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Negotiating an Institutional Framework for Turkey's Marshall Plan: The Conditions and Limits of Power Inequalities

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One contribution of the 'cultural turn' in Cold War scholarship has been to rethink the limits and conditions of agency attributed to societies, nation-states, and social groups. Scholars writing from this perspective have challenged the static story of the Cold War between two power blocs defined by rigid binaries such as strong/weak, big/small, dominant/subordinated. Arguing for a context-dependent analysis of power asymmetries, they have unraveled many randomly told stories of the Cold War in the peripheries as well as in the center.¹

The cultural turn in the Turkish case has proved relatively difficult, particularly because of the limited access to Turkish official archives and also the Turkish state's strict control over information about bilateral relations.² This essay aims to overcome such epistemological obstacles and present a more critical analysis of Turkish-US relations by focusing on the case of the Marshall Plan (1948-52). Acknowledging the power discrepancies underlying the donor-recipient relationship, I propose to explore the limits of control and the possibilities of resistance on the part of American and Turkish officials involved in the development and administration of the Marshall Plan projects.

Most analyses of Turkey's Marshall Plan portray American officials as a homogeneous group of individuals who undertook US aid projects either to benevolently assist Turkish modernization or to further US expansionism in the Middle East. Most scholars assume that Americans dictated the terms of the modernization projects as a result of the US preponderance of power or insofar as Turkish patronage politics allowed.³ In contesting this prevalent assumption, I specifically explore how the historical dynamics of US overseas expansionism intersected with the geopolitical priorities of the US administration to generate deep

conflicts among US officials during the early Cold War. As such divergences of opinion interacted with contemporaneous Turkish diplomatic strategies, power asymmetries were bent and twisted, creating limited realms of resistance and control on the part of Turkish officials.⁴

In advancing these arguments, I first illustrate that although officials of the US State Department and the Marshall Plan authority (ECA) viewed Turkey's modernization as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, they diverged on the ways in which Turkey should be modernized. I then turn to the short history and organizational features of the Turkish State Ministry responsible for the implementation of the Marshall Plan projects, and specifically discuss the ways in which divergent perspectives of modernization held by US officials played into the hand of the Turkish governments.

The Marshall Plan (1948–52): A Brief Historical Overview

The Marshall Plan was one of the US foreign assistance programs launched after the Second World War. It provided \$13 billion worth of US assistance over the course of four years to sixteen Western European nations so that they could achieve financial stability, contain domestic communist activities, and move away from the Soviet Union's political influence.⁵ The assistance projects were administered by the European Cooperation Agency (ECA), which acted as a liaison between the US and European administrations in undertaking various modernization projects in the recipient nations.

For the ECA, Turkey differed from other Marshall Plan recipients because of its 'semi-Oriental' features. In fact, ECA staff occasionally refused to implement certain projects in Turkey, asserting that the country lacked the necessary infrastructure that would ensure the success of these projects with other European recipients.⁶ Most US policy-makers also believed that it would require more than the Marshall Plan to achieve sustainable economic growth in Turkey. However, the financial costs of assisting Turkish economic modernization were considered less than the political gains of containing communist regimes in the Near East. The Soviet Union made territorial demands over the Turkish Straits and northeast Anatolia in 1946, and Moscow Radio jammed the Turkish airwaves to broadcast the official Soviet line.⁷ Isolating Turkey from European reconstruction would have therefore been detrimental to both the US and Turkey's oil-rich neighbors. In the end, the US administration granted Turkey \$349.02 million from the Marshall Plan. These funds were used to finance the construction of roads, agricultural

mechanization, and various training projects on economic productivity and industrial management.⁸

The Marshall Plan projects were interpreted on the receiving end through historical as well as contemporaneous power struggles. Some European elites perceived US assistance as a crucial chance to emulate modern production and management techniques, while others questioned the appropriateness of American methods to the unique conditions of their society. Still others denounced the assistance as a form of imperialism. Recipient governments typically utilized such differences both to manipulate the terms of American assistance and to bring about a transformation without challenging the fundamental values of their society.⁹ The degree to which the European government could outmaneuver the ECA directives nonetheless depended on their relative strength vis-à-vis the US administration. Holding greater political leverage, the 'big recipients' (namely, Britain, France, and Italy) were able to divert American assistance to particular issues of which the ECA did not fully approve.¹⁰ Interestingly, there are few works that examine the Marshall Plan from the perspective of the 'small recipients'; among them, even fewer reflexively problematize the limits of the ECA's influence on the process of economic modernization in the recipient societies. Starting off from this 'glaring lacuna in the bibliography of works on the Marshall Plan',¹¹ I examine in this essay how the divergences among US officials played into the hands of Turkish governments in manipulating the ECA's modernization efforts in Turkey. Before engaging this question, however, one needs to dwell on how and why US officials diverged on the proper way to modernize the Turkish economy. This requires a brief discussion of the historical trajectory and features of US activities abroad.

