁹ The number of radios, all them imported, also multiplied, and they became an indispensable item in every public place in towns and villages as a source of both news and amusement.⁴⁰

Party developments on the one hand, and economic and social changes on the other, affected the mentality and behavior and brought into active political life the most neglected group in Turkey: the peasants.⁴¹ The villagers' great interest and participation in politics,⁴² as demonstrated in the national elections (popular participation in these elections was 89.3 per cent in 1950, 88.6 per cent in 1954, and 79.4 per cent in 1957) have forced the political parties of Turkey, in view of the large number of rural votes (approximately 75 per cent of the total votes cast), to rely on the peasantry for power. Since no political party in Turkey can hope to win an election without the villagers' support, it is obvious that the peasantry will continue, under present circumstances, to play a decisive part in politics.

³⁹ In 1945, 1950, 1952 there were in Turkey 60 dailies and 276 periodicals, 109 dailies and 538 periodicals, 173 dailies and 602 periodicals, respectively. *Istatistik Yılığ*, p. 171. About sixty per cent of these publications appeared in the three largest cities of Turkey, İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. For the Turkish newspapers and the names of their publishers after the war, see *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, IV, 1946, pp. 814-817.

⁴⁰ A foreign traveler observed: "The modern Turk likes noise and must have music wherever he goes." Norman Bentwick, "Village Life in Turkey," *Contemporary Review*, March 1955, p. 176.

⁴¹ For an excellent study of the change in mentality among the peasants, see Howard A. Reed, "A New Force at Work in Democratic Turkey," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. VII, 1953, p. 33ff.

⁴² One peasant delegate at the convention of the Democratic Party in 1949 declared: "I was working in the field in my village. It hurt my honor when I heard that 14,000 votes at Eşme [in the elections of 1946] had been shifted to another ballot box. I put on my leather shoes and decided to go myself and seek justice for people." (*Tasvir*, June 22, 1949.) It was reported that some villagers asked the deputy candidates pointed questions to find out whether they possessed the intellectual ability to represent them in the National Assembly and whether they knew what were the problems of the greatest concern to the peasants. (*Cumhuriyet*, July 15, 16, 1946, villagers in Gebze, Trabzon.) For a more recent view on these attitudes, see HARP, "Turkey Under the Democratic Party," *The World Today*, Vol. IX, 1953, pp. 384ff.

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The emergence of the village as the decisive factor in Turkish politics and the consciousness of this fact, coupled with the economic changes taking place in Turkey since 1949, have further broken down the closed village circle,⁴³ have stimulated the villagers' interest in the outside world and in economic matters,⁴⁴ and have changed the pattern of town-city relations.⁴⁵ All these have vastly accelerated the changes in the villages which had been taking place since the Republic.⁴⁶

The middle-class citizens, especially those from urban areas,

⁴³ See Ibrahim Yasa, *Hasanoğlan Köyü*, Ankara, 1955, pp. 208, 238. On this village, and villagers' attitude on politics, see A. H. Hanson, "Village and Village Institute: Hasanoğlan," *Studies in Turkish Local Government*, pp. 92-101 *passim*; Yasa, *ibid.*, pp. 199-201.

⁴⁴ For instance, the elderman (*muhtar*) of Oba village in the province of Antalya went to study villages in Germany and Austria with the purpose of learning new ways of village administration. *Cumhuriyet*, September 28, 1957. For the manner in which the *muhtar* is elected, see Yasa, *op.cit.*

⁴⁵ Relations with the town are on a more rationalistic basis now. The exchange of goods is made on a cash basis for the purpose of profit. The towns and cities are now the center of exchange, unlike the past when exchange of goods took place mainly between a limited number of villages. The increase in the means of transportation (4,573 cars in 1938, 16,427 in 1952; 3,882 trucks in 1938, 18,356 in 1952; 1,044 buses in 1938, 4,569 in 1952: *Istatistik Yıllığı*, p. 420) and the excellent road program since 1949 have played a major part in bringing the village closer to the city. As a result, the peasant is more individualistic, aggressive, and aware of his own interests. Compelled to change his mode of life because of farm mechanization, he had to bear these changes, sometimes blessing, sometimes cursing, depending on the way he was affected. (See Cahit Tanyol, "Yurdda Zirai İnkılabın Doğurduğu Tehlikeler," *Cumhuriyet*, October 25, 1955.) The economic benefit drawn from the increase in economic activity has become a matter of primary concern to the peasant now, as compared with the past when he limited himself merely to contemplating the changes around him. For instance, the 15,000 peasants removed from the Seyhan River Valley because of a dam construction complained that the dam would bring additional benefits to the 500 shareholders, who already were rich people in the Adana region. See Şahap Balcıoğlu, "Çukurova Elektrik Santrali Hakkında Köylünün Düşünceleri," *Cumhuriyet*, October 30, 1955.

⁴⁶ For the first stage of these changes, see Boran, *Toplumsal*, pp. 164, 173, 217; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, also his article "State Control of Social Change in Turkey," pp. 248-249; Allen, *Transformation*, pp. 85ff. See my Chapters 3 and 4.

have shown resentment over the reliance of political parties on the peasantry, since this has undermined their own importance. They have also expressed concern over the changing patterns of relations between towns and villages, which they interpret as a lowering of standards and as a deterioration of national values.⁴⁷ They are, nevertheless, affected by both political and economic developments since 1946 which offer them new avenues for acquiring wealth and reaching social and political prominence.⁴⁸

Liberalization after 1945 and the freedom of criticism it entailed tested the durability of the reforms introduced in Turkey since 1923, and led to a more critical approach to the West and to the reforms themselves.⁴⁹ Consequently, reforms introduced for reasons of urgency and practicality, such as language reform, were partly modified, partly rejected. In many other cases, conservative views had a more detrimental impact in bringing about the rejection of some reforms beneficial to modernization, such as those in the field of secularism and education (Village Institutes). Other reforms connected with the political regime, dress, and legal and economic transformations were generally accepted.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ The upper hierarchy of the Ottoman Empire expressed a similar concern immediately after the Republic was established, when the intelligentsia and lower middle classes ascended to power and imposed upon society their own pattern of life. Now these groups show concern over the peasant's emergence as a power in politics, chiefly on the ground of the deterioration of values, although the actual reason may be the dwindling of their own importance.

⁴⁸ For the attitude of the middle class on economic matters in the Near East, see S. A. Morrison, *Middle East Tensions*, New York, 1954, pp. 78ff.; Clare Hollingworth, *The Arabs and the West*, London, 1952, pp. 229-239; Gibb, "Social Change," pp. 41ff.

⁴⁹ The belief in the absolute superiority attributed to the West in Turkey, although still strong, has begun to change as the younger generations demand consideration and respect for their own abilities both from the West and from the country itself.

⁵⁰ Most of the legal reforms introduced from the West have been adjusted, for better or worse, to the conditions in the country. The most typical example is the Civil Code of Switzerland, which is based on Roman Law and has few common features with the *Şeriat* applied in the Ottoman

The general transformation of Turkey since the Republic, and especially since 1945, have added distinctly new features to the country. These happenings have created a dynamic desire, an urge for accomplishment, and a search for a new political, social, and economic balance, all of which are fundamentally different from those of the Ottoman Empire. They have created a discontent with oneself, with the society, and with the old forms; and they have aroused urge for action, a restlessness which Professor Lewis finds as being a Western feature different from the Oriental repose.⁵¹ Furthermore, they have created in the individual a desire to participate in all activities, to seek responsibility, and to hold responsible those who exercise power on his behalf. This desire is the foundation on which democracy and its institutions are built, and its existence is the guarantee for Turkey's future.

Diversity of views is quite prevalent now; one may see in Turkey groups vehemently denouncing everything that is old, while other groups condemn all that is new. In one town a group may favor only religious schools, while in other towns delegations are sent to the Ministry of Education to demand modern schools. (An actual case is personally known to the writer regarding the towns of Erbaa and Nikhisar.) In one village a modern school teacher may be stoned, while in another he is feted.

The picture is not entirely bright. On a higher intellectual level, modernization-Westernization has not followed a similarly rapid transformation. Professor Lewis believes that Turkey is different from the Muslim world and close to the West because of her ability to conceive of the world as a

Empire for centuries. The Code was adopted in 1926; since then, through application and adjustment to local conditions and values it has come to differ from the Swiss interpretation but without losing its basic features. The Code is deeply rooted in Turkey now. See *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. IX, No. 1, 1957, which includes a series of articles on the reception of foreign law in Turkey.

⁵¹ Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," p. 328.

whole, as an organism composed of interrelated and interacting parts which shape the vision of the individual and the group, of the man and the universe, and create accordingly the institution and the thought.⁵² This is at the same time Turkey's intellectual goal and hope and her chief unsolved problem.

The general current of thought, in contradiction to this goal, portrays the individual as related to his group only, and expects him to judge the outside world in the light of his own group dogma and interest. The individual generally disliked, distrusted, and considered harmful is just the one who attempts to transcend the established patterns of thought or challenge the total subordination to the group,⁵³ or who shows the same understanding of outside values as of his own. Any attempt entailing objective consideration of the outside world may be easily interpreted as the symptom of one's weakening allegiance to his country and a rejection of his own culture. No wonder that philosophy in its general universal meaning has remained the least developed field. (Professor Ziyaeddin F. Fındıkoğlu, a disciple of Ziya Gökalp, a traditionalist by tendency, and long time student of Turkish sociology and philosophy, concluded in a recent article that speculative philosophy did not develop in Turkey; it was only in the field of social philosophy that certain work had been accomplished.)⁵⁴

There has been a growing anti-intellectualism during the past few years manifested in distrust of reason, ideas, system and procedure. Empiric practicality is often used as an excuse to wipe out overnight principles, traditions, and procedures

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ University students often organize debates on the topic "Should Turks marry foreigners" and the team which takes the negative side wins, of course. The last debate organized by the Institute of Journalism in İstanbul was won by the team which said that they should not, with 1,098 points against 398. See *Cumhuriyet*, December 19, 1957.

⁵⁴ For Fındıkoğlu's views, see *Türk Yurdu*, June 1955, pp. 894-897, July 1955, pp. 10-14, August 1955, pp. 81-85, October 1955, pp. 250-252.

in government practice and institutions, which had been painstakingly established over the past few decades. Universities have become a favorite target of attack for small-town politicians, and professors have been dismissed, especially on charges of political activity. On the other hand, the attacks on modern institutions have lost some of their vehemence, probably in the belief that these institutions have been "adjusted" to the country's requirements.

The modernization of Turkey is bound to continue with ups and downs until it has penetrated into all corners of the country and recast the society and its values into a new form which probably will not be an Eastern adaptation of the West or a Western form of the East, but for better or worse, a new pattern.⁵⁵ The modernist changes in Turkey are, however, established on a rather solid foundation and whatever reaction may take place in the future cannot wipe them out.

The much-discussed idea of Turkey being a link between East and West by combining in her own culture the best elements from both cultures is in essence the product of a syncretic desire and has little value in practice. As Professor Lewis mentions, society adopts, discards, and creates new values without much discrimination according to its own needs, conceptions, and understanding. Modernization in Turkey, if left to the free will of the society, will continue by adopting things, thoughts, and attitudes without much selection, as in the past. The future speed of modernization in Turkey will be determined by the ability of the modernists or conservatives to control the government, since no widespread change can be envisaged, for the time being at least,

⁵⁵ This presupposes that Turkey will be able to change even without a direct outside stimulus. Outsiders little acquainted with the changes in Turkey have expressed the view that American aid to Turkey needs to be continued for a generation "to assist the Turk to alter progressively his traditional concepts and attain a characteristically modern point of view in relation to the technological world in which he lives." *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1951, p. 1049 (Com. Harold G. Bowen, Jr.).

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without government approval and support.⁵⁶ It is assumed that in the present stage of reformism in Turkey persuasion and consent have replaced coercion, and that this is the direct result of the multi-party system which has changed the idea of government by force to government by consensus. Reform by consent will be possible only as long as government by consensus exists, fulfills the society's need for progress, and preserves the reforms. Any deviation from these goals would be considered by many to be justification for the use of force to prevent regression. But modernization, following the growing demands of the society, must rely on the creative power of the Turk, on his needs and aspirations.

⁵⁶ For a discussion of the fight between old and new in Turkey after liberalization, see A. Toynbee, "The Turkish Republic Today," *The Listener*, December 23, 1940, pp. 953-955. For an "old" and "new" approach to rain forecasting and praying for rain in the villages, see Hanson, "Village," pp. 100-101, who witnessed the event. See also Yasa, *Hasanoğlan*, pp. 201ff. Many Turkish intellectuals cling to the idea of Turkey's mission of being a link between East and West, which in the opinion of this writer has no practical possibility of implementation. For an example of these "missionarist" views see a discussion "Town Meeting," *Vatan*, August 15-17, 1949.

CHAPTER 14

COMMUNISM AND ITS EFFECTS

A. The Organized Activities

COMMUNISM in Turkey can be understood properly only by taking into consideration the proximity of Turkey to the Soviet Union and, especially, the relations between the two countries. In this respect, two periods appear distinguishable in the recent history of Soviet-Turkish relations. The first phase began in 1920 when Turkey and the Soviets found themselves united against the same enemy: the West, chiefly Great Britain. Mustafa Kemal, in a letter addressed to Moscow on April 26, 1920, declared his readiness to fight foreign imperialism and sought to conclude a military and political alliance with the Soviet Union.¹ The Soviets, while rejecting a military alliance, saw the advantage of collaborating with Turkey. A friendly Turkey in the south would strengthen the Soviet's southern flank (the Bolsheviks had been denounced by the Sultan's Istanbul government through the *Şeihülislam*)² and would also prevent open attempts at reviving the nationalist aspirations of the Turkic peoples residing in the Soviet states. Many Turkish intellectuals, on the other hand, had set high hopes in Bolshevism;³ and in certain places in Turkey several local peasant soviets had been established.⁴

The Soviets entered into diplomatic relations with Mustafa Kemal's Ankara Government in 1920, and on March 16,

¹ Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, Vol. 1, Princeton, 1951, pp. 390-391; Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. III, New York, 1953, pp. 474ff.

² Alfred L. P. Dennis, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*, London, 1924, pp. 216ff.; Fischer, *Soviets*, p. 391.

³ Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Middle East*, p. 12.

⁴ Carr, *Bolshevik*, III, p. 299.

1921 the two countries signed a treaty in Moscow settling the border disputes; the provinces of Kars and Ardahan were left to Turkey and Batum to Russia.⁵

As a result of these agreements, the Russians supplied Turkey with weapons and ammunition—the quantity of which is still not made public—which were successfully used by the nationalists to secure victory against the Greeks during 1921-1922.⁶ The assistance given by the Soviets to Turkey stemmed, as mentioned, from the fact that both countries were fighting the same enemy, and not from any belief that Kemal's movement was part of the world socialist revolution. As a matter of fact Zinoviev had declared as early as 1920 that the Soviets never forgot that Mustafa Kemal's movement was nationalistic and that he wanted to rescue the Caliph. Nevertheless, Russia would still continue to aid him, for Mustafa Kemal fought a war primarily against British imperialism.⁷ Moreover, assistance to Turkey would meet with sympathy in the Muslim world.

Later, in 1925, Turkey and the Soviets signed a treaty of neutrality and friendship which was renewed in 1929 and again in 1931, and extended for ten years in 1935.⁸ Soviet

⁵ For the text, see *Current History*, November 1922, pp. 276-279. See also Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti*, İstanbul, 1938, pp. 70-71; Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," pp. 190ff. For various treaties concluded between Turkey and the Soviets, see *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (a publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs), Vol. 1, 1917-1924, Vol. 2, 1925-1932, Vol. 3, 1933-1941, London, 1951, 1952, 1953, *passim*.

⁶ Fischer, *Soviets*, pp. 390-391. Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 112-113. Carr states that assistance to Turkey was given after the first Greek offensive had been stopped. *Bolshevik*, p. 474.

⁷ In the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, 235 Turkish delegates were represented out of a total of 1,891. G. Zinoviev, "Bolshevist Aims in Asia," *Current History*, March, 1921, pp. 465-466; Fischer, *Soviets*, p. 283; Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," p. 187; David J. Dallin, *Russia and Postwar Europe*, New Haven, 1943, pp. 87ff.

⁸ *League of Nations Treaty Series*, Nos. 2481, 3600, 4139, Vols. 125, 156, 179. This treaty was signed three days after the League of Nations granted the Mosul oil fields in Iraq to Great Britain.

friendship during this period was highly praised in Turkey,⁹ especially after Mussolini revived the Italian designs on Anatolia. Moreover, the Soviets lent Turkey technical assistance worth some 18 million dollars and charged no interest.

The Turkish-Soviet friendship gradually deteriorated after 1935. The Soviet support of attempts to establish a strong Communist Party in Turkey had caused considerable concern. This concern was further deepened by the Soviet demands in 1939 that Turkey sign a protocol to modify the Montreux Convention of 1936, to the effect of closing the Dardanelles to all non-Black Sea countries and allowing the Soviets to participate in Turkish decisions relating to these seaways.¹⁰ The Turkish-Soviet talks on this point collapsed on October 16, 1939, and three days later the Franco-British-Turkish Mutual Assistance Pact was signed in Ankara.¹¹ The Soviet Union based her demand for participating in the control of the Turkish Straits by showing that these seaways had been a traditional approach used by Western powers in the past to attack her southern coast.

During the first three years of the second World War, however, relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey were normal. The Soviets insisted on and praised Turkish neutrality.¹² But after the Stalingrad battle their tone changed and Turkey was attacked in the Soviet press for not having observed a strict neutrality; that is, she had let German vessels pass through the Straits into the Black Sea.

On March 19, 1945, the Soviets denounced the friendship treaty signed with Turkey in 1925, saying that it needed to

⁹ See *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, October 29, 1933, quoted in Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 114.

¹⁰ Necmeddin Sadak, "Turkey Faces the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1949, p. 453. See also Cevat Açıkalın, "Turkey's International Relations," *International Affairs*, October 1947, pp. 488-491.

¹¹ Sadak, "Turkey Faces," p. 453.

¹² On August 10, 1941 the Soviets handed to Turkey a note (jointly with Great Britain) assuring her of their fidelity to the Montreux Convention and of no aggressive intention on the Straits. *ibid.*, p. 458.

be adapted to new conditions. The Potsdam communique issued on August 2, 1945 had pointed out that the Montreux Convention "should be revised as failing to meet present day conditions," and it was agreed that "as the next step, the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three (U.S., U.K., USSR) governments and the Turkish Government." Consequently, on August 8, 1946, the Soviets demanded that the Montreux Convention be revised in a conference attended by Turkey and the other Black Sea powers only, and that the Soviet Union be associated in the defense of the Straits.¹³ Turkey rejected the proposals. The pressure on Turkey intensified thereafter and the Soviet press demanded, in addition to the bases on the Straits, the rectification of the northern border between Turkey and Russia established in 1921. (Molotov had mentioned the same to the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow in 1945.) Sometime later the secret documents of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs were made public and a German-Soviet agreement on the Turkish Straits was thus revealed.¹⁴ This agreement in fact entitled the Soviets to participate in the control of the Straits. Turkish-Russian relations deteriorated further and whatever reservations Turkey had about siding entirely with the West were wiped out—there was no choice left.

The relations between Turkey and the Soviets can be understood even better in the light of the revolution which took place in each country. The Russian Revolution was social in character and based on economic materialism. The

¹³ For a Turkish view on this dispute, see Cemil Bilsel, "The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence," *American Journal of International Law*, October 1947, pp. 727ff. For texts of notes between Turkey and the Soviets, see *Current History*, July 1951, pp. 38-50. For a history of Straits and for Potsdam communique and its Soviet interpretation, see *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (a publication of the U.S. Department of State), 1947, pp. 36-37; Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, p. 49. For a view on Turkey's partnership with the West, see Lewis V. Thomas, "Turkey: Partner of the West," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, August 1, 1952, pp. 5-7.

¹⁴ *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941* (a publication of the U.S. Dept. of State), Washington, 1949, pp. 233, 245-247, 253.

Turkish Revolution started as a reaction to foreign occupation and gradually became motivated primarily by political and cultural considerations. It favored the preservation of the existing social order, which it wanted to develop and improve in the spirit of the French Revolution of 1789. Thus, Turkey maintained private property and her economic and social developments followed a trend opposite to the one in the Soviet Union, although in matters of economic organization and bureaucracy,¹⁵ and even in some of her slogans (e.g., a classless society) there was some outward similarity between the two countries.

Communism in Turkey, according to the generally held classical opinion, is a means used by the Soviet Union to achieve her territorial ambitions, in the same way that Czarist Russia used Christianity and the defense of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire as a pretext for expanding her territory. According to the proponents of this view, the Soviet Union is bound to seek an outlet to the southern seas and this can be done only by securing a stronghold on the Turkish Straits. Consequently, it is argued, whatever political regime and philosophy Russia may have, she cannot escape from geographical determinism, which will inevitably bring her into conflict with Turkey. The renewal in 1946 by the Soviet Union of the old Czarist claims on the Straits was considered as evidence to prove the validity of this theory. Communism as a social philosophy is held to be totally subordinated to the Soviet Union's political goals, and is therefore dismissed.

The history of the communist movement in Turkey and the official attitude toward it followed very closely the trend in Turko-Soviet relations, as well as the public realization that social differentiation in the two countries followed opposite directions.¹⁶

¹⁵ Max W. Thornburg, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*, New York, 1949, pp. 26-27, 38-39.

¹⁶ A Socialist Party established in 1910 by a group of intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire met immediate resistance; its leaders were persecuted, and the party, which received little popular support, eventually disappeared

Early in 1920 there came into existence in Anatolia a group known as the *Yeşil Ordu* (Green Army).¹⁷ It was created with Mustafa Kemal's consent and intended to fight on his side. (According to some, the Green Army never came into existence but was a mere rumor purposely spread in order to bolster the people's participation in the War of Liberation.¹⁸) The leaders of this army were influenced by socialist ideas and supported the establishment of soviets in Turkey. Çerkes Ethem, who originally backed Mustafa Kemal but later tried to establish a military autonomy for himself and finally ended by opposing the Ankara government, gained control of the *Yeşil Ordu*. He was eventually liquidated by the nationalists.

The *Halk İştirakiyun* (People's Participation Party),¹⁹ established in 1920, is generally considered to have been the political branch of the Green Army. This party had one of its members, Nazım Bey, deputy of Tokat, elected Minister of Interior. Its leaders had contacts with the representatives of the Soviet Union in Ankara and strove to make Çerkes Ethem ("a glamorous leader" as they called him), the head of their party. The government abolished the party in 1921, arrested its leaders, and in 1922 forbade all communist propaganda.

Also in 1920 there was established, illegally, another Communist Party by Arif Oruç and Salih Zeki, who were against the Sultan's government in İstanbul and that of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara.²⁰ This party, which was also associated with the Green Army, was related to the Third International. It

and its leaders were exiled. It later showed some activity in Paris. This persecution was explained as stemming from the fact that since the country had no industry, socialism was therefore an artificially planted movement in Turkey. L. Erişçi, *Türkiyede İşçi Sınıfının Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1951, pp. 10ff.; Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 303-309, 334.

¹⁷ *Speech*, pp. 401-404, 423ff., 451ff., 453-467; *Tarih*, pp. 67ff.; Carr, *Bolshevik*, III, pp. 300ff.; Halide Edip, *The Turkish Ordeal*, pp. 175ff.

¹⁸ Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, p. 531.

¹⁹ On this party, see *Tarih*, pp. 69ff.; Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, p. 532; Kılıç Ali, *Hatıralarını Anlatıyor*, İstanbul, 1955, pp. 74-75.

²⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, July 26-28, 1931.

tried to incite the workers of Eskişehir to revolt, but without success. It published a number of newspapers, such as *Emek* (Labor) and *Yeni Dünya* (New World), the latter calling itself "communist," and finally was abolished by the government in 1922.

In order to control communist activities in Turkey, and to please the Soviets, Mustafa Kemal himself ordered in secret the establishment of a Communist Party by some of his close associates, such as Refik Bey (Koraltan), Mahmud Esad, Kılıç Ali, Tevfik Rüştü (Aras), Yunus Nadi, Mahmut Celal (Bayar), numbering altogether not more than twenty people who worked in close association with the government.²¹ Hakkı Behiç was the secretary of this group, which gave to Ali Fuat Pasha, the new Turkish Ambassador to the USSR, his Communist credentials. In the view of this party, communism was a means to serve the national welfare of the Turkish nation, and nationalism was its supreme ideal. Soon the party was denounced by the Soviets and the true Turkish Communists as the "creation of some Turkish pashas who intended to deceive the toiling masses."²²

The real Communist Party in Turkey was originally established on September 22, 1919 in İstanbul under the name of *Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası* (Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party) under the leadership of Şefik Hüsnü (Değmer) and Ethem Nejat.²³ The leaders of this party were intellectuals who had studied in Germany and who were influenced by the Spartacist movement. In contrast with the vague ideology of the socialists and communists at home, they had, as the party program indicates, a clear idea of the

²¹ On this party, see Kılıç Ali, *Hatıralarını*, pp. 75, 76; Ali Fuad Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, and *Milli Mücadele Hatıraları*, İstanbul, 1953, 1956; also *Millet*, February 1946, No. 2, pp. 3ff.; Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, p. 531.

