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Turkish Labour Migration to Germany: Impact on Both Economies

Gottfried E. Völker

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to show the impact of Turkish labour migration. While in the past the topic has been mainly discussed with respect to either the German or the Turkish economy, this is an attempt to show and evaluate the impact on both economies simultaneously.

Looking at earlier discussions only from the German point of view, it seems as if the attitude to the problem is closely related to Germany's business cycles. In the early 1960's, during the period of fast economic growth, most authors mainly emphasized the advantages of labour migration. In the recession of 1966/1967, Carl Föhl¹ pointed out that the use of migrant workers might have highly adverse effects for the host country. Yet the following economic recovery dampened Föhl's ideas and again authors pointed out the good points of labour migration. Today, amid an economic slow-down, a new discussion has started about the effects of mass transfers of workers to Germany.² Economists are increasingly doubtful about the long-term usefulness of foreign workers.

To demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages, it seems necessary to begin with a general discussion of the demand for and supply of Turkish migrant workers. Given the market situation for Turkish workers as a base, the impact of labour migration to Germany can be evaluated by the testing of the following hypotheses:

First, it is advantageous for the German economy to employ Turkish and other foreign workers, because (1) it increases wealth in Germany, (2) it keeps wages and prices relatively stable, and (3) it helps to maintain full employment.

Second, it is advantageous for the Turkish economy to allow workers to go abroad for employment, because (1) they get professional training, (2) they earn foreign exchange, (3) the domestic unemployment rate is reduced, (4) Turkey's wealth increases, and (5) it reduces social and economic conflicts.

THE MARKET FOR TURKISH WORKERS IN GERMANY

A. Demand for Turkish Workers

At the end of 1971, more than 2.2 million foreign workers were employed in Germany. They made up about 10 per cent of the total German labour force. Of these, approximately 20 per cent are Turkish.

There are at least six major reasons for the great demand for foreign workers in Germany. First, foreign workers are required to make up for the loss of labour occasioned by the construction of the 'Berlin Wall'. In the

early 1950's many Germans fled from East Germany to West Germany. In the beginning the inflowing stream of workers and their families inflated the unemployment figures. However, after a time their addition to the domestic demand for goods and services led to increased industrial production and consequently to a greater number of jobs. With the construction of the 'Berlin Wall' in 1961, the inflow of people from the East almost completely stopped. If Germany had been a closed economy, the sudden halt in this inflow of people would have resulted in a sharp decrease in the growth rate of domestic demand for goods and services. This would have created an economic recession. However, Germany was heavily engaged in meeting international demand for its goods, and 'over-employment' followed.

Second, foreign workers were also required to make up for labour shortages arising out of the changes in the German school system. At the end of World War II, the German 'Volksschule' had just eight grades. In the 1960's, with the school reform in some of the States, a ninth and a tenth grade were added. In addition, more students stayed on in the 'Gymnasium' and at the universities. The higher school-leaving age together with the resultant tendency of Germans to seek more specialized jobs, were a further cause for the severe domestic labour shortage.

Third, foreign workers were needed to fill the gap created by a prolongation of the period of military service from twelve to eighteen months in the early 1960's

Fourth, foreign workers were required because of a change in the age composition of the working population. Table 1 shows that the ratio of the working population is expected to decrease while the total population increases between 1965 and 1975. After 1975 it is expected that the ratio of the working population will increase at a faster rate than the total population.

Fifth, it is likely that more foreign workers will be needed to compensate for the fulfilment of labour unions' demands: shorter working hours, more vacations, and earlier retirement.³

TABLE 1
INDEX OF TOTAL AND WORKING POPULATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
BETWEEN 1965 AND 1980
1965 = 100

<i>Year</i>	<i>Working Age Population (%)</i>	<i>Total Population (%)</i>
1965	100	100
1970	98.5	102
1975	98.2	104
1980	102	105

Source: OECD Observer, Paris, October 1966, p. 21.

TABLE 2
FOREIGN WORKERS EMPLOYED IN GERMANY

Date	Foreign Workers		Turkey	Italy	Jugoslavia	Greece	Spain	Other Countries
	Total (x1000)	In Per cent of Total Working Population						
31.7.1960	279.4	1.3	2,500	121,700	8,800	12,000	9,500	123,900
30.9.1961	548.9	2.5	—	224,600	—	52,300	61,800	210,200
30.9.1962	711.5	3.2	18,600	276,800	23,600	80,700	94,000	217,800
30.9.1963	828.7	3.7	33,000	287,000	—	116,900	119,600	272,200
30.9.1964	985.6	4.4	85,200	296,200	53,000	154,800	151,100	240,000
30.9.1965	1,216.8	5.7	132,800	372,300	64,000	187,200	182,800	263,700
30.9.1966	1,313.5	6.1	161,200	391,300	96,600	194,600	178,200	270,500
30.9.1967	991.3	4.7	131,300	266,800	95,700	140,300	118,000	221,200
30.9.1968	1,089.9	5.2	153,000	304,000	119,000	145,000	116,000	232,900
30.9.1969	1,501.4	7.0	244,300	349,000	265,000	191,200	143,100	279,300
30.9.1970	1,949.0	9.1	353,900	381,800	423,300	242,200	171,700	331,300
30.9.1971	2,239.3	10.3	452,700	407,900	478,200	268,500	186,500	365,000

Source: Der Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung. No. IIc. Bonn, August 9, 1971.

TABLE 3
TURKISH WORKERS EMPLOYED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

States	June 30									
	1963	1964	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971		
Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg	2,370	3,562	7,887	7,431	7,216	10,223	15,975	23,892		
Niedersachsen, Bremen	1,156	3,797	11,557	9,436	10,001	15,663	25,731	34,382		
Nordrhein-Westfalen	10,820	26,996	51,929	42,349	40,033	59,622	94,549	121,916		
Hessen	2,062	5,867	14,332	13,465	14,173	21,873	30,907	43,252		
Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland	590	2,052	5,648	4,634	3,963	6,169	10,882	15,334		
Baden-Württemberg	5,615	16,114	34,231	29,761	33,005	49,269	69,135	84,202		
Bayern	4,248	10,467	28,762	25,602	24,872	38,443	58,016	71,012		
Berlin (West)	283	356	3,632	4,403	6,073	11,689	22,790	30,384		
Total	27,144	69,211	157,978	137,081	139,336	212,951	327,985	424,374		
Women (incl. in Total)	2,977	6,931	26,125	25,389	30,169	46,997	72,036	91,365		

Source: Der Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung No. IIc Bonn, August 9, 1971.