US Overseas Expansionism and a Brief Genealogy of Institutional Divergences

During the nineteenth century, US policy-makers chose to take a quite auxiliary role in the territories that came under US influence and extensively supported North American missionaries and investors to promote 'the American dream' on their behalf.¹² This collaboration intensified particularly during the mid-nineteenth century when US policy-makers appointed certain North American businessmen to key administrative positions at the recently acquired overseas bases and also endorsed an 'Open Door Policy' in China and 'Dollar Diplomacy' in Latin America.¹³

The twentieth century brought a significant transformation in this collaboration, primarily through the increasing preference of host

governments for employing North American economic experts who were not formally affiliated with the US state. Unlike the financial advisers imposed upon by North American investors or appointed by the US State Department, these politically 'detached' and 'disinterested' experts were expected to help host governments obtain greater US funding while effectively thwarting local, anti-imperialist opposition both against the host governments' policies and against the US impositions.¹⁴ The pervasive effect of the Great Depression on US business was equally significant in the professionalization of US overseas expansionism. While the US administration directly intervened to regulate and coordinate the hard-struck American economic enterprises at home and abroad, it chose to put the potential recipient governments in contact with independent technical experts and approved the international loan requests on the basis of the reports these experts prepared.

Such indirect involvement in Third World modernization became central to US foreign assistance programs during the Cold War, particularly to the Marshall Plan. Even though its activities directly concerned US foreign affairs, the ECA was established outside the institutional structure of the State Department, the ultimate agency that handled the country's international relations. The Chief ECA Administrator was recommended but not required to consult the Secretary of State about particular Marshall Plan issues, and any disagreements between the ECA and the State Department were to be handled and resolved by the US President.¹⁵ Moreover, the ECA's offices were located outside the State Department in Washington, DC as well as outside the US embassies in recipient countries. Last but not least, the ECA had financial autonomy in that its organizational budget came from the Marshall Plan counterpart funds provided by recipient governments.

In addition to the broader trend of professionalization, the ECA's autonomous standing stemmed from the experience of the US with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) that provided humanitarian assistance to Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. When the UNRRA did not render its promised objectives, the US State Department, having coordinated US participation in the program, came under severe public criticism. In fact, during congressional discussion of the Marshall Plan, many congressional members openly objected to the State Department's direct involvement in the Marshall Plan and argued instead for the establishment of an autonomous agency with a 'business mentality'.¹⁶

Although the ECA had legal autonomy, it ultimately followed the line of policy deemed appropriate by the US State Department. Its conceding

stance partly stemmed from the fact that most of its operational posts were occupied by individuals who were previously employed in either diplomatic or public service, and were thereby more receptive to the Marshall Plan's strategic objectives.¹⁷ Another influential factor was the congressional source of funding for the ECA's reconstruction efforts. Congressional deliberations on the Marshall Plan focused mostly on the possible political consequences of the Marshall Plan for the United States as well as for recipient governments. While proponents of the Marshall Plan presented it as an essential effort to prevent the spread of communism and Soviet influence in Europe, its opponents vilified it as an attempt to take over Great Britain's colonial responsibilities in the Middle East with particular respect to the region's oil fields.¹⁸

Both the US State Department and ECA staff argued for the exigency of containing the imminent political influence of the Soviet Union in Europe and the Near East. Yet, they diverged on the relative importance of this political objective in the actual administration of particular modernization projects. Such tensions largely stemmed from the dynamics of US overseas expansionism discussed above, which on the one hand designated the US State Department as the primary authority in the country's foreign affairs and on the other hand promoted a politically detached institutionalization of US modernization activities abroad. The ensuing tensions were quite palpable in the case of Turkey's Marshall Plan: whereas the ECA Mission argued to evaluate Turkish modernization proposals on the basis of their technical merit and economic exigency, US State Department officials frequently intervened against the ECA's decisions in order to secure the Turkish government's further support for US foreign policy objectives in the region.

Political versus Technical: Tensions between the US State Department and the ECA

The [US] administration w[ill] assist [Turkey] in preserving its independence and maintaining its present role [... as a] bulwark against Soviet expansion in the region.

– US State Department, 1949 Policy on Turkey¹⁹

The ECA has not come to Turkey, as generally alleged, for strategic reasons but because this country is in a position to play an integral part in the European recovery.

– Russell H. Dorr, ECA Mission Chief in Turkey²⁰

ECA personnel in Turkey argued that modernization could be accomplished through the full cooperation of Turkish and American staff as well as a sound evaluation of the possible benefits and costs of modernization projects. In the words of Russell H. Dorr, chief of the ECA Mission in Turkey, 'the [Turkish government] should indicate its point of view directly [to the ECA] so that the points in question could be fully discussed in light of the economic value of each case'. The 'economic value' of a project could, for him, be determined through a thorough evaluation of its infrastructural requirements, social necessity, and suitability to Turkish conditions. If Turkish governments, Dorr continued, decided on ECA projects on other grounds, they would turn the modernization efforts into an endless 'banker's transaction' or a 'trade' that would jeopardize his staff's 'duty and belief [... that they are to] be of real assistance to Turkey'.²¹