²² Walter Z. Laqueur, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East*, New York, 1956, p. 208.

²³ *Aydınlık*, December 1922; Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, p. 438; Laqueur, *Communism*, p. 208.

Marxist-Leninist interpretation of social classes and political struggle. The party was attached to the Third International. It spread its ideas on "scientific socialism" through the *Kurtuluş* (Salvation), *Yoldaş* (Comrade), *Orak-Çekiç* (Hammer-Sickle), and the literary *Aydınlık* (Light). It supported Mustafa Kemal's movement, and condemned the reactionary Istanbul government, in the hope of seeing the former produce a social revolution.

Outside of Turkey the communist movement was headed by Mustafa Suphi, who had fled to Russia in 1914, spent most of the war in internment, and had taken part in the international revolutionary meeting in Petrograd in December 1918. In 1920 he transferred his headquarters to Baku, where he published *Yeni Dünya* (New World) and was a member of the presidium of the Eastern People's Congress in 1920. A few months later he decided to come to Turkey to organize party activities, and, late in 1920, Mustafa Suphi and sixteen of his followers entered the country. In January, 1921, they were murdered in Trabzon by mobs, but the government did not disclose the news for two months. Later the Turkish government, after relations with the Soviets expanded, decided to liberate all the imprisoned communists and prosecute the murderers of Mustafa Suphi.²⁴

The party of Şefik Hüsnü ceased its open activities and went underground in 1925 as a result of the *Takrirî Sükûn* (Maintenance of Order) Law.²⁵ Şefik Hüsnü escaped to Vienna to evade a fifteen year jail term, but returned later, taking advantage of an amnesty law.

The underground activities of the party continued in İzmir, Trabzon, Samsun, and Adana through publications and secret organizations.²⁶ In 1927 one group of eighty-nine, and in

²⁴ Carr, *Bolshevik*, III, pp. 298-299, 303-304; Laqueur, *op.cit.*, pp. 210-211; *Millet*, May 1, 1947, pp. 8ff.

²⁵ *Ayn Tarihi*, January 1947, pp. 10ff.; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 104; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 67, 68, 69.

²⁶ *Ayn Tarihi*, January 1947, p. 11.

1928 another group of forty-five persons were arrested for spreading communist propaganda and a number of publications were suspended. In the following years a number of propagandists were arrested throughout Anatolia, in İzmir, Adana, Samsun, Ankara, Trabzon, etc.²⁷ Communist infiltrators were discovered in the Maritime Academy of İstanbul, in the technical schools in İzmir, Zonguldak, and Akhisar, and even among the crew of the cruiser Yavuz. In 1943 and 1944 some additional communists were arrested. Nazım Hikmet, the foremost realistic poet of Turkey, was arrested in 1932 for his revolutionary poems, and jailed again in 1938. In 1950 he was liberated and in 1951 escaped to the Soviet Union, where he still lives.

The political liberalization, and especially the amendment of the Association Law in 1946 permitting the establishment of political parties on a class basis, enabled Şefik Hüsnü Değmer legally to re-establish the Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party (*Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi*) on June 19, 1946. In other words, the party came into the open. Esat Adil Müstecaplıoğlu had already established, on May 14, 1946, a Turkish Socialist Party (*Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi*) which was inspired by Marxism, but in practice resembled the classical socialist parties. *Gerçek* (Truth) was its main newspaper. Both parties were established in accordance with set legal procedures and functioned until December 16, 1946.²⁸ On this date Şefik Hüsnü's and Esat Adil's parties were closed under the authority of martial law, together with the majority of the trade unions and six publications: *Sendika* (Trade-Union), *Ses* (Voice), *Gün* (Day), *Yığın* (Mass), *Dost* (Friend), and the Armenian newspaper *NorOr*, while Arif Oruç's *Yarın* (Tomorrow) was suspended for four

²⁷ *Tasvir*, January 4, 1946. For a non-documentary study of communism in Turkey, see a serial in *Tasvir*, December 25, 1947 to January 21, 1948.

²⁸ *Siyasi Dernekler*, pp. 341-368; *ibid.*, pp. 271-290; *ibid.*, p. 341.

months. According to the government, this action was necessitated because individuals known to be communists tried to use the political parties, the above-mentioned publications, and the trade unions to establish the political supremacy of one particular social class, i.e., the proletariat, and this was an illegal action under the Penal Code which forbids class struggle.²⁹

The leaders of the two political parties and of some of the trade unions—altogether seventy people, some of whom were soon released—were arrested and their homes searched, along with others suspected of communist activities.³⁰ The suspension of these parties followed immediately their decision to merge into one central socialist party.

The long trial of the communist leaders ended in 1948.³¹ Şefik Hüsnü and fifty-five others were sentenced to jail terms that varied from one to five years. Esat Adil was acquitted and his party allowed to reorganize itself, for “it was not established that it served communist purposes.”³² The Supreme Court upheld the decision.³³ Esat Adil’s party had lost so much prestige, and the fear of being considered “red” was so great, that the party was not able to expand, and in the elections in İstanbul of 1951 it could poll no more than 220 votes out of the more than 175,000 votes cast.³⁴ In 1947, the *Zincirli Hürriyet* (Enchained Freedom) began its pub-

²⁹ *Ulus*, December 17, 1946; also Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 67, 68, 69; *Aynı Tarihi*, January 1947, pp. 10ff. This last publication includes a detailed history of the Communist Party in Turkey as presented to the Grand National Assembly by the Ministry of Interior, Şükrü Sökmenşuer.

³⁰ *Yeni Sabah*, December 19, 20, 1946.

³¹ The trial was held in secret. This writer was undergoing at that time legal training in that court and thus had the opportunity to attend some of the sessions and to read the court files.

³² *Vatan*, July 15, 1948 (Decision 948/114-2030 of the Second Criminal Court of İstanbul); Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 86.

³³ Decisions #1597 and #1787, declaration #302.

³⁴ *Vatan*, September 18, 1951. Later in 1952 fifteen members of this party were arrested again because of communist propaganda. *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, xxv, 1952, p. 205, xxvi, p. 88.

lication in Istanbul but, unable to continue because of the Martial Law, it moved to İzmir where a number of students attacked the printing plant and seized and burned the paper.³⁵ The publisher of the paper, Mehmet Ali Aybar, formerly a professor at the University of Istanbul, had written strong anti-government articles in *Vatan* in 1945 and 1946.

In 1950 the *Friends of Peace (Barışseverciler)* protested Turkey's participation in the Korean War and a few people were arrested and condemned to various prison terms.³⁶ In 1951, additional arrests were made; and in 1953, 167 workers, intellectuals and professionals³⁷ were brought to trial for organizing to spread communism. Previously, in 1949, a group of Turkish students in Paris organized "The Progressive Young Turks Association" and sent various propaganda brochures through the mail to Turkey.³⁸ In January 1958, the *Vatan* (Homeland) party of Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, who had been in jail several times for communist activities, was closed and twenty-five of its members together with the leader were arrested for attempts to spread communism. The party had participated in the elections of 1957.

There are two programs of the Communist Party in Turkey. The first one, published illegally in 1931, is the fundamental document and provides the communist interpretation of Kemalism, expresses views on various problems of Turkey, and establishes the action program of the party. The second program, submitted to the government by the Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party in 1946, expresses the same ideas in a democratic form more acceptable to the government and to the public in general, and better adjusted to Turkish conditions.

³⁵ *Vatan*, April 19, 1947; *Cumhuriyet*, April 21, 1947; *Akşam*, April 24, 1947.

³⁶ Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 126, 134.

³⁷ *Cahiers*, xxviii, 1953, p. 191; Laqueur, *Communism*, pp. 216-217; *Her Gün*, May 2, 3, 1953.

³⁸ *Vatan*, April 8, 1949.

The first program begins by expressing the attachment of the Turkish Communist Party to the international proletariat, to the U.S.S.R., and describes the party as the only stronghold against the "new imperialistic enslavement of Turkey." The ultimate purpose of the party was to achieve, through the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transition from the bourgeois system to socialism. Consequently the party aimed at waging a constant struggle against the (Peoples) Republican Party, which was described as having usurped leadership in the Turkish revolution on behalf of the bourgeoisie, and used the victories achieved in that revolution for the consolidation of a Turkish bourgeoisie. This class had first replaced the minority bourgeoisie and the old aristocracy, then allied itself with imperialists and used the Republican Party to suppress all class struggle. In the view of the Party, imperialism was still dominant in Turkey, for it controlled key economic positions, and was in alliance with the reactionary landowners, the old Ottoman bureaucracy and big businessmen. (These ideas were expressed before large-scale statism was applied in Turkey.) The Communist Party proposed to organize the working class of Turkey into an independent political force and make it the leader of the masses, i.e., of the peasantry, as well as of the semi-proletariat elements of the urban petit bourgeoisie. (This bourgeoisie, the party claimed, had veered toward reaction because of the damage in crafts and small business caused by the competition of the West.) The party program stated that the Kemalist regime had abolished the tithe tax (*aşar*) under the pressure of the revolutionary peasant movement, but had preserved the feudal and semi-feudal structure of the agricultural economy, and that the peasant was still exploited. Consequently it advocated confiscation without compensation of all large land properties of individuals and religious organizations and their transfer to the peasants and farm hands. Furthermore, all enterprises belonging to cap-

italists, including banks, especially the Ottoman Bank, newspapers, and so forth were to be expropriated.

The Communist Party aimed at convincing the working masses that their welfare rested in stimulating the country out of passivity and enslavement by imperialists and bourgeoisie. The party program recognized without any reservation the rights of the minorities (*Lazes, Kurds*) to cultivate and develop their own language and culture, and to enjoy freedom of self-determination to the point of secession.

In matters of foreign policy, the Communist Party program opposed any rapprochement to imperialist powers and instead advocated close political and economic alliance with the U.S.S.R. and pledged support for anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist movements. Furthermore, the Party desired to expose (to the working people) the Grand National Assembly as a tool of dictatorship and to demonstrate its inability to solve the country's basic problems through parliamentary procedure. It hoped to prove that only the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants was capable of devising a solution for those problems. The Party aimed at carrying out an educational and propaganda program to bring about a rapid transition from bourgeois democracy to a dictatorship of peasants and workers, and ultimately a dictatorship of the proletariat.

In matters of taxation the party aimed at abolishing all the small taxes imposed upon the peasants and craftsmen, small business men, low-paid employees and workers; to replace these with a single progressive income tax. It also opposed the bourgeois chauvinistic educational system and instead advocated free schools controlled by committees of workers and peasants. The cultural monopoly of the Kemalist regime was to be abolished and substituted with a new democratic and diversified education according to the views and needs of the working masses. The party paid special attention to propaganda among the younger elements and intelligentsia of the

poorer sections by spreading the communist ideology, hatred of imperialism and capitalist exploitation, thus providing the labor movement with revolutionary elements. Furthermore, it aimed towards the emancipation of women by condemning their existing organizations as being unable to achieve true emancipation under the existing capitalist system.

Once power had been secured by the workers and peasants they would organize themselves against counter-revolutionary activities by disarming the armies of the bourgeoisie, and by establishing a Red Army and a revolutionary militia.

The second program of the party, that is of the Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party in 1946, was drafted by taking into consideration some of the changes undergone by Turkey and presenting the party views in a moderate form acceptable to the general public.

According to the program, the ultimate purpose of the party was to put an end to the exploitation of labor, to nationalize the means of production, and achieve a high standard of living for all people. However, since the conditions for these basic goals had not sufficiently matured it was necessary to concentrate on some immediate goals: enabling the workers and peasants to benefit from democratic freedoms and obtain a voice in the country's affairs; abolishing the unconstitutional laws; allowing groups in the country to organize themselves on the basis of interests and ideology; protecting the workers and peasants; regardless of their race, religion or origin, against exploitation by local and foreign capital; and finally, preparing the society's transition to a socialist order by securing the participation of the growing number of working masses in political struggle. The party aimed at improving the living standards and working conditions of all groups without discrimination, but believed that this could be achieved only through struggle, and consequently aimed at giving priority among its ranks to those elements willing to participate in such a struggle. The party demanded, like all

other opposition parties in 1946, immediate abolition of police, press, and association laws, which had greatly restricted the freedoms and rights granted by the Constitution, and recommended the establishment of a High Permanent Assembly Commission to adjudicate the constitutionality of laws. Furthermore, it demanded, by following an initial view put forth in the first party program, that the voting age be cut to eighteen, and that proportional representation be introduced as a measure to assure the establishment of democracy in Turkey. The party, in a bitter denunciation of fascism, demanded that all the elements in government jobs, universities, etc., who had promoted fascist ideas, be fired from their jobs.

The party program devoted considerable space to the peasantry whom it analyzed more in the light of its actual and realistic conditions than in theoretical and dogmatic views, as in the first program. It accepted the fact that the Turkish peasants did not form one single homogeneous group but were divided into several groups—the village landlords, *ağas*, the poor peasants, and the landless and insufficiently landed peasantry. Consequently, it advocated measures to end the economic and social domination of the first group, and measures (and land) to support the second and third groups. It termed the Land Reform Act of 1945 as being susceptible to various evasive interpretations, and basically insufficient to solve the peasantry's land problems. Moreover, the party envisaged the partition of large properties to peasants—instead of preserving them as large agricultural units—and the opening of new lands for agriculture in which mechanized farming was to be introduced, and which were to be preserved as large state-owned agricultural units. The peasants were to be persuaded to combine their lands and equipment in collective farms and to share the crops. However, in view of the country's backwardness in technology, the party believed that it was not wise to place emphasis on farm collectivization at the beginning, and instead advocated a campaign to eradicate back-

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wardness and religious reaction in the villages. The party expressed the view that the United Nations Charter envisaged a social and economic democracy and pledged to fulfill all those aims. Consequently, it expressed firm opposition to internal and external economic organizations (trusts, cartels) which were inherently opposed to social and economic democracy.

In international policy the party wanted to establish peaceful relations with all the neighbors of Turkey in the Balkans and the Near East and promote friendship with the United States and Great Britain. (Cautiously the program did not mention the Soviet Union.)

In internal matters, the party advocated a new administrative reorganization to enable every community, large or small, to have a voice in its own administration. It also envisaged a sweeping reform in government personnel to end corruption and maladministration, which, according to the party, had greatly spread during war years. Moreover, the party denounced "bourgeois statism," and advocated its replacement by "popular statism" with the purpose of securing the welfare of all people. As part of this general principle it advocated the nationalization of the chief means of production and the establishment of heavy industry. The small industries and crafts, however, were going to be preserved and improved. Expressing a popular resentment against illicit accumulation of wealth during war years, the party advocated expropriation of all properties accumulated in an unorthodox way. In matters of education, the party advocated first of all a program designed to interest the peasantry and the youth in modern technology, and educate every individual so as to make him a productive and useful element of society. The working classes were to have special schools to improve their professional and cultural standards. The universities were to be autonomous and the academicians were to be free to participate in politics. The judges were to

be reorganized and given special privileges to deliver them from being at the discretion of the government as were ordinary officials. The minorities were to be granted special privileges—there was no mention of the right of secession—for participation in local administration and in developing their own national cultures.

The Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party issued, in addition to its program and by-laws, some special directives for party workers. It stressed the point that the party was a new progressive group, which was the pioneer in uniting around itself the dispersed working classes, and emphasized the need for systematic activity. Consequently it advised the party members to draw a list of people who had accepted the ideals of democracy and socialism and persuade them to join the party. Racialists and reactionaries were to be ignored. Once the “qualified” individuals were thus determined, contact was to be established with each one of them by explaining the party program and asking them to join its ranks. In places in which citizens had decided on their own to form a party branch they had to secure the party leaders’ approval and confidence before admission to regular membership. Such branches had to strive to attract as many members as possible and organize themselves in larger groups with the express approval of the party hierarchy. The local branches were to spread the ideas of the party—its literature in special weekly courses by interpreting and applying them to local conditions. Party members were under obligation to subscribe to at least one party newspaper, or to a socialist one recommended by the party. One member of the local branch was to become a correspondent of the party newspaper by sending all information relating to labor and working conditions in the respective area. The basic purpose was to spread the ideology of the party and establish a dynamic class conscious group to provide leadership for the working masses.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ The text of the first party program is to be found in Ivar Spector,

These were in general the ideas and policy with which the Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party entered the political struggle in 1946. The success of this party, and to some extent that of the Turkish Socialist Party, is best evidenced by the fact that they were closed six months after their establishment.

The 1946 action against the two parties was precipitated by the unexpected success of the socialist ideologies among the trade unions and some of the intelligentsia, and by the apprehension that such ideologies might cause a rift in the united popular front with which the government wanted to face the Soviet claims to the Straits. Had these two parties met with total indifference, and as a consequence remained really small and harmless,⁴⁰ they would have been left in peace, as were some other more passive socialist parties.

The government abolished the two parties in accordance with Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code, which forbid class struggle. It was obvious, especially from the program of the Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party, that it was strictly a class party, and one may ask why the party was allowed to form in the first place, if not just to bring it into the open. The undemocratic aspects of this

The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, Seattle, 1958, pp. 82-90. The second text and the special party directives are to be found in *Türkiyede Siyasi Dernekler*, pp. 353-368.

⁴⁰ Reliable figures are lacking to indicate the exact number of communists in Turkey. One figure mentioned in the National Assembly (probably taken from the famous police records) placed the number of active communists at 589, while a more recent figure places the number as high as 3,000. Walter Z. Laqueur, "The Appeal of Communism in the Middle East," *The Middle East Journal*, Winter 1955, p. 21; *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 20, p. 582 (debate on June 8, 1949).

In İstanbul and Ankara alone more than ten newspapers and periodicals, obviously inspired by socialist ideologies, were being published in 1946. Moreover, two student associations in Ankara and İstanbul, *Türkiye Gençler Derneği* (Youth Association of Turkey), were known to have been established by students of leftist tendencies, and their membership grew to several hundreds. Their headquarters were searched by the police and some members brought to court, but they were acquitted. *Vatan*, July 30, September 30, 1948.

drastic action were apparently so obvious that Necmeddin Sadak (Foreign Affairs Minister in 1947-1950) found it necessary to write in the pro-government *Akşam* (Evening):⁴¹

What have the founders and the active members of the T.W.P.S. and T.S. [author's abbreviations] parties done to be subject to treatment that contradicts the simplest principles of freedom? Can this action be reconciled with an advanced type of democracy? Is it forbidden to adopt a "leftist" view on social, economic, and political matters? Can there be question of democracy and freedom anywhere in this century when "leftist" opinions cannot be expressed freely? The answer is no . . . the action against the two political parties, however, was taken because they were suspected of concealing their real purposes and because they worked in the country on behalf of a foreign nation . . . and acted on a program different from the one submitted to the government.⁴²

The truth is that the very program the parties had openly submitted to the government was based on Marxism.⁴³ Moreover the court found no evidence to show that the two parties had any direct connections abroad or that they received funds from any foreign powers; nor did the court find proof that the action against the communists and the trade unionists was undertaken "on direct orders from Washington" as claimed by the Soviet foreign affairs magazine *New Times*.⁴⁴

What was the cause of the relative success of leftist currents in Turkey? First of all, the low standard of living, the unsatisfactory social conditions, the lack of employment, and all the evils that may possibly result from an economy of state capitalism. If one considers the very low wages of the

⁴¹ This was especially true in respect to the trade unions. Three months earlier the Minister of Labor had stated that the "trade unions which are established are in our view entirely legal organizations and legitimate. I wish with all my heart that they be of benefit to the country." Yet most of them were abolished shortly afterward because of communist infiltration. *Tasvir*, September 12, 1946.

⁴² *Akşam* (editorial), December 19, 1946.

⁴³ For programs, see *Siyasi Dernekler*, pp. 343ff., 273ff.

⁴⁴ *New Times*, April 14, 1948.

worker, the contempt with which he was looked upon because of the manual work he did, and the denial to him of any means of improving his standard of living, one can better understand the situation. The militant trade-unionism based on class warfare advocated by the Communist Party seemed exactly the weapon needed to break the intolerance and scorn with which employers and some of the intelligentsia treated labor. The idea of "devotion to the motherland" with which the employer wanted to protect the "innocent" worker from the "evils" of "foreign ideologies"—the best proof of devotion to the motherland by the worker being not to ask for a wage raise and cause trouble—was an anachronistic echo of surviving paternalism which hardly satisfied the material needs of a new individualistic society.⁴⁵

Furthermore, the communists and the leftists in general introduced for the first time into society clear, simple, emotionally appealing political explanations of the existing social and economic difficulties and presented short-cut solutions to them. In the absence of other social and economic views inspired by non-Marxist ideologies, they were able to create the impression that Marxism was the only solution to all social and economic problems. One is bound to admit that in Turkey it was the leftists (the term "leftist" is used to include the communists and socialists) who defined for the first time, in political perspective, some of the existing economic and social problems of Turkey.⁴⁶ These ideas appeared orig-

⁴⁵ During the Young Turks period, adherence to a social-political ideology because of concern with the material necessities of life seemed utterly unacceptable. One deputy expressed it in the following way: "Socialism can be found only among the European workers whose wages are too low to suffice to their comparatively [too numerous] needs. This idea cannot develop among the Ottoman unpretentious *knaatkâr* [one who is satisfied with little] workers and porters." Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, p. 304, quoted from *Sabah*, August 23, 1908. The survival of this idea is demonstrated in an editorial in *Tasvir* which described individuals accepting some ideology because of material necessities as "animal-like stomach-mindedness." *Tasvir*, December 24, 1946.

⁴⁶ Reading the social literature of Turkey between 1930-1945, one

inal and as such attracted attention and awakened interest. While some intellectuals embraced Marxism as the "fashionable ideology," others sincerely accepted it, for lack of other alternatives, as the solution for a rapid modernization and a means of social justice.

Many individuals were aware of the new problems arising from the country's socio-economic transformation, but the general policy of intimidation, hostility, and distrust which developed towards social research and discussion rendered impossible the proper mental adjustment to this transformation. The summary suppression of publications and associations which were established as a natural by-product of the country's transformation and intellectual development, and the platitudes offered officially as substitutes for freely reached conclusions, could lead only to extremism. The establishment of a balanced, mutual relationship between the concepts of democracy, humanitarianism, and socio-economic development could take place only with a free debate on such important issues as "social justice," "economic interest," and "social classes."

The religious-nationalist opposition to the ideas of universal brotherhood and of international understanding, and the condemnation of such ideas as Marxist-inspired "internationalism," "cosmopolitanism," and "intellectual decadence," increased the prestige of Marxism instead of diminishing it. Instead of finding the explanation for the leftist upsurge in

realizes that problems such as labor organization, social classes, land distribution, and standards of living, not to mention political topics, were debated mainly in the socialist publications. It is enough to glance through some of the issues of *Tan* (Morning) during 1944-1945 and compare them with other newspapers to realize the diversity of the problems with which it dealt. In a country like Turkey, in need of progress and geared through its social evolution toward progress, any idea likely to give meaning, direction, and purpose to its dynamism will find acceptance. It is true that economic and social matters were studied and given a greater place in the life of the country by the Republican regime than by the Ottoman Empire, but an "idealistic" interpretation of society and social relations seems to have had priority over basic socio-economic considerations.

Turkey in 1945-1946 in the society's transformation, the press and the government arbitrarily attributed it to the lack of moral and ethical education,⁴⁷ to material privation, and to the weakening of family life.⁴⁸ Actually lacking were new ideals, new principles, and new goals in accord with the rationalist, realistic, modern spirit which Turkish society was acquiring. It was more than obvious that the ideas, manners, and philosophy of life, the narrow ossified contemplative concept of life, inherited by the Turkish middle class from the ruling circle of the Ottoman Empire could no longer satisfy the new dynamic and progressive society of the Republic.⁴⁹

In any event, the developments in respect to communist activities in Turkey proved a few essential facts and served as a lesson for the future. They proved that to avoid discussion of social and economic problems does not solve them, for however sublime idealism may be in itself, it does not suffice to assure the social welfare of the people; they showed that if the existing political parties do not include in their programs some basic ideas for solving the economic and social problems of Turkey, sooner or later they will be defeated by political parties with clear and concise views and solutions in respect to these problems; and they showed that whenever

⁴⁷ In 1944, the Ministry of Education, acknowledging in obscure terms the existence of a spiritual crisis, called the attention of educational institutions to the danger of some ideologies (leftist) that might take advantage of the crisis. As a consequence, the Press Directorate was recognized to oppose extremist currents more effectively. For this communique, see *Ayn Tarihi*, April 1944, pp. 2-4; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 24. For comments, see *Ulus, Akşam*, April 5, 6, 1944.

⁴⁸ *Tasvir*, December 24, 1946.

