Political Developments in Turkey, 1950–70[1]

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INTRODUCTION

The elections of May 14, 1950, which brought the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti) of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, President and Premier in 1950–60 respectively, to power and sent the Republican Party (Cumhurriyet Halk Partisi) of Ismet Inönü into opposition (it is still there) was the turning point in Turkish political and social life. It set into motion a new process of leadership selection, social mobilization and broader popular participation. Now, twenty years after this memorable political event, one may rightly ask whether the Turkish efforts to adopt first the classical mechanism of European parliamentarianism and then the ideas of social democracy were successful at all. The answer is positive, despite the brief interlude of a military takeover in 1960–61. Instead of restoring a strong régime under one party government, as demanded by some intellectual and bureaucratic groups, the military ended their rule formally in 1961, by adopting a broadly based social and political order and a new constitution.

The success of the Turkish experiment in parliamentary democracy stands in sharp contrast not only to the political régimes in the neighbouring countries but also to most of the Third World. It is true that the present régime in Turkey has been challenged by a variety of leftist and rightist groups, either because it supposedly retards modernization and does not achieve social justice, or because the economic development and the social change it promotes undermine the basic values and the established order in the society. But the régime seems to maintain its vitality.

The purpose of this article is not to provide broad generalizations about Turkish politics but a general and factual analysis of some of the major internal and international developments occurring between 1950 and 1970. Nevertheless, in order to place these developments in proper perspective it is necessary to point out some basic historical and social factors which conditioned, at least in part, the emergence of the current parliamentary régime.

The first factor is a historical one. The Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire not only a strong bureaucratic organization but also a sophisticated political understanding of conflicts and experience in solving them. One may say that throughout the nineteenth century the Ottoman bureaucracy, despite its internal weaknesses, sought to reconcile the social and ethnic conflicts rising from the encounter with, as well as the pressure of Europe, its own traditions of authority and social organization. This tradition was based on the principle that the role of the government was to achieve balance among various forces and interests within the framework of a political system. The social and cultural system on one hand, and the political system on the other, were manipulated in practice as separate entities subject to their own exigencies. The ability of the Ottoman bureaucracy to separate in practice—the theory was rather ambiguous—

the functional and technical aspects of its responsibilities from its cultural allegiances was one of its chief characteristics.

The Ottoman Empire failed to find lasting solutions to its problems in the nineteenth century chiefly because it avoided social ideological solutions which could have tied together separate ethnic, religious and social groups, and could have integrated them into one uniform political system by eradicating, or at least minimizing, their differences. (The Ottoman nationalism of 1839–76 was essentially Islamic, and Turkish nationalism which borrowed elements from the former through a process of desacralization was called—wrongly—secularism. These were ideological solutions which appealed only to small groups and were developed by intellectuals outside the stream of general society.)

The ideological shortcomings of the Ottoman bureaucracy may have prevented it from discerning the economic and social roots of the political and religious conflicts it had to cope with but did not prevent it from seeking some solutions to these conflicts. This experience enabled the bureaucracy to develop new insights into and approaches to the solution of conflicts, notably in learning how to respond realistically to the pressures arising from the social body.

The republican bureaucracy inherited the political experience of its predecessor and applied it successfully when the occasion arose. The adoption and the maintenance of the parliamentary democracy in 1945–50 was one of these major occasions. It developed not so much as the result of a commitment to lofty political principles but mainly as the outcome of a calculated decision to find a practical political solution likely to soothe and eventually to quell the rising social, economic and cultural discontent. It might have been intended as a 'safety valve', as Professor Bernard Lewis put it aptly, but when it worked out it was wholly adopted. Thus, the realistic and practical ability to manipulate power toward objectively defined and achievable goals stands as one of the chief characteristics of the Turkish leaders. Indeed, the political experience of the bureaucracy has been gradually emulated by leaders coming from the society at large. (If the concept of 'national character' were not so badly discredited one may be tempted to say that political and military ability has been a distinct characteristic of Turks as a group in the tribal age in Central Asia as well as in the contemporary period of nationhood.) It must be noted that as early as 1876, the Ottoman leaders viewed the idea of representation as a crucial political device likely to bring problems into the open and provide some clues to their solution through the co-operation of the interested parties. Indeed, the constitution and the parliament of 1876–78, appear to have been rationally conceived political instruments which could provide legal, recognized and formal outlets for articulating social and economic demands, and for solving conflicts. Ironically enough it was the European powers which dismissed this genuine Ottoman political experiment in parliamentarianism, at best, as a 'trick' intended to delay the reforms, and at worst, as a futile imitative effort to borrow a uniquely Western institution doomed to fail in the hands of the Asiatics,[2] though Turks had been on European soil for over five hundred years.

The second factor possibly responsible for the advent and preservation of the democratic system in Turkey is to be found in the emergence of the new middle class groups in the professional, entrepreneurial and service sectors of the economy and in their political outlook. It is true that social

mobility and stratification intensified increasingly throughout the Republic especially after 1931. But the top political leadership remained largely in the hands of the same groups which had been associated in one way or other with the ruling Republican Party and its modernist principles. Thus the conflicts within the Republican Party resulting often in dissent and splinter groups (the Democratic Party formed in 1946 was one of them) did not stem from some fundamental disagreement over the principles of the Republic but rather in group disagreements. It is in this framework of formal and often imposed allegiance to Republicanism and all that it entailed, that new cadres of leaders were formed among the agrarian, professional, entrepreneurial and labour groups with middle-class values. Eventually, with the establishment of opposition parties in 1945–46, these acquired the power positions in various political parties or organized themselves as pressure groups but without having sufficient numerical strength or ideological arguments to demand exclusive control of the system as a whole. Having developed vested interests in the existing political system which provided them with status and benefits, these new groups strove to preserve it against any challenge.

The economic development and the uneven distribution of income, as well as a series of cultural and social developments occurring after 1946, dislocated the bureaucratic and intellectual groups from power positions and, at the same time, provided them with new arguments, such as the need for rapid modernization, the establishment of an egalitarian scientifically-minded society, to justify their claim for power. Such ideas and claims were both a challenge and inspiration for the new middle-class groups, for it enabled them not only to assess more realistically their positions in society but also to borrow and implement some of the social ideas advocated by their opponents. The years between 1946 and 1959 may be regarded as the period in which the new groups emerged fully and acquired political supremacy, while the period between 1959 and 1965 may be regarded as the period of internal change in the leadership of the political parties and the acquisition of a new welfare philosophy by the same.

The third factor responsible for the durability of the Turkish democratic system is the self-generating intellectual activity created and maintained by political freedom. Even the most radical intellectuals, though opposed to the formal representative institutions and political parties, regarded the freedom of expression and debate as an inherent part of modern existence, and seemed determined to preserve it. Nurturing this attitude from underneath there is a process of intellectual, social and psychological revitalization far too complex and subjective to be treated with any justice in a few introductory sentences. Such a treatment would involve, first, an accurate, unbiased evaluation of what religion, that is Islam, was for the government on one hand and the ordinary Turk on the other, and what it has become today for both of them. It would call also for a lucid appraisal of the secularist reforms in Turkey and their actual impact on the Turks' inner life.

This writer finds himself at odds with most of the views expressed on Islamic reformation in Turkey, chiefly because he views religion not only as an historical fact, a body of laws, a dogma, a philosophy of life, a theological commitment, but chiefly as the spiritual evaluation of social situations which determine at some psychological level man's view of

himself, of others, and of society in which he lives. It is this latter aspect which concerns us here. The religious reforms in Turkey did not change Islam for they were not intended to do so, but aimed at preparing the foundations for a new form of existence. Obviously these generated a series of inner conflicts between faith and reason, the self and the society.

The secularist reforms and the crisis they created did not compel the Turk to seek salvation in another religion but forced him to reassess his entire individual and collective existence on several levels of experience. It produced on one hand alienation and on the other a frantic search for a new definition of his identity *vis-à-vis* his own past as a Turk and a Muslim but also as a member of a universal society which was the new dimension of his identity. All this resulted in inner conflicts and tensions hardly detectable on the Turks' grave and composed face and studied reserve. The freedoms achieved in democracy gave these inner tensions vitality and dynamism through unbridled expression which is the essence of freedom if not of humanity itself. The health of the soul, as Voltaire expressed it, is the freedom to think and write. It is in this atmosphere of freedom that the inner crises and conflicts, the clash between allegiance to one's historical identity and that nebulous yearning for being modern, did not become self destructive but found channels for creative expression. On the surface every principle, every tradition and norm was challenged and criticized including secularism, reformation, westernization, nationalism and religion. But from somewhere deep within there emerged a new modern Turk endowed with a new vision of himself and the world. If democracy has created nothing but this type of man in Turkey, then it was worth the effort.

