


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Publisher: Routledge

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## Middle Eastern Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20>

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Cangül Örnek

To cite this article: Cangül Örnek (2012) From Analysis to Policy: Turkish Studies in the 1950s and the Diplomacy of Ideas, Middle Eastern Studies, 48:6, 941-959, DOI: [10.1080/00263206.2012.723630](https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.723630)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.723630>

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# From Analysis to Policy: Turkish Studies in the 1950s and the Diplomacy of Ideas

CANGÜL ÖRNEK

‘Recognizing that the Turkish case paled by comparison with the crisis facing Greece, Truman made only the barest mention of Turkey in his historic message to Congress on March 12, 1947. Nor did testimony before congressional committees reflect greater emphasis.’<sup>1</sup> This comment by George Harris indicates the well-known fact that Turkey was not a focal point of interest for the Truman administration at the beginning of the Cold War. Nevertheless, Turkey from the beginning of the Cold War had enjoyed the advantages of being located at the crossroads of two geographic areas for which the US developed special tools to control post-war dynamics.

In Europe, the priority of the American government was to propose a wide-scale solution to the question of post-war economic build-up. The Marshall Plan, which offered cash grants to Europe, propelled a comprehensive reconstruction. Outside Europe, the US government found itself obliged to suggest a capitalist development alternative to the newly liberated countries of Asia and Africa.

Turkey fell into the intersection of these two categories of countries. Yet Turkey, unlike most of Europe, was not facing the opposition of a strong communist movement empowered by the anti-fascist struggle, neither was it under the influence of anti-western sentiments as was witnessed in the newly liberated countries of the ‘third world’. On the contrary, Turkey had already advanced its westernization programme and the ideological atmosphere was aggressively anti-communist and pro-western.

As a matter of fact, those peculiarities of Turkey, especially in the 1950s, awoke curiosity in the US among academic and diplomatic circles. This article is inspired by the academic and diplomatic aspects of American interest in Turkey’s experience with modernization and the influence of academic studies on the diplomatic perceptions about Turkey in the early Cold War context. For the former the article scrutinizes Turkish studies in the US while for the latter the focus is on the cultural activities carried out by the American diplomatic mission in Turkey.

Investigating the cultural activities, which was an important component of public diplomacy, is fruitful to map out the observations and perceptions of diplomats about the political and ideological atmosphere in Turkey. The primary source of this research is the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the United States Information Service (USIS)<sup>2</sup> information programme and particularly country papers produced to guide the cultural activities. Since public diplomacy is a wider

terrain and cultural relations even in the 1950s were not limited to the activities of these two institutions, sources other than USIE and USIS reports and papers are also used to complement the research.

Turkish studies had been one of the prominent subfields of area studies. There were two main reasons for this popularity. One was linked to the needs of the American aid programmes carried out in Turkey because the administration of aid programmes entailed comprehensive information on the political, social and economic structure of Turkey.<sup>3</sup> This demand was met not only through research missions sent to Turkey,<sup>4</sup> but also through research conducted within area studies programmes. The second reason was the role prescribed for Turkey in the Middle East as a model country. This approach was generated by modernization theory, which was dominating the analysis of the non-western world after the war.<sup>5</sup> Advocators of modernization theory saw Turkey as on the right path towards modernization since this young republic favoured a western-style capitalist democracy. In this sense, Turkey was accepted as a deviant case when compared with the post-war Middle East. If expressed by using the terminology of modernization theory, Turkey was in a totally 'healthy' condition.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, this did not mean that Turkey could continue with complete autarchy. Although modernization theory was an intellectual outcome of the anti-colonialist era, it still borrowed the Orientalist and colonialist viewpoint of 'the West as the guide' of the non-West in its journey of modernization.

The basis of knowledge of 'other geographies' was first laid by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In the aftermath of the war other institutions, including the Library of Congress, came to play a critical role in information gathering on the Middle East.<sup>7</sup> In the academic domain, the Committee on the Near and Middle East under the Social Science Research Council should be remembered. Turkish studies evolved out of these early attempts. The diplomatic counterpart of these institutions was the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, which was established in 1949 as an office of the State Department.<sup>8</sup> It became the key diplomatic office dealing with US policy in the vast geographies of non-alignment and anti-colonial struggle.

During the 1950s and 1960s Middle Eastern studies had gradually flourished, especially following the establishment of programmes and/or academic centres that had a regional focus on the Middle East at Princeton, the University of Michigan, Columbia, the University of Indiana, Harvard, Chicago, UCLA, Ohio State and the University of Wisconsin. The National Defense Education Act of 1958, which provided funds for graduate students, played an important role in the training of young scholars in various disciplines within Turkish studies.<sup>9</sup> Turkish studies gained special attention as a part of the general interest shown in studying the Middle East.<sup>10</sup>

Regarding the content of studies carried out within these new establishments, Turkish studies were primarily based on the contrast between Turkey, which had a stable and pro-western political system, and the Arab Middle East, which raised concerns in the West because of its turbulent political conditions. However, the literature on the reasons for Turkey's 'success' aroused new discussions on the objectives and instruments of the modernization model to be suggested to other

countries. Even in Turkish studies there were two conflicting, yet complementary, views on how a country could reach a 'happy ending'. Briefly, one was social transformation that led to grass-roots politics and democratization and the other was authoritarianism of firm political leadership or even the military cadres. In fact, both paths aimed at achieving a stable, strongly anti-communist system immune to radical politics. In the first phase, which lasted until the end of the 1950s, 'optimist modernization' sought a remedy for backwardness in multidimensional social transformation and through widening the channels of political participation. In the second phase, 'pessimist modernization' boldly emphasized the role of the political–military elite as subjects of modernization.

Following the Second World War, Turkish studies had proliferated in parallel with the popularization of the argument that the reasons for the backwardness of the Arab Middle East lay in its Ottoman past. The then popular thesis was that the failure of the 1848 Ottoman land code led to a concentration of land in the hands of the few at the expense of vast landless millions. According to this explanation, unsuccessful reform hindered the development of an agrarian democracy and became the source of instability. This interpretation of the Ottoman legacy was compatible with the post-war concerns of the US to foster modernization through agricultural development and land reform.<sup>11</sup>

US historians and social scientists observed that in Turkey the peasantry play a totally different role in the political system. It seemed that the existence of millions of small landholders had pre-empted destructive unrest in Turkey such as peasant uprisings. Furthermore, the property owning Turkish peasantry supported the Democrat Party,<sup>12</sup> and thus played a critical role in the transition to a multi-party system in 1950. In addition to such political repercussions of the landownership structure, the impact of the Marshall Plan on agriculture promoted research on the Turkish peasantry and agricultural structure.<sup>13</sup>

However, at a certain moment there occurred a shift in the analysis of the Ottoman legacy in modernization debates. Citino attributes this shift to the military–strategic priorities, which overshadowed socio-economic concerns.<sup>14</sup> Turkish studies continued to be one of the sources for understanding the political bifurcation in the Middle East between Turkey and the Arab world but now the projection was turned away from the historical roots of backwardness in the Arab world onto Turkey's 'success story'. Agricultural modernization continued to be on the agenda of the US government but land distribution ceased to be the favoured policy tool. The importance attributed to grassroots politics appeared to be unrealistic in regard to the US concern to assure stable and strongly anti-communist regimes in the region. The emphasis on participatory political systems was replaced by an attitude appreciating the results of authoritarian modernization. This should be related to the intensification of the Cold War rivalry in the region. The repercussions of these developments on Turkish studies could be observed as an emphasis on Turkey's success in building a western-oriented anti-communist regime.