⁴⁹ One example of the old habit of attempting to solve social problems by an appeal to the emotions was furnished by a deputy (Emin Soysal of Maraş) during the debate on the influences of socialism on the Village Institutes and villages. He declared: "They [the communists and socialists] . . . want to lead the peasants and the city proletariat to revolution. They won't be able to do it. The Turkish peasants, from the rich to the starving ones, love their country. They [the communists and socialists] do not know the Turkish peasant. He may starve, he'll put a stone upon his stomach [to forget his hunger] and still remain faithful to the State [and not accept their ideology]." *BMMTD*, Session 8.1, Vol. 3, p. 458.

necessary the interest groups in Turkey can use communism as a pretext to dispose of the workers associations and in this way perpetuate their own social and economic supremacy despite the theoretical rejection of the political supremacy of social groups. In the eyes of the government and most of the press there was not much difference between socialism and communism and the two could be equally condemned.

B. Communism and Cultural Reaction

The actual strength of the Communist Party in Turkey is limited, but its indirect impact on every phase of cultural and political life by far surpasses its numerical importance, for communism is so broadly defined as to include a very wide range of activities.⁵⁰ Indeed, the reaction which began during 1946-1947 under the pretext of combating communism soon spread to many of the reforms introduced in the Republic and definitely undermined some of them.

As a first measure against the leftist currents the government increased the penalties for such activities by amending Articles 141 and 142 of the Penal Code, in accordance with the recommendations of the Republican Party Convention of 1947. The necessary legislation was quickly adopted, with the opposition and the government parties both casting their votes in favor of the amendment.⁵¹ (A further amendment introduced by the Democratic Party government in 1951 increased the penalties for the establishment, or even the attempted establishment, of political parties and associations which aimed at the supremacy of a particular social class, or at altering any of the country's existing fundamental economic or social principles. Individuals directing the activities of these organizations are subject to death penalties.⁵²)

⁵⁰ Lewis, "Recent Developments," p. 330.

⁵¹ See *Vatan*, April 20, 1949; *Millet*, July 22, 1948; *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 20, pp. 572ff., Law #5435; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 103-104.

⁵² *BMMTD*, Session 9.2, Vol. 10, pp. 200, 248.

COMMUNISM AND ITS EFFECTS

The main reaction, motivated by partisan interests, started soon after the arrests were carried out in December 1946. It was stated that communists had penetrated the schools, in particular the Village Institutes, which had become communist cells.⁵³ A witch hunt ensued in order to liquidate all possible leftist influences in the schools. The main case concerned four professors in Ankara University.⁵⁴ The professors had published or contributed articles to the *Yurt ve Dünya* (The Country and the World), a publication considered socialistic, and to the daily *Tan* of the same political tendency. A group of students, representing the "rightist" wing, assembled in the hall in which Professor Nail P. Boratav was supposed to deliver a lecture, with the aim of preventing him from "disseminating communist propaganda." The intimidated professor did not show up. One hundred and eight students of liberal and leftist tendencies protested the action of the "rightists" in a letter published in the *24 Saat* (Twenty Four Hours).⁵⁵ The rightists reacted by burning that issue of *24 Saat* and demanding the withdrawal from the libraries of the collections of *Yurt ve Dünya* and the dismissal of the four professors from the faculty.⁵⁶ The then Minister of Education, Şemseddin Sirer (later Minister of Labor and bitter opponent of the workers' right to strike), suspended the professors despite the fact that the leading newspapermen in the governing Republican Party, Falih R. Atay, Necmeddin Sadak, and Şükrü Esmer, criticized such hasty action as labelling people communists without a court decision.⁵⁷ The Supreme Administrative Court, *Devlet Şurası*, reinstated the

⁵³ *Yakit* (editorial), December 26, 1946.

⁵⁴ Nail Pertev Boratav, Niyazi Berkes, Behice Boran, Adnan Cemgil. Behice Boran, an eminent sociologist who studied in the U.S.A., was active in the Friends of Peace Association and was brought to trial in 1950 for protesting against Turkish participation in the Korean War.

⁵⁵ *Ulus*, March 5, 6, 1947. (The Sakarya printing plant, fearing destruction, refused to print further issues of the *24 Saat*.)

⁵⁶ *Vatan*, March 7, 1947.

⁵⁷ *Memleket*, May 27, 1947 (R. N. Güntekin).

professors, but the Minister was able to secure a dismissal decision from the Senate of Ankara University. However, the Inter-University Board, the supreme academic body to decide on disputes involving the faculty members, did not back the dismissal because it found "no direct and decisive proof" that the professors had engaged in communistic propaganda, in spite of the Minister, who like the rightist extremists and the conservatives, criticized the decision of the Inter-University Board. Finally the Minister, backed by a sympathetic Assembly, succeeded in deleting from the budget of the University the lists "D" and "L" which provided funds for the courses of the professors involved in the controversy.⁵⁸ Naturally, this not only left the professors jobless, but also removed the courses from the curriculum. (The courses were on folklore, sociology, and anthropology.) Thereafter the professors were brought before the criminal court, in which some of their former students testified against them primarily on the basis of interpretations of the lectures delivered by the professors. Dr. Aziz Kansu, the Dean of Ankara University, also became a target of attack, primarily because of a "tendentious" poem published twenty-five years earlier in the leftist *Aydınlık*. A group of extreme rightist students walked into his office, made him shout "death to communists" and then forced him to write his own resignation from the deanship, an action which was denounced by the great majority of the press, and by the Democratic Party.⁵⁹

As soon as martial law in the İstanbul area was abolished, the National Student Union of İstanbul University decided

⁵⁸ *Ankara*, January 11, 12, 1948; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 81; *Vatan*, February 23, 1948; *Her Gün* (editorial), February 25, 1948 (F. Gürtunca); *BMMTD*, Session 8.2, Vol. 12, pp. 753ff., 783ff., 814; also, *Cahiers*, xiii, 1948, p. 163.

⁵⁹ *Vatan*, December 27, 28, 1947. *Cahiers*, ix-x, 1947, pp. 263ff. For a view praising the students, see *Son Saat* (editorial), January 4, 1948 (B. Dülger).

For similar cases of infiltration in schools, see *BMMTD*, Session 8.2, Vol. 12, pp. 3ff. This is the case of eight veterinary students at the Agricultural Institute of Ankara.

to fight communism through its own organization (and according to its own interpretations), a decision hailed in general as a patriotic undertaking, while only Nadir Nadi, the publisher of the *Cumhuriyet*, dared to point out that this kind of fight might end by opposing the wrong issues.⁶⁰

A debate on communism concerning the "Association for the Protection of Human Rights" soon involved the political parties too. The fact that Marshal Çakmak and Kenan Öner, then still on good terms with the Democratic Party, had agreed to join this association, founded by two persons known as leftist,⁶¹ was exploited by the Republicans to discredit the Democrats. Indeed, the two founders had tried unsuccessfully to persuade Marshal Çakmak to declare fraudulent the elections of 1946,⁶² and to boycott the Assembly, because at this particular period the Marshal's popular prestige was greater than Celal Bayar's. (In the İstanbul elections of 1946 the Marshal polled many more votes than Celal Bayar.⁶³)

The Republicans implied that somehow the Marshal had failed to reject the leftists' demands from the beginning. In self-defense the Marshal accused a "certain Minister of Education" of having offered protection to the communists and to communist sympathizers in the Ministry. Hasan Ali Yücel, the person under attack, asked the Marshal whether he was indeed the person aimed at. Instead of the Marshal replying, Kenan Öner, the Chairman of the İstanbul Democratic organization and later one of the founders of the National Party,

⁶⁰ *Vatan*, December 10, 13, 1947; *Ulus, Memleket*, December 14, 1947; *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), December 14, 15, 1947. The Union organized a series of conferences to combat communism through ideas, but in reality through nationalistic slogans. The organizations asked on behalf of youth the elimination from schools and government positions of all the communists who menaced the national ideal. *Cahiers*, XIII, 1948, p. 163.

⁶¹ Zekeriya Sertel, a publisher of *Tan*, and Cami Baykut. *Tasvir*, October 19, 20, 1946.

⁶² However, one governor and one police chief who called the Marshal "Communist" were brought before the court. *Vatan*, February 27, December 31, 1946.

⁶³ The Marshal, 194,833 votes; Celal Bayar, 186,340; Köprülü, 182,711. *Cumhuriyet*, July 24, 1946.

came out with an open "yes." The slander suit between Kenan Öner and Hasan Ali Yücel assumed such proportions and had such far-reaching effects that it requires a more careful analysis.⁶⁴

As far as the court action is concerned, after long and intricate procedures, testimonials, and reversals of decisions, it ended eventually by clearing Hasan Ali Yücel and condemning his accusers to various prison terms.⁶⁵ (Kenan Öner died before the Supreme Court reached a final decision about him.)

The cultural impact was much deeper. Hasan Ali Yücel, brought to preeminence by Atatürk himself, had been Minister of Education for many years and had associated himself with measures of far-reaching cultural effect, such as the creation of the Village Institutes and the translation of the world classics. Naturally, the traditionalists and the conservatives, which included the racialists, the religious and, to a varying extent, the right wing of the nationalists, had opposed these cultural reforms. Now they had their chance, through Yücel, to condemn all the cultural changes and the transformation which the new regime had brought about.

The racialists, extreme nationalists defended as patriotic youth by Kenan Öner,⁶⁶ rallied around him and furnished the main testimony in his favor. This testimony indicted practically all the individuals and publications in art, music, and literature which were known as liberal or socialist. They were labeled "subversive" and their publications described as having been "nursed" by the subscriptions of the Ministry of Education. While it is true that some of the people and publications involved in this campaign were obviously inspired

⁶⁴ The testimony and decisions in this trial have been made public by both parties. Kenan Öner, *Öner ve Yücel Davası*, 2 Vols., İstanbul, 1947; Hasan Ali Yücel, *Davam*, Ankara, 1947; *Hasan Ali Yücel'in Açtığı Davalar ve Neticeleri*, Ankara, 1950.

⁶⁵ *Hasan Ali Yücel'in Açtığı Davalar ve Neticeleri*, pp. 220ff.

⁶⁶ Öner, *op.cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 117. Moreover, the conservative *Millet* published the names of a number of intellectuals suspected of communism. *Millet*, No. 66, May 1947, pp. 8-9.

by leftist ideology, the great majority were of liberal and progressive.

The ensuing fear of being accused of communism silenced the liberal and progressive publications, while many individuals, intimidated by this uproar, were forced to condition and trim their ideas and writings to avoid any adverse comment. If one recalls the fact that the intellectual originality of the Ottoman Empire remained negligible primarily because of the rigid censorship imposed on behalf of Islam, it is easy to realize that the censorship resulting from fear of communism was bound to have crippling effects on political thought in Turkey.

The Öner-Yücel trial testimonies were fully advertised by the opposition in order to discredit the Republican Party and its government. It is rather unfortunate that the multi-party developments which produced political liberalization and beneficent effects in general had a negative effect on progress in the cultural field.

After the original success against the professors, reaction under the guise of anti-communism spread to other fields. Conservative Republicans and Democrats appeared united on the issues despite their apparently unreconcilable party affiliations.

A textbook in literature used in all the elementary schools of Turkey was denounced as tendentious because it included short stories and poems by contemporary or classic Turkish writers in which human suffering and misery were depicted.⁶⁷ Ignazio Silone's *Fontamara*, translated into Turkish some years previously, was denounced as inciting class antagonism.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ *Kuvvet* (editorial), February 12, 1947 (Köprülü's views). The authors denounced were Tevfik Fikret (the Young Turks had attacked Fikret on the same grounds as the Democrats in 1947. See Chapter 1), Sait Faik, and Orhan Kemal. The writers to *Yurt ve Dünya* answered Köprülü, who was attacking them, by saying that he himself had requested and published some of their articles while he was the editor of *Ülkü*. *Kuvvet*, February 17, 1947.

⁶⁸ *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 16, pp. 142-143.

Consequently this book, the collections of *Yurt ve Dünya*, *Kadro*, and some other literary works supposed to be "leftist," not to mention Marxist and socialist writings, were removed from public school libraries, especially the libraries of the Village Institutes. Lermontov's classic, *The Demon*, also translated into Turkish many years previously as *Vadim* (My Valley), was denounced because it contained certain passages unfavorable to the Turks. One of the most vociferous Republican deputies, Fahri Kurtuluş of Rize, even introduced a proposal in the National Assembly to delete those passages from the book.⁶⁹

The Village Institutes were affected next. They had been created, beginning in 1940, with the purpose of finding a quick remedy for the illiteracy and backwardness of the Turkish villages.⁷⁰ Even at the time of its passage the initial law was accepted with less enthusiasm than might have been expected.⁷¹ The idea was to train village boys and girls at the expense of the state, and then upon graduation to send them back into their own villages to teach village children and the villagers better agricultural methods and hygiene. The village teachers were given land and a house in the village to make them a part of the community's way of life. By 1948, about twenty-one Institutes had been established all over the country, and their graduates and students numbered about

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 224ff.; also *Millet*, No. 78, July 31, 1947. The same deputy attacked the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* as communistic because its publisher protested against the censorship imposed on literary works. In a long polemic between the deputy and the publisher of the *Cumhuriyet*, the deputy was unable to prove his accusations, which eventually ended his political career. *Cumhuriyet*, February 13-25, 1948.

⁷⁰ *Ayın Tarihi*, April 1944, pp. 27-29 (speech by H. A. Yücel praising the Village Institutes).

⁷¹ For instance, the law was passed with 278 votes for and 148 absences. During the one-party rule, absenteeism usually implied disapproval. Another law of much lesser importance passed by the National Assembly the same day had only 110 absences. This fact shows that there was at least some reluctance to accept the law from the very beginning. *BMMTD*, Session 6, Vol. 10, pp. 71ff., 99-102.

25,000 people in 1950.⁷² Today these graduates are the core of the teaching program at the village level, as well as of any program of social improvement there.

The Institutes had certain defects. The five-year training course was scarcely sufficient to give the student all the training necessary for dealing with the intricate social and economic problems of rural life. Some of the graduates became a kind of village elite concerned with theoretical discussions or political speculations, rather than with the realities and the scientific solution of the rural problems. Institute graduates were confined to remaining village teachers for most of their lives, and this produced in them a feeling of being discriminated and looked down upon, and eventually contributed to deepening the gulf between village and city.

Except for these shortcomings, the Village Institutes represented the most original educational project in Turkey. Given practical training in the field and in the classroom in a spirit of self-sacrifice,⁷³ the graduates of the Institutes considered themselves the standard-bearers and representatives of the new regime in its fight against ignorance, poverty, religious fanaticism, and archaic traditions in the villages. Among the graduates of these Institutes there were many valuable people who have contributed to the cultural development of the country.⁷⁴ Many of the women graduates became the

⁷² Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 90. For a general description, see T. Verschoyle, "Education in Turkey," *International Affairs*, January 1950, pp. 60-64. For a description of the Hasanoglan Village Institute, see Hanson, "Village and Village Institute: Hasanoglan," pp. 85ff. See also Stirling, *The Social Structure of Turkish Peasant Communities*, pp. 14-15. On the views of the Village Institute graduates, see their reviews: *Demet* (Bunch, published in Isparta), *Gayret* (Effort, published in Kayseri), *Eğitim ve Köy* (Education and Village, published in Ankara). The importance of these reviews lies in the fact that they represent the opinions of a large number of Turkish village teachers.

⁷³ Their initial monthly salary was TL. 20 (\$11.50; the dollar was then worth TL. 1.80) a month and they were under obligation to serve twenty years in the villages.

⁷⁴ One of these was Mahmut Makal, whose book *Bizim Köy* (translated into English by Sir Wyndham Deeds as *A Village in Anatolia*, London,

teacher, midwife, and social worker of the village to which they were assigned, and had become so integrated with the village life that their presence had become indispensable. The spirit of "doing" was imbued by the whole mentality of the Institutes; self-reliance and the progressive spirit seemed to be the new cast of the individual trained there.⁷⁵

In its essence, however, this dynamic spirit contradicted the religious, contemplative, patriarchal mentality of the conservative section of the middle class which was in the process of re-establishing its domination by taking advantage of democratic developments and the fear caused by communism. During most of the reform period of the Republic, this middle class spirit, called "oriental," had been a target for attack by the followers of Atatürk. But now the situation changed. The growing importance of economic status in acquiring political power gave to some sections of the middle class a certain political supremacy, together with an opportunity to change the society's progressive spirit into a conservative-religious one, in accordance with their own thinking.

It was feared in general that the rationalist, analytical mind developed in the graduates of the Village Institutes would subsequently affect the peasant, making him easy prey of socialist views which, in view of the villages' economic and social situation, would be conducive to class struggle. Thus, taking advantage of the hysteria caused by the Communist Party, some old cases of communist activities in the Institutes

1954) opened the way to a new literary current in which the peasant and his life are the main theme. Makal was arrested as a communist for a brief time in 1950, but was released upon the protest of the press. *Vatan*, April 9, 1950.

⁷⁵ For an idea of the philosophy of the Village Institutes and the spirit governing their establishment, see Ismail Hakkı Tonguç, *Eğitim Yolu ile Canlandırılacak Köy*, 2nd edition, İstanbul, 1947. Tonguç was in charge of the Institutes and later was attacked as having favored "leftist" currents in the Institutes. He was retired. The Village Institutes have generally sided with the Republicans and this has compelled the Democrats to diminish their influence.

were brought up and from there on the main progressive features of the Institutes were condemned. A case of communist propaganda at the Institute of Hasanoglan and another one at Hamidiye were used to prove that the curricula of the Institutes were not adequate for training a good teacher, but actually conducive to undesirable ideologies.⁷⁶ The consequent changes in the curricula of the Institutes resulted in the abolition of coeducational training; the girls were put in two separate Institutes.⁷⁷ The practical courses in the field and in the workrooms were limited and replaced by theoretical courses, and in general the spirit of "doing" was replaced by the spirit of "learning." As a result of all these changes the Village Institutes lost their dynamic and progressive spirit and by law later in 1954 (6234 of January 27) the Democratic Party Government united them with the existing teacher's schools under the name of Village Teachers Schools.

The reaction moved further to the *Halk Evleri* (Peoples Houses). This was another important project of the Republic to raise the general cultural standard and to emancipate the people. They started in 1931 in fourteen provinces and replaced the *Türk Ocakları* of the Young Turks' era.⁷⁸ The Houses, while achieving their cultural goals, had nevertheless assumed the role of agents for the Republican Party.

⁷⁶ Öner, *Öner ve Yücel*, p. 52; *Vatan*, December 9, 1948; *Aym Tarihi*, August 1947, pp. 9-10.

⁷⁷ See, for instance, *Millet*, January 15, 1948, p. 14. Emin Soysal (deputy from Maraş) emerged as the chief accuser of the Village Institutes, perhaps mainly out of revenge against Hasan Ali Yücel, during whose tenure in the Ministry of Education he was ousted from the directorship of one of the Village Institutes for mishandling some funds. (H. A. Yücel, *Davam*, Ankara, 1947, p. 101.) He attacked every phase of the Village Institutes, but chiefly their coeducational curricula, which he found detrimental to the youth's morality. Soysal, who was elected as an independent, joined the Republican Party. For his view expressing satisfaction with the abolition of the coeducational curriculum in the Institutes, see Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 159.

⁷⁸ See Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 110, 186, 193. Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 107, 132.

After lengthy discussions on the subject, the Republicans agreed in their convention in 1947, but did not carry out their decision, to make the Houses cultural foundations for the general use of the public. They were nevertheless deprived of all political responsibility.⁷⁹ The Houses were not accused directly of any communist activities, but it was implied that they were inspired by a similar project in the Soviet Union. It was pointed out that actually the whole idea originated from the suggestions of a "newspaperman who traveled in the Soviet Union and brought from there the idea of *Narondi Dom*" (Peoples House), although the Houses had no communistic character in Turkey.⁸⁰ This kind of criticism eventually reduced to a minimum the beneficial role the People's Houses had played during the time of Atatürk in the cultural development of Turkey. With the coming into power of the Democratic Party, the Houses were confiscated as having been built by the Republican Party with public funds and preserved as party property. The Houses became the property of the Treasury (Law 5830), and today are being used as buildings for general purposes.⁸¹ A most beneficial reform for social emancipation has come to an end.

The most interesting aspect of all these changes is that the criticism causing them came chiefly from the ranks of the Republican Party which had created these institutions. People who had helped, or had thought it advantageous to side with

⁷⁹ *Vatan*, November 19, 1946; also *Ulus*, January 17, 1951 (A. S. Levend).

⁸⁰ *BMMTD*, Session 8.3, Vol. 16, p. 608. H. S. Tanrıöver, who was the head of *Türk Ocakları* until 1931, reestablished them in 1949 and in the subsequent years began receiving back some of the buildings which had been taken over by the *Halk Evleri*. See my Chapters 2 and 9.

⁸¹ In 1946 there were 4,521; in 1950 there was a total of 478 People's Houses and 4,322 People's Rooms. For statistics, see Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 58, 70, 95, 117, 156. The latter were established in villages and towns. They had the following branches of activity: language and literature, fine arts, drama, sports, social assistance, adult education, library and publication, village welfare, museum and cultural exhibits. On November 26, 1951 they became the property of the Treasury.

those creating the institutions, later did not hesitate to attack and tear them down in their efforts to adjust to the new political situation. That which one Republican Minister had done previously another tried to undo, as though they no longer belonged to the same party but to two rival parties bent upon destroying each other. The new Minister of Education, Şemseddin Sirer, undid what Hasan Ali Yücel and other Ministers tried to achieve, although both were Republicans. The party of reforms had become its own prosecutor.

The impact of communism on culture and attitudes is deeply felt. Fear of communism, supplemented by a traditional distrust of reason and individual intelligence, has crippling effects. (There are people who still defend ignorance as the best means of assuring social quiet.) Discussions on the socio-economic problems of Turkey have been kept to a minimum, and limited to academic circles. General economic and social research thus has been hindered greatly.⁸² As a matter of fact, original creative ideas in these fields have come to a standstill, despite the fact that actual developments have been widespread; there is a wide gap between fact and thought. This state of affairs in Turkey, a country in urgent need of progress, may prove catastrophic in the long run.⁸³

⁸² It probably suffices to mention that Turkey today has just one Institute of Social Research, at the University of İstanbul's School of Economics, whose scope is extremely narrow and too academic; and even this harmless school has come recently under attack. The attempts of the American Mission for Aid to Turkey to establish an Institute of Social Research have not been successful. Another project initiated by the Ministry of Health in Ankara to establish a School for Social Work, in cooperation with the United Nations, despite very encouraging beginnings, has been delayed in G.N.A. chiefly because of lack of appreciation for social problems. It may be adopted this present session (1959).

⁸³ One editorial by the late Necmeddin Sadak, well-known journalist and Foreign Minister in 1947-1950, stated: "This attitude, that is, extreme 'rightist' enmity against all ideas called 'leftist,' in addition to being contradictory to the accepted ideas of democracy and freedom, is an obstacle to the development of the country no less than communism . . . in view of the world situation we want to have an increased number of 'leftists,' and from the point of view of the future of Turkey, we believe that a leftist party should take its place in the political life of

Turkish society and the Turks themselves have been prepared by the political, social, and cultural experiences of the past half century for a new kind of life in which each problem needs to be debated according to the views and interests of the majority, and the fear of communism should not be an impediment. The general welfare of the Turkish masses is an urgent problem that needs to be solved through a free exchange of opinions, not by "borrowing" political theories for purposes of expediency and discarding them overnight, or by using the state's authority to channelize thought. On the contrary, there is need to facilitate the formation of original ideas and concepts as inspired by the needs of Turkish society and as expressed by members of that society without fear of being immediately condemned as "outcasts" and "subversives." Experience has proved that sooner or later the hard facts of life chart the course of political activity, and that Turkish society develops according to the social forces that exist in it rather than by the wishes of a few. It has been so in the past and so it will be in the future.

The theme of communism is used as a device to promote the practical purposes of political parties, interest groups, and individuals,⁸⁴ causing damage to the entire country. There have been cases where competitors in business have tried to eliminate each other by exploiting the communist hysteria,⁸⁵

the country. We are anxious to see such a mentality and political party not only in view of the social reforms needed by the country, but also as a barrier to the communist danger so close to us." *Akşam* (editorial), March 8, 1947. See also my Chapter 4, n.78.

⁸⁴ The writer advanced these ideas to a factory owner in Istanbul. His answer was: "Give them full freedom and they all [the workers] will become communists." The wages in his factory increased only fifteen per cent in seven years, while he himself made several million dollars profit during the same period from the original half-million invested.

⁸⁵ For instance, it was reported from Adana: "A weaver's shop . . . whose owner was suspected of communist tendencies was demolished. The owner of a hat shop, just about to meet the same fate, grabbed the flag and waved it to the demonstrators and saved his shop. Some instigators wanted to direct the crowd toward the establishments of their competitors in business but were stopped from doing so." *Akşam*, July 7, 1948.

and frequently events not easily explained have been blamed on "communists" to evade responsibility.⁸⁶ In other cases there have been attempts to justify utterly unacceptable deeds by claiming they were caused by hatred of communism.⁸⁷ The destruction of several leftist publications in 1945 and the later demonstrations against similar publications—the spontaneity of these actions is highly questionable—are no longer acceptable in a society in which freedom of thought is granted.⁸⁸ Nor does it seem acceptable to say that freedom cannot be granted to those who deny freedom, namely, the communists,⁸⁹ merely to establish grounds to justify arbitrary actions against people not approved of.⁹⁰ The governments periodically warn the population to beware of leftist propa-

⁸⁶ The big fire that destroyed the Ministry of Education in 1947 was attributed directly to the communists, but the official investigation showed that the fire resulted from neglect. *Vatan*, December 23, 1947, January 10, 1948.