Under Dorr's leadership, the ECA Mission approached Turkey's modernization as a technical process that should be as much as possible kept separate from everyday political calculations. Even though some Turkish bureaucrats also shared this position, neither they nor ECA personnel had much power to hold their ground amidst Turkey's ongoing transition from one-party rule to multiparty politics. Political pressures on them particularly intensified on the eve of the 1950 Turkish national elections. In the midst of electoral campaigns, Hüseyin Kunter, an official from Turkey's International Economic Cooperation Organization (IECO), confided to Dorr that the competition between the incumbent government and the opposition was 'holding back certain economical and justifiable projects'. Dorr responded that one could not 'completely ignore' political considerations but instead should try to overcome political impediments by 'slow[ing] down certain projects and ... accelerat[ing] others'.²²

Despite his acquiescence on such constraints, Dorr was quite resistant to privileging political priorities over technical ones. In fact, a week before his meeting with Kunter, Dorr bluntly refused the Turkish State Minister Cemil Said Barlas's request to 'give the Turkish public some glad tidings' by increasing the allocated ECA funding. Stressing that 'enough money was allocated to the existent projects', Dorr argued that 'it was [the Turkish government's] fault' if it still needed more funds for its modernization endeavors. In the same meeting, Dorr also reacted strongly to the Turkish minister's insinuation that the government might transfer the funds allocated for coal-mine projects to agricultural industries in order to increase its popularity among Turkish farmers before the upcoming elections. Rejecting the minister's suggestion, Dorr

asserted that such unilateral decisions would greatly undermine the overall progress of US modernization efforts in Turkey and demanded that the Turkish government be 'serious' about its expectations and demands.²³

Nevertheless, ECA staff most of the time had to yield to the Turkish government's politically inclined requests about various modernization projects.²⁴ Their vulnerability vis-à-vis Turkish officialdom stemmed partly from the inadequate support they received from the US State Department. For instance, when Dorr complained to the US Ambassador in Ankara that the Turkish government disregarded the importance of anti-inflationary policies in achieving sustainable modernization, he was told not to be 'too strict with a country which [was] after all still Near Eastern in outlook and capabilities'. Dorr was further exasperated by 'the common gossip' in Ankara that he had 'a very strict attitude with the Turkish government while the Ambassador [was] endeavoring to secure them all that they ask[ed] for'.²⁵

The US Ambassador's approach to Turkish governments largely reflected the US State Department's vision of global politics and Turkey's role in them. Toward the end of the Second World War, the Department was preoccupied with the escalating rapprochement between the Soviet Union and communist parties in the Near East and Eastern Europe. After the war, ongoing civil strife in Greece between the center-right and their left-wing contenders was accompanied by the separatist activities of the Tudeh party in Iran. US foreign policy-makers interpreted these developments as the beginnings of an ideological bloc formed under Soviet leadership and suspected that it would expand across the world through armed conflict. In subsequent US foreign policy formulations, Turkey held importance because of its geopolitical position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Reflecting on Soviet demands over the Turkish Straits, Loy W. Henderson, the Director of the Near Eastern Affairs Desk, wrote in 1946 that

Turkey constitutes the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. A Russian dominated Turkey would open the floodgates for a Soviet advance in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula. ... It would also dangerously, perhaps fatally, expose Greece and Iran [... to the influence of] Soviet Russia and its agents. ... Such a development would ... considerably weaken ... the comprehensive security situation of the United States.²⁶

As US State department staff intended to secure Turkish support for US foreign policy interests in the region, they accepted most Turkish modernization requests without conducting a thorough technical assessment of their substance and consequences. For instance, on the eve of the 1948 Marshall Plan allocations, Turkish officials were greatly dissatisfied with the designation of Turkey as a 'cash country' that could directly purchase materials from the United States but would not be eligible for the low-interest credits provided under US assistance. Claiming that Turkey had high defense expenditures and insufficient gold reserves, Turkish officials urged their American colleagues to reconsider the terms of Turkey's participation in the Marshall Plan. Mainstream Turkish journalists, too, voiced discontent on the issue, emphasizing that Turkey's expected share in the allocations was too small in comparison to that of other Marshall Plan recipients, which, they claimed, did not face as much direct threat from the Soviet Union.

Reporting on the issue, Edwin C. Wilson, the US Ambassador in Turkey, recommended that the State Department arrange some 'token credits' for the country. He emphasized the significance of assisting Turkish modernization for the continuation of broader US interests in the region, stating that

Not only [the Turkish government] but [also ...] the opposition, ... even the man in the street, ... cannot overcome the feeling or apprehension that Turkey has been somehow overlooked or 'left out' in connection with American thinking on recovery plans for Europe. The conception that ... Turkey can make a contribution to [the Marshall Plan] by paying cash for needed equipment simply leaves Turks incredulous. ... The whole question has become of such extreme *political* importance here that ... it will be necessary for the [US], because of [its] *overall relations with Turkey*, to arrange to grant a small amount of credits, fully reimbursable, to assist Turkey in acquiring some of the equipment needed.²⁷

Upon further deliberations, the US State Department recommended that the US Congress change Turkey's status in the Marshall Plan and extend the country a \$10 million 'token credit'. In the following years, even though the country's economic situation remained largely the same in comparison to other recipients, the Marshall Plan credits and grants to Turkey increased considerably.²⁸ ECA staff vehemently objected to the State Department's politically motivated decisions, arguing that they turned the Marshall Plan into 'a sort of a *political* loan or bribe' in the

eyes of the Turkish government.²⁹ Nevertheless, their discontent did not find much support from the US administration whose approach to the Marshall Plan was shaped by Turkish reactions as much as by the US State Department's expectations about the Cold War.