Sixth, more foreign workers will be required to satisfy foreign workers' demands for goods and services. Tuchtfeldt points out in the case of Switzerland, a situation has developed in which the 'income effects are larger than the capacity and productivity effects', so that 'a growing number of foreign workers is needed to satisfy the needs of foreign workers'.⁴

Between 1961 and 1971, Turkish workers were employed for about 1.8 million man/years in Germany. Table 2 shows the distribution of this work over time. Except for the recession of 1966/1967, the number of Turks employed in Germany increased at an average rate of 40 per cent per annum. In 1971 more than 450,000 Turks were employed in Germany. Besides these officially registered workers, it is estimated that between 40,000 and 100,000 were working in Germany on tourist visas.⁵

Table 3 shows the distribution of Turkish workers by geographical areas within Germany. In 1971, the largest demand was in Nordrhein-Westfalen with 121,916 workers. Baden Württemberg with 84,202 and Bavaria with 71,012 workers followed. The large demand for Turkish workers in West Berlin seems also noteworthy. The reasons might be: (1) the migration of many young Germans from West Berlin to the Federal Republic of Germany and (2) the growth of the electric industry and its demand for trained workers.

Table 4 shows the distribution of Turkish workers by sectors. In 1971, about 42 per cent of all Turks were employed in the iron and metal producing industry and 15 per cent in construction. It seems interesting to note that of the 91,000 women, none were employed as domestic help, although there was and is a huge demand for this type of labour.

B. Supply of Turkish Workers

Presently, Turkish manpower stands at 15.62 million workers. Of these, 13.84 million workers are employed full- or part-time. For the remaining 1.78 million workers, it is believed that Turkey cannot even provide part-time employment. The burden of unemployment is eased by the temporary migration of 600,000 workers to other countries. The remaining 1.18 million unemployed make, in relation to the total available manpower force, an unemployment rate of 7.5 per cent.⁶

Some people believe that this official unemployment figure understates the actual situation by far. Attila Karaosmanoglu⁷ believes that if underemployment and useless employment were taken into account, the rate of actual unemployment would be brought up to 18 per cent in the non-agricultural sector and seasonally as high as 60 per cent in the agricultural sector.

In the way in which this statement was presented by the news media, it cannot be considered correct, primarily because underemployment and unemployment are basically different and because the former does not add to the latter. Y. Brenner⁸ has already pointed out that

D

TABLE 4
TURKISH WORKERS EMPLOYED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Sectors	June 30									
	1963	1964	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971		
Agriculture	247	597	1,269	1,525	1,061	1,704	2,467	4,307		
Coal-Mining	1,716	8,274	9,154	5,991	4,462	6,465	12,427	18,059		
Other Mining	485	2,927	6,338	5,643	5,058	6,990	9,624	12,373		
Iron and Metal Producing Industries	13,088	25,382	61,497	49,702	55,366	91,901	147,864	177,574		
Construction Industry	4,564	16,125	29,038	23,896	22,379	32,839	49,827	67,704		
Textile and Clothing Industry	2,176	3,912	15,568	14,148	15,791	23,790	32,459	39,556		
Other Manufacturing Industry	2,387	5,614	21,105	19,901	20,479	31,422	47,182	63,446		
Transportation	207	2,489	3,950	3,640	3,235	4,275	6,889	9,668		
Domestic Services	24	44	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Other Services	352	751	2,461	3,102	2,876	3,709	5,459	9,300		
Trade, Banking and Insurance	540	968	2,965	3,471	3,111	4,082	6,083	10,576		
Public Sector	1,358	2,128	4,633	6,062	5,518	5,774	7,704	11,811		
Total	27,144	69,211	157,978	137,081	139,336	212,951	327,985	424,374		
Women (incl. in Total)	2,977	6,931	26,125	25,389	30,169	46,997	72,036	91,365		

Source: Der Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung No. IIc Bonn, August 9, 1971.

Unemployment, or even partial unemployment, should never be confused with under-employment. The former describes a situation in which workers and other resources cannot find profitable utilization. The latter describes employment with low productivity. The former is concerned with the number of people who are unemployed; the latter with the productivity of their labour.

While the unemployed can migrate abroad without any direct effect to the Turkish economy, a migration of those underemployed workers will affect the Turkish economy.

The 1.18 million unemployed and the 150,000 workers who year by year enter the non-agricultural sector but cannot find a job will result in a labour surplus for some time. However, the quantity alone is only part of the problem; the quality of its migrating labour force seems to be an even greater one. Turkey, with 34 per cent, contributes the highest percentage of trained workers (measured by German standards). Whether Turkey is able to send even more trained workers in the future seems questionable. This is true because of the domestic requirements and the limited training facilities.

Table 5 shows the geographical regions from which Turkish workers come. In 1971, most of them came from West Anatolia, followed by the Ankara and Istanbul regions.

In September 1971, more than 1.2 million Turkish workers were registered with the local Turkish labour bureaus for employment in Germany. At the Istanbul recruitment office of the Federal Republic of Germany it is believed that workers with special skills have to wait up to two years on the average before they can expect to be even considered for employment. For workers without special skills the waiting period can be five years and more.

C. Turkish Labour Market

While on the supply side future development seems to indicate excess supply, on the demand side the situation seems to be more complicated.


Graph 1 shows Germany's prospective total demand for non-specialized and specialized workers. Both of those categories are then further divided into the projected demand for German and non-German workers.