In this regard, Turkey's transition to a multi-party regime in 1946 and the 1950 elections, which brought an end to the single-party regime, might have contributed to this ascription of success – not because they would not have collaborated with a single party regime but because this regime change demonstrated that Turkey on its

own chose to adopt a western-style political system. Turkey was also eager to convey a similar message to the West.<sup>15</sup>

In the post-war years, from the viewpoint of the US Turkey's most significant defect might have been Kemalist *etatism*. *Etatism* was not only a policy tool but also an article of the Turkish constitution and one of the six principles of Kemalist ideology. Although *etatism* was so basic in defining the founding ideology of the regime, the Democrat Party government, which came to power in 1950, did not hesitate to abandon state control of the economy and embrace liberal market policies. During the 1950s the new government took further steps towards liberalizing the national market and foreign trade. This might also have been appreciated by the Americans.

Another 'positive' feature of Turkey, along with its transition to a multi-party system and its adoption of liberal economic policies, was its anti-communism. Some of the examples of stern anti-communism in the aftermath of the war were numerous anti-Soviet statements, arrests of communists in 1951, and the intolerance of trade unions and leftist political parties. These examples demonstrated that Turkey was isolated from the atmosphere in the Middle East, which was anti-western, and even inclined towards the Soviet Union.

Turkish anti-communism inspired some new studies on Turkey. Bruce Cumings, in his article on area studies, states that the Ford Foundation, attempting to produce country analyses, suggested Dankwart Rustow<sup>16</sup> to write a country study on Turkey, which was regarded as an 'exclusive example in the Near East' with its 'smooth progress towards democracy' and immunity to 'the appeal of communism'.<sup>17</sup> It is known that Rustow wrote a brochure entitled 'The Appeal of Communism to Islamic Peoples', in which he handled the relations between the Bolsheviks and Turkey.<sup>18</sup> The Committee on Near East Studies, of which he was a member, conducted several leading research studies within Turkish studies.<sup>19</sup>

It was a general consensus among those writing on Turkey from a modernization perspective that Kemalism somehow led the country into the path of modernization and that the sectors of the Kemalist movement and especially Mustafa Kemal himself should be analysed in terms of authoritarian modernization.<sup>20</sup> Gilman mentions Mustafa Kemal as the first person ever to use modernization in nation building. He further argues that 'Although the idea of an all-encompassing world-historical progressive process had roots in eighteenth and nineteenth-century European thought, use of the word modernization to describe a political and economic programme was first popularized by the Turkish dictator Kemal Ataturk (1880–1938), who made the "modernization of Turkey" one of his central political slogans'. Gilman's statement reflects the general perception of Mustafa Kemal in the West. When Kemalism began to dispose of *etatism*, which was perhaps its most problematic aspect from the viewpoint of the American modernist social scientists, the authoritarianism of Mustafa Kemal was declared to be the basis of Turkey's success in modernization and its strong anti-communism.

This interest in Mustafa Kemal and Kemalism was nourished by the theory that modernism is an 'elite led' process. The modernization school paid special attention to the role of charismatic leadership and westernized bureaucracy in transforming

the traditional societies.<sup>21</sup> In addition to elite-based analyses of the social scientists, the US government recognized the importance of the political–military cadres for keeping the country on the ‘right’ course. As long as these national cadres supported alliance with the western bloc and secured the country from revolutionary politics, their authoritarian tendencies were consolidated and even legitimized.<sup>22</sup> As a matter of fact, during the 1960s, they were able to control anti-systemic dynamics under the pressure of social movements, and thus the military cadres were assigned greater roles in ruling their societies.<sup>23</sup> This policy change also promoted studies on civilian and military bureaucracy.

Although Mustafa Kemal was admired for being a radical modernizer, Kemalist modernization was presented as a new stage in the westernization process launched by Ottoman reformers. In this historical account, the course of modernization was depicted as a gradual process without any radical rupture. Thus, the successful transformation in the Turkish case was attributed to its evolutionary path, in contrast to the revolutionary change in surrounding regions. The modernization school, also in line with its concern for stability, preferred to present Turkey as one of the few countries that realized its modernization not through revolution but through evolution,<sup>24</sup> and without violence.

This explanation promoted studies on the eighteenth and nineteenth century Ottoman reforms. As stated above, there was an endeavour to elucidate the background of the contemporary political, social and economic conditions of the Arab territories through examining the Ottoman past. In other words, scholars of Turkish area studies who were curious either about modern Turkey or the reasons for flaws in Arab modernization searched for the advantageous and disadvantageous dynamics of modernization in Ottoman history. Although the focus of the studies was the reform era, the features of that period were contrasted to the traditional structure of the empire.

In this regard, there were some ground-breaking studies, which shaped perspectives on the Ottoman decline and reforms. One was *The Islamic Society and the West* written by H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen. *The Islamic Society and the West* structured Ottoman history as a constant decline after a peak expressed as ‘golden age’.<sup>25</sup> According to this interpretation the perfect balance of the ‘golden age’ of the empire was destroyed in modern times and the ruling circles of the empire found themselves obliged to trace a modernization programme. The book attracted wide acceptance among social scientists in the US and became the basis of historical accounts of the Ottoman Empire. However, in view of Gibb’s relation to the advocates and non-academic promoters of modernization paradigm such as the Council on Foreign Relations, Citino defines their work thus: ‘Gibb and Bowen transmitted Ottoman reformers’ depictions of imperial institutions to Cold War modernizers, who recycled them in defining “traditional” society.’<sup>26</sup>

The evolutionary account of Turkish modernization followed a historiographical approach known as the ‘continuity thesis’. Unlike the Kemalist version of history writing, which illustrates the foundation of the Republic as a refutation of the Ottoman past, the ‘continuity thesis’ interprets this history as being without ruptures and radical breaks. Popularization of this thesis was very much related to the exaltation of evolutionary change and stability. Furthermore, continuity was in harmony with the depiction of modernization as a unilinear path. In this regard, it



should be indicated that the perpetual influence of this reading of Ottoman-Turkish history owes much to Bernard Lewis's *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*.<sup>27</sup> In his analysis Lewis treated the history of nineteenth and twentieth century Turkey as a constant striving for westernization.

However, towards the end of the 1950s a new generation of young Turkish scholars who earned their degrees from American universities contributed to this genre of scholarship.<sup>28</sup> Their studies had significant influence on Turkish studies in the US and more on the development of social sciences at Turkish universities.