Conflicting Perspectives: The Case of the Turkish State Ministry

When Dorr first met with the Turkish Prime Minister Hasan Saka in November 1948, he requested that the Turkish government establish a State Ministry that would formulate modernization projects for ECA funding and also establish coordination among the relevant Turkish ministries and Turkey's ECA delegations in Paris and in Washington DC.³⁰ The Turkish prime minister showed great interest in Dorr's proposal, but the Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadık Sadak shortly informed Dorr that the Turkish government would be 'unable, because of [the] scarcity of appropriate personnel, to establish a ministry to handle [Marshall Plan] matters'. Instead, the government could, the Minister stated, appoint 'a director ... who would report directly to the Foreign Ministry and who would have a staff under him composed of individuals ... who were familiar with the various projects for which ECA financing was desired by Turkey'. After a lengthy discussion, Dorr was able to convince the Turkish Foreign Minister to have the Turkish government reconsider his proposal. Eventually on 16 January 1949, the Mehmet Şemsettin Günaltay government established a State Ministry and appointed Nurullah Esat Sümer as the State Minister to coordinate all foreign, including US, assistance programs in Turkey.³¹

The State Ministry was akin to a 'ministry without portfolio' in that the incumbent did not head a ministry with full-time staff but instead assisted the prime minister in supervising the work of public institutions established as part of the Turkish Prime Ministry. In the specific case of the Marshall Plan, the State Minister worked closely with the IECO personnel. IECO was founded 31 May 1949 under the Turkish Prime Ministry, but it was chaired by a Secretary General who was, throughout the Marshall Plan, a Turkish Foreign Ministry official.³² According to an IECO employee, the organization's personnel were predominantly recruited from the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the international affairs bureau of the Turkish Ministry of Commerce and Trade.³³

IECO meetings were usually held with a small group of officials at the Turkish Foreign Ministry after regular working hours and, more importantly, without the participation of the State Minister.³⁴ Moreover,

IECO staff decided on Marshall Plan projects in minimum consultation with other relevant Turkish ministries. Recalling his service as the Public Works Minister, Fahri Belen asserted that the IECO largely disregarded his ministry's recommendations about certain Marshall Plan projects and in fact commissioned them to the companies of which Belen himself disapproved.³⁵ Considering such institutional affiliations and practices of IECO staff, the organization can be seen as an informal extension of the Turkish foreign ministry, a form of institutionalization that served the Turkish government's intention rather than Dorr's initial proposal.

The ECA's request to establish a separate State Ministry with a full-time staff primarily aimed to place US modernization efforts on a technical, collaborative basis. This intention became more apparent on the eve of the Turkish national elections on 14 May 1950, when the ECA Mission informally discovered the government's plan to abolish the State Ministry and transfer all ECA work to the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Dorr immediately met with Nihat Erim, the Deputy Prime Minister, and asserted that the Foreign Minister might not have sufficient time to handle the Marshall Plan projects for he would need to travel abroad for his primary ministerial functions. Beneath Dorr's assertions was a desire to keep the Marshall Plan on a technical level. When he did not get any affirmative reassurance from Erim, Dorr reported to his superiors in Paris that the Turkish Foreign Ministry would turn the Marshall Plan into 'a political negotiation' and thereby inhibit its primary goals of 'economic recovery and development'.³⁶

When the elections brought the opposition Democrat Party (DP) to power on 14 May 1950, Dorr succeeded in convincing the new government to appoint a State Minister responsible for ECA Affairs.³⁷ However, the good relations between the ECA and DP did not last too long. On 9 March 1951, less than a year after the appointment of Fevzi Lütüf Karaosmanoğlu as State Minister, the DP Prime Minister Adnan Menderes replaced him with Refik Şevket İnce, who, Dorr claimed, 'would not be allowed to carry out the coordination functions'. The shuffling in the Turkish cabinet meant, for the ECA Mission, that they would have to deal directly with IECO staff who approached the Marshall Plan on a 'trading basis'.³⁸ In fact, on 21 March 1951, ECA Mission staff were called upon to meet with the Turkish Foreign Minister instead of the State Minister.³⁹ The State Ministry was liquidated a week after this request, and the IECO was officially linked to the Foreign Ministry three months after the liquidation.⁴⁰

The short-lived history of the State Ministry illustrates the two major contentions of this essay. First of all, the ECA Mission's reactions to

these institutional developments delineate its technical approach to modernization. The Turkish Foreign Ministry's control over the Marshall Plan would, ECA staff argued, endorse 'giving as little as possible in return for as much [funding] as possible'.⁴¹ After the IECO was linked to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Dorr complained to the US Ambassador in Turkey that channeling ECA work through the IECO 'drastically reduce[d] the usefulness of trained *technical* personnel and prevented them from *working* easily and informally *with each other* in the development of programs, organizations, and methods for executing such programs'.⁴²