The forecast is divided into three phases. In phase I, the short run, the German Bundeswirtschaftsministerium (Ministry of Economic Affairs) expects that the total demand for labour will remain nearly constant between 1968 and 1972 ($AO = A' O'$). In this phase, the demand for non-specialized workers takes a greater share than that for specialized workers. This is due to the fact that phase I can be seen as a period of preparation for industrial expansion and automation. The large number of non-specialized workers may be expected in construction and other preparatory engagements. The total demand for non-specialized workers is expected to decrease slightly from AC to $A' C'$. Since the supply of German non-specialized workers decreases at a higher rate (BC to $B' C'$)

TABLE 5
REGIONS OF ORIGIN OF NEWLY RECRUITED TURKISH WORKERS IN GERMANY

Region of Origin	1970		1969		1968	
	Absolute Number	Per cent	Absolute Number	Per cent	Absolute Number	Per cent
Istanbul and European Part of Turkey	20,445	21.4	19,949	20.3	9,953	24.0
Ankara and Central Anatolia	21,951	22.9	23,383	23.8	9,536	23.0
North Anatolia	15,977	16.7	15,790	16.1	5,983	14.4
West Anatolia	25,337	26.5	23,382	23.8	8,161	19.7
East Anatolia	4,090	4.3	7,797	8.0	4,095	9.9
South Anatolia	7,885	8.2	7,840	8.0	3,722	9.0
Total	95,685	100.0	98,142	100.0	41,450	100.0

Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer 1970*. Nürnberg, August 25, 1971, p. 27



Sources: Y.S. Brenner, Agriculture and the Economic Development of Low Income Countries. The Hague, Paris 1970, pp. 9-11; 139 ff.
 Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, op. cit., p. 16.

The graph is not drawn to scale.

than the total demand for non-specialized workers (AC to $A' C'$), industry needs to employ foreign workers. The decrease in the number of non-specialized German workers is due to the fact that an increasing number of them can be expected to receive more training enabling them eventually to enter the specialized worker group. In the field of specialized workers, total demand increases at a moderate rate from CO to $C' O'$. The increasing demand for specialized workers can only be partly satisfied by German workers entering from the non-specialized sector, the rest has to be made up by foreign workers.

In phase II, which may last up to the mid-seventies, it is expected that the total demand for labour will decrease slightly from $A' O'$ to $A'' O''$. This phase can be characterized as a period in which the necessary preparations for expansion and automation are completed. This has the result that the demand for non-specialized workers will considerably decline ($A' C'$ to $A'' C''$), while the demand for specialized workers will increase at an even faster rate than in phase I. This is due to the fact that more specialized workers are needed to operate the greater number of machines which were prepared in phase I. It may be assumed that the greater part of trainable German workers out of the non-specialized group has been trained in phase I. Consequently, the share of non-specialized German workers in the labour force will be constant ($B' C' = B'' C''$). The decrease in the total demand for non-specialized workers together with a constant German labour force available will result in a decreasing demand for non-specialized foreign workers ($A' B'$ to $A'' B''$). In the field of specialized workers, the growing demand can only be partly satisfied by German workers. It may therefore be assumed that foreign workers will be hired to satisfy the demand.

In phase III, basically, the development that started in phase II will continue. The demand for non-specialized foreign workers decreases further, but with a lower rate, while the demand for specialized workers tends to increase over time.

Essentially, the developments in the foreign labour market are also forecast by the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft. Table 6 shows Germany's expected demand for foreign workers.

For Turkey these developments in Germany's prospective demand for foreign labour may indicate that fewer unskilled workers will be wanted. To a degree this decline in demand for unskilled workers may be compensated by a growing demand for specialized workers. The problem which then arises is whether or not Turkey is willing and able to meet these changes. If it does so it can expect to hold, or possibly even improve its position in the German foreign labour market.

MIGRATION OF TURKISH WORKERS TO GERMANY: IMPACT ON BOTH ECONOMIES

If Turkey and Germany were within a perfectly competitive market system, the classical Theory of Comparative Advantages could be em-

TABLE 6
EXPECTED DEMAND FOR FOREIGN LABOUR IN GERMANY, 1972 TO 1985

<i>Year</i>	<i>Expected Demand for Foreign Workers (in mill.)</i>	<i>Expected Trend Variations</i>
1972	2.2	—
1975	2.180 1.996 2.088	Upper Lower Middle
1980	2.513 2.049 2.282	Upper Lower Middle
1985	2.843 2.078 2.460	Upper Lower Middle

Source: Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, *Perspektiven des Wirtschaftswachstums in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis zum Jahre 1985* (Perspectives of Economic Growth in the Federal Republic of Germany), in *Vierteljahresbericht III*, 1970, p. 16.

ployed. The well-known theory postulates that it is advantageous for two countries to specialize in the production of the goods that use the relatively more abundant production factor. For Germany this would mean a specialization in capital-intensive goods, while Turkey would have to specialize in labour-intensive goods. Total output of both countries together could be increased further, if production factors were transferred to the country with the higher factor productivity. However, Turkey and Germany do not exist within a perfectly competitive market system. The effects of labour migration are more complex than just an increase in the combined total output of Turkey and Germany.

A. Impact on the German Economy

There is a great volume of literature on the effects of Turkish and other labour migration to Germany. Most authors regard migration as positive for the German economy.

Joseph Stingl,⁹ President of the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit pointed out that with about 2,000,000 workers from foreign countries employed, people are obviously beginning to ask questions about their economic value. To answer this it can clearly be pointed out that they are a great gain for the Federal Republic of Germany in the economic and social-political sense. Without their help Germany's economic growth would have been slower. Their work is a necessity for the labour market.

Helmut Jelden¹⁰ believed that without sufficient foreign labour a yearly increase in the GNP of greater than 3 per cent was not possible in the long run.

Both authors see only one side of the problem. Foreign workers apparently have advantages for the German economy but they also have disadvantages. To look at the problem as objectively as possible, the following hypotheses ought to be examined:

It is advantageous for the German economy to employ Turkish and other foreign workers, because (1) it increases wealth in Germany, (2) it keeps wages and prices relatively stable, and (3) it helps to maintain full employment.