⁸⁷ The well-known leftist writer, Sabahaddin Ali, was murdered by the smuggler who was supposed to help him escape to Bulgaria. (The victim had been refused a passport to go abroad.) The murderer was caught, and during the trial he tried to explain the murder as having been committed in a moment of deep resentment against the communist ideology which, in the view of the murderer, the writer personified. The motive of the murder was robbery, and the criminal was sentenced to a life term in jail. *Vatan*, January 12-14, 1949; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 100.

⁸⁸ *Vatan*, December 5, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, April 20, 1947.

⁸⁹ *Akşam*, April 24, 1947; also *Vatan*, April 21, 1947 (remarks of F. L. Karaosmanoğlu).

⁹⁰ There have been, and still are, cases when a sentence or an idea has been arbitrarily interpreted to connote the communistic tendency of a person, and cases of personal rivalry in which false evidence has been produced to condemn someone for "communist activities." In many cases even village teachers and government officials who had incurred the displeasure of some people were removed from office on the basis of fabricated charges of communist activities. The courts and the government authorities are aware of the situation and display the necessary caution, but if the charges are repeated the suspicion is bound to grow. At times the good reputation of a person may suffice to save him, but in cases of unknown people without sufficient social status to make them appear unlikely to be affected by such ideas, the false testimony may result in a jail sentence, or at least keep them under suspicion for some time. The individuals most likely to attract immediate suspicion of communist influence are the liberals, that is, those who dare to come into the open with new and original ideas or to expose certain bad social conditions.

ganda,⁹¹ actually meaning the more violent critics of the government.⁹² Recently the government issued a declaration to fight "hidden communism" and this was criticized by the opposition as a means of imposing control over society. The government was accused that its own economic policy had created class differences that prepare the ground for communism.

The main difficulty lies in the fact that the responsibility for this state of affairs cannot be attributed to anyone in particular, nor to the government or a specific political party. Neither can it be said that all this has happened predeterminedly. One may, however, assume that the one-party regime and its increasing tendency to control and channel thought into an excessive rightist direction, was greatly responsible for this situation. One fact remains certain: the conservatism and religion now defended by all the political parties in Turkey as a means of opposing communism is no quick remedy to this situation.⁹³ This narrow political and social conservatism, regardless of whether it is motivated by interest or mentality, is the greatest danger to the general development of Turkey.

⁹¹ *Zafer*, the Democrat's newspaper, recently warned that the leftists were trying to penetrate the trade unions, universities, and press by criticizing the government's failure in economic development. *Cahiers*, xxxi, 1955, p. 100.

⁹² *New York Times*, December 12, 1957.

⁹³ Incidentally, the writer finds it appropriate to mention the much advertised "irreconcilability" of Islam and communism. It is said that basically they exclude each other. But so do Christianity and communism as far as their basic approach to life and ultimate goals are concerned, and that has not prevented communism from being established in Russia, where religious fanaticism was at an extreme. The political hold on the masses through Islam is possible only by preserving Islam in its omnipotent primitive form so as to dominate the masses and to give political leadership to a small, arch-conservative group. Islam more than any other religion offers similarity to communism, in organization, concepts, rejection of democracy and acceptance of totalitarianism, and obedience to and dependence on the state. For a discussion of these ideas, see *U.S. News*, March 29, 1957, pp. 88ff. (Charles Malik of Lebanon); Bernard Lewis, "Communism and Islam," *International Affairs*, January 1954, pp. 7ff.; Morrison, *Middle East Tensions*, pp. 106ff.; Laqueur, *Communism*, pp. 6ff. For an opposite view, see *New York Times*, May 16, 1957.

COMMUNISM AND ITS EFFECTS

The overzeal of the police to control "communist" activities in Turkey and their dependence on unqualified information usually end by bringing the liberal and the communist together and by condemning them indiscriminately before public opinion. In many cases, the liberal, unable to express his ideas and oppressed because of this inability, becomes an extremist himself. Intolerance can breed only intolerance and oppression.

It is too obvious that all that has been said in the past pages affects directly the political parties and party developments in Turkey. The effect is felt in the programs and activities of the political parties. They all avoid including in their programs ideas which might give their opponents a pretext for attacking them for sympathy for leftist ideas. Since "leftism" in Turkey includes a good many ideas which in the West are generally accepted or at most can be labeled "liberal," it follows that the political parties cannot include such ideas in their program, and consequently are bound to conform to rigid socio-political conservatism. Indeed, the greatest shortcoming of the Turkish political parties lies in their ideological limitations, which results in their inability to transcend the level of daily politics. All are bound to defend one set of ideas, and this in itself is the very denial of the multi-party system.

The situation calls urgently for a definite differentiation in theory and practice between the subversive and the liberal, between the humanist and the despot, between the politically harmful and the beneficial if democracy is to be established permanently. In the last two years there has been a rather encouraging development in separating "social" from "socialistic" as the economic development has made imperative social action on a large scale, and the liberals seem best fitted to relate economic development with political democracy. The evolutionary and progressive forces in the society may eventually bring a satisfactory solution to this problem.

CHAPTER 15

THE POLITICAL REGIME AND POLITICAL PARTIES

A. The Constitutional Regime and the Election System

THE present chapter is devoted to a general study of the election mechanism and of the existing political parties in Turkey, including their legal status.¹ The Constitution of Turkey, unlike many modern constitutions, does not mention political parties as part of the political regime and as the components of the National Assembly. Only the by-laws of the National Assembly (Articles 22, 23) recognize political parties. A political party, in other words, gains recognition only when and if it wins a seat in the Assembly.

Political activities are regulated by the Association Law, the Penal Code, and the Election Law. The Penal Code (Articles 141, 142, 163) contains certain restrictive provisions: the first two outlaw extreme leftist parties, while the last forbids the use of religion for political purposes. The Association Law of 1938 regulated in detail the general right of assembly granted by the Constitution (Article 70).² This law was primarily restrictive in purpose. It prohibited the establishment of associations on the basis of class and economic interests, or for political, religious, racialist, sectarian, and internationalist purposes, and consequently it also forbade the establishment of political parties. The amendment of the As-

¹ In order to give an over-all picture of all the political parties in Turkey, some of the general information mentioned in the previous chapters has, of necessity, been referred to in part in this chapter.

² There were two additional laws regulating the right to associate: *İçtimayata Umumiye* and *Tecemmuat* (Laws on Meetings).

sociation Law in 1946 in theory permitted the establishment of political associations based on class and economic interest and, consequently, the formation of political parties.³ The Election Law (No. 5545 of February 16, 1950),⁴ is the mechanism which regulates the voting and consequently the changes of government. The election is direct, the balloting is secret, and the counting of votes is open (Article 1).

According to the Turkish Constitution, one deputy may be elected for every 40,000 citizens. The deputies form the Grand National Assembly, the body with supreme legislative and executive powers.⁵ The Assembly elects the President, who in turn designates the Premier. The Premier forms his Cabinet and submits his choice directly to the Assembly for approval, and throughout its tenure the Cabinet is responsible only to the Assembly. The President cannot dissolve the Assembly and therefore, theoretically, the Premier has no political responsibility toward the President. A strong Premier controlling the Assembly can jeopardize the influence of the President.

Each province in Turkey is an election district.⁶ The election is based on the majority system. A unit of 150 people forms a voting precinct (Articles 2, 3) which has its own voters' registers. The total number of deputy candidates is

³ A Law, No. 5830 of August 8, 1951, enacted by the Democratic Party Government forbids the political parties from accepting any assistance, financial or in kind, from government or municipal bodies. *BMMTD (Zabit Ceridesi)*, Session 9.1, Vol. 9, pp. 575-631 *passim*.

⁴ I. Olgun - S. Köksal, *Hâşiyeli Yeni Millet Vekili Seçimi Kanunu*, Ankara, 1950. This law has been amended thrice making it less liberal, but its main principles have been so far preserved.

⁵ See Philips Price, "The Parliaments of Turkey and Persia," *Parliamentary Affairs*, Summer 1948, pp. 43ff. For a general view on government in Turkey see, Leonard Binder, "Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Middle East Governments," *American Political Science Review*, September 1957, pp. 651-668.

⁶ For the election mechanism, see also A. H. Hanson, "Democracy Transplanted: Reflections on a Turkish Election," *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. IX, 1955-1956, pp. 65-74; Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 127. For the text of laws, see *T.B.M.M. Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu ve Dahili Nizamname*, Ankara, 1957.

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determined according to the results of the latest population census (taken every five years). For instance, 610 seats were slated in 1957, since the country's population at the 1955 census was over 24 million people. Every citizen twenty-two years of age is an elector, but members of the security and armed forces cannot vote. There are no absentee votes (Article 12). Newcomers can register for voting three months after their arrival at a new location.

Citizens aged thirty or more can become candidates for deputy, with the exception of those in the service of foreign states, those who do not speak and read Turkish, permanent exiles, or those sentenced to jail terms of more than five years, and those deprived of public service rights (Article 34). Candidates can be nominated both by political parties and by independent citizens, but a candidate's name cannot be placed on more than two election lists (Article 36). Each party has its own lists. Campaigning for election is open, but no propaganda is allowed after dark in open places (Article 42), while indoor campaigning is restricted to party representatives and deputy candidates only. According to a new amendment in 1956, political parties are not allowed to start the election campaign until forty-five days before the election date. All the elections and election boards are under the supervision of the Judiciary. The election boards are: the Supreme Central Board in Ankara, provincial Boards, both with power to judge appeals, district Boards, and voting precinct committees (Articles 58, 59). The Boards, which are headed by the supreme local judge, are composed of representatives of municipal boards and party members. The ballot can be filled in by voters who can also use a special list printed by the party (Article 88) with party labels on it, if necessary. A recent amendment makes compulsory the use of one list without the voter having the right to delete any candidates and replace them with his own choice, i.e., no split ticket. The ballot is placed in an envelope in a polling booth (Article 92)

and cast there. The law provides a series of penalties (Articles 111, 112, 127-168) for those violating the law safeguarding the secrecy and safety of the ballot. Coalition of parties for election purposes, according to an amendment passed in 1957, is forbidden. Failure of a party to participate in elections in a locality jeopardizes its votes in all other localities.⁷

B. Major Political Parties of Turkey

All the major political parties of Turkey established after 1945 were born directly of dissension and secession in the manner of a chain reaction, originating basically from the Republican Party. This dissension normally began among deputies, and the new political parties therefore were conceived directly in the National Assembly and not among the people. The intra-party disputes generally were caused by personality conflicts rather than by differences of ideology.

The political parties of Turkey do not represent any specific social class but aim, theoretically speaking, at representing the whole of the nation. Accordingly, they have reacted unfavorably to the minor political parties which were established on a class basis. All the major political parties of Turkey consequently are middle of the road parties, representing the conservative, traditionalist conceptions.

Initially, the basic goal of all these parties was political, and consisted of establishing a multi-party system on solid democratic foundations. Thus far all the major political parties have expressed support of democracy, although they have not agreed upon a generally acceptable definition of democracy. As yet none of the parties has developed a basic viewpoint on the socio-economic aspects of democracy and freedom with which to supplement their political goal. The

⁷ *New York Times*, August 23, 29, September 12, 1957; Law No. 7053 of September 11, 1957.

measure of democratization so far achieved came about because there were no real issues dividing the major parties. Had there been such issues the results would have been different.⁸ The programs of the existing major political parties of Turkey are not based on any definite economic and social theory other than statism, which is accepted in varying degrees by all of them. Even when socio-economic matters are given more space in the party program, this is done more with a view to formally possessing a more comprehensive program than to embodying a definite concept of economic and social matters.⁹ The ideological shortcomings of the Turkish political parties have been criticized frequently, but so far no substantial attempt has been made to remedy the situation.

The limited experience provided by those political parties which have acceded to power has demonstrated that the old restrictive governmental mentality, procedures, and habits gradually gain preponderance over the relatively liberal philosophy and views with which the party was initiated. Unconditional mass acceptance of a few general ideas, rather than the enlistment of individual support based on the deliberate acceptance of a detailed party philosophy, seems to be the basis on which party allegiance is sought. The Republican Party alone appears to have acquired a somewhat more rationalist approach to problems.

⁸ Hanson, "Democracy Transplanted," p. 72. For a general view of party politics in Turkey, see Sarah P. McCally, "Party Government in Turkey," *Journal of Politics*, May 1956, pp. 297ff. Also, Kerim K. Key, "The Origins of Turkish Political Parties," *World Affairs Interpreter*, April 1955, pp. 49-60.

⁹ Nadir Nadi, the publisher of *Cumhuriyet*, complained as early as 1948 that the Turkish political parties had no real programs to face basic problems such as increase of population, social progress, and economic development and this made them look colorlessly alike. "The outside appearance is Western," he wrote, "but inside it is entirely Eastern, even worse than Eastern, for it is a poor imitation." He urged the responsible party leaders to take necessary measures to correct this fundamental shortcoming. *Cumhuriyet*, July 27, 1948. The situation has not changed now. For a recent view, see *Forum*, November 15, 1955, p. 4, November 1, 1957, pp. 2ff.

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The political parties of Turkey are dominated by personalities. The party—whatever its program—normally becomes subordinated to the leader, and its policy is moulded in accordance with the leader's views, temper, and character. Personality problems are sources of frequent frictions which end in total submission to the leader or by the elimination of the rebels from the party.

The party founders and leaders belong almost exclusively to the well-to-do landowners or intellectuals; the industrialists and businessmen have taken a somewhat aloof attitude toward political activities. The party leaders, with certain exceptions, are usually people with strong characters easily irritated by criticism. Appeals to emotion, search for mass support to justify personal views, implicit belief in their own ideas as being exclusively the best for the country, outright condemnation of those opposing them or possessing different ideas, and displays of fervent nationalism as explanation and justification for their actions, seem to be some of the main features of their political behavior. Moreover, family background is of major importance. The present party leaders of Turkey, with only minor exceptions, belong to rich, or politically and socially prominent sections of the population. Many times individuals with little experience in public life and questionable educational background are catapulted into leading positions in the parties merely because of family background. The cult of personality, fought against during the early years of the multi-party regime, has found encouragement in some parties where it is used to create sufficient prestige for the leaders so that their views may be accepted without question by the public.

All the major political parties of Turkey are right of mid-center. All of them accept nationalism as a basic philosophy; they are secularists, although religious opinions vary according to the particular view of each party.

The Major Political Parties

I. PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY

(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)

This party, the oldest in Turkey, is associated directly with Atatürk and the history of the Republican regime.

The Republican Party originated in the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti* (Associations for the Defense of Rights) established in Anatolia and Thrace which consisted partly of the members of the defunct Union and Progress Party. The Defense of Rights Associations were centralized by the convention of Sivas in 1919 into one single body, which was able to elect its own candidates in Anatolia in the general elections of 1919 held under the auspices of the government of İstanbul. The pro-Kemalist deputies turned the House of Deputies in İstanbul into a body opposed both to the Sultan's government and to the Allied Occupation Powers by accepting the National Pact formulated at the Erzurum and Sivas conventions. Eventually the House of Deputies was dissolved by the Sultan and most of the deputies returned to Anatolia to join Mustafa Kemal in Ankara.¹⁰ The same deputies formed the bulk of the First National Assembly opened on April 23, 1920, when Mustafa Kemal was elected President of the Assembly. In 1922, Mustafa Kemal engaged in plans for creating a new political party and the Associations for the Defense of Rights provided its first support.

The proposal to transform the Association for the Defense of Rights into a political party was included in the nine-point election platform with which the Association entered and easily won the elections of 1923.¹¹ The *Halk Fırkası* (People's Party) was established officially in October 1923,¹² and sub-

¹⁰ See Chapter 2. Also Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, p. 476.

¹¹ Tunaya, *ibid.*, p. 559. For text of the election platform see Tunaya, *ibid.*, pp. 580-582. For the initial program of this party, see also Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 173-180, 307-318.

¹² *Siyasi Dernekler*, pp. 5-6 (see letter of Mustafa Kemal). The actual

sequently the deputies elected to the Assembly automatically became members of the party. After the establishment of the Republican regime, the name *Cumhuriyet* (Republican) was added to its title on November 10, 1924, and finally in 1935 the Arabic name of *fırka* (party) was changed into the French form of *Parti*. Today the full official name is *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (People's Republican Party), but in everyday language it is simply called *Halk Partisi* (People's Party), while in English it is usually referred to as the Republican Party. The first chairman of the party was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.¹³ Recep Peker was elected Secretary-General.

From 1923 to 1945 all the reforms and policies in Turkey were initiated by the Republican Party. It was based on nationwide constituency and acted as the instrument of government. As the agent of the Kemalist revolution it took over the power of the local magnates.¹⁴ In time, however, the government, the state, and the party became so identified with each other that it was impossible to separate the achievements of Turkey from the party or the criticisms which were leveled

date of establishment given by the party is September 11, 1923 (*CHP-25 Yılı*, Ankara, 1948, p. 16). The establishment of the Republican Party in 1923 was in fact a maneuver to win control of the Assembly. The Constitution had a provision which deprived the President of the right to dissolve the Assembly. This in effect rendered Mustafa Kemal powerless in an Assembly in which there were groups of conservatives opposed to him. To win control of the Assembly he established the Republican Party to elect a new Assembly with deputies supporting him.

¹³ The personality of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) cannot be properly discussed in this chapter. There are as yet no really comprehensive studies to show his basic ideas on social, economic, or cultural problems. Nor is there any proper study to describe his faith in the average citizen, and his strivings to assure him a decent existence. Atatürk's motives have assured the survival of the reforms he initiated. He was a subtle leader who was able, by way of persuasion in the First National Assembly, to unite the religious bigots and socialists, the feudal lords and chieftains, and make them cooperate for common ends. Atatürk could have easily become, through the prestige he held in the country, a monarch, but he chose to remain a president-elect. He had actual control over affairs in the country but he was a "dictator in order that there might never again be a dictator in Turkey." Lewis, "Recent Developments," p. 331.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 324-328.

at it. The monolithic form taken by the party was best expressed by the famous slogan "one party, one nation, one leader" displayed on national holidays.

One fact remains undeniable, however: during his lifetime Atatürk attempted to find out and embody in the party program the views prevailing among the people, rather than follow dogmatically a certain theory as in other one-party systems. For this purpose the program of the Republican Party was broadened gradually in order to meet the needs of all the groups in society which it was supposed to represent. Indeed, the first program of the Republican Party had only nine basic principles with which it entered the elections of 1923. These principles in general aimed at establishing the authority of the National Assembly as the sole representative of the Turkish people. The party convention of 1927 drew a more detailed program by defining the party as Republican, Populist, and Nationalist.¹⁵ The convention of May 10, 1931 finally accepted the six principles known in general as Kemalism and which were included later in 1937 in the Constitution (Article 2): republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism.

The convention of 1935 definitely accepted one-party rule. The party was idolized as the organization uniting all individuals;¹⁶ the program was supposed to be a national ideology, shaped according to the realities of life and the international situation.¹⁷ Consequently, it proclaimed statism as its major economic tenet and rejected leftist, liberal, and rightist ideas. At the same time, however, it borrowed, as pointed out in previous chapters, certain notions from each. The state was the means of reconciling, through national faith and understanding, all the economic interests.

¹⁵ *CHP 1923-1948*, p. 21. Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 108-109, 162-172 for a brief discussion of these principles. See also my Chapter 2.

¹⁶ *CHP Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı Görüşmeleri Tutulgası*, Ankara, 1935, pp. 25ff. Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 570-572.

¹⁷ *CHP, ibid.*, pp. 43ff.

According to Recep Peker, its long time General-Secretary, the party accepted the principle of "demand"; that is, all requests were to be directed to the party, which would decide whether or not such requests could be met.¹⁸ He redefined democracy as a political system that changed according to the country. Therefore, the specific form taken by democracy in Turkey resulted in merging all government powers in one Assembly, a decision which was not "imitative but was taken to support national unity through strength."¹⁹ Consequently the virtues of a one-party regime were extolled and denial of democracy became general.

Upon the death of Atatürk in 1938, İsmet İnönü was elected the permanent Chairman of the party. Particular emphasis was placed on his function as the *şef* (leader), unifying around him all tendencies and viewpoints. Special attention was also paid to the recruitment of party members; that is, only selected individuals able to understand the principles of the party were accepted.

With the convention of 1939, a certain degree of liberalization began. Critical remarks were advanced for the first time, especially by Hikmet Bayur.²⁰ This convention decided that the Minister of the Interior and the Party Secretary, the governor and the Chairman of the party provincial organization should not be one and the same person. Moreover, a *Müstakil Grup* (Independent Group) was created from among the deputies to simulate an opposition party in the Assembly. The convention of 1939 attempted to separate the state from the party and define more clearly the principles of Kemalism. The convention of 1943 did not bring any substantial changes.

Some liberalization was seen in 1945,²¹ when the by-elec-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-50. See also Şeref Aykut, *Kemalizm*, İstanbul, 1936, pp. 9, 11.

²⁰ See *CHP 5ci Büyük Kurultay Zabıtları*, Ankara, 1939.

²¹ On this liberalization, see Part II. For chronology, see Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 46ff.

tions were held in Istanbul in June without candidates designated by the Central Committee of the Republican Party.²² Finally, in its extraordinary convention of 1946, the party decided to adopt direct elections, to recognize freedom of association, to abolish the Independent Group, and to elect the party chairman at every convention instead of having him nominated for life.

After 1946 the general philosophy of the party changed. Republican Party speakers claimed that the democratic features of the party had been obvious all the time,²³ and that the party was not organized for dictatorial purposes.²⁴ Even Recep Peker, the fiercest defender of the one-party system, claimed that Turkey never had been a country with a real one-party regime and that political oppression never had existed.²⁵ Other party members claimed that democratization in Turkey resulted from the party's strength rather than from its weakness.²⁶ (The good will of the party cannot be denied, but a good part of the credit for democratization is due to internal difficulties and to the second World War, which destroyed the countries having one-party rule.) The convention of 1947 finally enabled the Republican Party to become a normal political party by amending its program and by-laws in accordance with the requirements of a multi-party regime.

The present program of the party, as accepted at the convention of 1947, is built around the above-mentioned six principles which the Republicans desired to make strictly their own by taking them out of the Constitution. People are defined in the program as the origin of all government power, and the National Assembly as the body using this power on their behalf. Freedom of thought, speech, press, and of asso-

²² *Vatan*, June 8, 1945.

²³ *Ibid.* (editorial), August 11, 12, 1946. *Ulus*, August 22, 1945.

²⁴ *Ulus* (editorial), August 2, 1946.

²⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, July 17, 1946 (speech of Peker in Kütahya).

²⁶ *Ulus*, November 21, 1947 (speech by Hilmi Uran at Party Convention). See also my Chapters 5 and 6.

THE POLITICAL REGIME AND POLITICAL PARTIES

ciation to form political parties and trade unions, is recognized as the primary condition for the development of the individual and of society (Article 2). The state is defined as a body created for the welfare and protection of the individual (Articles 8, 9).

In economic matters, while recognizing private enterprise, the party program preserves statism and envisages the state as the impartial regulator of economic relations. A decentralized system of administration and responsibility is advocated for the state enterprises. Special emphasis is placed on agricultural cooperatives created for purposes of sale, consumption, and building, and on those offering credit to the producers. The program envisages improved organization for exports, and measures for the encouragement of production. It purports to accept foreign capital in industry on equal terms with local capital. Emphasis is also placed on consumer goods and protective measures for industry (Article 61), and on a tax system having due consideration for social justice (Articles 77, 78). In matters of social policy the program aims at protecting the workers and the unemployed, at improving their standard of living in accordance with the principles of democracy. It aims subsequently at granting them overtime pay, paid holidays, accident, maternity, old age, and life insurance (Articles 84-89), collective contracts and collective bargaining (Articles 92, 93). In education, the program advocates a free education in grade and high schools for all citizens, and the preservation of the autonomy of the universities (Articles 95-99).

The internal organization of the party, as described in the party bylaws accepted in the 9th and 10th party conventions, is based first on the provincial bodies, consisting of precinct, county and district province organizations and conventions, executive boards, and province discipline committees (Article 9). The conventions of the provincial organizations, in addition to directing the main party activity, elect the executive

provincial boards which carry out the day to day party activities (Articles 13, 14). The party is organized, secondly, on the national level through the General Party Convention (*Kurultay*), Party Council, General Chairman, Secretary-General, the Central Executive Committee, and the High Disciplinary Committee (Article 9). The General Party Convention, the supreme policy making body, composed of elected and ex-officio delegates, meets every year between April and June at a place designated by the Central (Executive) Committee.

The Party Council (Article 24), comprises the General Party Chairman, the Secretary-General, the members of the Central Committee, the Chairman or Vice-Chairmen of the Parliamentary Group, and one provincial representative, and is the supreme executive organ. The Central Committee, composed of fourteen members, including the Chairman and the Secretary-General, is the permanent executive body. The Chairman of the party is elected by the party convention. He represents the party (Article 29) while the Secretary-General is in charge of party liaison, administration, coordination, and supervision. The High Disciplinary Committee (Article 43) is charged with maintaining the party discipline.