ECA staff continuously pointed in their memoranda to the Turkish governments' blatant disregard for the technical requirements of ECA modernization projects. They were particularly concerned with IECO officials' constant requests for obtaining more US funding to balance the Turkish foreign trade deficit. ECA staff found such requests technically inept, because they believed that the Turkish budget deficit would disappear when all modernization projects were finalized.⁴³ After participating in a series of highly confrontational meetings with Turkish officials about the budget deficit, Dorr reported to Milton Katz, the ECA Special Representative in Europe, that the Turkish government aims to

get completely out from under the *safeguards* which have hitherto governed the expenditure of ECA funds. The Prime Minister himself ... is extremely impatient with the idea that ECA should concern itself in any way with the *financial policies of the government*. Government officials at secondary levels have repeatedly expressed to members of this Mission their *impatience* at being required to give *some accounting* of *what* the funds are to be used for or *why* they are needed. ... My appraisal of the present situation is that the Turkish government is now making an all-out effort to have *economic aid* placed on a *political-military* basis.⁴⁴

Second and equally importantly, the liquidation of the Turkish State Ministry clearly illustrates the conflicts between the ECA Mission and the US State Department as well as the latter's informal authority over US modernization efforts in Turkey. One of the most evident tensions between the ECA Mission and the US Embassy surfaced when the Republican People's Party (RPP) government wanted to liquidate the Turkish State Ministry on the eve of the 1950 elections. A week before the ECA Mission was notified about this plan, the Turkish Foreign Minister 'brought up' the notion in his meeting with US Ambassador

George Wadsworth, in a way 'flying ... a trial balloon'. Although the ambassador did not encourage the Turkish minister, he did not oppose the idea 'in very strong terms' either.⁴⁵

Dorr was disturbed that the ambassador's leniency strengthened the Turkish government's confidence to take unilateral decisions about the administration of the Marshall Plan and to thereby eschew the necessary technical collaboration with the ECA Mission. When he asked Milton Katz to personally confront the Turkish delegates in Paris and the US ambassador in Turkey about the issue, Phillip W. Bonsal, one of Katz's aides and a US career-diplomat, suggested to him not to intervene directly and to instead consult with the US State Department in dealing with the problem.⁴⁶ The eventual acceptance of this suggestion illustrated that, in the last instance, top-level ECA staff yielded to the US State Department's directives about the administration of the Marshall Plan projects. It also highlighted the fact that the ECA Mission in Turkey lacked support from both the central ECA administration and other US government agencies in dealing with the Turkish government's politically inclined perspective on modernization.

Tensions between the ECA Mission and the US Embassy in Turkey accelerated especially during the second half of the Marshall Plan. In 1951, Dorr reported to the ECA Special Representative in Europe that US Ambassador George C. McGhee sided with the Turkish government in increasing the amount of Turkey's Marshall Plan allocation to balance the Turkish budget deficit. In fact, the ambassador had promised the Turkish prime minister, in the absence of Dorr, an increase in US aid to Turkey. When Dorr later rejected such a possibility, the Turkish prime minister treated him in an extremely bitter manner, fueled by confidence from the ambassador's promises about financial assistance.⁴⁷

Yet, mere disagreement between the ECA Mission and the US Embassy did not trouble Dorr as much as the fact that the Turkish elites knew about it. Knowledge of such disagreement, he argued, encouraged Turkish officials to believe that they could

play off the greater influence of the Diplomatic Mission ... to get out from under a method of operation in which [the Turkish government was] called upon to prove the economic usefulness of the aid rendered and [was] asked to undertake changes in internal policies as the price of such aid.

The Turkish government, Dorr argued, viewed US desire for Turkey's military alliance as 'so strong that they [could] afford to defy the

Economic Cooperation Administration, and [could] count upon the influence of other [US] government agencies to get them what they [wanted]'.⁴⁸

Dorr requested from Milton Katz to have the US Secretary of State call the Turkish Ambassador in Washington DC, 'making [ECA's perspective] clear to him' and 'transmitting [a memorandum] of that conversation to the Ambassador' in Ankara. 'So long as the present variance of views exist[ed] and [was] known to Turks', he further contended, 'there [would] be little purpose in maintaining a[n ECA] mission [in Turkey] since its influence [would] be negligible.'⁴⁹ Nonetheless, Dorr's pleas fell on deaf ears. As Katz chose to follow Bonsal's rather than Dorr's suggestion, only two weeks after Dorr's memorandum seeking Katz's assistance, the Turkish government liquidated the Turkish State Ministry and transferred all Marshall Plan affairs to the Foreign Ministry.

After the Turkish Foreign Ministry gained formal control over Marshall Plan affairs, Dorr hesitantly sought Ambassador George McGhee's support in placing Turkey's modernization projects on a technical footing. He specifically requested that McGhee explain to the Turkish Foreign Minister how IECO staff were so overburdened with other foreign economic engagements that they could not pay 'prompt and adequate attention' to ECA projects. Yet, he was quite cynical on the question of the ambassador extending wholehearted support to the ECA Mission on this issue at the expense of jeopardizing the Turkish government's support for US foreign policy interests. His cynicism became apparent when Dorr told the ambassador that the existing nature of the ECA Mission's interactions with Turkish officials 'promote[d] a feeling of *frustration* among *Americans* who ha[d] come to Turkey with a *sincere desire to assist in the economic recovery of the country*'.⁵⁰ Questioning the sincerity of American personnel, such as the ambassador, who were content with the current configuration of the Marshall Plan administration, Dorr adamantly took issue with the Ambassador's political approach to Turkish modernization as well as with his inadequate support to the ECA Mission's technical vision.