THE RULE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The events which generated the transformation described above could be traced to the early days of the Republic or to the formal acceptance of opposition parties in 1945–46. But it was during the Democratic Party's rule in 1950–60 that their impact was fully felt. The party acquired government power through elections in 1950, as mentioned without any difficulty, though some four generals loyal to Ismet Inönü, President in 1938–50, offered their unsolicited assistance to retain him in power if he so desired. Inönü turned down the offer, possibly aware of the fact that some other lower-ranking officers, such as Fahri Belen and Seyfi Kurtbek, dissatisfied with the one-party rule had pledged, on behalf of their own secret organization, support to Celal Bayar.

The Democrats' rule began with promises of constitutional amendments and institutional innovations necessary to consolidate democracy. They promised to uphold all the reforms of Atatürk and to refrain from resuscitating any controversy over past events. However, they abandoned soon their promises and began to criticize the Republicans' policies since such criticism seemed to create, at the beginning at least, some sympathetic reaction among the public. The Democrats soon became concerned with their own power and attempted to consolidate it by depriving the Republicans of some privileges obtained during the latters' unopposed rule from 1923 to 1950. The buildings of the People's Houses, which were still registered as Republican Party property, despite a proposal to transform

the Houses into a cultural foundation, were confiscated on behalf of the treasury.[3] A few of these were handed to the *Türk Ocakları*, (Turkish Hearths) the old nationalist organization which had been re-established in 1949. The virtual abolition of the People's Houses was regarded by the reformists as an attack on Atatürk's reforms, despite the fact that the Houses had accomplished their initial goal of disseminating the Republic's nationalist secularist principles, chiefly among the urban intelligentsia. The religious liberalization which began (actually it started under the Republicans in 1947) with the permission to read the *ezan* (call to prayer) in Arabic was followed by additional educational measures intended to teach Islam and to train a modern clergy.[4] All this was accompanied by an upsurge of the Islamic sects and of religious practices in the countryside, which occasionally took reactionary forms and led even to attacks on Atatürk's statues.[5] The religious revival, which showed some vehemence at the beginning, exhausted its momentum by 1954, but without inflicting lasting damage on the basic republican modern character of the state. After 1954, the discussions on Islam, despite sporadic ominous reactionary undertones, seemed to concern themselves chiefly with the role and place of religion in the individual's life and the freedom of worship in a democratic régime rather than with the contradictions likely to arise between Islam and a secularist political régime. Religion certainly had a part, though a diminishing one, in party politics. The Republicans had their share of responsibility in it, for their local organizations were occasionally as responsive as the Democrats' to the people's wish for religious freedom.

The real meaningful issues debated during the Democrats' rule stemmed from their economic policy. The military aid from the United States, which began in 1947, was coupled with economic assistance after Turkey was admitted to the Marshall Plan in 1948.[6] By 1950 the initial allocation of 100 million dollars to Turkey was increased to 233 million dollars, especially after Turkey joined the United Nations forces in Korea with a brigade of about 5,000 men who, notwithstanding heavy casualties, achieved a brilliant record on the battlefield. Eventually the assistance from the United States, as well as aid from the consortium of European Powers, reached a total of about five billion dollars by 1968, a third of which was economic and the rest military aid. The change of government certainly had helped trigger the generosity of the United States which hoped to make Turkey, planted on the southern flank of the Soviets, a model of democracy and free enterprise.

The identification of Turkey with the Western political and economic philosophy and policies was further enhanced after the country joined NATO in 1952, and was thus formally insured against outside aggression.[7] It was due partly to this assurance against foreign pressure that the Democratic Party government could concentrate all its efforts on internal domestic political development. The Democrats' liberal economic policy, implemented for about two years after 1950, gradually reverted to statism. However, in contrast to the one enforced in 1931–45, this statism had different economic–political goals, for the state assumed a major role in developing the entrepreneurial middle classes, though outwardly economic development regardless of the cost or method seemed to be Menderes' chief goal. The state invested heavily in cement, sugar, power plants and construction industries while trying to promote private investment

through generous credits to the farmers, tax exemptions and special treatment accorded to foreign capital.

The total investment in 1950 stood at 1 billion liras or 9·63 per cent of the gross national product. The investment in 1953 went up to 2,087 million liras and 12·41 per cent, and in 1960 it reached 7,779 million liras or 15·89 per cent. The gross national product which stood at 28,491 million liras in 1950 (at 1961 factor prices) went up to 49,941 million in 1966, and 49,213 million in 1967, while *per capita* income increased from 1,181 liras in 1950 to 1,469 liras in 1961.[8] (The exchange rate for the dollar went up from 2·80 to 9 liras in 1958.) But the price index, which was 100 in 1950, reached 263 in 1960. The population, on the other hand, went up from 13,648,270 in 1927, to 18,790,174 in 1945, and then to 27,754,820 in 1960, and to 31,391,207 in 1965.[9]

Meanwhile the percentage of the rural population decreased from 78·3 in 1950 to 71·2 per cent in 1960, while the share of agriculture in the national income went down to 42 per cent in 1961; industry's share climbed up from 16 to 23 per cent. But the yearly foreign trade deficit, which was 22 million dollars in 1950, went up to 162.8 million dollars in 1961. Recent studies indicate that the real national income of Turkey, after approximately a 6 per cent increase in 1950–53, slowed down to about 3 per cent annually until 1961, and resumed growth afterwards. The government provided ample credits, machinery and subsidy prices to farmers; actually the real benefit went to a small group.[10] Nevertheless, the economic activity in the rural areas, spurred by intensified communication through an excellent road programme, water projects and a variety of other works, and further enhanced through the abolition of controls and intense political activity left their impact on the peasantry. The Turkish villager began to change rapidly his living habits and thoughts as he gained confidence in his own value and asked for opportunities to better his life not as a favour of the rulers but as his birthright.[11] Many of them migrated to the cities in search for better fortune and caused there a wide range of social and political problems.

The economic development which had started under rather auspicious conditions created a measure of welfare which was reflected in the national elections of 1954. The Democrats won 504 seats, the Republicans a bare 31 places and the small Nation's Party just 5 seats.[12] The electoral victory induced the Democrats to accelerate further the economic development through inflationary policies. The growing budget deficits, inflation, and the depreciation of the currency, all of which were already visible in 1953, took their toll. The inflation hurt the salaried groups by lowering their living standards. The price mechanism was disrupted and the markets lost their normal exchange functions. The price of imported goods soared. All this brought in turn unproductive government controls and red tape which stifled the economy and caused a misallocation of resources resulting in a general deterioration of the economy.

There emerged in Turkey in 1950–59, from the lower urban groups and semi-rural towns, a small group of capital owners along with a larger group of aggressive entrepreneurs with a rather superficial liberal view of economics. Many of these became associated with the ruling Democratic Party, often as chairmen or members of its local executive boards. This was, in fact, the new middle class of Turkey which together with their families formed about 10–15 per cent of the total population in 1960, and

about 25 per cent in 1970. Political power gradually passed into their hands. Meanwhile the upper economic and landed families, which had joined the Republican Party during its one-party rule and benefited from its statist policies, began to accuse the rising groups of corruption, political opportunism and, naturally, religious reaction. The younger members of this group and the sons of the bureaucrats eventually formed the intellectual nucleus which produced the organized opposition to the Democrats after 1954.

Economic policy became subject to political controversy. The Democratic Party government, crticized for its unplanned economic policy, reacted by imposing restrictions on the press and the opposition.[13] The attempt by some Democratic Party deputies, led by Fevzi L. Karaosmanoğlu to oppose the dictatorial tendencies of Celâl Bayar and Adnan Menderes at the party convention in 1955, were of no avail, as was the revolt within the Democratic Parliamentary Group. Shaken briefly, Menderes regained control of the party and liquidated his opponents. Meanwhile the dissidents formed the *Hürriyet Partisi* (Freedom Party) in 1955, under Karaosmanoğlu's leadership, but had limited success for they failed to establish branches in the countryside and develop a popular philosophy.

The conflicts among politicians were in fact the symptoms of much deeper social unrest, as indicated by the riots of September 1955, in Istanbul. The gathering which started as a demonstration to protest against the Greek designs on Cyprus soon turned into a devastating show of social animosity. Hundreds of shops mostly belonging to Greeks, but also property, especially luxury goods, owned by Turks, were destroyed while the police watched helplessly. The government apparently had planned the demonstration for political reasons but without realizing that it could serve as an outlet for releasing the accumulated social tension. The opposition asked unsuccessfully for an investigation. However, later in 1961, at the Yassıada trials the Democrats had to account for these destructive riots.

The Democrats began to show clear evidence that they distrusted the intelligentsia, the military and the bureaucracy as the supporters of the Republican Party, and did not hesitate to condemn system, organization and intellect as their means of power. The most formidable opponent of the government was the press. It emerged as a dedicated supporter of democracy and played a major role in spreading political information. The total number of newspapers increased from 131 in 1950 to 506 in 1960, and the total circulation went up from about 300,000 in 1945, to over 1·4 million in 1960.[14] The number of published books which stood at an annual average of about 2,600 in 1936–50, went up to over 4,100 in 1960.