The party's income is derived from dues paid by members, lotteries, party pins, publications, the revenue from its properties, social activities, and donations (Article 58). Party penalties range from *Ihtar* (warning) to expulsion.

Today, along with diminution of the personality cult, the dictatorial organization of the party has disappeared. Ismet İnönü,²⁷ the present party Chairman, still retains great prestige

²⁷ Ismet İnönü was born in 1884. His career, like the majority of the Turkish leaders, was formed in the Army. He was Chief of Staff of Ottoman Armies in Yemen and in Eastern Thrace, then Commander of the 4th Army on the Russian front. He became Undersecretary of War in 1918, and later joined Mustafa Kemal in Ankara and was instrumental in winning the decisive battle of İnönü (hence his last name) in 1921 over the Greek forces. He became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1922, and in this capacity negotiated and signed the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. İnönü

among party members, but he is no longer the demigod of the past.

The Republican Party ended its long term in office on May

was Premier in 1923-1924 and 1925-1937 and upon Atatürk's death in 1938 he succeeded him as the second President of Turkey. İnönü held this position until 1950, when the Republican Party lost the elections and he was replaced by Celal Bayar.

İsmet İnönü has been one of the most controversial figures in the recent history of Turkey. His enemies have accused him of being the chief architect of the totalitarian policies of the Republican Party. He was identified with the one-party rule and was regarded as its symbol. The truth is that after becoming President, he appeared rather doubtful of his own position in the Republican Party and in the country, as contrasted with the undisputed allegiance commanded by Atatürk. He had himself elected Permanent Chairman of the Republican Party as a result of his doubts.

With the beginning of the struggle for the multi-party system, İnönü appeared as champion of democracy in the Republican Party and in the country. He has often been quoted after 1946 as having said that he desired to achieve two major goals for Turkey: schools in every village and a multi-party system. It is no doubt that the democracy envisaged by İnönü at the beginning was a limited one, and perhaps dictated by expediency. However, in time he grew to accept a genuine democracy as necessary for the country, and this view led him to fight the extremists in his party, such as Recep Peker. Due to his prestige in the Republican Party, his great political skill which earned him the admiration and hate of his opponents, and the respect he still enjoyed in the country because of his past services to the Republic, İnönü was able to win the fight in his party and bring his own supporters to the leadership of that party. Eventually İnönü's policy resulted in the ousting of the Republican Party from power, but nevertheless, it set the first example of honest and truly democratic elections in the history of Turkey. İnönü's enemies have been quick to point out, without any proof, that such an election was due to İnönü's miscalculation based on an exaggerated belief in the power of the Republican Party.

Since 1950, İnönü has gradually emerged as a tenacious defender of the democratic reforms. This was done despite a wave of accusations and slanders directed against him from all quarters and by all the dissatisfied elements, and despite open threats to his person.

After the elections of 1954, as discontent with the party in power increased, İnönü appeared as the staunchest opponent of the anti-democratic measures. It is no exaggeration to affirm that İnönü's person in a way now symbolizes the opposition's fight for a multi-party system in Turkey. His following in the country has greatly increased, and even some of his old opponents regard him now more favorably than they did ten years ago. Each instance of discontent caused by policies of the Democratic Party adds in a way to the prestige of İnönü the same way that in the past each fault of the Republican Party diminished it. For an appraisal of İnönü's personality, see *Vatan* (editorial), December 24, 1949, February 1-8, 1950; *Tasvir*, October 10, 1946.

14, 1950, as the result of the elections which had taken place according to a liberal election law prepared by its own government. The party entered the elections of 1950 with the assurance that the liberal amendments of its basic principles and by-laws were sufficiently satisfactory to the people to enable the party to win the elections. Indeed, the amendments to the principles of secularism, statism, populism, etc., changed it into a middle-class conservative party, and this no doubt liberalized and made it more acceptable to a good number of voters in 1950, but did not save it from defeat.²⁸

Before 1947, despite its great shortcomings, the Republican Party stood on the principles on which the regime's reforms were carried out, and therefore an uncompromising attitude on those principles would have maintained its originality. Had not the party accepted compromises in its principles at the 1947 convention, it would have lost the elections of 1950 by a greater margin than it did, but would have preserved a more definite difference between itself and other political parties. Such a difference of program eventually might have caused discussions and brought forth new ideas, which in a democracy are essential to healthy political life. The Republican Party, however, chose to narrow the differences between itself and other parties in the hope of retaining office.

Nevertheless, the Republican Party, when compared with the other political parties, appears still to be guided in its actions by its principles rather than merely by opportunistic partisan views. Such a statement, of course, is only relative, but the fact that during the period from 1946 to 1950 the

²⁸ The defeat of this party in the elections of 1950 may be due to its miscalculation, but this electoral defeat was its greatest triumph and secured the party an honorable place in the political history of Turkey. Lewis, "Recent Developments," pp. 331-332. For comments on these elections and political parties in Turkey, see *World Today*, July 1950, pp. 289-296; also D. Ingber and M. Benjenk, "Turkey in Transition," *Fortnightly*, May 1951, pp. 317-321. Malcolm Burr, "Change in Turkey," *Fortnightly*, September 1951, pp. 149-154; also Siegbert J. Weinberger, "Political Upset in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, May 1950, pp. 135-142.

party endured patiently all the opposition's bitter and at times unjustified criticism in order to make good on its promise that the right to criticize is the main condition for democracy, proves it.²⁹

The party's membership has undergone a gradual change too. In the past the best known personalities in politics, art, literature and science were made party members, and a seat in the Assembly was the highest reward offered by the party.³⁰ The party's membership included individuals of all political tendencies, from extreme left to extreme right, since the party was a political conglomeration rather than a body with definite social or economic views. However, after 1946, since membership in the party was no longer a privilege but a responsibility, many members resigned, leaving behind those determined to stay with and in the party, and this in a way strengthened it. Today the main support of the party comes in general from the city dwellers, the intelligentsia, and salaried workers. The Republican Party is the largest opposition party of Turkey and as such has the greatest chance of returning to power.

The Party's actual popular support is stronger than appears indicated by its limited representation in the Assembly. In the elections of 1950 the Republicans received 3,165,096 votes as against 4,242,831 for the Democratic Party out of a total of 7,953,055 votes cast. In the 1954 elections it received 3,193,000 votes as against 5,313,000 votes received by the Democratic Party, out of a total of 9,095,000 votes cast.³¹ In

²⁹ For an example, see Z. F. Fındıkoğlu, "Siyasi Fırkalarımız ve Ormancılık," *İş*, No. 88, 1948, pp. 250ff. For a view of the developments during this period, see K. M. Smogorzewski, "Turkey Turns Towards Democracy," *Contemporary Review*, October 1949, pp. 213-220.

³⁰ A. E. Yalman, "The Struggle for Multi-Party Government in Turkey," *The Middle East Journal*, 1, 1947, p. 52.

³¹ On the elections and results of 1950, 1954, 1957 in Turkey, see *CHP XI Kurultayı*, Ankara, 1954, p. 3. Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, pp. 120, 121. K. M. Smogorzewski, "Democracy in Turkey," *Contemporary Review*, August 1954, p. 81; also Hanson, "Democracy Transplanted," p. 65ff.; also *World Today*, June 1954, pp. 230-232; Malcolm Burr, "Turkish Trends," *Fortnightly*, May 1954, pp. 319-323; *Forum*, October 1, 1957, p. 11; *İstatistik Yılığ*, p. 177.

the elections of 1957, which the party contested vigorously, it received 3,767,000 votes, that is, about 640,000 less than the party in power which had 4,407,000 votes.³²

Although the number of votes received in the first two elections is roughly thirty-five per cent and in the third, forty-one per cent of the total votes cast, the Republican deputies represented only thirteen per cent after 1950, and six per cent after 1954, and about twenty-eight per cent in 1957 of the total number of deputies in the Assembly, that is, 69, 31, and 174 seats respectively. Thus, the majority system of election does not reflect fully the political consensus in the country and reduces greatly the power of the opposition in the Assembly. The Republicans demand Proportional Representation to make the election results correspond to the number of votes.³³

Analysis of the total votes in the elections of 1950, 1954, and 1957 shows that the Republicans have retained and even increased their support, contrary to the general expectation that the party would disintegrate after the first defeat. This increase probably is based largely on the newly eligible voters rather than on dissidents from the Democratic Party. The dissident members of this second party appear more desirous to join political parties other than the Republican. The strength retained by the Republicans is all the more significant in view of the international economic assistance received after 1950, which helped the Democratic government ameliorate conditions in the villages and enhanced its prestige. After the general elections in 1957, a series of talks between the leaders of the Republican and Freedom Parties resulted in their merger, known as *Güçbirliği* (Union of Power). This added additional strength to the Republicans, although many members of the Freedom Party went back to their original Democratic Party.

The part played by the Republican Party in opposition, as

³² *Forum*, November 1, 1957, p. 3.

³³ *CHP Programı*, p. 10.

defined by İnönü at the 8th party convention in 1950,³⁴ was to discharge in earnest its control duties over the government in the National Assembly. The party was in agreement with the Democrats on foreign policy. However, it feared that the Democratic Party government wanted to undermine the Republicans' existence by subverting the government entirely to its own purposes.³⁵ In the Assembly, although overwhelmed by the Democratic Party deputies, the Republican Party has assumed the role of defender of democracy, as well as of reforms. After the elections of 1957, with an increased number of deputies in the Assembly, it can provide a better opposition, and this fact has caused great concern among the Democrats.

The Republicans placed growing emphasis on the preservation and broadening of the democratic foundations established from 1946 to 1950,³⁶ which according to them the Democratic administration did not consolidate.³⁷ It advocated the establishment of a Supreme Constitutional Court, impartiality for government officials, freedom of press, equal use of radio facilities by the parties, and guarantees that the Republicans' own existence as a party would not be endangered.³⁸ The party feared for its existence because of certain laws (5830 of August 8, 1951, 6195 of December 14, 1953) which were enacted to expropriate goods acquired by it through government donations during its term of office under the one-party system.³⁹ These laws although partly justified were, never-

³⁴ *Ulus*, June 30, 1950.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ulus*, November 27, 1951 (opening speech of İnönü at the 9th party convention of 1951).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, December 1, 1951.

³⁸ *Muhalefet Yok Edilmek İsteniyor*, Ankara, 1952, pp. 2ff.

³⁹ According to the Republican Party, the expropriated assets amounted to TL. 100 million, out of which only TL. 48 million were government grants, while the remaining amount consisted of private donations. The party, while accepting the restitution of goods, claimed that the matter could have been settled in the courts rather than in the Assembly. According to the Republicans, this was a pretext used by the Democrats to render them unable to pay their debts and then to declare the party bankrupt and dissolve it in accordance with the appropriate laws. The expropriation

theless, to some extent the result of partisanship, because along with the duly confiscated property, there was also some property left by Atatürk to the Republican Party, such as the printing press of *Ulus*.⁴⁰ In its conventions of 1951, 1953, and especially 1954,⁴¹ the Republican Party accused the government of encouraging its own unequal treatment by government officials, of preparing a law which would enable the government to retire judges after twenty-five years of service, and of partisan use of the state radio. These complaints resembled in many respects those advanced by the Democrats while in opposition, indicating that democratic guarantees for a truly multi-party system as yet are not in existence.

After 1954, as the effects of economic changes became evident in the form of high living costs, migration of the rural population to the cities, increasing luxury, and shortages of primary items on the market, criticism of the Democrats mounted, and along with it the prestige and popularity of the Republican Party increased. The circulation of newspapers favoring the Republicans—a sure indication of public support in Turkey—has increased greatly, and so has the number of people attending the party's meetings.

The lethargy which appeared to have seized the Republicans after the defeat in the elections of 1950 and 1954 disappeared in the elections of 1957. Early in 1957 the Republicans, following the suggestion of the Freedom Party, agreed to join an election coalition of all the major opposition parties to oppose the government in power. But after the amendment to the Election Law in September 1957, which made difficult

law was enacted in 1953, and accordingly the *Ulus* printing press of the party newspaper was taken over by the Treasury. Hanson, "Democracy Transplanted," p. 68.

⁴⁰ The last issue of the historical *Ulus* appeared with black borders on December 15, 1953. The successor, *Yeni Ulus* (New State) was qualitatively far from replacing the original one. *Ulus* reappeared and now is the spokesman for the party.

⁴¹ See *Inönü'nün Nutku*, Ankara, 1954; also *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, XXXII, 1955, pp. 242-244.

the coalition of opposition parties, it renounced the idea of coalition.⁴² One of the chief faults of the Republican Party lies in the fact that it tends to minimize the importance of other parties while adopting an over-exaggerated belief in its own importance and strength. It clings to the idea of achieving a stable multi-party system on its own, and hence receiving the credit for it. The idea of political pioneering is still prevalent in the party.

The party's defeat in 1957, whatever may be the accidental causes and some mishandling of election results, is the Republicans own fault. First of all, the party campaign was conducted on a strictly partisan basis depending primarily on the exploitation of the government's policy. The party platform contained some liberal promises which had already been made in the past,⁴³ but, as to basic economic policy, it offered little new. The issues of *Ulus* around election time comprise literally no objective news but only party polemics and news. Moreover, the nomination of deputy candidates was left in great part to the party hierarchy. The candidates in İstanbul nominated by İnönü himself were relatively weak compared with the Democrats (Bayar, Menderes) and this led to their defeat in this city, when all the odds were that the Republicans would win the elections there. (They lost by almost 100,000 votes.) The Republicans demanded from the deputy candidates in 1957 a written pledge that they would abide by the promises included in the election platform, such as the renewal of the elections in May 1958, establishment of a multi-party system, and finding a remedy to economic difficulties.⁴⁴ This pledge aimed at winning popular support but actually was interpreted as the party's lack of confidence in its own candidates.

During the election campaign İnönü, despite his advanced age, campaigned in various provinces, and so did some of the

⁴² *Forum*, March 15, October 1, 1957.

⁴³ *Ulus*, October 11, 1957.

⁴⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, October 8, 1957.

party members,⁴⁵ but everywhere the lack of a fundamental economic policy was visible and thus, despite the party's crusading spirit,⁴⁶ the elections ended in defeat. The party was based primarily on the leadership of intelligentsia who seem *unaware of the real atmosphere in the villages which still rejoice at the thought of being delivered from the gendarmes, oppression and having some say in country affairs, all of which they attribute primarily to the Democrats.* It is, nevertheless, true that the Republicans place priority on the establishment of solid foundations for a truly democratic system, and until this is achieved they see no advantage in discussing other issues. At the end of the elections in 1957, the Republicans gained a considerable number of seats (chiefly in eastern and central Anatolia which were less affected by economic developments) and thus has a number of eminent people in the Assembly.

The Republican Party nowadays still appears handicapped by two major shortcomings inherited from the days of one-party rule: the initiative for action is normally expected from the top party hierarchy and therefore the spirit of obedience and the cult of leadership is preserved,⁴⁷ causing a lack of mobility; a good many well-known members of this party who reached prominence in the old days through the favors of the party chiefs cling very tightly to the party leadership hoping eventually, when the moment is ripe, to ride to power without any efforts on their part. This group appears to be

⁴⁵ In this campaign an issue was made of the fact that class differences were being created in Turkey by the unbalanced economic progress—millionaires in Cadillacs watching citizens crowded in line waiting for hours for a bus. *Ulus*, October 17, 1957 (Günaltay in Bursa).

⁴⁶ Ahmet Emin Yalman, who after long supporting the Democrats, disappointedly turned against them, compared the campaign of the 1957 elections to the days when the English assaulted Gallipoli in the first World War, and claimed that the issues were similarly vital to the country. *Vatan*, October 16, 1957.

⁴⁷ The newspaper *Sabah* placed on the front page a caption reading: "Atatürk's order is: in case of difficulty always call on Ismet Pasha (Inönü) not others, because he knows and can solve all problems." *Sabah*, October 16, 1957.

a real obstacle to the younger generation in the party, which is animated by a more active and progressive spirit.

2. THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

(*Demokrat Parti*)

The Democratic Party was established on January 7, 1946 by Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü and Refik Koraltan,⁴⁸ all of whom were associated with the Republican Party until a few months earlier.

⁴⁸ Mahmut Celal Bayar was born in 1884, in Umurbey village near Bursa. His parents had immigrated to Turkey from Pleven, Bulgaria. He attended a French school, Alliance Israelite, in Bursa and then worked for a while as clerk for a German bank. He joined the Union and Progress Party and became its representative in his district. During the War of Independence he joined Mustafa Kemal's movement and was active in organizing the national forces in Akhisar and Bursa. After the war he served in various cabinets as Minister of Economy, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, and as Minister of Reconstruction and Settlement. In 1924 he established the *İş* (Work) Bank, and then in 1932 became Minister of Economy until he succeeded İnönü as Premier in 1937. He resigned early in 1939 after Atatürk's death, three months after İnönü became President. From 1939 to 1945 he was Deputy for İzmir. He resigned as deputy in 1945 but was re-elected to the Assembly in the summer of 1946. In January 1946 he became chairman of the newly established Democratic Party, and until 1950, when he became President, he was its active leader. See Cemal Kutay, *Celal Bayar*, İstanbul, Vols. I, II, 1939, Vols. III, IV, 1940. Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 123-124. For a critical view of Celal Bayar, see *Tanin*, July 7, 11, 14, 1946 (articles of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and the open letter of Atif İnan).

Adnan Menderes was born in Aydın in western Anatolia in 1899, of a rich landowner's family. He attended the American College of İzmir and later, while a deputy, he graduated from the School of Law in Ankara. In 1930 he was elected to the National Assembly after he had been rather active in backing the Liberal Party of Fethi (Okyar). However, with the exception of the Republican Party chairmanship in his province, he did not hold executive office until 1950, when he became Premier. During the opposition years of the Democratic Party, whose strategist he was, he obtained great popularity, but in his years as Premier he created much controversy as the chief architect of the government's policy. For a critical appraisal of Menderes, see *Ulus*, October 21, 1948 (reproduction of N. Topçuoğlu's article appearing in the *Aydın*).

Mehmet Fuad Köprülü was born in İstanbul in 1890 of a family related to the *vezirs* (Premiers) of the Ottoman Empire. He was educated in İstanbul and at the age of twenty-three became Professor of Literature at the University of İstanbul, and in 1924 became Undersecretary to the

Their opposition started with the submission to the Republican Parliamentary Group of a joint proposal in which they demanded certain reforms within the Republican Party. The founders' actual purpose embodied in this proposal has caused some debate. The Republicans have asserted that the signatories of the proposal did not intend originally to establish an opposition party, but demanded only some improvements within the Republican Party organization. Some claimed that during the closed debate on the proposals in June 1945, the four founders of the Democratic Party had expressed loyalty to the Republican Party; one of them professed eternal allegiance to İnönü, while another considered the Republican Party the only real political power in the country.⁴⁹

The founders themselves insisted that the proposals actually embodied their intention of forming an opposition party. But as the situation stood in 1945, with the one-party rule firmly established in the country, they could hardly afford to divulge their intentions from the beginning, and therefore they were forced to conceal their actual purposes.

The resolution submitted by the "four" actually was a

Minister of Education. He has published several works on the history and literature of Turkey and holds several honorary degrees from academic institutions abroad. He had been one of the disciples of Ziya Gökalp in the Union and Progress period, working for the awakening of Turkish nationalism. Like all the leading intellectuals in the one-party period, he was elected to the National Assembly as a Republican deputy. In 1945 he was expelled from the Republican Party and in January 1946 he became one of the founders of the Democratic Party, and until 1950 he was the "rationalist" and intellectual of that party. In 1950 he became Minister of Foreign Affairs. He resigned in 1956 from the Central Committee of the Democratic Party, in disagreement with Premier Adnan Menderes, and now has gone into opposition as did many members of his family, all of whom were once prominent in the Democratic Party.

Refik Koraltan, born in Divriği in 1891, was a strong supporter of Atatürk and the Republican Party during the first two decades of the Republican regime. He held senior appointments, and once was the President of the Tribunal of Independence. He had been one of the bitterest critics of the Liberal Party of Fethi Okyar in 1930. In 1950 he became Chairman of the National Assembly, a position he has since held.

⁴⁹ *Vatan*, May 18, 1949 (remarks by Şükrü Sökmensuer). For proposal and debate, see Chapter 5.

means of expressing the discontent caused by the one-party rule in general, *Varlık Vergisi* and the Land Reform Law. If the demands of the "four" formulated in their proposal had been met fully, probably the signatories would not have gone into opposition. Since these demands were not met, the only way left for the "four" was to come into the open and defend their views through an opposition party.

On the other hand, the Republican Party itself encouraged such an opposition for two definite reasons: first, it wanted to have an opposition party in order to answer the criticism that it was a totalitarian party; and second, the Republicans wanted to rid the party of certain dissatisfied elements who weakened it from within.⁵⁰

As soon as the Democratic Party was established it concentrated its attacks on the anti-democratic features of the Republican Administration. The Democrats discussed more fundamental issues and ideas only when forced to do so by circumstances and as an answer to other political parties. The preference shown by the Democrats for strictly political matters, a procedure repeated by the Republicans now, had two basic causes. First, the Democratic Party program differed from the Republican Party's only in degree. Second, the Democratic Party started as a movement to end one-party rule and establish the foundations of democracy; therefore it was compelled to seek immediate political goals, rather than discuss fundamental ideas. However, this preference shown for strictly political topics eventually prevented the party's ideology from acquiring a more definite and concrete form. The Democratic Party conventions have been marked by speeches intended to divert attention from essential topics and to create a drive against the government, when the party

⁵⁰ İnönü and Bayar had irreconcilable views and could not have worked together for long anyway. It is also known that Adnan Menderes wanted a more responsible position and had considered the party chairmanship in his own province of Aydın and a deputy's seat to be insufficient. See Chapter 2, n.110.

was not in power, and against the opposition when the party came to power. The preservation of such a spirit and such an attitude may prove fatal in the long run to the country and to the party itself.⁵¹

The Democratic Party derived its power during the first years from the mass support received from all social groups, ranging from university professor to the simplest peasant. This general support stemmed from the opposition to the Republicans, and indirectly from the hope that the Democratic Party would achieve a new type of political organization satisfactory to all groups.

The growth of the Democratic Party organization after its inception in 1946 could be defined as phenomenal. Celal Bayar claimed that the party had over one million members eleven months after its establishment.⁵² Although the party leaders wanted to accept party members selectively,⁵³ most of the original membership was secured through the "bandwagon" of democracy. Local groups would get together and, often without prior knowledge of the party program, would establish a branch and then notify the Democratic Party headquarters of the fact, in the same way the Union and Progress Party branches were established in 1908. Very often the whole Republican Party organization would go over to the Democratic Party, and in some cases, there would not be any Republican Party members left to take over.⁵⁴ The "Republican Party" sign on the wall or over the door of the party premises would be changed to the "Democratic Party."

In some cases, people who joined the Democratic Party did so because of local rivalries. For instance, the villagers dissatisfied with their *muhtar* (elder) would switch to the Democratic Party in the hope of replacing him.⁵⁵ In some

⁵¹ *Akşam* (editorial), July 27, 1946.

⁵² *Yeni Sabah*, November 25, 1946.

⁵³ *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), January 27, 1946.

⁵⁴ *Tasvir*, May 4, 1946.

⁵⁵ *Akşam, Ulus* (editorial), June 28, 1946, February 24, 1947.

cases, if the candidate of a village group lost the local elections, the entire group would go over to the opposition party. (Changes of party allegiance based on reasons similar to the above applied to all political parties.)⁵⁶

At all events, the Democratic Party was able to gather sufficient popular support six months after its establishment to force the Republican government to hold general elections on July 21, 1946 rather than in 1947 as originally scheduled.⁵⁷ This was done, according to the Democrats, so that the Republican Party could secure office for another four years. The Republicans originally expected to see the Democratic Party remain a small organization concentrated mainly in cities and playing the part of an acquiescent opposition, but its sudden growth produced anxiety. The subsequent elections of 1946, as mentioned before, were far from being democratic and did not reflect accurately the popular vote. It is doubtful, however, whether the Democratic Party would have won the elections of 1946, even if they had been completely free, because the party lacked a country-wide organization, in particular in the eastern provinces. On the other hand, the acquisition of government power by the Democratic Party at that date, only a few months after its establishment, when it was still in the process of organization, might not have been in the best interests of the country.

and concentrate on strengthening their organizations, as well

The July Declaration in 1947, which guaranteed the existence of the opposition parties, forced the Democrats to adopt a more conciliatory attitude with respect to the government as on clarifying the party's stand on issues such as secularism and statism.

The ensuing calm produced inter-party conflict and dis-

⁵⁶ See Ethem Tatlıoğlu, *D.P. nin Hükümeti ve Köyde Bir Mahkeme*, Ankara, 1947; also Şeref L. Akgün, *Balıkesirde D.P. nin İç Yüzü*, Balıkesir, 1950, p. 2.