Yet, toward the end of the Marshall Plan, Dorr and his staff came acquiescently to acknowledge the fact that among US foreign policy circles, their requests carried less weight than the US embassy's views. Hence, after reporting his disagreements with the US ambassador in detail, Dorr suggested to Milton Katz that 'if [the ECA did] not intend to maintain [its] policy [in Turkey]', he needed 'immediate instructions to that effect so that [the Mission could] get along with [its] job on the new basis'.⁵¹

Epilogue

This essay started off from one of the central assumptions of the cultural turn that societies, social groups, and organizations are not monolithic entities locked once and for all in fixed binary power discrepancies. Focusing on a landmark foreign assistance program, I sought to illustrate that different agencies of a donor society may operate with slightly divergent views and thereby only enable limited opportunities for the recipient groups to attempt to correct underlying inequalities. Specifically, as the ECA Mission and the US State Department approached Turkey's modernization through slightly different lenses, they simultaneously fostered a situational alliance between the Turkish governments and the US State Department. As a handful of select Turkish diplomats were designated to propose, discuss, and implement the Marshall Plan projects on behalf of the Turkish governments, the ECA Mission found itself in a game of endless diplomatic negotiations that favored political considerations over technocratic judgments. In the end, the general convergence of opinion among the US State Department and Turkish governments subordinated the ECA's technical approach to the overarching political visions of containment and defensive modernization. In this respect, geopolitical considerations provided the relatively less powerful Turkish governments ample opportunity to revise the Marshall Plan projects in line with their political agenda.

Many diplomatic historians of the Cold War have shown that US officials as well as North American entrepreneurs were divided on whether and how the United States should sponsor European economic modernization through foreign assistance.⁵² In explaining such divergences, David J. Alvarez asserts that foreign policy is a partially 'cooperative' and 'often uncoordinated' process of interactions among officials 'that represent diverse perspectives and interests' based on 'personal and organizational biases, fears, and goals'.⁵³ Approaching Turkish and American diplomacy through this lens may help instigate the much-warranted cultural turn in analyses of Cold War Turkey and thereby demarcate the intricate negotiations of power inequalities as well as the limited possibilities of resistance and control on part of less powerful actors.

Notes

1. T. Smith (2000) 'New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, 24, no. 4, pp. 567–91; B. Wheelan

- (2000) *Ireland and the Marshall Plan, 1947–57* (Dublin: Four Courts Press); K.B. Burk (2000) 'Marshall Plan: Filling in Some of the Blanks', *Contemporary European History*, 10, pp. 267–94.
2. I discussed the epistemological influence of such factors in detail in B. Keskin-Kozat (2011) 'Re-interpreting Turkey's Marshall Plan: Of Machines, Experts and Technical Knowledge', in N.B. Criss et al. (eds), *Turkish–American Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830–1989* (Cambridge: Scholars Press), pp. 187–212.
 3. O. Sander (1979) *Türk–Amerikan İlişkileri: 1947–64* (*Turkish–American Relations: 1947–64*) (Ankara: Sevinç); N. Uzunoğlu (2003) *American Aid to Turkey: 1947–1963* (Istanbul: Acar); B. Oran (2001) *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (1919–1980)* (*Turkish Foreign Policy: Facts, Documents, Perspectives from the War of Independence to Today (1919–1980)*) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları); M.E. Değer (2004) *Emperyalizmin Tuzaklarındaki Ülke: Oltadaki Balık Türkiye* (*A Country in Imperialist Plots: Turkey in the Hook*) (Istanbul: Otopsi).
 4. In this essay, I do not dwell on the ways in which Turkish political elites approached Turkish economic modernization during the Marshall Plan. I argued elsewhere that this issue needs to be evaluated in relation to the history of Westernization efforts from the late Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic as well as in relation to the Soviet Union's territorial demands from Turkey during the early Cold War period. B. Keskin-Kozat (2006) 'Negotiating Modernization through U.S. Foreign Assistance: Turkey's Marshall Plan (1948–1952) Re-interpreted' (PhD thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), pp. 111–17, 129–43.
 5. The 16 Marshall Plan recipients were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Turkey. Although the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia were also invited to participate in Marshall Plan discussions, they declined the invitation, arguing that their involvement would jeopardize their national sovereignty. All of these countries, except Finland, later banded together to establish the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance that supervised economic development in communist/socialist countries (1956–91).
 6. In response to an inquiry about a new productivity project, Henry Wiens, the ECA Mission's Program Review Officer, wrote as follows: 'A training program such as proposed for August in Austria would be of little or no value to Turkey, since immediate problems here are of a more elementary nature than those facing most Western European countries. ... [B]asic production techniques are more needed than those refinements usually visualized in the concept of productivity.' RG 469, Entry 1042, Airgram TOREP A-30 from MSA Ankara to SRE Paris, 31 July 1952. Also see RG 469, Entry 1042, letter by Donald C. Stone, the Director of MSA Administration, 4 January 1952; RG 334, Entry 250, Folder 091.112/C (1952).
 7. Keskin-Kozat, 'Negotiating Modernization', p. 4.
 8. Keskin-Kozat, 'Negotiating Modernization', pp. 102–12.
 9. R. Kuisel (1993) *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
 10. I.M. Wall (1991) *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945–54* (New York: Cambridge University Press); C. Esposito (1994) *America's Feeble*

Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948–1950 (Westport, CT: Greenwood).