A truly modern Turkish literature was born after 1950, in the atmosphere created by social tensions, political debate and relative freedom of expression. The literature, written mostly in colloquial Turkish, was social in character and represented the views of the lower-class intellectuals and reflected the infinite problems and aspirations of all other groups, including the peasantry.[15] All these combined to teach the population the benefits of a true democracy while the new rulers, like their old predecessors, continued to regard the citizens as ready to acquiesce to their orders simply because they, the rulers, represented the *devlet*, that is, the state, and considered it to be the sum of all human virtues.

The tension between the ruling Democrats and the Republicans increased after the elections of 1957. The Republicans had elected 178 deputies as against 31 in 1954, while the Democrats lost seats and votes; their total popular vote was in fact below the combined vote of the opposition. Although the Democrats won the elections largely because of the majority system, they had lost considerable popular support.[16] Actually considerable support for the opposition came from those Democrats who opposed the growing dictatorial tendencies of their party leaders. These were the new middle-class groups who regarded the maintenance of a free and democratic system as the guarantee of their own power and safety.

Finally, the government, seeking to recapture its popularity and with considerable prodding from creditor countries, accepted to stabilize the economy, after receiving a new foreign loan of about 300 million dollars. The ensuing relative economic stability, however, had no effect on the political struggle. The opposition regarded the loan as having given the Democratic Party government a new lease of life and consequently began to accuse the West of indirect interference in Turkey's domestic affairs. Eventually, the criticism acquired ideological dimensions as the leftists described the entrepreneurial and business groups as the agents of the Western economic interests and as promoters of capitalism, and of subservience to imperialism. Meanwhile the Republican Party, encouraged by its success in the elections, absorbed the Freedom Party,[17] and then tried to form a united opposition front. The Democrats launched in turn a new organization, the *Vatan Cephesi* (Patriotic Front) in order to attract the uncommitted voters. The relations between the two parties worsened to the point of physical clash in the Assembly and in the country, especially after the Republicans defied the ban and held mass meetings. The confrontations reached a climax when the Democrats tried to use the military to stop Inönü, a venerated figure among the military, from entering the town of Kayseri. This was a political blunder since the military flouted the order and thus dealt a demoralizing blow to the government's authority. Undaunted by this ominous rebuff, the Democrats finally established, in April 1960, an Inquiry Committee with absolute powers to investigate the 'seditious' activities of the opposition in order to prevent it from involving the army in politics and eventually to reassert the supremacy of law and order.[18] The major goal seemed to be the muzzling of the opposition and the press. Inönü, protesting against these measures, declared that 'when conditions are complete, revolution becomes a legitimate right for the nation, for the citizen begins to think that no other institution or way exists to defend his rights'. He pointed out that Turkey had had to fight for a long time to transform the revolutionary Republican régime into a democratic system, and warned the Democrats that their attempts to establish a repressive régime would unavoidably lead to a revolution. 'We cannot be involved in the revolution', he declared; 'such a revolution will be carried out by outsiders who have no relation to us.'[19] Inönü's speeches were banned but the underground printing shops formed overnight circulated them widely. Leftist and other radical groups which had been neutralized either by police controls or the unwillingness of the opposition to collaborate with them joined the underground movement. They provided some leadership and especially the ideological guidance, the effects of which became clearly evident in the debates after the revolution.

Meanwhile the government's efforts to quell the student demonstrations failed, for the army refused to fire on or even arrest the demonstrators. The universities were closed and martial law was imposed, only to be followed by the War College cadets' silent march in Ankara; the army was clearly on the side of the demonstrators. Already the retiring Commander of the Ground Forces, General Cemal Gürsel, had advised the Minister of Defence to take a series of political measures designed to restore calm and order. Instead Menderes, with his characteristic flamboyance, made new speeches threatening to crush whatever opposition was left.[20] The tight curfew imposed on the large cities, the martial law, the police controls had created a common front against the government mainly in the major cities. The atmosphere for a violent change was thus prepared; the question was its timing.

THE MILITARY IN POLITICS

The military took over the government in a few hours early on May 27, 1960.[21] The War College cadets in Ankara and a few units in Istanbul constituted the core of the *vurucu kuvvet*, the *force de frappe* of the revolutionary organization. Power was in the hands of the *Milli Birlik Komitesi*, the Committee for National Unity headed by General Cemal Gürsel. The military in a communiqué explained the takeover as an action aimed not at any special group but at preventing internal dissension. They promised to hold elections soon to choose a new government and pledged to respect Turkey's foreign policy commitments.

A group of professors summoned to Ankara to provide advice on the future policy and on the drafting of a new Constitution, issued a declaration justifying the revolution.

> It would be wrong [they stated] to view the situation [military take over] . . . as an ordinary political coup. . . . The political power that should have been the guardian of civil rights, and that should have symbolized the principles of state, law, justice, ethics, public interest, and public service had . . . become instead a materialistic force representative of personal influence and ambition and class privileges. . . . The state was transformed into a means of achieving personal influence and ambition . . . [and, therefore,] the political power ended up by losing all spiritual bonds with the true sources of state power, which reside in the army, its courts of justice and bar associations, its civil servants desirous of demonstrating attachment to their duties, and in its universities . . . it descended into a position of virtual enmity toward the basic and essential institutions of a true state and also toward Atatürk's reforms. . . . The situation was the same from the viewpoint of legitimacy. The legitimacy of a government is . . . [derived from] its ability to exist as a rule of law. Instead the government and political power had kept formulating new laws totally contrary to the constitution, and then had proceeded to utilize these laws to violate the constitution. It had also engaged in activities without the benefit of any law. . . . We look upon the action of the Committee of National Unity in arranging for the administration to be taken over by state forces and institutions as a measure dictated by the imperative need to re-establish a legitimate rule so as to redress a situation in which social institutions had been

> rendered virtually inoperative, in which the people were led to anarchy . . . and in which there was being exerted a conscious effort to destroy all the ethical and moral foundations required to support such institutions.[22]

The professors' statement resembled the old *fetva* through which the Şeyhulislam had given religious sanction to government acts, including the change of power. It symbolized in a way the changes in philosophy and group alignment in Turkey. The university, more in form than essence, appeared as the epitome of science and progress, and the professors as the high priests of modernity and democracy, whose pronouncements could turn might into right and revolutionary deeds into legal acts. The university and the intelligentsia had replaced the *meşihat* (Şeyhulislam's office) and the *ulema* respectively, and performed now their functions in the investiture and legitimization of authority. But developments in the next decade were to blow apart these vestiges and postures of the past.

The professors justified the revolution by emphasizing the destruction of the state order at the hands of an interest group, that is the new middle class. This view contrasted sharply with the military's assertion that the revolution did not aim at any social group. The revolution was actually a social upheaval of utmost importance. It represented the natural reaction of the traditional ruling groups around the state to the emergence of a diversified type of civilian order in which group interests dominated. It is symbolic that the opposition to the Democrats began first in 1953, at *Mülkiye* (School of Political Science) known now as Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, and that the revolution was carried out by the *Harbiye* (War College). These two institutions represented the main locus of early modernization in Turkey, and were the channels through which the power élites were recruited in the early days of the Republic. (The same had been true in the nineteenth century.) The Democrats, the first truly civilian administration in the history of Turkey, chosen by the people, had failed to find the proper balance and relationship between the old and new groups and thus doomed themselves to failure. But now the modernist elites had become the 'old', and the entrepreneurial middle class groups the 'new' élites of Turkey.

The background of the revolutionary organization proves the point that the revolution was caused in good part by group conflicts.[23] The first secret military organization established in 1954–55 came out as a means to safeguard the military's social and economic status and to protest against the ascendancy of business groups and countryside politicians. Waiting for a long time, the revolutionaries were seeking a propitious time for action, which finally materialized in 1960, through the Democrats' repressive measures. The initiative in establishing the secret organization and in carrying out the revolution fell on colonels and majors, whereas the generals who assumed leadership afterwards played limited roles. The members of the secret association, except for a vague agreement to hold an early election, could not decide on a common ideology, or on the policy to be followed after assuming power.

The military administration went rapidly into action. The Committee for National Unity, composed of 38 officers, abolished the Constitution of 1924, and assumed 'legal' powers under a self-drafted Provisional Law of June 12, 1960.[24] It liberated the political prisoners and re-established

freedom of press and assembly. Executive power was left to the Council of Ministers which, though composed mostly of civilians, followed the instructions of C.N.U. The military arrested the Democratic Party ministers and deputies and banned all political activity. They detained in a camp the landlords associated with the Democrats, established committees to investigate the source of wealth of the newly enriched families, and dissolved the executive committees of the Chambers of Trade and Industry, the pressure institutions of the business groups.