During the Cold War, academic production in general and area studies in particular was somehow germane to the struggle for hegemony. Thus there had been strong parallelism between the theses of area studies and the political-ideological highlights of US foreign policy. The Turkish case reveals some significant points on the penetration of ideas between information programmes and area studies during the Cold War. Although it is difficult to demarcate public diplomacy in this research, the information programme of the USIE/USIS is taken as representative of the perspective of American public diplomacy, especially for the 1950s. But since this programme was not isolated from other activities of public diplomacy, supplementary materials are also used.

The Department of State, since the end of the Second World War, had revised its relations with the countries in the Middle East area, including Turkey. For instance, a report published by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in 1942, paid attention to the improving 'cultural affairs' between the US and countries of the region.<sup>29</sup> However, during the 1940s one of the obstacles facing the US, which failed to act decisively on the issue, was the lasting cultural influence of Britain and France in the region. Therefore, until it developed an active Cold War regional policy, the US government had tried to revise its relations with the Middle East but encountered the problem of stepping on the toes of these colonialist powers.<sup>30</sup> The US was certainly not totally out of the region but was aware of the fact that it was not yet fit to enter a competition with other western powers in cultural and intellectual relations.

Whereas it was not ready for such an encounter, the US did inaugurate a series of new initiatives based upon the warnings of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. It had not taken long to embark on new arrangements for consolidating cultural relations. In this framework, in 1944 the appointment of ten cultural attachés to the Middle Eastern countries had been considered, but in the end, only Donald E. Webster was appointed to Ankara.

The appointment of a cultural attaché to Turkey indicated that the US had started to take heed of the cultural domain, which had not previously been associated with foreign policy. However, it should be noted that American civil organizations had been conducting activities in this domain long before this rise of awareness in the government.<sup>31</sup> Some of these activities were part of religious missionary movements in the Ottoman territories, which had commenced long before. Thus, they also took an Orientalist approach that would have a deep and enduring effect, even observed in the future Turkish Republic. In the early twentieth century, the US volunteers and staff of philanthropic foundations conducted relief campaigns in various areas of the Ottoman Empire. These campaigns were also partly related to the missionary activities. Then Anatolia was suffering from disasters such as destruction, famine and migration due to incessant wars. These activities also caused the migration of a

significant number of non-Muslim people, Greeks and Armenians, to the US. Major philanthropic foundations also dealt with treatment of diseases, improvement of hygiene conditions, and they supported the American educational institutions. This interest in Anatolia, in which the Rockefeller Foundation took the lead,<sup>32</sup> was transformed into a rather 'militant' mission of modernization starting from the Republican era. American foundations carried out activities particularly in the areas of healthcare and education, which were also useful for intellectual interaction, until a systematic programme was later launched through diplomatic channels.

After the Second World War, the first notable public diplomacy attempt came with the battleship *Missouri's* visit to Istanbul, carrying the corpse of Ambassador Münir Ertegün. The Turkish government was pleased by this act of intimidation against the Soviets. The arrival of the *Missouri* aroused great excitement in the Turkish press, which published full-page illustrated stories about the visit.<sup>33</sup> During its stay, residents of Istanbul rushed to the harbour and crowded into small boats to get on board to explore the battleship.<sup>34</sup> This visit was symbolic in the sense that it declared the beginning of the Cold War collaboration between Turkey and the US.<sup>35</sup> In addition, the *Missouri* affair heralded the inauguration of America's Cold War public diplomacy in Turkey. Henceforth, the US was involved in more organized public diplomatic activity to reinforce mutual relations in the political, military and economic fields.

The core of this systematic public diplomacy had been the information programme carried out by the USIE/USIS. The operations of these two bodies were embedded in the American diplomatic mission in Turkey.<sup>36</sup> The USIE/USIS through various cultural activities endeavoured to tailor the general atmosphere in the society favourable for the US. This is a very general explanation of the task undertaken with the information programmes. However, this task and the means for achieving it were refined to correspond with the existing social, political and ideological conditions in Turkey.

The USIE/USIS had offices in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir in the early 1950s. These offices were operated as bases which assumed responsibility for their surrounding regions. The range of programmes carried out by the USIE/USIS consisted of many fields of information gathering, including educational and exchange programmes, news services, film screening, library services, exhibitions, language education and translation programmes.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, the USIE/USIS worked as a communication channel for the flow of information and to facilitate personal relations between the two countries. USIE/USIS staff prepared programmes for educational and cultural visits from Turkey to the US and vice versa and acted as an agency for contacts and meetings of the visitors.

Among these activities, the educational exchange programme constituted the major workload of the USIE/USIS during the first years of operations. Execution of the Fulbright agreement signed between Turkey and the US, and student, instructor and specialist exchange programmes could be listed among the educational tasks of the USIE/USIS. Furthermore, they were responsible for various scholarship programmes, including 'leader scholarships', 'specialist scholarships' offered to top bureaucrats and scholarships to journalists. All these educational activities greatly



occupied the USIE/USIS. This privileged position of education in American public diplomacy was also manifest in the role ascribed to education in modernizing societies.

USIE/USIS library facilities were considered indispensable in cultural relations since they ensure one-to-one communication with different segments of society including students, teachers, technicians and professionals of various fields.<sup>38</sup> Because it enables direct contact with people, librarianship had been an important cultural task during the Cold War.<sup>39</sup> These libraries were located in central districts of cities and were designed as social spaces where especially educated people could get accustomed to the US and to American culture. In addition to American libraries, USIE/USIS librarians offered expert services to various institutions in the transition of library catalogues from the German classification system to Dewey.<sup>40</sup>

The USIE/USIS news service operated as a news agency. The service was primarily responsible for publishing news about the visits of notable Americans to Turkey or vice versa,<sup>41</sup> delivering the statements of the American leaders that directly related to Turkey, and supplying relevant visual material to the press. Another important task of the news service was to produce content for radio broadcasts for the Turkish audience and to manage the broadcasting of the *Voice of America* radio station.<sup>42</sup> The USIE/USIS news service aimed at being one of the major news and information sources for the Turkish press and through this channel shaping public opinion on critical issues in accordance with American interests. But in their relations with the Turkish press, they gave special importance to personal ties with journalists, editors and owners.<sup>43</sup>

Although the information programme of the USIE/USIS encompassed the realm of cultural relations to a large extent, there were other governmental or non-governmental institutions that undertook a complementary role. These institutions directly or indirectly assisted the USIE/USIS in achieving its goals. One was the Economic Cooperation Administration, administering the Marshall Plan programme in Turkey. After the change in the aid programme it was renamed the Mutual Security Agency. Other such entities were the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey and the United States Bureau of Public Roads. The contribution of these institutions was mostly related to their specific mission but ultimately had a wider impact in public diplomacy.