⁵⁷ Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 63. See also my Chapter 5.

sension in 1948. The disposal of this conflict in a questionable fashion, as explained in a previous chapter, nevertheless, strengthened the Democratic Party, and through the earnest efforts of party leaders who were backed by press and public opinion, the dissidents were unable to draw away more than a small number of party members. Although these dissidents claimed that the Democratic Party leaders acted in concert with the Republican Party hierarchy and therefore could never form a genuine opposition,⁵⁸ their propaganda had no real effect.

The first Democratic Party convention was held on January 7, 1947, presided over by Kenan Öner,⁵⁹ for the purpose of ratifying the program drafted by the party founders and for establishing the future policy of the party. The discussions on the program, however, were overshadowed by acceptance of the *Hürriyet Misakı* (Freedom Charter), which was characterized by its aggressive tone in demanding from the government the necessary measures for making possible the establishment of a multi-party system in Turkey. The Charter in essence, aside from its aggressiveness, was a simple, elementary declaration demanding a few political measures with short-range effects, which offered no definite solution of the basic needs of the country.⁶⁰

The first articles of the party programs accepted at the convention in 1947, and still in use, concern democracy. Family and private property are considered the society's foundations, to be strengthened and guaranteed by republicanism; a multi-party system; freedom of association; social justice; and free elections (Articles 1-12). The program draws its essence from the six fundamental principles of the Republican regime incorporated in the Constitution as well as in the

⁵⁸ Müstakil Demokratlar Grubu Beyannamesi, *Demokrat Parti Kurucuları Bu Davanın Adamı Değildirler*, Ankara, 1949, pp. 3ff. See my Chapters 6, 7, 8.

⁵⁹ Jäschke, *op.cit.*, p. 68.

⁶⁰ *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), February 10, 1948; *Akşam*, January 7, 1947; Jäschke, *ibid.*

program of the Republican Party, with the difference that the Democratic Party interpreted them more liberally.

The Democrats recognized freedom of religion as one of the basic human freedoms and condemned the use of religion for political purposes. Reformism was interpreted as a measure necessary to adjust society to the changing needs of the time. Populism was understood as a rejection of class privileges. The state was considered to be a body created for the welfare of the individual, achieving its ends by participating directly and realistically in economic activities, and by regulating such activities in order to help the growth of private capital and private enterprise (Article 17).⁶¹

The only limitation on private capital and enterprise may be envisaged in the light of public interest. The Democratic Party program theoretically favored local government and consequently advocated a limitation on the authority of the central government. It viewed the government official as rendering service and not favor to the public (Article 23).

The program aimed at bettering the existing educational and judiciary systems and at retaining the autonomy of the universities, while the everyday language was to be left to evolve naturally without interference from the state. The Democrats considered agriculture to be the least developed field and therefore aimed at protecting the farmer by offering him credits on easy terms, buying his produce at subsidized prices, importing agricultural machinery, and supporting the agricultural cooperatives (Articles 56-68). The program aimed at improving the tax system to meet the demands for social justice (Article 75) and at assuring the general welfare through a social security policy for industrial workers, and government officials when possible (Articles 87, 88). On foreign policy the party believed in the equality of sovereign

⁶¹ For a general view of the Democrats on these principles, see *European Atlantic Review*, Spring 1956 (The Five Principles of Government). See also my Chapters 9-13.

states and in international cooperation for peaceful existence.⁶²

The local party organization of the Democrats starts at precinct level and broadens gradually to neighborhood, county, district, and provincial organizations. The central party organization consists of the Party Convention, the Central (Administrative) Committee, the Parliamentary Group, and the Central- and High-Disciplinary Committees. The Party Convention is the supreme body, and comprises delegates from local organizations and members of the central bodies. It meets periodically, decides all basic problems, and elects the Party Chairman who, if elected President, is substituted for *de facto* by the Vice-Chairman. (Since Celal Bayar, the Chairman, is now President, Adnan Menderes, the Premier and Vice-Chairman, is *de facto* Chairman of the party.) The day to day work in the party is carried out by the Central (Administrative) Committee, while the Disciplinary Committees are charged with adjudicating violation of the party rules. The relations between the local and central bodies are supposed to be on a democratic basis, but in practice the balance of power is now in favor of the Central Committee which

⁶² For a time, in 1946, the Democrats had a rather undecided view on foreign affairs. Bayar declared that "as a man who had followed closely the harmonious Turkish-Russian relations, I cannot accept the opposite"—meaning that the rumors of Russian claims for territory and military bases in Turkey had no substance since all territorial matters between the two countries had been settled before. These views possibly originated in the fact that Bayar was Premier and Minister of Economy in a period when Turkish-Russian relations were at their best. At the opening of the Kayseri textile factory, built with technical assistance from the Soviet Union and according to their methods of industrial management and organization, Bayar, as Minister of Economy, delivered a friendly speech in which he affirmed his belief in everlasting friendship with the Soviet Union. (*Millet*, May 16, 1946, p. 4.) However, as soon as the Soviet territorial claims took a definite form in 1946 the Democratic Party issued a formal declaration and expressed agreement with the pro-Western foreign policy of the Republican government and condemned communist activities at home and abroad. Thereafter, the pro-Western foreign policy of the Democrats did not change and the Democrats' anti-communist attitude stiffened. *Cumhuriyet*, April 12-16, 1948; *Tasvir*, April 29, 1946; *Ulus*, August 14, 1946; *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, pp. 252-253.

can nominate thirty per cent of the deputy candidates, can veto the candidates nominated by local organizations, and can dominate the Central Disciplinary Committee, through which it is able to expel party members.

As mentioned before, the Democratic Party's program does not differ from the Republican Party's. Many leading Democrats have stated, when convenient to do so, that their party's program consisted of the reinterpretation of the Republican Party's program. However, in practice some differences between the two parties have resulted from special historical and political circumstances which determined the inception of each party. Similarly differences have resulted from the conditions in which each party had to lead its activities and from their leaders' personalities.⁶³

First, the Republican Party was established on the power and authority of the state, and then, gradually, of necessity, it went down to the people. The Democratic Party, on the other hand, although established within the Assembly by a limited number of persons, in a short time acquired mass support and became the spokesman for the masses. Second, the Republican Party was born in historical circumstances which necessitated urgent and radical reform measures; its spirit was idealistic, its views were academic and influenced by political romanticism, and its methods were forceful. The Democratic Party was born primarily as a reaction to the excesses of the Republican Party and its oligarchic philosophy. It voiced the dissatisfaction of the masses caused by economic and social conditions and authoritarianism, and as such it was closer to

⁶³ A rather lengthy discussion by one of the leading Democratic Party members on the differences between the two parties does not, in the view of this writer, objectively explain those differences. Samet Ağaoğlu, *İki Parti Arasındaki Farklar*, Ankara, 1947; also *Kudret*, April 30-May 3, 1947. For other views on these differences, see speeches and editorials by leading Democrats: *Cumhuriyet*, June 30, 1946, *Kuvvet*, August 4, 1947, *Vatan*, October 5, 1947, *Son Saat*, March 16, 1947, *Son Posta*, March 11, 1947.

reality, to life, and to the individual. The actual differences between the two parties emanate from this basic premise.

The Republicans considered in their early days that the state was the personification of the nation and attributed to it a somewhat metaphysical character. The supremacy of the state was accepted thoroughly and the individual was made subservient to it. The Democratic Party considered the state a corporate body established by the individual for his own welfare and that of society, and advocated limitation of state powers in accordance with the needs, views, and rights of the individual. The Republicans were inclined to accept human rights as originating in the state, while the more pragmatic Democrats were inclined towards accepting the theory of natural rights. These basic attitudes have determined somewhat the positions of the two parties in respect to social groups. These positions, however, are not defined in philosophical or political terms, but stem chiefly from practical needs and expediency. The Democratic Party, despite its opposite claims in theory, has a growing tendency to give place to the political representation of well-defined interests, while the Republicans in practice cling more rigidly to the idea of general representation. As such, without drawing any definite line of demarcation, and taking into account many fluctuations in party allegiance, it can be said that the farmers, workers, and some businessmen have supported the Democrats, and the intellectuals, city dwellers, and independents have supported the Republican Party.⁶⁴

There remains one undeniable truth about the Democratic Party. It is the only political organization in the history of Turkey which through its economic policy affected en masse the villages and succeeded in breaking the vicious circle of poverty and ignorance there. It is true that this policy was originally initiated by the Republicans but it was developed

⁶⁴ A. H. Hanson, "Turkey Today," *Political Quarterly*, October 1955, pp. 325ff.

fully by the Democrats. Whatever the motives underlying this attempt, whatever the means used to achieve it, and whatever the ultimate outcome of this policy, the Democratic Party still stands as the government which opened in the villages new avenues for development for the first time in the history of Turkey.⁶⁵

The Republican Party, having established its organization twenty-three years earlier than the Democrats, presents the picture of a rather stable political party in which all decisions have to follow a slow routine and have to conform to the established patterns. The Democratic Party, on the other hand, still preserves the features of an organization representing a movement. It still has flexibility, dynamism, and ability to mobilize rapidly popular support, especially among lower strata. The precinct and district organizations of the Democratic Party are powerful, while the Republicans depend chiefly on province organizations as policy-making bodies.⁶⁶ The oft-repeated statement by the Democrats that the Republican Party represents the one-party mentality, while the Democrats represent a democratic viewpoint, has not been substantiated by facts.

The main activities of the Democratic Party immediately after it took over the government also can be briefly sum-

⁶⁵ For a general view on the prospects of democracy in the Near East, see Bernard Lewis, "Democracy in the Middle East; its State and Prospects," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, April 1955, pp. 101ff.

⁶⁶ One of the oft-used devices by the Democrats is to publicize their achievements in industrial development. Prior to elections new factories would be opened or the ground broken for such factories and these events would be attended by large numbers of people drawn from the neighboring localities. Usually a high-ranking Democrat would be there to address the crowd. It is undeniable that people in general greatly appreciate these factories which provide them with employment. Despite the opposition's claims to the contrary, the Democratic Party leaders still draw large crowds wherever they go. A large crowd in Turkey, however, does not necessarily mean support of the leader who is addressing them, but rather curiosity to see the man and compare him with previous speakers from the other party. Turkish villagers and town folks like to compare notes on the eloquence, speaking ability, and ideas of various party speakers. As a matter of fact, party politics and all that it entails has become the greatest social event in practically all the small localities of Turkey.

marized. Between 1950 and 1954, Turkey enjoyed under the Democrats a relatively free and democratic life, which is generally accepted by the opposition parties.⁶⁷ The Democratic Party, in accordance with its liberal view on religion, allowed the reading of the call to prayer in Arabic. The period of military service was reduced, a liberal Amnesty Law was adopted, the travel of Turks abroad and of foreigners and former Turkish citizens in Turkey was greatly liberalized, a new Press Law was enacted, some of the restrictive laws were amended,⁶⁸ and a committee was established to list the "undemocratic" laws. The activities of this committee cannot properly be appraised now, but in general it can be said that in time its activities dwindled to a minimum.

The change of government through normal elections in 1950 brought a general feeling of political stability and security. By the middle of 1950 Turkey was included in the European Recovery Program and \$100 million was earmarked for Turkey.⁶⁹ This led groups in the country who had accumulated capital, and investors from abroad, to invest in various branches of industry. The Democrats also passed the Law on Foreign Capital to encourage investment from abroad by allowing capital owners to transfer their profits out of Turkey. There was also abundant credit from abroad. The government therefore invested heavily in power plants, in a number of factories such as cement and sugar, and in agriculture in the form of extensive farm credits for mechanization. The government investment, however, did not aim at strengthening the small individual enterprises except in the long run, if the industrialization could be carried out successfully. Nor was this invest-

⁶⁷ Kasım Gülek, "Democracy Takes Root in Turkey," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1951, pp. 135ff.

⁶⁸ The amended laws are numbered, respectively, 5665, 5673, 5677, 5682, 5683; Penal Code Art. 526, Military Service Law, Amnesty Law, Passport Law, Law on Travel and Residence of Foreigners in Turkey. Also see *BMMTD*, Session 9.1, Vols. 1, 2.

⁶⁹ H.A.R.P., "Turkey Under the Democratic Party," *World Today*, September 1953, p. 385. For a general view, see R. M. Saunders, "The New Turkey," *Current Affairs*, September 15, 1953, pp. 4-30.

ment dispersed sufficiently to stimulate simultaneously activity in all economic fields and to affect equally the living standards of the masses. Moreover, the investment in industry took place without a well-planned program, without due consideration of the procurement of raw materials or the repayment of credits. The reliance on foreign capital and on credit became the primary aspect of economic development. In agriculture also, although small farms were the dominant agricultural enterprise, mechanization nevertheless favored the large farms, thus contradicting the advice of foreign missions.⁷⁰ Subsequently, the small farms began to be absorbed into the large farms and the surviving small farmers continued to work the land by the old methods because their economic status was only superficially affected. This establishment of large farms was economically desirable provided the disrupted socio-economic balance in the villages was counteracted with proper measures.

As a result of these investments, an economic boom took place during 1951-1953. The resulting social well-being greatly favored the Democratic Party, which easily won the national elections in 1954, primarily on the basis of its achievements in the economic field.

Simultaneously, with the expansion of economic activities, the Democratic Party overlooked consolidation of the multi-party system and democracy in general, which had been its goal when it came to power and which indirectly made possible the economic development.

⁷⁰ For instance, the International Bank estimated that in 1951 there were already 10,000 tractors in Turkey and that these could be used profitably on the available land on the existing large farms. A greater number of tractors would have caused dislocation of tenants. The Mission advised the manufacture of light metal ploughs to stimulate the small farmers. (*The Economy of Turkey*, pp. 74, 75.) Yet in 1954, the number of tractors went as high as 40,000. Richard D. Robinson, "Tractors in the Villages, A Study in Turkey," *Journal of Farm Economics*, November 1952, pp. 451-462; see also Robinson's letter to Russell Dorr on the subject, *Vatan*, June 15, 1949. See my Chapters 11 and 12.

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In the early stages of the economic boom when credit from abroad seemed to flow constantly into the country, and American economic aid appeared steady enough to enable the country to carry its economy to a self-sustaining stage, industry expanded and absorbed the people dislocated from their farms because of mechanization. Landowners who were able to receive farm equipment expanded their farm operations to a point of vital dependence on parts supplied from abroad. However, the difficulties of repayment abroad, the droughts in 1954 and 1955 which reduced crop production and left a relatively small amount for export, the failure of American economic aid to reach a volume sufficient to support the economic development, and the subsequent refusal of the American government to offer the credit requested by the Turkish government (\$300 million), slowed down the economic boom. This policy has been reversed since August 1958 and new credits have been extended to Turkey. Industry could not absorb the available manpower, factories could not import the raw materials, and the shortage of parts for farm equipment became acute. The farm income, which seemed to be concentrated in a few hands, was hardly invested in economically suitable fields. For instance, a good part of the income thus acquired was spent on items of secondary economic importance, such as houses in towns, cars, and a number of other items considered luxuries. Meanwhile, speculation in real estate created new fortunes. The taxes on farm products had been abolished a few years previously, leaving the farmers almost untaxed, and thus the burden of financing the public services was shifted onto industry, the industrial worker, and salaried people. Economic development took place, as in the past, without due attention to social effects.⁷¹ This development was accompanied inescapably by

⁷¹ For these economic difficulties, see *The Economist*, January 22, July 2, December 24, 1955, pp. 285-286, 46-47, 1090-1091. For a general view on Turkey during this period, see Philips Price, "Turkey Today,"

changes in the social structure of the country, by shortages in a number of primary consumption items, and by a number of social disturbances and acts of opposition to the government,⁷² whose causes were attributed to factors other than the real ones.

Along with social discontent, there was increased criticism coming from the opposition parties, the press, and even from Democratic Party members. With it grew the sensitiveness of the Democratic Party hierarchy to such criticism, because for the first time since their party's inception the Democrats were meeting unfavorable public reaction.⁷³ In order to divert

Asian Review, October 1955, pp. 33off., Lord Kinross, "Impressions of a Recent Visit to Turkey," *Asian Review*, January 1955, pp. 56-66.

⁷² For instance, the regrettable riots in İstanbul on September 6-7, 1955 started as a simple demonstration protesting the attempt to bomb Atatürk's birth home in Salonica, Greece. Soon, however, the demonstration took devastating forms directed against the property of Greeks and other minorities, but also ethnic Turks. (For an eyewitness account, see Frederic Sondern, Jr., "İstanbul's Night of Terror," *Reader's Digest*, May 1956, pp. 185ff.) Although these riots have received wide publicity, there has not been any earnest effort to determine their actual cause. The truth lies in the fact that the newcomers to the city and the lower classes were socially discontented. They used the demonstration as an outlet to express their own dissatisfaction and to protest against the extreme luxury of a small section of the urban population. That the Greek minority was the target is due to the fact that the Greeks represent the well-to-do section of the population of İstanbul, and the mob used the Cyprus dispute between Turkey and Greece, which had reached a tense point, as a pretext to devastate the Greeks' property, along with the property of other minorities and some ethnic Turks. Very few individuals were hurt in the riots. The dean of Turkish journalists, the late Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, by nature the least inclined to economic interpretation of events, nevertheless wrote: "Here the enmity was not directed against the Greeks who threw the bomb into Atatürk's house but against a group which they envied and considered guilty of being rich and living in comfort. Greek or Jew or Armenian or Turk were all the same from this point of view. The enmity was social and not political. It was the upheaval of poverty against richness. This was the birth in our streets of the same enmity and revolt of which we have seen examples throughout history." H. C. Yalçın, "En Tehlikeli Cephe" (The Most Dangerous Front), *Ülus*, September 14, 1955.

⁷³ In 1953 an amendment to the Universities Law No. 4936 (Law 6185 of July 21, 1953), Article 46, had already restricted faculty members from engaging in political activities. *Forum*, November 1, 1955, p. 10. For an analysis of these restrictions, see H. A. Reed, "Turkish Democracy at Crossroads," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, March 15, 1955, pp. 97-98, 101.

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public attention from political topics and gain unconditional popular support, the Democratic Party attempted—at times by artificial means—to create enthusiastic support for its policy of “economic development.” The party was almost automatically compelled to pursue its policy of economic development at any price, in part by the conditions in the country and because of the great popular support it received in the general elections of 1954.⁷⁴ These elections were also “clean.”⁷⁵ This support, as mentioned above, was generated by the party’s achievements in the economic field. Appeals for unconditional support of the party, heard in the period prior to 1950, were reiterated. In the past the support had been requested in order to establish democracy. Now the support was requested to help the party carry out economic development. A bright economic future and increased welfare were to be the rewards for all the anticipated economic privations and difficulties. The chief purpose was to create wealth regardless of the cost and consequences, for it was thought such a process indirectly would answer all the social and cultural problems of Turkey which were supposed to have resulted from poverty. Democracy, with all its intricate aspects, especially freedom, became a matter of secondary importance. Critics who tried to point out that the party owed its origins to the promise for democracy and not to “economic development,” and especially those critics objecting to the manner in which economic development policy was carried out, were considered by the party to be ill-intentioned and were accused of partisanship and obstructionism.⁷⁶ The Republicans, on the other hand, encouraged

⁷⁴ *Cumhuriyet* (editorial), November 2, 1955.

⁷⁵ For these elections see also Hanson, “Democracy Transplanted,” pp. 68ff.; K. M. Smogorzewski, “Democracy in Turkey,” *Contemporary Review*, August 1954, pp. 8off.

⁷⁶ The new philosophy of the Democrats is based on a simple premise. Democracy, they say, cannot be established without solid economic foundations, without creating wealth. Of course, there is going to be some discontent until the economic development is achieved, and its ill effects will be reflected against the Democratic Administration. Since economic develop-

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by popular reaction to the Democratic Party's policies, intensified their opposition by exploiting the mistakes of the Democrats. In order to secure the necessary tranquility for "economic development," a number of freedoms were restricted.⁷⁷

This restrictive policy showed its effects within the ranks of the Democratic Party itself. The main party controversy was caused by a proposed law drafted by ten prominent Democrats, some of them ex-Ministers, to enable newspapers to produce evidence against high government officials whom they accused of mishandling funds or of grave errors.⁷⁸ The proposal was interpreted as a protest against the deviation of the party from its basic aims. The number of signatories gradually grew to nineteen, and the party leaders' attempts to convince them to withdraw the proposal remained ineffective.

ment is of vital importance to the country, it must be kept out of party controversies. For this reason the Democrats believe that they are morally entitled to see to it that this development is not obstructed by anyone, including the opposition. The Democrats do not advocate abolition of political parties in order to carry out economic development in peace and quiet, but they do demand that the opposition abstain from "instigating" the people against economic development.

⁷⁷ The amendment Laws 6272, 6428, 7053, restricted the right to vote by requesting the elector to use a pre-established party list, and reduced the duration of the election campaign to 45 days. Law 6422 reduced to twenty-five the number of years of service required for the retirement of government officials in order, according to the opposition, to enable the government to retire the unwanted judges (judges are considered government officials). Law 6429 reduced Kırşehir from a provincial to a district seat, because this province chose to elect the candidates of the National Party in the 1954 general election. Later in 1957, Kırşehir was made a province seat (*Dünya*, July 1-3, 1957), but this did not prevent it from voting against the Democrats and thus elect the candidates of the National Party. The Press Law was strictly amended to forbid criticism of government officials. The International Press Institute of Vienna in its report for 1954 cited Turkey as a country in which freedom of the press was restricted. Newspapermen were arrested, among them the dean of Turkish journalists, the late Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın. For the imprisonment of newspapermen, see *Cahiers*, XXXI, 1955, p. 99, XXXII, 1955, pp. 242-244.

⁷⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, October 13, 14, 18, 1955. Also *Cahiers*, XXXII, 1955, pp. 244-245.

The suspicion that the "nineteen" might lead a revolt against party leadership in the approaching fourth party convention brought about a showdown. The two leaders of the group and well-known Democrats, Fethi Çelikbaş and Fevzi Karaosmanoğlu, refused to withdraw the proposal and consequently were informed by the Central Committee that they could not attend the party convention because of their "attempts to break the party's solidarity." They were referred together with the remaining nineteen signatories to the Disciplinary Committee. This Committee, hoping to break up the group of the "nineteen," expelled nine of its members from the party but withheld decisions in respect to the remaining ten, who nevertheless resigned by themselves. Furthermore, the credentials of those delegates to the impending convention, who favored the "nineteen," were rejected by the Central Committee.⁷⁹

The Party Convention was opened on October 15, 1955 by Adnan Menderes, *de facto* Party Chairman. He attacked the Republican Party and the opposition in general and demanded party solidarity, claiming that too much freedom serves the enemy of the people, that is, the opposition, to destroy freedom itself.⁸⁰ Menderes attributed the "revolt" of the "nineteen" to Fevzi Karaosmanoğlu's unfulfilled desire to become Chairman of the National Assembly,⁸¹ which the latter denied.

The convention was "maneuvered" to avoid discussing at length the question of the "nineteen." On the very last day of the convention a proposal was introduced and immediately submitted to the vote, without debate and even without giving the delegates a chance to understand what it meant. The proposal recommended that a law be submitted to the National Assembly to deprive of their seats those deputies who had

⁷⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, October 11, 1955; October 14, 16, 1955; *Cahiers*, xxxii; *ibid.*, October 15, 1955.

⁸⁰ *Zafer*, October 16, 1955.

⁸¹ *Cumhuriyet*, *Zafer*, October 17, 1955. Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu had acted ruthlessly in eliminating the "rebels" from the D.P. in 1948.

been expelled or who had resigned from the party.⁸² It was accepted. The proposal actually was a gross violation of the Constitution and of the very elementary rules of democracy, and brought a wave of protest from all over the country, which convinced the party leaders of the unpopularity of the proposal.⁸³ It was not submitted to the Assembly. The convention finally wound up its work lacking the solidarity and enthusiasm of the past and having been a scene for personality conflicts, such as the one between Sarol and Köprülü.

The intra-party dissatisfaction was expressed in the Democratic Party Parliamentary Group. Refik Koraltan, one of the founders of the Party, was nominated candidate for the chairmanship of the Assembly with only 198 votes, while his opponent, a rather unknown deputy, received 147 votes.⁸⁴ In the past he had been unanimously nominated. The Assembly Vice-Chairmen were elected against the candidates supported by the party hierarchy. In the plenary session of the Assembly, the Democrats preserved their unity and voted in a bloc for their party candidates.

The popular reaction to the Democratic Party became manifest in the municipal elections held three weeks after the convention. The Republican and National parties boycotted the elections, in a way similar to the Democratic Party prior to 1954. The popular participation was as low as thirty-seven per cent, as compared to eight-eight per cent in the general elections held one year previously. Even so, a good percentage of the votes went to the Peasant Party and to independent candidates.⁸⁵

A final reaction caused by the Democratic Party's policies took place in the Democratic Parliamentary Group. During

⁸² *Ibid.*, October 19, 1955. For a legal argument in favor of this decision, see *Tercüman*, December 3, 1957 (T. Z. Tunaya).

⁸³ *Dünya, Vatan*, October 20, 1955.