The revolution's social motives became more evident when General Gürsel, the President of the Republic and head of C.N.U. declared that Turkey needed social reforms and that 'socialism' could be regarded as a possible avenue for development. Gradually the military began to propose long-range plans for economic and social development. Some intellectuals and the press advanced first cautiously the view that parliamentary democracy based on political parties and dominated by various interest groups was a slow process which could achieve neither rapid progress nor social justice.[25] The attacks on the parliamentary régime were supported by two groups in C.N.U.; the nationalists headed by Colonel Alparslan Türkeş and the social-minded following Orhan Kabibay and Orhan Erkanlı. The attacks eased when Inönü stated emphatically on behalf of the Republican Party, which was inactive but potentially the only organization capable of assuming power, that the military rule would be temporary and that the return to the parliamentary order through election was an irreversible process.

The struggle within C.N.U. was fought between those who wanted social reforms under prolonged strong rule and those who defended an early return to a civilian democratic order. The conflict was solved when the fourteen most outspoken advocates of reforms and strong government were ousted on November 13, 1960, and assigned to overseas posts. The action paved the way for return to a civilian rule but did not solve the problem of social reforms.

The military had already undertaken a series of measures, and passed altogether 125 laws supposedly to correct the Democrats' errors and speed the society's modern progress. Among these measures the most important ones were the literacy programme, the establishment of a State Planning Organization, the founding of Turkish Cultural Societies (this was a new name for the People's Houses, which was used until 1963), the university reform which led to the summary dismissal of 147 university professors, the programme to rejuvenate the army according to which about 7,000 officers were retired, and finally the revamping of the High Court of Justice in order to try the ousted Democrats.[26]

The above measures, passed hurriedly and without much preparation, expressed on one hand a yearning for social reform and on the other reflected nationalist ideas. The spirit and manner of execution of some of these measures, besides contradicting the military's professed allegiance to democracy, affected also directly the interests and views of various intellectual and entrepreneurial groups. All this finally combined to undermine the enthusiasm for prolonged military rule and strong government. Indeed, such a rule appeared as a strong possibility after a group of about 67 senior field officers formed their own council to speak for the armed forces. It was this group which spoke on behalf of the military and imposed itself on the C.N.U.[27]

Meanwhile the economy, subjected to rigorous controls and beset by incertitude, came to a standstill. The entrepreneurial groups after a brief hesitation began to exercise growing pressure on the government by sending missions to Ankara, by using the press to air their discontent and opposition, and especially by refraining from investment. On the other hand, the workers, now over a million strong, while in favour of welfare measures, showed little interest in a strong rule by the military or the intellectuals. The peasantry and the lower-middle classes, passive at the beginning, started to display signs of unrest at the danger of prolonged strong rule. Faced with this opposition the military had to pass laws in order 'to protect the reforms of May 27', and to reaffirm their promise of re-establishing civilian rule.[28] It was evident that the social structure of Turkey had become so diversified and interests and attitudes so complex as to make impossible the return to the élitist-monolithic order of the past.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC

The military revolution of 1960, although not intending to do so, destroyed the vestiges of the old order and permitted the new middle class to gain additional political and social power through a new constitutional order. It also liberated the social forces from the hold of surviving traditionalism and gave them the freedom to act according to their power and interests. Constitutionalism, parliamentarianism and liberalism, that is the traditional values of the middle class, became the political credo of the new order.

The return to a civilian order began with the convening of a Constituent Assembly on January 6, 1961, to draft a constitution.[29] The 292 members of the Assembly, the majority of whom belonged to the Republican Party or were its sympathizers, were chosen by political parties (the Democrats were expressly left out), universities, bar associations, trade unions, etc. The Constituent Assembly worked on two constitutional drafts: one prepared by an Istanbul committee, the other by *Mülkiye* or the School of Political Science in Ankara and came out with a compromise text. The debates in the Assembly revolved basically around the proposals of a younger group to give a predominantly social and statist orientation to the new régime, and the demands for a liberal parliamentary régime and economic freedom defended by the large majority consisting of the established interests.

The final constitutional text which was approved in the referendum on July 9, 1961, began with a preamble expressing faith in national independence and progress as inspired by Turkish nationalism, in the rule of law and social justice, and ended by entrusting the constitution to the citizens' custody.[30] Article 2 of the Constitution defined the Turkish Republic as being a democratic, secular, social state based on the recognition of human rights. It defined the legislature, that is the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, as consisting of a Senate with 150 members elected for six years and 15 appointed by the President, and a National Assembly composed of 450 members elected for four years. The joint houses choose the President for a seven-year term. The Executive, which could include ministers outside the Parliament, was made subject to legislative controls. The judiciary was granted full independence and immunity. A High Court of Judges decided on all matters connected with the personal status of the

magistrates while the newly established Constitutional Court judged the constitutionality of all statutes. Individual rights and freedoms were guaranteed by easy access to courts, checks on the Executive, and recourse to the Constitutional Court.[31]

The Constitution called on the government to achieve social justice and rapid economic development while recognizing extensive liberties for the individual, and granting freedom for private enterprise, and security for property. Thus, it strove to define future goals and set up political standards for achieving continuous political development rather than placing in a legal strait-jacket the existing Turkish structure.[32]

The constitution-making process was accompanied by the gradual association of the Republican Party with the military government. The military expected the Republicans to win the forthcoming elections, and by assuming government responsibility to pursue its own policies. All this prompted the former supporters of the Democratic Party to rally against the Republicans, and implicitly against the military. Thus, when the ban on political activity was lifted early in 1961, the opposition was there all but in name. The *Yeni Türkiye* (New Turkey) party of Ekrem Alican, an economist, and later the *Adalet* (Justice) Party of the late Ragıp Gümüşpala, a retired general, were supported mainly by former Democrats, often the brothers and relatives of those being tried at Yassıada for the violation of the Constitution.[33] The trials ended on September 15, 1961; fifteen people were condemned to death and the remaining to various jail sentences ranging from a few months to life terms. Of those condemned to death only Adnan Menderes, Hasan Polatkan, the former Minister of Finance, and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the former Foreign Minister, were hanged, despite insistent internal and external pleas for clemency. Adnan Menderes had been a hero, now he was made a martyr; to assure the victory of any party opposing his accusers was a duty incumbent on his followers. Nevertheless, the trials did provide a practical lesson to future politicians, for it brought a government before the public to account for its deeds; an event without precedent in Turkish history. But it also opened a profound political wound.

The parliamentary elections held on October 15, 1961 in complete freedom reflected all these influences. Despite the military's moral support and the fact that it was opposed by newly-formed parties, the Republican Party could not win the necessary electoral majority to form an independent government. It had a plurality in the Assembly while in the Senate the Justice Party had a majority. The election for the Assembly used proportional representation, while a majority system was used to elect the senators. Consequently three successive coalition governments were formed in 1961–64, all under the premiership of Inönü.[34] The military, after an initial attempt to nullify the election agreed to a civilian government under Inönü, provided that the laws passed by the revolutionary officers would not be annulled and that no vindictive action would be undertaken against them. General Cemal Gürsel was elected President, while Ali F. Başgil, the candidate favoured by the Justice Party, withdrew under pressure.

The first coalition formed in collaboration with the Justice Party, despite great differences of opinion and personalities, represented a political compromise overshadowed by mutual fears of military intervention. Nevertheless, this was a civilian government. Soon, however, the

economic liberalism and the proposal to liberate the jailed Democrats as put forth by the Justice Party conflicted with the Republicans' statist views and irritated the military who were too sensitive to any action likely to impair the legitimacy of the revolution. The government and the Parliament became impotently deadlocked only a short time after the intensive reformist activities and the ideological discussions in 1960–61 had opened new intellectual, social and economic vistas requiring swift action.

The intelligentsia, disappointed by the failure of the political parties to endorse the social and economic reforms proposed in 1960–61, turned against the parliamentary régime and condemned it as unsuitable to Turkey's need for rapid progress. In the Parliament itself the opposition accused the Republican Party of using the military to maintain their own power and of conveying the impression that it was the army that delayed the full establishment of a civilian rule. The Justice and New Turkey parties insisted on the supremacy of the national will, the Parliament, the Constitution, and the freedom of political parties. These discussions, widely reported by the press, stimulated further the ideological currents in society already in the making since the revolution.