These propositions do not cover all the possible effects of labour migration, but they may be the most important ones.

1. *Wealth*¹¹

The effect of foreign workers on wealth might be two-fold. First, they might help to raise Germany's stock of goods, and secondly, their presence might increase the level of education and training. While all scholars reject the second point, they disagree on the first point.


If a change in wealth is assumed to be identical to a change in growth national product, in the German case an increase in the foreign labour force will help to maintain or even increase the growth rate of the GNP. This is due to the fact that a larger number of workers increase the total output. The increase in total output can be seen as identical with an increase in total wealth of the nation, yet by increasing the number of workers, the wealth *per capita* might have decreased. If the wealth of the individual or the increase in the *per capita* GNP is considered as a measuring stick for the advantages of foreign workers to the German economy, foreign labour will only be an advantage if their average labour productivity is higher than the average German labour productivity.

Carl Föhl¹² used an equation system to prove that labour productivity, given a purely German labour force, would be larger than labour productivity given a mixed foreign-German labour force. He argued that, without foreign workers, new private investments would have the effect that old companies would be abandoned by the workers. Attracted by higher wages they would move to the new companies. Higher wages become feasible if it is assumed that labour productivity is larger in the new industries than in the old ones. However, if foreign workers were to be employed, industry might hire them to continue the operation of the old industries. Thereby, total labour productivity would decline.

In case of a gross investment, graph 2 shows Föhl's result as a functional relationship between the percentage of foreign workers to domestic workers employed and the percentage of decrease in labour productivity due to the employment of foreign workers. The function has to be read in such a way that an increase in the ratio of foreign workers to domestic workers results in a decline of the average labour productivity, expressed as a rise in the percentage of that decline. If Föhl's idea is assumed to be correct, the present share of 10 per cent foreign workers would have depressed labour productivity by 9.09 per cent in Germany.

Graph 2
Employment of Foreign Workers and the Impact on
Labour Productivity

percentage of decrease
in labour productivity
due to the employment
of foreign workers



Source: Carl Föhl, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

These findings are of course only valid under the given assumptions: two economic situations are compared with each other, one with and the other without foreign workers. Given foreign workers, it is assumed there is a tendency for older industries which are operating with low labour productivities to be kept going. The result must therefore be modified if labour productivity is the same in both new and old industries, if technological disadvantages in the old industries are compensated by better working attitudes of foreign workers, and if the new investment is not a replacement of an old industry but an expansion which leads to economies of large scale production.

Christoph Rosenmöller¹³ questions Föhl's findings. He believes that the problem has to be seen from a global point of view. Foreign workers would have a positive impact on wealth if we take into consideration that they increase labour mobility and that they bring advantages to their home country.

It has to be admitted that in Föhl's model full labour mobility is assumed and this is not actually found in reality. Still, it cannot be said that foreign workers necessarily increase labour mobility. It is true that with their first coming, labour mobility increases but as soon as they are settled at a place the advantage of their mobility is gone. By contract, they have to stay with one company for a year or two. It is easier to agree with Rosenmöller's second point, that the effects of labour migration on the foreign workers' home country are important, but this is a different problem and has little impact on Germany's wealth.

Werher Steinjan¹⁴ used a simplified input-output analysis to show the impact of labour migration on the wealth of the economy. He assumed that the foreign workers' share in the GNP is equal to that of the German workers', namely 20,000 DM per year.¹⁵ To find their contribution to the increase in wealth (*Beitrag zur Wohlstandssteigerung*) he subtracts from this amount their expenditures for consumption, the various costs of social security, and the transfer payments to their home countries. The residual of approximately 7,000 DM, he calls foreign worker's contribution to wealth. However, this contribution is obtained at a cost. If it is assumed that the average capital needs per working place are about 50,000 DM (this is a very conservative estimate taking into consideration that the investment can be as high as 1 million DM in the chemical industry), and the investment *per capita* for schooling, housing, and transportation totals to about 100,000 DM, it will take quite a number of years before foreign workers will actually bring full benefit to Germany's economy.

As a result it seems reasonable that Turkish and other foreign workers increase wealth as long as this can be seen as an increase in the GNP. If the increase in wealth is considered to be an increase in the *per capita* GNP, it seems questionable whether foreign workers will bring an increase. Since the use of the *per capita* GNP seems to be a more reasonable approach to describe the change in wealth, it can be concluded that foreign workers do not increase Germany's wealth.

2. Wage and Price Stabilization

The impact of labour migration on wage-price stability can be seen as two alternative possibilities: (1) A growing labour supply keeps wages down. This would increase price stability. (2) The greater number of foreign workers inflates the demand for goods and services. This tends to raise prices, which are in turn an indicator for labour unions to demand higher wages.

In economic analysis it is one of the fundamentals that the cost of labour is determined by demand and supply. In general, an increase in the supply of labour would tend to decrease the cost of labour. Yet, for the German labour market, and other markets, this model cannot be employed due to the downward inflexibility of wages and the unions' ability to ask for and obtain wage increases regardless of the demand and supply situation.

Table 7 seems to indicate that changes in the recruitment of foreign workers do not seem to influence the behaviour of wages. Between 1962

TABLE 7
WAGE, FOREIGN WORKERS, AND PRICE DEVELOPMENTS, 1962 TO 1971

Year	I		II		III	
	Wages ¹		Foreign Workers ²		Cost of Living ³	
	Index (%)	Change of Index	Index (%)	Change of Index	Index (%)	Change of Index
1962	100		100.0		100.0	
		+ 7		+16.4		+3.0
1963	107		116.4		103.0	
		+ 7		+22.1		+2.4
1964	114		138.5		105.4	
		+ 8		+32.5		+3.6
1965	122		171.0		109.0	
		+ 9		+13.6		+3.8
1966	131		184.6		122.8	
		+ 7		-45.3		+1.6
1967	138		139.3		114.4	
		+ 6		+13.8		+1.7
1968	144		153.1		116.1	
		+ 9		+57.9		+3.2
1969	153		211.0		119.3	
		+19		+63.0		
1970	172		274.0			
		+24		+40.8		
1971	196		314.8			

1. OECD, *Main Economic Indicators: Germany*. March 1972, p. 78; *Ibid.*, June 1968, p. 76. (All figures changed to the base 1962 = 100.)