⁸⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, October 31, 1955.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, November 19, 1955 (communiqué of the Ministry of Justice) and editorial, November 15, 1955; *Cahiers*, xxxii, 1955, p. 244.

the debate caused by an interpellation regarding the rising cost of living, the deputies forced the Ministers of Finance, Trade, and Foreign Affairs to resign, one by one. The Minister of Justice, about to meet the same fate, suggested the resignation of the whole cabinet. Immediately thereafter, Adnan Menderes asked for and received a vote of confidence for himself personally, and proceeded to form a new cabinet, although, according to the Constitution, the Ministers' responsibilities are shared in common by the whole cabinet. A special Parliamentary Committee was formed to investigate the allocation of foreign currencies to the import firms by a committee of which the three resigned Ministers had been members. The Ministers were later exonerated.

The "revolt" in the Democratic Parliamentary Group was quelled by promise of democratization measures, such as: amendment to the Constitution to provide an Upper House, respect for the autonomy of the universities, amendment of the "undemocratic" laws accepted since 1950, amendment of the election law, amendment of the press law to allow newspapers to produce evidence in the courts against high government officials accused of maladministration, and measures to fight the rising cost of living. All these points were included in the work program of Menderes' new cabinet.⁸⁶ The opposition interpreted these promises as maneuvers to calm the unrest in the Democratic Party and give the party hierarchy time to gain control over the "rebels" within the party.⁸⁷ Following these happenings, a number of "rebels" were expelled from the party and further laws and measures restricting freedom were adopted. Later Fuad Köprülü, one of the founders of the Democratic Party, resigned from the Central Committee in protest against the decision of the Democratic Parliamen-

⁸⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, December 6, 14, 1955. *The Economist* said, "what is new and heartening is the way the representatives of the Turkish people have themselves forced Mr. Menderes to think again." *The Economist*, December 24, 1955, p. 1090.

⁸⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, December 15, 1955; *The Economist*, December 24, 1955, p. 1091.

tary Group to drop investigation of the accusation that Mukerrem Sarol had built a large fortune while he was Minister of State. He later denounced the policy of the Democratic Party for being undemocratic.⁸⁸ The Assembly controlled by Democrats dissolved itself on September 11, 1957 after having voted to renew the elections on October 27, 1957, and after having passed a law declaring a ten-year moratorium on all farmers' debts. It also amended the Election Law to prevent the opposition from forming an election coalition, that is, a united slate of candidates.⁸⁹

The Democrats' election campaign followed a well-organized and well-timed course in which the main theme was the prosperity of the villages and their delivery from the oppression of the gendarmes and the state. Industrial development was stressed. Afyon and Çorum cement factories were opened during the campaign and widely publicized.⁹⁰ A number of houses were dedicated to the workers and the ground was broken for new factories during the campaign. The opposition, and especially İnönü, were attacked primarily on their past records, on their present election platform which was held not to be serious, and on Proportional Representation, "a tragedy for the country."⁹¹ In smaller places religious propaganda was used, the Republicans being accused of irreligion,⁹² although the Democrats themselves were subject to similar accusations.⁹³

⁸⁸ For the accusations, see *BMMTD*, Session 10, Vol. 10, pp. 100-130. *Cahiers*, XXXIII-XXXIV, 1956, p. 183; *Zafer*, October 8, 1957.

⁸⁹ *New York Times*, September 12, 1957.

⁹⁰ *Zafer*, October 12, 25, 1957.

⁹¹ *Zafer*, October 17, 1957 (Menderes in Samsun, where he accused the opposition of "sabotage").

⁹² *Cumhuriyet*, October 5, 1957; *Ulus*, October 10, 17, 1957.

⁹³ One Democratic candidate who went to the mosque for *seçim namazı* (election prayer), that is to show the people that he was pious, was discovered to be without the necessary *abdest* (ablution) and this, of course, was exploited by the Republican opponents. *Cumhuriyet*, September 30, 1957.

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The election took place in a rather tense atmosphere,⁹⁴ and a considerable number of people could not find their names on the election lists, and therefore could not vote. However, the general results are valid, for the differences would not have changed the result. The Democrats won 424 seats out of the 610 with 4,407,000 votes against the combined opposition with 186 seats and 4,758,000 votes. In other words, the Democrats had about 300,000 votes less than the opposition, but the majority election system permitted them to acquire a comfortable majority in the Assembly. In the elections in 1954 the Democrats had 5,314,000 votes as compared with 3,675,000 of the combined opposition. The total number of eligible voters in 1957 was 11,500,000, and 9,140,000 or 79.4 per cent voted as compared with 88.6 per cent in 1954.⁹⁵ (The actual number of deputies for each party will vary slightly since several deputies in both parties were elected in two provinces.)

The Democrats face a stiff opposition now in the Assembly, and there are already signs that the relations there will be tense and the Democrats will face handicaps in discharging their legislative functions.⁹⁶

The Democratic Party is still one of the strongest, if not the strongest, political parties in Turkey. It came to power in 1950 and has held power since then through legitimate popular vote. One is bound to accept the fact that the policy of this party and its methods are a result of the interpretation it has given to the mandate of power entrusted to the party by the people. The wisdom of this policy ultimately is to be judged by the voters. As long as the impartiality of the election system is preserved, criticism of the Democratic Party

⁹⁴ The car of Ministers Samet Ağaoğlu and Cemil Bengü were fired upon while they were driving back to Ankara from Kırşehir. *Ulus*, October 6, 1957.

⁹⁵ *Forum*, November 1, 1957, p. 3; *Zafer*, October 31, 1957 (Official results).

⁹⁶ There is already talk of additional measures to curb the press. *New York Times*, December 9, 1957.

may be regarded as having temporary value, directed to the policy of the party rather than to its fundamentals. Faced with the unification policy of opposition parties, the Democrats have appealed to all citizens to join the *Vatan Cephesi* (Homeland Front) that is their own party.

One cannot conclude the study of the Democratic Party without mentioning some of its major achievements. The economic policy, despite its shortcomings, the urge for accomplishment, and the dynamic spirit of this party, have created a new revolution in the life of the country and of every citizen—the farm mechanization, the road building, and the public works program have affected every layer of the society and compelled every individual and social group to face the modern life together with its conveniences and problems. The possibilities of better life, of freedom and enlightenment, of self assertion, are no longer a dream but are realities which each generation wants and can enjoy in its own lifetime. The economy of the country is losing more and more its primitive aspect by integrating itself in the form of larger units and by being conducted in a more rationalized way. The Democratic Party is the first political party in Turkey which through its origin, activity, and spirit came close to the wishes of the people, and as such it has operated by paying major attention to public opinion. Whatever the deviations from this principle, it still tries to abide by it. It is the economic policy and the respect for public opinion which have enabled the Democrats—many times unaware of it—to channel down to large sections of the population the technology of the twentieth century and many of the ideas accompanying it, without creating resistance and opposition. One may add that despite many compromises on the principle of reformism—the foundation of the Turkish Republic—the Democrats are still respectful of its spirit, and try to achieve it according to their own interpretation.

The future of the Democratic Party depends largely upon the manner in which it interprets the new developments in

the country, the social forces it resuscitated, and the solutions it finds to establish a new balance in the society. But no solution could be envisaged without paying paramount attention to the fundamental reason which brought about the establishment of the Democratic Party—democracy. The final judgment about the Democratic Party will be passed in accordance with its failure or success in fulfilling this basic goal.

3. THE REPUBLICAN PEASANT NATIONAL PARTY (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*)

This party was founded on July 20, 1948 by dissidents and those expelled from the Democratic Party.⁹⁷ The founders claimed to represent the views of the liberals in the Democratic Party,⁹⁸ and consequently adopted from the beginning an uncompromising opposition to the Republican Party. The Independent Democrats' Group in the Assembly joined the National Party in July 1949 after the Democratic Party Convention ratified the decision of the Central Committee to expel them from that party. The members of the "True Democratic Party" which was established in Afyonkarahisar also joined the National Party at the same time as the Independent Democrats.⁹⁹ The National Party bitterly opposed the Republican and the Democratic parties, which it considered to be alike since the leaders of both had belonged at one time to the same party. The National Party did not acquire great popularity prior to 1950, despite the fact that among its leaders there were well-known and capable personalities. The main reasons for this failure lay in the fact that this party overlooked the important issues and chose to attack

⁹⁷ *Siyasi Dernekler*, p. 489; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 87, gives the date as July 19; Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, p. 712.

⁹⁸ Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, Enis Akaygen (retired diplomat), Hikmet Bayur (professor of History), Kenan Öner (lawyer), Mustafa Kentli (doctor), Osman Nuri Koni (lawyer), Sadık Aldoğan (retired General), Osman Bölükbaşı (landowner).

⁹⁹ *Kudret*, July 5, 6, 1949.

personalities, especially İnönü, rather than policies in the Republican and Democratic parties.¹⁰⁰ It did not achieve a unity on party policy even among its hierarchy, because the top leaders acted independently of each other. Sadık Aldoğan, one of its deputies in the Assembly, was eventually deprived of his immunity for having advocated violent opposition to the government.

The political liberalism professed by the party was jeopardized by its clericalism and conservatism in cultural matters.¹⁰¹ The death of two important leaders of the party Kenan Öner in 1949 and Marshal Çakmak in 1950, further weakened the party. Finally, the unfriendliness of the press, caused by the fact that religious elements seemed to align behind the party (as was seen during the funeral of Marshal Çakmak) kept the main opposition groups rallied around the Democratic Party. The National Party received only 240,209 votes out of nearly eight million votes cast in the election of 1950, and only one National Party candidate was elected to the Assembly, although later the number of its deputies increased to three.

The National Party nevertheless had indirect effects on the over-all political development. It compelled the Democratic Party to maintain an active opposition to the Republican Party lest their slow-down in the political struggle would lead the masses to consider their opposition faked. Similarly, the Democrats adopted a more reconciliatory attitude toward the Republican Party in order to form a common front with them against the National Party, which they feared would split and weaken their own party and also undermine the secularist foundations of the regime.

The National Party program adopted liberalism as its basic principle, recognized unlimited freedoms (speech, thought,

¹⁰⁰ *Vatan*, May 23, 1949.

¹⁰¹ For a more detailed description of this attitude see Rustow, "Politics," pp. 93, 103.

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press), and considered any limitation of these freedoms a criminal offense.¹⁰² (Program 73, Articles 26, 29.) It accepted the role of political parties as expressing society's feelings of mutual help, traditions, customs, and cooperation (Article 14). The role of the state was limited to preparing the necessary conditions for the development of human personality; justice being the moral foundation for it. In general economic policy, the state's part was limited to merely supervising but not interfering in such activities. Nationalism and religion were considered the most important factors in strengthening the family institution, which was considered the basis of a healthy society. Private property was considered sacred, and free competition the basis of trade. In order to strengthen democracy the party favored an Upper House (Article 35), immunity for the Judiciary (Articles 48, 50), a change in the administration to suit democratic needs (Article 71), and the election of the President of the Republic for one term only. A new spirit of education in the schools was advocated in the program, having as credo the love of country. Workers were to be granted the right to strike (Article 121), while the peasantry was promised land (privately owned lands were to be respected) and farming equipment.

After the failure registered in the elections of 1950, the party changed its methods. In the conventions held in 1950, 1951, and 1952 the delegates advocated necessary amendments to the Constitution to make the democratic regime a stable and representative one, and Proportional Representation was considered one of the first means to achieve it. The party defended the principle of retroactive political responsibility.¹⁰³

It considered the Democratic Party's economic policy successful only in those fields affected by American economic aid,

¹⁰² For program, see *Siyasi Dernekler*, pp. 493-527.

¹⁰³ *Kudret*, February 27, March 3, June 18-21, 1950, May 30, 1951, May 19, 20, 1952. Also Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 714-715. Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 123, 146.

while the other areas of activity were considered to have remained untouched.¹⁰⁴ Accused of harboring religious and extreme rightist elements, the party redefined its position on religion as being a "moderate political and social stand between extreme political currents . . . respectful of national institutions and historical past . . . but being openly evolutionary, for it does not intend to bring back institutions like the Caliphate, polygamy, the Arabic letters, or the veil for women."¹⁰⁵

However, the party convention of July 1953, held in an atmosphere of disorder amidst fights with press correspondents, ended by passing the religious fanatics the control of the party. A number of leading members, among them Hikmet Bayur, resigned from the party because it had adopted a reactionary, anti-Kemalist attitude. The government began to prosecute the party for its definitely anti-Constitutional clericalism and eventually dissolved it amid protests of undemocratic action along with the periodical *Millet* which had become its religious reactionary supporter.¹⁰⁶ Soon, however, the party was re-established under the name of *Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi* (Republican National Party) without the religious reactionaries, and from then on it worked steadily to become a true political party under the leadership of Osman Bölükbaşı, a resourceful speaker. It was due to these efforts that in the elections of 1954 the National Party received 480,000 votes and elected five deputies to the Assembly.¹⁰⁷ In 1957 it received 603,000 votes but elected only four depu-

¹⁰⁴ *Kudret*, June 1, 1951.

¹⁰⁵ *Kudret*, May 20, 1952 (report on ideologies).

¹⁰⁶ *New York Times*, July 13, 27, and September 27, 1953. Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 135. For more detailed description of these events, see also *Cahiers*, XXVIII, pp. 190-191; Smogorzewski, "Democracy in Turkey," p. 83.

Millet reappeared but then ceased publication altogether for lack of readers. *Cahiers*, XXXI, 1955, pp. 99-100.

¹⁰⁷ The regional character of the party is one of its main characteristics. Its strength is in central Anatolia, especially in the provinces of Kırşehir, Kastamonu and Sinop. See *Istatistik Yılığ*, Ankara, 1953, p. 178.

ties including Osman Bölükbaşı who was in jail at the time for having attacked the Government. After elections, the strength of the National Party increased further when, in line with the policy of unification adopted by other major political parties, it merged with the Peasant Party and added "Peasant" to its name.

The National Party at present has a relatively strong position in the opposition ranks, and it is to be expected that its influence will increase, provided it adopts a more realistic attitude on all political matters including cooperation with other political parties, and strives to represent all viewpoints.

4. FREEDOM PARTY (*Hürriyet Partisi*)

This party was officially established on December 20, 1955 by the deputies who were expelled or had resigned from the Democratic Party on the eve of or after its fourth convention in October 1955.¹⁰⁸ The founders of the party numbered as many as thirty-three, out of whom thirty were deputies in the National Assembly, a good many of them ex-Ministers who had been very active during 1946-1950, when the Democratic Party was struggling to establish itself.¹⁰⁹ In general, the dissenters represented the liberals and the "intellectuals" of the Democratic Party who had not been associated with the Republican Party in the past. The leaders of the party defined the circumstances which led them to establish a new party and criticized the Democrats as follows: "The one hundred-year-old fight for freedom has failed once more because of the leaders' lack of faith. . . . Recent history has proved once more that our people are mature for democracy but

¹⁰⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1955; also *The Economist*, November 26, 1955, p. 738; *Cahiers*, XXXII, 1955, p. 244.

¹⁰⁹ For dissension and expellings from the Democratic Party see pp. 221-224, 232, 413, 424-426.

the development of democracy has been handicapped by people who did not interpret it properly, who did not understand its roots in the Western sense, and who did not sincerely believe in it.¹¹⁰

Since, according to the Freedom Party leaders, the Democratic Party no longer believed in democracy, they established their own party to pursue the initial democratic goals with which the Democratic Party was founded.

The foundations of democracy, in the view of the party, were rooted in the individual and in the freedoms given to him. The individual can secure, through democracy, social welfare, happiness, and progress. In order to achieve these goals and not commit the mistake of the Democratic Party which became dominated by personalities, the Freedom Party believed in measures to assure the survival of a democratic political regime, such as Constitutional guarantees for political parties, impartial administration and an independent Judiciary, non-partisan use of the state radio and the police force, check and balance of government powers, and a free press. Economic development was to be achieved on the basis of the solidarity of people united together by deliverance from fear of despotism and suspicion,¹¹¹ and by using the means and skills available in the country. However, the party did not want to adopt specifically any economic theory such as liberalism or statism because such nomenclatures had become deprived of scientific bases. The establishment of economic research institutes, the adjustment of currency and taxes, economic rationalization and coordination, and social justice were to be the main features of its economic policy. In more specific terms, the program of the Freedom Party envisaged the establishment of an Upper Legislative House, a Supreme Court to judge the constitutionality of laws, and free trade

¹¹⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, November 20, 1955.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, December 24, 31, 1955.

unions with the right to strike. In order to avoid accepting undesirable individuals, the party planned to accept its members on a selective basis, but as soon as it was officially established there were already reports that demands had been received from forty-eight provinces to open party branches there.¹¹²

The Freedom Party drew its membership primarily from members of the Democratic Party who became dissatisfied with their own party. The party started its organization in the Aegean Sea region, once the stronghold of the Democratic Party.

It initiated the unsuccessful talks on a coalition of opposition parties. Its ranks grew in 1956 with some of the professors from Ankara University who had been suspended because of interfering in politics, that is, criticizing the government including Aydın Yalçın, the England-trained publisher of the *Forum*. The views of this party on its own influence in the country were over-optimistic.¹¹³ In the elections of 1957 it received only 358,000 votes and elected only four deputies (from Burdur) to the Assembly. One of the chief reasons for this poor performance lies in the fact that it was unable to establish a country-wide organization, and even the branches established were not properly consolidated. (During the election campaign it was busy opening new branches which could hardly cope with the well-entrenched branches of other parties.) The defeat of the party in the elections of 1957 had such demoralizing effects that after a series of talks and hesitations it finally decided to merge with the Republican Party in November 1958. It has thus become part of history and has shattered many hopes and possibilities of a creative independent part in the country's political life.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, December 12 and 19, 1955. Critics pointed out that basically the program of this party would not differ from the rest. *Hürriyet*, November 21, 1955.

¹¹³ It published a five year development plan entitled *Towards Freedom and Welfare*, Ankara, 1957.

C. *The Minor Political Parties of Turkey*¹¹⁴

The so-called minor political parties established since 1945, numbering as many as twenty-nine (and some are still being formed) excluding the socialist parties mentioned previously,¹¹⁵ do not present any particular originality. They contributed superficially only to the general development of politics in Turkey. In most cases these parties rarely succeeded in opening more than one central branch and the membership seldom exceeded a limited group of the leader's friends. Consequently, it might be more appropriate to refer to these parties as ordinary political clubs or associations. In many cases they serve as an outlet for expression of the ideas and emotions of some of the leaders who usually are well-known personalities in publishing, university, or public life and belong to the well-to-do group of the middle class. Most of them do not offer any broad and systematic policy, but tend to express one particular trend of thought, viewpoint, or recommendation. In general, they are Republican and conservative, with little or no systematic analysis and knowledge of the country's actual political and social conditions. The public in general is unaware of the existence of most of them. As the situation stands today, it is not likely that they will so increase in size and activity as to affect fundamentally the course of political life in Turkey. A large coalition, which is practically impossible, could bring together all their leaders and form a rather strong party.

Among these minor political parties, listed below, special mention should be made of the National Resurgence Party and the Peasants Party. The former, *Milli Kalkınma Partisi*, holds the honor of being the first political party established in 1945 after the ban on political parties was lifted. It participated in the İstanbul municipal elections of 1946 but without achiev-

¹¹⁴ Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 693-748 *passim*. *Siyasi Dernekler*, pp. 105-144, 183-620 *passim*.

¹¹⁵ See my Chapter 14.

ing much success. In the general elections of 1950 the party won 9,257 votes and in 1954 its leader, the late Nuri Demirağ, a rich İstanbul industrialist, was elected deputy for İstanbul on the Democratic Party list.¹¹⁶ The party reflected the moral and social views of its leader, and survived more on the basis of the financial assistance supplied by him than on popular support. Torn from the beginning by internal disputes,¹¹⁷ and without any specific economic or social ideas, it ceased to be a force in Turkish politics after the Democratic Party was established.

The Turkish Peasants Party, *Köylü Partisi*,¹¹⁸ was established on May 19, 1952 by a group of intellectuals.¹¹⁹ It was not based on class organization but expressed an intellectual desire to raise the standard of living of the peasantry and stimulate public interest in rural problems.¹²⁰ Its program—although placing particular emphasis on the development of agriculture—as a whole dealt more with political issues. The party polled 60,900 votes, or 0.56 per cent of the total votes cast in the 1954 elections, without winning any representation in the Assembly. In the municipal elections of 1955 it was able to win 262 seats out of the total of 11,807 contested. However, this was due to the non-participation of the major opposition parties rather than to its own power.¹²¹ It had organizations in thirty provinces and 120 districts, but its strength could not properly be measured. The fourth conven-

¹¹⁶ *Istatistik Yıllığı*, p. 177. Tunaya based on information from the party places the number of votes at 121,353, which is highly improbable. Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, p. 640.

¹¹⁷ *Millet*, April 4, 1946, p. 3. Also Tunaya, *op.cit.*, pp. 63ff.; also my Chapter 1.

¹¹⁸ The party was a coalition of the Liberal Peasants Party, Land, Building Owners Party, Free Enterprise Party, and the Union of Independents.

¹¹⁹ Professor Ethem Menemencioglu, Professor Remzi Oğuz Arık, Cezmi Türk, Tahsin Demiray. Some of the founders were deputy members of the Democratic Party.

¹²⁰ *Türkiye Köylü Partisi*, İstanbul, 1950.

¹²¹ *Cumhuriyet*, December 1, 19, 1955. For information on party convention, see *Cumhuriyet*, December 5, 1955; *Cahiers*, xxxii, 1955, p. 244.

tion of this party held in 1955 proved that except for its idealism the party had in fact little to offer in the way of original political concepts. It did not enter the elections of 1957.

The leader of the party, Tahsin Demiray, appeared to be a liberal humanitarian rather than a political thinker with specific ideas on political issues.¹²² This party cannot be compared with the peasant parties of the prewar Balkans either in size, ideas, or organization. After the elections of 1957 it merged with the National Party and thus ended its existence.

The minor parties, active or dissolved, which were established since 1946, are the following:¹²³

Social Justice Party—established in 1946, still active.

Liberal Democratic Party—established in 1946, still active.

Farmers and Peasants Party—established in 1946, now inactive.

Turkish Social Democratic Party—established in 1946, now inactive.

Turkish Workers and Farmers Party—established in 1946 under the leadership of the late Ethem Ruhi Balkan, it had participated in the 1946 elections and received 16,000 votes, but in the 1950 elections it received only 465 votes.

For the Homeland Only—established in 1946, had fascist tendencies, came to an end in 1952.

Ergenekon Peasants and Workers Party—established in 1946, still active.

Purity Defense Party—established in 1946, dissolved in 1947.

¹²² For an opinion, see his writings: Tahsin Demiray, *Arkada Bıraktığım Küçük İşaret Taşları*, İstanbul, 1955; *Toplum Yapımıza Tarih İçinde Bir Bakış*, İstanbul, 1955.

¹²³ See Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, pp. 693-744; *Siyasi Dernekler*, pp. 183-620 *passim*; *Cahiers*, XXVI, 1948, pp. 252ff.; Rustow, "Politics," p. 93; Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 138; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, pp. 57-75 *passim*.

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- Party for the Defense of Islam—established in 1946, closed same year by the government.
- Service to the Homeland Party—established in 1946, inactive now.
- Idealist Party—established in 1946, now inactive.
- Turkish Development Party—established in 1948, still active.
- True Democratic Party—established in 1948, it merged with the National Party in 1949.
- Turkish Conservative Party—established in 1947, still active.
- Free Democratic Party—established in 1948, now inactive.
- Independent Turkish Socialist Party—established in 1948 by Arif Oruç, known as a leftist in the earlier days of the Republic; it dissolved after his death.
- Land, Building Owners and Free Enterprise Party—established in 1949; merged with the Turkish Peasant Party in 1952.
- Union of Independents—established in 1949; merged with the Turkish Peasant Party in 1952.
- Labor Party—established in 1950, still active.
- Liberal Peasants Party—established in 1950; merged with the Turkish Peasants Party in 1952.
- Workers Democratic Party—established in 1950, still active. It attempted to represent politically the trade unions, but without success.
- Islamic Democratic Party—established in 1951, inactive. Although there had been rumors about a Christian Party, it never materialized.

CHAPTER 16

SUMMARY AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

THE development of the multi-party system in Turkey has been studied in the preceding chapters in conjunction with the various historical, economic, social, and cultural factors which have conditioned it. This development has been generally evaluated in comparison with the democratic multi-party systems in the West. Such a comparison may not bring out properly Turkey's rapid political evolution, which would be obvious if the present stage of development were compared with the situation existing ten or fifteen years ago. However, since Turkey's national goals were set according to Western standards, her achievements and shortcomings must be appraised accordingly.

The Ottoman Empire began its modernization with small reforms in the army which gradually evolved over a century to the point of necessitating the abolition of monarchy, the transition to the Republic, and finally, a multi-party liberal system. The first political party in Turkey, Union and Progress, was established originally as a secret association. Its main purpose was to achieve a limited political reform—to restrict the Sultan's absolute powers and to reinforce the Constitution of 1876. This association, after accomplishing its purpose in 1908, changed itself into a formal political party, but in practice and philosophy it preserved the characteristics of a narrow-minded revolutionary organization.