The Marxist current, represented by the *Isçi Partisi* (Labour Party) to fall one year later after its establishment in 1961, under the leadership of Mehmet Ali Aybar, a former university professor, and a variety of other less socialistic organizations were countered by nationalist groups and associations. The ideological disputes were basically confined to the intelligentsia and did not exercise much influence among workers, peasants or business groups. Formally all groups accepted Atatürk as the founder of modern Turkey and vowed allegiance to his reforms. In practice, however, Atatürk's ideas were interpreted and often distorted according to one's particular viewpoint. To the modernist, secularist school of thought *Atatürkçülük* (Ataturkism or Kemalism) meant a mixture of ideas related to future reforms and a rejection of policies not approved of.[35] To the socialist, Kemalism meant a strong statist-collectivist régime, while for the few intellectuals siding with the new middle classes it was liberalism and freedom of enterprise. The confused ideological atmosphere, indeed proved suitable to extremist actions as indicated by the abortive coups of Colonel Talat Aydemir in 1962 and 1963, which intended to bring about a strong, supposedly reformist, régime but which in reality was a rightist dictatorship. The coups were unsuccessful, first because the commanding echelons among the military remained loyal to Inönü, and second because the army as a whole wanted to stay out of politics, especially since its interests were safeguarded by a series of laws and measures enacted in 1960. Aydemir's trial and execution, in 1964, produced no reaction.[36]

Actually, by 1964, the chances of democracy in Turkey appeared brighter than the above analysis may indicate. Most of the jailed Democrats, including many of those condemned to life terms, were quietly released, largely through the President's clemency powers. The economic plans for development undertaken with the advice of the State Planning Organization, established in 1960, seemed geared to produce, if stability were restored, an annual economic growth rate of more than 6 per cent. The Planning Organization, after an initial effort to acquire extra-parliamentary powers, submitted to political controls and began to promote the idea of a mixed economy through its publications and was

instrumental in establishing the idea of a rational planned economy.[37] The five-year plans (the first was adopted in 1963), although encountering difficulties because of shortage of foreign currency, were nevertheless successfully implemented. In fact, experts conceded that the Turkish economy had some basic strength, that private capital was accumulated, that managerial skill had developed but it had been handicapped by adverse psychological and political conditions. But the intelligentsia still affected by its élitist view on authority could not accept and learn to live with a new middle class which controlled the party organizations and much of the economy. In fact, some did not hesitate to indicate the Ba'th Party of Syria as the model to be followed. The new middle class in turn, accustomed to associate the military and the intelligentsia with absolute government, could not fully accept that these groups too had their special social and cultural roles. Nevertheless, the uncompromising attitude shown by the two groups against each other in 1961–64, became somewhat more flexible after both had undergone some change. The intelligentsia gradually discredited itself, as did the academics, through their utopian schemes of development, the defence of strong government, the meaningless rhetoric and especially the embarrassing lack of practical understanding of society and the human being.[38] In the Justice Party itself the extremist nationalist group was defeated by the moderate majority which was willing to accept the political realities of Turkey and learn to live with them. The debate taking place within the Justice Party was concluded in the party convention of December 1964. The anti-militarist extremist group headed by the incumbent chairman, Saadeddin Bilgiç, a doctor from Isparta province, was defeated by an almost two-thirds majority by those supporting Suleyman Demirel, a former high government official born in a village in the same province as his opponent. Demirel slowly distinguished himself as one of the most capable men to appear on the Turkish political scene for a long time. Under his direction the Justice Party and eventually the government achieved a *modus vivendi* with the military and broadened further the sphere of political and economic activity as indicated further.

THE COALITION GOVERNMENTS AND THE JUSTICE PARTY RULE

The first coalition government under Inönü's leadership was formed, as mentioned, between the Republican and Justice parties in 1961. It dissolved in June 1962, largely because the partnership seemed to erode the latter's popular support. The assumption proved to be right. Inönü formed his second coalition in association with the New Turkey Party and the Republican National Peasant Party. However, in the municipal elections of November 17, 1963, N.T.P. lost almost half of its votes, mostly to the Justice Party, and hurriedly abandoned the coalition in a futile attempt to regain its popularity. A third coalition formed by Inönü with the other minor parties in January 1964, lacked vitality. The economy, though somewhat improved in comparison with the situation in 1960–61, still stagnated. Consequently, even its most rabid opponents appeared resigned to a government by the Justice Party which behind the scene exerted profound influence on the public. Meanwhile the public image of the Justice Party improved considerably through the election of Suleyman Demirel as chairman in the party convention held beginning November 30, 1964. Demirel was brought to the chairmanship of the party primarily

because of his proven administrative capability and political moderation, and because he symbolized by background and achievement both modernity and national authenticity; he came from a Turkish village and achieved technological reputation as an engineer of water-works. Under his chairmanship, the professionals, technicians, and the moderate elements interested in political stability and economic development gradually acquired the upper hand in the party organization by replacing the agrarians and some of the diehard former Democrats. The military and sections of the intelligentsia, though still suspicious of the Justice Party, welcomed the change in the leadership as a repudiation of the anti-militarist extremist and reactionary views, and as a step closer to their own modernist–secularist stand.

Demirel faced a series of conflicting demands. He had to devise a policy within his own party which would satisfy the entrepreneurial, business and professional groups' demands for political security and stability necessary for investment and economic development but without alienating the right wing, as well as those desiring to rehabilitate the condemned Democrats. Moreover, he had to placate the military as well as a variety of intellectuals, all too prone to read reactionary or vindictive motives in Justice Party decisions. Demirel had also to preserve the loyalty of the rank-and-file, notably the peasantry, who out of interest or conviction or sheer sentimental attachment expected the Justice Party to follow the Democratic Party's policies and rehabilitate its leaders. But most important of all he had to achieve control of the government and acquire some charisma. He achieved both by toppling the Inönü cabinet through the rejection of the budget law. Inönü resigned early in 1965, and a new coalition government was formed under the premiership of Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, elected as an independent. The new coalition was based on the Justice Party (Demirel was Deputy Premier) and the New Turkey Party and two other minor parties.

The campaign for the forthcoming elections, to be held in the autumn of 1965, appeared as a struggle chiefly between the Republican and Justice parties. The Republican Party, various supporters of the revolution of 1960, including the intelligentsia, seemed to have united merely with the purpose of preventing the Justice Party from securing an electoral majority sufficient to form a cabinet by itself. While heading the coalition government, the Republican Party had allowed considerable freedom to the Labour Party and various leftist organizations, partly because of constitutional obligations, but chiefly with the hope that the leftists would take away the Justice Party's rural support; in the process the Republicans lost their own best young leaders to the Labour Party. An amendment to the election law introduced a cumulative system supposedly to help strengthen the minor parties but actually to weaken further the Justice Party's electoral chances.

The effect of all this was just the opposite; the Justice Party appeared as the victim of the old ruling groups while the intelligentsia and even the Republican Party appeared unwilling to abide by popular will. The Justice Party capitalized on these issues and in the elections held October 10, 1965, it won a comfortable majority in the Senate and the Assembly and formed an independent government under Demirel's premiership. The party received its support mostly from villages, labour and the lower urban groups, while the Republicans were supported by upper urban groups, the

intelligentsia, bureaucracy, and scattered regions in the East and South-east, and Central Anatolia.

It is interesting to note that prior to these elections the Republican Party revised its programme in order to give broader representation to social ideas and make it a party 'left of the centre', *ortanın solu*. This shift to the left, which was fully exploited by the Justice Party, cost the Republicans considerable votes. It also exacerbated the differences in the Republican Party between an ideologically oriented small group in the national party organization and two other groups: the moderate statists, some of whom were influential in the central bodies, and the larger groups in the country branches favouring a somewhat more liberal economic policy. The conflict in the Republican Party eventually came into the open, and the moderate statists under the leadership of Turhan Feyzioğlu, a former professor, seceded and formed the *Güven* (Trust) Party in May 1967. The actual control in the Republican Party remained in the hands of İsmet Inönü, the chairman, and his Secretary General Bülent Ecevit, a former newspaperman.

The Justice Party policy in 1965–69 was conditioned on one hand by the need to promote economic development and achieve social justice and on the other to do away with the lingering effects of the revolution of 1960, that is, to pardon and rehabilitate the condemned Democrats. The economic development, which resulted in a mean annual growth of about 7 per cent, was criticized by socialists as favouring the businessmen and entrepreneurs whom they labelled as 'the stooges of Western capitalism and imperialism', as well as by the liberals who found it laden with cumbersome government controls. Actually the economic policy followed generally the constitutional principle of a mixed economy, that is, the joint use of the economic means in the hands of the government and individuals to promote general welfare and social justice. The leftist organizations which arose mostly among university students, teachers and some professionals, subjected the government to vehement attacks by claiming that its economic and social policies were complete failures. The fact is, however, that the steady increase of production and employment, and a visible qualitative change in the life of town and many village dwellers, made these attacks ineffective as far as the bulk of the population was concerned. But some of the student boycotts and demonstrations, as well as the clashes between leftists and rightists, which tended to go beyond the university campuses, and initially were intended to create difficulties for the Justice Party achieved their goal. The party vacillated between a firm conviction that in a liberal democratic régime all liberties should be freely exercised and the fear that certain groups may abuse this freedom to promote their own anti-democratic ends. The ultimate hope seems to rest in a self-binding sense of civic responsibility.