11. Burk, 'Marshall Plan', p. 271.
12. E. Rosenberg (1982) *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York: Hill and Wany).
13. M. Cuti and B. Kendall (1954) *Prelude to Point Four: American Technical Missions Overseas, 1838–1938* (University of Madison Press); W. Lafeber (1986) 'The "Lion in the Path": The U.S. Emergence as a World Power', *Political Science Quarterly*, 101, pp. 710–18; N. Gilman (2003) *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 69; G. Steinmetz (2005) 'Return to Empire: The New U.S. Imperialism in Comparative Historical Perspective', *Sociological Theory*, 23, pp. 341–50.
14. E. Rosenberg and N.L. Rosenberg (1987) 'From Colonialism to Professionalism: The Public–Private Dynamic in United States Foreign Financial Advising, 1898–1929', *The Journal of American History*, 74, pp. 59–82.
15. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1948), *The Hearings before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Economic Recovery* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), pp. 9–24.
16. Response to a letter by Carl M. Saunders, editor of *Jackson Citizen Patriot*, 2 January 1948, *Arthur H. Vanderberg Papers*, Roll 5.
17. W. Averell Harriman, the ECA Special Representative to Europe (1948–50), had been the US Ambassador to Moscow, whereas his successor, Milton Katz, had served as the deputy chief in the US Office of Strategic Services that provided foreign intelligence during the Second World War. Similarly, Donald C. Stone, the Director of Administration (1948–51), had previously served as Assistant Director of the US Budget Bureau, and his assistant, Wayne C. Taylor, was the US Undersecretary of Commerce during the war. For more information, see www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist; www.marshallfoundation.org.
18. See for instance, Mr Sikes, Representative from Florida, *U.S. Congressional Record*, 24 July 1947, p. 10089; Mr Mason, Representative from Illinois, *U.S. Congressional Record*, 12 January 1948, p. 113; Mr Taft, Senator from Ohio, *U.S. Congressional Record*, 4 March 1948, p. 2641; Mr Rich, Representative from Pennsylvania, *U.S. Congressional Record*, 18 December 1947, p. 11627; V. Marcantonio (1956) *I Vote My Conscience: Debates, Speeches and Writings* (New York: n.p.), pp. 250–7. Also see W.F. Sanford (1980) 'American Business Community and the European Recovery Program, 1947–1952' (PhD thesis, University of Texas, Austin), pp. 50–5; J.B. Bonds (2002) *Bipartisan Strategy: Selling the Marshall Plan* (London: Praeger).
19. Cited in G. McGhee (1990) *The U.S.–Turkish–NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine Contained the Soviets in the Middle East* (New York: St Martin's Press), p. 61.
20. 'Turks are Fearful of ECA's Motives', *New York Times*, 4 January 1949, p. 70.
21. RG 469, Entry 1399, Memorandum on the Meeting at the Prime Ministry between the Deputy Prime Minister His Excellency Samet Ağaoğlu and Chief of Mission the Honorable Russell H. Dorr, 17 June 1950, pp. 2–4. Also see Memorandum on the Meeting at the Ministry of Economy and Commerce between Minister Vedat Dicleli and Chief of Mission the Honorable Russell Dorr, 18 January 1950, pp. 11–13.