2. Calculated from Table 2 to the base September 30, 1962.

3. Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Wiesbaden, 1970.

and 1966, a growing number of foreign workers entered the country, yet, wages increased more and more. If we exclude the 1966/1967 depression, between 1968 and 1972, it again seems as if more workers could not halt the wage demands. From column II and III of the same table it may be concluded that an outflow of foreign workers did relieve inflationary pressure but, in general, it seems much more likely that additional foreign workers ‘overheat’ the economy and lead to price increases.

This leads to the conclusion that the hoped-for stabilization effect of the employment of foreign workers is illusory. More foreign workers employed do not seem to keep wages down, but on the contrary they seem to ‘overheat’ the economy, which leads to an increase in the cost of living which in turn is the signal for unions to demand higher wages.

3. Full Employment

It is one of the declared economic aims of the Federal Republic of Germany to seek ‘full’ employment. While during boom periods this aim is easily obtainable, during recessions it may create some problems.

TABLE 8
 QUALIFICATION AND USE OF QUALIFICATION OF FOREIGN WORKERS*

Type of Jobs	<i>Qualified Training at Home</i>							
	<i>Turks</i>		<i>Italians</i>		<i>Greeks</i>		<i>Jugoslavs</i>	
	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Non-specialized	32	19	87	66	69	36	57	38
Specialized	68	81	13	34	31	64	43	62

*All figures in per cent.

Source: Gerhard Welbers, 'Arbeit und Beruf' (Work and Job), in *Leben als Gastarbeiter. Gegluckte und Missgluckte Integration* (Life as Foreign Worker. Successful and Unsuccessful Integration.) Ed. Karl Bingemer, Edeltrud Meistermann-Seeger, Eberhard Neubert. Cologne and Opladen, 1970, p. 93.

Some students of the subject believe that foreign workers are an ideal safety valve against domestic unemployment in periods of recession. There are two reasons that make this view questionable: (1) foreign workers have contracts lasting two to four years; (2) a decrease in the number of foreign workers results in a decrease in demand which in turn creates more unemployment.

Wilhelm Weidenbörner points out that foreign workers are treated as equals with German workers. This is also true for dismissals, which is the relevant point in recessions. Most Turkish workers recruited through the official recruitment office of the Federal Republic of Germany in Istanbul, have contracts over a certain time. These contracts cannot be cancelled at will. In general, it can be said that during recessions such contracts are more protective than the period of notice granted by law for German workers.¹⁶

The statistics show that during the 1966/1967 recession the number of foreign workers decreased by 322,000. The decrease resulted from the hiring of fewer additional workers, from the discontinuing of old contracts, and in some cases, from the foreign workers' own decisions to return home. Can it now be argued from this that a reduction in the labour force helped Germany to keep domestic unemployment at a low level? Probably not. It is much more likely that the departure of foreign workers in fact accelerated the recession. The reason was the decrease in demand. Unemployed German workers get unemployment insurance which they spend mainly for consumption. Foreign workers whose contracts expire do not get unemployment benefits. They leave for their home countries, and consumption decreases abruptly. The decrease in consumption accelerates the recession with the effect that more workers will become unemployed. Who can be dismissed? Mainly German workers who are only protected by the dismissal notice granted by law. It may be concluded that foreign workers do not necessarily help to maintain full employment.

4. *Other Aspects*

Besides the above mentioned impact, there are a number of smaller and less important effects. Foreign workers, with their contributions to social security, help Germany to master the so-called 'pension mountain'. This point should not give the impression that Germany is getting something for nothing. Today's payments from foreign workers finance the pensions of the aged. Due to World War II, Germany's share of aged people will increase in the next five to ten years. Present labour, with their contributions, has to carry the burden. Since foreign workers are also paying social security, they are also helping to carry the burden. If foreign workers are paying social security for a certain time, later their pensions will be paid for by a future generation of German workers.

As a burden for the German economy the growing cost for infrastructure due to foreign workers and their families has to be mentioned. More schools, more housing, more hospitals, etc. are needed to meet the demand of foreign workers. Up to now these costs have not been estimated.

Another negative effect of foreign workers on the German economy might be their influence on technological progress. Without foreign workers the German industry faces a severe labour shortage. This labour shortage can be seen as a driving element for technological progress. With foreign workers so easily obtainable, industry will employ them instead of searching for new labour-saving methods of production.

B. *Impact on the Turkish Economy*

Carl Föhl¹⁷ pointed out that labour migration can only be justified as aid to the less developed world because through migration its workers get additional training. The training together with their savings might help the migrant workers to start a business after their return.

Christoph Rosenmöller¹⁸ agrees with Föhl's idea and adds that the workers do not just get additional training, but they also become industry-adapted.

Besides these, there are other possible effects of labour migration on the Turkish economy. Therefore, to draw a more complete picture, the following hypotheses will be tested: It is advantageous for the Turkish economy to let workers go abroad for employment, because (1) they get professional training, (2) they earn foreign exchange, (3) the domestic unemployment rate is reduced, (4) Turkey's wealth increases, and (5) it reduces social and economic conflicts.

1. *Professional Training*

In 1971, 452,700 Turkish workers were employed in Germany. About 34 per cent of them had received qualified training in Turkey.¹⁹ Of these skilled workers, 68 per cent found employment in jobs requiring specialized training. Of the 66 per cent that had no original training in Turkey, 81 per cent found employment in jobs requiring specialized training. The last group undoubtedly received some training in Germany to qualify for specialized jobs. However, the first mentioned group, too, required

training to adjust itself to more advanced industries. Altogether it can be assumed that about 350,000 workers got additional training. This, provided the workers actually return to Turkey, is an investment in human capital by which Germany contributed to the Turkish economy.