The relations of the Justice Party's government with the military after 1965 were far smoother than expected. The election of General Cevdet Sunay as President upon the incapacitation and death of Cemal Gürsel in 1966, was considered by the military as an act of good faith. Sunay, as Chief of Staff, played an important role in saving the parliamentary régime in 1961, and was instrumental in securing better conditions for the military. The government improved further the material conditions of the officers and refrained from interference in strictly military matters while displaying the traditional reverence for the army. Yet for a long time it was not able

to solve the main problem on which the military and the Justice party seemed diametrically opposed: the complete amnesty of the Democrats. These, including former President Celal Bayar, had been released from jail but were deprived, under a constitutional clause, of their political rights. It seemed that a group in the Justice Party, mostly the politically rightist and economically liberal group formed around the former chairman Saadeddin Bilgiç, wanted to make the full rehabilitation of the Democrats the issue for capturing the party chairmanship. Moreover, the former Democrats, notably the octogenarian Celal Bayar and his ageing disciples, seemed more than interested in acquiring some position in the Justice Party which they regarded as their own usurped inheritance. Inönü and his Republican Party capitalized on this situation by introducing, just before the elections of 1969, a proposal to amend the Constitution and rehabilitate the Democrats. The amendment was accepted in the Assembly but was stopped in the Senate by the Justice Party largely because of the military's opposition. The amendment was duly passed after the elections without causing any reaction from the military.

It must be mentioned that the debates revolving around the use of religion for political purposes, which seemed to have been a major difference between the Republican and Justice Party in 1961–64, gradually lost their importance. Except for a handful of old-time secularists, very few people seem to be interested in indulging in such polemics. Finally, prior to the elections of 1969, the Republican Party decided not to invoke the issue in its election campaign since it apparently did not affect the electorate one way or other. Instead, it stressed the need for social and economic reforms through statism, which in the context of Turkish historical experience implied strong government controls, and the supremacy of an intellectual bureaucratic élite. At the end the Republicans grudgingly acknowledged the existence of a new entrepreneurial middle class and adopted some measures specifically designed to attract them. It is important to note that despite some social measures such as the right to strike and collective bargaining favourable to labour enacted by the Republican government in 1963, the workers still backed the Justice Party. Apparently they preferred political freedom to statism, though the latter was potentially more favourable to them.

The economic development in 1960–69, and the social and cultural transformation which accompanied it, have changed considerably the nature of the political issues as well as the voters' attitudes in Turkey. Accounting for this change are material and cultural factors, such as the increase in the rate of urbanization, which reached more than 25 per cent in 1960 and 31 per cent in 1965, the literacy rate which went up to 48 per cent (actually the enrolment of school-age children is over 90 per cent), the intensive communication, the exposure of workers in Europe—most of whom come from villages and lower urban groups—to new ideas and modes of life, and the rise of new professional and service groups. (See appendix.) Meanwhile the rate of employment in industry and the income derived from industrial and service occupations have increased much faster than those in agriculture.

These basic changes do not seem to have impressed sufficiently the existing political parties since most of these appear to be more concerned with maintaining the *status quo* rather than adjusting to change. In fact, the surge of various leftist currents, first among the well-to-do intellectuals

and lately among some labour and other urban groups, can be attributed to the inability of the major political parties to evaluate these changes and give them an intellectual and practical expression in their own programmes and attitudes. The Republican Party, as mentioned before, revised its programme, supposedly with the purpose of making it more responsive to the new conditions. Actually the revisions did not stem from a realistic appraisal of the Turkish economic and social realities but from tactical considerations designed to capitalize on the social ferment and win votes. The party speakers, headed by the Secretary-General, used the slogans of class warfare, notably in the campaign for the municipal election of June 1968, with the ardour of professional revolutionaries. This approach attracted some of the Labour Party followers but did not secure the Republicans substantial popular support. The Republicans were instrumental in the beginning in stirring up and supporting the student demonstrations in the hope of paralysing the government. They also obstructed much of the legislative programme of the government party. But these unorthodox tactics caused considerable friction in the party, while the Marxists attacked the Republicans for degrading socialism and for utilizing the radical tactics of the left for their own conservative ends. Finally, many leftists turned against the party as being ideologically unsuitable for creating the 'new society'. All this had a moderating effect on the party's policies and forced it to scale down its attacks on the régime; the Secretary-General had proclaimed that *bu düzen değişmelidir* (this order must change). At the same time the Labour Party, the chief exponent of Marxism, all too prone to produce ready-made slogans to explain the society's transformation, gradually alienated itself from the mainstream of thought. After considerable activity it was torn apart by internal struggles among its own groups; the intellectuals, the trade unionists and the 'authentic' revolutionaries, that is, those who claimed seniority in starting the leftist movement in 1946. The latest conflict broke out after the party chairman criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The Justice Party's understanding of the changes in the country which it promoted and generalized was rather superficial and ambiguous. Like its predecessors, the Democratic Party, it accepted material change as an inherent part of modernization but refused to acknowledge the social and cultural adjustments necessitated by the same change. It clung stubbornly to the notion that the peasants and the lower urban groups have a permanent fear of the urban, intellectual and bureaucratic élites and that this fear would make them vote for the Justice Party as long as the Republican Party lasted. The party alienated a large part of the intelligentsia by its condemnation of the ideologically formulated social ideas as being leftist or quasi-subversive, and by its lukewarm attitude towards the rightists. Moreover, it tended to overemphasize the danger of military takeover and to keep alive the resentment caused by the revolution of 1960, which was latent among some of its followers. Most important, however, is the fact that the party failed to keep up with the intellectual development, the aspirations and the broader political philosophy of its main leadership group: the élites of the new middle classes. The *yeminliler* (sworn) group in the Parliament, made up of the younger members of the party, usually from the larger urban centres, advocate a social and economic policy based on broader popular participation, while the rightists and the conservatives prefer a very liberal economic policy, strict control of the

ideological parties and the maintenance of the grass-root character of the party. Suleyman Demirel, often siding with one or other group, contained the struggle until the last elections held on October 12, 1969. These elections were won by the Justice Party due to an amendment of the electoral law which abolished the cumulative vote. The party won 256 seats for the Assembly (out of a total of 450), but its popular vote fell from 52·9 per cent to 46·60 per cent. The Republican Party also increased its seats, while the extreme left and right were practically liquidated as far as their parliamentary representation was concerned. Of the six minor parties only the Trust Party won enough votes to form a parliamentary group. For all practical purposes Turkey returned to the two-party system as the two major parties, the Justice and Republican, accounted for 74 per cent of the popular vote and 88·7 per cent of the parliamentary seats. (See appendix.) Even in the past, despite the special provisions favouring the small parties, the pattern did not vary greatly. Probably the most important trend revealed by the elections was the gain made by the Republican Party in the traditional strongholds of the Justice Party in the South-west, that is the main centres of the new middle-class groups. It seems that this group has begun to look upon the programme and the overall intellectual level of the Republican Party as being more congenial to its own level of development and expectations, especially after the party rid itself of its borrowed radicalism and extreme leftist postures. The new cabinet formed by Suleyman Demirel did not include those ministers (Saadeddin Bilgiç, Mehmet Turgut, Faruk Sükan, Cihat Bilgehan and Hasan Dinçer), in the former cabinet considered to belong to the right-conservative wing of the Justice Party.

FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1954–70

The foreign relations of Turkey reflected the internal developments and were affected by the same.[39] After a rapid and total involvement in the Western policies in the Middle East in 1947–60, Turkey gradually tried to disengage partially in order to consolidate her regional relations and to adjust to the conditions likely to be created by the East–West *détente*. Moreover, as her economy developed, Turkey attempted to improve her economic relations with the Balkan countries, and later, after the June war of 1967, with the Arab countries by supplying the latter with some commodities and household goods. Though Turkish foreign policy remained basically pro-Western, nevertheless it acquired increasingly independent postures, especially after the Cyprus dispute, renewed in 1963, brought about a critical confrontation between what the country considered to be her national interest and her commitment to international alliance.