22. RG 469, Entry 1399, Memorandum on the Meeting at the Ministry of State between Minister of State C.S. Barlas and Chief of Mission the Honorable Russell Dorr, 22 March 1950, p. 5.
23. RG 469, Entry 1399, Memorandum on the Meeting between Minister of State C.S. Barlas and Chief of Mission the Honorable Russell H. Dorr, 14 March 1950, pp. 8–10.
24. B. Keskin-Kozat (2006), 'Negotiating Modernization through U.S. Foreign Assistance: Turkey's Marshall Plan (1948–1952) Re-interpreted', (PhD thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), pp. 201–3, 236–8.
25. RG 469, Entry 927, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Milton Katz, Special Representative to Europe, 12 March 1951, p. 8.
26. RG 59, 867.00/10–2146, Memorandum from Loy W. Henderson (NEA) to Acheson, Secretary of State, 21 October 1946, pp. 2–4. On the significance of Turkish–Soviet relations for US foreign policy during the Cold War, see M. Leffler (1985) 'Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO, 1945–1952', *The Journal of American History*, 71, pp. 807–25; B.R. Kuniholm (1980) *The United States, The Northern Tier and the Origins of the Cold War: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece* (Princeton University Press).
27. Letter from Edwin C. Wilson to John D. Jernegan, 10 February 1948, quoted verbatim in RG 59, 867.00/2-2648, Memorandum from Mr Trop to Mr Henderson, 26 February 1948, emphasis mine. Also see RG 59, 867.00/1148, Memorandum on the meeting between Hikmet Baydur, the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, DC, and Marshall, the US Secretary of State, 11 May 1948; Turkish Republican Archives – Foreign Ministry Archive, 'Marshall Planında Türkiyenin Durumu' ('Turkey's Position in the Marshall Plan'), 16 January 1948.
28. G. Harris (1972) *Troubled Alliance: Turkish–American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research), pp. 31–2.
29. RG 469, Entry 927, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Milton Katz, Special Representative in Europe, 12 March 1951, p. 7, emphasis mine.
30. RG 469, Entry 1399, Chronological Index of Memorandums Prepared by Chief of Mission and Members of Mission, p. 1.
31. RG 469, Entry 236, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Paul G. Hoffman, ECA Administrator – Washington, DC, 14 January 1949, pp. 1–4.
32. *Turkish Grand National Assembly Proceedings*, 8th Session, vol. 19, pp. 1139–40; Law Number 5412, Law about the Establishment of International Economic Cooperation Organization, *Resmi Gazete*, 6 June 1949, Issue 7225, pp. 16257–8. The two IECO Secretary General during the Marshall Plan were Haydar Görk (1949–51, 1951–55) and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (1951–52), both of whom were young Turkish Foreign Ministry officials at the time.
33. S. Günver (1985) *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü: Z Zorro Gibi (The Story of Fatin Rustu Zorlu: Z as in Zorro)* (Istanbul: Bilgi). It is not exactly clear how many people were in fact employed at the IECO, because the organization's records are located in the Turkish Foreign Ministry archive, which is still closed to researchers. Yet, a juxtaposition in the ECA memoranda about the meetings with the Turkish State Ministry personnel and the available memoirs of Turkish Foreign Ministry officials reveals that the IECO was in fact run by

- individuals who were employed either in the Turkish Foreign Ministry or in the international affairs bureaus of the Turkish Ministry of Commerce and Trade.
34. Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü*, p. 37; S. Günver (1990) *Garip Ada'nın Garip Eşeği (The Odd Donkey of the Odd Island)* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları), p. 27; O. Gökmen (1996) *Bir zamanlar Hariciye: Eski Bir Diplomatın Anıları (Once Upon a Time at the Foreign Ministry: Memoirs From an Ex-Diplomat)* (Istanbul: Kaptan Ofset), pp. 229–32; Y. Gör (1996) *Seyahatname (Travelogue)* (Istanbul: Çağdaş), pp. 19–52; M. Esenbel (2000) *Türkiye'nin Batı ile İttifaka Yönelişi (Turkey's Drive Toward an Alliance with the West)* (Istanbul: Isis), p. 62.
 35. F. Belen (1960) *Demokrasiden Diktatörlüğe (From Democracy to Dictatorship)* (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaası), pp. 13–14.
 36. RG 469, Entry 927, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Averell Harriman, Special Representative in Europe, 24 April 1950, pp. 2–3.
 37. RG 469, Entry 1399, Memorandum on the Meeting at the Prime Ministry between the Deputy Prime Minister His Excellency Samet Ağaoğlu and the Chief of Mission the Honorable Russell Dorr, 17 June 1950. The DP government was established on 22 May 1950 and its first State Minister responsible for ECA Affairs was appointed on 11 July 1950. During these two months, interactions with the ECA were directly undertaken by the IECO.
 38. RG 1399, Entry 927, Letter From Russell H. Dorr, Chief of the Mission, to Milton Katz, Special Representative, Office of Special Representative in France, 12 March 1951, p. 6.
 39. RG 469, Entry 1399, Chronological Index of Memorandums Prepared by Chief of Mission, Members of the Mission etc., p. 3.
 40. Turkish Republican Archives, 30.18.1.2.126.53.2, 5412 sayılı Kanun'la kurulan Milletlerarası İktisadi İşbirliği Teşkilatı'nın Dışişleri Bakanlığı'na bağlanması (IECO which was established by Law No. 5412 to be linked to the Turkish Foreign Ministry), 20 June 1951.
 41. RG 469, Entry 1400, Memorandum from Russell H. Dorr, Chief of Mission, to the Honorable George McGhee, Ambassador of the United States, 17 January 1952, p. 3, emphasis mine.
 42. *Ibid.*, p. 3, emphasis mine. Also see RG 469, Entry 1399, Memorandum from Henry W. Wiens, Acting Chief of Mission to the Honorable George McGhee, Ambassador of the United States, 24 January 1952.
 43. RG 469, Entry 1399, Memorandum between Russell H. Dorr, Chief of the Mission, and Minister of State C.S. Barlas, 19 November 1949, pp. 3–4.
 44. RG 469, Entry 927, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Milton Katz, Special Representative in Europe, 12 March 1951, pp. 7–9, emphasis mine. Also see RG 469, Entry 1399, Letter from Henry Wiens, the Acting Chief, to John B. Lindeman, Director of Program Division, ECA-OSR, 2 May 1951.
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 48. RG 469, Entry 927, Letter from Russell H. Dorr to Milton Katz, p. 9.
 49. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

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