The transfer in human capital will be even greater, if the new joint programme²⁰ for expatriated workers is implemented. For this programme a joint fund of T£11.5 million (\$821,000) has been set up. The main points of the programme are:

1. *Aim:*
To train a large number of Turkish workers in their fields of profession for middle management positions.
2. *Prerequisites:*
 - (a) Willingness of workers to return to Turkey.
 - (b) Training as a craftsman.
 - (c) Industrial experience – at least two years in Germany.
 - (d) A good knowledge of the German language.
3. *Programme:*
It is divided into two parts, a technical one in Germany and an administrative one in Turkey. The first part lasts nine months, the second one three months.

There can be little doubt about the fact that Turkish workers get some additional training if they migrate to Germany. Yet, it is an open question how much use Turkey can, and does, actually make of these transfers of human capital.

TABLE 9
WORKERS' REMITTANCES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TURKISH BALANCE OF FOREIGN PAYMENTS

Year	Workers' Remittances ¹ (mill. \$)	Share of all Remittances on Turkey's Imports ¹ (%)	Remittances transferred from Germany 12 = 3.60 DM (mill. \$)
1964	8.1	—	—
1965	69.8	11.2	—
1966	115.3	16.0	97
1967	93.0	14.3	83
1968	107.3	14.4	97
1969	140.6	17.6	153
1970	273.0	28.8	247
1971	490 (estimate)*	—	440 (estimate)*

1. Union of Commerce, *Economic News Digest*, No. 18, July 1, 1971.

2. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer 1970* (Foreign Workers 1970), *Beschäftigung, Anwerbung, Vermittlung – Erfahrungsbericht 1970 – (Jobs, Recruitment, Arrangement – Report of Experience 1970)*. Nürnberg, August 25, 1971.

*Estimate for 1971 added by author. Exchange rate: 1\$ = 3.10 DM.

According to the OECD Working Party, set up by the Manpower and Social Affairs Committee, most returning workers do not go into jobs appropriate to their skills or at least the specialized training they got abroad. Most of them go into small-scale crafts or services as taxi or dolmush driver.²¹ There are two main reasons for this: (1) on their return the workers find a top-heavy economic structure in which the seniority principle is dominant. In such an economy, for the returning worker there are no incentives for progress and development, since upper positions are already overstaffed and advancement mainly depends on the age of a person and on the time he has been with the company; (2) Turkey's industry is technically not well enough equipped to make full use of the skills of the returning workers.

2. Foreign Exchange

Table 9 shows Turkish workers' foreign exchange remittances and their contribution to the balance of payments. In 1970, \$273 million were sent home by Turkish workers. Without question this is an important aid to Turkey's balance of payments, as it covers 75.8 per cent of Turkey's total foreign trade deficit. Of the \$273 million, about \$247 million were transferred from Germany.

It is estimated that Turkish workers have about \$300 million in savings accounts in Germany. To attract these savings, the Turkish government took a number of special measures:

- (1) It established a workers' investment bank with the status of a government enterprise.
- (2) Workers with foreign exchange were permitted to make transfers to any foreign country.
- (3) Deposits in foreign exchange accounts are subject to interest in foreign exchange at a rate of 9 per cent.²²
- (4) Depositors who keep their deposits for at least three years were allowed²³ to import an automobile or other equipment needed for their trade up to a value of 20 per cent of their foreign exchange account.²⁴

To some extent these measures were successful. In 1971, the remittances rose from \$273 million to \$490 million.

The remittances may have a positive effect on the Turkish economy if they help to overcome the 'physical' development constraints Turkey is facing, mainly in agriculture. Table 10 shows Turkey's imports of commodities. In 1970 (1969), total imports of commodities had a value of \$948 million (\$801 million). These amounts were used up for the import of basic materials \$532 million (\$425 million), investment goods \$287 million (\$299 million), and consumer goods \$129 million (\$77 million). The fact that a large part of the imports were either consumer goods or basic materials cannot necessarily be used as an argument against foreign workers' remittances. Without the remittances it could be assumed that

about as many consumer goods and basic materials would be imported at the expense of the import of investment goods.

Foreign workers' remittances might have a negative effect in the sense that they might contribute to Turkey's inflation. The reason for the inflationary pressure is the increased demand, due to the transferred remittances, that is not met by domestic or foreign goods. By the use of a licence system, foreign imports are restricted from entering Turkey's domestic market, and therefore some of Turkey's inflation can be attributed to the inflow of workers' remittances.

3. Unemployment

About 600,000 Turks left Turkey to seek employment in Germany and other countries of Western Europe. In Turkey it is a commonly-used

TABLE 10
TURKISH IMPORTS: COMMODITIES
(thousands of dollars)

	1969	1970
Cattle	14·423	7·334
Coffee, tea, spices	2·128	4·066
Wheat	32·264	74·021
Fats and oils	4·954	6·547
Mineral fuels	60·848	66·666
Chemical goods	64·675	74·534
Organic fertilizers	52·011	31·362
Paints	13·953	
Photo	16·535	
Plastic materials	16·930	13*
Rubber and products	14·884	11*
Leather	2·243	
Wood	894	
Paper	21·775	15·039
Clothing	38·370	37·184
Cement	8·957	
Ore	76·806	
Ordinary metal products	6·649	
Machinery, electrical equipment	224·022	274·182
Transportation equipment	86·036	112·690
Optic	15·111	17·270
Others	26·758	
Total	801·226	948*
Basic Materials	425	532*
Investment Goods	299	287*
Consumer Goods	77	129*

Source: Ödemeler Dengesi El Kitabı ve Türkiye'nin Ödemeler Dengesi Rakkamları, 1950-1970, (Balance of Payments Manual and Balance of Payments Figures of Turkey, 1950-1970). Ankara, 1971.