We have mentioned above foreign relations in 1947–52. It remains to survey those in 1953–69. The Balkan alliance with Greece and Yugoslavia signed in August 1954, following a friendship treaty enacted one year earlier, aimed chiefly at strengthening the position of Tito after his break with the Kremlin in 1948. Though it opened at the beginning tantalizing possibilities, it was not pursued to its logical conclusion. The Geneva talks between the United States and the Soviets in 1955, having produced a reduction of tensions, and the Russians and the Yugoslavs having achieved an understanding, the tripartite Balkan pact lost its meaning. The relations of Turkey with the Arab world worsened after 1952, because of Turkish total commitment to Western foreign policy. The still un-

healed wounds caused by the annexation of Hatay in 1939 were reopened when Turkey recognized Israel in 1949, and then out of deference to her Western allies refused to support some Arab causes. A brief attempt at rapprochment with the Arabs in 1955 failed when its real motive, that is the involvement of the Arabs in the Western defence system, became evident. The Baghdad Pact of mutual assistance, concluded on February 24, 1955, between Turkey and Iraq, and joined later by Great Britain, Iran and Pakistan, was the principal factor which spoiled the relations between Turkey and the Arab nationalist régimes. Though the pact members mediated successfully in the Suez Canal dispute of 1956, this did not improve Turkey's standing among the Arab bloc headed by Egypt. On the other hand, Turkey maintained friendly relations with the monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq. However, the destruction of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958, led to the expected withdrawl of this country from the Baghdad Pact. The latter was renamed Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and turned gradually from a military and political alliance into a regional organization for economic co-operation between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.

The real test of Turkey's foreign relations and dependence on the West came through the Cyprus dispute. It began in 1954/55, in the form of Greek Cypriot demands for independence and *enosis*, unity with Greece. Turkey claimed that any final settlement on Cyprus should consider the fact that the island lay only 43 miles from her coast, and that over 100,000 Turks lived on it. The dispute was eventually settled in 1959/60, but not until the relations between Turkey and Greece, both members of NATO, reached breaking point. The agreements of London and Zürich, concluded first between Turkey and Greece and joined later by the United Kingdom and Archbishop Makarios in 1959/60, led to the independence of Cyprus under a special Constitutional arrangement based on the communal organization of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish community was granted the vice-presidency and 30 per cent of the seats in the Parliament and civil service. Internally each community decided its own affairs. In December 1963, Makarios proposed a series of constitutional amendments which, if accepted, would have deprived the Turkish self-governing community of its political rights and transformed it into a minority. The proposals were rejected and Makarios' irregulars attacked the Turkish Cypriot communities in order to force upon them the rule of the Greeks who now viewed themselves as a majority. Turkey reacted by threatening to intervene as she was entitled by a special Treaty of Guarantee signed in 1960. Greece also declared her readiness to oppose the military actions of Turkey and claimed that prior treaty agreements had lost their validity. The Greeks seemed to have accepted the settlements of 1960 as the first step leading to the incorporation of Cyprus into Greece. The archaic idea of Greater Greece which had marred relations between the two countries for a century and a half was thus revived along with all the medieval religious prejudices and abusive propaganda which the Greeks had used against Turkey in the past. The Cyprus issue came before the United Nations which sent a peace-keeping force to the island in March 1964, but without being able to restore peace or safeguard fully the safety and properties of the Cypriot Turks. The United States, while opposing several times Turkey's decision to land troops to protect the Cypriot Turks, claimed to maintain a neutral policy even though this 'neutral' attitude

favoured the Greeks who, assured that the Turks would be prevented from landing, proceeded to annihilate the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Meanwhile Makarios had already entered into negotiations with Egypt to secure arms, and in September 1964 received a promise of aid from the Soviet Union. Turkey found herself with no support from her Balkan or Middle East neighbours or the new nations of Africa and Asia. The West seemed to have failed Turkey in an issue which had a profound symbolic and historical significance for her. Moreover, subtle pressures, including withholding of economic aid to force Turkey into compromise, increased the antagonism to the United States. Finally, in 1964, President Johnson wrote a rather ill-considered letter to Inönü, who was still the Premier, which, when made public, turned popular opinion against the U.S.A. Consequently the neutralist feeling and the reaction against total commitment to Western foreign policy which was already evident after the revolution of 1960 gained ground rapidly. The reaction was nurtured further by the intelligentsia's social resentment, since economic aid from abroad seemed to have strengthened the new middle class in economic occupations and helped the Democrats and the Justice Party maintain themselves in power. Yet, when Turkey joined the European Common Market in 1963 as an associate member, an event of profound long-range consequences, there was little opposition to it except from the radical left.

Meanwhile, feeling isolated and relatively insecure as a consequence of the Cyprus dispute, Turkey began to move towards some sort of accommodation with the Soviets after she had rejected for a decade promises of help and renewed friendship. The claims on the Straits had been renounced by the Soviets long ago as being a Stalinist aberration. In November 1964, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Cemal Erkin, visited Moscow, the first man of his rank to do so in 25 years. Later, Parliamentary groups, prime ministers and the heads of state exchanged visits, and several trade and technical assistance agreements were signed. The Soviet–Turkish thaw enhanced also the position of the leftists at home who became an important factor in Turkish domestic politics despite their division into Maoist, Soviet, Turkish revolutionist and anarchist groupings.

The Arab–Israeli War of 1967 provided Turkey with a chance to better her relations with the Arabs by supporting various U.N. resolutions. Though relations with Israel have cooled considerably, Turkey has refused to become involved in the dispute. Relations with the United States seem to be relatively stable now after some adjustments in Turkish–American treaties have been made. The government and the major opposition parties endorse generally the pro-Western alliance including membership of NATO. Nevertheless the press and the students persist in their anti-American campaign.

Turkey has over 400,000 workers in European countries, who provide a substantial portion of her foreign currency, and is a member of several economic and political organizations. She has become an integral part of the European system, though some say more as a tolerated poor client than an equal ally. One cannot envisage at this time any drastic changes in Turkish foreign policy so long as the domestic régime lasts. It is, however, natural and expected that in the near future Turkey would play some important part in the Middle East as well as in Soviet–Chinese relations. Her geographical position, historical ties and military power makes her a natural candidate for such a role.

APPENDIX

MAJOR INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT*
(*Thousands*)

Indicators / *Years*	*1927*	*1935*	*1940*	*1945*	*1950*	*1955*	*1960*	*1965*
Population (000)	13,648	16,158	17,821	18,790	20,947	24,065	27,754	31,391
Net national income (Factor cost, 1948, million TL)	4,449	6,111	7,690	5,942	9,098	12,334	16,677	20,926
Per capita income (Factor cost, 1948, TL)	328	378	431	316	434	512	601	667
Urban population (000) (Centres over 10,000)	2,236	2,684	3,203	3,442	3,872	5,324	6,999	—
Urban population (per cent of total)	16·4	16·6	18·0	18·3	18·5	20·9	25·2	—
Radios (000)	—	29	78	176	321	999	1,341	2,443
Newspapers, Magazines	—	149	338	336	647		1,658	1,722
Highways (km)	22,053	39,583	41,582	43,511	47,080	55,008	61,542	—
Railroads (km)	4,637	6,639	7,381	7,515	7,671	7,802	7,895	9,301
Literacy (as % of total population)	10·7	19·6	22·4	29·2	33·5	40·7	43·7	48·0

* The sources for these statistics are the Yearbooks and the relevant publications of the Turkish Institute of Statistics, Ankara, issued in 1927–65. For reasons of space they have not been included here.

CHAIN INDEX NUMBERS OF MAJOR INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT

	1927	*1935*	*1940*	*1945*	*1950*	*1955*	*1960*	*1965*
Population	100·0	118·4	112·9	105·6	111·5	114·9	115·3	113·1
Net National Income	100·0	137·4	125·8	77·3	153·3	135·6	135·2	128·8
Per capita Income	100·0	116·0	114·1	73·3	137·4	120·3	117·2	110·9
Urban population	100·0	120·0	119·3	107·5	112·5	137·5	131·5	
Communications and Mass Media								
Radios	—	100·0	269·8	225·3	186·2	311·2	134·3	182·1 (1963)
Newspapers and Magazines	—	100·0	226·8	99·4	195·2		256·3	103·9
Transportation								
Highways	100·0	179·5	105·0	104·9	108·2	116·8	111·9	
Railroads	100·0	143·2	111·2	101·8	102·1	101·7	101·2	117·8
Literacy								
As % of total population	100·0	183·2	114·3	130·4	114·7	121·2	107·6	109·8
Literate population	100·0	216·7	126·0	137·4	109·7	162·4	124·1	124·2
				(1946)	(1950)	(1954)	(1957/60/1961/65)	
Political participation	insignificant			100·0	119·1	99·2	86·7/105·7/100·5/87·6	

	1950	*1954*	*1957*	*1961**		*1961*	*1965*	*1969†*
Eligible votes	8,905,743	10,262,063	12,078,623	12,747,901		12,925,395	13,679,753	14,692,581
No. of votes cast	7,953,085	9,095,617	9,250,949	10,321,111		10,522,716	9,748,678	9,380,860
% of participation	89·3	88·6	76·6	81·0		81·4	71·3	63·8
Trust Party								577,026 (6·42)
Democratic Party	4,241,393 (53·3)	5,151,550 (56·6)	4,372,621 (47·3)					
Freedom Party			346,881 (4·0)					
Nation Party	250,414 (3·1)						582,704 (6·3)	294,655 (3·3)
National Movement P.								278,220 (3·1)
Justice Party						3,527,435 (34·8)	4,921,235 (52·9)	4.184,814 (46·6)
New Turkey Party						1,391,934 (13·7)	346,514 (3·7)	202,042 (2·7)
Peasant's Party		57,011 (0·6)	350,597 (3·8)					
Republican National P.		434,085 (4·8)	652,064 (7·0)					
Republican Peasant's National P.						1,415,390 (14·0)	208,696 (2·2)	
Republican Peoples P.	3,176,561 (39·9)	3,161,696 (34·8)	3,753,136 (40·6)			3,724,752 (36·7)	2,675,785 (28·7)	2,465,554 (27·5)
Turkish Labour P.							276,101 (3·0)	238,741 (2·7)
Union P.								228,586 (2·54)
Independents	383,282 (4·8)	137,318 (1·5)	4,994 (0·1)			81,732 (0·8)	296,528 (3·2)	508,733 (5·7)

POST REVOLUTION – (NEW CONSTITUTION, BROADER REPRESENTATION)

* Constitutional Referendum.