The other political parties established during the Young Turks' era limited their activities to the pursuit of partisan objectives. The Young Turks accepted parliamentarianism and liberalism as the foundations of the constitutional regime they installed. In practice, however, they continued to mis-

trust the public and its political maturity by refusing to share with the citizens the power they wrung from the Sultan. Reacting to a complex set of socio-cultural factors in which the feeling of inferiority towards the West, the desire for self-glorification, and the dream of restoring the decaying Empire to its old magnificence played equal parts, the Young Turks ended in failure by quickening that Empire's disintegration. The tasks facing the Young Turks, such as the reorganization of a multi-national state torn with struggles for independence and the modernization of a primitive economy almost entirely at the mercy of foreign capital exceeded both their ability and power. The only way out of this chaos was, as the Young Turks saw it, to strengthen the state apparatus and launch a series of cultural and economic reforms to modernize the social and political structure and give it national characteristics. Thus, after a brief period of parliamentarianism, the Young Turks ended in the dictatorship of a small group which fully utilized the state to achieve those ends. The age-old autocratic, leader-worshipping traditions were continued on behalf of the state, which now was sanctified and justified by nationalism. The Young Turks' era, however, had a definite impact on future developments in Turkey. It was in this period that the main ideology of the Republic, nationalism, was defined; and it is also here that secularism and statism, two other fundamental principles of the Republic, began to be applied. Thus, the beginning of a well-rounded cultural and material modernization in Turkey can easily be traced to the Young Turks. Moreover, the Young Turks rendered a valuable service to the Republic by allowing a modernist-minded, lower middle-class intelligentsia to acquire control of government and thus effectively undermine the prestige and power of the monarchy. The Young Turks have been criticized during the past four decades, however, not only for their failure to save the Empire but also

for their extremist policies, and thus their achievements have found no recognition.

The Republic as a regime was the result of a deliberate decision made by a handful of leaders who acquired national stature in the War for National Liberation. Modernization through Westernization became the Republic's supreme goal, and nationalism and secularism were used to implement it. Along with this policy an egalitarian tendency developed which expressed social resentment of the oligarchy of the Young Turks, as well as of the special privileges enjoyed by the Sultan and the ruling classes in the Empire. The predominantly political character of Turkish reform, and the subsequent internal and international political and economic developments, gradually diminished this social resentment and prevented it from pushing the regime to the extreme left—indeed, finally charted its course to the right.

The Republic survived, despite many extremist fluctuations, mainly because it was based on a solid foundation: the sovereignty of the people. It did not explicitly accept democracy as its ultimate objective, but owing to the Republic's intrinsic meaning and to the prevailing liberal political thought which took its essence from the French Revolution, it expected to culminate in democracy. Later, after the regime turned to democracy, it was revealed that its leaders' ultimate purpose had been to institute in Turkey a regime similar to the democracies of the West.

People endured the rigors of a one-party regime and the sacrifices necessitated by ambitious plans for economic development in the belief that the regime would be liberalized and democratized once the survival of the Republic's political and cultural reforms was assured. The Republic's supreme goal was the country's rapid modernization. A strong and stable government animated by a forceful nationalism utilized all the available means to achieve this goal. It initiated an intensive economic development which gradually changed and

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diversified the country's social structure. These socio-economic changes were accompanied by modernist-nationalist indoctrination and a series of cultural reforms, which consolidated the Republican regime and its modern institutions.

The one-party regime and its restrictive, monolithic philosophy in time appeared utterly inadequate to meet the diversified socio-political needs of the society. Indeed, the society had evolved and formed its ideals—whatever the exceptions—in accordance with the liberal ideas of a multi-class society. As a result of the internal socio-political developments and of the victory of the democracies in the second World War, the Republican government felt the need to liberalize somewhat the regime. This decision greatly encouraged the opposition to the government to come into the open, in the form of general demands that the Constitution be reinterpreted liberally and that the regime be readjusted to the principle of the sovereignty of the people. Shortly afterwards the opposition was organized in a political party. A number of people seceded from the ruling Republican Party and formed the Democratic Party. The subsequent struggle between the Republicans and the Democrats—the latter rallied around themselves almost the entire opposition—revolved around the establishment of a truly democratic multi-party system.

Meanwhile, another struggle developed within the Republican Party itself. The younger members of that party, following the liberalization demands on the part of rank and file members, fought and defeated a minority favoring a slow liberalization which would have enabled the Republican Party to retain power for years to come. Although the subsequent liberalization undertaken by the Republicans during 1947-1948 enhanced their popular prestige, it nevertheless did not save them from defeat in the elections of 1950.

The struggle for a multi-party system was not a class struggle; it was carried out by a social coalition apparently animated by one common goal: a desire for change which was defined

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in general terms as democracy, although no common understanding had been reached as to its meaning, except freedom. Even the idea of a multi-party system was not conceived in advance but came to be accepted as a fact after liberalization started and opposition parties were established. The struggle for a multi-party system began in the big cities, but it took its main power from and was concluded in the countryside. Middle-class elements—namely, landlords, professionals, and businessmen—inhabitants mainly of the small cities and towns throughout Turkey, had a leading role in this struggle, unlike the past when the intelligentsia had an almost exclusive voice in political affairs. The peasantry and the workers who were united in complaint against the government and who lent their support to this struggle had no actual representation in leadership. The leaders of the major political parties, after some wavering, finally rejected the idea of establishing the forthcoming political parties of Turkey on the basis of social classes, although the class organization of the society had been accepted as a fact.

Thus the middle class in productive occupations acquired almost exclusive leadership in the struggle. But this fact caused no resentment at that time, since all the social groups seemed to believe that the democracy they sought to establish in common would provide equal social and political benefits for all. This basic idea transcended all party affiliations and class conceptions.

The political struggle which began in 1946 came gradually to define its goals as consisting not merely of a transfer of government from one political party to another without changing the concept of government, but of a desire to bring into power a new political party with a mandate to establish and consolidate multi-party democracy.

This struggle reached its first goal of ending the one-party domination, but not the second; for it did not produce any constitutional amendments and institutions to guarantee the

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survival and consolidation of the multi-party system. The new system was installed by reinterpreting more liberally the same Constitution under which the one-party system had been established. It was hoped that the multi-party system could be consolidated in the future through trial and error. This hope stemmed from the assumption that every politician would act with bona fide dedication to the cause of democracy.

The political parties involved in this struggle appear to have been entrusted with the historical mission of establishing and consolidating democracy in Turkey. It was expected that the political parties to be established subsequently in this democracy could give a more concrete expression and direction to the new socio-economic needs and cultural aspirations of Turkish society. The Republican and Democratic parties and governments which appeared to be the architects of this political reorganization would have been faced with three alternatives after the multi-party regime was firmly established: first, to accept eventual disappearance, like a Constituent Assembly which had finished its mission after having laid the foundation of a new regime; second, to change their own general and conservative-traditionalist program and philosophy into more specific, and socially more representative, policies, in order to suit the country's new needs and thus assure their own survival; or third, to leave unfinished the work of democratization begun in 1946, and to cling to power under various pretexts and excuses.

The Republican Party reformed itself and, after having finished a part of its mission, left the power to the Democrats in 1950 by following the people's decision. The Democratic Party's first and logical objective was to get into power, but its subsequent and most important mission, while changing itself from a movement into a real political party, was to consolidate the new regime and assure its existence. The Democrats achieved their first goal by taking office in 1950 but failed to achieve the second goal since the achievement of

democracy was made secondary to economic development.

Political liberalization not only created security for investors from abroad, but also placed the country among the democracies to be defended and preserved against any aggression. As a result, beginning in 1949 and steadily increasing afterwards, there was a constant flow of credits and economic assistance from the West, especially from the United States. As economic activities expanded swiftly, the importance attached to the multi-party system by the Democrats dwindled to a minimum. Thus, assistance from abroad, while contributing to the country's economic development, served also to neutralize the power of the forces mustered to establish a true multi-party democracy in Turkey. In a way the emphasis laid on economic development by the Democrats arose necessarily both from the promises they made to the peasants during opposition years and also from a complex set of socio-cultural problems, which could be properly met only by increasing economic activity and production. The general living standards in the Republic did not rise very high, but the consciousness of and the demand for a better living, stimulated by cultural-social changes, developed several times faster than the actual standards.

The struggle for a true multi-party system, though it appeared to end in a standstill, produced profound transformations in the country, which, in the long run, guarantee both the survival and the further development of democracy in Turkey. First of all it destroyed the one-party regime and any justification for its re-establishment. The Republican Party had justified its monopoly of power in the past as necessary to carry out, and then maintain, the reforms. It became apparent during the struggle that most of these reforms had been accepted by a majority of the people, and that they could be maintained through the existing institutions without resorting to authoritarian methods, provided that reactionary forces did not gain control over the government.

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The liberalization resulting from the struggle for the multi-party system brought with it political security and respect for the individual, freedom from bureaucratic pressure, and above all a sense of personal participation in government affairs. People regarded the right to vote as one of their inalienable rights and as the most effective means of controlling a government. The theory formulated by the Democratic Party in its convention of 1949 to the effect that a violation of the ballot would entitle the individual to act in self-defense, that is, to rebel, seems to have considerably enhanced the sanctity of the ballot. Consequently, nobody could openly attempt to establish a dictatorship in Turkey without assuming the grave responsibility of inciting internal disorder and unrest. One of the primary purposes of the multi-party struggle was to restrict the state authority by establishing respect for the individual and, by using all the public means available, to achieve his happiness.

The struggle produced a series of changes in political behavior which have made public opinion a strong factor in Turkish politics. The authority of the police has been limited, the "halo" of leadership has disappeared, and the country's leaders now mingle with the people and are often subject to public questioning. (This trend has been reversed recently.) The right to criticize the government is theoretically accepted as the citizen's inherent privilege, because government actions are no longer considered beyond and above the citizens' control. As a corollary, the people's interest in public affairs has sharply increased, as is shown by an increase of more than 300 per cent in newspaper circulation since 1946. The country and the people have evolved, through hardship and experience, to the point of judging a government not only on the basis of its achievements, but also according to the methods used and the price paid for those achievements. Under such conditions, it is extremely difficult for a government to carry out for long a policy which does not conform to the views

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held by the people. All these changes in the individual's thinking and attitudes remind one of the political individualism developed in France after the Revolution of 1789.

The expanded economic development after 1949 gave further impetus to social forces which had brought about the liberalization after 1946. As a result of economic development, national production almost doubled, but the distribution of national income maintained the same unbalanced pattern as in the past. Capital rapidly accumulated in the hands of landowners, industrialists, and businessmen while the wages of industrial and agricultural workers remained low (though industrial workers benefited from the increased employment and from some welfare measures). The mechanization of agriculture led to a subsequent dislocation of tenants and sharecroppers.

Statism in agriculture had been reinterpreted to provide economic support for the farmers. In industry, however, the liberalization trend was soon reversed and the state itself plunged into an ambitious industrialization program with the purpose of meeting the upset in agriculture. This new economic policy was concerned with immediate results and as usual left unsolved, and even untouched, the complex socio-political problems arising from the overnight mechanization of a rudimentary agriculture and the unbalanced distribution of the national income.

As long as there was a steady flow of credits and economic assistance from abroad, the social changes and unrest caused by the fast economic development were hardly noticeable and gave no reason for concern. However, when the credits and economic assistance from abroad decreased, the economic boom dwindled and the effects of an ill-planned development were felt in all possible forms. Political debates acquired priority, and the idea that the first condition for economic development—formulated by the Democrats in opposition years—lay in the proper settlement of the outstanding polit-

ical problems, that is, establishing political security and freedom for everyone, came once more into vogue.

As a result of these economic and political developments, the social classes in Turkey are aligning themselves at the present time in a new coalition for the same purpose which had brought them together in 1946: the establishment of a firmly-based democracy. Some of the ideas and even the leaders of the new alignment are different from those in the struggle after 1946. The intellectuals, animated by socio-cultural goals and backed closely by industrialists, seem to have assumed an important part in this new alignment. The intellectuals were the first to express dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party because it did not realize the political aims with which it came to power and paid only superficial attention to cultural development. These intellectuals, most of whom were brought up under the Republic, are reacting to the pragmatist policies of the Democrats by demanding a new approach to problems. Their alleged purpose is to place the emphasis in politics on the element of reason—the thoughtful, critical mind—and thus replace the emotionalism and conservatism which have become the landmark of politics in Turkey. It is thought that such a mental attitude would not only protect the Republic's modern institutions against reactionary forces, especially against the religious and the extreme conservatives, but would further consolidate them. One cannot fail to see in these ideas a mental yearning similar to the one which produced modern Turkey. Moreover, this coalition envisages the replacement of the last vestiges inherited from the one-party period, such as ideological isolation, false pride and glorification, by a sense of reality to be acquired in open competition and comparison with the outside world. Finally, the basic purpose of the new alignment is to adopt democracy, not as an expedient arising from practical calculations, but as the result of inward devotion to a higher form of political organization and to freedom. Great impor-

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tance is attached to economic development, but in a form which would benefit materially, socially, and culturally the largest number of people. Thus, economic development in Turkey since 1949 has released forces hitherto passive or unaware of their own power and interest, has forced the formation of a realignment, and has rendered irreversible the trend of democracy in Turkey. The mastery of these forces no longer is possible through oppressive policies, but only through humanism, knowledge, wisdom, and vision. The Democratic Party was keenly aware of these developments and in order to assure itself power for another four years decided to hold elections in the fall of 1957 instead of the summer of 1958, that is, before the new alignment took a more definite form. It won these elections with great difficulty, and it may be taken for granted that the party will be defeated in the next elections in 1961 unless it produces a new economic boom or reverts to its liberal policies of 1950 to 1954. The alternative is to liquidate the opposition entirely.

The final factor which guarantees the preservation of the democratic gains made in the struggle from 1946 to 1950 and which paves the way for future development is the attitude taken by world opinion in respect to the democracy of Turkey as the first test-case of political Westernization outside the Western countries. The country's reliance on assistance from abroad for defense and economic development and its membership in the United Nations have rendered this attitude very effective. The influence of world opinion on Turkey became even stronger during the multi-party struggle, when the Turks became aware of the world's approving interest in their country's democratization. Moreover, the Turks in general realize that developments in Turkey have profound influences on the Muslim world, although such influences may not be openly recognized. It is doubtful, therefore, that a government in Turkey can long oppose or reverse the country's trend toward democratization without taking into account the

loss of prestige abroad, which, in turn, would unfavorably affect many benefits, such as economic assistance and favorable publicity stemming from this prestige.

The evolution of Turkey's political regime thus appears in three stages. The first stage consisted of a period which started prior to the Young Turks' experiment and included their era too. It was in this period that political parties, constitutionalism, and parliamentarianism were introduced. The second stage consisted of the one-party rule in the Republic until 1945, which served as a period of political training and prepared the socio-economic foundations for democracy. The third stage, which began in 1946, aimed at the establishment of a multi-party regime on truly democratic bases. The country is still in this stage; it has departed from one-party rule, but has not fully achieved the multi-party regime it seeks. It would be rather premature to volunteer any definite opinion on the final form that democracy may take in Turkey. It may be assumed, however, that it is bound to place—in view of the country's situation—equal importance on social and economic as well as on political democracy. If the experiment in democracy—both social and political—in Turkey fails, the only alternative is to go to extremes; and most likely the extreme right would appear the first choice. Such a course, however, could be chosen only by undertaking great responsibilities, for the country is utterly unwilling to go through another rightist experience. Furthermore, many of the socio-economic problems which need solution could not be tackled by a rightist regime. In short, the failure of democracy in Turkey would prepare the ground for an extremist regime which would be fatal to the country.

The achievement of a real multi-party democracy in Turkey depends on the fulfillment of certain conditions. Some of these conditions would prepare the socio-cultural atmosphere necessary for the survival of a genuine democracy, while others would provide the legal and political safeguards for

its maintenance. First, a consensus and persuasion should be the basis for all political relations. Such a consensus and persuasion would substitute for the idea of force, would affect the government philosophy, and also would favorably influence the society's general philosophy and mentality.

The establishment of a tradition of political thinking with a universal character and long-range goals is a vital necessity for Turkey's political institutions and her democracy. The Ottoman Empire was not able to create such a tradition because it lacked the factors necessary to generate a political ideology and because it rejected freedom of thought. The Ottoman leaders recognized the country's socio-economic and cultural deficiencies, but they rejected basic reforms and clung stubbornly to Islam, conservatism, and social dogma.

The Republic accepted freedom of thought as a basic tenet, but was unable to create an atmosphere in which thinking could freely develop, without having to conform to an officially accepted dogma or social humbug. Two ideologies diametrically opposed to each other prevent the establishment of a culturo-political atmosphere conducive to creative political thinking, if not to thinking as a whole: communism and nationalism, the latter in its excessive form. Both ideologies have transcended their political meaning and serve as outlets to express socio-cultural reactions to the society's transition to a modern stage. Archaic traditions and conceptions are being embodied and defended in politically safe, that is, nationalistic forms, while many new modern concepts are opposed by being depicted as communistic. One appears forced to make a choice between two ideological alternatives presented as "black or white."

The third way must be found, and this way is democracy; it is the combination of progressive socio-economic cultural thinking with political liberalism and national values. To achieve this, communism and nationalism in Turkey must be seen and studied in the proper light, despite their delicate

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and controversial nature. It is necessary, therefore, to prevent progressive and liberal ideas from being labeled communist-inspired. Whatever the external danger of communism, internally Turkish society is strong and healthy enough to withstand an advanced degree of political liberalism. The excesses in respect to communism stem from the fact that the Soviet Union is located in the immediate vicinity of Turkey. The fear of communism and the extreme caution it entails annihilate spontaneity and daring in planning, especially in the social field.

Nationalism, on the other hand, no doubt played a vital part in the establishment of the Republic. It still retains its importance in international relations in preserving national independence. In internal relations, however, nationalism's principal historic mission has ended. It achieved national independence, revived the country's national character, created national consciousness, and started the modernization drive. Having achieved its primary mission, nationalism, which as a whole is based on the past and is conservative, tends to become an obstacle to the individual's cultural and political development, and to modernization as a whole. During the multi-party struggle, there was an official denunciation of the excessive forms of nationalism as practiced during the early periods of the Republic. The new, supposedly mild form of nationalism advocated, was in reality a return to Ziya Gökalp's traditionalist nationalism. This was a move designed to appease the conservative-religious groups whose views have played an important part in the politics of Turkey since 1946. Yet Gökalp's brand of autocratic, totalitarian, leader-worshipping nationalism, which takes its sap from Islam and is based on the rejection of the individual, opposes all that democracy and freedom stand for. Nationalism in Turkey, therefore, should be examined with a view to placing more importance on its patriotic-cultural aspects and less on its political and excessive tendencies. Cultural activities should be promoted

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as such, and not only when and if they conform to the political aims of nationalism. Moreover, the concept of modernization promoted through nationalism must be properly evaluated and analyzed. Can modernization be an abstract goal in itself, or is it the sum total of developments in all the fields of human activity? Does the need for modernization arise from a desire for advanced comfort and prestige, or is it the expression of an inner urge for broader views on the human being and his society? The answer to these questions may settle a great number of problems connected with the establishment of a tradition of political thinking in Turkey. The lack of such a tradition, and the existence of unsolved cultural problems, prevents politics in Turkey from concentrating on ideas and issues. Thus, of necessity, personalities play the main part in political life. The establishment of a true multi-party democracy depends on the people's discriminating choice of leaders; that is, in terms of the leader's real achievements, character, and integrity, rather than merely on his position.

The free discussion and settlement before the public of all problems of national concern is another condition for the establishment of a durable democracy in Turkey. The fear that public discussion on certain issues, in particular social issues, may create antagonism among people, has not been substantiated by facts. For instance, many "explosive" issues, such as religious freedom and trade unionism, have been amply debated since 1946 without causing national disaster. The political maturity of the Turkish people and their national solidarity has indeed advanced to the point where all the outstanding problems can be solved without causing national and internecine dissension. Moreover, there is in Turkish society a sense of order and respect for law such as few societies have, and this will forestall attempts to create unrest. Political leaders and intellectuals accept, in varying degrees, the conditions formulated in the preceding pages for a truly democratic regime in Turkey, but no real attempts

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have been made to realize them, lest the traditional socio-economic balance might be disturbed. In practice, however, the various economic and political developments have already upset this balance and no measures have been taken to restore it.

All political parties in Turkey, in the light of the above explanations, need to complement their programs and ideology in accordance with the country's economic, social, and cultural needs, if the Western democracy they take for a model is ever going to be established. Political liberalism and a multi-party system are generally accepted as prerequisites to the establishment of this democracy. Opinion is divided on statism. Some consider statism as vital for the country, in view of Turkey's special social structure; others reject it, believing that economic liberalism cannot be divorced from political liberalism. No definite view on this issue is formulated in the hope that a solution satisfactory to all can be devised once the multi-party democracy has been firmly established. However, it is obvious that statism is a fundamental question on which every party must take a definite position. It is this position which will give to each party an orientation, a philosophy, and a meaning. So far, political parties have evaded taking a definite stand on it lest they be criticized for liberalism or socialism. Thus a definite stand on statism may give a clear ideological orientation to the political parties of Turkey.

The survival of a political party in Turkey depends, in view of a population still consisting of large groups of people with low living standards, on its ability to formulate its program in accordance with the basic needs of the largest social group. Since the peasantry forms the largest single group, it is only natural that the political parties of Turkey readjust their programs in accordance with the villagers' views in order to secure their votes. The above hypothesis has already been confirmed by the tendency of the existing political parties to solicit the peasants' vote with various short range promises

which, as a whole, are not permanent solutions to Turkey's rural problems. One has to accept the fact that such give-away policies, which benefit only a relatively limited number of farmers, cannot last forever.

The present political parties, although claiming to represent all the social groups in Turkey, in reality are led by individuals who, by mentality and background, belong to the middle class. These parties need, therefore, to enlarge their policy-making bodies by including therein elements from other social groups. If the shortcomings of these political parties (restricted program and leadership) were remedied, the party system of Turkey might function on the basis of general, rather than class, representation. The oft-expressed desire to establish the party system of Turkey on two major political parties, as in the English-speaking countries—without properly studying the special socio-political background of political parties in the English-speaking world—may be carried out only by correcting the shortcomings in the program and leadership of the existing parties, or by allowing the establishment of two major parties, each one representing definite sections of the population. Turkey's need to give new political expression to her pressing social, economic, and cultural problems is made more urgent by the fact that the country is sandwiched between countries which are in the grip of ideological ferment (socialist countries in the north and northwest, and Arab countries in the midst of a religious-national upheaval in the south). To prevent Turkey from going to one political extreme or the other—and suppression of freedom is no solution—one must find a political system satisfactory to all. Democracy and a multi-party system seem to offer the best solution.

The most urgently needed measures for the establishment of a democracy and a multi-party system in Turkey consist of a series of Constitutional amendments. The present Constitution is democratic and individualistic in spirit, but its guar-

antees (institutions, procedures) are inadequate to realize its liberal spirit and maintain political freedom. The National Assembly has absolute supremacy over the Executive and Judiciary. The President is elected by the Assembly but he cannot dissolve it, nor can he control the Premier, who is responsible to the Assembly only. A Premier, if Party Chairman, can control both the party and subsequently the Assembly. This denies, in essence, the parliamentary system of government which the Constitution strives to maintain in appearance. A multi-party system and a democracy cannot function without parliamentary procedure, establishing checks and balances between the government powers. The granting of power to the President to dissolve the Assembly and thus call for new elections, if necessary, and the establishment of an Upper House, appear necessary in order to check and balance the branches of government.

The creation of a Supreme Court with power to judge the constitutionality of laws and the granting of complete immunity to the Judiciary are other urgently needed measures.

The political parties of a country are institutions which unite the people to the government, and in many cases they are the originating legislative body, particularly if the party is in office. Yet, the political parties of Turkey are not recognized in the Constitution. Such recognition is necessary to assure the survival of political parties. The present Constitution embodies republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism as the basic principles of the Republic. They appear as prerequisite conditions for the establishment of a political party. In other words, a political party cannot envisage a program without the above six principles or with new additional principles. Since political parties are bound to have different views, even in respect to the country's regime, it is necessary to delete the above principles from the Constitution. It is, however, also necessary to take measures to prevent a return to the old form of government. (As a mat-

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ter of fact, the Constitution forbids the submission of any proposal to amend the Republican form of government.)

The majority system of elections, although it eliminates the danger of dividing the Assembly into small factions, does not accurately reflect the popular vote in the Assembly. This situation, in addition to being undemocratic, renders the opposition's control of the party in power extremely difficult. Proportional Representation or the fragmentation of the election districts (the provinces) into smaller election districts appear as the best means to remedy this shortcoming, so as to make possible the representation in the Assembly of all ideas and tendencies.

The basic condition for the establishment of democracy, however, is the faith that it is the only form of government under which men can live in human dignity, and a willingness to strive to make it as inherent a part of life as air and food.

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³ Editorials in Turkish newspapers appraise events with critical remarks as well as, at times, intimate information uncovered by the news section of the newspaper. The editorial usually appears at the left corner of the first page. The names of the editorial writers of only Turkey's major newspapers have been mentioned in this study.

The party affiliation of some newspapers changed after 1950 in accord with the trend of thought in the country. Some of these publishers are no longer with the same newspapers.

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