*OECD, *Economic Surveys: Turkey*. Paris, January 1972, p. 44.

argument that these workers reduce the volume of unemployed. This is correct as far as unskilled workers are concerned. Their jobs – if they had jobs – can be filled by others out of the million or more unemployed. However, as soon as trained workers leave Turkey, this is not necessarily so. In Germany alone there are more than 150,000 trained workers from Turkey. Their migration left job openings for skilled labour in Turkey. In many cases it was not possible to find workers equally well trained to fill these vacancies. Most speakers at a recent UNIDO²⁵ meeting agreed with this observation. They pointed to Turkey's needs for skilled labour and to the problem of labour that is leaving, mainly for Germany, as soon as it is skilled. It can be concluded that labour migration in these cases cannot relieve the burden of unemployment. Since Germany's future needs will be for more skilled workers, the impact of Turkish labour migration will be less of a relief of domestic unemployment.


Yugoslavia was in a situation similar to Turkey's some years ago. A large number of skilled workers were seeking employment abroad. This migration retarded industrial development. Today, the government of Yugoslavia restricts the migration of skilled labour but encourages the migration of unskilled workers.

4. Turkey's Wealth

Table 9 shows that in 1971 Turkish workers' remittances transferred from Germany to Turkey were about \$440 million. On a per worker basis, each worker transferred about \$970 per year.²⁶ This amount may be considered as each worker's contribution to Turkey's wealth. However, the full amount should not be considered as gain for the economy. Opportunity cost has also to be taken into consideration. If the Turkish worker had stayed in Turkey and had employment, his contribution to wealth might have been \$500. One might conclude that the difference of \$470 is Turkey's gain per migrant worker. Yet, this result overlooks the derived effects. Migration may decrease agricultural production and may change labour productivity.

Graph 3 shows the path of Turkey's long-run expected growth. It is assumed that total output along this path is produced by two sectors, agriculture and industry. In the early phase of development (0 to 0), economic growth is expected to be about 1 per cent. In the second phase (0 to 0), the expected growth rate increases. Since this is a period of industrial preparation, the share of agricultural goods on total production increases in absolute and relative terms. This result is due to the fact that the developing industry demands from agriculture additional inputs plus the fact that consumers change their diets to more protein food. Phase III can be seen as the take-off period of industry. Production of agricultural goods still increases but with a decreasing rate. Industry takes the lead in the further development. Along this growth path labour productivity in agriculture changes. While in phase I one worker in agriculture produces food for about $2\frac{1}{2}$ additional people, in phase II the ratio is about $1:3\frac{1}{4}$, and in phase III it will increase to 1:16.


Graph 3
Turkey's Expected Growth Path



Turkey's economy cannot be assumed to be at a certain point on this growth path, since the development of the different geographical regions differs considerably. Central and East Anatolia, the least developed areas in Turkey, may be considered to be at the end of phase I; North and South Anatolia in phase II; West Anatolia and the Istanbul region may be in the early stages of phase III

In 1971, 54 per cent of the workers who migrated to Germany came from North, South, Central and East Anatolia.²⁷ Besides international migration, the rural labour force of these regions was further reduced by internal migration to industrial centres and urban areas. A result of this migration might be a decrease in agricultural production.

Graph 4 shows the seasonal demand and the supply of labour in agriculture of the less developed areas in Turkey. If it is assumed that total agricultural output is a direct function of the amount of labour available in the fall, a migration of agricultural workers away from these regions will



cause farmers to decrease the total area under cultivation, and this decreases total output. Yet, Turkey's expected growth path for these regions indicates that an increase in agricultural production is a prerequisite for more development. The negative effects of labour migration on Turkey's agricultural production might decrease if some of the workers' remittances are used to import labour-saving machinery for agriculture. As a side effect, this would also have the advantage of reducing seasonal underemployment in agriculture.

5. *Reduction of Social and Economic Conflicts*

Presently, Turkey is an associate member in the Common Market. This type of membership was granted to give Turkey time to adjust itself to the social and economic standards of the other member countries. The migration of Turkish workers may be considered an advantage for Turkey if it results in a reduction of social and economic conflicts.

Turkish migrant workers have great difficulties when they first enter Germany. Frequently, they come from a rural job with a very limited scope. They had only primary education and little or no vocational training. Some of the main problems they face when they change from an artisan economy to an industrialized one are the loss of the 'greater family' as a source of security, and a change in desirable aims.²⁸

There are several studies²⁹ suggesting ways by which foreign workers can adapt to and integrate into an industrial society. Hermann Ernst³⁰ suggests four points that will make integration more smooth: (1) Foreign workers should learn the German language; (2) German agencies should make sure that foreign workers are supplied with modern and hygienic housing; (3) Families should follow as soon as possible; and, (4) Foreign workers' children should get proper schooling. Table 11 shows the amounts German federal and state agencies are spending to realize these requirements. As a result of this, foreign workers become more or less adapted to life in Germany, and consequently an increasing number settle permanently. For those who return to Turkey, the time in Germany has unquestionably influenced their attitudes and behaviour. This can have positive as well as negative effects on the Turkish economy.

On the positive side returning workers help their fellow workers at home to adapt to more industrialization. This adaptation may, however, start too early, and lead the country into a revolutionary situation. In Turkey it seems as if migration to Germany has become one of the main hopes for

TABLE 11
BUDGET OF DIFFERENT GERMAN AGENCIES FOR THE INTEGRATION OF FOREIGN WORKERS
(in 1,000 DM)

<i>Agency</i>	1966– 1968	1969	1970	1971	<i>Total</i>
Federal Budget (without money for help in construction of housing)	9,860	4,050	6,670	10,150	30,730
Sum of State Budgets	3,236	2,112	3,000	5,072	13,420
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit	4,040	1,600	2,800	2,800	11,240
Total	17,136	7,762	12,470	18,022	55,390

Source: Werner Kottusch, 'Was wird für die Eingliederung ausländischer Arbeitnehmer aufgewendet?' (How much is spent for the integration of foreign workers?), in: *Bundesarbeitsblatt* 7/8 *op. cit.*, p. 496.