There were also joint endeavours to help Turks and Americans to have contact in daily life. In this context, the Turkish–American Friendship Association was founded, following the model of bi-national centres in Latin America.<sup>44</sup> Under the long presidency of Halide Edip, a novelist and political leader, the association was incorporated into the American information programme in Turkey. In addition, Turks and Americans founded the Turkish–American Women’s Cultural Society,<sup>45</sup> the Turkish–American University Association and the Turkish–American Culture and Friendship Association in Istanbul.<sup>46</sup> There were also semi-religious and semi-educational organizations such as the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), active especially in Istanbul. It was known for its language and accounting courses. It also worked in cooperation with the USIE.<sup>47</sup>

In fact, the Robert College of Istanbul and the Üsküdar American College for Girls, two selective American education institutions in Turkey, continued to be prominent actors in cultural relations, through their incomparable role in shaping

new generations.<sup>48</sup> The graduates of these schools held critical positions in the economic and political life of Turkey and some of them became respected intellectual figures of their time. The graduates, since they were equipped with some basic qualifications such as good knowledge of English, a high standard of education and a western value system, constituted a crucial segment of new elites who led the integration of their society into the western bloc. After the Second World War, as the US government geared up its cultural relations, Robert College also developed ambitious projects.<sup>49</sup> However, not all new initiatives were welcomed. The acknowledgement of the college as a higher education institution aroused clamour among those who were sensitive about foreign influence.<sup>50</sup>

Despite the reaction shown to the transformation of Robert College, it is still possible to say that Turkish–American cultural rapprochement encouraged the affiliated institutions of public diplomacy to undertake new projects. Above all, they were financially capable of pursuing more dynamic and demanding projects. In addition to increasing government funds, the major philanthropic foundations, which were defined as the civilian pioneers of cultural affairs, began to shoulder the financial burden of new cultural relations.<sup>51</sup> During these years, the rapidly growing Ford Foundation joined the Rockefeller and Carnegie, and more generous funds poured into the programmes carried out in Turkey.<sup>52</sup> Thus these foundations' role was dual since through their support for area studies they promoted research on Turkey while at the same time they were players on the ground through their activities. As the cultural relations programme was structured as a part of diplomatic relations, there was a need for close collaboration between the civil foundations and state institutions.

In this structure of public diplomacy as a whole, the advantage of the USIE/USIS was that it was working under the guidance and supervision of the State Department. In addition to that, the reports issued by the USIE/USIS or the country plans prepared in Washington during the 1950s demonstrated that before deciding on the elements of information programme, the general political/ideological atmosphere in Turkey was analysed as well as the needs of the American policy and also the feasibility of carrying out certain activities.

During the first half of the 1950s, in the USIE/USIS official papers, particularly in country reviews written on Turkey, it was repeatedly stated that Americans were welcomed in Turkey and they enjoyed the assistance of Turkish officials. The existence of these favourable conditions was attributed to the fierce anti-communism of the Turkish elites and even the masses. This was a point also emphasized in academic studies on Turkey. The enduring hostility against communism led Americans to define Turkey as the 'most anti-Russian and anti-communist country in the world'.<sup>53</sup> This seemed to both please and surprise the Americans. Ironically the anti-Russian public opinion, which was one of the major sources of anti-communism in Turkey, prompted even the US to act more cautiously in Turkey when commenting on Russians and communism. For instance, in correspondence on a film, *The Story of Two Cities*, the following statements were made:

Turkey is, of course, profoundly anti-Russian. Turkey's deep and abiding distrust of the Soviet Union is, perhaps, as much emotional as it is political and

economic. The peasant of Erzerum whose grandfather was killed by the Russians, is as inflexible in his hostility as is the cabinet minister of Ankara who parries Russian diplomatic thrusts.<sup>54</sup>

In the same memo, it was affirmed that there was no real necessity to conduct an exclusive anti-communist propaganda in Turkey since Turks have their own peculiar reasons to be anti-communist and that they might react negatively to anyone who dared to teach them about their 'own enemies'. Furthermore, the Americans had concerns that anti-communist propaganda might trigger curiosity in a country where there was no particular interest in communism.<sup>55</sup> Thus because of these reasons the US reduced anti-communism in its cultural activities in the country.<sup>56</sup>

Turkey's natural anti-communism eased the information programme to a certain extent through removing the burden of developing tools for fuelling anti-communist feelings among the intellectuals, governing circles and ordinary people. When the cultural activities in Turkey are compared to those conducted in Europe, for instance, this constituted one of its distinctive characteristics.

In Europe, alongside continuous delivery of anti-communist messages, American cultural activities aimed at impressing the intellectual circles by exhibiting quality cultural products adapted to the characteristics of 'high culture'.<sup>57</sup> Although there were also attempts in Turkey to change the negative opinions of intellectuals who regarded the Americans as money-minded people lacking a taste for high culture,<sup>58</sup> when compared to the endeavours in Europe, these attempts remained marginal. In fact, it is possible to argue further that activities in Turkey were strikingly different from those in Europe in the sense that they did not primarily address artists or intellectuals but bureaucratic-technocratic elites and a group composed of teachers, engineers and other professionals who were implementing the modernization projects in their fields.<sup>59</sup> The primary reason for the secondary importance of the intellectuals was the weakness of leftist voices in the political and ideological debates during the 1950s, in contrast to Europe or the Middle East where socialist thinkers and artists through their works and ideas dominated intellectual life. In the latter case intellectuals were also highly critical of the US hegemony. In Turkey only a small group of intellectuals criticized the growing American hegemony, but under the conditions of oppressive anti-communism of those years these few people had already been isolated from society and their influence on the ideological atmosphere was minimized.<sup>60</sup>

In accordance with the prescriptions of modernization theory suggested to the non-western world, Americans were more interested in building ties with those whom they considered vital for governing and modernizing Turkey. At the head of this group came different sectors of the bureaucracy and technically skilled people. The information programme gave priority to having an influence on these groups, although intellectuals or ordinary workers and peasants were not totally neglected.

According to the Americans, one of the deficiencies of Turkey was the lack of human resources. For instance, while carrying out aid programmes in Turkey they faced difficulty in finding people who spoke their language, who understood what they were asked, and who had the adequate knowledge and skill to fulfil complicated tasks. That is why education had been one of the principal issues they dealt with.

However, the importance attributed to education was not because of practical concerns only but was directly related to the modernist approach that assumed education as one of the primary instruments of social change. Thus, most of the USIE/USIS workload stemmed from duties related to education or training activities. The close cooperation between the Ministry of National Education and the USIE/USIS, the joint education projects with various institutions including Gazi Teachers' College, collaboration with the universities, teacher and scholar exchanges, film exhibitions at schools and library services were among those activities in the field of education. On the other hand, considering that the modernist elites in Turkey historically have had a tendency to regard education as the key to solving social problems, education stood out as the most convenient area of communication between elites in Turkey and the American 'modernizers'. This shared vision could explain the collaboration between the USIE/USIS and the Turkish Ministry of National Education in various projects.

In the first phase, the exchange programmes enabled many American scholars and experts to come to Turkey and be assigned posts in universities or state institutions. In most cases these people played a critical role in the transformation of the areas they were assigned to. For instance, especially in the social sciences at universities they replaced the German émigré scholars who had escaped from the Nazis and come to Turkey in the 1930s. It would be wrong to think that Americans simply undertook the role of the Germans. In some disciplines such as medicine or areas related to agricultural education, American scholars had a constituent role. At ministries American experts guided public administration reform. In the 1950s almost all ministries hosted American experts to counsel the ministry in its organizational structure and in its areas of responsibility.