† Unofficial results excluding Hakkari province.

Sources: 1950–65 Milletvekili ve 1961, 1964 Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üye Seçimleri Sonuçlari (the Results of 1950–65 Deputy Elections and the Senate Elections of 1961, 1964), State Institute of Statistics, Ankara, 1966.
Cumhuriyet, Oct. 15, 1969 (Istanbul).

NOTES

1. Several articles by this writer dealing in detail with some of the issues treated in this general analytical survey have appeared elsewhere. See 'Political Developments in Turkey and Their Social Background', *International Affairs*, June 1962; 'Society, Economics and Politics in Contemporary Turkey', *World Politics*, October 1964, etc.

2. See Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, Baltimore, 1963.

3. By 1950 a total number of 478 People's Houses and 4·322 People's Rooms (founded in villages after 1940) were established throughout Turkey. The Houses had the following branches of activity: language and literature, fine arts, drama, sports, social assistance, adult education, library and publications, village welfare, museum and cultural exhibits. Kemal H. Karpat, 'The People's Houses of Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, Winter–Spring, 1963, pp. 31–44.

4. Howard A. Reed, 'Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, VIII (1954), pp. 267–82; 'The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara', *The Muslim World*, October 1956, pp. 295–312, January 1957, pp. 22–35; 'Turkey's new Imam Hatip Schools', *Die Welt des Islams* IV (1955), pp. 150–63.

5. G. Jäschke, 'Die Heutige Des Islams in der Türkei', *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol. VI, 3, 4, 1961, pp. 185–202.

6. Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic*, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, pp. 138 ff., 180, 209.

7. Nuri Eren, *Turkey Today and Tomorrow*, New York, 1963, pp. 236 ff.

8. *The First Five-Year Development Plan*, Ankara, 1963, pp. 14–15.

9. Orhan Türkay, *Türkiye'de Nüfus Artışı ve Iktisadi Gelişme*, Ankara, 1962, p. 8; also *Economic Developments in the Middle East* (United Nations Report) New York 1955–62; *Istatistik Yıllığı 1963*, Ankara, 1963, p. 42; *1965 Genel Nufus Sayımı*, Ankara, 1965, p. 3.

10. William H. Nichols, 'Investment in Agriculture in Underdeveloped Countries', *American Economic Review*, May 1955, p. 64.

11. For change in the economic life and the political outlook of peasantry, see John F. Kolars, *Tradition, Season and Change in Turkish Village*, Chicago, 1963, p. 108 ff.; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, 1958.

12. K. H. Karpat, 'The Turkish Elections of 1957', *Western Political Quarterly*, June 1961, p. 459.

13. The election law was amended several times in order to limit the election chances of the opposition. The province of Kırşehir was 'punished' by being reduced to a district seat, for it supported the Nation Party. The press restrictions were so heavy that by 1954 the International Press Institute in Vienna cited Turkey as a country infringing upon the freedom of communication. Later the government passed a law to retire judges at an early age.

14. K. H. Karpat, 'Mass Media', *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (R. Ward and D. Rustow, eds.), Princeton, 1964, pp. 255–82.

15. For a literary sample, see *Literary Review*, June 1960, and *Middle East Journal*, Winter–Spring 1960.

16. Inönü described these elections as the 'proof of the country's progress and of the salvation hopes in the future The people have asserted consciously that the régime is theirs. The people are acting as an umpire with common sense over political disputes and violent debates', *Muhalefette Ismet Inönü* (S. Erdemir, ed.), Istanbul, 1959, p. 2.

17. *1958 de Inönü* (C.H.P. Publication), Anjara, 1959.

18. *Resmi Gazete*, ♯10484, April 19, 1960.

19. *Milli Birliğe Doğru* (S. Erdemir, ed.), Ankara, 1961, p. 151. The book is an anthology of documents and speeches; see also *Ulus*, April 19, 1960.

20. *Milli Birliğe*, pp. 101–38.

21. See the military's statement in *Ulus*, May 28, 1960. Two days later the military expanded further on the basic ideas in the communiqué. *Vatan*, May 29, 1960 See also Walter F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution 1960–61; Aspects of Military Politics*, Washington, D.C., 1963.

22. Turkish text in *Milli Birliğe*, pp. 319–20; English text in *News From Turkey*, May 30, 1960, pp. 6–9; and Kemal H. Karpat, *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*, New York, 1968, pp. 307–9.

23. See *Milliyet*, May 27–July 14, 1962. Abdi Ipekçi-Omer Sami Coşar, *Ihtilâlin Içyüzü*, Istanbul, 1965.

24. *Inkilâp Kanunları*, Vols. 1–2, Istanbul, 1961, pp. 17–21.

25. Menderes' statement in 1957 that each city district had 15 millionaires was

repeatedly cited as an outrage to social justice and as an indication of Democrats' corruption.

26. *Inkilâp Kanunları*, pp. 367, 382.

27. In fact some claim that the rivalry among the C.N.U. and the council of officers speeded the return to a civilian order. The members of C.N.U. had resigned from the army and lost effective control of troops.

28. Law number 6 of June 30, 1960, *Resmi Gazete* ♯10539.

29. See *Kurucu Meclis Kanunu* ♯158 of December 13, 1960; also *Encyclopedia of Islam*, under *Dustur*-Turkey, p. 644 (new edition).

30. The texts are in Rona Aybay, *Karşılaştırmalı 1961 Anayasası*, Istanbul, 1964.

31. In the constitutional referendum of the 12,749,901 eligible voters, 10,321,111 cast their ballots: 6,348,191 were in favour, 3,934,370 against the Constitution. For various interpretations, see Ismet Giritli, 'Some Aspects of the New Turkish Constitution', *Middle East Journal*, Winter 1962, pp. 1–17; also Nuri Eren, 'Turkey: Problems, Politics, Parties', *Foreign Affairs*, October 1961, pp. 95 ff.

32. A questionnaire, *Anayasa Komisyonu Anketi*, Istanbul, 1960, according to reliable information was hardly used. The Constitution has a series of serious weaknesses, such as accepting the former members of Committee for National Unity as lifetime senators in a system based on popular vote. For critical views on Constitution, see Ali Fuad Başgil, *Ilmin Işığında Günün Meseleleri*, Istanbul, 1960, p. 86–131.

33. The accused included 17 ministers and the President, and about 379 deputies. See Hasan Halis Sungur, *Anayasayi Ihlâl Suçları ve T.C.K. 146ci Maddesi Hükümleri*, Istanbul, 1961, pp. 7 ff., 318–23, also *Yassıada Broşürü*, Istanbul, 1960, pp. 22 ff.

34. See Kemal H. Karpat, 'Political Developments in Turkey', also René Giraud, 'La Vie Politique en Turquie apres Le 27 May 1960', *Orient* 21, 1962, pp. 21 ff.

35. *Atatürk 'çülük Nedir?* (Yaşar Nabi, ed.), Istanbul, 1963; also *Çeşitli Cepheleriyle Atatürk* (Conferences delivered at Robert College), Istanbul, 1964.

36. Frank Tachau and Halük Ülman, 'Dilemmas of Turkish Politics', *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1962*, Ankara, 1964, pp. 21 ff.

37. See *Planning in Turkey*, Ankara, 1964; *Capital Formation and Investment in Industry*, Istanbul, 1963, pp. 150 ff.

38. *Öncü*, April 20, 1962.

39. On foreign policy of Turkey, see Hikmet Bayur, *Türkiye Devletinin Diş Siyasası*, Istanbul, 1938. L. V. Thomas and R. N. Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1951, D. A. Rustow, 'Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic', *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (Roy C. Macridis, ed.) Englewood, N.J., 1958, pp. 295–322; Richard Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic*, Cambridge, 1963, pp. 162–89; Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, *Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası, 1919–1938*, Ankara, 1963; *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1947). See also *Turkish Foreign Policy* (K. H. Karpat, ed.) forthcoming.