Turkish workers. In several interviews, Turkish workers pointed out that they do not see any hope for progress in their present jobs, but that their situation would change as soon as they leave for employment in Germany. It seems as if many Turkish workers have lost their belief in the Turkish economy. It often happens that young people leave their homes and apprenticeships in the hope of increasing their chances of getting to Germany as unskilled workers.

CONCLUSION

It was the aim of this paper to show the impact of Turkish labour migration on the German and Turkish economies. After a discussion of the market situation for Turkish workers, the effects of migration on both economies were tested by using two hypotheses.

The first hypothesis assumed that it is an advantage for the German economy to employ Turkish and other foreign workers. This hypothesis could not be found to be true. Although the migration of foreign workers possibly increases Germany's GNP, it seems questionable that the wealth, measured as GNP *per capita*, will increase. The hoped-for effect that labour migration will stabilize wages and prices, and help to maintain full employment, could not be found valid. Except for the advantages Germany gets out of the foreign workers' social security payments, the still unknown cost of infra-structure and the loss in technological development seems to be reason enough to question the overall advantages of foreign workers to the Germany economy.

The second hypothesis assumed that labour migration is an advantage for the Turkish economy. It was found that the migration of Turkish workers results in a transfer to human capital from Germany to Turkey. Unfortunately, Turkey so far does not fully exploit this additional training. The remittances of Turkish workers may be an advantage for the Turkish economy if they help to overcome the physical development constraints Turkey is facing mainly in agriculture. The assumption that labour migration reduces domestic unemployment seems to be only valid for unskilled workers leaving the country. With respect to Turkey's wealth it seems as if migration adds about \$470 per migrant worker per year. Yet, this will only create a long-run advantage, if some of the remittances are used for investments in the agricultural field to increase labour productivity and in that way secure economic development mainly in Central, East, North, and South Anatolia. Social and economic conflict will be reduced by labour migration, but adjustments should not come too fast, since it might lead to a revolution. Overall, migration of workers brings advantages for the Turkish economy. However, it seems as if these advantages, because of the way they are used, will not have long-lasting effects on Turkey's economic development.

NOTES

1. Carl Föhl, 'Stabilisierung und Wachstum bei Einsatz von Gastarbeitern' (Stabilization and growth using foreign workers); in *Kyklos*, Vol. 20, 1967, pp. 119-146.
2. For books and articles for further reference see the bibliography.
3. Hermann Ernst, 'Mit der Beschäftigung allein ist es nicht getan' (Employment only is not enough) in *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik* (Foreign workers in the Federal Republic). Sonderdruck aus *Bundesarbeitsblatt* No. 4/1970 (reprint from *Bundesarbeitsblatt*), Der Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Bonn, 1970, p. 1.
4. E. Tuchtfeldt, 'Das Problem der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte in der Schweiz' (Problems of foreign workers in Switzerland), in *Wirtschaftswoche*, No. 12, 1965, p. 643.
5. Union of Chambers of Commerce, *Economic News Digest*. No. 18, Ankara, July 1, 1971.
6. The Undersecretary of the Ministry of Labour, Press Conference in Ankara, in *Economic News Digest*, No. 28, Ankara, December 1, 1971.
7. Attila Karaosmanoglu, in *Daily News*, Ankara, November 25, 1971.
8. Yehojachin Brenner, 'Problems of Under-employment in West Africa', in *Africa Quarterly*, No. 2, July-September 1965, p. 106.
9. Joseph Stingl, 'Das Problem der Gastarbeiter' (The problem of foreign workers), in *Auslandskurier*, No. 5, Schwäbisch Hall, October 1970, p. 1.
10. Helmut Jelden, 'Wenn die ausländischen Arbeitnehmer zurückkehren' (When foreign workers return), in *Auslandskurier*, *op. cit.* p. 36.
11. Wealth is defined as the sum of all goods existing and the level of education and training of a certain nation at a particular time. As more meaningful indicator of an economy's potential, the term 'wealth' is used to mean wealth per capita.
12. Carl Föhl, *op. cit.*, pp. 127 ff.
13. Christoph Rosenmöller, 'Volkswirtschaftliche Aspekte der Ausländerbeschäftigung' (Macro-economic aspects in the employment of foreign workers), in *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer in der B.R.D.*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
14. Werner Steinjan, 'Beschäftigungskurve sollte allmählich abflachen' (Increase in the employment curve should slowly flatten out), in *Auslandskurier*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
15. With this assumption, it seems as if the result overstates the advantages of foreign workers.
16. Wilhelm Weidenböner, 'Beschäftigung ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland' (Employment of foreign workers in the F.R. of G.), in *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer in der BRD*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
17. Carl Föhl, *op. cit.*, p. 145.
18. Christoph Rosenmöller, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.
19. Compare Table 8.
20. Vereinbarung der Regierung der Türkischen Republik und der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Agreement between the government of Turkish Republic and the government of the Federal Republic of Germany). Technische und Berufliche Aus- und Fortbildung Türkischer Gastarbeiter in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Technical and professional training of Turkish workers in the F.R. of G.). Signed provisionally in Munich, June 15, 1971.
21. *OECD Observer*, No. 47. Paris, August 1970.
22. Union of Chambers of Commerce, *op. cit.*, No. 18.
23. Only the permission to import is granted, but no duty reduction.
24. Union of Chambers of Commerce, *op. cit.*, No. 15.
25. UNIDO Meeting. Ankara, January 10-15, 1972.
26. On the average, all foreign workers transferred from Germany \$850 per worker.
27. Compare Table 5.
28. Elie Dimitras, 'International Migration', in *Adaptation of Rural and Foreign Workers to Industry. International Joint Seminar*. Wiesbaden, December 1963, pp. 47ff.
29. Most articles in *Bundesarbeitsblatt* 7/8, *op. cit.*, are devoted to this topic.
30. Hermann Ernst, 'Mit Beschäftigung allein ist es nicht getan' (Employment only is not enough), in *Bundesarbeitsblatt* 7/8, *op. cit.*, p. 446.

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- Ausländiskurier* No. 5, 1970, *Gastarbeiter in Deutschland*.
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