The notion of expertise had always been an important component of modernization ideology. It was thought that countries could obtain it either through the import of expertise or through local technocratic elites. However for the sustainability of the model, after a brief period of outsourcing the countries were required to provide expertise depending on their own resources. From after the Second World War until the end of the 1950s, the exchange of persons was one of the major functions of the information programme in Turkey. This inflow of people could be deemed the import of expertise. But beginning from the last years of the 1950s, this traffic of persons had begun to slow down. Turks who were equipped with the necessary qualifications were to replace the foreigners in most fields.

The USIE/USIS records further elucidate these features of public diplomacy, particularly when defining the target groups of the activities. The USIE country reviews confirm the idea that the educated classes in Turkey were highlighted as the pioneers of modernization, rather than sectors to be drawn into an ideological struggle. Bureaucrats (particularly young bureaucrats), teachers and students (particularly instructors), technicians and professionals were labelled as the primary target groups in the 1950s country planning of the USIE.<sup>61</sup> The country planning indicates that the US information programme, rather than propagating anti-communism, rested on two other objectives: introducing the US to Turkish elites and thus convincing those people of the friendship of the Americans and, in the wide meaning of the term, training these people to best fit the needs of the modernization process.

In conclusion, the focus of the information programme in Turkey was not intellectuals and artists but bureaucrats, educators and technicians. As stated above, this was also related to the development strategy of the modernization paradigm. Anti-communist hysteria in Turkey, which had already silenced the intellectuals who inclined towards socialism, public sector reform and the needs of the American aid programmes, rendered those groups important for the Americans. It should be emphasized that the application of the Marshall Plan led the USIE to design the information programme according to the needs of the aid operations. In this regard, the USIE/USIS invited American experts to assume positions at ministries, set training courses for technicians and bureaucrats in various fields and even included technical titles in the library catalogues and, for film screenings, selected themes related to the US aid programmes.

Apart from the educated classes, the USIE/USIS conducted propaganda activities which addressed the masses but were not as comprehensive. The primary tool of the USIE/USIS to promote the US and its worldview to the peasants was the mobile film screenings in the countryside. Although there were questions about the impressions these films might create in the minds of peasants, still the USIE/USIS approved their screening in villages, which gathered a wide audience. The films were selected to attract the interest of peasants. Most of them were about agricultural production, an effective theme for addressing the peasants and relevant for the agricultural modernization task of the Marshall Plan. Furthermore, through films the American rituals of business conduct and modern lifestyle were introduced to the Turkish peasants, who were suffering from 'poverty and backwardness'. The peasants, who became familiar with the 'modern' through these films,<sup>62</sup> also, after a while, listened to the *Voice of America* broadcasts. The films and the *Voice of America* were the only means for the Americans to reach out to the countryside. The radio broadcasts included programmes that might draw peasants' interest, since radio had widening access to rural population as its footprint expanded. An evaluation of the efforts to reach out to the peasants shows that the importance of the peasantry was derived from the aid programmes. In fact, as stated above, the peasantry in Turkey was not a source of worry because it provided an assurance of stability rather than a source of revolutionary tumult, as it was the case in some parts of the 'developing' world.

One other feature of the American public diplomacy was compatible with the role endorsed for Turkey in the Middle East. The abovementioned attitude of analysing Turkish modernization in the context of problems of modernization in the Middle East manifested itself also in the diplomatic policy pursued in Turkey. Especially until Turkey's membership of NATO, Turkey's place in the Cold War struggle was defined in the context of Middle Eastern affairs. Thus the mission cut out for Turkey could be summarized as acting as a facilitator of western politics in the region as one of the closest allies of the 'free world'. However, regarding Turkey's role in the Middle East the policies of two powers, Britain and the US, did not completely overlap. Britain, insisted that Turkey's primary responsibility had to be helping the political and military projects of the western bloc in the Middle East, while Americans were not so insistent.<sup>63</sup> In fact it seemed that on the part of the US,



Turkey's role was conceived as a solidification of a 'model' rather than being an ambitious political and military player in the Middle East.

In this vein, Turkey was chosen as the headquarters of a couple of new initiatives regarding the region. One was the foundation of the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East (TODAIE) in 1952.<sup>64</sup> This institute was designed as a training and research centre for public administration and bureaucracy. After the Second World War, the US government set public administration reform as a precondition for technical aid,<sup>65</sup> and such institutes were thought to be instrumental in spreading a modern-rational approach in the realm of public administration. TODAIE came after other examples and was founded as a regional institute like its predecessor in Brazil, which was then serving Latin America.<sup>66</sup> But in time it appeared that TODAIE did not receive the regional attention that had been anticipated and lost its regional function.<sup>67</sup>

Another initiative was the foundation of the Middle East Technical University (METU) as the first Turkish university organized according to the American university model. At the beginning METU had a regional identity and enrolled a small number of students from the region. Complementary to the function of TODAIE in the modernization of the country, METU was thought to be a source of technical personnel educated in western standards. This was also a response to the complaints of the Americans about the lack of well-educated personnel.<sup>68</sup> According to the mission set for METU, the university would meet that deficit not only for Turkey but for the whole region. Although METU became a long-lasting project, it could not carry on this regional responsibility indefinitely. However, in both cases, TODAIE and METU, the US government and non-governmental foundations contributed to these projects particularly through enabling the exchange of persons. The visitors who held various posts at different stages of the establishment of these institutions brought in knowledge, technique and experience for modernizing the relevant field in the American way.

If one seeks a common motto for the Cold War American policy and social sciences, this would be 'stability beyond everything'. Behind the developmentalist policies lay a concern to ameliorate conditions in the non-western world in order to avoid social turbulence. Despite the dominance of this concern, in the first half of the 1950s Americans came out with a change in their strategy of establishing stability. Towards the end of this era the US government was more convinced of the need for coercive intervention rather than waiting for the evolutionary adoption of western values. This process was remarkably parallel to what Citino gives as a reason for change of emphasis in Turkish studies: 'the military-strategic priorities'. This positive attitude towards 'authoritarian' policies was triggered by the emergence of revolutionary uprisings in Asia, such as the Chinese revolution and the incidents in the Korean peninsula. Especially, the latter urged the US government to act more vigorously in its struggle against communism.

The overall effect of the Korean War on public diplomacy had been the enhancement of anti-communist propaganda. Public diplomacy in this new era gained new momentum and thus the ideological struggle was intensified in some critical areas. The Campaign of Truth inaugurated by the Truman administration



supplied additional funds for information activities. The reflection of this process in Turkey was that the information programme carried out by the USIE/USIS was upgraded in terms of funding, staff and range of activities.<sup>69</sup> The augmentation of public diplomacy in Turkey was further stimulated by Turkey's decision to send a brigade to fight in Korea against communist forces. People, especially through radio broadcasts and films about the Korean War, which were telling them about the heroism of Turkish troops 'fighting against red communism' in Korea, were inclined to believe in the 'sincerity' of Americans' friendship. Hence, USIE/USIS activities about the war reached a wide audience.

However, the most significant result of the Korean War had been an increasing sensibility of the US administration to the military cooperation between two countries. Following the Korean War, Turkey was accepted into NATO in 1952, which further intensified the military relations. Hence, the public diplomacy instruments in Turkey started to give the message that American aid strengthened the Turkish military.<sup>70</sup> This message aimed at winning the sympathy of the Turkish people, for whom military strength had always been important. More importantly, it was a message targeting the military officers

The emphasis on military modernization was also compatible with the 'authoritarian modernization' paradigm, which was embraced especially at the end of the 1950s. The early interpretation of modernization paradigm, which gave priority to economic changes and rested on an optimistic evolutionary process, reached a deadlock. The eruption of anti-systemic movements in different geographies concerned the US government. The Korean War had been an early alarm for the Americans to realize that the optimism of the early Cold War years regarding the stability of the capitalist system should be replaced by a 'realistic' focus on military build-up. As a result, the military officers were now seen as shepherds of the masses for preventing instability and anti-systemic turbulence. This process had implications also for narrating the history. For instance, in the Turkish case Mustafa Kemal was now appreciated as a model for military cadres since he managed change without revolution and kept his society in the western system without long-term instability.

The USIE/USIS films could be considered as a mirror and summary of the American perspective while they were either analysing or developing policy for Turkey. First, it should be noted that the films chosen for Turkish audiences unveiled the colonial substance concealed in this perspective. The themes of films such as *Prevention of Malaria* or films about hygiene elucidated how the modernization paradigm in some respects preserves an Orientalist spirit. Another striking point about the film programme was that through films it was aimed at familiarizing Turkish people with the American way of doing things. *An Election Day in the US* or *Cotton Farmer Builds a Better House* exemplified this aim through presenting the American way of doing politics or the American way of everyday life. On the other hand, *Our Friend America* and *America is Wonderful* were the films chosen to convince people of the friendship of the US. The last but widest category consisted of films, shown as complementary to the targets of the aid programmes. *Hoover Dam*, *Factory Worker Turns Farmer*, *Valley of Tennessee* were creating admiration for

American development projects while teaching people how to carry out technical modernization especially in agriculture. As explained in this article, although the American perspective was a combination of all these aspects, the last point was dominant in studies on Turkey and diplomatic policy applied in this country. The emphasis on modernization and aid programmes further incorporated the authoritarian methods of modernization beginning from the end of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s and 1970s. That urged Americans to develop special ties with military officers and a young technocratic cadre in Turkey. These technocrats, like Süleyman Demirel and Turgut Özal, were the technicians of the modernization programme but they would become leaders of political life and close friends of the Americans.

### Notes

1. G. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish–American Studies in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), p.26.
2. The United States Information and Education and Exchange Act of 1948 had been the basis of overseas information and education exchange activities. The USIE (United States Information and Exchange), which operated between 1948 and 1952, could be defined as the predecessor of the USIS (United States Information Service). However, during the Cold War, the United States Information Agency (USIA), which was founded by the Eisenhower administration, was primarily responsible for US public diplomacy efforts. The USIS was the name given to the overseas branches of the USIA. In this article, considering the continuity between the activities of the USIE and USIS in Turkey, both are included in the analysis as if they were one institutional body and the differences between their approaches, organization and functions are neglected.
3. Countries like Turkey, Greece and Iran came to the agenda of US public opinion by the early years of the Cold War. Introductory books on Turkey written in those years aimed at satisfying the curiosity of public opinion and guiding the American staff that would serve in Turkey. As examples of these books see L.V. Thomas and R.N. Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), and T.D. Roberts, *Area Handbook for the Republic of Turkey* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1970), prepared for the American University by Systems Research Corporation.
4. Research missions sent to Turkey influenced the policies of Turkish governments. A delegation sent by the Twentieth Century Fund and headed by Max Weston Thornburg wrote a relatively extensive report on the general view of the Turkish economy. Thornburg recommended abandoning state control of the economy. Furthermore, Thornburg argued that the future of the Turkish economy would depend on its performance in agricultural production. The ‘Thornburg report’ had a profound impact on government policies and Thornburg himself was accepted as a ‘friend of Turkey’. Following Thornburg, Turkey invited the James Barker mission from the World Bank. The Barker mission reiterated the ‘Thornburg report’ in many respects, but its main concern was public administration reform. Apart from these two missions, the Democrat Party government invited oilman Max Ball. The oil law was amended according to his suggestions and the oil market was opened to foreign investment.
5. For criticism of modernization theory and its relation to the Cold War American policy, see N. Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), and M. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and ‘National Building’ in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
6. Modernization theory attributed psychological identities to societies by dividing the non-Western world into ‘healthy’ and ‘pathological’ cases. Those pursuing the modernist mentality were appreciated as healthy nations while areas witnessing social and political turbulences were condemned as pathologies.
7. D.A. Rustow, ‘Middle East’, in L.W. Pye (ed.), *Political Science and Area Studies, Rivals or Partners?* (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1975), p.174.

8. It should be noted that George McGhee, who had been assigned to this bureau, later served as the US Ambassador to Turkey from 1952 to 1953.
9. D. Quataert and S. Sayarı (eds.), *Turkish Studies in the United States* (Bloomington: Indiana University Ottoman and Modern Turkish Studies Publications, 2003), pp.vii, viii.
10. The prominent scholars of Turkish studies were Richard N. Frye, Roderic H. Davison, S.N. Eisenstadt, Frederick W. Frey, William Hale, Zvi Yehuda Hershlag, Jacob M. Landau, Bernard Lewis, Dankwart A. Rustow, Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Howard Reed, Frank Tachau and Walter F. Weiker.
11. Huntington was writing extensively on land reform and rural stability. According to him, 'the key to political stability is the extent to which the rural masses are mobilized into politics within the existing political system rather than against the system'. Thus, land distribution in some countries was considered as the warrant of stability. S.P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp.74–7.
12. It was ironic that the Democrat Party emerged out of the opposition to *Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu* (Land Reform Bill). The bill was proposed by the one party government and came to the parliament in 1945. The bill passed from the parliament but its real effect remained very limited. In the end the government distributed some parcels of state-owned land, but this barely changed the structure of landownership in Turkey.
13. During the 1950s and 1960s Turkey's rural structure and peasantry was analysed in the following studies: F.W. Frey, *Rural Development Research Project: Report* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International Studies, 1967); A.P. Stirling, *Turkish Village* (New York: Wiley, 1966); M.W. Thornburg, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949); B. Helling and G. Helling, *Rural Turkey – A New Socio-Statistical Appraisal* (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi, 1958).
14. N.J. Citino, 'The Ottoman Legacy in Cold War Modernization', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.40 (2008), pp. 579–597 (p.585).
15. İsmet Pasha instructed the delegation to San Francisco Conference to deliver the message that Turkey would embrace western political model.
16. Dankwart Rustow was a well-known figure in the field of Turkish studies in the 1950s and he was also very close to the foreign policy makers in Washington.
17. See B. Cumings, 'Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies during and after the Cold War', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol.29 (1997), <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/cumings2.htm> (accessed 20 May 2011). Rustow wrote a comparison of Turkey and Japan, although its direct relation with the abovementioned suggestion is unknown. Also see D.A. Rustow, 'Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey (1920–1955)', in R. Frye (ed.), *Islam and the West* (Lahey: Mlouton, 1997).
18. See D.A. Rustow, *The Appeal of Communism to Islamic Peoples* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1965).
19. John Kingsley Birge presented his book, which was an introductory work for Turkish area studies to this committee. See J.K. Birge, *A Guide to Turkish Area Study* (Washington: Committee on Near Eastern Studies, American Council of Learned Societies, 1949).
20. Aykut Kansu gives a list of those books on Mustafa Kemal period written in the West from modernization perspective. See A. Kansu, *1908 Devrimi* [The Revolution of 1908] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p.13.
21. According to this paradigm, as Gilman indicates, 'All modernizing societies were led by [modernizing elites], who by definition possessed "modern" psycho-cultural traits. These elites would bend populations to their modernizing will'. Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, p.101.
22. For a typical example of this approach see D. Lerner and R.D. Robinson, 'Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force', *World Politics*, Vol.13, No.1 (Oct. 1960), pp.19–44.
23. Then the role of military in Turkish modernization attracted more attention. Rustow's works illustrates this rising interest. See D.A. Rustow, 'The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic', *World Politics*, Vol.11, No.4 (July 1959), pp.513–52.
24. Kansu, *1908 Devrimi*, p.11.
25. H.A. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East* (London, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950). Islamoğlu and

- Keyder mention *Islamic Society and the West* along with Halil İnalçık's *The Ottoman Empire* as two studies dealing with 'golden age' and institutional decline. İ. İslamoğlu and Ç. Keyder, 'Agenda for Ottoman History', *Review*, Vol.1, No.1 (Summer 1997), pp.32–6.
26. Citino, 'The Ottoman Legacy', p.591.
  27. B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1961).
  28. Kemal Karpat and Şerif Mardin were among them. Mardin's *The Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thought*, which reflected the elite-led modernization strategy, was one of the most influential studies in Ottoman-Turkish history.
  29. F. Ninkovich, *A Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.51.
  30. Even for the first years of the Cold War, it was yet possible to mention a rivalry between British and American propaganda. See J.R. Vaughan, *The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945–1957: Unconquerable Minds* (London: Macmillan, 2005), pp.178–91.
  31. American archaeologists' endeavours in Anatolia should be mentioned for their role in strengthening cultural relations during the foundation years of the Turkish Republic. Their discoveries helped to arouse interest in the study of Turkey's ancient past. See J. Goode, 'Archaeology and Diplomacy in the Republic of Turkey, 1919–39', in M. Aydın and Ç. Erhan (eds.), *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p.63. Thus they contributed to the formation of Turkish nationalism, which rested on a new national history from this ancient past.
  32. For an analysis on the activities of the Rockefeller Foundation in Turkey see M. Erdem and K.W. Rose, 'American Philanthropy in Republican Turkey: The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations', in *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Special Issue on 200 Years of Turkish-American Relations*, Vol.31 (2000), pp.131–57.
  33. The headline of the semi-official newspaper, *Ulus*, was in English: 'Welcome Missouri'. See 'Welcome Missouri', *Ulus*, 6 April 1946.
  34. These scenes of rushing people are narrated in a story written by N. Tirali, *Yirmibeş Kuruşa Amerika* [America for Twenty-Five Kurush] (Istanbul: Yazko, 1983). The title of the story comes from the shouting of the rowers.
  35. While the US declared the inauguration of public diplomacy by sending Missouri to Turkey, Turkey responded by founding the Turkish Information Bureau in New York. The main task of the bureau was to create a positive image of Turkey in the American public opinion. American authorities welcomed the activities of the bureau. See L.V. Thomas and R.N. Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran* (New York: Archon Books, 1971), p.151.
  36. But the Turkish government did not accept the diplomatic status of USIE staff and this caused crisis between the two countries. See S. Shepard Jones to NEA, Mr. McGhee, *Instruction For Your Signature*, 10 Sept. 1951, Department of State Decimal Files, 1950–54, RG59, Cultural Affairs Near East, Box 2491, NARA.
  37. At first, they prepared English–Turkish Redhouse dictionary for publishing in collaboration with the Rockefeller Foundation. John Kingley Birge and a group of other editors participated in this project.
  38. At the beginning libraries were affiliated with the War Information Office of the US. Later in 1945 they were reopened as libraries for public use. For one of the detailed accounts about library facilities written partly by librarians see Embassy Ankara to the Department of State, *February 1950, USIE Activities in Turkey*, 27 March 1950, Department of State Decimal Files, 1950–54, RG59, Cultural Affairs Near East, Box 2491, NARA.
  39. For the influence of the Cold War ideological rivalry on libraries, librarians and book publishing, see the special issue of the *Library and Culture* journal entitled 'Cold War Libraries', *Library and Culture*, Vol.36, No.1 (Winter 2001).
  40. In addition, with the financial contribution of the Ford Foundation a librarianship chair was founded at Ankara University. In fact it was founded as an institution but later integrated into the university as a chair. American scholars took an active role during the institutionalization period of the education and research. Until 1964 scholar exchange had been funded by the Ford Foundation, but later American scholars came on Fulbright fellowships. O. Ersoy, 'Ankara Üniversitesi DTCF Kütüphanecilik Bölümü' nün Onbeş Yılı' [The Fifteen Years of Ankara University DTCF Department of Librarianship], p.1, [http://www.kutuphaneci.org.tr/web/node.php?action=6&type=6&target=contentShow&id=1709&node\\_id=348](http://www.kutuphaneci.org.tr/web/node.php?action=6&type=6&target=contentShow&id=1709&node_id=348) (accessed 17 Oct. 2011).

41. One good example of this service was the USIS news releases about Celal Bayar's trip to the US. For a collection of these news pieces see H. Bars, 'Türkiye III. Reisicumhuru Sayın Celâl Bayar'ın Birleşik Amerika Devletlerini Ziyaretleri' [The Visit of Turkey's Third President Celâl Bayar to the US] (407 Sayılı Donanma Dergisi Eki, İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 1954).
42. After a short while radio broadcasting was conducted from Washington.
43. For a collection of reports on the Turkish press by American diplomats see R.N. Bali, *An Overview of the Turkish Press through the Reports of American Diplomats* (İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık, 2011).
44. Embassy Ankara to Department of State, *Semi Annual Report on Turkey*, 9 July 1951, Department of State Decimal Files, 1950–54, RG59, Cultural Affairs Near East, Box 2491, NARA.
45. Wives of American staff in Turkey participated in the activities of this society. For instance, they took part in the organization of English teaching classes for children.
46. One noteworthy activity of the association was the conference held in Yalova, which assembled prominent Turkish social scientists from different disciplines. During the conference state of the art of social sciences in Turkey was discussed in length. See Turkish–American University Association, *Report on the Conference on Problems of Research in Turkey* (İstanbul: Turkish-American University Association, 1953).
47. However, it also drew reaction from conservative sectors of the political life. Not their courses but their parties and balls, because they gathered young women and men together, became the subject of discussion in the conservative newspapers and even at the national assembly. See 'Talebe Yurdu mu? Yoksa Bar mı?' [Dormitory or Bar?], *Sebilürreşad*, Vol.2, No.41 (April 1949), pp.255–6. At the national assembly parliamentarian Hasan Dincer put a question on the issue.
48. From the memos about the mission of this college the following comments are worth citing: '[the most influential persons], were willing to let their daughters, at a very tender age, come into the orbit of American influence. [A]pparently, the girls who attend these schools tend to become wives of leading men in each generation, and, of course, the mothers of the leaders of the future'. R.L. Riley, *Report of Overseas Trip*, Nov. 1957, RG 59 Department of State, Records of the Board of Foreign Scholarship, 1950–63, Container 98, NARA.
49. Among these projects the college inaugurated a bilingual and bicultural humanities programme.
50. In the mid-1950s a discussion had erupted around Robert College's acknowledgement as a higher education institution. The deal between the US and Turkish governments was to transmit a nuclear reactor to Turkey on the condition that Turkey would permit the college to be transformed into a university. Since the status of foreign schools was defined in the Lausanne Treaty and foundation of a foreign university was criticized as a violation of the Lausanne. Zafer Toprak cited the debate in detail. See Z. Toprak, 'Türkiye'de Amerikan Üniversitesi Sorunu: Demokrat Parti, Lozan ve Robert Koleji' [The American University Problem in Turkey: Democrat Party, Lausanne and Robert College], *Toplumsal Tarih*, No.120 (Dec. 2003), pp.92–7.
51. The American philanthropic organizations had undertaken new responsibilities in the Cold War. They partly redefined their task as to complement the government policies and informing the public opinion. D.C. Hammack, 'Foundations in the American Polity, 1900–1950', in E.C. Lagemann (ed.), *Philanthropic Foundations: New Scholarship, New Possibilities* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p.44.
52. The Rockefeller Foundation spent \$16 million in Turkey between 1952 and 1971. See Erdem and Rose, 'American Philanthropy in Republican Turkey', p.132. The Ford Foundation during the 1950s and 1960s gave half of the total fellowship it awarded in Turkey for 60 years. K.W. Rose, 'The Rockefeller Foundation's Fellowship Program in Turkey, 1925–1983' (paper presented at 'The First Turks in America', held at Yeditepe University in İstanbul, 4 Jan. 2003), p.13.
53. Embassy Ankara to the Department of State, *Semi-Annual Evaluation Report on Turkey*, November 30, 1950, 8 March 1951, Department of State Decimal Files, 1950–54, RG59, Cultural Affairs Near East, Box 2491, NARA.
54. Ankara to Department of State, *Motion Pictures: Story of Two Cities*, 18 Jan. 1950, Department of State Decimal Files, 1950–54, RG 59, Cultural Affairs: Near East, Box 2491, NARA.
55. Ibid.
56. Limited anti-Soviet or anti-communist material was produced or distributed directly, other than the 'anti-communist' anecdotes to be published in the press and the translated works to defame the Soviet Union. It is also known that such material was especially offered for use in local press, often upon request.



57. For comprehensive researches on the American cultural policy in Europe see V.R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone Between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), and F.S. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: New Press, 2000).
58. It is possible to find the comments of American diplomats on the negative perceptions of American culture by Turkish elite. Just one example from part of a report on music recordings in the libraries: 'But they have reached an important and influential elite, and have tended to do away with the impression that Americans are proficient only in business and money-making'. From Ankara to Department of State, *USIE Country Paper-Turkey*, 27 July 1950, Department of State Decimal Files, 1950-54, RG 59, Cultural Affairs: Near East, Box 2492, NARA.
59. The more appropriate comparison with the Turkish case would in some respects be South Korea. During the Cold War South Korea was also following a strategy of development. In his book on this process Brazinsky explains how the US government rebuilt the relations between intellectuals and government, thus urged the intellectual class to contribute in their country's endeavours for development. For this analysis see G. Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), pp.163-88.
60. Periodicals that were criticizing the US interventions, such as *Zincirli Hürriyet* and *Markopaşa*, were under constant pressure and were eventually banned. The members of Peacelovers Association were arrested because of a pamphlet criticizing the Korean War.
61. *USIE Country Paper-Turkey*.
62. Although it was germane to public diplomacy, the enormous effect of Hollywood films is not covered here.
63. See A. Sever, *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Orta Doğu 1945-1958* (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1997).
64. The World Bank report entitled 'The Economy of Turkey - An Analysis and Recommendations for a Development Program', known as 'Barker Report', referring James M. Barker, the head of the committee that wrote the report, instigated the foundation of the institute.
65. The US administration gave special importance to public administration reform. In this context public administration education in Turkey was also reconsidered. Other than the foundation of TODAIE, a new exchange programme was launched between the faculty of New York University and the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University. Again from the Political Science Faculty a group of faculty members had the opportunity to carry out their studies at South California University. For more information see C. Mıhçıoğlu, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Kamu Yönetimi Öğretiminin Başlangıç Yılları* [The First Years of Modern Public Administration Education in Turkey] (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1988), pp.6-7.
66. N. Abadan, 'Amme İdaresinde Son Gelişmeler', *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol.11, No.3 (September 1956), pp. 402-22.
67. Between 1953 and 1957 a total of 47 foreign students enrolled in the institute. However, it is not clear whether these people came to Turkey and finished their studies. After a short while the funds supplied by the United Nations were cut. This impeded the institute from fulfilling its regional mission. But the primary reason for the ending of this mission was the foundation of another institute in Cairo in 1954. Mıhçıoğlu, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Kamu*, p.26.
68. Kemal Karpat defines the purpose of METU as 'There people would be trained who have practical mentality, can work smoothly, who aggregate planning and executive skills with technical knowledge.' K. Karpat, 'Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversite ve Zaruri Bir Müdafaa' [Middle East Technical University and An Obligatory Defence], *Forum*, Vol.12, No.136 (15 Oct. 1959), pp.7-10.
69. Embassy Ankara to the Department of State, *Psychological Offensive*, 20 Nov. 1950, Department of State Decimal Files, 1950-54, RG59, Cultural Affairs Near East, Box 2491, NARA.
70. From Embassy, Ankara to the Department of State, Washington, *Semi-Evaluation Report for USIS Turkey for the Period Nov 30, 1951 to May 31, 1952*, 9 June 1952, Department of State Decimal Files, 1950-54, RG 59, Cultural Affairs: Near East, Box 2492, NARA. Replacement of Ambassador George Wadsworth by George McGhee in 1950 was also a strong factor in intensification of public diplomacy.